

Politics of Climate Change
Global Power Shift and New Identities

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Abstract

Stemming from an observation that global power is shifting from North to South, this research project is a critical inquiry of the global power shift through climate negotiation. Climate negotiation has been selected as a case study because of its multinational dimension. Climate negotiation is a multinational process and it requires multinational cooperation. At present, it occupies a central position in International Relations (IR). It is one of the most influential topics of IR and global politics. Climate negotiation helps us to understand current characteristics, changes and transformations in global politics. It has influenced the development narrative. In the main, climate change has made global politics more convoluted. Co-operation is necessary at the international level to cut emissions. These cuts require systemic change in global climate governance. These two issues have brought climate politics to the centre of IR. Conflict and co-operation define climate negotiations, which have been influenced by the response to climate change issues by the actors. The conflict and co-operation game provides a new position to the actors. This dissertation puts forth the hypothesis that climate negotiations are redistributing power and helping actors form new identities in power shifting process. In this power redistribution and group reconstruction process, climate politics and negotiations have indicated the appearance of a new global political order led by China and other advanced developing countries.

The central aim of this research has been to develop analytical tools to observe the power shifting process and make the appearance of new global order more visible. In order to conduct this research, this dissertation integrated the idea of Samuels Barkin's constructivist realism and power theory and developed its own typology to

examine power redistribution and the process of reconstruction. This dissertation conceives the idea that global politics is anarchic, actors struggle for power for developing the self-help system. Therefore, the typology considers power as controlling the agenda, limiting alternatives to opponent and winning negotiations to improve the self-help system.

Based on the analytical tool, this dissertation applied qualitative research methodology to collect data and analysis. Mainly, the foreign policy of actors in climate negotiations has been closely observed based on the statements, proposal and argument in different session in conferences as well as domestic policy document of actors. An intensive semi-structured qualitative interview survey has also been conducted among the negotiators from different sections such as government delegations, NGO activists, or epistemic communities. Climate negotiations are very complicated and many domestic and global issues are connected to the negotiations, therefore, this dissertation follows Sil and Katzenstein's "analytic eclecticism" to analyze collected data. Analytic eclecticism helps us construct new knowledge by combining different approaches in complicated situation.

The research findings show that power is indeed shifting. Firstly, power is shifting between different state actors. For example BASIC countries have emerged as a connecting hub among the members of the *United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)* between developed and developing countries. For instance, China is the leader of advanced developing countries by initiating many groups such as BASIC, LMDC, G77, and China. At the same time China has made many joint announcements with USA on climate negotiations as well. China, India, Brazil and South Africa, known as BASIC countries are playing a key role as the main opposition to the developed world in the negotiation process. China has been

accepted as leader of negotiating countries and China also shares the power of allied countries in its network, in particular with BASIC members. These countries are interlinked to each other and their leadership has been institutionalized by accepting proposals in decision-making process in many climate conferences. BASIC countries constitute a parallel hegemony against the US-EU hegemony on global politics.

A second finding is the emergence of knowledge based non-state actors, for example NGOs, CSOs and the epistemic community. The research project shows that power is not only shifting from state to state actors, but also from state actors to non-state actors as well. Member of NGOs, CSOs and the epistemic community are included in negotiations process and they have influence on decision-making process.

According to the research findings, this dissertation stresses two changes in global political structure. First, there is a clear indication of economic and geopolitical power shift from north to south or from developed industrialized countries to developing countries and emergence of non-state actors as separate identity in global negotiations.

Till the end of the 80s of the last century, world political groups were previously divided into two groups. One side was led by the USA and the other by the former Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, USSR. However, after the fall of the USSR, global politics reshaped into a unipolar system under US leadership and hegemonic structure. Research findings show that the global power structure is gradually restructuring by forming a multi-polar system. China, India, Brazil, and many more players are more active and making the new leadership in the global political landscape along with non-state actors.

This dissertation has mainly examined the strategy and position of state actors. It has a small section regarding non-state actors in the climate negotiations.

The concluding remarks of this dissertation address the pressing need to begin serious discussion to redefine the role of non-state actors in global politics, particularly for constructivist and realist scholarships. To that end, further study and research is required in order to figure out the role and implication of non-state actors in anarchic global politics.

Zusammenfassung

Aus der Beobachtung heraus, dass sich die globalen Machtverhältnisse von Norden nach Süden verschieben, führt dieses Forschungsprojekt eine kritische Untersuchung der globalen Machtverschiebungen durch Klimaverhandlungen durch. Die Klimaverhandlungen wurden aufgrund ihrer multinationalen Dimension als Fallstudie ausgewählt. Die Verhandlungen sind ein multinationaler Prozess und erfordern multinationale Kooperation. Im Moment nehmen sie eine zentrale Position in den Internationalen Beziehungen (IB) ein und bilden sowohl in der IB als auch in der Weltpolitik eines der einflussreichsten Themen. Klimaverhandlungen helfen uns die momentanen Charakteristiken, Veränderungen und Transformationen der Weltpolitik zu verstehen. Sie haben die Entwicklungsnarrative beeinflusst. Im Allgemeinen hat der Klimawandel die globale Politik verflochtener und komplexer gemacht hat. Um Emissionen zu verringern ist Kooperation auf internationaler Ebene nötig und die Emissionsverringern erfordert eine systematische Veränderung der globalen Klima-Governance. Durch diese zwei Problematiken ist die Klimapolitik in den Fokus der IB gerückt. Konflikt und Kooperation bestimmen Klimaverhandlungen, die durch die jeweiligen Reaktionen der Akteure auf den Klimawandel beeinflusst worden sind. Das Spiel von Konflikt und Kooperation stellt den Akteuren neue Positionen zur Verfügung. Die vorliegende Dissertation verfolgt die Hypothese, dass Klimaverhandlungen die Macht umverteilen und den Akteuren helfen im Prozess der Machtverschiebung neue Identitäten auszubilden. In diesem Prozess der Machtumverteilung und Gruppenumstrukturierung haben Klimapolitik und Klimaverhandlungen eine neue globale politische Ordnung unter der Führung Chinas und anderer Schwellenländern in Erscheinung treten lassen.

Das zentrale Ziel dieses Forschungsvorhabens ist es analytische Werkzeuge zu entwickeln, um die Machtverschiebungsprozesse zu beobachten und das Erscheinen einer neuen globalen Ordnung besser sichtbar zu machen. Zur Durchführung der Forschung verwendet die vorliegende Dissertation Samuels Barkins Idee des konstruktivistischen Realismus und seine Machttheorie und entwickelt ausgehend davon eine eigene Typologie zur Untersuchung der Machtumverteilung und des Prozesses der Restrukturierung. Hierbei folgt die Arbeit der Vorstellung, dass die internationale Politik anarchisch ist und Akteure um Macht kämpfen, um das System der Selbsthilfe zu etablieren.

Basierend auf den analytischen Werkzeugen wurde in dieser Dissertation qualitative Forschungsmethodologie zur Datenerhebung und -analyse angewendet. Die Außenpolitik der Akteure in Klimaverhandlungen wurde hauptsächlich auf der Basis von Statements, Vorschlägen und Argumenten in den verschiedenen Konferenzsitzungen sowie nationalen politischen Dokumenten der Akteure beobachtet. Darüber hinaus wurde ein intensives halbstandardisiertes Interview mit Verhandlungsführern aus verschiedenen Bereichen, wie Regierungsdelegationen, NGOs und Expertennetzwerken durchgeführt. Da Klimaverhandlungen sehr kompliziert sind und mit vielen globalen und nationalen Problematiken verknüpft sind, folgt die Dissertation dem „analytischen Eklektizismus“ von Sil und Katzenstein um die gesammelten Daten auszuwerten. Der analytische Eklektizismus ermöglicht es uns neues Wissen zu generieren in dem man in komplizierten Situationen verschiedene Ansätze kombiniert.

Die Forschungsergebnisse zeigen, dass Macht sich verschiebt. Erstens verschiebt sich die Macht zwischen staatlichen Akteuren. Beispielsweise haben sich die BASIC-Staaten in der United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

zu einem Bindeglied zwischen den Industrie- und Entwicklungsländern entwickelt. So ist z.B. China durch die Bildung von Gruppen wie BASIC, LMDC und G77&China Anführer der Schwellenländer geworden. Gleichzeitig hat China auch viele gemeinsame Statements mit den USA zu den Klimaverhandlungen abgegeben. China, Indien, Brasilien und Südafrika, bekannt als BASIC Länder, spielen in den Klimaverhandlungen eine Schlüsselrolle als größte Opposition zu den Industriestaaten. China ist als Anführer der verhandelnden Staaten akzeptiert und teilt sich außerdem die Macht mit seinen Bündnispartnern in diesem Netzwerk, besonders mit den BASIC Ländern. Diese Länder sind miteinander verbunden und ihre Führung wurde institutionalisiert, da auf vielen Klimakonferenzen ihre Vorschläge im Entscheidungsprozess akzeptiert wurden. Somit stellen die BASIC Länder eine parallele Hegemonie gegen die USA-EU Hegemonie in der globalen Politik dar.

Zweitens lässt sich das Hervortreten wissensbasierter, nichtstaatlicher Akteure wie NGOs, CSOs und Expertennetzwerke beobachten. Das Forschungsprojekt zeigt somit, dass die Macht sich nicht nur zwischen staatlichen Akteuren verschiebt, sondern auch von staatlichen zu nichtstaatlichen Akteuren. Mitglieder von NGOs, CSOs und Expertennetzwerken werden in den Verhandlungsprozess mit einbezogen und haben Einfluss auf den Entscheidungsprozess.

Basierend auf diesen Ergebnissen, hebt diese Dissertation zwei Veränderungen in der globalen politischen Struktur hervor. Erstens gibt es deutliche Hinweise auf eine wirtschaftliche und geopolitische Machtverschiebung von Nord nach Süd und von den Industrieländern hin zu den Entwicklungsländern. Zweitens entsteht durch das Aufkommen nichtstaatlicher Akteure eine separate Identität in internationalen Verhandlungen.

Bis zum Ende der 80er Jahre des letzten Jahrhunderts war die politische Welt in zwei Gruppen geteilt. Die eine Seite wurde angeführt durch die USA, die andere durch die ehemalige Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken, UdSSR. Durch den Fall der UdSSR veränderte sich die Weltordnung jedoch in ein unipolares System unter Führung der USA mit hegemonischer Struktur. Forschungsergebnisse zeigen, dass die globale Machtstruktur sich graduell zu einem multipolaren System wandelt. China, Indien, Brasilien und viele weitere sind aktiver und bilden eine neue Führung in der internationalen politischen Landschaft zusammen mit nichtstaatlichen Akteuren.

Diese Dissertation untersucht hauptsächlich die Strategie und Position staatlicher Akteure. Darüber hinaus enthält sie einen kleinen Abschnitt über nichtstaatliche Akteure in Klimaverhandlungen. Aber die Schlussfolgerungen der Dissertation weisen auf das dringende Bedürfnis hin, eine ernsthafte Debatte über die Rolle nichtstaatlicher Akteure in der globalen Politik zu führen, gerade in der konstruktivistischen und realistischen Schule. Um die Rolle und den Einfluss nichtstaatlicher Akteure in der anarchischen globalen Politik zu identifizieren ist jedoch weitere Forschung nötig.

Inhaltlicher Aufbau

Die Einführung, den Umfang der Studie, Literatur und Einschränkung der Forschung ist es im ersten Kapitel. Das zweite Kapitel wird sich intensiv mit der analytischen Diskussion auseinandersetzen. Dieses Kapitel basiert auf dem konstruktivistischen Realismus und dessen Bezug zur Macht und kombiniert diesen mit der Vorstellung von Macht. Zunächst wird der konstruktivistische Realismus in Kürze diskutiert. Nachdem die wichtigsten Charakteristika des Realismus und des Konstruktivismus vorgestellt wurden, wird erklärt wie die beiden Theorien miteinander in Verbindung stehen. Der theoretische Teil ist überwiegend auf dem konstruktivistischen Realismus von Samuel Barkin basiert. Barkin erklärt wie Realismus und Konstruktivismus trotz vieler Unterschiede kompatibel sind. Der konstruktivistische Realismus hilft uns dabei die Nähe von Machtverschiebungen zum Realismus-Konstruktivismus zu verstehen und wie Machtverschiebungen es ermöglichen die neue Identitätsbildung zu erklären.

Auch die Methodologie und das Forschungsdesign werden in diesem Kapitel erläutert. Die Forschungsmethoden basierten überwiegend auf der Analyse von Primär- und Sekundärtexten sowie halbstandardisierten Interviews. Begriffliche Erklärungen enthält wissenschaftliche Definitionen für Klimawandel, Ursachen des Klimawandels und dessen Auswirkungen auf die Erde. Unter Verwendung von wissenschaftlichen Daten und Beispielen fokussiert sich dieses Kapitel auf das Verhältnis von Politik und Klimawandel. Um das Verhältnis von Klimawandel und globaler Politik zu bestimmen wird hier außerdem das Konzept von Konflikt und Verhandlungsprozess analysiert.

Das dritte Kapitele diskutiert globale Politik, den institutionellen Rahmen und die Reaktionen auf den Klimawandel. Wie Staaten mit dem Klimawandel umgehen

und welche Maßnahmen sie ergreifen wird ebenfalls kurz behandelt. Außerdem werden in diesem Kapitel die Initiativen der Regierungen, ihre Bündnisse mit anderen Regierungen und die Bildung von Bündnissen diskutiert. Somit bietet dieses Kapitel einen Einblick in die ungeordneten Verhältnisse von Klimaverhandlungen.

Um einen Eindruck von der Geschichte des Verhandlungsprozesses zu geben enthält das dritte Kapitel auch die Genese des Klimawandels seit 1979. Der Verhandlungsprozess wurde in fünf Phasen eingeteilt – die Agenda-Setting Periode, die frühen Reaktionen (1970-1990), die prä-Kyoto-, Kyoto- und post-Kyoto-Phase. In diesem Kapitel wird der Einfluss von aufstrebenden Mächten in Klimaverhandlungen diskutiert.

Kapitel vier behandelt die Sicherheitsproblematiken unter den Hauptakteuren in Klimaverhandlungen basierend auf den Ansichten der Befragten. Energiesicherheit, wirtschaftliche Anpassung, Armutsbekämpfung und Hegemoniestreben bilden ebenfalls einen wichtigen Teil des Kapitels.

Kapitel fünf diskutiert die Forschungsergebnisse. Hier werden die Veränderungen in den Klimaverhandlungen und der Gruppendynamik unter den Akteuren erläutert. Dadurch wird erkennbar wie aufstrebende Mächte die Verhandlungen beeinflussen und die Alternativen ihrer Gegner einschränken. Die Rio Konvention, das Kyoto-Protokoll, der Fahrplan von Bali, die Kopenhagen Vereinbarung, das Paket von Cancún, das Paket von Durban, der Doha Gateway und das Klimaabkommen von Paris werden als Wendepunkte in den Verhandlungen betrachtet. Das fünfte Kapitel analysiert außerdem die Gründe für die Verlagerung und Verzögerung von Verhandlungen. Dieser Teil erweist sich als der komplizierteste, da einige Länder sehr aktiv in der Gruppenpolitik sind, gleichzeitig jedoch in den Verhandlungen auch als einzelne Akteure agieren. Indien ist beispielsweise Mitglied

von BASIC, G77, G20, LMDC und anderen Gruppen im Verhandlungsprozess, vertritt aber feste Standpunkte, die von den Positionen der anderen Gruppenmitglieder abweichen. Wie Gruppen in den Verhandlungen aktiv werden, wie sie ihre Rolle spielen und wie sie internationale Verhandlungen beeinflussen wird im Kapitel über Gruppendynamiken behandelt. Dieses Kapitel diskutiert die empirischen Daten die aus den Experteninterviews gewonnen wurden. Basierend auf den Antworten werden außerdem die Gründe für Verhandlungsverzögerung und die Beeinflussung des Verhandlungsprozesses durch wirtschaftliche Aktivitäten und entwicklungspolitische Aspekte dargestellt. Zu diesem Zweck enthält das Kapitel auch kleine Vergleiche zwischen China und USA.

Das sechste und letzte Kapitel enthält eine vergleichende Analyse, Schlussbemerkungen und Vorschläge für zukünftige Forschung.

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Acronyms, abbreviations and general expressions

AAU: Assigned amount unit (exchanged through emissions trading)

AF: Adaptation fund

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and other Land-Use

AG13: Ad Hoc group on article 13

AGBM: Ad Hoc group on Berlin Mandate

AIJ: Activities Implemented Jointly (under the pilot phase)

AIP: Annex I Parties

AOSIS: Alliance of Small Island States

AR4: Assessment report 4 (by IPCC)

Art: Article

AWG: Ad Hoc working group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol

BAPA: Buenos-Aires Plan of Action (decided at COP 4 in 1998)

BINGO: Business and industry non-governmental organizations (observer constituency)

CACAM: Central Asia, Caucasus, Albania and Moldova (as a negotiating group)

CBD: Convention on Biological Diversity

CDI: Capacity Development Initiative (of GEF/UNDP)

CDM: Clean Development Mechanism (under the Kyoto Protocol)

CDMEB: Clean Development Mechanism (under the Kyoto Protocol) Executive board

CER: Certified emission reduction (generated through the CDM)

CF₄: Carbon Tetra fluoride

CFC: Chlorofluorocarbon

CG-11: Central Group 11 (former negotiating group, replaced by the Central Group)

CGE: Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Non-Annex I Parties

CH₄: Methane

CO: Carbon monoxide

CO₂: Carbon dioxide

COP: Conference of the Parties

COP/MOP: Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol

COW: Committee of the Whole

CP: Commitment period

CPF: Collaborative Partnership on Forests

CRF: Common reporting format

EC: European community

EEC: Emerging economic countries

EGTT: Expert Group on Technology Transfer
EIG Environmental Integrity Group
(negotiating group)

EIT: Economy in transition (countries of the former Soviet Union and
Central and Eastern Europe which are undergoing the process of
transition to a market economy)

ENGO: Environmental non-governmental organizations (observer
constituency)

ERU: Emission reduction unit

EU: European Union

FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FAR: First Assessment Report (by the IPCC)

FCCC: Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

FSP: Full-Size Project (GEF project category)

G-77: Group of 77 and China (a coalition of developing countries in the
UN context)

GCOS: Global Climate Observing System

GEF: Global Environment Facility

GEO: Ad hoc Group on Earth Observation

GEOSS: Global Earth Observation System of Systems

GET: Global Environment Trust Fund (replaced by the GEF Trust Fund)

GHG: Greenhouse gas GOOS Global Ocean Observing System

GRULAC: Group of Latin America and Caribbean States (UN regional group)

GTOS: Global Terrestrial Observing System

GTZ: German Technical Cooperation Agency

GWP: Global warming potential

HCFC: Hydrochlorofluorocarbon

HFC: Hydrofluorocarbon

HWP: Harvested wood products

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization

ICJ: International Court of Justice

ICSU: International Council of Scientific Unions

IEA: International Energy Agency

IGBP: International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme

IGO: Intergovernmental Organization

IHDP: International Human Dimensions Programme on Global

Environmental Change

IMO: International Maritime Organization

INC: Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (1990–1995)

IOC: Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (of UNESCO)

IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Indigenous peoples organizations (observer constituency)

ISSC: International Social Science Council

IUCN: World Conservation Union

JI: Joint Implementation (under the Kyoto Protocol)

JLG: Joint Liaison Group (between the UNFCCC, CBD and UNCCD secretariats)

JUSSCANNZ (or JUSCANZ): Japan, United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand (former negotiating group, has been replaced by the Umbrella Group)

JWG: Joint Working Group (between SBSTA and IPCC)

LDC: Least Developing countries

LDCF: Least Developing countries Fund

LEG: Least Developed Countries Expert Group

LGMA: Local government and municipal authorities (observer constituency)

LUCF : Land use change and forestry

LULUCF: Land use, land use change and forestry

MOU: Memorandum of Understanding (between the COP and the GEF)

MS: Medium-sized project (GEF project category)

N₂O: Nitrous oxide

NAIP: Non-Annex I Parties

NAPA: National Adaptation Programme of Action

NCCSAP: Netherlands Climate Change Studies Assistance Programme

NCSA: National capacity needs self-assessment

NCSP: National Communications Support Programme

NGO: Non-governmental organization

NIR: National inventory report

NMVOC: Non-governmental organization National inventory report Non-methane volatile organic compound

NO_x: Nitrogen oxides

ODA: Official development assistance (of the GEF)

OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OP: Operational programme

OPEC: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Project Preparation and Development Facility

PFC: Perfluorocarbon

POP : Persistent organic pollutant

QA: Quality assurance

QC: Quality control

RDB: Regional Development Bank

RINGO: Research oriented and independent non-governmental organizations (observer constituency)

RMU: Removal unit (generated by LULUCF projects)

SAR: Second Assessment Report (by the IPCC)

SB: Subsidiary Body

SBI: Subsidiary Body for Implementation

SBSTA: Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice

SBSTTA: Subsidiary Body for Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (of the CBD)

SCCF: Special Climate Change Fund

SDR: Special Drawing Rights

SF: Sulphur hexafluoride

SGP: Small Grants Programme (of the GEF)

SIDS: Small Island Developing States

Sox: Sulphur oxides

STRM: Short-term response measures (GEF programme category)

TAR: Third Assessment Report (by the IPCC)

TEAP: Technology and Economic Assessment Panel (of the Montreal Protocol)

TT: Technology Transfer Information

UN: United Nations

UNCCD: United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification

UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNEP: United Nations Environment Programme

UNESCO: United Nations Education, Science and Cultural Organization

UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNFF: United Nations Forum On Forest

UNGA: United Nations General Assembly

UNIDO: United Nations Industrial Development Organization

UNITAR: United Nations Institute for Training and Research

UNU: United Nations University

URF: Uniform Reporting Format

USCSP: U.S. Country Studies Program

WCRP: World Climate Research Programme

WEOG: Western European and Others Group (UN regional group)

WHO: World Health Organization WMO: World Meteorological Organization

WTO: World Trade Organization

Chapter 1: Introduction

Global power shift and the rise of new power as new identity in the global power order are the most cited phenomena in the current world. This doctoral dissertation is a theoretical inquiry and explanation of global power shift and new identity formation specifically looking at climate negotiation as a case study. Since the beginning in 1992, climate talks have moved to the centre of International politics. Viola, Franchini and Rebeiro have described climate talks as the most cited event and an occurrence that has moved to the centre of global politics. They argued that the future development trajectory and survival of humanity is dependent on the result of climate change negotiations, specifically on the decisions and behavior of the main actors in the climate negotiation to reduce GHG emissions.¹ Therefore, the global community has already moved forward and taken some steps. The UN Security Council adopted this agenda for discussion for the first time ever in 2007 and they met again in 2011. The creation of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate was another significant step of the global community. Climate change is also a recurring subject of G-20 and G-8 summits. And, of course, the establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was a major step made to tackle climate change. The substantial presence of world leaders during the Copenhagen Conference (COP 15) in 2009 and at the Paris conference in 2015, including the intense media coverage of the summits shows the importance of climate negotiations. And therefore it evident that climate security is becoming a key issue in the planning of the defense establishment of major powers.

Climate negotiation is getting more space and importance in international politics because of its proximity to economic, political, security and defense issues.

¹ Viola, E. Franchini, M. Ribeiro, T, L (2012) Climate governance in an international system under conservative hegemony: the role of major powers. *Brazil International Politics*, vol: 55 (special edition), pp 9-29.

Currently climate politics occupy a very central and core position of International Relations (IR). This is one of the most significant topics of IR and global politics. Climate negotiations help us to understand the current characteristics, dynamics, changes and transformation in global politics. Climate change has made global politics more complicated. As a matter of fact, co-operation is necessary and most expectedly between states to stabilize emissions. In order to reduce emissions, global climate governance must be reviewed. According to the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the current climate governance makes it difficult to oblige any member state to reduce emissions. Therefore discussions on co-operation to cut emissions, and how this can be achieved have brought climate politics to the center of IR. Emission reduction, development activities in the developing countries, financial assistance, technology transfer are the main explanatory factors of the climate negotiations, which are determined by the responses to climate change issue by the actors. At the same time, actors are greatly divided into two parts: as developed and developing countries of the north–south group in climate negotiations, and which is adding a new dimension to global politics. This research project discusses this new dimension as a power shifting process.

Power shift and new identity formation are abstract concepts and continuous phenomena. They mean different things to different people. As the entry point of inquiry, current research takes the standpoint of power redistribution process by looking at the climate negotiation process. To be more specific, current research examines the redistribution of global power among the states through the reproduction of the groups such as BASIC, BRICS, G20 and LMDC in the negotiations process.

Utilizing this power redistribution and grouping reconstruction process, this research project aims to investigate how power is shifting through climate negotiation and to what extent. It also argues that climate politics and negotiations indicate the appearance of a new global political order led by China and other advanced developing countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South Africa. This dissertation seeks to answer the following questions: How do the new players act in the power game of the negotiation process? What is their behavior and strategy in the negotiations? Have they been accepted by others powers as new powers? From a cursory investigation of climate negotiations, we can see two changes in global politics. First, there is a clear indication of economic and geo-political power shift from north to south and from developed industrialized countries to developing countries. China, India, Brazil and South Africa, the BASIC countries, have played a key role as the main challengers to the developed world in the climate negotiations process. And second is the emergence of the knowledge-based non-state actors, for example NGOs and the epistemic community.

Earlier, we noted that world politics was divided into two camps, one side led by the USA, while the other by the former Soviet Union. Later, this shifted into unipolar politics after the collapse of the communist bloc. But as things stand presently, the world order is gradually adopting a multi-polar dimension. Many players are active and getting more space in global negotiations.

According to the collected empirical data, this research observes that in this growing multi-polar world, China, Indonesia and India are assuming a leading role in South–South diplomacy and with close cooperation. They have had very active cooperation since the mid-2000s. But at COP-15 in Copenhagen, in 2009, they intensified their co-ordination along with Brazil and South Africa. They played an

increasingly important role in global politics in general and in climate politics in particular. There has also been partial improvement in Sino-Indian relations, built on increased co-operation on energy and climate issues since the mid-2000s. The longstanding rivalry between China and India, mostly related to the two Asian giants' conflicting behavior based on their regional security interests had made closer collaboration on global issues difficult. But now the two countries share development-related energy security interests and face similar pressure to limit the environment impact of their development. They see this as a vista of opportunity to work together on climate issues.

This research aims to analyze the political aspects of climate negotiations and conflict between developed and advanced developing countries and the South-South co-operation. It will also analyze the causes of conflict, alliances, formation of alliances and the effects of conflict and alliance in the negotiation process and in global politics as well. This dissertation will attempt to answer the question of what type of power is shifting. Do the players use power as a resource? How do they apply power in negotiations? In order to answer these questions, the central objective of this research is to develop an analytical tool based on International Relations theory to explain the prolonged climate negotiations and its relation to power. The research project attempts to explain a plausible, theoretical reason for the protracted negotiations, the cooperation between China, India, Brazil, Indonesia and other developing countries and its relation with the global power shift and emergence of new identity in the global order.

1.1: Power shift and new identities as scope of study

Power shift in international politics is a continuous phenomenon since the beginning of the history. Undoubtedly political and economic power is shifting from

northern to southern countries of the globe at the present. *Power* is a term widely used and applied in IR. But it has many and very complicated definitions and meanings. While Joseph S Nye believes that “power is surprisingly elusive and difficult to measure”.² Other scholars have also attempted to make definitions of power, and divided power into two categories – hard and soft. Military capabilities, economic strength, natural resources, and population size - these are elements highly considered in IR as source of power, and applied by states. This dissertation observes that power is not static or situated in one geographical setting. Power is dynamic; it shifts from one place to another place and provides new identities to states as new powers, big powers, and middle powers, regional and emerging powers.³ In this research, climate negotiation was selected as a case study to prove that power is shifting and forming a new identity in global politics. Climate change negotiation is the biggest negotiation in history and it constitutes lengthy process as well. Nearly every country is participating in these negotiations. Each country has contributed to the negotiation process. Though the negotiation process is complicated, it has its own dynamic character. States are co-operating with each other; they have much disagree on many issues, even within the same group. Climate negotiation is full of diversity-state strategies, their behavior, statements, and bargaining process in the negotiation are unique examples clarifying the intricacies of global politics. Climate negotiation brings change to the normative power structure and provides us a scope with which to examine new players on the turf of international politics. For the frequent uses of the term *power*, this research defines *power as influential capacity, limiting the alternative and normative change in global power structure* based on Berenskoetter

² Nye, J (2003). *The future of power*. Public affairs. New York. P:3

³ibidem

idea.⁴ There is huge debate among scholars regarding power shift and resulting new identities. But in general, all these symptoms are common in the climate negotiation.

1.2: Climate negotiation and politics as focus of inquiry

As it has been mentioned, power shift is one of the most cited features of IR. Another highly discussed topic of IR is climate politics. It is very crucial to understand the politics of climate negotiations and its relation to the concept of power. However, it is not easy to formalize the dynamics of power and its relation with climate negotiations. Though climate is a subject of physical science, it has strong socio-economic impacts as well. Climate change needs to be perceived from the socio-political perspective. As sociologist Anthony Giddens noted, this is a socio-political problem rather than a physical science which includes political norms, values, regulation, governance, political will and the decision-making process. It does not only cover issues of morality, justice, equality and other moral obligations. Giddens argues that climate negotiation is fully connected with power relationship among global players. According to him, power and power relationship will determine how states respond to climate change.⁵ On the other hand, Geographer David Manuel argued that climate politics is all about power. Manuel notes that climate politics is not like the primary notion of power as the idealist want to assume. According to the notion of idealism, power is a moral issue, which is concerned with high moral motivation and the achievement of human wellbeing as the ultimate objective of power.⁶ Human wellbeing, therefore, is the ultimate target of the negotiation. But, this dissertation assumes that climate politics has embraced the realist stance that finds eloquent expression and adumbration in Machiavelli,

⁴ Berenskoetter, F (2007). Thinking about Power. Power in the World Politics. Berenskoetter, F and Williams, M, J. (eds). Routledge. Oxon. Pp:1-22

⁵ Giddens, A (2009). The Politics of climate change. Polity press. Cambridge. Pp: 5-15

⁶ Navarrete, D (2010), Climate Change and Power: It's not all about power? Environment, politics and Development working paper series. Kings College. London

Hobbes, Locke and Montesquieu.⁷ This research has therefore found that climate change is an external threat to society. It can be a problem for security and securitization issues for states. For instance, states are using mitigation and adaptation as plausible strategies to tackle climate change. Mitigation and adaptation can reduce the overall threat and cope with the new conditions should human development continue without any interruption. States are very cautious about disrupting their development rights. They always try to gain the maximum benefit from the climate negotiation. This makes reaching a deal in negotiations more difficult and consequently, emissions increase.

Herein lays the realist perspective in the negotiation- people need to be controlled to avoid self-destruction or harming others. Coercion and strong authority are the preconditions for stability and security. The success of the political system depends on the stability and consensus between rulers and the ruled rather than ideals of fairness, justice and freedom. This realist notion of political system is very much applicable and rooted in the environmental governance system. This system will have power to force actors to enact global policies. Global governance will exercise power. As Montesquieu has said, it would also introduce checks and balances to global politics.⁸ This power distribution system has the capacity to set out policies to reach goals and solve problems. This process should be inclusive, transparent and accountable. But in climate negotiations, the UNFCCC does not have any executive powers to compel any country to cut emissions. Moreover, countries are divided into many groups to secure their interests. Besides this, many non-state actors, such as NGOs and the epistemic community, are very active in the negotiation process. Few

⁷ Viola' E. Franchini, M. Ribeiro, T, L (2012) Climate governance in an international system under conservative hegemony: the role of major powers. *Brazil International Politics*, vol: 55 (special edition), pp 9-29.

⁸ Mearchheimer, J (2007). *Classical Realism: International Relations Theories*. Dunne, Kurki, M. and Smith, S (eds) Oxford University press. Oxford.

developed countries, developing countries, and NGOs are set to perform pre-decided roles in the negotiation. Therefore, negotiation is centered on technological incentives, finance, and the price of carbon, loss and damage, rather than cutting emissions as an emergency step.⁹ So, state and non-state actors are involved in a power game in the climate negotiation. This dissertation will discuss the power game in subsequent section of this analysis.

1.3: Limitation of the research

Though it was successful, this research has faced a number of challenges, which have to be acknowledged. These challenges help to provide a compass with which future research can navigate. The first problem that this research exercise encountered centered on the formulation of an analytical framework with which to examine the data. The analytical framework was based on the constructive-realist agenda. Climate negotiation covers a wide area. It is so diversified and so complicated that it was really difficult to carry out reasonable analysis using any specific theory. The concept of power shifting means different things to the respondents who were interviewed in this research. Then there is the traditional concept of military power. It was very complicated to push power-shifting issues in the climate negotiation. Already it has been mentioned that in order to make a framework of power shift, this dissertation has adopted the concept of power as capacity to influence- limiting alternatives and bringing changes in the normative structure. This approach guided respondents to reply to the question.

Another challenge was to conduct interviews in order to collect empirical data. Thousands of participants attended climate change conferences from different parts of society. All of them had their own agenda. They tried to push their agenda in the

⁹ Manuel, D (2010). *Climate change and power: Isn't it all about power politics?* Working paper, Geography department, Kings College, London.

interview process. Some were very late to reply to questions. One of the senior negotiators from Bangladesh replied to the questions almost one year after the questionnaire was made available to him. Consequently, the interview process had to be carefully conducted and applied.

1.4: Structure of the thesis

The next chapter will take an in-depth look at the analytical discussion. It is based on constructivist realism and its relation to power. It combines constructivist realism and the notion of power. First, realism and constructivism have been briefly discussed. The main features of realism and constructivism have been explained followed by a discussion of how constructivism and realism relate to each other. The theoretical part is mainly based on Samuel Barkin's constructivist realism. In his writings, Barkin explained how compatible constructivism is with realism since realism and constructivism have many differences. Constructivist realism helps up to understand the proximity of power shift to realism-constructivism and how power shift helps to explain the new identity formation.

The research methodology and design is also included in the same chapter. Research method was mainly based on primary and secondary text analysis and qualitative semi-structured interviews. Conceptual explanations included the scientific definitions of climate change, causes of climate change, and its global effects on the globe. By using scientific data and examples, this chapter focused on the relation between politics and climate change. In order to determine the relationship between climate change and global politics, this paper also analyzed the concept of conflict and negotiation processes.

Chapter three discusses global policy and institutional frameworks as responses to climate change. How this issue is being dealt by states and their response to tackle

climate change is briefly included. Initiatives by governments, their alliances with other governments, and the formation of alliances are discussed in this chapter. This chapter gives us some idea of the disordered condition of climate negotiations.

The genesis of climate change since 1979 has also been also included in chapter three in order to give a clear idea regarding the history of the negotiation process. To that end, the negotiation process has been divided into five phases – the agenda-setting period, the early response (1970-1990), the pre-Kyoto, Kyoto and post-Kyoto phase. This chapter discusses the influences of emerging powers in the climate negotiations.

Chapter four outlines the security issues among the top actors in climate negotiations based on respondent views. Energy security, economic adjustment, poverty eradication, and the drive for hegemony have also become a significant part of this chapter.

Chapter five discusses the findings of this research. This chapter explains the shift in climate negotiations and group dynamics among the actors. This demonstrates how emerging powers influence negotiations and limit alternatives to opponents. The Rio Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, the Bali Action Plan, the Copenhagen Accord, the Cancun Agreement, the Durban Outcome, Doha Gateway and Paris Agreement are considered turning points in climate negotiations. This chapter also analyzes the reasons for shifting and prolonging negotiations. This appears to be most complicated part of the paper, because some countries are very active in group politics. At the same time, however, they operate as single actors in the negotiations. India, for example, is a member of BASIC, the G77, the G20, LMDC and other groups in the negotiation process. But India also has very strong positions that differ from the position of other members of the same groups that India belongs

to. How the groups are active in the negotiation, how they play their roles and their influence in the internal negotiation has been discussed in the chapter on group dynamics,. This chapter discusses the empirical data that has been collected by interviewing experts. It has also revealed the reasons for prolonged negotiation, how economic activities and development issues influence the negotiation process, based on the response of the respondent. In order to get the answers, comparisons between China and USA have been included in this chapter.

Final chapter six offers a comparative analysis as well as concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.

1.5: Literature review and research question

This author selected the topic by exploring the following questions: (i) If power is shifting, then (ii) How are emerging powers forging new identities in global politics? (iii) How do they form these new identities? (iv) How can climate negotiations be connected to the global power shifting process? Not much research has been done by International relations (IR) researchers on this topic even though the number of studies is growing. Some part of this area remains under research. It requires more research and study. Hence, the following paragraphs will review the current topics on this issue and explore the contribution of the dissertation to this field.

In recent years, many separate studies have been conducted on politics of climate change and global power shift processes. Some theoretical analyses of climate negotiations have also been done. These studies were based on politics of a specific country or group or only a rising power. But no one has combined power shift process and politics of climate change together. In order to combine this complex issue together, **firstly** this dissertation examined theoretical studies on climate change. Theoretical analysis on climate negotiation is limited, but the main objective of this

dissertation is to develop a theoretical framework to combine the climate negotiations and power shift process together. This research shows that the theory of Samuel Barkin fits with this dissertation. Barkin is a pioneer in the integration of the opposing notions of International Relations theory: constructivism and realism. In his work, he describes how realism is compatible with constructivism. He clearly describes how constructivist realism helps us to understand power as the center of international politics and power as a social construction in international politics. He argues that the integration of realism and constructivism will help us to understand global politics as the result of social change. He focuses on structure as a source of change. He argues in his book that states struggle for power, security, and to achieve preferences. This behavior shapes the interests of the actors and gives them a new identity in global politics. Barkin argues that constructivist realism or realist constructivism explains new identity formation and power struggle behavior of the actors. In his book, *Realist Constructivism*, Barkin outlined a theory that explains his understanding of global politics. But Barkin's theory has some limitations. For example, Jennifer Folker has argued that Barkin only tells us that realist-constructivism as a combination concept could allow us to deal with the morality of global politics.¹⁰ But he does not explain how this would work. How can morality influence global politics?

Secondly, the political analysis of climate change negotiations has been widely reviewed in a number of studies and books. But most of these works have not focused on the real source of the problem: the lack of empirical evidence. For instance, Anthony Giddens book, *The Politics of Climate Change*, is one of the most cited regarding climate change and politics. Giddens treats climate change as a political

¹⁰ Folker, J (2004). *Bridging the Gap: Towards a Constructivist and Realist Dialog*. International Studies Review (2004) 6, pp: 337-352

problem rather than a moral or technological one. He is more optimistic and rational in seeking a solution. He insists on morality of active actors in climate negotiations. He argues that the involvement of the government will solve this problem. According to his opinion, the state and market should perform in climate negotiations rather than command; the approach should be bottom-up. The state should not be a top-down agent in climate negotiation. In the first part of the book, he provides scientific explanation for climate change. Then he moves to policies on climate change and suggests a future model for tackling climate change. His main argument is based on domestic policies rather than multilateral arrangements and that domestic policies would evolve from a moral point of view. Here, even though Giddens is a bit Utopian, it becomes clear that no one (actor) will limit the scope of their domestic policies without a multilateral agreement. Multilateral agreements are necessary to solve climate change problems. He also mentions the gap between the interests of states and groups of states. He argues that UN mechanisms have failed to deliver any breakthroughs and that we cannot wait for long before we will have to tackle climate change. In this, he is realistic to some extent. For example, he views climate negotiations as a competition for energy security. This competition is shaping a new kind of balance of power through emerging economies. He suggests working on an individual level, to arrange some bilateral talks among the top emitters, or some sort of arrangement in large groups. He does not believe in international agreements. He insists instead that states should pursue their interests by pursuing climate change in bilateral talks. He argues that the convergence between climate change combat and energy security is the prerequisite for a climate change deal. He makes a case for keeping climate change on the top of the political agenda. He also advises that actors should introduce market-oriented policies. For example, he insists on the introduction of a green tax system. That is, states should ensure that the market will

work in favor of climate policy. The state's role will be to facilitate the policy rather than enable it. Even though he goes ahead to give an account of climate negotiation, its prospects and problems, but he does not explain how power is related to climate negotiations. His analysis is more related to the socio-political explanation. He does not explain climate change only through politics, a summary of Giddens' work include how states play their role, the market's He does not mention any thing about how politics plays a role in climate negotiation and how power shift from developed countries to developing countries through climate negotiation happens. Another significant criticism of his works is that reliance on market economy. The main weakness of his writing is that he insists on individual and group negotiations rather than multilateral arrangements. He wants to see climate negotiations as negotiations between elite groups of emitters. He also criticizes the role of NGOs even though they and the epistemic community are very influential in climate negotiations.

Sir Anthony Brenton is also closer to Giddens. Brenton's article, "Great powers in the climate politics" is about top emitters in climate negotiations. He argues that climate negotiations started with a global image. They did not start with a small group and expand gradually. According to him more than one-hundred heads of state joined the Rio Convention. He combines the economic weight, global political influence and emissions as the indicators of great power in the negotiation process. Based on these criteria, he identifies the US, Japan, Russia, China, India, Brazil, Canada and the EU as the great powers in the negotiation process. And he defines them as the most dominant actors in climate negotiations. He divides actors in two groups: developed and developing. In his article, he wrote that China, India and Brazil take common positions in climate negotiations. In conclusion, he showed that in Copenhagen, Cancun and Doha, deals were made between developed and BASIC countries. Even the EU was sidelined. Sir Antony Berton did not discuss the decision-

making process and how the BASIC countries are becoming more influential in the negotiations. Also he did not mention other groups and non-state actors.

In the article *“Rising powers: The Evolving role of the BASIC countries”*, Karl Halding briefly discusses this topic. He methodologically and theoretically explains the development of BASIC and its evolving role in climate politics. His article is mainly based on the activities of BASIC in climate negotiations. He also makes some comparisons between the BRICS, WTO and G8. He recognizes the two factors that have brought the BASIC countries together - the first being social whilst and the second is institutional. BASIC countries have the same challenges and face huge pressures from developed countries to reduce their emissions. He argues that climate change was becoming the top issue in the global agenda when the rapid growth of the emerging economies began to draw international attention and concern. He saw this alliance among the BASIC countries as the partial improvement in the China-India relationship. China and India have had a long standing rivalry in regional politics. The BASIC arrangement makes room for them to come closer. He considers BASIC to be an increasingly influential and constructive forum in global politics.

In a paper that focuses on the formation and emergence of the BASIC group in climate change negotiations, Chinese scholar Xinran Qi also discusses the rise of the BASIC group in climate change negotiations. In his paper, he describes how the BASIC group of countries influences negotiations. In his view, he sees power shift in climate negotiations as rooted in the dynamics of global market. He argues that consumption of commodities is increasing in the emerging economies. Energy consumption is increasing in these countries, at the same time as emissions are increasing. The world is witnessing newly industrializing countries edging toward the center of climate change.

In spite of the fact that there have been a number of articles and books on climate change negotiations and politics, most are based on actors' strategies and policies. They do not explain the dynamics of climate politics and their effects on global politics. In addition, they do not clarify the impact of climate negotiations on developmental politics. Therefore, this dissertation focuses on the multiple dimensions and perspectives of the climate negotiations based power games and will provide a comprehensive assessment of power shift through climate negotiations.

This paper will also examine how the parties are playing their obstructionist zero-sum game so as to help us to frame the research questions. The following research questions guided the present study:

Q1: Why has the main objective of the climate negotiation shifted?

Q2: What is the political aspect of the prolonged climate negotiation and its consequences to global politics?

Chapter 2: Theoretical Consideration, framework and research design

This chapter presents the theoretical and conceptual consideration which is necessary to develop an analytical framework for this study. First, this chapter will look at the nature of the case study “*climate politics and negotiations*” in the following paragraph. The nature of the case study will help us to flesh out the theoretical base in order to explain it. In the second step, we will consider how constructivist realism can be applied to explain this case study. In this section, the body of existing constructivism and realism in International Relations (IR) research will be reviewed. Then, this thesis will examine the nexus between these two theories to explain the climate negotiations and power shift processes. In the third section of this chapter, power theories will be reviewed. This dissertation will also focus on the definition of power based on the current study in IR research, which is compatible with the case study. In section four, other concepts related to climate change issues and negotiation processes will be discussed. Section five will develop a typology to examine power shifting process through climate negotiations. The hypothesis based on researcher’ typology will be presented in section six in order to explain how power shift depends on the strategy and position of emerging powers in negotiations. This dissertation predicts that climate negotiations are anarchic and that there is no hierarchical design in the climate negotiation. Some groups of actors can play a very effective role in the decision-making process however. In the final section of this chapter, the methodology and structure of the case study will be explained in order to demonstrate the hypothesis. This chapter will provide the research design of this study for the following chapters.

2.1: Nature of the case study

According to its nature, climate change is a trans-national or trans-boundary global environmental problem (TBGEP). Thus, climate change is increasingly becoming an important part of states' foreign policies. Czempiel argues that TBGEP is a sub-domain of International Relations and political actors repeatedly interact to manage conflict based on their national interest in TBGEP negotiations. Their interaction may be open and uncertain at the same time.¹¹ For that reason, an understanding of foreign policy processes is a necessary central element to study international environmental cooperation and negotiations such as climate politics and regime politics. But in spite of this, Barkdull and Harris consider foreign policy to be the core policy and strategy of states to determine success in international climate change negotiation.¹²

Hence, in order to study climate negotiations by using classic international relations schools of thought template, second power theory has been selected. The classic international relations school of thought is divided in two parts: cooperation and conflict. In this dissertation, 'co-operation' and 'conflict' in climate negotiation will be examined based on power structure (neo-realism), change in the normative structure and formation of new regimes (constructivism). In this effort, constructivism and realism are integrated as constructivist realism based on Samuel Barkin's train of thought. He argues that constructivist realism is a thread of realism that helps us to understand the structural change in international politics by applying inter-subjectivity and co-constitution.¹³ Most trans-boundary environmental

¹¹ Czempiel, E, O (1996). Internationale Beziehungen: Begriff, Gegenstand und Forschungsabsicht. In: Einführung in die Internationale Politik. Knapp, M. & Krell, G. (eds). Oldenbourg, München, Wien, pp. 2–26.

¹² John, B and Harris, P (2002). Environmental Change and Foreign Policy: A Survey of Theory in Global Environmental Politics. *Global Environmental Politics*, Vlo.2. Issues.2, (Cambridge: MIT press), pp. 63-91

¹³ Barkin. S. J (2003). Realist constructivism, *International studies review*, vol: 5, pp:325-342

problems are commonly known to exhibit this trait, and therefore if TBGEP brings any changes as a result of negotiations, the results are usually inter-subjective and co-constitute.

This usually involves strategic interaction and interdependencies between economic agents and countries. For instance, the problem of global warming is caused by almost all the countries of the world, each contributing to this global externality. In order to reach the target of reducing global warming, many countries have to reduce their Green House Gas (GHG) emissions, such as Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) and methane. But pushing the world community together in an agreement to cut the GHG emission has proven to be a difficult task. Strategic interdependencies and positioning is a factor in reaching any agreement. In other words therefore, constructivist-realism is such a powerful set of tools for analyzing the construction of strategic interdependencies and the formation of new identities among actors. It is a very effective tool for analyzing the environment and the problems of resource economics. It provides a comprehensive framework for the analysis of the fundamental causes of environmental problems such as 'Global Warming or Climate Change'. When many countries are affected and many countries are responsible for this pollution, it is known as trans-boundary pollution. The main feature of this kind of problem is the absence of such a powerful institution to enforce the policy. Global warming is this kind of problem. There is no strong institutional framework to enforce a policy of GHG reduction. The United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an institution which coordinates the negotiation process. It has no power to force its member countries to enforce its policy. For instance, one of the major polluters, the USA, did not ratify the first legal framework to reduce the GHGs - the Kyoto Protocol. The UNFCCC could not compel them to

ratify the Kyoto Protocol because so many players are active and trying to gain advantages from negotiations when institutional frameworks are weak or anarchic. Constructivist-realism helps researchers to examine the position of players in a rational and constructive way. It provides a framework for understanding the relationship between the study of power in International Relations and the study of International Relations as a social construction.

In the following section, the concept of realism, constructivism and the relations between constructivism and realism will be discussed. We will examine the complementary roles that realism and constructivism offer each other and how they can be applied to explain climate negotiations as a case study.

2.3: Realism, Constructivism and Constructivist Realism

This section will discuss realism, constructivism and constructivist realism. Realism has been the most dominant theory in International Relations, ever since the beginning of political thought. How human nature imposes constraints on politics and the effect of absence of international government on global politics is what realism as a political concept emphasizes. This makes International Relations largely a realm of power and interest-based politics.¹⁴ Though this is the most dominant theory of international politics, it has no unique definition. Scholars divide realism in many subdivisions such as Classical realism, neo-classical realism, Structural or neo-realism, the liberal realism of the English school of thought and left realism. But this dissertation will only focus on neo-realism.

The main difference between classical and neo-realism is that classical realists believe that the struggle for power causes anarchy and it is a natural occurrence.

¹⁴ Barkin, S. J (2003). Realist constructivism, *International studies review*, vol: 5, pp:325-342

Hobbs defines this as an *evil of human nature*. It is rooted in human nature. Justice, law and society have no place in this theory. Human nature and desire are the driving factors of the state.¹⁵ In Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations*, "politics are governed by laws that are created by the human nature".¹⁶ Though states are the main actors in International Relations, the anthropocentric assumption determines the behavior of states in global politics. For instance, states are always struggling for power in global politics. This dissertation assumes that a political actor's behavior is shaped by definitions of situations and preferences, aims. National interest is the main focus of classical realism. Acquisition, increase and demonstration of power are the purposes of foreign policy to maximize gain or profit. The maintenance of national sovereignty and survival in a hostile environment is the ultimate argument of classical realism.¹⁷

On the contrary, neo-realism argues that anarchy is not natural or a result of human behavior. Anarchy is a structure of the international system. Rousseau argued in his book *The State of War* in 1750 that the quest for power is not human nature but that anarchical systems foster fears, jealousy, suspicion and insecurity among states.¹⁸ This dissertation assumes that, these provoke actors to gain more power. States are driven by systematic demands. States possess some offensive military capabilities in the anarchic system in order to dominate the international system and gain predominance in the international system, which is relative to the distribution of power among all actors. Security issues are the focus of neo-classical realism. Self-help is the purpose of foreign policy and is geared towards ensuring security. Anarchy leads to a self-help system in which states seek to maximize their security. The Self-help system compels states to maximize their relative position of power. Realist

¹⁵ Barkin. S. J (2003). Realist constructivism, *International studies review*, vol: 5, pp:325-342

¹⁶ Morgenthau, J. Hans (1978). *Politics Among Nations: The struggle for power and peace*. Fifth editions revised. Alfred A Knopf. New York. Pp: 4-15

¹⁷ Barkin. S. J (2003). Realist constructivism, *International studies review*, vol: 5, pp:325-342

¹⁸ *ibidem*

scholars argue that the defense of one's systematic position is relative to other actor's position; it maintains the balance of power.¹⁹

Actors can maintain the balance of power in many ways. Waltz argues that states have two basic reasons for wanting to maintain power: to protect or defend. One is an external balancing policy of forming alliances or bandwagoning with other states. Partners will share their resources to help or protect each other. The other is an internal balancing, which requires the development of the state's own economic capabilities to build stronger military defense systems.²⁰

In many ways, states can balance power. The techniques of balancing are:

- Divide et impera*
- Territorial consolidation after war
- Creation of buffer states
- Bandwagoning
- Formation of alliances
- Creation of regional influence areas
- Military interventions
- Diplomatic negotiations
- Conflict settlement of mediation
- Cooperative arms control
- Arms races
- War

¹⁹ Mearchheimer, J (2007). Classical Realism: International Relations Theories. Dunne, Kurki, M. and Smith, S (eds) Oxford University press. Oxford.

²⁰ Glaser, C (2007). Realism: Contemporary security studies. Oxford University press. New York. pp:21

In order to secure balance in power system of international politics, Wohlforth argues that realism is based on a three-core assumption. These are *groupism, power centrism and egoism*.²¹

According to Wohlforth's explanation, *groupism* ensures that actors survive at anything above subsistence level. *Groupism* creates solidarity among the group members but according to the realist school of thought, group members adhere to their nationalist principles and that makes them strong to achieve preferences. Wohlforth's explanation is called the "Individual actor analysis". It posits that individuals gather in groups called states and provide solidarity among group members - as the state is the individual actor in International politics, then, for our case study of climate politics we will look at how this concept works among the major players.²²

Power centrism is another fundamental feature of politics. Realists believe that power is the core point of International politics. Human affairs are always identified by huge inequalities of power in terms of social influence or control and resource. Some groups or individuals always try to hold the control over politics.²³

Egoism is another main idea of realism. Self-interest comes from political behavior. It is generated from human behavior. In the International system, there is no high authority that subjects everything under its control. So, the possibility of war is always present mostly because no one can prevent an actor from becoming involved in war. Waltz explains that this is called the anarchic system. In this anarchic system, states very much rely on themselves for their own security.

²¹ William C. Wohlforth (2008). Realism and Foreign Policy, Foreign policy: Theories-Actors-cases. Oxford University press Ins. New York, pp: 32-35

²² Ibidem,

²³ Ibidem P 37

Structural realism argues that in the self-help system, a balance of power emerges as a source of security.²⁴

Finally, realists argue that International politics is anarchic and that the self-help system is very much active. In the brutal arena of global politics, all actors seek to maximize power and look for opportunities to take advantage of each other.²⁵ Here, Ellen Pfeiffer and Jan Leetavaar's ratiocinations hold brief for the realists. They argue that the economic metaphor requires actors to maximize the kind of power they refer to as "Invisible hand".²⁶

Another basic theory related to this dissertation is constructivism. Constructivism as a theory or approach- is a subject of debate among scholars. Some scholars consider constructivism a social theory. Wendt's *Social "Theory of International Politics"* is a major initiative to establish constructivism as a theory.²⁷ On the other hand, some scholars like Finnemore and Sikkink have argued that constructivism is not a substantive political theory but a social theory that provides explanations for social life and change in the structure.²⁸ Perhaps this is why Ruggie argues that it is not a traditional IR theory; rather that it should be perceived as a theoretically informed approach in order to study International Relations.²⁹

Christine Agius believes that constructivism highlights the importance of ideas, identity and interaction in International Relations. According to her, it explains international politics as being based on the three highlighted core notions of

²⁴ William C. Wohlforth (2008). *Realism and Foreign Policy, Foreign policy: Theories-Actors-cases*. Oxford University press Ins. New York, pp: 32-35

²⁵ Mearcheimer, J (2007). *Classical Realism: International Relations Theories*. in Dunne, Kurki, M. and Smith, S (eds) Oxford University press. Oxford.

²⁶ Glaser, C (2007). *Realism: Contemporary security studies*. Oxford University press. New York. pp:21

²⁷ Wendt, A. *Social Theory of the International Relations*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. Pp-120-139

²⁸ Finnemore, M (1996). *An exploration of norms in International Relations*. National Interest and International Society. Cornell University press.

²⁹ Ruggie, J, G (1998). *What Makes the World to hang together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the social constructivist challenge*. *International Organization*, vol: 52, pp: 855-885

constructivism. The human world is not simply given and natural; it is constructed through interactive processes of the actors. It explains the relationship between agent and structure. The state is the individual actor in international politics. In this way, constructivist explains the relationship between states and the international political structure. Individuals or collective agents are the central actors in constructivism. Shared norms, rules, language, collective identity and interests and social structures are the explanatory factors of constructivism. Collective identity can be considered as an alliance of co-operative security systems. Security can also be socially constructed.³⁰

Constructivists argue that international structures and agencies are co-constituted. Norms and institutions matter in constructivism. Institutions are stable sets of identities and interests. Institutions do not exist apart from the actor's knowledge and socialization. Identities form the basis of interests. Identities are an important factor, but they are not constant; they are malleable and dynamic. Identity is not given, it is constructed. Actors with multiple identities are related to their position and environment. Interests need to be understood with reference to other factors. Identities and interests are dependent on relationships; they are not part of a portfolio.³¹

In constructivism, identities are defined by the relationship of interaction of one actor to other. Identities are social and always formed in an effective system. Constructivism explains that identity shapes interest or interest shapes identity.³² Constructivism as a theory in international relations is concerned with the centrality

³⁰ Agius, C (2010). Social constructivism, Contemporary security studies. Oxford press. Oxford, pp: 62

³¹ Fierke, K, M (2007). Constructivism. International Relations Theory. Dunne, T, Kurki, M and Smith, S (eds). Oxford University Press. Oxford. Pp:166-183

³² Agius, C (2010). Social constructivism. Contemporary security studies. Oxford press. Oxford. pp: 60

of ideas and human consciousness, and explains the holistic and idealist approach of structure and describes how structure constructs identities, norms, and interests.³³

According to Wendt, idealism and holism is from the core of constructivism. The idealist notion explains the role of ideas in global politics. The world is defined by material and ideational forces. These ideas are social, such as symbols, language, knowledge and rules. Idealism does not reject materialism, but the construction of materialism depends on ideas and interpretation.³⁴ The Balance of Power does not exist outside of constructivism. States try to find the answer to the question of what balance of power means in the anarchic system and how to respond to it. Balance of power depends on the identities of the actors.³⁵

Traditionally, International Relations (IR) theory has defined structure in material terms. It emphasizes the distribution power and then considers structure as a constraint on actors. In contrast to the materialist structure, the normative structure talks about knowledge, norms, rule, idea, and beliefs as constraints on actors. It also constitutes the identity and interests of the actor.³⁶

Regarding anarchy, constructivism does not stray far from neo-realism. Neo-realism argues that anarchy is not given or natural. It is a structure of the international system. Constructivism argues that this structure is constituted through the interaction between the actors. So, both schools of political thought are similar here in arguing that anarchy is a social construction or a result of interaction. Similarly, constructivists believe in the diversification of anarchy, whereas neo-realists believe that anarchy is a product of such a system based on war, military

³³ Barneit, M (2014) *Social constructivism: The globalization of world politics, An introduction to the International Relation*. Oxford university press. Oxford, pp: 117-123

³⁴ *ibidem*

³⁵ Barkin, S. J (2003). Realist constructivism, *International studies review*, vol: 5, pp:325-342

³⁶ Barneit, M (2014) *Social constructivism. The globalization of world politics: An introduction to the International Relation*. Oxford university press. Oxford. Pp: 117-123

competition and balance of power. Wendt explore three types of anarchy in his piece, “Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”. According to Wendt, the three types of anarchy conform to the Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian.³⁷

This dissertation conceived that according to the Hobbesian definition of anarchy, actors are described as enemies of one another. The main argument of the Hobbesian type of anarchy is that it is based on the self-help system, where actors cannot rely on other actors. The survival of the actors is dependent on their own power. For instance, states have to rely on military power or economic statecraft and the security dilemma. Wendt mentions that over the time that the Hobbesian anarchy is common in the international setting but not all the time.³⁸

Lockean anarchy is about rivalry. Wendt observes that this culture emerged since the Treaty of Westphalia and the beginning of modern state systems. In the Lockean definition of anarchy, states are considered rivals. But there are some kinds of restraints to violence. Warfare is accepted among the states but scope is limited. Christine Agius sees Kantian culture as friendship where force and violence are avoided as a matter of security.³⁹ Here, states resolve their disputes in a non-violent manner. But is it possible to explain state behavior by using realism and constructivism? Do they support each other or marry? The following part of this chapter will describe how they cohere.

Many scholars argue that constructivism is incompatible with realism. Constructivism is commonly seen as the opposite of realism. Realists focus on rationalism and materialism. On the other hand, constructivism is more focused on

³⁷ Wendt, A (1992). Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization*: 42, 2. Pp: 393-425.

³⁸ Agius. C (2010). *Social constructivism: Contemporary security studies*, Oxford press, Oxford, PP: 60

³⁹ *ibidem*

the idea and ideal notion. To some extent, it can be said that constructivism is idealistic or utopian. Methodologically, constructivism does not fit with realism. But Samuel Barkin has attempted to prove that constructivism is compatible with realism in many ways. He describes constructivism as a method of studying international politics rather than how international politics works. Constructivism focuses on the social construction of international politics and sees the facts of international politics as not reflective of an objective material reality but an inter-subjective or social reality. Barkin states that, “what actors do in international relations, the interest they hold, and the structures within which they operate are defined by social norms and ideas rather than by objective or material conditions”. On the other hand, he defines realism focuses on power in which states are the central actors in international politics. According to him, states are the organizations in international politics with power as the central actor. No one institution, like the state, has effective power internationally. ⁴⁰ Therefore states matter. People and domestic institutions are also factors because they determine how much power states should have and how power is applied and dispensed. Many constructivists accept that power is a factor in global politics. For instance, Wendt notes that realism is all about power.⁴¹ He and other constructivists accept the centrality of power in international politics.

Barkin also explains that realism begins with human nature. In favor of his argument, he cites from Wendt that “all social theory must begin with some theory of human nature, even if it is that human nature is infinitely malleable”⁴². Some scholars argue that theories of human nature are compatible with political realism because human nature is infinitely malleable or perfectible. But Barkin argues that all

⁴⁰ Barkin, S, J (2003). Realist constructivism. *International studies review*, vol: 5, pp:325-342

⁴¹ Wendt, A (1992). Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization*, vol: 42.2, pp: 393-425.

⁴² Barkin. S.J (2003). Realist constructivism. *International studies review*, vol: 5, pp: 330

of this ultimately depends on the individual's position. Realism does not suggest that individuals are not always aggressive or self-interested. Some try to accumulate power and no one can stop them even when others are facing insecurity. Herein lies the distinction between status quo and revisionist states.

Another debate regarding the compatibility of realism and constructivism is that political realism is variously positivist or empiricist. This notion is criticized by referencing the idea of scientific or critical realism and which has no relationship with political realism. It is an idea of social science that is independent of our observations of them. Real social structures are out of existence. This notion contrasts with the positivist-empiricist realism that argues that we only know what we can observe and the postmodern deconstructivist notion that because all social knowledge is discursively created, no social structures can exist independent of our discourses with them. At this point logical positivists and deconstructivists share the same positions, that there can be no knowledge of social phenomena separate from the observer. Scientific realism's position is that there can be knowledge of social phenomena separate from the observer. Based on these arguments, Barkin stated that constructivism and political realism ontology jointly deny the scientific realist's notion.⁴³

The positivist and post-positivist debate also dismisses the compatibility of realism and constructivism. But some constructivists subsume that any definition of positivism is broad enough to capture realist and constructivist thinking. Heikki Patomöki and Colin Wight argue that political realism is very close to the logical positivist and deconstructivist positions. They note that realism, logical positivist and deconstructivist positions - all share the anthropocentric view of knowledge that is

⁴³ Barkin, S, J (2003). Realist Constructivism. *International studies review*, vol: 5, pp:325-342

incompatible to scientific realism.⁴⁴ Barkin argues that this notion is based on the political realism of Morgenthau, the empiricism of Hume and the postmodernism of Nietzsche. The genealogy posits a sharp disjuncture in realist thought between the realms of empirical, observable and of moral thought. This notion provides us with a way to repeat that political realism is positivist and positivism is incompatible with the scientific realism. All these arguments leave us in such a position that political realism is incompatible with constructivism.⁴⁵ Therefore, the question then is how is political realism compatible with constructivism? To answer to this question, we would have to clarify some terminological uncertainty in this field. We know Wendt uses the terms *realism* and *idealism* in two different ways. The distinction between the two realisms has been discussed. The distinction between the ‘two idealisms’, which is a focus on ideas versus a focus on ideals according to Barkins, will be discussed in the following paragraph.

Wendt distinguishes between idealism as a theory of social politics and idealism as a theory of IR.⁴⁶ The first refers to the social phenomena and looks at the importance of ideas. The second refers to a theory of IR based on ideals rather than realism. But E H Carr rejects idealism. He does not use this term in his *The Twenty years of Crisis*. Rather, he uses the term Utopianism.⁴⁷ Similarly, Moravcsik explicitly tried to distance liberalism’s role as a historical ideology in the redefinition of liberal in IR.⁴⁸ Liberalism is very rare in Morgenthau’s scientific Man versus Power Politics.⁴⁹ Barkin argues that Wendt and Moravcsik try to rehabilitate the terms

⁴⁴ Patomaki, H and Colin, W (2000). After Positivism? The Promises of Critical Realism. *International Studies Quarterly*, vol: 44, pp: 213-237

⁴⁵ Barkin. S, J (2003): Realist constructivism. *International studies review*, vol: 5, pp: 330

⁴⁶ Wendt, A (1999). *Social Theory of International Relations*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.

⁴⁷ Carr, E.H (1964). *The Twenty years of crisis. 1919-1939: An introduction to the study of International relations*. Harper and Row. New York.

⁴⁸ Moravcsik, A (1997). *Taking Preferences seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics*. International Organization. Vol: 51. Pp: 513-553

⁴⁹ Morgenthau, H (1946). *Scientific Man versus Power Politics*. University of Chicago Press. Chicago.

idealism and *liberalism* from the charge that these concepts reflect normative approaches to social science. Barkin rehabilitates the normative approach to the IR that Moravcsik and Wendt were trying to keep at a distance. On the other hand, in realist thinking, Carr uses Utopianism and Morgenthau uses these terms liberalism and scientific men. They are quite different. The essence of this school of thought is that people have consistent and reasonable preferences, which they pursue rationally. Well-designed political institutions that rationally pursue their preferences will appeal sufficiently to people's reasonableness as to obviate any necessity for power politics. In other words, as per Kant, political institutions can ensure peace. The classical realist response is that the ultimate solution is not available; peace is subject to time and space and must be achieved and maintained by different methods and this depends on the everyday relations of the nations. But the problem is that international peace exists only for philosophers as Morgenthau says. Barkin talks about how institutions can deal with the problem in order to establish peace. But the nexus of problem, time, and place is historically unique to establish peace. The emergence of other problems is inevitable in other times and places. But the significant nature is that if international political problems have some distributional ramifications, the relative gain or interest of the actor will reflect on the solution of the problem at any time and place, and obviously depends on powerful actors to solve the problem. It does not matter how well -designed the political structure is; power will always be the ultimate arbiter of the outcome of international politics. Consequently, power is the ultimate matter in international politics. But where therefore is the place of morality? As Kubalkova explains, international politics is the practical balancing of the demands of power on one hand and morality on the other

hand—just so as there exist dialectics between power and morality. Barkin said that realism is the corrective to idealism, but not a replacement.⁵⁰

But where are the compatibilities between realism and constructivism that they jointly explain the international politics.

Barkin identifies three major compatibilities between realism and constructivism: the logic of the social, recognition of the historical contingency and the need for reflexivity. Barkin said that all three elements of classical realism were lost in the second generation of realism development. He argues that if we want to consider power in global politics seriously as a social phenomenon, these elements have to be restored again. These three compatibilities can open a space where realism and constructivism can work together. Specially, the logic of the social distinguishes both theories from those that are grounded on the individualistic ontology. The recognition of the historical contingency distinguishes both approaches that focus on theories on the trans-historical structure of international politics. A need for reflexivity separates realism and constructivism from the theories that claim pure objectivity. Along with these compatibilities, realism and constructivism have many differences.⁵¹ But what can they really offer to each other?

According to Barkin, realism can offer two things to constructivism. First, realism offers constructivism a comprehensive way to think about power rather than the kind of liberal constructivism obtainable in the US. The liberal view of power can be constrained by social institutions. Then, power becomes the secondary issue to the institution. In the critical view, power exists in the social institution rather than in the agency. None allows studying the use of power or as a tool of policy to apply by actors in international politics. Therefore, realism offers a conceptual framework of power.

⁵⁰ Barkin, S, J (2003): Realist constructivism. *International studies review*, vol: 5, pp: 335

⁵¹ *ibidem*, pp: 330

This helps constructivists to study foreign policy through the concept of power. The second is that realism offers constructivism the relationship between empirical research and policy, including foreign policy analysis.⁵²

Meanwhile, constructivism also offers two things to realism. The first is very easy and simple: a useful practical way to study politics. Classical realism describes international politics as they are, not as they ought to be seen. It does not tell us what to do; it tells us how to study politics as they are. But constructivism offers realism a set of tools, a way forward to study international politics. This method is well developed and ontologically and epistemologically congenial for realism. It is not the only set of tool for realists to analyze international politics or relations. But Barkin argues that this particular tool addresses the question about social structure and change, and also questions the realist's concern with the national interest in the evolving, yet anarchical world.⁵³

The second thing constructivism offers to realism is an opportunity to deal with both the commitment to a political morality and an acceptance of moral relativism. The commitment to political morality is driven by national interest. All states are active in international politics according to their national interest. Without a national interest, there is no reason to support any aggregation of power by one's state. The realist sees this national interest in many ways. For example, Morgenthau sees national interest as way or tool to keep peace. Some others consider national interest as a way to survive. But this notion is only limited to the great powers that utilize their power for survival. Other realists accept the idea of national interest beyond the idea of survival by introducing the national interest as state behavior. But this idea gives a static image of national interest. Realism tried to ignore the political

⁵² Barkin, S, J (2003): Realist constructivism. *International studies review*, vol: 5, pp: 343

⁵³ *Ibidem*, pp: 345

morality over a time. Constructivism provides realism a way to think about the political morality that clearly recognizes the difference between the categories of empirical social constructs and normative theory. It bridges the gap in realism between the beliefs in foreign policy prescription and the reality that those beliefs are not universally held.⁵⁴

Finally, this dissertation conceives that constructivist realism is realism that takes the inter-subjectivity and co-constitution together and seriously. It focuses on structure as central mechanism or locus of change in international politics. We know that states are struggling for power, to achieve preference, and gain more outcomes from interactions. This power-seeking or struggling identity shapes the interest and preferences of actors in global politics. Sometimes actors seek more power to continue their hegemony while others establish their own hegemony. These struggling behaviors engender a system of anarchy when there is no system of global governance to hold back the struggling race. In an anarchic system, sometimes they are enemies, rivals or friends. Through this struggle, actors construct their new identities. Constructivist realism therefore helps to explain the formation of new identities in global politics.

2.3: Power in the lens of International Relations

In this section, the dissertation will find the answers to the following questions: what is power? How can power be measured?

The concept of power is the most contested and complicated notion in the field of International Relations (IR). Some scholars consider power as the ultimate instrument of control and influence in global politics. Conflict or war has been the

⁵⁴ Barkin, S, J (2003): Realist constructivism. *International studies review*, vol: 5, pp: 346

ultimate or constant aspect of power struggle in international affairs. Global politics is power politics. But this dissertation also assumes that power can be rooted in peaceful interaction such as negotiations and not necessarily in conflict and war.

After reviewing many studies on power scholarship, this study also assumes that power has no unique or universally accepted definition. Joseph Nye Jr. describes power in his book, *The future of power*, that generally some believe that power is the ability or capability to bring or resist any change in a specific framework. Other scholars define power as the ability to get what they want. Nye defined power as the capacity to do things and in a social situation to affect others to achieve the outcome that an actor wants. It can be defined as a technique to influence others in global politics.⁵⁵

But it is not easy to say how much power an actor has in global politics without specifying what they do with the power. Nye describes this as the “the scope of power and this translates to an identification of who iswho is involved in the domain of power...or what topics are involved in power”.⁵⁶ In the real world however, the definition of power depends on the motives and intention of the actors and the context of time. Nye Jnr explains power as “who gets what, how, where and when”⁵⁷.

Power can be perceived as a resource-based factor and behavioral or relational factors. David Baldwin describes this discourse as national power (resource) and relational approaches. Important resources that a state possesses determine its overall aggregate national power, for instance, the level of military expenditure, its GNP, the size of its armed forces, the size of its territory and the size of its population.

⁵⁵ Nye, J (2011). *The future of Power*. Public affairs. New York. Pp: 13-23

⁵⁶ *ibidem*

⁵⁷ *ibidem*

This resource-based power may convert into behavioral power.⁵⁸ Nye argues that national or resources-based power can determine expected outcomes in global notations. But converting national resources into relational or behavior power depends on the strategies and skill of the leadership in interactions. Nye calls this “soft power”.⁵⁹

Subsequently Nye introduced three different aspects of relational power: commanding to change, controlling agenda and establishing preferences in negotiations or interactions.

This dissertation assumes that, commanding power means having the ability of a state or an actor to change the behavior of other actors against their own initial preferences. Usually actors apply the commanding ability to change an opponent’s behavior, to influence preferences and shaping of opponents preferences in order to establish their own preferences. Robert Dahl is the pioneer of the commanding face of power and introduced it in the 1950s.⁶⁰ But in 1960, political scientists Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz criticized Dahl’s discourse and argued that Dhal somehow missed or did not mention one important face of power, which they considered to be the second face of power.⁶¹ Nye calls this *agenda setting*.⁶² Agenda framing helps actors to keep the own preferences on the list of discussion or bargaining and to achieve the best outcomes from any negotiation and interaction.

In 1970 Steven Lukes, a sociologist, introduced the third face of relational power. It describes the establishment of the preference for how other actors act according to the preferences set by others. In this face of power, actors push the

⁵⁸ Baldwin, D (1979). Power analysis and World Politics: New trends versus Old Tendencies. *World politics*, vol: 3, pp 161-194

⁵⁹ Nye, J (2011). The future of Power. *Public affairs*. New York. Pp: 13-23

⁶⁰ Dahl, R (1961). Who governs: Democracy and Power in the American city. Yale University Press. New Haven. Pp. 35

⁶¹ Bachrach, P and Baratz, M (1963). Decisions and non decisions: an analytical framework. *American political science review*, vol: 57, no: 3, pp:632-642

⁶² Nye, J (2011). The future of Power. *Public affairs*. New York. Pp: 13-23

preferences of other actors to get support for their own preferences. Normally, actors can reach in win-win situations in this face of power.⁶³

Based on the Nye argument, this dissertation assumes that commanding power is more visible and tangible than the other two faces of power. Agenda controlling or preferences setting power is co-optive, more subtle, less visible and a matter of perception. To achieve preferred outcome through the co-optive option means that there must be an agenda setting and there must be persuasion and an attraction in the negotiation or in the interactive process.

This study conceives that the concept of power can be explained by all IR theories but is closely associated with the idea of realism. As the main analytical framework of this paper is based on constructivist-realism, therefore, constructivist and realist notion of power will be presented in the following paragraphs.

Constructivism considers power to be a causal relation between one action and another. Oppenheim describes anarchy as the “law of jungle, rule without government, social organization without hierarchy”.⁶⁴ Power acts in that situation as a medium of communication. Luhmann defines power as not an action, but a way of communication. It depends on the will and motivation of actors. It is a kind of explanation of actions in global politics. Here, actions are a concept of power is not intended; instead, power is political intervention.⁶⁵

On the other hand, realist scholars believe that power is the decisive factor of relations among the actors in global politics. Power is the *sine qua non* in international politics. Realism concentrates more on power politics. Brian C Schmidt argued that “realists are the theorists of power politics; the role of power has been,

⁶³ Lukes, S (2005). Power: A radical view. Palgrave Macmillan. London. Pp: 39-50

⁶⁴ Oppenheim, F.E (1976). Power and Causation. Power and Political Theory, Barry, B (ed). The Pitman press, pp: 103-116

⁶⁵ Guzzini, S (2007) The Concept of Power: A constructivist Analysis. Power in the World Politics. Berenskoetter, F and Williams, M,J.(eds). Routledge. Oxon. Pp: 23-42

and continues to be, central to any theory of realism”.⁶⁶ Realists believe that actors are in a continuous struggle for power. Conflict and competition are the natural practice of International relations.

Classical realists believe that power politics is a law of human behavior; it is given and natural. Actions to amass power and dominate or control others are fundamental aspects of human nature. And the behavior of states reflects that of the people who comprise the state.

Morgenthau, the most famous classical realist, argues that the goal of every state is to maximize power. Three basic patterns of the struggle for power are: to keep power to maintain the status quo, to increase power (imperialism), and to demonstrate power for prestige.⁶⁷

Structural realism conceives of power-seeking as the function of International anarchy. Structural realism shifts the locus of the struggle for power from human nature to the anarchical environment that states inhabit. Waltz’s competition and the conflict of states stem directly from the anarchic condition.⁶⁸ In the anarchic situation, self-help is the principle of the action. Scholars divide structural realism into two parts: defensive and offensive realism.

Offensive and defensive realism both believe in anarchy. But the gap between offensive and defensive realism is in how much power the actor has. Offensive realism argues that all great powers possess some offensive military capability, since survival is the primary preference of states, and that states are rational actors. Power is the key concept of offensive realism. Actors are power maximisers. Therefore the

⁶⁶ Schmidt, B,C (2007). Realist conception of power. *Power in the World Politics*. Berenskoetter, F and Williams, M,J.(eds). Routledge. Oxon. Pp: 43-63

⁶⁷ Morgenthau, j. Hans (1978). *Politics Among Nations: The struggle for power and peace*. Fifth editions revised. Alfred A Knopf. New York. Pp: 4-15

⁶⁸ Grieco, M, J (2007). Structural Realism and the problem of polarity and war. *Power in the World Politics*. Berenskoetter, F and Williams, M,J.(eds). Routledge. Oxon. Pp: 64-81

other hand defensive realism stands for the position that actors will seek power to minimize power gap in global politics rather than maximize power.⁶⁹

Neo-classical realists argue that power is a mechanism that states are expected to pursue subject to cost benefit calculations. Guzzini has introduced the lump concept of power, meaning all elements of power can be combined into one general indicator.⁷⁰

Based on this discussion, we can adopt a definition of power that states national power can be converted into relational or behavioral power in order to achieve an expected outcome in global politics. In order to achieve the preferred outcome, power can be applied to **winning negotiations, limiting alternatives and shaping normality** in negotiations.⁷¹ This dissertation will examine how power is exercised by both existing and emerging powers in climate negotiations and how power is shifting from north to south and how southern countries are achieving more and more power in global negotiations.

2.4: Identity and International Relations

Identity is the most fluid and complex notion in the realm of International Relations (IR). The question of identity is definitive in international politics. Who is active or whose action shapes international politics? Generally, realists and constructivists consider the state to be the main actor in global politics. Both realists and constructivists argue that identity forms in global politics within the state structure. As a part of the political process, states have political identity.

⁶⁹ Schmidt, B,C (2007). Realist conception of power. *Power in the World Politics*. Berenskoetter, F and Williams, M,J.(eds). Routledge. Oxon. Pp: 43-63

⁷⁰ Guzzini, S (2007) *The Concept of Power: A constructivist Analysis*. *Power in the World Politics*. Berenskoetter, F and Williams, M,J (eds). Routledge. Oxon. Pp: 23-42

⁷¹ Berenskoetter, F (2007). *Thinking about Power*. *Power in the World Politics*. Berenskoetter, F and Williams, M. J (eds). Routledge. Oxon. Pp:1-22

But at the same time, states have different types of identity according to their military capabilities, natural capabilities, size of their population and size of the territory. For example, there is super power, middle power, emerging power and so on. States get their identities by applying strategies to achieve goals. Identity formation is a continuous process and never finishes. Solidarity, competition, global equity, political-social interaction help get identity. Interaction provides the identity and produces the “we and they” dichotomy.⁷² For example, the neo-conservatives in the US hold a position of ‘either with us or with the devils’. Samuel Huntington defines Latin American immigrants as unassimilatable and Muslims as external others who pose a threat to their economy and security in his famous book *Clash of Civilization*. Apart from this, some scholars argue that identity is developed through adversarial struggles. Lebow claims that there is historical evidence of this kind of identity. He mentions the Israelites and this author also considers the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan as pertinent instances of identities developed through adversarial struggles.⁷³

IR scholarship mainly focuses on the state, but many non-state actors are now active in shaping policy and interests in global political action. Some scholars think that it is time to redefine identity in global politics. For example, Spike Peterson is one of the advocates for redistributing the definition of identity in IR. He argues that the boundaries of identity are no longer secure.⁷⁴ The environmental protection movement, the anti-militarism, the anti-religious fundamentalism, the feminist movement, and ethnicity have generated many sub-national and trans-national and non-state identities in global politics.

⁷² Lebow, N, R (2008). Identity and International relations. *International Relations*. SAGE publications. London, vol: 22.4, pp: 673-492

⁷³ ibidem

⁷⁴ Peterson, V (1993). Politics of Identity in International Relations, *The Fletcher F. World Aff.* Vol: 17, p: 1.

Lebow argues that in the last two decades, non-state actors, especially NGOs and many social movements, have united many actors on the cosmopolitan notion of democracy beyond the state. The emergence of non-state actors in global politics has challenged many established institutions.⁷⁵

By considering the abovementioned discussion, this dissertation will take into account the idea of state and non-state identity in global politics. Finally, this dissertation will explain how state actors are forming new identities and non-state actors are shaping policy and interests in climate negotiations.

2.5: Other concepts

This chapter also includes a short description of related concepts to provide an overview of the case study. It is recognized that many concepts and pieces of terminology are confusing. The same term applies in different way in academic and general usages. Here are definitions of concepts in the following part and how they will be used in this dissertation.

2.5.1: Climate change:


In IPCC terms, Climate change refers to a change or shift in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g. using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties and which persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer.⁷⁶ It refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity. This usage differs from that in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), where climate change refers to a change in climate that is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and that is in

⁷⁵ Lebow, N, R (2008). Identity and International relations. *International Relations*. SAGE publications. London, vol: 22.4, pp: 673-492

⁷⁶ IPCC website: <http://www.ipcc.ch/>

addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods. IPCC defined climate change as a long-term shift in the statistics of the weather (including its averages). For example, it could show up as a change in climate normals (expected average values for temperature and precipitation) for a given place and time of year, from one decade to the next. We know that the global climate is currently changing apparently because apparently in last decade of the 20th Century and the beginning of the 21st have been the warmest period in the entire global instrumental temperature record, starting in the mid-19th century.

Figure 1 : Temperature rise



Source: US Energy Agency

Why is the Climate Changing?

Climate change is a normal part of the Earth's natural variability, which is related to interactions among the atmosphere, ocean, and land, as well as changes in the amount of solar radiation reaching the earth. The geologic record includes significant evidence for large-scale climate changes in Earth's past.⁷⁷

Human-induced change Greenhouse Gases

Certain gases, such as carbon dioxide (CO₂) and water vapor (H₂O), trap heat in the atmosphere causing a greenhouse effect. The burning of fossil fuels, like oil, coal, and natural gases has added CO₂ to the atmosphere. The current level is the highest in the past 650,000 years. The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concludes, "that most of the observed increase in the globally averaged temperature since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations."⁷⁸

Scientists predict that if greenhouse gas(GHG's) emission continue unchecked, the World will face mass destruction, water, energy and food security, the loss of reefs through coral bleaching, rising sea levels, costal and infrastructural damage, and human death and suffering from a growing incidence of 'extreme weather'. Paul G. Harris argues that Climate Change is not only a technical matter to be resolved by scientists, but also a political issue with political implications as all level of global governance. It has been the subject of three decades of diplomacy⁷⁹. There is currently a diplomatic negotiation for getting such situation to stabilize the GHG concentration into the atmosphere. But failure in the negotiation process has produced increasing concerns over the capacity of the climate negotiation process.

⁷⁷ National Oceanic and atmospheric administration. US. Available at: <http://www.nws.noaa.gov/os/brochures/climate/Climatechange.pdf>. Accessed on 15 February, 2012.

⁷⁸ National Oceanic and atmospheric administration. US. Available at: <http://www.nws.noaa.gov/os/brochures/climate/Climatechange.pdf>. Accessed on 15 February, 2012.

⁷⁹ Harris, G,P (2009). Introduction: The glacial politics of climate change, Paul G. Harris (eds), The Politic of climate change: Environmental Dynamics in International affairs. Routledge. New York. p 1

2.5.2: Conflict

As a generic term “conflict” means a clash or clashes on specific issues among actors in a system. Stefan Wolf discusses conflict is as old as human civilization a social phenomenon of competition among actors in order to achieve same preferences.⁸⁰ Regarding the political system, current research project accepts the definition of conflict of Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research. It refers to as a clash of interest among actors according to their different positions. “This clash is over the values of some duration and magnitude between at least two parties (organized groups, states, groups of states, organizations) that are determined to pursue their interests and achieve their goals”.⁸¹

This dissertation also accepts the idea of conflict that denotes struggle between opposing forces for victory or supremacy. Conflict applies both to open fighting between hostile groups and to a struggle between antithetical forces. It can be struggle or clash between opposing forces. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, conflict is a state of opposition between ideas, interests, etc or disagreement or controversy among parties.⁸² The Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research identified territorial occupation, secession, decolonization, autonomy, system/ideology, national power, regional predominance, international power, resources as sources of conflict among the actors in global politics.⁸³

This dissertation will pay attention to and identify the nature and causes of current conflict among the actors in climate negotiations.

⁸⁰ Wolf, S. The study of Conflict in Political Science and International relations. Available at: [file:///C:/Dokumente%20und%20Einstellungen/Maruf/Eigene%20Dateien/Downloads/The%20Study%20of%20Conflict%20in%20Political%20Science%20and%20IR%20\(1\).pdf](file:///C:/Dokumente%20und%20Einstellungen/Maruf/Eigene%20Dateien/Downloads/The%20Study%20of%20Conflict%20in%20Political%20Science%20and%20IR%20(1).pdf). Accessed on 25 February, 2015

⁸¹ Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict research. Methodological approach. Available at: http://www.hiik.de/en/methodik/methodik_bis_2002.html. Accessed on 31 December, 2014

⁸² Oxford Dictionary. <http://www.oed.com/>

⁸³ Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict research. Methodological approach. Available at: http://www.hiik.de/en/methodik/methodik_bis_2002.html. Accessed on 31 December, 2014

2.5.3: Negotiation

There are many ways in which negotiations or negotiation behavior may be conceptualized. In relation to the area of inquiry of this dissertation, three aspects of negotiation are important: negotiation strategy, coalitions and framing the agenda.

Negotiation strategy may be understood in relation to the bargaining spectrum. Mainly two types of strategy are adopted by actors in negotiations: distributive or value claiming strategy and integrative or value creating strategies. Distributive strategies include tactics like refusing to make any concessions, threatening to hold other preferences, issuing threats and penalties, limiting the other actor's alternatives. On the other hand, integrative strategy adopts the technique of widening the issue of area to explore a common solution.⁸⁴

Bloc type versus issue-based coalitions is effective for this research rather than balance versus bandwagon. Bloc type coalition consist of like-minded actors unifying based on some common value, identity and beliefs. It adopts a wide range of positions over a long time. In contrast, issue-based coalitions are for a short-term for some specific type of issue. Stephen M. Walt defines balancing on the one hand as allying with others to prevent a threat, and bandwagoning as a kind of alignment against a source of threat or danger.⁸⁵ This type of coalitional approach helps us to understand climate negotiations and power shift. We will see in the analysis of following chapters the emergence of bloc types, issue specific and balancing coalition approaches among emerging powers. Bandwagoning is also not rare in the climate negotiations.

The fundamental aspects of negotiations for power are ideational. In the international negotiation, agenda framing is the most important thing. John Odell,

⁸⁴ Narlikar, A. (2003). Negotiating the rise of new power. *International Affairs*, vol: 3, pp:561-576

⁸⁵ Walt, M, Stephan, (1985), Alliance formation and balance of world power. *International Security*. Vol.9, no: 4, pp: 3-43


for example, describes how “negotiation” is a contest or competition among the parties and that each party attempts to establish the dominance role by framing their own agenda.⁸⁶

2.6: Hypothesis

According to the previous theoretical and conceptual discussion, this dissertation conceives the idea that global politics is anarchic. There is no global institution to control the actors. This dissertation assumes that the UNFCCC is a global institution but it has no executive power. There is debate among classical realists and constructivists as to whether anarchy is a natural or systemic construction. But constructivists and neo-realists agree that anarchy is not a given. Neo-realism argues that anarchy is a system and constructivism explains that this system is constructed through the interaction among the actors. But both realism and constructivism agree that anarchy makes actors concerned over security. Security concerns motivate actors to balance power in the self-help system. In order to achieve security, states seek followers with the same interests. Their shared interests help them create alliances, collective identities or power centrism to protect their interests. In order to do this, states always try to influence global politics, interaction and negotiations. Many states individually or collectively are able to influence global politics, interactions or negotiations, which bring some changes in the global normative power structure.

Figure 2: Theoretical diagram of climate politics


⁸⁶ Odell, J. (2006). *Negotiating trade: Developing countries in WTO and NAFTA*. Cambridge press. Cambridge. Pp-1-41



Source: Author's compilation

From these possibilities, this dissertation will examine the following hypothesis: ***i) global power is shifting from north to south ii) change in the normative power structure and new identities in power order***

Figure 3: Hypothesis



Source: Author's compilation

2.7: Research design and methodology

The framework of this study inquires the global power shift in a different time period of climate negotiations. This dissertation raised questions based on the main hypothesis (i) what type of power is shifting (ii) the impact of power shift to global politics. In order to test these two hypotheses, the author has chosen to explain climate negotiation in many phases. An explanation of different time periods of climate negotiations will help us to understand who the major players in negotiations process are, how emerging powers came closer in the negotiations process, how they fixed their agenda, how they achieved their demands and, finally, the formation of the power shifting process.

This dissertation assumes that the US, the EU, China, Brazil and India, are the top players in climate negotiations according to their emissions levels and national resources. Most significant is that China and India are known to be rivals in regional politics. But they are in the same group in climate politics. They have many joint statements on climate negotiations. This dissertation describes China as the leader of developing countries. China gets some advantages because of the size of its economy and image. But this dissertation also hypothesizes that the relationship among emerging powers is not hierarchal, but rather it is horizontal, although the whole negotiations process is vertical. In order to test the hypotheses, climate negotiations will be operationalized within the theoretical framework in the following way:

2.7.1: Operationalization of case study

As it has been mentioned in hypotheses, climate negotiation causes changes in the normative power structure, and the emergence of new powers in global politics is the result of changes in the normative power structure. In the case of a relationship between structural change and the emergence of new identities, the dependent

variable of this hypothesis is choice, strategy and tactics in climate negotiations. These variables will be measured by the actions and statement of actors. Dependent variables will be measured based on three factors: controlling agenda, winning/influence negotiation and limiting alternatives to the opponents.

- I) **Controlling Agenda:** This factor will be assessed by the actions, statement, behavior, and moves of the major actors in the negotiations.
- II) **Limiting the alternative:** This will be assessed by the collective action by emerging actors.
- III) **Wining negotiations/influence:** This factor will be assessed by the outcomes of actions, statements and moves.

Independent variables are the security issues that provoke the actor to adopt actions and strategies in negotiations. National resources will measure independent variables. Emissions levels, economic growth, hegemony, energy security will be the explanatory factors for both dependent and independent variables.

The research tradition of this dissertation is influenced by Sil and Katzenstein's "analytic eclecticism" to analyze interactions among the actors. Analytic eclecticism helps us construct new knowledge by combining different approaches. As Sil and Katzenstein state, the individual approach is not enough to explain any complex issues such as climate negotiations. Collecting elements from different approaches will help to explain this. They claim that the rigidity in knowledge approach has decreased over this period.⁸⁷ Analytic eclecticism allows us to combine realism and

⁸⁷ Sil, R and Peter, J, K (2010). Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions, *Perspectives on Politics*, Volume 8, Issue 02 (June 2010), pp. 411-431.

constructivism, though historically they oppose each other according to traditional IR scholarship.

It should be noted that climate negotiations are a multidimensional case study and power shift and negotiations are lengthy processes with different phases. Therefore, dependent and independent variables will be applied for different phases of negotiations.

2.7.2: Structure of case study

Climate negotiations as case study in this dissertation demonstrate the global power shifting process. The whole negotiations process is divided into two parts: Global institution & policy and the genesis of the negotiation. Each part is structured in a similar way. First, a brief background of part of the case study is presented. Second, an analysis of case studies according to the analytical perspective and variables would be followed by a conclusion including findings.

2.7.3: Source of data and analysis

The research is based on qualitative methodology. In order to understand climate politics and the negotiation process, it was essential to directly observe climate negotiations, as it is the most complicated current situation in international politics. It was a huge task to compile the data and analyze it. Qualitative research methodology followed to gather data and to answer the research questions. Research methodology was divided into different parts. The first part was the analysis of the text. The second part was to conduct interviews to get empirical data. The primary focus of the research is on the interaction of actors in the negotiation process. The analytical part is largely based on the Barkins research project to integrate realism and constructivism. This paper examines the emergence of new power order in global politics, which creates new identities for emerging powers. Barkins constructivist

realism theory has been applied to analyze the interaction of power seeking and defending actors. This work is also influenced by Waltz's neo-realism and Wendt's social constructivism to apply the Barkins constructivist realism. This paper also follows the concept of power provided by E H Carr and others as it has been discussed above. In order to examine hypothesis through theoretical lens empirical data has been collected by two means. The first was text analysis. For example, documents from the UNFCCC have been selected to get some interactive data. Statements, proposal, speech of the major actors in the conferences, articles of newspapers have been reviewed. Secondly, in order to obtain qualitative data there was an extensive semi structured interview survey. Around 40 people were interviewed. They are senior diplomats, negotiators, researchers, NGO activists, journalists, and students who are following the negotiation process.

Chapter 3: Institutional framework and genesis of negotiations

3.1: Institutional framework of UNFCCC

Though immediate and effective action is required, global institutions for climate negotiations have moved slowly under the current regime. Output from the top climate negotiations regime of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has not been able to bring any significant change in climate policies. The following parts of this chapter will discuss the function of the UNFCCC and its main features.

3.1.1: Background

In the last two decades, many regimes have been established to tackle climate change and its future consequences. But the UNFCCC remains the top climate governance mechanism. UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol are the main pillars in the negotiation process and set the target for developed countries to limit emissions. But the existing global regimes have failed to reduce emissions by following the KP. Emission rates have actually increased since KP was negotiated. In 2007, the Bali Action plan launched negotiations to reach an agreement in 2009 at the Copenhagen summit. But global leaders could not make any deal on this.

The UNFCCC was established in 1992 and came into force in 1994 with the ultimate goal to reducing emissions to levels that would prevent interference with the climate system. The UNFCCC is an intergovernmental framework set up by the United Nations, UN, to tackle climate change. The main objective of the convention is to “stabilize of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to

enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner”⁸⁸. According to Article Three of UNFCCC convention, its main principles are equity, common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and special needs for particularly vulnerable countries. It states that parties should take precautionary measurement to tackle the adverse effect of climate change and to promote sustainable economic growth and development⁸⁹.

The convention divided its member states into three groups according to their commitment to reduce emissions and economic status. First, Annex-1 party- mainly made up of industrial developed countries that were members of the OECD in 1992 and countries that were in economic transition (EIT)-including Russia, the Baltic States, and several central and eastern European countries. They committed to adopt climate change policies and measures to reduce emissions to the level of 1990 by 2000. Also they agreed to make regular reports on their implementation of the Convention – in particular, on the policies and measures they were taking and the impacts that these were having on emissions trends, as well as on the amount of Greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere.

The second group was the Annex II Party- consisting of OECD members of Annex I, but not the EIT parties. They committed to provide financial resources to enable developing countries to undertake emissions-reduction activities under the Convention and to help them adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. In addition, they have to “take all practicable steps” to promote the development and transfer of environmentally friendly technologies to EIT Parties and developing countries. Funding provided by Annex II Parties is channeled mostly through the

⁸⁸ Article 2, UNFCCC conventions, available on http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf, web accessed on 15 Dec, 2014

⁸⁹ Article 3, UNFCCC conventions, available on http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf, web accessed on 15 Dec, 2014

Convention's financial mechanism.

The Non-Annex group is mostly made up of developing countries. They committed to undertake the general obligation to formulate and implement national programs on mitigation and adaptation.⁹⁰

For instance, the G77 & China, the African Group, the Alliance of Small Islands of 43 states (AOSIS), least developed countries (LDC), OPEC parties, Umbrella group, the EU and Environment integrity group are the recognized groups of Non-Annex group of UNFCCC.

The G77 & China **is the biggest group of** altogether 130 countries. Its main position is that the rich countries should accept their historical responsibility for climate change and greatly reduce their emissions while allowing the G77 & China to continue to develop. Of course, there is some disagreement and tensions due to the wide diversity among countries and regions within that group.⁹¹ But member countries are very much united. Sudan, for instance, has a strong voice and strongly criticized the Danish draft, the BASIC draft and the 'Final Accord' at the Copenhagen conference. Patrick Lumumba, Chairman of G77 in 2009 and ambassador of the Sudan, considered the accord a suicide pact, or at best a means to maintain the economic dominance of a few countries

One of the most influential groups, the African Group, is made up of 50 countries, which highlight their vulnerability to climate change and issues of concern, such as poverty and access to resources. Most of the African Group of countries are members of the G77. On the eve of the COP-15, they gathered in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa and set their agenda such to take more mitigation action in developed

⁹⁰ UNFCCC website. www.unfccc.com, web Accessed on 14th may 2010.

⁹¹ International Institute for environment and development, "A Guide to the UN Climate Change Summit", available at <http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/17074IIED.pdf>, web accessed on 24th April, 2010

and advanced developing countries, financial assistance to African countries for adaptation. Another influential group in the negotiation is the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), a coalition of 43 small islands and low-lying coastal countries that share concerns about rising sea levels.

The 49 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are the world's poorest countries and are mostly in Africa. Their emissions are insignificant compared to those of other countries and they are the least prepared for the changes ahead. Although most of their members are also part of the G77&China, the LDCs and AOSIS want large developing nations such as China and India to reduce their emissions and are calling for tougher action to address climate change than any other groups.⁹²

BASIC, an informal group, is the most influential and powerful pact of emerging economic countries (China, Brazil, India and South Africa) is not an officially recognized negotiation group but it has emerged as a strong and influential group in COP15 in the negotiation process. Their proposals have caused debate several times among the parties, and are mainly opposed by the African Group and G77. The **Most Vulnerable Countries** (MVC) group is an informal alliance of the LDC, SIDS and African countries. Most of the members of this group are poor and developing. The Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CRN) is not an official negotiating group but it often issues joint statements. The European Union (EU), which comprises 27 member states, negotiates as a unified entity. The Umbrella Group brings together non-EU industrialized nations (Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Ukraine and the United States), but currently they are not very active in negotiation. The Environmental Integrity

⁹² International Institute for environment and development, "A Guide to the UN Climate Change Summit", available at <http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/17074IIED.pdf>, web accessed on 24th April, 2010

Group (Mexico, South Korea and Switzerland, together with Liechtenstein and Monaco) sometimes intervene as a separate negotiating group to ensure their inclusion in last-minute, closed-door negotiations. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is not a formal negotiating group, but its 13 member states closely coordinate their positions.⁹³


Apart from this, state actors, many NGOs are also active and play effective roles in climate negotiations. **Climate Action network (CAN)** is a network of NGOs and has influence in the negotiation process. They can join the decision making process and submit proposals as an observer. Another influential group is the **Epistemic Community** consisting of experts. They are members of the government and NGO delegation. They are very active and applied their knowledge and intellectual capacity as soft power in climate negotiation on many occasions.

By reviewing the convention, it is clear that the ultimate decision-making body of the convention is its conference of parties (COP), which meets every year. It has two subsidiary bodies. The subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice (SBSTA) provides information to the COP on technology, science and methodology. The subsidiary body for implementation (SBI) looks after implementation processes, such as financial and administrative processes. And the conference of the parties serving as the Meeting of Parties (MOP) to the Kyoto protocol (CMP) meets every year during the time of the COP. It is the supreme body of the Kyoto protocol. The decision making process of UNFCCC is based on the consensus of the parties, and it is obligatory for parties to make any decision. This dissertation assumes that it fosters anarchy in the climate regime. There is a great difference of power of individual nations as their negotiating teams vary greatly in size, skills and experience. To

⁹³ International Institute for environment and development, "A Guide to the UN Climate Change Summit", available at <http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/17074IIED.pdf>, web accessed on 24th April, 2010

address this issue, nations made many alliances to negotiate on common interests at all climate meetings. But it is a bit complicated, because some countries are in the different groups and each group has its own position on climate change issues and plays a very significant role in the negotiation process.

Figure 4: Organogram of the UNFCCC



Source: Author’s compilation

3.1.2: Conclusion

This dissertation assumes that climate negotiations are anarchic by the structure of the UNFCCC. The main actors are sometimes rivals and sometimes friends in climate negotiations. This anarchy in the climate negotiation is not given. It is a result of the global structural system. Structurally the UNFCCC was anarchic when it was formulated. It allows the most powerful countries to act to bolster their interests and benefit as the formation of the UNFCCC was highly influenced by the interest of its member states.

The UNFCCC as an institution suffers from many weakness. For example, the objective of the conventions was to stabilize GHG concentration at levels that would

prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference to the climate system. But it did not specify what a “dangerous” level would be. This could be a result of anarchy, because top emitters are not interested in solving this issue. Or, on the contrary, not specifying the levels might have brought anarchy and chaos to climate negotiations. Sergio Castellari argues that specifying the level is a political question and is related to socio-political and economic issues and scientific judgment as well.⁹⁴ This dissertation argues that the UNFCCC did not bring any effective outcomes to reduce emissions. Although it delivered some protocols, action plans and accords, these are very weak and flawed agreements and have not brought any action. It did not produce any legal mechanism to hold member countries accountable to each other. The Kyoto protocol, the first agreement to bind countries to reduce emissions, was considered a pledge between the parties. It has become an international blame game. Aubrey Meyer argues that the current climate negotiation is an international blame game and the UNFCCC approach reflects the interests of parties as individuals or groups.⁹⁵ If this convention fails to deliver an effective outcome, it will be considered a dead horse and parties will consider it to be in their interest to join meetings.⁹⁶ Then it will become a meeting of elite emitters.

By reviewing decisions implementing process, this dissertation identifies that the UNFCCC acts as a facilitator to parties. It has no capacity to oblige its member states to implement any decision. It recognizes its member state as sovereign entities. For instance, the United Nations has the power to impose sanctions on its member states. The UNFCCC is flexible compared to any other International treaty and protocol. Decisions taken by the COP are not bindings on its members. These

⁹⁴ Kastellari, S. (2014). International climate politics towards a climate agreement, available at: http://ckic-phd-ffm.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Lecture_s.castellari_3.9.14-PDF.pdf

⁹⁵ Sagara, T. (2012) Is there realistic ways to improve UNFCCC? Available at:

http://www.climaticoanalysis.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/tsagara_interview.pdfTakasj

⁹⁶ Huq, S. (2014) Is UN climate change body fit for purpose? The Dhaka Tribune. Dhaka. Dec 21.


activities at the UNFCCC are mere voluntary activities. Now, the UNFCCC is trying to move to the legal binding option for member states. Surprisingly, the UNFCCC could not fix the definition of CBDR. CBDR is widely related to economic situation of member countries and the economic situation is changing in member states. For instance, Qatar and Kuwait are still considered developing countries. But the per capita income has increased since 1992 in these two countries. Therefore, the main problem of the UNFCCC is its decision making system. It does not have any voting system in the decision making process. It takes all decision on consensus. The UNFCCC does not have any option to enforce its decisions, like other international treaties such as the International Maritime protocol, the International Vessel convention, and International Marine Protection Act. These treaties have an option to punish signatory parties who choose not to obey the law. But the UNFCCC does not have this kind of executive power inherent in these pacts. This flexibility fosters anarchy in climate negotiations. Major players in climate negotiations are controlling the entire negotiation process.

Finally, this dissertation accepts the idea that the UNFCCC has moved away from its objective of stabilizing GHG concentrations according to precaution and equity. Many others issues have been included in the negotiations process. In the following chapters, this dissertation will describe the anarchic politics of climate change and causes of movement of the negotiation track. At the same time, this research advises that in order to achieve the objective and principles of the convention, it has to be more realistic. Some scholars argue that by focusing on issues, the deficiencies of the UNFCCC can be solved. As Abouyer Meyer suggests, “contraction and convergence” can solve the problems of the UNFCCC.

3.2: Genesis of negotiation: Realism replaces Optimism.

This chapter will examine the strategies and tactics of the major actors in climate negotiations and also will provide a historical overview of climate negotiations over four decades. This chapter will show how optimism has been replaced by realism. This dissertation divides climate negotiations into four periods to provide a brief account of the climate negotiations process. Throughout the period of climate negotiations, climate change problems have become developmental as well as with many complexities at different periods of time. This chapter will examine positions, statements and submissions on some specific issues, for example, mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer and the financial assistance of major actors, to explain how they control, influence and limit the agenda in negotiations. Sometimes actors are involved in many groups. Therefore group statements are also considered in this chapter as individual actors' views. For example, at the beginning of negotiations China always pushed the G77&China to deliver their position on specific issues. On the other hand, the Umbrella Group most of the time delivered statements on behalf of Annex-1 countries, particularly the US position. Canada, Japan and Australia were very active on behalf of the Umbrella group at the beginning of negotiations.

Figure 5: Timeline of climate negotiations



Source: Author’s compilation

3.2.1: 1972-1990- Agenda setting and early response to problem

The first phase of climate negotiations was to identify problems and set the agenda to solve problems. Nation states started to discuss environmental problems and pollution. Besides nation states, non-state actors also became active in the agenda setting process with the benefit of their research and knowledge. Actually, the identification of environment problems, pollution and the climate change issues took place among scientists. In 1960, scientists established the idea through a remote observation system that concentration of CO₂ in atmospheres was increasing. The so-called CO₂ measurement line named “Keeling curve” showed the rise of CO₂ and led to scientific apprehension.⁹⁷ In early 1970, politicians also started to consider environment-related problems with some seriousness.

⁹⁷ Bodansky, D. (2001). The history of the global climate change régime. *International relations and global climate change*, pp: 23-40.

Background: Global leaders met in 1972 in Stockholm at the conference of “Human Environment” to discuss environmental degradation. Leaders from 113 countries, inter-governmental organizations, NGOs and experts joined this conference. World leaders gathered in Stockholm to reduce increasing pollution. Daniel Bodansky describes how the Stockholm conference focused on industrial pollution-oil spills and waste being dumped into the sea⁹⁸. This conference recognized that the environment was endangered and required a collective global effort to protect it. At the same time, the Stockholm conference also accepted the argument that the developed world had ignored the protection of the environment while the developed countries argued that poverty causes pollution.⁹⁹ But developing countries, such as China, India, Brazil, argued in the Stockholm conference that unsustainable development causes pollution and it is necessary to eradicate poverty from developing countries. Poverty cannot be identified as a cause of pollution. The Stockholm Conference concluded with a declaration and an action plan. This conference insisted on involving industrialized countries to address environment problems. The conference identified some industrial problems, such as water pollution, air pollution, habitat degradation, and acid rain. It also advised industrialized countries to fill the gap between developed and poor countries. The Stockholm conference was the first meeting on environment problems after World War II. It also introduced the notion that development and the environment are related to each other. Following the Stockholm Action Plan, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was established.

Since the Stockholm conference, there have been many meetings and conferences on environmental issues. Facing increasing industrial pollution, the epistemic community arranged a meeting in 1979 in Geneva. The World

⁹⁸ ibidem

⁹⁹ Bhandari, P. (1998). Historical perspective on negotiations. *Climate change*, pp:51-60.

Meteorological Organization (WMO) and other international organizations organized this conference. For the first time, climate change was recognized as a problem in this conference by the epistemic community even though this was supposed to be a scientific conference, mostly attended by researchers and academics. Four different working groups were founded in order to examine data related to climate change, and they were as follows: to identify climate change, create integrated impact studies and research climate variability and change in the atmosphere.

The Geneva Conference concluded with a declaration to urge the global community "to foresee and to prevent potential man-made changes in climate that might be adverse to the well-being of humanity." This conference identified some causes for the increase in atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide. They recognized that the burning of fossil fuels, deforestation, and changes in use of land are increasing global warming, and causes change in climate status.¹⁰⁰

A few conferences also took place after 1979. In 1983, the UN established the World Commission on Environment and Development. It was mainly known as the Brundtland Commission. Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland was the head of this commission. The commission published its first report titled "Our Common Future" in 1987 on issues to the environment and development together. He also suggested the use of the term, 'sustainable development.'¹⁰¹ This report advised to adopt sustainable development that will not endanger the environment in the future.

The WMO and UNEP organized the Villach conference in 1985 to call on the global community to initiate a global climate convention. The Villach conference warned the global community regarding the adverse effects of climate change. But the Toronto Conference of 1988 was very significant for the climate change issue for

¹⁰⁰ UNFCCC website, accessed on 19 June, 2012

¹⁰¹ Meakin, S. (1992). The Rio Earth Summit: Summary of the United Nation Conference on Environment and development. FAO.

many reasons. The Toronto conference recommended reducing CO₂ emissions by 20% by 2005 and to form a legal framework. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was founded in 1988 to assess the impact of climate change. The IPCC published its first report in 1990. It predicted that global temperatures were likely to increase by 0.3°C in every decade under the current development policy or trajectory. The IPCC and World conference on climate change in 1990 called for a global treaty to tackle the climate change problem. Negotiations at the UN General Assembly also started at the same time. The UN established the Intergovernmental Negotiations Committee (INC).¹⁰² The first meeting of the Inter-governmental negotiation committee was held in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil. It was known as the Rio Earth Summit.

Outcomes: In this phase, states, NGOs, scientists and academics started to work together. The epistemic community expressed their concerns on climate change issues first. They suggested taking action in conferences, meetings and in reports to assess the seriousness of the problem and identify the causes of the problem. Experts advised taking precautionary steps to the global community. The global community intended to distribute the responsibility among the states. Specific targets were set for developed countries. For example, developed countries were advised to provide resources to developing countries in order to fill the gap between developed and developing countries. But climate change created a debate between developed and developing countries. States were mobilized in order to take action on mitigation and adaptation. It was recognized in 1972 at the Stockholm Conference that pollution is the result of unregulated industrialization and unprecedented development activities.

¹⁰² Bodansky, D. (2001). The history of the global climate change regime. *International relations and global climate change*, pp: 23-40.

On the other hand, developed countries argued that pollution was a factor but poverty was the main problem. Countries needed to develop.¹⁰³

Another significant step in the first phase of the climate negotiations was the decision to establish an Intergovernmental Panel on climate change (IPCC) in 1988 to monitor the real situation and trends of climate change. The IPCC published its first report in 1990 and urged global leaders to take action to tackle climate change.

Figure 6: Key points of the first phase

- **Pollution is a problem**
- **Unregulated industrialization causes pollution**
- **Developed countries should fill gap with developing countries**
- **Burning of fossil fuels, deforestation, and changes in land uses are increasing global warming**
- **Call for a global treaty to tackle the climate change problem**

Source: Author's compilation

3.2.2: 1992-1996- Pre Kyoto

The Rio Earth Summit and Berlin Mandate are the two major pre-Kyoto events in this phase of climate negotiations. Global leaders signed a treaty to establish the UNFCCC in 1992 and declared the Berlin Mandate to oblige Annex-1 developed countries to reduce emissions by 1995. These decisions came after a huge debate among the parties in climate negotiations. At the end, the parties made some

¹⁰³ Bodansky, D. (2001). The history of the global climate change regime. *International relations and global climate change*, pp: 23-40.

decisions on climate change particularly on mitigation and adaptation. The following part of this chapter will discuss how negotiations were influenced by some developed and emerging developing countries according to their national interests.

Background: The Pre-Kyoto phase of climate negotiations started at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), usually known as the Rio Earth Summit. The Rio Earth summit focused on three main agenda items: biodiversity, climate change and Agenda 21. The Rio summit recognized climate change as a problem to human safety. Heads of 192 countries gathered in the Brazilian capital in 1992. World leaders signed an international treaty to establish the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in order to manage climate change related problems. At that time they did not have enough scientific evidence regarding the impacts of climate change except the first IPCC report. But the meeting of global leaders brought them under the UNFCCC convention and obliged them to take action for human safety regarding climate change.

The main objective of the convention was mitigation. But mitigation targets were to some extent ambiguous in the quest to reduce emissions. For example the convention aimed at what would prevent dangerous anthropogenic (human induced) interference with the climate system at a level. It states that such a level “should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened, and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”¹⁰⁴ But the main weakness of the convention was that countries were asked to join the mitigation process according to expected levels of emissions. Parties did not introduce any mechanism or decision. They left this for future negotiations.

¹⁰⁴ UNFCCC website. Essential background. Available at: www.unfccc.int. Accessed on 19 June, 2012

As part of the mitigation process, the convention distributed “common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR)” to its members. The convention adopted CBDR to tackle climate change. But it did not mention anything on respective capabilities. This dissertation assumes that this decision was flawed and the responsibility was not equally distributed among the top emitters. It imposed the responsibility only on developed countries based on their historical responsibility. But it did not consider current and future emissions trends and did not include emerging emitters.

This dissertation also considers that CBDR is significant issue to generate debate on the mitigation process. At the beginning of the discussion on CBDR, Annex-1 countries rejected all responsibility for mitigation. They insisted on including all countries as part of the respective capabilities to the CBDR. But the G77&China, backed by China, India, on behalf of the developing countries, pushed CBDR on the negotiation table to mitigate GHG emissions. Brazil, Argentina and other Latin American countries, South Africa, Indonesia, and Pakistan strongly supported the G77&China’s proposal. AOSIS also played a very effectual role in adopting CBDR in convention. Since the beginning of negotiations, developed countries have repeatedly disagreed concerning taking responsibility for GHG emissions. They have argued that though environmental degradation has mainly stemmed from the economic activities of developed countries and developed countries have historical responsibility; they have also insisted that future and current emissions trends must be accepted.¹⁰⁵

Developed countries were initially reluctant to provide massive aid to developing countries. But through a long debate among the parties, industrialized countries accepted the proposal from the developing world to provide financial

¹⁰⁵ The Daily Yomiuri, Emerging economies must accept environmental responsibilities. Tokyo. June 25, 2012

support to developing countries under the convention.¹⁰⁶ The states also agreed that this would be additional to any financial assistance developing countries were already receiving as development aid. In order to manage aid to developing countries, the convention established the Global Environment Facility (GEF) as the operating mechanism in Rio. Industrialized countries also agreed to provide technology to developing countries.

On the other hand, developing countries did not want to commit to emissions reductions. The Indian environment and forest minister told the conference that, “Yes we are major polluters according to developed countries argument. We have to pay for this, we can pay, but we must dictate the negotiations as well”.¹⁰⁷ Eventually, conditions were made flexible for the developing countries regarding responsibilities, according to the developing countries’ demands. For instance, developing countries (Non-Annex Parties) would not have to report their mitigation actions regularly, as developed or Annex countries would have to do. Moreover, non-Annex countries would prepare reports on domestic action subject to the availability of assistance, especially in the case of least developed countries (LDC).¹⁰⁸

In Rio, developing countries emphasized the importance of continued development activities in the poor world. At the Stockholm conference, it was recognized that growth-dependent capitalistic development causes environment degradation. In order to address this, the Brudtland report suggested integrating development with environmental protection. Developing countries were worried in Rio that emissions reduction would constrain current development practices. Therefore, in order to assure developing countries, the development rights of developing countries were also recognized by the convention, especially for poorer

¹⁰⁶ International Herald Tribune. One summit: differing goals. London. June 02, 1992

¹⁰⁷ UNFCCC website. Essential background. Available at: www.unfccc.int. Accessed on 19 June, 2012

¹⁰⁸ *ibidem*

countries. But development activities are directly related with emissions. According to the scientific statement, the current development path is dependent on fossil fuels, which produce GHGs. Therefore it is difficult for developing countries to reach developmental goals if they take action to reduce emissions, even without the complications added by climate change. Hence, the convention faced two major challenges in Rio: to reduce GHG emissions and continue development in developing and poorer countries.

According to the Earth News Bulletin, the convention ultimately accepted that development in developing countries based on fossil fuel would produce gas emissions in the coming years.¹⁰⁹ However, in order to achieve the ultimate goal of mitigation of climate change, the convention sought cooperation from developing countries which would limit emissions in such ways but would not deter their economic development. It was a strategic gain for the developing and poor countries in the early years of negotiations. Especially for emerging economies of the time, such as China, India, Brazil and Indonesia, which were also emerging emitters in 1992.

There was clear division among the developed countries on biodiversity, climate change and providing financial assistance. The European Union and Japan were keener to accept the proposals from the developing countries regarding financial assistance to adopt climate change. Japan stated in April 1992 before the Rio Summit that they would take the lead in providing financial assistance if the USA failed to accept the responsibility.¹¹⁰ But other developed countries led by the USA repeatedly rejected the proposals on financial assistance. The USA was especially hesitant to sign the biodiversity deal. President H.W. Bush told the summit in California that “we cannot shut down the lives of many Americans by going to the extreme on the

¹⁰⁹ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 30 November, 2013

¹¹⁰ The Guardian (1992) Japan set to take lead on aid. London. April 25.

environment”¹¹¹ The USA argued that the biodiversity deal and emissions reduction activities would have negative impacts on US economy.

But developing countries strongly rejected the US position. China, India and Pakistan warned that they would pull out of climate negotiations if the US refused to sign the biodiversity deal and provide assistance to the developing world. NGOs were disappointed with the US position. Barry Coats, head of development policy at the “Worldwide Fund for Nature,” said at the conference that the position of US was very disappointing.¹¹² Environmental activists demonstrated against the developed countries’ position in Rio. American activists gathered at Copacabana beach to protest against the policies of the Bush administration. Facing huge criticism from developing countries and NGOs, developed countries finally accepted the proposals. But they were not happy with that. Republican senator Larry Pressler complained that the Earth Summit has become a meeting of world leftists¹¹³.

The UNFCCC became effective in 1994. Since then, parties to the convention have met every year in order to evaluate the progress and develop guidelines to stabilize GHG emissions. The “Berlin Mandate” is the result of the first Conference of the Parties (COP-1), held in Berlin in 1995. The parties met in Berlin in order to prepare a mechanism to make the convention effective. The objective of the conference was to determine how the convention should be implemented. **COP-1** concluded with the declaration of the “Berlin Mandate” that industrialized countries should be legally obliged to reduce GHG emissions. But the mandate was to some extent flexible on developing countries’ responsibilities. The Berlin Mandate held that developing countries would not be included in future obligatory emissions reduction

¹¹¹ The Guardian (1992) Rio Summit crumbling. London. June 01

¹¹² ibidem

¹¹³ International Herald tribune. (1992). UN limits Rio access Amid Anti-Bush Mood, June, 6, 1992

systems. Eventually, observers considered it to be the groundwork for the Kyoto Protocol.¹¹⁴

The parties were engaged in heated debates on some fundamental issues in COP-1 in 1995 which were very core to reducing the emissions. First, disagreement emerged when developing countries proposed to exclude themselves from future obligations by arguing that they were not responsible for historical emissions and they needed to continue development activities for socio-economic reasons. Only developed countries will be obliged by law to cut emissions. Backed by China and India, the G77 proposed this idea.¹¹⁵ Developed countries were divided on this proposal. The EU intended to accept this while the EU environment commissioner Ritt Bjerregaard proposed that the EU could reduce 10 percent of its emissions from 2000 to 2010.¹¹⁶ But the US, Canada, Japan opposed this proposal and argued that developing countries should join the action to reduce emissions because emissions levels were increasing very rapidly in major developing countries.

The Non-Annex developing countries rejected the view of the Annex-1 developed world, particularly the position of the Umbrella group. In a statement, China noted that the Berlin Mandate should not impose any new commitments on the developing countries. China urged the full implementation of the current commitments of developed countries according to the convention and argued that this was an essential first step towards the implement of the convention.¹¹⁷ Along with China, other developing countries argued that the developed countries should take

¹¹⁴ Earth News Bulletin.(2013). Available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 30 November, 2013

¹¹⁵ Staunton, D. (1995). EU and US delegates divided on reducing emissions. The Irish Times. P: 9

¹¹⁶ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 30 November 2013

¹¹⁷ High-level statement by China. UNFCCC website, available at: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/1995/agbm/eng/misc01a01.pdf>. Accessed on 14 January 2015.

the lead in reducing emissions. They also noted that the commitments in the convention were not adequate and not effective enough to tackle climate change.

Therefore, they proposed the establishment of a legal tool to implement the convention. But developed countries were trying to avoid any obligatory protocol. Most of the developing countries pushed the idea of a protocol on the negotiation table. The Group of the small islands countries (AOSIS) submitted a draft of a protocol regarding an increase in the commitments of parties in future negotiations. They also put pressure on developed countries to implement their current commitments.¹¹⁸

AOSIS, backed by Germany (The EU) proposed an emissions reduction of 20 percent by 2005 for the Annex-1 countries in the protocol idea. They also wanted to fix a schedule to control the emissions of GHGs.¹¹⁹ Most of the developing countries supported the AOSIS proposal. But some Annex-1 and emerging economies rejected the idea of starting to discuss a protocol. One negotiator from a developing country told the author in an interview that at that time, Chinese emissions were increasing very fast and they intended to take time. However, OPEC and China, India, and Indonesia argued that it was not an appropriate time to negotiate for a protocol. They noted that enough scientific information was not available and a review of Annex-I parties' communications did not provided sufficient information for negotiations. Moreover, developed countries such as the OECD countries also rejected the proposal. They noted that the protocol did not distribute the responsibility equally among the parties. It did not include developing counties and stressed only CO₂ rather than GHG emissions as a whole. They argued that the responsibility of emerging economies had to be fixed before starting to discuss a new protocol. The

¹¹⁸ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 5 October, 2013

¹¹⁹ Hare, B (2008). The EU, The IPCC and 2 degree C. Potsdam institute for climate impact research.

OECD suggested a comprehensive and inclusive protocol on all GHGs and argued that negotiations should begin at COP-1.¹²⁰

The US was strategic and tactical in this discussion. They tried to avoid any move for a protocol and were very rigid in arguing for a new target only for developed countries. The US stressed the need to look at emissions trends and to take actions to tackle emissions. The US said in a statement in a high-level segment of the conference that ‘after considering the current trends of emissions, we can make assumptions about how our reaction will affect this process’.¹²¹ The US also said in the conference that they would accept a new target for the post-2000 period. But they did not mention the word “protocol”. The US undersecretary for global affairs Timothy Wirth said at the negotiation: "We are not going to commit ourselves to things we cannot do. We will be fortunate if we can keep this treaty alive. I suspect if we do we will still be talking about climate change in the year 2000, 2010 and 2020."¹²² This reflected the US position that she would not accept any new deal without including emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia. The North European countries, Sweden, Norway and Denmark argued for effective action to cut emissions. But the East European countries took the same position as China and OPEC countries in arguing that it was not an appropriate time to negotiate a protocol.

Another top player in the negotiations, India, dramatically shifted its position. India rejected any negotiations to create a protocol. But in Berlin, India drafted a proposal within the G77 regarding future commitments. The G77&China did not support the Indian proposal. Therefore the meeting was postponed for a while, after

¹²⁰ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 5 October, 2013

¹²¹ High level statement by USA, UNFCCC website, available at: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/1995/agbm/eng/misc01a01.pdf>

¹²² The Gazette (1995). Conference on climate crumbles into confusion. Montreal. April 05

which India tried again to submit its proposal by arranging a meeting of 72 states, including China and other emerging emitters. This meeting was known as the “Green Group” initiative. Besides developing countries, many environmental NGOs were involved in this process to prepare draft proposals to cut emissions.¹²³ They pushed hard for the others to accept this draft in the negotiations. The OPEC countries, led by Saudi Arabia, and OECD hard-liners, like the U.S, Canada, and Australia, rejected this draft. They did not want to make any new commitments. But the EU countries and AOSIS agreed to include the term “emissions cut” in the document.¹²⁴

On behalf of the EU, Germany proposed to develop an inclusive commitment mechanism. This mechanism would include developing countries in different categories as part of a joint implementation (JI). Their argument was that emissions in developing countries were increasing very fast, particularly in some advanced developing countries. Consequently, Germany called for the inclusion of developing countries in this mechanism. But the developing countries rejected this proposal. They did not want to be part of any mitigation process and argued that the JI should be implemented among the developed countries as per convention. They saw the proposal of the developed countries as a strategy to include them in the mitigation process, particularly in the emissions reduction process. The Developing countries anticipated that the JI would be a complementary process to emissions reduction. It would not be a replacement for funding and financial mechanisms. However, after a long debate, the JI was adopted in the Conference.¹²⁵ The parties agreed to establish a pilot phase for joint implementation of COP-1. Developing countries were reassured

¹²³ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 5 October, 2013

¹²⁴ The Gazette (1995) Conference on climate crumbles into confusion. Montreal. April 05

¹²⁵ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 10th October, 2013

that their participation in the pilot phase would be voluntary and it would not be related to emissions credits.

After long and tough discussions among the delegates, the parties reached a consensus known as the “Berlin Mandate”. But most of the developing and poor countries did not accept these outcomes, except the Umbrella group and advanced developing countries. They criticized it as being inadequate to fulfill the UNFCCC’s article 4.2(a)¹²⁶ and (b)¹²⁷.

The Berlin Mandate could be greatly criticized because it did not fix any target for emissions reduction. Even though it was an agreement between the developed and advanced developing countries many poor countries and NGOs saw it as a flawed version of the AOSIS draft proposal. The Berlin Mandate was described as “vague, ambiguous and unfair” with a lack of transparency. For example, AOSIS delegates left the discussion and were not present in the final session of discussion. They pointed out some developed and advanced developing countries as “obstinate and

¹²⁶ Each of these Parties shall adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. These policies and measures will demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objective of the Convention, recognizing that the return by the end of the present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol would contribute to such modification, and taking into account the differences in these Parties' starting points and approaches, economic structures and resource bases, the need to maintain strong and sustainable economic growth, available technologies and other individual circumstances, as well as the need for equitable and appropriate contributions by each of these Parties to the global effort regarding that objective. These Parties may implement such policies and measures jointly with other Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the Convention and, in particular, that of this subparagraph;

¹²⁷ In order to promote progress to this end, each of these Parties shall communicate, within six months of the entry into force of the Convention for it and periodically thereafter, and in accordance with Article 12, detailed information on its policies and measures referred to in subparagraph (a) above, as well as on its resulting projected anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol for the period referred to in subparagraph (a), with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. This information will be reviewed by the Conference of the Parties, at its first session and periodically thereafter, in accordance with Article 7;

obstructionist”.¹²⁸ But the developed countries and advanced developing countries eventually accepted this mandate because both groups succeeded in avoiding mandatory obligations to reduce emissions. They got time to influence negotiations. Specially, advanced developing countries were seeking time to adjust their economies. But the question remained: who would take primary responsibility? A lot of NGOs were not happy with the Berlin Mandate. They had tried to push their agenda through the developing countries. For instance, the climate action network (CAN) closely worked with AOSIS by providing technical information to AOSIS members.

But developing countries, specially emerging economies, considered the Berlin Mandate to be the cornerstone of future legally binding instruments. China stated that if the process of the Berlin Mandate would end up producing a legal instrument or protocol, the nature and scope of the legal instrument would be stipulated in the Berlin Mandate.¹²⁹

The **COP-2** was held in 1996 in Geneva. COP-2 was significant for two reasons. One was the shift of the US position regarding the expected protocol and the discussion about the future protocol. The COP-2 delivered some political signals to include stronger commitments in the protocol. At the beginning of the conference, most developed countries intended to avoid the legal agreement. But developing countries pushed hard for a legal instrument based on the Berlin Mandate. In the negotiation, the USA surprisingly changed its position on the protocol issue.¹³⁰ They announced that the US would support any legal instrument to reduce emissions. The US strategy was to include emerging emitters in the legal instrument. Some

¹²⁸ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 5 October, 2013

¹²⁹ UNFCCC. 1995. High-level segment statement. Available at: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/1995/agbm/eng/misc01a01.pdf>

¹³⁰ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 10th October, 2013

developing countries became hopeful upon hearing the US announcement. Developing countries anticipated that other developed countries would follow the new position. Eventually, other developed countries followed the US position and started to talk about an expected protocol. But the developed countries demanded a Carbon trading option in the protocol. This meant that emissions in developed countries would be reduced, but developed countries could buy carbon credits from the developing countries. Some developing countries rejected this dependency on a market mechanism. The developing countries also insisted on the inclusion of food security, social justice and economic development in the protocol.¹³¹

But apart from these discussions on the future protocol, the Geneva conference accepted the Second Assessment Report (SAR) and its findings on IPCC. The SAR found that GHG emissions were increasing due to human activities. It suggested adopting a legal instrument to reduce emissions. However, developing countries were not satisfied with the COP-2 discussion. They repeatedly stressed the need to adopt a legal instrument within a very short time.

Analysis: Controlling agenda and influence negotiations

Financial assistance to vulnerable developing countries, the adequacy of commitments and negotiations for future legally binding protocols and CBDR were the major issues in the first phase of climate negotiations. When global leaders met in Rio to establish the UNFCCC to reduce emissions, one fundamental question was: who will take responsibility to reduce emissions? Annex-1 countries insisted on including all parties in the effort to emission-reduction processes. But the developing countries, particularly China, India, Brazil and Indonesia were at the forefront in arguing for imposing this responsibility on developed countries as per historical

¹³¹ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 15th October, 2013

responsibility. Finally, they reached a CBDR excluding developing countries at the beginning of the emissions reduction process. They forced developed countries to commit to financial assistance. Advanced developing countries also succeeded in pushing the idea that developing countries would have a development right based on fossil fuel consumption.

The parties agreed in COP-1 in 1995 to a negotiation for a protocol as a legal instrument to cut emissions. The argument of the necessity of a protocol was accepted by the developed and advanced developing countries because they also recognized that a commitment to cut emissions was not adequate. If we look at the dynamics of COP-1, advanced developing countries or emerging emitters such as China, India, and Brazil sometimes balanced power along with other developing countries against the developed countries. At the conference they pushed the idea that commitments were not adequate in the convention along with other developing poor countries. More concrete commitments were needed to cut the emissions. But they did not want to be part of any mitigation process. On the question of protocol, emerging economies band-wagoned with Annex-1 developed countries because, both developed and advanced developing countries did not want to be part of any legally binding protocol. Both of them came together to reject the developing poor countries and NGOs pressure for a protocol with legal obligation. The EU tried to bridge the gap between developed and developing countries. NGO activists insisted on developing a protocol and pushed their agenda in the negotiations. Besides these, some new coalitions such as the Green Group emerged. But major divisions between parties were left intact or even widened on some core issues.

Finally, it is evident that major developing countries and some developed countries controlled the negotiation agenda and influenced the negotiation process.

Figure 7: Findings of the first phase at a glance

Issue	US position	EU position	China/India/Brazil	Decision
CBDR	According to respective capacity	According to respective capacity	According to historical responsibility	According to historical responsibility
Financial assistance	Agreed	Agreed	Proposed	Agreed
Commitments are adequate	Yes	Yes	Not	Establish a protocol to review commitments
Joint implementation	Supported	Partially Supported	Rejected	Pilot project
Developed countries commitment	Not to specify time table	Not to specify time table	Not adequate and has to be implemented	Quantified emissions limitation and reduction objectives (QUELROS)
Developing countries commitment	To include developing countries	To include developing countries	Exclude developing countries	Exclude developing countries

Figure 7 shows some decisions on mitigation and financial assistant in developing countries. Most of the proposals launched by the developing countries were accepted in the pre Kyoto Phase. On decisions regarding mitigation and financial assistance, developing countries proposed including only industrialized countries in the emissions reduction process. Developing countries also rejected the proposal on joint implementation. Regarding the adequacy of commitments, developing countries proposed to establish a protocol on legally binding commitments. This dissertation assumes that decisions were accepted in the pre

Kyoto phase reflect the influence of developing countries particularly advanced developing countries.

3.2.3: 1997-2014 Kyoto era

Background: The second phase of climate negotiation has been named the Kyoto phase. This dissertation divides the Kyoto phase into three parts: (i) establishment of Kyoto Protocol (ii) first commitment period of KP and (iii) second commitment period of KP. Finally, the Kyoto phase since 1997 was a very politically eventful negotiation process.

3.2.3.1: Preparing and process to enforce Kyoto protocol (1997-2007)

Most developing countries and NGOs had been demanding a legally binding protocol since 1995 in COP-1 to oblige major emitters to reduce emissions. The Conference in Kyoto in 1997 was the first breakthrough in climate negotiations in delivering the highly anticipated “Kyoto Protocol”. The protocol is famous for its adoption of the first legal instrument to specify a reduction target. The parties were divided into two groups of developed and developing countries based on their reduction targets as usual. The US, Australia, Canada, Japan and EU were closely connected during the conference. On the other hand China, India, Brazil, Indonesia led the developing world.

At the beginning of COP-3, the parties agreed to formulate a protocol with a legal instrument. But questions lingered: how would the emissions reduction levels be differentiated? How would the distribution of responsibility be decided and how would the Protocol be implemented?

Initially the US proposed an inclusive one-size-fit solution with the overall target to reduce emissions average levels from 2008 to 2012 to levels compared to those in 1990. The EU proposed a-15% emissions cut comparable to the levels of 1990 by 2012. The EU rejected the Argentine proposal to differentiate emissions targets as

10.5% for EU, 5.5% for US and 2.5% for Japan. The EU environment commissioner Ritt Bjerregaard said: “We cannot accept this proposal. All large industrialized countries should have the same target”¹³².

Due to this disagreement, the EU, along with the G77&China, adopted a strategy of wait and see if the US and its allies would step forward to approve the target to cut emissions to the 1990 levels. Ultimately, the countries agreed to accept differentiated emissions reduction targets (See figure 8). At the same time, as a response to the US position, the EU rejected the US and the JUSSCANZs idea of emissions trading and sinks criteria. The EU demanded that the US and JUSSCANZ increase reduction levels first at domestic levels.¹³³.

Developing countries, particularly China and India, also criticized the emissions trading proposal and attacked the US and JUSSCANZ plan. They consistently rejected any idea to include developing countries in the voluntary emissions reduction process. At this moment, they took the strategy to move slowly on the negotiations track. They started to debate on emissions trading issues rather than emissions reduction. In this way, they succeeded in dropping voluntary commitment language from the protocol text. However, developing countries and the EU accepted the emissions trading idea.

Interestingly, Brazil proposed a clean development fund on behalf of the G77&China though China and India did not support it. The US accepted the Brazilian idea and renamed it the clean development mechanism (CDM). The US also proposed including private finance in the clean development mechanism. The US insisted that

¹³² The Guardian (1997). EU softens greenhouse gas stance. Dec 08

¹³³ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 21st October, 2013

other countries should accept this idea. Brazil argued that in order to reduce emissions, developed countries had to pay for clean technology.¹³⁴

If we consider the scope and nature of the Kyoto Protocol, it is clear that the protocol is based on the market mechanism. Interestingly, the emissions reduction process would have to be implemented by the CDM process in developing countries. It would have involved private sector and NGOs in the implementation process. It was accepted by emerging developing countries because they were excluded from the binding process and got financial support through CDM project. Recent data helps to establish this argument. According to UNFCCC statistics, 65 percent CDM project are now registered in China and India.¹³⁵

This dissertation considers that it was a win-win situation for developed and advanced developing countries. The market based mechanism brought opportunities to both developed and developing countries. For instance, the CDM would allow developed countries to reduce their emissions by investing in other developing countries. Because already developed countries have reached some level of development based on a traditional unsustainable development process, they have high levels of economic growth. Eventually, the CDM provides developed countries two opportunities: they do not need to take any action domestically and they can argue that they are providing financial assistance through CDM projects. This dissertation applies the classic General Equilibrium Model (GEM) in order to explain the strategies of developed countries in the Kyoto protocol. The core point of the GEM is that people will take the external options first and then they will go for the internal option later. If the classic model is right, developed countries will go for the CDM to reduce emissions.

¹³⁴ *ibidem*

¹³⁵ UNFCCC (2011). www.unfccc.int

KP fixed individual, legally binding targets for industrialized countries to take action to reduce emissions. The Kyoto protocol did not explain how it would be implemented, but it is clear from the KP decisions that Annex-1 countries accepted their responsibility to reduce emissions and emerging economies got a waiver from it.

Figure 8: Kyoto protocol at a glance

Reduction target:

Annex: 38 Annex countries will reduce GHGs from 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012. The EU would reduce 8%, US 7% and Japan 6%. Some developed countries would reduce less, some will not. But all developed countries would reduce at average level of 5 %.

Non Annex: Non annex developing countries, including emerging economies, are not obliged to reduce emissions. But they are asked to set a voluntary reduction target.

Emissions of gas

Protocol included six gases in the emissions list: carbon dioxide (CO₂); methane (CH₄); nitrous oxide (N₂O); hydro fluorocarbons (HFCs); per fluorocarbons (PFCs); sulphur hexafluoride (SF₆).

Enforcement:

Protocol suggests later meeting of parties will decide appropriate and effective ways to deal with non-compliance.

Implementation:

Protocol did not mention anything regarding the implementation process. But it said, once 55 countries representing 55% of world emissions in 1990 level ratify it, the protocol would go into effect.

Source: Author's compilation

After a difficult talk in Kyoto, two announcements made the **COP-4** more complicated in Buenos Aires in 1998. Hosts Argentina announced at the conference that it would accept binding condition to reduce GHG emissions and the US announced that they would sign the KP.

Some respondents suggested that the US and Argentine announcements were interlinked. In the COP-1 Argentina proposed introducing differentiated targets for Annex-1 countries. Argentina proposed a lower emissions target for the US than other Annex-1 countries. The Argentine announcement showed a clear division among developing countries, particularly in the G77&China. Argentina reached out to developing countries in the pre-cop meeting to accept voluntary commitments. But most of the developing countries, especially G77 & China, consistently rejected this idea. China and other nations blocked Argentina's initiative for a reduction target. But the COP-4 President Maria Julia Alsogaray informally met many representatives from developing countries.¹³⁶ And eventually the number of informal meetings took place in COP-4. That is why COP-4 can be considered a conference of informal meetings.

As it has been mentioned, the Argentinian initiative created divisions among developing countries. Because it opened a new door to other developing countries, they had to decide whether to accept a binding obligation or not. Following the Argentine announcement, Kazakhstan also declared that it would accept a binding obligation¹³⁷. This dissertation accepts that this was a strategy to create friction among developing countries. Why did Argentina announce its acceptance of a binding probation? It is assumed that Argentina wanted to bridge the gap between the Annex-1 and non-Annex countries. Another reason was that Argentina wanted to be a member of the OECD.

¹³⁶ The International Herald Tribune (1998). Argentine Call helps Heat UP Climate Talks, Nov 4.

¹³⁷ The International Herald Tribune. (1998). Fast Track Towards Climate Coals, Nov 16.

According to the respondents, most of the developing countries also did not trust the US announcement. Developing countries guessed that the US would sign but not ratify the KP because the US consistently argued that developing countries, particularly emerging emitters, were not part of the legal binding process. The US argued that the Kyoto protocol would do harm to its economy. The Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which passed 95-0 in the Senate in 1997, was very clear and bipartisan. It explicitly stated that ‘the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol’ that excludes developing countries from legally binding commitments or that causes serious harm to the US economy¹³⁸.

Developing countries were strict in not accepting any new conditions in the COP-4 and sought to review the adequacy of commitments. The G-77&China accused developed countries of moving slowly to make adequate commitments. But developed countries rejected the developing countries’ position by arguing that climate change is a trans-boundary issue and it has to be solved by global participation, particularly the participation of emerging economies, such as China, India and Brazil. However, the G77& China strictly refused to be part of any commitment. Moreover, they sought to get assistance for technology transfer, finance and capacity building in developing countries. The strategy of emerging economies was to remain free from any conditionality and responsibility. In reply to the demands of developing countries, the Global Environment Fund (GEF) was established and compensation for adverse impacts. (Articles 4.8 and 4.9) was also included in the Buenos Aires Action Plan (BAP) in which developed countries agreed to promote technology and financial assistance in developing countries.

The debate in COP-4 showed that many fundamental factors in the implementation of the KP went unresolved. Therefore, BAP determined that the

¹³⁸ The International Herald Tribune. (1998). Fast Track Towards Climate Coals, Nov 16.

detailed structured of Kyoto protocol should be finalized by the COP-6. Therefore, **COP-5** became an important compass on the road to implement the KP.

Many issues came with the drive to implement the KP. For example, the parties discussed how compliance, communication, Land use-land use change and forestry (LULUCF), joint implementation, technology transfer, and financial assistance process would be implemented under the Kyoto protocol. The parties discussed the introduction of a system to monitor commitments and structural design of the Kyoto mechanisms, especially the **Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)**. They also made guidelines to report national emissions of industrialized countries.

The parties in COP-5 insisted on a strong and effective compliance system. The G77&China wanted it should be fair, comprehensive and effective. The Group of small island countries, AOSIS, argued that it was necessary to take urgent action. Already many island countries were being affected.¹³⁹ The EU announced it would ratify the KP but argued for the revision of the text to make it more inclusive. The US also agreed to ratify the KP by 2002 but argued for developing countries' participation in the emissions reduction process. The US Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs Frank Loy told the COP-5 that Washington would ratify the Kyoto Protocol by 2002, but only with developing country participation and only if the greenhouse reduction mechanisms were "cost effective"¹⁴⁰. Developing countries accused the US of trying to derail the negotiations. They argued that some developed countries were ready to reduce emissions. For example, a senior Chinese official, Liu Jiang, told the conference that few developed countries were sincerely ready to limit their emissions,

¹³⁹ BBC, Climate treaty worries emerge in Bonn, available at:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/503640.stm>. Accessed on 31 Dec, 2015

¹⁴⁰ Australian Financial Review (1999). No to greenhouse penalties, Nov 5.

which were actually rising¹⁴¹. Consequently, most of the parties stressed that the compliance system would be a tool to implement the Kyoto protocol.

In order to introduce a compliance system in the KP, the conference decided to create guidelines for Annex-I communications to review GHG reduction actions in developed countries. Eventually and for the first time, the convention made the decision to monitor emissions reduction action in the developed countries. But the convention also adopted another guideline for non-Annex countries communication regarding activities. Initially the developing countries rejected the guidelines for them to monitor emissions reduction actions. But later, the developing countries accepted the proposal to formulate guidelines because the developed countries convinced the developing countries that data would be used to provide GEF assistance to tackle climate change. Parties also decided to start a primary discussion as a framework to address land-use, land-use change and forestry because the IPCC reported that land use and deforestation also cause emissions in the atmosphere.

Regarding the KP enforcement, many parties proposed entering the KP into force by Rio+10, that is, that the KP would be effective from 2002. The EU sought to consider more ambitious emissions reduction commitments in order to implement KP. It proposed to fix a ceiling point to execute the implementation process. The EU said at the COP-5 that it was ready to ratify the protocol, although its readiness appeared to be conditional on other countries doing so as well¹⁴².

Parties, especially developing countries, were divided in this conference on participation to emissions reduction. AOSIS and others developing countries insisted on global participation to solve climate change. This clearly meant that the participation of advanced developing countries like China, India, Brazil, and

¹⁴¹ *ibidem*

¹⁴² BBC, Climate treaty worries emerge in Bonn, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/503640.stm>. Accessed on 31 Dec. 2015

Indonesia was needed to stabilize emissions in their countries. Argentina's announcement in COP-2 that it would participate in the voluntary reduction process particularly inspired AOSIS to submit a proposal to include them. But at this conference, Argentina also announced that they would not leave non-Annex status. Kazakhstan expressed its intention to leave the non-Annex status and the EU proposed the introduction of a common participatory reduction process for all countries after the first commitment of Kyoto protocol. This would mean that after 2013 all countries would be part of reduction process and it would be obligatory. China, India, and the Annex-I countries would have the main responsibility to reduce emission. But China rejected any participatory commitment until reaching the status of "medium development level." In addition, a financial mechanism to assist SIDS in achieving adaptive capacity; strong leadership from Annex I countries in taking responsibility for action on climate change, and a meeting to explore the needs of EITs were also highlighted in COP-5.¹⁴³

At the conference, developing countries argued for assistance in capacity building and technology transfer. On behalf of developing countries, the G-77&China told the conference that developing countries are institutionally, technologically and financially poor. The transfer of environmentally sound technologies (ESTs) would help to engage developing countries in sustainable development practice and emissions reduction process.¹⁴⁴ The G-77&China, the African Group and others argued that assistance in capacity building would engage developing countries in emissions reduction action.

There was also debate among parties regarding the CDM project selection process. The G-77&China argued that the host country should finalize the CDM

¹⁴³ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 15th November, 2013

¹⁴⁴ *ibidem*

project, as it would be implemented in the host country. They also proposed that the project related to poverty eradication should be top priority and nuclear technology should not be part of the CDM and the JI. The Developing countries also demanded that GEF should also provide assistance for poverty eradication projects, which were not eligible for financing from GEF. The African group wanted to include reforestation and the preservation/reclamation of wetlands in the priority list of CDM projects.

The NGOs were also more active in the negotiation process. They were calling for the Protocol's entry into force by the tenth anniversary of the Earth Summit in 2002. The NGO community played a vital role for transparency and worked for access for civil society in the negotiation. NGOs have also worked hard to encourage parties to exclude the nuclear option from consideration under the JI and the CDM mechanisms.

According to respondent's views, expectations were very high at the **COP-6** in The Hague following COP-5. The COP-6 was set to finalize the detailed structure of the Kyoto protocol. But parties failed to reach any agreement among the Umbrella Group, which included the US, Australia, Canada, Japan and Russia; the group of developing countries and the European Union.

Disputes emerged over the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, its enforcement, compliance regime, methodology, emissions planning system, finance package, technology transfer and so on.¹⁴⁵ The parties did not accept the other arguments within the group. Therefore COP-6 concluded in two phases.

The first phase was held in 2000 in The Hague. The parties engaged in debate regarding the future of the Kyoto protocol and its implementation mechanism. They

¹⁴⁵ Federal ministry for environment, nature conservation, buildings and nuclear safety, stages of climate negotiations, available at: <http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/topics/climate-energy/climate/international-climate-policy/climate-conferences/chronicle-of-climate-change-conferences/>

could not agree on key political issues in The Hague. They met in Bonn again in 2001 to complete the negotiations process. The developing countries introduced a new term in COP-6 - “Equity”. Since the beginning of the negotiations, developing countries had demanded that the participation of Annex-1 countries in the mitigation process according to the CBDR should be based on equity. But the US argued for an inclusive participation process because they believed that it was the key to the success of negotiation. The US delegation chief in conference Frank Loy said that the conditions in the KP regarding emissions reductions were unacceptable and imbalanced¹⁴⁶.

The LULUCF and CDM created disagreement among the parties. Even developed and developing countries were divided within their group structures. In fact, the LULUCF included additional conditions in the first commitment period under Protocol Articles 3.4.¹⁴⁷ Developed countries considered this as a pre-condition for ratifying the protocol. The EU and the G77&China were cautious on this condition. In the Annex-1 group, the umbrella group and the EU were divided fundamentally on this issue. For instance, the US insisted on meeting Kyoto obligations through “carbon sinks” and emissions with other countries. But the EU argued that the world’s biggest polluter should achieve half of its target by reducing CO₂ at home, not through CDM in developing countries and carbon sinks.¹⁴⁸ And the G77&China was also divided in many groups on LULUCF because LULUCF is related to the use of land and forestry. If developed countries would provide assistance through CDM for LULUCF, then countries like China, India and Brazil would have

¹⁴⁶ Drozdiak, W (2000). Sharp dispute sand global-warming agreement at Hague conference. International Herald Tribune. Nov 25.

¹⁴⁷ Article 3.4: The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development. Policies and measures to protect the climate system against human-induced change should be appropriate for the specific conditions of each Party and should be integrated with national development programmes, taking into account that economic development is essential for adopting measures to address climate change.

¹⁴⁸ Drozdiak, W (2000). Sharp dispute sand global-warming agreement at Hague conference, International Herald Tribune, Nov 25, 2000

benefited. ASOSIS and developing countries, on the other hand, criticized the LULUCF conditions.

The parties could not reach any agreement on protocol mechanism because mechanisms are very important to the implementation of CDM and the carbon trading process. The Umbrella group proposed to create a simple and plain procedure to implement the KP and also included a variety of issues, for example *nuclear* and *sink*. The EU argued for a quantitative mechanism including a positive list for energy related CDM project. The G77&China remained strict on financial assistance. They proposed integrating finance and environmental protection in CDM projects and insisted on optimizing the benefits from CDM projects.¹⁴⁹ But later, the EU shifted its position on "quantitative," in favor of "qualitative" limit on the mechanisms. At the last moment, the EU insisted on more domestic actions to reduce emissions for developed countries and particularly for the US.

Ultimately, the parties could not reach any agreement in The Hague. Besides sinks and carbon trading, there were many unsettled issues such as funding and adverse effects, technology transfer and adaptation under the UNFCCC. For example, the parties engaged in strong debate in The Hague on the role of GEF and other funding sources and financial mechanism. Developing countries proposed mobilizing additional sources for funding: they proposed establishing an Adaptation Fund, a Convention Fund and a Climate Resources Committee. But the parties decided to meet again within six months in Bonn to settle unresolved issues.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 18th November, 2013

¹⁵⁰ *ibidem*

Figure 9: who wants what?

US, Russia, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, Canada	European Union	G77&China
Forest, crops etc at home counted as carbon credits Assistance in forestation outside of country to be counted as carbon credit Stated may sale their surplus to other country as carbon credit	More domestic action to reduce emissions Strict limit on carbon trading	Developed countries to make real domestic action US to pay overdue contribution to allow world bank to finance green energy project in z77 countries

Source: International Herald Tribune

In July 2001, the parties met in Bonn and made “The Bonn Agreement” on international climate policy to ratify and implement the Kyoto protocol and to solve disagreements, though in March the US announced it would pull out from the Kyoto protocol.

Dutch environment minister Jan Pronk, submitted a proposal to ministers to resolve disputes on CO2 sink, the design of the Kyoto mechanism, the system for monitoring compliance, and support for developing countries. After numerous consultations and two nights of negotiations, the parties accepted the proposal. But the US withdrew from the negotiations.

The Bonn agreement created an emissions trading system, sink in Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and outlined a package of financial and technological assistance to developing countries.

After the chaos and the deadlock of COP-6, climate negotiations gained momentum in **COP-7** by adopting the “Marrakech Accord”. While COP-7 adopted an agreement to implement the Kyoto protocol the Marrakech accord adopted language on adaptation, a 2% levy for adaptation, technology transfer for adaptation and

financial assistance, specially establish LDC fund. LDC countries were also advised to prepare National Action Plans on Adaptation (NAPA) and detailed work programmes on mitigation and the adaptation process.

Just like at the last three previous COPs, the main discussion in COP-7 was how to implement the Kyoto Protocol. In order to enforce the Kyoto protocol, many technical issues needed to be settled by the parties. The lead negotiator of LDC told the author of this study in 2014 that the EU and the G-77&China joined COP-7 with the intention to approve the Kyoto implementation process. Their preferable time was 2002 at the Johannesburg Summit. But the EU and China were yet to agree on many issues. The EU official told the conference that there were many things that ‘we could criticize but we prefer an imperfect agreement than a perfect agreement that does not exist’¹⁵¹. Earth News Bulletin called it a buyers’ market to sell the Kyoto protocol. The participation of developed countries was very important to implement the Kyoto protocol. They would be the main contributor to the KP mechanism. Some Annex-1 countries took this as an opportunity to bargain for maximum profit from negotiations. For example, some Annex-1 countries, such as Russia and Japan, demanded a flexible compliance system, lower eligibility requirements for mechanisms, opportunities for public participation and transparency, and minimal requirements for providing information on sinks¹⁵². It was clear in the last three years of negotiation that to implement the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, that both developed and advanced developing countries applied their bargaining powers to protect their national interests especially their continued economic growth. They considered that emissions reduction would have had direct impacts on current development activities.

¹⁵¹ Revkin, A (2001) .Without US, 178 nations advance Kyoto Protocol, International Herald Tribune.

¹⁵² Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 18th, November, 2013

The US said on many occasions in the negotiations that emissions reduction would have an adverse impact on their economy. President George HW Bush also told on the eve of the Rio summit as the US diplomats in several conferences carried the same approach “We cannot permit the extreme in the environmental movement to shut down the United States. We cannot shut down lives of many Americans by going to the extreme on the environment”.¹⁵³

At the beginning of the conference, Russia, Japan and Canada appeared as ‘blockers’. Along with them, most of the Umbrella group members pushed the conference to prepare a flexible deal for them. They appeared in the conference with many preconditions. For instance, Russia proposed to resettle Kyoto’s “Appendix Z” about sinks allowances from 17 to 33 megatons of carbon. They consistently argued for dropping two key criterion of the KP: the submission of sinks inventories and the adoption of a compliance regime.¹⁵⁴ Umbrella group member Australia and Canada were also rigid on specific issues and supported the proposals of Japan and the Russian federation. For instance, Australia was at the forefront of the push to remove the option of Party-to-Party interaction regarding compliance regime, while Canada advocated for flexible reporting requirements on sinks issues.

Ultimately, the Marrakesh Accord adopted 15 decisions on structuring and implementing the KP, including a monitoring system for compliance, a mechanism for crediting carbon sink and the promotion of assistance activities in developing countries.

One of the significant events of COP-7 was the emergence of the LDC in the negotiations. They strongly supported capacity building; finance and technology transfer to least developed countries to adapt to the adverse impact of climate

¹⁵³ Walker, M. Brown, P. Rocha, J. Vidal, J (1992). Rio summit crumbling. The Guardian, June 1.

¹⁵⁴ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 25th November, 2013

change. Until the COP-7, the EU, the G77&China, AOSIS, Umbrella groups were the dominant groups in the climate negotiation.

The Kyoto protocol was based on a mitigation mechanism to cut emissions. It was expected that Annex-1 developed countries would implement the KP and that emerging developing countries would join the KP implementation process. But surprisingly some powerful developing countries introduced the idea of adaptation in **COP-8** because negotiations for binding actions were almost completed in previous COPs. Therefore, developing countries, specially emerging developing countries, started to talk about an adaptation process for climate change.

In this conference, the proposal from the G77&China for adaptation was repeatedly supported by the US. This dissertation assumes that this was a strategy of advanced developing countries particularly China, India and Brazil to avoid any new negotiations including them in the legal process of emissions reduction because Annex-1 countries repeatedly proposed the inclusion of emerging economies or emitters in the mitigation process in previous COPs. The emerging economies might have anticipated that Annex-1 countries would propose new responsibilities for emerging economies in the second commitment period of the KP. But it was clear from the developing countries' position that developed countries would only implement mitigation and adaptation only to take place in developing countries. The Delhi Declaration eventually failed to bring any balance between mitigation and adaptation. Rather, this dichotomy caused some difficulties on other issues.

For instance, the EU proposed a voluntary review of national communications for developing countries for both - adaptation and mitigation. But developing countries wanted to provide information on adaptation but not about the whole scenario because improvements in the content and comparability of national communications could make it more difficult for developing countries to secure

funding if they failed to provide requested information. Moreover, good quality information on developing country emissions and capacities could open the door to a broadening of commitments. In this context, the G-77&China succeeded in obstructing the EU proposal for the voluntary review of national communications.¹⁵⁵

In order to be accepted by all parties in the adaptation process, emerging developing countries pushed the idea of adding adverse effects of climate change in developing countries onto the negotiation list. They wanted to focus on adaptation to be the same as mitigation. Why adopt this strategy? This dissertation considers that the reason for this strategy was that according to the Kyoto protocol only developed countries were responsible for mitigation action. Another reason is to gain time to adjust their economies before any new agreement. The G77& China continuously stressed that emissions in Annex-1 countries were increasing and policy measures were not adequate to minimize adverse effects. Most of the Annex-I Parties and some developing countries were mostly vulnerable to the G77&China but they argued that adaptation would ultimately be useless if there were no mitigation efforts. But the G77&China group did not accept their argument.

Another significant event of Cop-8 was the integration of environmental protection and development. This brought the idea of sustainable development into the negotiation process based on the Brundtland report of 1987. But the parties had very different ideas on sustainable development. For example, countries from Africa believed that climate change vulnerabilities caused poverty in Africa. Therefore, development should be environmentally friendly and focus on poverty eradication. On the other hand, many other developing countries argued that poverty eradication was an argument being made so as so to avoid new commitments. They stated that development is important for environmental management because economic growth

¹⁵⁵ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 28 November, 2013

provides financial and technological resources. The environmental and development dichotomy was included in the LULUCF discussion under the CDM.¹⁵⁶

Besides this political discussion, 25 decisions were made in COP-8, including the design of the Clean Development Mechanism and the use of funds provided by industrialized countries for climate action in developing countries¹⁵⁷. In addition, the New Delhi Summit also discussed new guidelines for national reports to be drawn up by developing countries, and agreed on a work program aimed at raising awareness of climate issues and anchoring them more firmly in the Parties' educational programs.

COP-9 started with doubts as to whether Kyoto would be functional or not because Russia had announced in Moscow during the ongoing conference in Milan that it would not ratify the KP. They argued that the KP was incomplete and mistaken and the KP would place significant limitations on the economic growth of Russia. A senior official of the Kremlin said in Moscow that they would not ratify the KP in its present form¹⁵⁸. This announcement from a leading Annex-1 country made uncertain the date when the KP would come into force. However, in COP-9, it was made clear that the KP had the support of an overwhelming majority in the international community, which was important because it needs to get 55% support to enter into force.

The future of the KP was the most important topic in COP-9. Besides this, the major outcome of COP-9 was a successful conclusion of two years of negotiations on rules for forestation in developing countries through CDM projects. Negotiations for afforestation and reforestation were a win-win situation for both Annex-1 and non-Annex countries. The US and other Annex-1 countries wanted to conduct emissions

¹⁵⁶ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 28 November, 2013

¹⁵⁷ UNFCCC website. A brief overview of decisions. Available at: www.unfccc.int/cop8: Webpage of the 8th Climate Change Conference

¹⁵⁸ Kirbey, A (2003). Russia's climate tussle spins on, BBC. Nov, 3.

reduction through CDM in developing countries. This would help to fulfill their commitment to reduce emissions. On the other hand, this was an opportunity for large developing countries like Brazil, China, India and Indonesia¹⁵⁹ because they have large amounts of land and forests. They could go for more afforestation and reforestation programs which could help them to get more money from developed countries through CDM process. This created a CO₂ trading opportunity based on the market mechanism. The Annex-1 countries could buy carbon credit from non-Annex countries. This created a buyer and seller relationship. But Annex-1 countries were very cautious to implement this project. For example, the EU, Norway and Switzerland, were mostly concerned about the quality of the product. They proposed including environmental NGOs in this process to fix specific criteria for socio-economic and environmental impacts, non-permanence and leakage¹⁶⁰. Developing countries proposed flexible and favorable market conditions and periods. They also argued for an easy transition process to avoid transaction costs for CDM projects.

The parties also discussed the Third Assessment Report (TAR) of IPCC in COP-9. Questions arose about how to implement the Third Assessment Report (TAR). The G77& China were a bit conservative and critical regarding the TAR. This dissertation argues that emerging emitters such as China, India, and Brazil were worried about future commitment because the First Assessment Report (FAR) led to the formation of UNFCCC and the Second Assessment Report (SAR) resulted in the Kyoto protocol. It took three years of negotiations to adopt mitigation and adaptation in the agenda of SBSTA and COP. Therefore, the developing countries and the G77&China rejected TAR because TAR suggested a more inclusive mitigation process

¹⁵⁹ UNFCCC Handbook (2006). Pp: 20.

¹⁶⁰ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 18th December, 2013

based on temperature rise since 1861.¹⁶¹ Annex-1 countries strongly argued for the consideration of current emissions trends. They wanted to include current emitters in the mitigation process. Interestingly, the G77&China were very positive and seemed to want to accept the First Assessment Report (FAR) and the Second Assessment Report (SAR). They wanted to avoid any future commitments on reductions for developing countries. Moreover, they insisted on the fulfillment of the Annex-1 countries commitments, the increasing transfer of technology and financial assistance in developing countries rather than expecting any new commitment from developing countries.

This dissertation has mentioned in previous paragraphs in this study that the LDC became increasingly influential in the negotiation process. In addition, in COP-9, non-state actors, such as NGOs, business lobbyists and the epistemic community played a very effective role in the negotiations process. For example, NGOs arranged more than one-hundred side events in Milan. The Earth News Bulletin, published by International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), reported that non-state actors sought the highest participation of emitters to fulfill the ultimate target of UNFCCC. They arranged some side events to specify the direction of the negotiations track. Side events were focused on future action and post first commitment period thinking. On the last day of the conference, parties met non-state actors to discuss future tracks. This was an official recognition of non-state actors' participation in negotiation. Non-state actors were recognized as new constituencies in negotiations in order to arrange independent research and analysis on adaptation mitigation and negotiation.¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2003). Third Assessment report.

¹⁶² Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 18th December, 2013

COP 10 focused particularly on adaptation measures to deal with the effects of climate change in developing countries. Developing countries and the poorest of the poor countries pushed to consider the necessary actions for adaptation and the provision of financial assistance.

In COP-10, developing vulnerable countries submitted some evidence of extreme weather behavior. Increasingly frequent floods, droughts and storms, like in 2004 in the Caribbean and the US, brought to the negotiation the urgency needed for adaptation measures, not only in developing countries but in industrialized countries as well. Therefore, developing countries argued that adaptation is as necessary as mitigation. They also submitted some scientific assessments about natural disasters to convince the parties in the conference. They also noted that financial assistance was important to adapt to the new situation. In response, the Annex-1 countries announced that SIDS and LDC countries would get financial assistance for adaptation and mitigation. In COP-7 in Marrakesh, developing countries demanded the establishment of three funds. In COP-10 Annex-1 countries declared that The EU member States would, together with other industrialized countries, make available an annual total of US\$ 410 million for all three funds starting in 2005.¹⁶³ Developing countries were also asked to prepare five-year National Action Plans on Adaptation programs (NAPA) in order to get financial assistance.

After the KP came into force in 2004, the parties adopted the Montreal Action Plan in order to formulate a post-2012 climate regime in **COP-11** in the same year in December. One hundred and fifty six signatories of the UNFCCC out of 189 ratified the KP.¹⁶⁴ Most of the Annex-1 countries ratified the KP, except the US and Australia, which joined COP-11 as observers. The parties that ratified the KP also met at the

¹⁶³ Federal ministry for environment, nature conservation, buildings and nuclear safety, stages of climate negotiations. Available at: <http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/topics/climate-energy/climate/international-climate-policy/climate-conferences/chronicle-of-climate-change-conferences/>. Accessed on 24 January, 2015

¹⁶⁴ *ibidem*

“Meeting of the Parties” (MOP). The parties decided to establish a two-track negotiation process after 2012. One would be under the UNFCCC and the other would be under the KP.

In this COP, the parties insisted on the implementation of the KP. But they differed on the way to implement the protocol. Developing countries wanted to implement existing commitments. But developed countries insisted on improving and including new options in the implementation of the KP. For instance, at the COP-11 and CMP/MOP-1, the Canadian environment minister Stéphane Dion insisted on negotiating with the three “I”. According to her, “parties need to “implement” the Protocol, especially the Marrakesh Accords, and need to “improve” the operation of protocol and “innovate” in search of new opportunities for future cooperation.¹⁶⁵ Therefore, main challenge was in COP-11 to implement the Marrakesh Accord and include advanced developing countries in the KP implementation process. Because the “Marrakesh Accord” provided technical details on how to implement the KP and emissions were increasing in advanced developing countries.

Despite some disagreements, the parties accepted the “Marrakesh Accord” to implement the KP. The parties, particularly the developing countries, accepted that they would benefit through CDM projects under the KP because at that time CDM funds were topped up with an additional US\$ 7.7 million¹⁶⁶. On the other hand, except for the US and Australia, most of the developed countries accepted the accord to get benefits from CDM projects as well. Developed countries could buy carbon credits through CDM projects. So, it was the biggest compliance system for any multilateral environmental agreement.

¹⁶⁵ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 25th December, 2013

¹⁶⁶ Federal ministry for environment, nature conservation, buildings and nuclear safety, stages of climate negotiations, available at: <http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/topics/climate-energy/climate/international-climate-policy/climate-conferences/chronicle-of-climate-change-conferences/>

COP 12/MOP2 in Nairobi was called the “Africa COP”. African countries became very influential and negotiated for adaptation, equitable distribution of CDM projects, and other issues, which are important for African countries. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also insisted on new capacity building processes and a fair share of CDM projects between Africa and other countries. Kofi Annan considered The US and Australia refusal to ratify the KP as a problem, because, "They (the US and Australia) have to be in step with the rest of the industrialized world. They have a responsibility to their citizens and to the rest of the world."¹⁶⁷ Anan also stressed the need to understand the urgency of the situation. He argued that momentum of negotiation was not necessary, but adaptation and mitigation were also very important for survival of the human race.

COP-12 was centered on African issues. Parties to the conference agreed to adopt the Nairobi Work Program on “Adaptation and the Nairobi Framework on Capacity Building”. This program was intended to help spread KPs CDM projects in the developing countries, particularly in Africa. COP-12 also sought to establish principles and structures for the Adaptation Fund and a five-year work program. Moreover, the parties also agreed to help Africa by increasing CDM projects. The EU announced the mobilization of 1.23 billion Euros to top up the European Union's umbrella “Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund” (GEEREF) in order to invest in climate-friendly projects and to eliminate energy poverty, particularly in Africa¹⁶⁸.

¹⁶⁷ The Guardian. (2006). Annan attacks big polluters on emissions. November 16.

¹⁶⁸ Federal ministry for environment, nature conservation, buildings and nuclear safety, stages of climate negotiations, available at: <http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/topics/climate-energy/climate/international-climate-policy/climate-conferences/chronicle-of-climate-change-conferences/>

It is evident that developed countries, especially the EU, accepted the Nairobi work program to convince developing countries to participate in future long-term negotiations. This dissertation assumes that it was a way for Annex-1 countries to support the most vulnerable developing poor countries and to limit the options for advanced developing countries. Because Annex-1 countries considered that if the adaptation proposals were accepted, they would be able to put more pressure on emerging developing countries to join an obligatory reduction system. Even other poor and vulnerable developing countries would join the negotiation to include emerging economies. On other hand emerging developing countries supported this work program to initiate new negotiations on adaptation. This would provide them an opportunity not to be included in the obligatory system. They wanted to take time and include more tracks in the negotiation process. Emerging economies adopted a time-consuming negotiation process. The announcement of the “Adaptation Fund” was a strategic gain for emerging economies because they had pushed the idea of adaptation since COP-8 in 2002. Some respondents argued that emerging economies encouraged African countries to participate more vigorously in Nairobi on adaptation because most of the African countries are members of G77 and LDC.

Another significant character of the COP-12 was the more active role of the business lobby and NGOs. They insisted on pushing their ideas in the negotiation process. The BINGO and ENGO repeatedly called for long-term negotiation with specific targets. The BINGO particularly insisted on increased investment in developing countries through CDM projects, innovations, and incentive-based mechanisms¹⁶⁹. This dissertation observes that in addition to the NGO activities in climate negotiations, scientific knowledge of epistemic society increased tremendously. It was expected that the IPCC would deliver its Fourth Assessment

¹⁶⁹ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 25th December, 2013

Report (FAR) in a short time. The Numbers of national and regional studies were also revealing the impact of climate change.

The climate conference in Nairobi only delivered the “Nairobi Work Program”. COP-12 concluded without any specific results beyond some discussions on the KP. Beside this, the situation remained the same in the negotiations process, characterized by a US unwillingness to accept any mandatory emissions limits and increased tenacity by emerging economies such as China, India Brazil and Indonesia.

Annex-1 countries were repeatedly criticized by developing countries for their 5% reduction in the first commitment period. Non-state actors, like NGOs also criticized the Annex-1 countries’ position, especially the US position. John Stanton, vice-president of the Washington-based National Environmental Trust, accused the US of trying to destroy the multilateral negotiation process. He told the conference, "We can anticipate that the Bush administration will continue its destructive role in trying to sabotage progress at these talks. It will push for bilateral and voluntary agreements, rather than any multilateral treaty under a mandatory UN framework".¹⁷⁰

On the other hand, Annex-1 countries insisted on including emerging countries in the negotiation process. Paula J. Dobriansky, the top American official at the conference argued for voluntary partnerships between developing and wealthy countries, which could foster economic growth while limiting pollution. The most effective strategies on climate change were those that were integrated with economic growth, with energy security, air pollution reduction.”¹⁷¹

¹⁷⁰ The Guardian (2006). Annan attacks big polluters on emissions, November 16.

¹⁷¹ International New York Times (2006). Big Conference on Warming Ends, Achieving Modest Results, November 18.

The parties gathered in Bali in **COP-13 with** two objectives. One was to come to a specific decision on KP implementation. Since the 1997 culmination of the KP, Annex-1 countries had made a number of promises but nothing had come of them. Therefore, it was not clear how the KP would be implemented in its first period. How would the adaptation fund and the fund for LDC countries be mobilized? And how would post KP activities be launched? The Bali climate conference had a lot of complicated issues.

At the beginning of the negotiations, parties were divided in two groups. The EU and developing countries wanted industrialized Annex-1 countries to talk to fix targets to cut emissions. But some Annex-1 countries, led by Canada, rejected this idea. Canada prepared a set of principles for a post 2012 regime known as "Canadian Principles for a post-2012 Climate Change Agreement" on the argument that the agreement should include all major emitters and that Annex-1 countries should have more responsibility in such a way that developing countries should also have binding targets.¹⁷² Annex-1 countries argued that a number of commitments had been made in the first commitment period of KP. Now it was time for developing industrialized countries to make commitments to cut emissions because emissions in China, India and the OPEC countries had increased. But developing countries such as China, India and Brazil argued that per capita emissions were still very low in developing countries. Moreover, accepting any target on emissions reductions would slow their economic growth. However, both Annex-1 and non-Annex countries insisted on long term cooperation in Bali.

One significant point of COP-13 is the recognition of the economic status of countries. In COP-13, the "Annex-1 and non-Annex" terms were formally replaced by "developed and developing" in the official literature of negotiations. The Ad hoc

¹⁷² BBC (2007). No unity yet at UN climate talks, Dec 10.

Working Group (AWG) used these terms for the first time in a long-term negotiation text¹⁷³. The official recognition of economic status was very significant. It is assumed that the implication of this recognition will have an impact on future negotiations.

The Bali conference differentiated the negotiation process in four blocs focusing on mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer and finance. In discussions on mitigation, particularly about long-term cooperative actions, the US shifted its position and supported the Indian proposal. The G77&China also supported the Indian proposal. India's proposal was to provide support to developing countries through technology transfer and capacity building in order to help them join the mitigation process.¹⁷⁴ India made this proposal to engage developed countries in implementing the process of pledges. Another strategy was to launch a new track of negotiation to avoid future responsibility for a contribution to the emissions reduction process. India proposed that developing countries would take action to cut emissions but before that, they needed to develop technology and needed financial assistance to develop capacity¹⁷⁵. But most of the developing countries, including South Africa, rejected the Indian proposal. They argued that technical and financial assistance can only go to the poor developing countries that have contributed less to emissions increasing. Emerging economies like India, China, and Brazil emit more, so they cannot get assistance for adaptation and technology transfer.

However, parties agreed to establish an "Adaptation Fund" in COP-13 regarding the question of finance and adaptation following the Indian proposal. But there was little debate on the appointment of GEF as the fund's manager.

The parties agreed to support technological development in developing countries for mitigation action under GEF project. Almost every COP-developing

¹⁷³ Decision-/CP.13, Bali Action Plan (Advance unedited version), para. 1.

¹⁷⁴ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 25th December, 2013

¹⁷⁵ The Daily Telegraph. (2007). Bali climate talks on the verge of striking deal, Dec, 07. London.

country called for more assistance transfers from industrialized countries to vulnerable developing countries in terms of finance and technology. Developing countries expected a broader agreement among parties to top up fund for assistance on the forthcoming Copenhagen conference. The EU accepted the developing world's position. On behalf of the EU, Portugal said they were fully convinced of the urgent need for technology transfer and financial support for developing countries to begin to take action against climate change¹⁷⁶.

Though, most of the developing countries contribute a small amount of GHG emissions but deforestation in developing countries due to poverty and increasing agro-industrial activities accelerate emissions in developing countries. Deforestation accounts for one-fifth of the total GHGs emissions but neither the UNFCCC nor the KP recognized this as a problem.¹⁷⁷ The push to deal with deforestation gained momentum at the Bali conference. Some Latin and African countries had urged parties in previous COPs to consider providing finance to developing countries to halt deforestation. Finally, parties agreed in Bali to take steps towards “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries’ (REDD)¹⁷⁸. Therefore parties agreed to reduce emissions from deforestation in developing countries. But debate arose regarding how to implement this and about the timeframe of the proposal because developing countries demanded more money for REDD project. On the other hand, Annex-1 countries insisted that consideration must be given to the use of the term “use of land” in the REDD and it should be included.

¹⁷⁶ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 25th December, 2013

¹⁷⁷ Watanabe, R. Arens, C. Mersmann, F. Ott, H. Streck, W. (2008). The Bali Roadmap for Global Climate Policy- New Horizon and old Pitfalls. *Journal for European Environmental and Planning Law*, vol: 5(2), pp 139-158

¹⁷⁸ Decision -/CP.13, Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to stimulate action (Advance unedited version), paras 3 and 4.

Besides these, the developing countries in COP-13 insisted on strict adherence to the convention and the Kyoto Protocol in order to avoid the adverse effects of climate change. On behalf of the G-77&China, Pakistan said that the convention and the protocol should be the central platform to control climate change and any less equitable agreement after 2012 would be unacceptable. On behalf of AOSIS, Grenada urged to protect people living on islands as a priority by considering their low adaptive capacity. They insisted on shared-vision based agreements. Speaking for the Umbrella Group, Australia said that they supported the Bali roadmap and the progress on the technological cooperation and deforestation issues. Germany, the leader in renewable energy, announced its plans to cut emissions by 40% by 2020 compared with 1990 levels.¹⁷⁹

If we consider the nature of COP-13, we see that the Bali Climate Conference as integrating climate change, economic activities and development. For example, Indonesia arranged two different meetings of finance ministers and trade ministers in Bali on climate change and development. These meetings considered linkages between climate change and economic and development planning, and between the World Trade Organization and UNFCCC. This way, it became clearer that any legally binding deal to cut emissions would be highly related to economic activities and economic growth.

Analysis: Controlling agenda and influence negotiation

A major outcome of this phase is the Kyoto Protocol (KP). The Kyoto Protocol is a legal recognition of responsibility. The KP included binding commitments for Annex-1 countries for six major greenhouse gases.¹⁸⁰ Parties agreed in the KP that Annex-1 countries should achieve their target at period from 2008 to 2012. But the

¹⁷⁹ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 25th December, 2013

¹⁸⁰ UNFCCC, A brief overview of decisions. Available at: <http://unfccc.int/documentation/decisions/items/2964.php>. Accessed on 15 June, 2012

KP was flexible on including developing countries in the binding commitment process. Whereas Annex-1 countries, particularly the Umbrella group, strongly argued that major developing countries should be included in the binding commitment processes based on current and future emissions trends, major developing countries strongly opposed this idea and developing countries were excluded from the obligatory process. No doubt, emerging developing countries such as China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia have benefited from this decision. The market mechanism and carbon trading within the KP have also been beneficial for developing countries. Annex-1 countries proposed the carbon-trading process, which was initially rejected by developing countries. But developing countries accepted this because the carbon-trading process is implemented through a clean development mechanism. They anticipated that it would be beneficial for them. According to the UNFCCC, China and India have captured 65% of registered CDM projects.¹⁸¹

Following the KP, parties also decided to develop and strengthen the financial mechanism to assist developing countries in capacity building in Buenos Aires. They also made the decision to apply obligatory reporting on the mitigation activities of Annex-1 countries. Another significant decision taken in Bonn was about land use and deforestation (LULUCF). In the Delhi conference, development literature was changed in negotiations. In this conference, parties accepted the argument that technology must be provided to developing countries to maintain sustainable development. This dissertation assumes that major developing countries' economies were rapidly growing based on their high dependency on fossil fuels, which cause high emissions in developing countries. Therefore, Annex-1 countries accepted the proposal to provide technology to developing countries.

¹⁸¹ UNFCCC (2011). Available at: <http://unfccc.int/documentation/decisions/items/2964.php> Accessed on 17 March, 2014

At that moment in the negotiations, the parties moved to institutional and procedural developments to implement the KP and the UNFCCC regarding the implementation process and the financial assistance process. The Parties have adopted rules and guidelines with which to implement the KP on forests, like new emissions guidelines based on good practice guidance, modalities and scope for carbon forest management projects in the clean development mechanism.

These were major advancements towards the implementation of the KP. Following these decisions, the parties agreed to establish two funds to provide financial and technological assistance to developing countries for adaptation. Two funds - the climate change fund and least developed countries fund (LDC) will support technology transfer, adaptation processes and other activities. A decision was also made in Montreal to establish guidelines for the Global Environment Fund (GEF), which will act as financial mechanism of UFCCC. Parties also started negotiations for beyond 2012 procedures to tackle climate change, as well as adopted the five-year work program on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change in developing countries. In Nairobi at COP-12, the parties included a program on vulnerability and adaptation in the “Nairobi Work program”. It was also agreed to establish principle structure of the Adaptation fund. The Bali Action plan in 2007 launched the Adaptation fund. The Bali Action plan centered on four blocks: mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer and finance.

The major outcomes of the Bali conference were: i) measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions by all developed countries, and; ii) nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing countries, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner.

Finally, by analyzing the KP preparation and enforcement period, it is clear from outcomes of negotiations that top emitters tactfully controlled the agenda setting process. Sometimes they pushed many agenda points in the negotiation process. If we consider the number of decisions-taken, it will show that advanced developing countries were very successful in making decisions according to their own interests in order to achieve preferences (see figure 10).

Figure 10: Major findings

Issue	US position	EU position	China, India, Brazil position	Decision
Inclusive fit for all responsibility	Supported	Supported	Rejected	Rejected
LULUCF	Supported	Supported	Conditional support	Accepted
CDM	Conditional support	Conditional support	Conditional support	Accepted
Financial assistance for adaptation, capacity building, technology for mitigation	Conditional support	Conditional support	Strongly support	Accepted
Emissions trading	Strongly support	Conditional support	Conditional support	Accepted
Legal obligation for Annex-1	Strongly rejected	Conditional support	Strongly supported	Accepted
Developing countries commitment	Strongly supported	Supported	Strongly rejected	Rejected
Shared vision on mitigation	Strongly supported	Supported	Strongly rejected	Rejected

Source: Author's compilation

Figure 10 describes the positions of major actors in negotiations and outcomes on some specific issues. It shows that most of the proposals made by advanced

developing countries were accepted. Proposals from developed countries were rejected or accepted based on advanced developing countries trade-off policies.

3.2.3.2: First Commitment period of KP

Financial assistance got more attention in climate negotiation for mitigation and adaptation. Developing countries applied pressure for more pledges from developed countries of financial assistance for mitigation and adaptation activities. Emerging economies called for financial assistance for mitigation action in their countries as well. Developing countries have urged specific commitments and the implementation of pledges from Annex-1 countries. Therefore, financial assistance was on top of the negotiations in **COP-14**, which took place in Poznan, even though the world was facing a critical economic crisis on that time.

Since the beginning of COP-14, developing countries have been insisting on a final decision on financial assistance. On behalf of developing countries, the G77&China made two separate proposals on a financial architecture and technology transfer mechanism within the UNFCCC. China proposed that rich countries should pay 0.7% of their GDP to extremely poor countries to help them adapt to the effects of global warming¹⁸². The G77&China along with other developing countries also urged Annex-1 countries not to derail the negotiations by pushing other issues because some Annex-1 countries proposed to redefine the status of the developing countries' group. Eventually, Japan proposed that some developing countries should take responsibility to cut emissions as emissions are also increasing in these countries. Australia supported the Japanese idea and proposed the introduction of three categories for developing countries: one group would be countries with a higher per capita income than Ukraine and Portugal and the second group would be

¹⁸² The Guardian. (2008). How the different countries stand on climate change

countries with a higher Human Development Index than Turkey.¹⁸³ Australia argued that Ukraine and Turkey are Annex-I members and Portugal is in Annex-II group but some developing countries have a higher per capita income than Ukraine, Portugal and Turkey. The connection was that they couldn't begin to enjoy the advantages of being developing countries in climate negotiations. The Umbrella group members supported this idea. It was clear that the Australian proposal focused on China, India and Brazil.

The most vulnerable poor countries (MVC) also suggested that some developing countries should make commitments to cut emissions because the Australian proposal did not propose anything regarding commitments from developing countries. It was only about revisions to the list. However, these views were rejected by the emerging developing countries to be "differentiated". Even they did not recognize the methods by which the classification exercise was being carried out by the developed countries.¹⁸⁴

Developing countries have continuously argued that developed countries have a historical responsibility to decrease GHGs in the atmosphere. Therefore, they should undertake and put into practice binding commitments to reduce emissions according to prior conventions and the Kyoto Protocol.

Developed countries placed another inclusive proposal in COP-14 on the emissions reduction process. They proposed to set up an agreement with a target of 50% emissions by 2050 at the 1990 level by all countries. The EU made this proposal in Bali, but it did not get on board. Emerging developing countries rejected it by arguing that it would also oblige them to be part of the reduction process. India took a very hard line in Poznan to accept the "share vision". Even India indicated it would

¹⁸³ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 25th December, 2014

¹⁸⁴ *ibidem*

be willing to work to keep its growing per capita emissions below that of industrialized countries¹⁸⁵.

Emerging developing countries claimed that the Annex-1 countries must first start the emissions reduction process through the KP. For example, developing countries argue that per capita emissions in developing countries are very low. If developing countries would reduce 30% of global deal target that would be much higher than their current per capita emissions trends. And pledges on technology and finance have not come.¹⁸⁶ Therefore, developing countries opposed this idea for a global deal. In spite of this however, some other Annex-1 industrialized countries have viewed the AOSIS proposal as a “shared vision,” such as the EU¹⁸⁷. The EU and other developed countries have advocated placing the idea on board in Poznan negotiations.

COP-14 saw hot debates in the AWG-LCA meeting to consider “a shared vision for long-term cooperative action”. Eventually, parties in COP-13 in 2007 decided to discuss a shared vision in Poznan. It was expected that parties would strike a deal in Poznan about a shared vision to reduce emissions. But Annex-1 and non-Annex countries were divided on this “shared vision” responsibility. The EU was the main promoter of the shared vision and other developed countries focused on a global target by 2050. Many developing countries expressed their concern that parties were spending more time on developing a shared vision than other important issues such as technology transfer, financial assistance and the implementation of the KP. The G77&China proposed establishing a new technology transfer and financial

¹⁸⁵ The Guardian. 2008. How the different countries stand on climate change

¹⁸⁶ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 25th December, 2014

¹⁸⁷ Federal ministry for environment, nature conservation, buildings and nuclear safety, stages of climate negotiations, available at: <http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/topics/climate-energy/climate/international-climate-policy/climate-conferences/chronicle-of-climate-change-conferences/>

mechanism under the UNFCCC in order to implement the convention rather than a shared vision or global goal¹⁸⁸.

Supporting the notion of shared vision, the US argued in the AWG-LCA meeting that “shared vision” has vision and inspiration. It should not only encompass the challenges but also create opportunities in energy security and resilience in the sectors of the economy. In relation to mid-term targets, the EU proposed that developed countries should reduce emissions by 30% by 2020 compared to the 1990 levels. Norway proposed that it should be 25-40% by 2020 for developed countries. They added that emissions in developing countries would increase in the next few decades and developing countries should contribute according to their respective capabilities. The EU proposed it could be 15-30% by 2020 for developing countries.¹⁸⁹

The parties also agreed to establish an adaptation fund in COP-14 that would become effective in 2009. AID agencies estimated that US\$ 34 billion would be needed per year to adapt to climate change¹⁹⁰. But they did not make any clear decision to mobilize the fund. Developing countries expressed their frustration in COP-14. For example, Brazil urged all countries, especially developed countries, to move forward in a way that allowed for the operationalization of adaptation through agreement on concrete actions¹⁹¹.

After the Kyoto protocol, negotiations were based on mitigation, adaptation, financial assistance, technology transfer, and the implementation of the KP and future activities beyond KP. Parties, especially developed countries, made a lot of pledges. But all pledges, including those related to the KP, remained on the table, while nothing went into the field or implementing process.

¹⁸⁸ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 25th December, 2014

¹⁸⁹ The Guardian (2008). How the different countries stand on climate change. P: 10

¹⁹⁰ The Telegraph. (2008) UN Climate change conference: the roundup.

¹⁹¹ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 25th December, 2014.

Observers expected new pledges from the US in Poznan because they thought that the Obama administration and the rest of the developed world would have a change of attitude to emissions reductions. Emissions had been consistently rising in developed countries, especially in the US, Japan, and Canada. The UNFCCC reported that there was hardly any progress in reducing emissions from developed countries. They had not even implemented any commitment on finance and technology transfer in developing countries.¹⁹² But the situation remained the same. Just one year before COP-14, the US announced that it would not ratify the KP because the Bush administration repeatedly said that it would not join any binding commitment. **Barack Obama's** new administration promised “**vigorous engagement**” at Copenhagen, but wanted to see greater efforts from developing countries and China in particular.¹⁹³ Some NGO activist and analysts considered this stance to be escapist. Considering this situation, the **COP 15** in Copenhagen was an historic event in climate negotiations for many reasons. First of all, there was massive hype among those concerned, to get a deal or finalize a legal instrument. Leaders from the 115 countries gathered at the conference - the largest gathering of world leaders on any global negotiation outside of New York in recent times. Even though around 40000 thousand applied to attend COP-15, the UNFCCC allowed only 15000 due to the capacity of the conference Centre.¹⁹⁴ Non-state actors were very active at the conference. They arranged a mock or parallel conference in Copenhagen. Protests and demonstrations also took place in Copenhagen during the Conference as people urged the world's leaders to reach a meaningful agreement.

¹⁹² UNFCCC website. www.unfccc.int.

¹⁹³ The Guardian (2008). How the different countries stand on climate change? P: 10

¹⁹⁴ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 25th December, 2014

From the beginning of the conference, the situation was very heated. Negotiators from developing countries advised Annex-1 countries not to renegotiate responsibilities. They said that the time had come to implement pledges, not to negotiate more. They said that developed countries should not try to continue to attempt to shift the emissions reduction responsibility in the name of a global effort of shared vision on to developing countries.

For example, the G77&China refused to share any responsibility with developed countries to reduce emissions. The African group urged Annex-1 countries and others to follow the KP and put into operation pledges before beginning any negotiations for future reduction processes. They argued that negotiations would not bring any positive outcomes without the implementation of the KP and pledges. They accused developed countries of not implementing their pledges.

Early on the conference, developed countries proposed redistributing responsibility for the reduction process. They said that developed countries would reduce emission but developing countries had to participate in the emissions reduction processes. Speaking for the EU, Sweden proposed an inclusive global agreement to prevent temperatures from rising more than 2 degree Celsius. They said that emissions must peak no later than 2020 and developed countries must reduce their emissions in the range of 80-90 % compared to 1990 and that developing countries should contribute in the reduction process¹⁹⁵.

The parties had debated the distribution of responsibility for the emissions reduction process since Rio. Bolivia argued in the conference that climate change is the result of the capitalistic system and is embedded in consumerism and over exploitation of resources. Therefore, it was the responsibility of developed countries to lead this process. China told the conference that developing countries have

¹⁹⁵ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 25th December, 2014

demonstrated their responsibility, but some developed countries held a far from adequate position and that was the main constrain in reaching a deal. China urged developed countries to be constructive and avoid transferring the responsibility to the developing world. In reply to the developing countries, Norway said that there is no excuse for not being ambitious and bold. The global goal should be limiting the temperature rise to 2 degree Celsius by 2015 and a reduction target by 2020 for all except LDCs and all major emitters must be included. The US said that it couldn't solve the problem alone. Participation of all major economies is the key to successful climate negotiations. ¹⁹⁶

The mood at the conference became nervous when the British daily 'The Guardian' published the "Danish Text" prepared by some developed countries to be placed in the conference discussion. The Danish draft included an obligatory option for developing countries for mitigation, adaptation, finance and to protect the intellectual property rights in relation to the technologies.

Most developing countries were upset with that publication in the British newspaper. As a result, the African Group and LDCs, supported by the rest of the G-77&China, proposed a suspension of the negotiations. The G77&China, LDC and other developing countries argued that Copenhagen should deliver the extension of the KP and fix a new target for developed countries. The G77&China also "walked-out" from the negotiations.¹⁹⁷

Developed countries, and China in particular, accused emerging economies of suspending the negotiation process. In a press conference, US president Barack Obama hinted that China was to blame for the lack of a substantial deal. He condemned the insistence of some countries to look backwards to previous

¹⁹⁶ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 25th December, 2014

¹⁹⁷ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 25th December, 2014

environmental agreements. He said developing countries should be "getting out of that mindset, and moving towards the position where everybody recognizes that we all need to move together".¹⁹⁸

But surprisingly, the situation in Copenhagen changed after a very short time. Developed countries and emerging economies reached a consensus. They reached an accord and US President Barack Obama announced this accord on the eve of his departure to Washington. The Accord was not placed at the negotiation table for discussion among parties. Rather it turned out to be a deal among elite members. As a matter of fact, many parties heard about this accord from the media. According to the media report, few countries were party to the accord.

Initially, many developing countries refused to accept this accord. They saw it as a non-democratic document that some elite emitters had produced. In spite of a huge debate about whether the accord process was democratic and transparent or not, COP President and Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen submitted the "Copenhagen Accord" for formal adoption without any pre-discussion¹⁹⁹.

Based on participation observation, it is clear that the Copenhagen Accord faced strong criticism from poor and vulnerable developing countries. Regarding the mitigation process, it did not mention any specific responsibilities of developed and emerging emitters. It did not give any long-term global goal for emissions reduction or a specific timeframe for global emissions to peak. The accord did not include any quantifiable reduction targets. It only included the measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of developing country actions.

Importantly, the Accord delivered some promise for financial assistance for mitigation and adaptation action in developing countries. It promised US\$30 billion

¹⁹⁸ The Guardian (2009). Low target, goals dropped: Copenhagen ends in failure. Dec:18

¹⁹⁹ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 25th December, 2014

for the period 2010-2012 and long-term assistance of a further US\$100 billion a year by 2020, to be mobilized from a variety of sources.²⁰⁰

The main goal of COP-15 was to make binding decisions on certain specific issues of a climate deal. But this was not achieved. One significant feature of COP-15 was the emergence of “elite emitters group”. The multinational negotiation process is one of the cornerstones of the UNFCCC. But in Copenhagen, a group of selected leaders made the Copenhagen Accord (CA) at the last moment of negotiations. As a matter of fact the deal was brokered between China, South Africa, India, Brazil, the BASIC group and the US.²⁰¹ This agreement was a political compromise and trade off among the key powers in climate negotiations, and which other countries had to acknowledge. It helped to understand the new dynamics of climate negotiations, particularly the emergence of the BASIC group. The emergence of the BASIC group was very significant for climate politics. At the beginning of negotiations the G77&China and AOSIS were the main players against the Annex-1 countries. The G77&China, AOSIS and LDC accommodated about 130 astute negotiators from the developing countries. But in this conference BASIC appeared as new influential group as it is consisted of four advanced developing countries and top emitters as well. Therefore, the emergence of BASIC was a new dimension to climate negotiation (See chapter 5).

Though major polluters crafted the Copenhagen Accord, many parties did not accept it. They took it only as a note. But in **COP-16** in Cancun, developing countries announced that more action on mitigation in developing countries will be taken according to the Copenhagen Accord, although they needed more financial assistance to initiate activities on mitigation.

²⁰⁰ Federal ministry for environment, nature conservation, buildings and nuclear safety, stages of climate negotiations, available at: <http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/topics/climate-energy/climate/international-climate-policy/climate-conferences/chronicle-of-climate-change-conferences/>

²⁰¹ The Guardian (2009). Low target, goals dropped: Copenhagen ends in failure. Dec: 18.

Developing countries in Cancun insisted on establishing a climate fund. Lesotho proposed on behalf of the LDC the establishment of a fund for adaptation and technical support. For the first time, developing countries also placed a new demand: financial compensation for loss and damage due to climate change.

Japan proposed creating a single legally binding framework including all major economies and emitters based on the Copenhagen Accord. But developing countries, such as the G77&China, the Africa group, LDCs, ALBA proposed to negotiate for a second commitment period of the KP. For instance, Chinese negotiator Xie Zhenhua said in an interview to a British daily The Guardian that developed countries should accept the second phase of KP. He also suggested that all emerging economies bring plans forward that would demonstrate their willingness to curb the growth of their emissions. But this would be a voluntary action for emerging economies.²⁰² The Chinese proposal offered a new way out forward in the climate negotiation because it proposed taking action in emerging economies based on economic status. But actions would be taken within different framework than the framework for Annex-1 countries.

The EU, the Umbrella group and Environmental integrity group accepted the importance of the KP and of the move to a second period. But they proposed to include all major emitters within the regulatory system. The EU said in a statement in conference that it would consider a second period for the KP but it also insisted on a balanced outcome for adaptation, technology, finance, REDD+ and capacity building for developing countries. The EU also accepted the significance of adaptation as it mentioned that adaptation is of vital concern for developing poor countries and for that reason the EU pledged 2.34 billion euro for fast start funding, of which 844

²⁰² The Guardian (2011). Climate talks: China calls on developing countries to 'step up'. Nov: 3.

million would be for adaptation²⁰³. But the US and Japan rejected the idea of KP second phase without including emerging economies.

Developing countries have insisted on the activation GEF. Even though developed countries have been willing to provide more assistance, they have called for a balanced outcome. They argue that it is important to balance the responsibility among major emitters whether for Annex-1 or Non-Annex group. On the other hand developing countries have suggested bringing balance between pledges and implementation of the KP. A study by the United Nation Environment Program (UNEP) said that pledges on the negotiation table have not been enough to stabilize global average temperatures below the level that most of the parties want.²⁰⁴ Majority of countries want to hold temperature rise to the range set in the pre-industrial era with an increase of 1.5 degree to 2 degree Celsius.

In response to the developing countries' opinion, Annex-1 countries announced that they would establish the Green Climate Fund (GCF). These funds would total 100 billion dollars per year by 2020. The agreements made in Copenhagen were turning into official decisions, developed further and operationalized.²⁰⁵ They also announced at the conference that GCF will be effective as soon as possible and it would be a long-term assistance process. The parties in Cancun agreed to establish a register system for developing countries for Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) and enhanced procedures on Measuring, Reporting and Verification (MRV)/ International Consultation and Analysis (ICA).

²⁰³ Statement by the EU in High level segment of COP. Available at: http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/items/5777.php. Accessed on 15 January, 2015.

²⁰⁴ The BBC. 2010. Climate change warning at UN Cancun summit. Dec: 08.

²⁰⁵ Federal ministry for environment, nature conservation, buildings and nuclear safety, stages of climate negotiations, available at: <http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/topics/climate-energy/climate/international-climate-policy/climate-conferences/chronicle-of-climate-change-conferences/>. Accessed on 17 January, 2015

The GCF and NAMA/MRC were tradeoffs between developed and developing countries. It was a win-win agreement among the top emitters. Developing countries focused on the adaptation program and on securing developing countries' rights to development. For instance, South Africa said at the conference that adaptation must be the core point of the agreement. The agreement should bring balance between adaptation and mitigation to integrate climate change and the development imperative. South Africa also proposed revisiting Annex B of the KP to oblige non-signatory parties of the KP to undertake mitigation under the convention. The amendment would provide developing countries time and resources to contribute to the mitigation process²⁰⁶. Therefore, they argued that developing countries needed assistance for both mitigation and adaptation. But parties could not make any deal for a second commitment period of the KP.

During the COP-16, developing countries argued that they have adopted many measures domestically though socio-economic development is very significant for them. For example, China said that it had adopted its eleventh five-year plan to reduce energy consumption per unit of GDP by 20% by 2010 on the level of 2005.²⁰⁷ China also expressed its intention to provide assistance to other developing countries with its capabilities through South-South cooperation. China urged developed countries to fulfill commitments for mitigation and adaptation by providing financial and technical assistance.

Brazil also argued that poverty eradication is one of the top priorities for developing countries. However, Brazil also implemented many mitigation projects. Brazil said that quite a number of extremely poor people had decreased in Brazil by

²⁰⁶ Statement by South Africa in High-level segment. Available at: http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/items/5777.php. Accessed on 21 January, 2015

²⁰⁷ Statement by China in High-level segment. Available at: http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/items/5777.php. Accessed on 27 January, 2015

70 percent and at the same time the deforestation rate had reduced by over 75%.²⁰⁸ Brazil argued that it is the time for developed countries to implement pledges that were taken in previous COPs.

But who would be first to accept the responsibility to reduce emissions became the main topic in **COP 17** in Durban. In general, mitigation, adaptation, finance, and technology transfer were the dominant issues in the Durban conference as in previous conferences. But the future of the KP, particularly the second commitment period of the KP, was a most significant topic as well. The parties also engaged in debates on a Russian proposal to amend the article 4.2(f) to review the party's status in the UNFCCC.

At the very beginning of Conference, non-Annex countries urged Annex-1 countries to implement the KP and achieve its targets. They accused Annex-1 countries of not implementing pledges and of violations of agreements, particularly referring to the US. Many developing countries expressed their concern that some Annex-1 countries were taking time to re-negotiate the KP. They vowed to keep the KP on the negotiation track. China said at the conference that decisions agreed at COP-16 should be implemented by operationalizing mechanisms for adaptation, finance, technology transfer, capacity building and transparency. They also argued for launching GCF in Durban, as it was urgent and necessary for developing countries.²⁰⁹ Brazil also stressed the need to operationalize mechanisms that were adopted in COP-16 by parties. Chair of the G77&China, Silvia Meregá, said at the conference that Durban cannot be a burial place for the KP rather it would be the birth place of the second phase of the KP for emissions reduction by developed

²⁰⁸ Statement by Brazil in High-level segment. Available at: http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/items/5777.php. Accessed on 29 January, 2015

²⁰⁹ Statement by China in High level segment. Available at: http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/items/5777.php. Accessed on 10th January, 2015

countries. Venezuela, speaking for ALBA, said that the KP was the only legally binding instrument that was being directly breached by developed countries. China, speaking for the BASIC group, said that the KP was a cornerstone and should stay.²¹⁰

India insisted on domestic action in developed countries on mitigation. India argued that carbon trading can be a good option but developed countries should implement some domestic policies as well. India proposed a waiver for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) to facilitate technology transfer and development.

Non-state actors were also very active in seeking to force Annex-1 countries to implement the KP. For example, environment groups such as the Africa Network for Environment and Economic justice, ANEEJ, urged countries to review their pledges under the Kyoto treaty and not to waste time negotiating for a better deal. "Negotiating a new climate deal will take too long and be a recipe for inaction," said Andy Atkins, head of Friends of the Earth²¹¹.

Speaking for the Environmental integrity group, Switzerland stated that the KP was not sufficient and needed to be clarified. Australia spoke for the Umbrella group in saying that the KP alone is not enough to address climate change and a comprehensive regime is needed based on the Cancun agreement.²¹² They argued that continuous economic growth as a result of industrial activities in developing countries would help to remove poverty but that emissions in developing countries were also rapidly increasing.

The EU agreed to accept the second commitment period of the KP through transition including all parties. They saw the KP as limited for some parties and not

²¹⁰ The Guardian. (2011) Durban climate talks 'roadmap' held up by India. Dec: 04.

²¹¹ The Guardian. (2011) Durban climate talks 'roadmap' held up by India. Dec: 04.

²¹² Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 21st February, 2014

politically and rationally acceptable. There was one question - how to manage the window from 2012 to 2020. The EU proposed an inclusive road map for all. They announced that the EU would reduce emissions by 30% but they would not be doing this alone, not unless other UNFCCC parties moved for a new negotiation platform.

By proposing this future road map, the EU moved closer to the developing countries. AOSIS and LDC supported the EU's road map. The EU Commissioner Hedegaard jointly issued a statement with AOSIS and LDC to negotiate for a second commitment period. The new position of the EU brought a shift in the dynamics of the negotiations. It was very important for the EU to come to the centre of negotiations. The EU was isolated in Copenhagen by the Umbrella group and BASIC countries. But the support of AOSIS and the LDCs was not adequate for the EU to board this proposal. It was also essential for the EU to get support from the BASIC countries and to convince them to support the new proposal. The EU also assured China and India that it was necessary to work together to turn the pledges of Annex-1 countries in Cancun into new legal arrangements.

Finally, the EU was able to convince India and China on the condition that the new legal instrument would not include emerging economies in the binding process. However, the parties agreed in Durban on the need for a second commitment period of the KP. Finally, they also agreed to launch a deal in 2015 under the Convention applicable to all Parties in the "Durban platform".

Following the difficult negotiation in Durban, the parties adopted a package of decisions in **COP 18** in Doha. The Kyoto Protocol was continued. The EU 27-member States along with Norway, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Monaco, Croatia, Switzerland, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Australia announced their plans to accept a second commitment period under the KP. The parties also decided not to allow emissions

trading in countries which have not signed up for the second commitment period for KP such as Russia and Japan²¹³.

The G77&China and other developing countries had called for a strong and effective second commitment period of KP. In the end, the parties accepted the second commitment period provisionally and it could be applied from 1st January 2013.²¹⁴ But the Doha conference also confirmed that the second phase of the KP would end in 2020. The KP would be replaced by a single legal agreement and the distinction between developed and developing countries would end. Countries would take action to cut emissions in respect to their level of development.²¹⁵ And it would be an inclusive and equitable regime. The EU told the conference that the second commitment period of the KP would be to transition to a new inclusive and comprehensive regime for all by 2015 at the latest²¹⁶. The US and the EU did not want to keep the firewall any longer. But emerging economies argued to keep the firewall between developed and developing countries and urged for more climate action.

Though China was a bit flexible on future action, most of the developing countries were not happy with the outcome of negotiations over the second commitment period. They argued that the average emissions reduction target (18%) for Annex-1 countries in the period of 2013-2020 compared to 1990 would not be enough to avoid the 2°C temperature rise²¹⁷. But developed countries and major emitters such as China, India and Brazil accepted this, because it did not impose any

²¹³ Federal ministry for environment, nature conservation, buildings and nuclear safety, stages of climate negotiations, available at: <http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/topics/climate-energy/climate/international-climate-policy/climate-conferences/chronicle-of-climate-change-conferences/>. Accessed on 11 January, 2015.

²¹⁴ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 21st February, 2014.

²¹⁵ The Guardian (2012) The Doha Climate talks were a start, but 2015 will be moment of truth. Dec 12.

²¹⁶ Statement by the EU in High Level Segment. Available at: http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/items/5777.php.

²¹⁷ The Telegraph (2012). Has Doha finally laid the ghost of Copenhagen? Dec 10.

additional obligations on them. Developed countries and major developing countries gained some advantages from the flexibility of the mechanism.

Finance has always been the key player since the beginning of the negotiations. The Copenhagen Accord agreed to provide financial assistance to developing countries up to 2012, with US\$100 billion mobilized both for adaptation and mitigation by 2020.²¹⁸ But what happened to the period spanning 2013 to 2015? The accord did not clarify anything. The Doha agreement announced that developed countries would provide financial support from 2013 to 2015 at the same levels as provided up to 2012. Parties also extended the mandate of the work program on long-term finance to scale up the mobilization of the climate finance. But there was no clear and concrete signal to implement the mandate and agreement. In Doha, developing countries insisted on increasing financial assistance for the adaptation process. For example, LDC countries urged to stimulate the GCF in order to make new and additional pledges for increasing fund for the GCF.²¹⁹

In Doha, developing countries accused developed countries of moving slowly on climate change. They argued for the need for additional effort by developed countries to implement decisions made in Cancun, and to facilitate financing and technology transfer. At the conference, the G77& China called for a decision on effective, sustainable and full implementation of the convention²²⁰.

Decisions taken at Doha show that more immediate climate initiatives are needed to meet the 2°C target. COP-18 established a process to clarify emissions reduction activities in industrialized, industrializing and developing countries. To keep the pressure on industrialized Annex-1 countries and in order to get appropriate

²¹⁸ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 21st February 2014.

²¹⁹ Statement by LDC in High Level Segment. Available at: http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/items/5777.php. Accessed on 15 January, 2015.

²²⁰ Statement by G77&China in High Level Segment. Available at: http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/items/5777.php. Accessed on 22 January, 2015.

legal instruments, developing countries have urged the establishment of an international mechanism to provide financial assistance to deal with losses and damage caused by climate change.²²¹

Analysis: Controlling agenda and influence negotiations

In the first phase of the KP commitment, some institutional and procedural decisions have been taken regarding adaptation, financial assistance and technology transfer. For example, rules and procedures for the adaptation board to make the adaptation fund active were established because developing countries demanded the operationalization of the adaptation fund. The parties also decided on a 2% levy on projects under CDM for the adaptation fund. They decided to scale up investment on technology transfer in developing countries to enhance the technology transfer program under the UNFCCC. The major outcome of the Copenhagen conference was long-term financial cooperation. Annex-1 countries agreed to mobilize US\$100 billion a year by 2020. And for the short term, the sum of US\$30 billion for 2010-2012 was earmarked. The Copenhagen Accord also decided to limit temperature rise to less than 2 degree Celsius.

The establishment of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) for developing countries for thematic funding windows was another gain for developing countries. The parties decided to share a vision for long-term cooperation in order to achieve a global target based on equality, CBDR and respective capabilities. In order to scale up mitigation activities in developing countries, negotiators agreed that developed countries should take the lead to provide technology and financial assistance to improve capacity in developing countries. In order to enhance action on adaptation, the parties agreed to establish the Cancun Adaptation framework. The parties also agreed to continue the

²²¹ Federal ministry for environment, nature conservation, buildings and nuclear safety, stages of climate negotiations, available at: <http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/topics/climate-energy/climate/international-climate-policy/climate-conferences/chronicle-of-climate-change-conferences/>

KP for a second period from the beginning of 2013 in first commitment period of the KP. The parties decided to launch a new platform for future negotiation under the convention. They also agreed to establish a framework to report on developed and developing countries' domestic actions. Another significant decision was that in this period, the parties agreed to make a global inclusive deal in 2015 in the Paris conference that will come in to effect by 2020. The parties also agreed to discuss and provide financial assistance for losses and damages in developing countries.

Figure 11: Main decisions

Issue	US position	EU position	China, India and Brazil position	Decision
Redefine groups	Strongly supported	Strong supported	Rejected	Rejected
Inclusive future treaty	Strongly supported	Strongly supported	Rejected	Rejected
Shared vision	Strongly supported	Strongly supported	Partially supported	Accepted
Second commitment period for KP	Rejected	Partially supported	Strongly supported	Accepted
GEF/GCF	Supported	Supported	Strongly supported	Accepted
Assistance for loss and damage	Rejected	Partially supported	Strongly supported	Accepted to discuss

Source: Author's compilation

Figure 11 shows how the negotiation agenda was controlled by advanced developing countries. If we consider seven important agenda and decisions on these agenda, it is clear from the abovementioned list that the advanced developing countries successfully pushed their agenda and convinced parties to accept their

ideas. On the other hand, developed countries proposed two important agendas in COPs, but developing countries rejected these and the COP rejected the developed countries ideas.

3.2.3.3: Second commitment period of KP

Background: Loss and damage was one of significant issues at **COP-19** in Warsaw along with the cameo range of issues related to tackling ambitious targets for mitigation and adaptation process. Despite difficult negotiations, delegates agreed to launch a new climate agreement. The decision to make a new deal as the basis for future inclusive deals is expected to be made at the 2015 Climate Change Conference in Paris.

Besides this, developed countries were urged to increase financial assistance to developing countries. The deputy head of China's National Development and Reform Commission, Xie Zhenhua told the conference that funding is the key for successful negotiations. Without the fulfillment of pledges, the future of the negotiation will be challenged by uncertainty. China insisted on establishing a roadmap to scale up financial resources in order to avoid the funding gap for the period from 2013-2020.²²²

In response to developing countries' demands, developed countries agreed to initiate assistance to developing countries. But developed countries put forth a proposal for an inclusive and equitable regime. For instance, the EU wanted to introduce climate action in line with responsibilities and capabilities for all. South Korea announced it would provide US\$40 million for GCF and US\$72.5 million by seven European countries to the Adaptation Fund. But developing countries viewed

²²² The China Daily (2003). China urges developed world to fulfill funding for climate. Nov: 21.

these as inadequate. Developing countries said that funds had decreased by 71% in the last year. Thus far, the GCF has US\$6.9 million donated by only ten countries.²²³

In **COP-19**, developed countries proposed to diversify the source of financial assistance to developing countries. Developed countries insisted on private investment in developing countries for adaptation and mitigation. As a matter of fact, this was proposed by the US. But developing countries rejected this proposal. They argued that developed countries are obliged to provide financial assistance to developing countries under the convention. Public source should remain the primary source of financing. Public finance could leverage private and other sources of finance.²²⁴ They also urged making the financial mechanism more robust with additional funding.

COP-19 established the “Warsaw International Mechanism” to address losses and damages. The mechanism would provide financial and technical assistance in developing countries caused by climate change. In COP-18 in Doha, the parties decided to establish a mechanism to accelerate the assistance process in developing countries. In the initial negotiations, Annex-1 countries refused to provide any assistance for losses and damages because it had not been clarified how losses and damages would be defined. They argued that if losses and damages were caused by slow extreme weather events then these could be mitigated. If they were caused by a permanent extreme event this could be an adaptive situation. Hence, developed countries disagree with the idea of financing any project parallel to other funds like

²²³ Earth News Bulletin, available at http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm#top, accessed on 21st February 2014.

²²⁴ Statement by LMDC in High Level Segment. Available at: http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/items/5777.php. Accessed on 25 January, 2015.

LDC fund, GEF or GCF. However, the parties reached a minimal agreement to finance losses and damages.²²⁵

Another significant outcome of COP-19 was the acceptance of REDD+ to protect forests in an eight year-long negotiation. According to the COP decision, the forest protection program REDD+ would be implemented at the national level. It would identify changes in land use and deforestation, which also causes emissions and is important as forest make up about one third of the world.²²⁶ Financial assistance would be channeled through GCF for REDD.

One significant turn in Warsaw was the emergence of the "like-minded developing countries (LMDC)" group - many countries from different backgrounds comprising the LMDC. For example, some oil-rich nations, such as Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Bolivia and Malaysia, as well as many countries heavily dependent on fossil fuels with huge coal deposit as China and India, and some countries with strong connections to other developed countries, such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Thailand.²²⁷

The main goal of the LMDC is to maintain the firewall between "developed" and "developing" countries with respect to emissions reduction responsibility. This idea, which was first set at the Rio conference in 1992 and legally accepted by the KP in 1997, proposes that developed countries are obliged to cut emissions but developing countries have no obligations. The LMDC suggested that this firewall must remain as the base point for any future deal. The LMDC also insisted that mitigation by developed countries should be central to the post 2020 agreement and

²²⁵ Federal ministry for environment, nature conservation, buildings and nuclear safety, stages of climate negotiations, available at: <http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/topics/climate-energy/climate/international-climate-policy/climate-conferences/chronicle-of-climate-change-conferences/>. Accessed on 26 January, 2015.

²²⁶ *ibidem*

²²⁷ The Guardian. (2013) Warsaw climate talks set 2015 target for plans to curd emissions. Nov, 24.

that developed countries should take the lead in emission-reduction domestically, according to convention article 3.1.²²⁸

The COP-20 in Lima was a preparatory meeting to finalize agenda for the COP-21 in Paris in 2015. In essence, COP-20 had two goals: to prepare an outline of the text for the Paris conference and to set rules for countries to tackle climate change domestically. Another objective of delegates in Lima was to operationalize the Warsaw mechanism on losses and damages.

In COP-20, developing countries called for the capitalization of GCF. Its initial capital would be scaled up to US\$100 billion by 2020. They argued for mobilizing US\$10 billion per year. Major emitters like the US, China and the EU would mobilize more resources for GCF. As a response to this, the US merely reiterated President Obama's announcement during the conference that the U.S. contribution of \$3 billion to the Green Climate Fund, which had now received capitalization pledges of over \$10 billion, was a major step forward.²²⁹

Regarding mitigation, the EU announced its target for 2030. The US and China jointly announced their mitigation target for 2025 and 2030. The US and China also declared plans to expand cooperation in climate change outside the conference in bilateral meeting in Washington between the US and Chinese presidents.²³⁰

There was heated debate among the parties on “differentiation” and Intended nationally Determined Contribution (INDC). The parties discussed differentiation on mitigation for the Paris agreement. For example, developing countries argued that

²²⁸ Article 3.13: The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.

²²⁹ The US statement in High Level Segment. Available at: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/lima_dec_2014/statements/application/pdf/cop20_hls_united_states_america.pdf. Accessed on 19 January, 2015

²³⁰ The Washington Post (2014). US and China announce climate deal. Nov: 12.

the responsibility for mitigation should be differentiated according to the parties' obligations under the convention. The principle of CBDR and equality should be reflected in this. On the other hand, the US argued that "differentiation" would be defined according to the parties' respective capabilities.

Regarding the INDC, the LMDC opposed the "Parties in a position to do so" policy in INDC. They insisted on support for developing countries in preparing and implementing INDC. Developing countries wanted to include adaptation and financial assistance as in INDC as well as mitigation. But Annex-1 countries did not make any new deal on financial assistance.²³¹ Developing countries also urged the provision of additional support to the GCF, GEF, and the technology and adaptation funds. Developing countries suggested the creation of a mitigation centric INDC. AOSIS and LDC countries also suggested preparing another separate document for losses and damages.

This dissertation assumes that there was a clear compromise among top emitters at the Lima climate negotiation regarding INDC. INDC is a bottom –up approach for parties in negotiations because it allows parties to take action domestically doing whatever they want. It does not set any rule to impose on parties according to agreements, as in a top down approach.

Analysis: Controlling agenda and influence negotiations

In Warsaw, parties decided to establish the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage to address loss and damage caused by climate change in developing countries. They also made the decision to enhance or initiate domestic preparations for their national contributions before December 2015. Developed countries agreed to mobilize funds to support developing countries to provide US\$100 billion a year by 2020. The agreement to prepare a text for a new deal by

²³¹ Jacobs, M (2014). Lima deal represents a fundamental change in Global climate regime. The Guardian. Dec-15.

2015 was the most significant outcome of this phase of negotiations. The joint announcement by the US and China of national targets under the forthcoming Paris protocol shaped a new regime in climate negotiations. In the new structure all countries will announce targets for the contribution to mitigation process. This represents a classic compromise between developed and developing countries and means that a new regime has replaced the politically divided negotiations which threatened climate negotiations over 20 years in which all countries participated in the mitigation process.

Figure 12: Main decisions

Issues	US position	EU position	China, India and Brazil position	Final outcome
An inclusive deal in 2015	Supported	Supported	Supported	Accepted
Fulfill current pledges	Supported	Supported	Supported	Accepted
Private investment	Supported	Supported	Rejected	Rejected
Discussion loss and damage	Rejected	Rejected	Strongly supported	Accepted

3.2.4: Post Kyoto Agreement

Background: COP-21 focused on legally binding agreement. Moreover, finance and technology transfer remained major issues in the Paris conference. Finally, the 195 member countries of UNFCCC approved the Paris agreement. Developed countries also pledged \$100 billion per year by 2020 for developing countries in financial assistance. By nature, Paris Agreement is legally binding where parties agreed to keep the temperature “well below” 2° C above pre-industrial level. They also decided to pursue effort to limit the temperature increase to 1.5° C. After reviewing the Paris agreement, this dissertation assumes that it has everything, a lot of promising words. But it has not any action plant to achieve the target. Though, according to agreement countries are obliged to submit domestic target to reduce emission as Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC). But it would be self determined.

Interestingly, in Paris, major players were very flexible and accepted each other's proposal. Since the beginning of the conference most of the developing countries were pushing for new legally binding agreement and financial assistance. Developed countries accepted the argument for a new deal and financial package. All actors are happy with the Paris agreement. But there is a huge controversy and debate regarding the Paris agreement. Scientists argue that current INDC proposal will not help to hold the temperature at 2° c. President of the Copenhagen Consensus and climate scientist Bjorn Lumburg had told press on Paris conference that current ambition only reduces 1% of emission by 2030. It is not enough to keep the temperature rise to 2° c by the end of the century.²³²

Another outcome of the Paris agreement is the dissolution of current development narrative “developed and developing” division that commenced in the 1992 Rio convention. Rio convention determined that developed world called Annex-1 countries will take the lead initiative to reduce emission for mitigation, adaptation and technology transfer as part of historical responsibility. But in recent COPs, most of the developed countries argued to review this division; in particular they said South Korea, Saudi Arabia, China and Brazil are not developing countries anymore. The Rio Convention specified group responsibility for Annex-1 group. But the Paris agreement has introduced both individual and collective responsibility. Responsibility will be determined based on the national circumstances and socio-economic conditions. It assumes that current national socio-economic situation would give the top-emitting countries some opportunity. For instance, countries like China, India, Brazil and many other top emitters will get advantage because they are still arguing that they have a significant number of poor people and need to continue with a growth-dependent economy to eradicate poverty.

²³² See: Daily Prothom Alo, Dhaka, Bangladesh, Dec 29, 2015

Regarding the long-term vision, the agreement says that countries will communicate new INDC every five years. Each round of INDC has to be more ambitious than the last. It means that every country has to increase reduction rate in every round. Therefore, emission will reduce gradually in many phases. This dissertation assumes that the Paris agreement, in fact, combined the enduring vision with short-term goal. Hence, emission will not reduce in a very short time. But the countries will pursue short-term vision to achieve long-term objectives.

The Paris agreement also includes Sustainable Development Mechanism (SDM) that opens the door for a less-emitter country to sell emission to a high-emitter nation. A high-emission country can pay a low-emission state to continue its own emission.

Analysis: Trade-off and bandwagon among top emitters

This dissertation assumes that in particular, the Paris agreement puts in the table a win-win situation for all parties, even for non-state actors. Because, top emitters do not need to cut emission immediately and developing countries have received pledges from developed ones on financial assistance. It is a clear sign of compromise among the parties such as trade-off between developed and advanced developing countries (China, Brazil and India) and trade-off and bandwagon between the US and China.

Developing countries accepted this so-called toothless binding agreement and the developed nations pledged financial commitment. But it has not been specified how money would be managed to provide financial assistance to the vulnerable, developing countries. There is clear sign of a trade-off between emission allowances and financial packages among the parties. It was anticipated before Paris conference based on the Bonn talks that top emitters will pledge financial and technological assistance for developing vulnerable countries, while vulnerable countries will accept the pledges of

top emitters on volunteer emission reduction rate. And this mechanism builds on a long-term vision. The UNFCCC considers this as “backed by financial support for developing countries, a clear long term destination of climate neutrality in the second half of the century and a ratcheting up of ambition in a structured, transparent and timely way, the INDCs provide an inspiring part of what has become the Paris package”.²³³

This dissertation also identifies bandwagon between BASIC countries and the US in the Paris conference. Both are responsible for more than 60% of global emission. The US and BASIC members, particularly China and India, faced huge pressure from the EU and developing countries in the conference to reduce emission. Then, they got together to tackle the pressure from developing countries to make a binding agreement. An impotent agreement is the result of the bandwagon between them. In all honesty, it was a treaty of elite emitter countries. Since the beginning of negotiations, BASIC members were with the developing countries to tip the balance against the developed world. But now they are very close to the developed countries to avoid the responsibility of emission cuts.

Figure 13: Main outcomes

Issues	US position	EU position	China, India and Brazil position	Final outcome
Legally binding agreement	Supported	Supported	Supported	Accepted
Inclusive collective effort	Supported	Supported	Supported	Accepted
NDC	Supported	Supported	Rejected	Accepted
Historical responsibility for loss and damage	Rejected	Rejected	Strongly supported	Not specified

²³³ See <http://www.climatechangenews.com/2015/10/30/un-paris-climate-plans-need-radical-ambition-boost/>

3.3: Conclusion:

This chapter examines agenda setting, controlling, and bargaining of actors in the climate negotiation process. The UN climate negotiations are a very intricate and multidimensional subject. They are not only about how to tackle climate change, but many other issues are also involved in the climate negotiation process. For example, poverty, economic development, securing economic competitiveness and energy security are important for actors in relation to other negotiations partners. Therefore, the strategy and tactics of the actors in climate negotiations are the result of intense interactions to integrate all these goals. Hence, the position of actors and the inclusion of many issues in negotiations are two main explanatory factors to understand the political economy of climate negotiation.

In general, actors in climate negotiations are divided in two major groups: developed and developing countries, or Annex and non-Annex. But actors have been changing their positions on these issues over time. They are strict on some specific issues, for example regarding the responsibility to reduce emissions. Since the beginning of negotiations, advanced developing countries have rigidly refused to take responsibility with regards to any mitigation of climate change. Time after time, advanced developing countries have rejected any inclusive deal on mitigation. But in Cop-16, advanced developing countries surprisingly shifted their positions by announcing that domestic voluntary action would be taken in developing countries. Particularly one of the top emitters, China urged other developing countries to move forward regarding domestic mitigation action. But advanced developing countries started a new campaign in COP-16 that developing countries have already taken mitigation action domestically. Now, it is the time for developed countries to take domestic action and implement pledges on financial assistance. Since COP-16, Brazil,

China and India have delivered almost the same statements regarding their domestic actions.

Why have advanced developing countries shifted their position in negotiations? This dissertation assumes that at the beginning of negotiations, the economies in advanced developing countries were gaining momentum. Since then, the socio-economic situation in advanced developing countries has changed. Now, China is the largest economy according to PPP.²³⁴ Brazil has eradicated extreme poverty.²³⁵ Both have adjusted their economies by applying a rational fossil fuel dependent development path. In these cases, advanced developing countries were more rational than ideational. The previous chapters have briefly discussed the link between economic development and climate change in climate negotiations. In order to adjust the economy, advanced developing countries are sometimes compromised and tradeoff on issues to maximize time. A good example is the market based mechanism in the Kyoto Protocol. The market-based mechanism allows parties to operate CDM and carbon trading. Initially, advanced developing countries rejected market based mitigation mechanisms. But these were later accepted by China, India and Brazil along with other developing countries. Voluntary commitments for developing countries were also another trade off for financial assistance. Major developing countries mostly accepted CDM, carbon trading and voluntary commitment in order to get financial assistance. At the same time, developed countries pledged to provide financial assistance to get support for CDM and carbon trading because CDM and carbon trading allowed developed countries to take emissions reduction action in other countries rather than domestic action by investing in CDM project in developing countries.

²³⁴ Bird, M. (2014). China just overtook the US as the world largest economy. The Business Insider. Oct, 08

²³⁵ Interview

Another explanatory factor of negotiations is the inclusion of many issues besides mitigation activities to tackle climate change. The issues in negotiations are the dependent variables emerging from the independent variables. Rio started with one target: to mitigate climate change. But over time, many other issues have been included in the negotiation process due to actors' national interests - issues like adaptation, technology transfer, and financial assistance for adaptation-mitigation and compensation for loss and damage have been included in negotiation agenda. On these issues, the parties have morphed into developed and developing country groupings. In order to maximize gains from negotiations, it is clear from the above-mentioned discussion that both groups balanced power and regrouped in negotiations by forming many alliances within the group according to their security interests, such as economic security, or to continue development growth as the G77&China, AOSIS, LDC, LMDC, the Umbrella group, Cartagena group and so on. The divisions have remained the same over time. But sometimes we also see bandwagoning among the countries. For example, at the Durban conference in 2011, the EU jointly worked with developing countries to show its leadership and to force the Umbrella group and emerging developing countries to accept legally binding commitments.

The scenario of climate negotiations began to change at the Bali conference, when countries started to renegotiate their responsibility to reduce emissions because emissions were increasing in emerging developing countries. Emerging countries showed their flexibility to join the emissions reduction process in 2009 and 2010 by announcing their willingness to accept voluntary emissions reduction commitment in future negotiations for long-term cooperation. In 2011, all parties agreed to make a deal at the 2015 Paris conference for all countries to participate in the mitigation process. Finally they adopted Paris agreement that included all members of UNFCCC

in the mitigation process. Paris agreement is bit complicated because every members are obliged to take action but level of action would be voluntary initiative.

The binary distinction between developed and developing countries has dominated the climate negotiations over the last 20 years. But recently the situation has changed because larger developing countries, such as China and Brazil, have emerged as economic superpowers and major emitters of greenhouse gases. And India is following China and Brazil to become an economic superpower. To anticipate continuous economic development and emissions trends, the developed world proposed considering current economic growth and emissions trends in 1992 at the Rio earth summit. The developed world proposed several times to break down the “firewall” between the developed and developing world in climate negotiations.²³⁶ But the developing countries and China have strongly insisted on maintaining the “firewall”. But the distinction dramatically changed at the Lima climate talk. For the first time in climate negotiations, the Lima agreement announced obligations for parties for a deal to be signed at the Paris conference. The Lima agreement did not mention the distinction between Annex 1 and non-Annex groups regarding obligations in the future deal. This dissertation identified that the Lima agreement adopted a new phrase regarding countries’ responsibility, which will be based on “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in light of different national circumstances” in a text from the joint announcement by China and the US just on the eve of climate talk to begin. The joint announcement by the US and China indicates a breach of the distinction between developed and developing countries in climate negotiations. This dissertation hazards a guess that this announcement will have implication for the creation of an inclusive new deal in Paris.

²³⁶ Stavins, R. (2014) Assessing the outcome Lima limited talks. Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs. University of Harvard. Available on: <http://www.robertstavinsblog.org/2014/12/14/assessing-the-outcome-of-the-lima-climate-talks/>

By examining the agenda-setting and controlling process, this dissertation also assumes that emerging economies are more influential in climate negotiations, compared to other global negotiation processes, such as the UN Security Council, WTO or nuclear proliferation. In order to assess the controlling and influential capacity of emerging powers, this chapter has examined the strategy and position of top players in negotiations. And it is evident that emerging powers effectively influenced and controlled agenda in climate negotiations. For instance, since the beginning of negotiations advanced developing countries are rejecting any binding agreement for them. They insisted a binding agreement for developed countries, voluntary responsibility for developing countries, financial assistance for developing countries, technology transfer. The Paris agreement ensures all the demand of the advanced developing countries, except the binding option for developed countries. The next chapter will discuss the security concern of the key actors in climate negotiations to influence the negotiations and its political implication on the global politics.

Chapter 4: Security issues

The purpose of this research project is to understand the global power shift process through climate negotiations. Therefore it is important to explain why states adopt particular position on some foreign policy issue in negotiations. It is necessary to find out what factors as independent variables are guiding the policy making process of main actors in negotiations since it seems that security is the main concern of actors in International politics. The following analysis will find the answer according to the first research question presented in the introduction: *why the main objective of climate negotiations has been shifted* based on qualitative interview among negotiators and observation in climate negotiations.

At first, this dissertation assumes that the main reason for conflict between Annex-1 industrialized and advanced developing countries is about the responsibility of emissions. Who will be first to take responsibility? Developed countries do not accept that that they are the only emitters of GHGs. They accepted the historical responsibility but they also want to consider the present scenario by including the emerging economies. On the contrary the developing world argues that Annex-1 industrialized world are the main sources of emissions for global atmospheric change. Therefore, Annex-1 industrialized and developing countries are always been at loggerheads on this issue. Developing countries want more action from developed countries and developed countries demand that developing countries should accept that while the Annex-1 industrialized country's past and developing countries future should be considered in terms of emissions level. This is another area where developed and developing countries have definite attention. This is not going away. This is going to be a source of conflict on a future looking approach. Tension is common among the parties in every COP on future agreement. Annex-1 industrialized and developing world do not want to accept to share in emissions

reduction and to come forward approach. It causes more complex division among the countries. In general, the US, Canada, China, and India do not want rigid legal agreements binding on them. But convention itself has the very strong principal of common but differentiated responsibility. This means that convention is adopted as the dichotomy of sharing structure. One shares Annex-1 industrialized and the other is developing identity. The Annex-1 industrialized world needs to take the primary responsibility or leadership for cutting emissions. And the developing world may follow the Annex-1 industrialized countries. At the onset, climate change negotiations look as if one party is reluctant to take responsibility to lead while the other is reluctant as well to follow the other. After the Bali roadmap and Cancun agreement, the situation changed. China, India and other developing countries started to say that they are going to reduce GHGs emissions. In their history, they do not have any relevance of reduction of GHGs. But now officially they say are doing so under the convention. But still at the ad hoc working group of UNFCCC on Durban platform, which founded on these issues, China and India said this is a voluntary initiative to the international binding process. So, it is expected to reach a deal by the end of 2015.

One negotiator from the BASIC group commented that, “more time, when you are shopping negotiations, but you do not say the real price you want to pay”.²³⁷ This conflict of interest, made the negotiations more difficult. From the perspective of the Annex- Industrialized countries, it is understood that it would not be expedient to solve the climate problem without using the opportunity to carry the advanced developing countries along. There is also a conflict about finance. These are ongoing disagreements about where and how solutions can be found. Negotiators do not think that conflict between developed and developing countries is necessary all the time.

²³⁷ Interview

But some countries want to put it that way. So, there is diversity when parties examine all the issues.

This chapter has identified the factors that foster main players in negotiations to select strategies. Political and socio-economic factors are the main factors that actors require to engage in prolonged negotiations processes. According to the respondents and experts on climate negotiations, four factors have been identified in this research. These are:

- i) Economic activities and development issues
- ii) Energy security
- iii) Poverty eradication and development
- iv) Establishment of hegemony


4.1: Economic activities and development issues

Almost all respondents agree with the outlook that the economic development or security is the main architecture of climate negotiations. GHG emissions and its reduction have direct implication on economic activities. If countries agree to reduce the GHG emissions, then the pattern of energy consumption must be developed and changed. This is the main source of conflict between the Annex-1 industrialized and developing countries. The Annex-1 industrialized countries argue that if the energy consumption pattern has to be changed and follow the demands of advanced developing countries, then the economy of Annex-1 countries will enter into such an economic stagnation whereas other economic entities in the developing world will continue to do the same as Annex-1 did in the past. That will not help to curb the problem. That will make the problem severe, if China and India emit as Annex-I emits and they did. So the major developing countries have to deliver something in the negotiations.

Many respondents explained in qualitative interviews that curbing emissions would mean reducing competitiveness. This would raise the price of production because in order to bring changes in technology, a company has to invest in modern technology and have to pay more for energy. This is not a burden for competitiveness in the developing world. But it will be a problem for the industries in the rich countries if they are forced to cut emissions. One of the senior diplomats of the BASIC countries said that industries in the developed countries will be bankrupt in favor of emissions reduction than the industries in the developing countries. For example, Brazil is Canada's major competitor in the production of aircraft. Canada produces small-sized aircraft called "CanAir" which fly on the European domestic routes. But now, these have been replaced by Brazilian "Embriers". If Canada asks CanAir to invest more in green technology in favor of climate change, and if Brazil will not do same, ultimately the Canadian company will be the loser. On the other hand, if the Brazilian company invests in green technology, then it will be difficult to enter into the market with high prices. So, GHG reductions and the mitigation process would have a direct effect on the economic activities for both developed and developing countries.

The following graph shows the nexus between climate change and economic development. Annual GDP growth, energy consumption and CO₂ emissions increased simultaneously since 1970. Since the Industrial revolution and even up till 1970, all the indicators are closely related

Figure 13: Economic activities and emission



So

Source: BP Energy outlook 2030

This dissertation tracks economic and emission growth rate of five major actors in climate negotiations since 1970 with a view to understand the connection between economic growth and emissions rate. US, China, the EU, Brazil and India are responsible for over 60% of global emissions.²³⁸

China is at the center of the debate on climate politics because of its great contribution to global emissions and competitiveness in the global trade, what with its large population, rapidly expanding and growing economy, and heavy reliance on coal. Between 1979 and 2013, the Chinese economy grew at an average annual rate of 9%. By the end of the 2007, China held \$1.5 trillion (USD) in foreign exchange reserves. As a result economic analysts argue that China is no longer a developing country. Despite this progress and according to a recent World Bank report, up to 200 million people in China live on less than \$1.25 a day in 2005. Poverty alleviation

²³⁸ International Energy Agency report 2009, *CO₂ emissions for fuel consumption*, (Paris: IEA), p. 11. 2009

and growing economy remains a priority for China.²³⁹ China surpassed Japan as the world's second-largest economy in the second quarter (April-June) in 2010, a result capping the nation's three-decade constant rise of economy from Communist isolation to emerging superpower. China's total valued economy was \$1.337 trillion in the second quarter of 2012 with \$ 4.9 trillion annual GDP. In 2013, GDP was \$9.24 trillion. Scholars see China as leading the world in tackling the recent global recession with an economy that is about 90-times bigger than when Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping left hard-liner Communist policies in favor of free-market economic reforms in 1978. It was expected in last decade that the country of 1.3 billion people would overtake the USA as the world's largest economy by 2027 with \$14 trillion annual GDP.²⁴⁰

But the situation has changed. *The Economist* reports that China was the largest economy till 1980 before the USA surpassed them. It is expected that China will be on track to reclaim the position in a very short time. Even *The Economist's* calculation showed in 2014 that China would surpass the USA by the end of year. But the IMF predicted that China would reclaim its position by 2019. . *The Economist's* prediction was "The American Century ends and the Pacific Century begins".²⁴¹

The International Comparison Programme, a part of the World Bank, released its latest data in April 2014. It calculated the cost of living in 199 countries in 2011. New data indicate that China's purchasing-power parity (PPP) exchange rate is now higher than economists had previously estimated using data from the previous survey in 2005: a massive 20% higher.²⁴²


²³⁹ Revolin, M and Chen, S. (2008) "*The developing world is poorer than we thought but no less successful in the fight against poverty*", World Bank-2008 (Washington: World Bank publication), p.21.

²⁴⁰ Bloomberg (2010) China GDP surpasses Japan: Capping three decades rises. Aug 30.

²⁴¹ The Economist. (2014). Crowning the Dragon. April,30.

²⁴² The World Bank, available at: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ICPINT/Resources/270056-1183395201801/Summary-of-Results-and-Findings-of-the-2011-International-Comparison-Program.pdf>

Figure 15: Economic trend in US and China



Source: Internet, the Economist


On the other hand the USA has the highest real gross domestic product (GDP) in the world. Between 1990 and 2008, U.S. GDP grew by over \$5.78 trillion (in constant 2008 dollars) or 66.9 percent to reach \$14.4 trillion (2008 dollars). Per capita income on a purchasing power equivalence basis was \$46,716 in 2008—the fourth highest in the world behind Luxembourg, Norway, and Singapore. The USA is the world’s largest producer and consumer of energy.²⁴³

The USA’s real gross domestic product (GDP) has grown at about 2 percent in 2008. The recent global financial crisis has caused the USA’s GDP to slow in 2009 in 1.1 percent.²⁴⁴ Even though the USA is the world’s largest economy, it has the highest unemployment rate in recent time after the economic great depression since 2008. But the US economy is reviving. The economic momentum picked up in 2013. GDP grew up 3.3 percent in the second half compared to 1.2 percent of first half in 2013.

²⁴³ United States, Department of State. (2010) *U.S. Climate Action Report 2010*.5th ed. (Washington: Global Publishing Services, January 2010.).p4

²⁴⁴World Bank. (2009).*World Development Indicator-2009*, (Washington: World Bank publication), p. 162.

Figure 14: Emission in the Us and China



Source: International Energy Agency

The EU as single operating entity with its 28 member countries is the world’s major trading partner. According to its quantity of goods and services, EU’s economy is now bigger than the US economy with a GDP in 2012 worth €12 945 402 million with just 7% of the world’s population. EU trade with the rest of the world accounts for around 20% of global exports and imports. Trade plummeted as a consequence of the global recession but the EU remains the world’s largest player accounting for 16.4% of global imports in 2011. The EU is followed by the United States with 15.5% of all imports, and China with 11.9%. The EU was also the biggest exporter,

accounting for 15.4% of all exports – compared with 13.4% for China and the 10.5% for the United States.²⁴⁵

According to the euro indicator, EU economy has started to revive. GDP rose by 0.4% in the EU during the fourth quarter of 2014. In the third quarter of 2014, GDP grew by 0.3%. During the fourth quarter of 2014, GDP in the United States increased by 0.7% compared with the previous quarter.²⁴⁶

Recent Indian growth and development is one the significant achievements of the global economy. India becomes a global agricultural powerhouse by removing its chronic dependence on food grains. Now India is a net exporter of food. Since 1970, the Indian economy grew at an annual level of average 5.5 percent. Currently India is the fourth largest economy of the world with 1.78 trillion GDP.²⁴⁷

Recently economists at Goldman Sachs, the World Bank and the IMF have forecasted that the Indian economy will grow faster than the Chinese economy in a very short time. They predict that in near future, the Indian economy will be faster than the Chinese According to Indian Central Statistics Office (CSO) data released on February in 2015 shows that India's GDP increased by 7.5% in the last quarter of 2014, which is faster than that of China.²⁴⁸ China had 7.3% in last quarter of 2014.²⁴⁹

The Indian economy grew between 1970-80 3.06 percent, 1981-90 5.87 percent, 1991-2000 5.49 percent and 2001-2010 7.69 %.²⁵⁰ Economic development indicates that prospects for India's economy are brighter than for other emerging markets and is rapidly growing.

²⁴⁵ The European Union official website. www.europa.eu

²⁴⁶ Euro indicators. Eurostat. (2015) Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/6614030/8-09022015-AP-EN.pdf/4f054a0a-7e59-439f-b184-1c1d05ea2f96>

²⁴⁷ The World Bank. (2014) Country profile.

²⁴⁸ The Economist.(2015). On the Dragon's Tail. February 14.

²⁴⁹ The Guardian (2014). China's economic growth falls to lowest in 5 years. Oct 21.

²⁵⁰ Bagh, S (2012). Performance of Indian Economy during 1970-2010: A Productivity Perspective. Delhi School of Economics.

Brazil is an emerging economy, but Brazil has not had the same development trends like China and India. The Brazilian economy has steadily developed. On the other hand, the Chinese and Indian economies have grown very rapidly. Brazil was the world's seventh largest economy with GDP of US\$ 2.2 trillion in 2012. It is also the largest economy in South America and the Caribbean region.²⁵¹

The Brazilian economy grew above the average of developed and underdeveloped countries from 1970 to the beginning of the 1980s. Brazil had industrial growth at that time. Its manufacturing sector income increased from 20.2 to 27.3 percent.²⁵² Since 1980, the Brazilian economy experienced ups and downs. Brazilian GDP decreased in 2011 by 2.7 percent and 0.9 percent in 2010. However, Brazil has the most success in terms of poverty eradication in recent times. Figures in 2009 indicate that extreme poverty was 11%. But in 2013 Brazil, claimed that it had eradicated extreme poverty through its social protection programme.²⁵³

Along with economic development, emissions have been increasing since the industrial revolution. But the scenario became acute in the last century. In 1950 particularly, experts started to say that environmental degradation was taking place due to high level of emissions. If we consider recent emission trends, it shows a huge leap since the 1970s and 1980s. According to the Netherland Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), emissions increased by 75 percent since 1970 to 2004. It was about 45000 megaton CO₂ equivalent. In between 1990-2004, emissions increased by 25 percent.²⁵⁴ Scholars argued that rapid industrialization in many countries accelerate emission trends. For example, in 1979 China introduced state-

²⁵¹ The World Bank (2015). Country over view, Brazil.


²⁵² Feijo, C. Punzo, L and Lamonica, M. (2009). Brazil's economy 1971-2005: Growth pattern and structural change. Centre for inequality and development studies. Discussion paper.

²⁵³ The World Bank (2015) Country over view, Brazil.

²⁵⁴ Netherland Environmental Assessment Agency (2006).

controlled liberal economic policy for development. India, Indonesia, Malaysia and many other countries also embarked upon a massive industrialization policy.

Figure 15: Global emission trend



Source: BP Energy Outlook 2030

This figure shows that the developing countries took the lead to emit CO2 since 1990 as a result of unprecedented development activities. Chinese emissions rose by 280 percent and Indian emissions increased by 230 percent till 2010. And it will be increasing. It is a result of the rapid economic growth. On the other emissions of the OECD and non-OECD country from the developed group, emissions have increased from 60 to 75 percent since 1990.²⁵⁵

The annual emissions of major emitters, including the U.S., the European Union, Japan, and other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have been reflected on the above figure. It also shows emissions from the group of richer “developed” countries and other non-OECD (e.g.

²⁵⁵ Netherland Environmental Assessment Agency (2006).

“developing”) countries. It is clear from the figure that the developing countries particularly Chinese emissions have just jumped in very rapidly than any other country in history. In 2005, the US was in the top position as emitters. Experts anticipated that by 2015 China would emit almost twice more than the US.²⁵⁶


Increase in emission continued in the first decade of this century. Emissions jumped in 2010 by 45 percent since 1990 the base year of the Kyoto Protocol. It is observed that the growth rate of 45% of global CO₂ emissions in the 20 years since 1990 was same as 20 years before 1990. Two significant features of development pattern after 1970 are the growth of the manufacturing sector in developing countries and the replacement of the manufacturing sector by the service sector in industrialized countries. Emissions increased in developing countries. In 1990 industrialized countries were responsible for 68% of world emissions and developing countries 29%. But by 2010 developing countries accounted for 54% emissions and 45% in industrialized countries. Emissions were rapidly increasing in China and other developing countries in terms of par capita or per unit GDP. On the other hand emissions decreased in the EU and US. Since 1990, CO₂ emissions per capita have increased in China from 2.2 to 6.8 tons per capita and decreased in the EU from 9.2 to 8.1 tons per capita and from 19.7 to 16.9 tons per capita in the USA. Per capita emissions of India also doubled from 0.8 tons since 1990 1.5 tons in 2010. Surprisingly, emissions decreased in Brazil from 1.5 tons in 1990 to 0.7 tons in 2010. In 2010, the US emitted 5250 tonnes, EU emitted 4050 tonnes, China 8950 tonnes, India 1840 tonnes and Brazil 430 tons of CO₂ equivalent gas.²⁵⁷ The following graph shows that China already is in the leading position for CO₂ emissions. China emits

²⁵⁶ Global green house gas data, available at: <http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/global.html>

²⁵⁷ The European Commission (2011). Long-term trend in CO₂ emissions. Report.

23% of total CO₂ emissions. The US emits 19% of the total emissions, India 6% and the EU emits 13 percent excluding its new member states.

Figure 16: Global emission share by country



Source: International Energy Agency, 2014

If we consider the economic development of the largest economy, it shows that high growth is linked with the high rate of emissions in energy intensive economy. The trajectory of traditional economic growth is of paramount importance in climate negotiations. The unprecedented emissions are the result of a fossil fuel-based economy. The historic economic growth in developed countries is fueled by GHG emissions that are now threatening small island states and other vulnerable countries and they are yet to accept the blame. Economic growth is a term that unites all the countries in the world because it has to be taken in consideration that economies

have to develop. Obviously it is different in all developed countries where they have reached in high level of development and achieved quality of life for the majority of their population. So they do not need growth in the same way growth is needed in the developing countries. Developing countries need more growth because they have large number population and do not measure up to the standard of life as the developed world. So, the economic issue is an issue for everybody. Sustainable economic growth is largely dependent on energy supply and security. As very diplomatic pose, some developing countries say that poverty eradication is the issue for them. Some observers think that economic activities and poverty eradication is the same thing, but it is more about economic growth.

4.2: Energy security

The structure of current energy pattern is a result of rapid growth of consumption pattern in last 150 years. World economic and demographic trend fostered to growth of energy consumption. Increasing demand for energy comes from worldwide economic growth and development. Total global primary energy supply (TPES) more than doubled between 1971 and 2012, mainly because of reliance on fossil fuels.²⁵⁸ In previous sections of this chapter, this dissertation explained the interlink between economic growth and emissions. However, this section is about energy dynamics because the rise of energy consumption is a result of unprecedented economic activities, and development remains the major issue in some developing countries. Therefore energy security and a sustainable supply of energy are vital for both industrialized and developing countries to continue the development process.

Energy consumption trend changed in the middle of the nineteenth century. From the dawn of civilization till the middle of the nineteenth century, the main

²⁵⁸ Chowdhury, R. (2014). Global CO2 emissions from fuel combustion: Gloomy picture of the IEA. Observer research foundation analysis. Dec 02.

sources of energy were renewable such as water, wood, and wind, human and animal power.²⁵⁹ Renewable energy provided slow but sustainable economic growth. In the middle of the nineteenth century energy consumption moved from the renewable to non-renewable fossil fuel. In 1993, 82 % worldwide energy came from fossil fuel. It remained same in 2011 and it is expected that fossil fuel dependency would be reduced to 76% by 2020.²⁶⁰

In 1990, total primary energy supply in China was 8707 metric tons (MT), in 2000 11613.53 MT, and in 2012 28942.85 MT. In the US it was 19150. 51 MT in 1990, and 22733.44 MT in 2000 and 21406.18 MT in 2012. The EU consumed 16446.56 MT in 1990, and 16926.54 MT in 2000 and 16435.93 MT in 2012. Total primary energy consumption in India and Brazil is lower than that of China, the EU and US. India consumed 3163.99 MT in 1990, 4564.69 MT in 2000 and 7881.26 MT in 2012. Brazil consumed 1402.06 MT in 1990, 1874.42 MT in 2000 and 2817.23 MT in 2012 energy equivalent to oil.²⁶¹

Chinese energy production and consumption of coal increased for the 13th consecutive year in 2012. China is the world's largest producer and consumer of coal, accounting for 46% of global coal production and 49% of global coal consumption—almost as much as the rest of the world combined. China needs electricity for its manufacturing plants. Most of the power plants are coal based, while 69% electricity comes from the coal-based power plant²⁶². Coal does not only fuel electricity generation in China: it is the main fuel for its economy. China's gross domestic

²⁵⁹ Chevalier, J (2013). The new energy crisis. Palgrave Macmillan, pp: 35-40.

²⁶⁰ World Energy Resource: 2013 survey. World Energy Council


²⁶¹ International Energy Agency (2012). Energy Balance, 2012.

²⁶² EIA. Country over view: China, Available at:

http://www.google.de/imgres?imgurl=http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/China/images/electricity_generation_fuel_forecast.png&imgrefurl=http://www.eia.gov/country/cab.cfm?fips%3DCH&h=438&w=610&tbnid=JVZqxGvi7hjLQM:&zoom=1&tbnh=92&tbnw=128&usg=__-KP71lpYhBBPgfUFbR-xkywRpZw=&docid=TJvwvsxaOcrIuM&sa=X&ei=wXKZU65e0sDsBtOCgcgF&ved=OCFEQ9QEwBw&dur=1428

product (GDP) grew 7.7% in 2012, following an average GDP growth rate of 10% per year from 2000 to 2011.²⁶³

Figure 17: Coal consumption and production



Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration


Moreover, China is also the largest oil and petroleum fuel importer. In September 2013, China surpassed the net imports of petroleum and other liquids compared to the US on a monthly basis, and became the largest net importer of crude oil and other liquids in the world. Steady economic growth increases the consumption of petroleum products in China.²⁶⁴ Energy analyst Candace Dunn in his analysis on the EIA website predictions that total annual production of petroleum and other liquids would rise to 31% between 2011 and 2014 to 13-3 million barrels per day. Meanwhile, Chinese production will increase at a much lower rate (5% over this period) and is forecast to be only a third of U.S. production in 2014. On the demand side, China's liquid fuels consumption was expected to reach more than 11 million barrels per day in 2014, while U.S. demand reached close to 18.9 million barrels per day; it was less than the level of 20.8 million barrels per day in 2005 in US. The U.S. refined petroleum product exports increased by more than 173% between 2005 and 2013, lowering total U.S. net imports of petroleum and other liquids. China extends its source to import crude oil in recent years because of the robust growth of oil demand and recent geopolitical uncertainties. For instance, Saudi Arabia is still the

²⁶³ EIA website: <http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=16271>

²⁶⁴ The Economist, fact sheet 2013

top exporter to China. Saudi Arabia exported 19% of China's 5.6 million barrels per day in 2013 But China has been exploring new sources in Africa and South America as well.²⁶⁵

Figure 18: Petroleum import in China and the US



Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

Trends show that energy consumption is increasing among the top actors in climate negotiations. Climate change mitigation processes largely depend on the actions of the top actors to cut emissions. However, energy demand and consumption patterns have increased in most developing countries. There is shift in energy growth from Annex-1 industrialized countries to developing countries. Indeed and very significantly too is the fact that energy consumption in China has grown rapidly. The International Energy Agency estimates that China will be top oil consumer by 2030. But India, South East Asia, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa are predicted to be the main engine to increase energy demand because energy demands in India and South East Asia are rapidly increasing. It is predicted as well that global energy consumption will rise by 41% in 2035 and 90% of this demand will come from emerging economies.²⁶⁶

²⁶⁵ Dunn, C (2014). China is now the world’s largest net importer of petroleum and other liquid fuels, available at <http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15531>, accessed on 20th May 2014

²⁶⁶ BP Energy Outlook in 2035 (2014). British petroleum.

Hence, climate negotiations are very much connected with the energy security. Security of energy supply and climate change is a central concern for policy makers. Economic growth and emission trends leave a crucial question to policy makers- would energy security and climate change be complementary to each other or made to trade off to each other because the current economic trajectory is highly dependent on cheap fossil fuel? It is not possible for states to reduce their dependence on cheap energy source by moving to clean or renewable energy because this requires huge investment and innovation for clean energy to secure energy security. If Annex-1 industrialized countries accept the developing countries argument and provide a strong commitment that is obliged by law, what will happen? They will simply have to transform into clean technology economies and would have to reduce fossil fuel consumption. They would have to introduce green technology and avoid the cheaper coal and an oil-based technology. Maybe some countries are exploring sources domestically but many countries are not. For example, the US is very concerned about its energy security. Shale gas may have been a source to confirm the US energy supply and may meet demand. But it will be difficult for other countries to find supplies at home. This has to be pursued through links with other countries. These can be commercial links with other oil producing countries. China, for example, is exploring energy security in Central Asia, African and South America, and it is looking for oil and coal for energy security.

There is another issue. It is the difference between developed country's conception of energy security and developing countries perspective of energy security. For example, for some of the BASIC countries like Brazil, energy security is access to energy facilities. Brazil wants to make sure that its citizens have access to energy - everyone has to have energy supply. And that done, Brazil could get to another dimension in terms of energy security, having provided energy for its

citizens. But we have to keep in mind that countries are dependent on other countries for energy security. It is a fact that any one country cannot depend on itself for energy security, even though like Brazil, may has many natural resources. One Brazilian senior diplomat said, “Brazil has sustainable energy. Sustainable energy is something we believe in, in Brazil that is extremely important. But it is only important after you have reached energy access. Then you can go to the sustainable dimension of energy security”.²⁶⁷

So, for the developing countries it is very important to confirm the energy security for their development and secure access to energy. But the developed countries who enjoyed the advantages of the industrial revolution, have failed to develop the new technologies such as renewable and to make them affordable for all. Therefore, most of the emerging economies are running after the traditional fossil fuel to make sure the energy security, which unfortunately increases carbon emissions.

4.3: Poverty eradication for developing countries

Poverty eradication is also a substantial factor in the climate negotiations. It is a top priority of some big emitters. In order to mitigate climate change, reduction of GHGs is one way for developed countries that they enjoyed the benefit of the industrial revolution and uncontrolled emission. But for developing countries, it is important to do away with poverty and ensure that they provide the basic needs of their citizens. Climate Change impacts make it more difficult for developing countries to address poverty eradication even though it is the number one factor militating against the eradication of poverty in many countries. And poverty eradication has direct relationship with development and emissions. If we consider the poverty track

²⁶⁷ Interview

in China, Brazil and India, major emitters and the emerging economy, the degree of poverty has been drastically reduced along with increasing GDP growth and emissions since 1981.

In 1981, 84% of the population of China lived under the poverty line. They could not spend \$1.25 a day compared to prices and purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2005. But the scenario has changed: the number of poor people in China who lived below the poverty line has fallen by 16% by the year of 2005. Prior to this the figures were below the poverty rate of 26% in the developing world. Mathematically, every year, poverty decreased 6.6% since 1981 to 2005. In 2008 it was 14%. In 2011, only 6.3% percent people lived below the poverty line. China made extraordinary progress to reduce poverty. Relatively Brazil had lower number of poor people than China, but it decreased from 17% to 8% since 1981 to 2005. It was 3.2% in 2012. Brazil recently announced that it had moved away from extreme poverty while the poverty eradication scenario in India is not the same as that of China and Brazil. In 1981, 60% of the total population of India lived below a poverty line lower than that of China. In 2005 India's 42% population could live on "\$1.25 a day". In the year 2010, the figure was 32.7. Poverty reduction rate is comparatively slower in India than China and Brazil. Until now, poverty eradication was a big challenge for China, Brazil, India and other developing countries. Developing countries are succeeding to remove poverty, but at the same time they emit GHGs as well to sustain development.²⁶⁸

Many of the respondents to questionnaire from this research explained the relationship between poverty eradication and climate change in this way: "It is time of the post-colonial era. We do not have exploitation as we had 200 years back. It's an issue to save the planet and also to continue the development assistance. For a country like Bangladesh to get out of poverty a degree of assistance is needed". One

²⁶⁸ Ravallion, M (2011). A comparative perspective on poverty reduction in Brazil, china and India. *World Bank Research Observer (International)*, vol: 26, pp:4-5.

negotiator from a developing country said that, “the developed countries are not doing enough for us and this generates conflict. Poverty eradication for developing countries has a positive evolution in recent years because many countries have been able to eradicate poverty”. He explained that in the case of Brazil, they have eliminated extreme poverty. According to the Brazilian source, there is no Brazilian who lives below the internationally agreed unit of assessment of \$1.25 a day.

Poverty eradication does not only mean the eradication of extreme poverty. Eradication of extreme poverty is only the beginning. One Chinese diplomat said, “We have to work on poverty eradication as a priority of developing countries with support from the convention, sustainable development is one of the first things we must achieve.

Most respondents said that poverty is one of the major problems for the emerging economies, especially for India and China. Now, because of poverty, it is very difficult for India to take action against climate change or to reduce emissions. Millions of small and medium home-based firms are able to function based on cheap coal and oil in India. This has contributed to increase in emissions so it is not possible for India all of a sudden to ask its small and medium industry change their traditional energy consumption system by installing green technology systems. This requires huge investment. Either India has to invest on its own or the developed countries must help them through finance and technology transfers. Otherwise, this will cause unemployment and poverty in Indian society.

Therefore, poverty is also a significant driver in climate negotiations. Most of the developing countries adopt their climate strategy based on a poverty reduction policy. Climate change is increasing poverty in most vulnerable poor countries, while it is also increasing emissions that cause climate change.

4.4: Hegemony of global actors or diplomatic race

This dissertation assumes that there is hegemonic conflict in climate negotiations. Hegemony describes a situation that one state or group of states seeks a dominant position over other countries to construct the international rules and norms to its own advantages. It is a structure in which other states accept the demands of the hegemonic power. Realists explain hegemony as being a result of hard power, such as economic and military power. Soft power also provides hegemonic power according to Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. For example intellectual and moral capacity and leadership also dominate in the ideas and values of international relations.²⁶⁹

We see significant conflict over time in climate negotiations between the US, EU and emerging developing countries China, Brazil and India. In the hegemonic conflict, the EU and China-India-Brazil are more close and friendly against the US. There is also the US vs. EU and the US vs. China, Brazil and India hegemonic conflict. The US is still hegemonic but US hegemony is being challenged by the EU and emerging developing countries China, Brazil and India on many occasions in climate negotiations. Excluding US intervention in Afghanistan and the Middle East, climate negotiations are the most significant way to explain the most prominent Trans-Atlantic rifts since World War II. ²⁷⁰ This hegemonic conflict has prolonged climate negotiations. The complex economic phenomena of climate negotiations provide a clear picture of hegemonic conflict in climate negotiations.

Conflict over the Kyoto protocol reflects hegemonic conflict. Initially, the US insisted on including advanced developing countries under the binding commitment

²⁶⁹ Robinson, P (2008). Dictionary of International Security. Polity press. Malden. USA. P: 95.

²⁷⁰ Ochs, A. and Sprinz, D (2000). Europa riding the Hegemon? Transatlantic climate policy relations, in D.B. Bobrow and W Keller(eds), Hegemony Constraint: Evasion, Modification and Resistance to American foreign policy(Pittsburg PA: University of Pittsburg Press), pp: 144-166.

in the KP. But finally the KP was accepted excluding advanced developing countries. When the US announced that it would not to ratify the KP, the EU accepted the KP and moved to establish its implementing process along with China-India-Brazil. This dissertation assumes that the EU assumed that the US would back down on the negotiations. The EU developed its diplomatic trading and investment relation with China and Brazil, the top two CDM project recipients.²⁷¹ The EU's main goal was to develop relations with developing countries. In order to do this, the EU announced plans to cut its emissions by 2020. The EU also worked with developing countries to establish a post Kyoto regime. The EU and advanced developing countries did not consider any reaction from the US.

We see some sort of soft and hard hegemonic practice in lengthy climate negotiations. Major actors try to establish a hegemonic situation in which they can force others to accept decisions and to their own economic advantage. Annex-1 industrialized countries want to pay for the cost of adaptation to the impacts of climate change in developing countries. But at the same time, Annex-1 industrialized countries want advanced developing countries to join the mitigation process. This dissertation assumes that it is a hegemonic battle over market competitiveness. If only Annex-1 industrialized countries took action to cut emissions, this would have implication for its economic competitiveness. On the other hand, advanced developing countries would get some advantages.

US interests may not fundamentally effect development in developing countries but it might have some international trade implications in the long run. So a kind of economic hegemony is there in the climate negotiations. It constructs the image of actors. How actors will be identified on the global stage depends on their hegemonic capacity.

²⁷¹ Peterson, M (2009). Post-Hegemonic Climate Politics. *The British journal of Politics and International Relations*, vol: 11, pp: 140-158.

Some respondents argued that the main character of climate negotiations is in Annex-1 industrialized and developing countries blaming each other. They always look at the problems of the other. Parties are not looking at their own problems. This is one of the biggest hegemonic battles in climate negotiations.

Many respondents from the developing countries explained that it seemed that new emerging countries are the main problem in the negotiations. Actually this is the position of developed countries. They always try to impose some ideas on the developing countries. In climate change negotiations, we see this as a clash of interest. This clash is the result of the hegemonic battle.

Another significant incident in climate negotiations is the emergence of NGOs and the epistemic community as non-state actors. Sometime non-state actors also dominate the negotiations process through their knowledge and ideas. Knowledge, ideas and communication power bring the NGO and researcher to the center of climate negotiations. If we consider knowledge, ideas and communication capacity as power to influence and win the process, then this constructs a new image of non-state actors in global politics. Ultimately, how actors will be represented on the global stage depends on the hegemonic capacity of actors. What we have seen is some change of normative structure in global negotiations of climate change. We see that some developing countries are very active regarding climate change and they have very close relations with NGOs and civil society groups, notwithstanding the fact that NGOs are not members of the UNFCCC. But they are very active in agenda-setting processes. They break the boundary between state and non-state actors in climate negotiations. That the climate negotiations have expressed globalization in an interesting way and has very much diminished the hegemony of the developed world is not in doubt. The role of NGO and epistemic community has been discussed in detail in chapter number 7.5.

4.5: Conclusion

This chapter has examined and identified the security issues for the actors in climate negotiations. Strategies, arguments, policies were main sources of identifying the security factor for key players in negotiations. This dissertation believes that the above-mentioned factors are the main issues for most of the actors in negotiations that have motivated the main actors to shift the goals of negotiations and involvement in complicated group politics. Economic development, energy security, poverty eradication and hegemonic are the independent variable for the actors and strategies in negotiation were the dependent variables for the actors in climate negotiations. Based on these variables, the next chapter will discuss the shift in agenda setting process, in leadership process and in the level of identity.

Chapter 5: Findings

Based on the inherent nature of international negotiations on climate change, this dissertation assumes these are highly political and closely connected to development activities. Therefore, major players in climate negotiations continue to dominate agendas to maximize profits. Prior to this chapter, the dissertation has examined how ideas, power and resources are conceptualized and applied by actors in negotiations to achieve preferences. If we consider the outcomes of climate negotiations, then we will find a clear deviation in the negotiations process. Socio-economic development and the environment effectively shift the international focus of climate negotiations from mitigation towards other approaches, particularly adaptation priorities. The parties gathered in 1992 in Rio to mitigate climate change. Mitigation or emissions reduction was the main target and objective of the meeting. But at the end of the COP-20, the actors along with mitigation were dealing with many other issues that were not even on the agenda of the meeting. In order to achieve their preferences, actors involved in-group politics and many groups emerged during the prolonged negotiations. The lengthy negotiations reflect that major actors in the negotiations always included some new issue as a condition to avoid the main objective through group politics. Involvement in many groups limits the options for opponents in negotiations.

This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section will examine the shift in the negotiations based on the major outcomes of negotiations. The second section will discuss group dynamics, the third will identify new leadership in climate negotiations and economic adjustment, while the fourth and fifth sections will provide an overview of a new identity based on empirical factors.

5.1: Shift in the negotiations: Wining approach

The UNFCCC was crafted to solve the climate change problem. It is clearly outlined in the objective of the convention that greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced to a certain level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic (human induced) interference with the climate system.²⁷² It also states “such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened, and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”²⁷³ Emissions reduction or stabilization targets explain many things. For example, they stress the need for emissions reduction and the importance of continuing the current development process by protecting economic development in a sustainable way. Ultimately, the convention changed the development narrative or discourse. The conference adopted “sustainable development” and Paul E Little considered this term as the “leitmotif” of the convention.²⁷⁴ The Economic development dilemma and inequity in society fosters a convention that divides emissions responsibility according to development status. Developing countries have successfully placed the issue of economic development and inequity in conference talks. They imposed the main responsibility on developed countries to reduce emissions. The convention also fixed the assumption- developed countries should provide financial and technological assistance to developing countries.

Developing countries only have to report to the convention regarding their action measurers on a voluntary basis, not on a regular obligatory basis, as developed countries must do. Moreover, their reporting depends on the funds provided by the

²⁷² UNFCCC website, available at: http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php, accessed on 15th March, 2014

²⁷³ ibidem

²⁷⁴ Little, P (1995). Ritual, power and ethnography at the Earth Summit. *Critique of Anthropology*. Vol: 15(3), pp: 265-288

developed countries, especially for the LDC countries. At the same time, the convention allowed developing countries to emit GHGs to continue their development activities. The Convention considered economic development as a way out of poverty for the world's poorer countries. Ultimately, the convention was more flexible to its member parties because it did not impose any obligatory pressure on developed and developing countries.

So, this dissertation accepts the idea that the Rio convention was established to mitigate the climate change problem with a weak structure. Jacqueline Roddick described the climate conference as anarchic by applying Waltz's argument that when sovereign actors are involved in any interstate interaction, it is conventionally and naturally anarchic due to the preferences of actors.²⁷⁵ Structurally, the Convention was not as strong as any treaty. It cannot oblige its signatory members in any way. The Treaty has legal standing and the formal commitments of signatory members.²⁷⁶ The Treaty can take action not to fulfill the agreement. Therefore, by nature, the Rio convention allows its members not to follow the main targets. In the Rio conference, the US directly refused to accept responsibility for reducing emissions as a developed country identified as a main polluter. Advanced developing countries also pushed the idea of historical responsibility on developed countries. This dissertation assumes that the Rio convention allows parties to include more agenda items in the negotiations process to avoid the main target. Capitalist development discourse and the economic understanding of the 1980's insisted that parties adopt a convention rather than a strong treaty. Simon Dalby explained this as result of the universalization of Western, modern development experience in an underdeveloped world towards advanced society through the historical patterns of

²⁷⁵ Roddick, J. (1997) Earth Summit north and south: Building a safe house in the winds of change. *Global environmental change*, vol.7.2. pp.147-165

²⁷⁶ Little, P. 1995. Ritual, power and ethnography at the Earth Summit. *Critique of Anthropology*. Vol: 15(3):265-288

economic, environmental exploitation.²⁷⁷ This economic trend motivates actors to undertake shifts in climate negotiations. Yet the key question is how and why?

Modern international relations theory accepts the importance of regimes in global negotiations to bring consensus in order to come to agreements on disputed issues. The Berlin mandate and the Geneva Ministerial Declaration were the continuation of the Rio convention. Both emphasized the implementation of the convention to make it more effective according to the urgency of the current situation. The parties met in COP-1 to continue the negotiations to prepare a climate deal. In the COP-1 in Berlin, actors reached a consensus that the commitments of developed countries, adopted at the Rio convention were "inadequate" to achieve the main goal of mitigation. Developing countries insisted that Annex-1 developed countries should take more action to tackle climate change. The parties also decided in the "Berlin mandate" to achieve effective and detailed commitments from developed countries.

In Berlin, the actors negotiated some institutional issues such as the establishment of an Ad Hoc group to conduct negotiations, a subsidiary body for implementation (SBI) and a subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice (SBSTA). Developing countries established the idea in Berlin and at the Geneva conference and concluded that commitments from developed countries are not enough to solve the climate problem. This was the first step to change the track of the climate negotiations because it was anticipated by some Annex-1 countries that emerging economies would become top emitters very soon. Therefore, both groups took the strategy to prolong the negotiations process to adjust and achieve their preferences.

²⁷⁷ Dalby, S (1996). Reading Rio, writing in the world: the New York Times and the Earth Summit. *Political Geography*. Vol: 17. No. 6/7. Pp. 593-613

In Kyoto, the actors met to make a deal to oblige top emitters to take action for emissions reduction. The Kyoto Protocol was the first legal initiative to oblige the parties to reduce emissions in climate negotiations history. The main feature of the KP is that the parties to the UNFCCC are legally obliged to set targets to cut emissions. But this was only for developed industrialized countries. The KP imposed this decision on developed countries under the notion of "common but differentiated responsibilities." It was a clear turn in the climate negotiations and successful for advanced developing countries or emerging economies. Advanced developing countries in particular were not part of this legal obligation. At that time it was anticipated that emerging economies like China, Brazil, and India would become major emitters in the future, even in the very near future. However, they were successful in avoiding the responsibility and the parties adopted the KP. The main weakness of the KP was a lack of an implementation process. These implementation mechanisms were subsequently adopted at COP-7 in Marrakesh, Morocco, in 2001, and are referred to as the "Marrakesh Accord". The "Marrakesh Accord" indicated that the KP would kick off in 2008 and its first commitment would end in 2012.

If we look at the KP mechanism, mitigation remained the main goal of the agenda. The KP indicates that parties should reduce their emissions through domestic measures initially. But the question that remained was how the target was going to be achieved. Because the protocol was flexible on the market-based mechanism to meet target through its features, which are:

- International Emissions Trading
- Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)

- Joint implementation (JI)²⁷⁸

To a questionnaire made available to them by this research, most respondents explained that these were tactics of the emerging developing countries to encourage developed countries to invest in developing countries through CDM. This had two implications. It helped them to meet their reduction targets and also their development work. And parties in the Kyoto agreed to establish an adaptation fund to assist vulnerable countries.

Market mechanism in the KP can be considered an economic instrument to protect the environment. Market mechanism is economic policy like any other economic policy. Market mechanism involves intergovernmental action to cut emissions.²⁷⁹ They help developing countries to implement sustainable development and reconcile economic development and environment.

The Kyoto Protocol can be seen as a win-win position for developed and developing countries. But by and large developing countries, mainly the major emerging economies were successful in imposing the sole responsibility on the developed Annex-1 countries. They compelled the Annex-1 countries to make commitments for an adaptation fund. Achievements for the Annex-I countries were the flexibility of the condition to reduce the emissions and emissions trading system. In short, mitigation was the main negotiation track of the KP and it was only the responsibility of Annex-I countries. Importantly, the major player, the US, did not ratify the protocol and much later some other major emitters, such as Canada and Australia, withdrew from the protocol. Some observers have said that the Kyoto protocol failed to deliver any positive outcomes to stabilize emissions except some financing in the developing countries.

²⁷⁸ UNFCCC website, available at: http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php, accessed on 25th March, 2014

²⁷⁹ Philbert, C. (2000) How could emissions trading benefit developing countries. *Energy policy*, 28, pp: 947-956

The Bali action plan was another strategic gain for advanced developing countries in climate negotiations. Developing countries were successful in avoiding any legal obligations to cut emissions as in the KP. However, their emissions were gradually increased. The Bali action plan designed the way for the future negotiations process. It was a comprehensive inclusive initiative for future negotiations for sustained implementation of the convention.

The Bali Action Plan included many agenda items. It adopted 28 decisions. The major outcomes were on shared vision, adaptation, technology transfer and financing. According to the UNFCCC, the shared vision refers to a long-term vision for action on climate change, including a long-term goal for emissions reductions to be decided in COP-15 in Copenhagen. The Bali Action plan adopted the decision to operationalize the adaptation fund with GEF. It was about \$30 billion fast-start financing (in 2010-2012) for adaptation and mitigation in developing countries, with priority given to the least developed countries.²⁸⁰ Developed countries committed to provide this fund to vulnerable countries. The parties also decided to support developing countries to cut emissions through reductions of deforestation (REDD). The World Bank and Norway promised to increase their support on this issue. The decision to scale up the investment was taken by the developing countries to enhance technological development to mitigate and adapt to climate change.

Most of the respondents viewed the Bali Action Plan as highly ambitious and a strategic win for emerging economies. It includes many agenda items and imposed the responsibility on the Annex-I countries to implement the major part of the agenda. In terms of the time lines it was a bit optimistic, and failed to understand the complexity both of climate change as a problem and of crafting a global response to it.

²⁸⁰UNFCCC website, available at: http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php, accessed on 25th March, 2014

The big achievement for the developing countries was to include the US in the negotiations process and emerging developing countries successfully avoided the responsibility on GHG reduction issues and added more agenda items to protect their interests in the negotiations.

The Copenhagen conference produced an accord for the parties. If the Kyoto Protocol was the first break through as a positive move to set a target, then the Copenhagen accord was a political move to derail the negotiations. The Copenhagen Accord is a set of political pledges rather a legal document. It left many agenda points to be implemented in the future.²⁸¹ In Copenhagen, major developing countries such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa emerged as an obstructionist powers in the negotiations while they eventually became major emitters.

Observers have commented on this and China is accused of halting the negotiations process. At that time, Annex-I countries, particularly the US, were very active in trying to make a deal to include advanced developing countries in the mitigation process. In order to get support from the vulnerable poor countries, Annex-I countries announced the fund for adaptation and mitigation in developing countries. It put strategic pressure on the major developing countries to accept the obligatory legal framework.²⁸² In reply to the Annex-1 countries advance developing countries particularly China, Brazil announced to provide financial and technical support to poor developing countries as well.

However, the Copenhagen Accord accepted the scientific view that temperature rise should be stabilized below 2 degree Celsius on the basis of equality and sustainable development. Economic development and poverty eradication would be top priorities for developing countries. Annex-1 countries would implement

²⁸¹ Bondasky, D (2010). The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem, *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol. 104. No. 2, pp. 230-240

²⁸² UNFCCC website, available at: http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php, accessed on 25th March, 2014

mitigation actions individually and the quantified economy-wide emissions target jointly for 2020.²⁸³ The Accord also included a decision to provide financial assistance to developing countries for mitigation, adaptation, REDD plus, technology development and transfer to implement the convention. Developed countries pledged to provide USD 30 billion for the period of 2010-2012 and also USD 100 billion a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. The Accord established the Green Climate Fund (GCF) as an operating entity. Another important decision of the accord was to establish a technology mechanism to develop and provide technical assistance based on a country driven approach and on local circumstances and priorities.²⁸⁴

Though the Copenhagen accord delivered a set of decisions, it was very simple and plain. It did not set any time frame to create a common deal for all countries similar to the KP. The Copenhagen accord did not mention any legal bindings. At the beginning of the conference, developed countries tried to include the emerging economies in the mitigation process. But emerging economies strongly influenced the negotiations and molded the accord according to their interest.²⁸⁵ Moreover, they forced developed countries to make commitments to deliver the financial assistance and concentrated on adaptation and financial issues. Ultimately, the Copenhagen accord expanded commitments made in the KP but did not make any decision regarding the obligations of emitters made in the KP set to expire in 2012. Copenhagen did not provide a comprehensive global solution to climate change, particularly on binding emissions reduction commitment and funding for developing countries. ²⁸⁶

²⁸³ The Guardian. (2009). Low targets, goals dropped: Copenhagen ends in failure. Dec: 19.

²⁸⁴ Decision 2/CP.15. UNFCCC. 2009.

²⁸⁵ Brown, D (2011). An ethical analysis of Cancun climate negotiations outcome. DILEMATA, vol: 2, pp: 11-30.

²⁸⁶ ibidem

The outcome of the “Cancun Agreements” remained the same as previous conferences. Parties engaged debate on adaptation and finance. The “Cancun Agreement” led to a compromise by the international community to address the long-term challenge of climate change collectively and comprehensively over time and to take concrete action immediately to speed up the global response to it.

The Cancun agreement encouraged participation of all countries in reducing these emissions, in accordance with each country's different responsibilities and capabilities to do so. Reviews of progress made towards the two-degree objectives and a review by 2015 on whether the objectives needed to be strengthened in future, including the consideration of a 1.5C goal, on the basis of the best scientific knowledge available were instituted. The Cancun agreement insisted on mobilizing the development and transfer of clean technology to boost efforts to address climate change, getting it to the right place at the right time and for the best effect on both adaptation and mitigation.

Parties were asked to scale-up funding in the short and long term to enable developing countries to take greater and effective action. It fixed a way for developed countries to distribute \$100 billion per year by 2020 through the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to assist developing countries in mitigating climate change and adapting to its impacts.²⁸⁷

The Cancun agreement pledged to assist particularly vulnerable people in the world to adapt to the inevitable impacts of climate change by taking a coordinated adaptation approach. The focal points in Cancun were on protecting the world's forests, which are a major repository of carbon. Governments agreed to launch concrete action on forests in developing nations. Steps were taken to build global capacity, especially in developing countries, to meet the overall challenge efforts were

²⁸⁷ UNFCCC website, available at: http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php, accessed on 10th April, 2014

undertaken to establish effective institutions and systems which will ensure that these objectives are implemented successfully.²⁸⁸

The BBC considered the Cancun agreement to be a set of pledges because the parties were flexible after the Copenhagen chaos. But in Cancun the BASIC countries shifted their position. They did not make any serious opposition in the conference. On the other hand, developed countries accepted most of the conditions that came from the developing countries.²⁸⁹ Respondents viewed the Cancun COP as a symbol of compromise. Delegates found some sort of compromise among top emitters. The Cancun document accepted that deeper cuts in carbon emissions were needed and urgent, but it did not establish any mechanism to achieve the pledges countries had made.

The final outcome of the Cancun agreement was that developing countries would take the emissions-curbing measures subjected to international verification only when they were funded by Annex-1 money. The top two actors in climate negotiations, China and the US, became happy with that. China and the US which has demanded them, had concerns on such verification procedure.

The Durban Conference gave a new geopolitical sheen to the climate conference, although the agenda remained the same. It was also another big turn in the climate negotiations. The year 2012 was the last year of the first commitment period of the KP. The parties in Durban decided to continue the KP in its second commitment period under the notion that developed countries would have the main responsibility to cut emissions. It also launched a new platform of negotiations under the Convention to deliver a new and universal greenhouse gas reduction protocol,

²⁸⁸ UNFCCC website, available at: http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php, accessed on 10th April, 2014.

²⁸⁹ BBC. UN climate change Cancun: agree and deal. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-11975470>, accessed on 15 April.

legal instruments or other outcomes with legal force by 2015 for the period beyond 2020. These new negotiations critically included finding ways to further increase national and international level actions and stated ambitions to bring greenhouse gas emissions down.

The Durban conference provided strong promises that parties would work together to push to implement short term ambitions for a low carbon society. But the most significant aspect of the Durban conference is that the USA, China and Brazil jointly announced plans to cut emissions. This was not a legal obligation, rather a voluntary pledge for developing countries. However, India emerged as the obstructionist in Durban – the Indian Environmental Minister Jayanthi Natarajan refused to sign up a deal that committed the developing world to a strong legal treaty.²⁹⁰

One respondent from Japan in an interview said that China had backed India. The World's second and third largest emitters on that time, China and India, had demanded climate justice. They explained the need to continue their current development path over the next few decades in order to bring millions of people out of poverty, but which would produce emissions. The conference focused mostly on finance and technology transfer. Developing countries, especially the BASIC countries, effectively obstructed any legal agreements.

Durban conference brought some change in negotiations scenario. Jenifer Morgan and Edward Cameron considered the Durban Platform to be an empowering document. It empowered developing countries. According to their view, it recognized the emissions gap, confirms long-term goals, restores faith in multilateralism, and points to a future regime that has legal force and universal membership. The extension of Kyoto is a positive development as it preserves the key mechanisms such

²⁹⁰ Minas, S (2013). BASICs position: major emerging countries in the UN Climate change negotiation. Foreign Policy briefing.

as emissions trading and the CDM. It further represents an important political gesture by a set of major industrialized countries.²⁹¹ The EU's joint announcement on emissions target with AISIS and LDC is another symbol of empowerment of developing countries.

By analyzing the outcomes of the Doha Conference, this dissertation accepts that the Doha declaration is also a clear gain for developing countries. It fixed a time line for making a global deal in reducing emissions. It was a strategic win for emerging developing countries, as they always said that they would not be part of the obligatory reduction process. They argued that if we were to have any obligatory treaty by 2015, which will be effective by 2020, only developed countries would take action to reduce the emissions. They insisted that developed countries again increase their ambitions and provide more help to developing countries. The Doha Conference carried out the decision of the Durban conference to fix the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. It also ensured that developed countries would lead expected action to cut greenhouse gas emissions.

The Doha climate conference also amended some conditions of the KP. For instance, if countries announced any new commitments under the Kyoto Protocol to cut emissions, the commitment should be reviewed at the latest by 2014. The Kyoto Protocol's Market Mechanisms – the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and International Emissions Trading (IET) – would continue in the second commitment period of the KP.

In Doha, the parties initiated some infrastructure to provide technology and finance to the developing countries. For example, South Korea was selected as the hosts for the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the work plan of the Standing Committee on Finance was established. The inclusion of the phrase “Loss and

²⁹¹ Reflection on COP 17 in Durban, available at: <http://www.wri.org/blog/reflections-cop-17-durban>, access on 25th April, 2014.

damage” in the text was another significant decision in Doha. As British Daily “The Guardian” reported, for the first time, the terms *loss* and *damage* for climate change were included in an international document.²⁹² Initially, developed countries strongly opposed the notion of loss and damage, particularly the US, which did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, they accepted the *loss* and *damage* issue and agreed to discuss it.

This dissertation sees this as a clear strategic achievement for developing countries. Developing countries untidily took the position for the *loss* and *damage* issues starting at the Cancun conference in 2010. Respondents to this research project, observers and media consider this to be a win for developing countries. The British daily *The Guardian* called it a “historic recognition of the plight they face from the ravages of climate change, wringing a pledge from rich nations that they will receive funds to repair the "loss and damage".²⁹³

Since the beginning of the negotiations, developed countries had come under huge pressure to reduce emission. But the scenario has changed over time. Emerging economies also faced the same challenge to reduce emission particularly since the Copenhagen Conference. In the Paris conference, both developed countries and advanced developing countries such as China, India, and Brazil came closer because of the pressure on them to reduce emission, since they are top emitters. Specially G77 and LDC countries argued for the inclusion of all top emitters in the legal process to reduce emission.

²⁹² Harvey, F (2012). Doha climate change deal clears way for 'damage aid' to poor nations. The Guardian. December 08.

²⁹³ *ibidem*

This dissertation assumes that the Paris agreement has everything, but it has no teeth to bite. It is not a legally binding agreement. Parties are not obliged to honour the deal. But a regular review of emission action is binding, if any party ratifies the agreement. Therefore, all parties will submit mitigation and adaptation plan, in which they may detail their priorities, support needs and plans. Developing countries will get more assistance for adaptation and mitigation. The existing Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage will be significantly strengthened. The agreement includes a robust transparency framework for both action and support. The framework will provide clarity on the countries' mitigation and adaptation actions, as well as the provision of support. At the same time, it recognises that the LDCs and Small Island Developing States have special circumstances. The agreement includes a global stock-taking starting in 2023 to assess the collective progress towards the goals of the agreement. The review will be done every five years. The agreement includes a compliance mechanism, overseen by a committee of experts that operates in a non-punitive way.

Conclusion: To sum up, this dissertation has considered the negotiations track since the 1992 Rio conference and has identified that the negotiations began with one issue: to reduce emissions through mitigation. But one question arose among the actors in climate negotiations: who would accept the responsibility? Actors were divided in two groups on this question. Developed industrialized countries argued for common responsibility. And developing countries, particularly advanced developing countries, argued to impose responsibility on industrialized countries as a historical responsibility. But at that time it was anticipated by most countries that advanced developing economies would become major emitters within a short time.

By analyzing strategies, agendas and outcomes, this dissertation has found that emerging developing countries initially adopted the strategy of imposing the entire burden on Annex-1 industrialized countries as a historical responsibility over the last 200 years. After that they gradually added many agenda items to the discussion table. The KP was based on mitigation and the Annex-I countries accepted proposals to cut GHG emissions. Later, they included the adaptation process to tackle the results of climate change and the developing countries asked Annex-1 countries to facilitate the adaptation process. They argued that Annex-I countries should provide financial assistance for adaptation. They also demanded technology in order to control their own emissions and to continue the development process. The latest inclusion has been loss and damage in the negotiations. Developing countries have argued that the adverse effects of climate change are already being felt. This causes damage and loss in vulnerable countries due to the unprecedented development activities of the Annex-I countries. Therefore, Annex-I countries have to pay for the loss and damage in the vulnerable countries.

It is evident that most of the benefits of the negotiations have gone to the emerging developing countries such as China, India, Brazil, Indonesia as per their size of population, economy and of course vulnerability. For example, according to a top official of the UNFCCC, already more than 60 percent CDM projects are registered in China and India.²⁹⁴ The largest part of financial assistance would go to the advanced developing countries if financial assistance were distributed according to per capita calculation. Some respondents also argued that in the prolonged negotiations process, advanced developing countries have adjusted their economies. Currently they are the top emitters, and they are not part of any legal obligation to reduce emission. It is clear strategic win for emerging economies in climate

²⁹⁴ UNFCCC website. www.unfccc.int.

negotiations. Paris conference shows that emerging economies particularly BASIC countries were succeeded to avoid to take any legally responsibility to reduce emission though other developing countries such as LDC, G77 argued to include all top emitters in the obligatory process.

Finally this dissertation finds clear shift in the negotiation process. In 1992 BASIC countries were very close to developing countries. Now they are very close to developed countries. China, India and Brazil were very actin at the beginning of negotiation to make legal obligation for developed world to reduce emission. Now, they are flexible and advocate accepting voluntary commitment to cut emission.

5.2: Group dynamics- limiting the alternative

By analyzing the positions and strategies of major actors in climate negotiations, this dissertation has found that actors are involved in many groups in climate negotiations. The group dynamics of the climate negotiations are very complicated and diverse. Parties are engaged in many opposing alliances, which are sometimes contradictory and complicated. For example, China and India are both members of the G77, BASIC and BRICS. It could be assumed that they would have very close ties in negotiations. While they are in the same group, they still have a lot of disagreements in the negotiations process regarding their individual interests, such as mitigation, adaptation, financial allocation and technology transfer. In 1995 in COP-1, India proposed establishing a protocol. But China rejected any protocol, arguing that negotiations were premature to begin talks to establish a protocol. But they were in the same group of the G77&China which has been a very influential group since the beginning of the negotiations. Later, they created another small group called BASIC with Brazil and South Africa.

Background

Primary and secondary data shows that since the beginning of negotiations, the parties have been divided into mainly two groups of developed countries and developing countries according to their economic status, historical responsibility of GHG emissions and level of development. Initially the G77&China was the leader of the developing countries. AOSIS and LDC were also in the group with the G77&China on some specific issues. LDS was known as the group of Asian and African countries.

This dissertation has found that later many subgroups emerged among the developed and developing countries throughout the negotiations. For example, BASIC, BRICS, LMDC, African group, Latin American countries, Bolivarian group, Cartagena progressive countries group, most vulnerable countries (MVC), highly vulnerable countries (HVC), GRULAC and so on.

On the other hand the US and the EU was the leaders of the developed industrialized countries. They also have some groups, like the Umbrella group, and the environment integrity group.

These groups emerged based on thematic and territorial notion. For example, MVC, HVC, the Umbrella group, and the environment integrity group were thematic groups. AOSIS, Bolivarian group, Latin American countries are territorial groups. There have many disagreements among the groups at the same time. For example, the Umbrella group versus the EU in the developed world and major developing countries versus the poor vulnerable countries among the developing countries.

In the following part of this chapter, the group dynamics of climate negotiations will be discussed in order to show that how actors are limiting alternatives to the opponent in negotiations game.

Considering their positions, from the beginning of climate negotiations, the EU has been very active as a group. The US took the leading role in the decision-making

process as an individual player. But the EU and the USA worked together. On the other hand China, Brazil, Argentina, Sudan, and India were at the forefront in the developing countries group and the G77&China was in the leading position as a group from the developing world. LDC and AOSIS were also active; they were relatively less active than the G77&China as a group. They were not as influential and powerful, but drew attention and sympathy from the developed world since they were the victims of climate change. They had very influential capacity. If they were sewing to any specific decision with the US and EU, it had a better chance to come about. For example, AOSIS was in favor of making a protocol. They advocated for a protocol on many occasions. Finally, the parties agreed to adopt the Kyoto protocol. If they went with China, India and the other developing countries group, then the pendulum would move to the developing world. Actually, they were not the most powerful group in the negotiations but relatively influential to build a group.

Based on interviews and observations, it is evident that over the years the group dynamics have changed. In the beginning of the negotiations, as single countries, the US, the EU, China, and India were more influential. South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Singapore were also influential and powerful. But Argentina was not very influential and active in the negotiations. Observers assumed that Argentina had lost its position in the negotiations due to their slow economic development and its intentions to be a member of the OECD. Comparatively, the Chinese, Indian, Brazilian, South African and Indonesian economies have rapidly developed and given the countries strong positions in the negotiations. They established BASIC and BRIC with Russia, a clear indication of the global dominating character of developing countries. They formed many groups to apply extra pressure in the negotiations to get favorable agreements.

Recently they also formed the Like-Minded developing countries (LMDC) group to keep more developing countries with them. Countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, the Philippines, Sudan and more than 30 countries are in the LMDC. Some observers view the LMDC act as co-partners of the BASIC. LMDC appeared very actively in the COP18 and COP19 yielding their power. Sometimes they tried to block negotiations. For instance, they strongly opposed the term, *commitment* for developing countries; the term *commitment* was replaced by *contribution* in the ADP text in the Warsaw conference. The parties discussed the national commitment of the parties in the COP-19 for the agreement text for 2015 for mitigation. But the LMDC demanded that they replace the word *commitment* with *contribution* because according to the Durban plan, all parties would be part of the new agreement or protocol or agreed outcome with legal force. So, the LMC took advantage of the previous decision. Meanwhile, LDC, AOSIS, African group, AILAC, ALBA, SIRCA have emerged as strong groups in the negotiations. They were always very proactive.

BASIC has become a central player in climate negotiations; they have economic and emissions power. GHG emissions are the major power in climate negotiations. “If you are major emitters, you will be the powerful player in the negotiations”, one official of the UNFCCC told the researcher in an interview.²⁹⁵ BASIC members are the top consumers of fossil fuel and emit huge amounts of GHGs in the name of their right to development.²⁹⁶ But they do not want to take any responsibility for emissions. Even LDC and AOSIS talk about sustainable development, the right to livelihood, and the right to survival. BASIC talks about common but differentiated responsibilities but they have not said anything about respective capabilities in any COP, whereas LDC, AOSIS have argued for respective

²⁹⁵ Interview

²⁹⁶ Interview

capabilities to cut emissions for all, though all countries in the LDC, AOSIS have the same image of developing countries.

Based on the strategies of actors in negotiations, this dissertation assumes that there was a basic fire wall between developed and developing countries. BASIC and LMDC have wanted to maintain the firewall between developed and developing countries because if it is possible to maintain this, all the major developing countries will benefit. They will be able to protect their interests. They would continue with their CO₂ emissions as their per capita emissions are lower than other competitors in terms of equity and CO₂ space.

LDC, AOSIS and African countries are mostly victims of the adverse impacts of climate change and want to protect their right to survival. They asked all countries to contribute to the mitigation process. All parties should have commitments and they must implement their commitments. They argued that developed and advanced developing countries should cut their emissions, including the BASIC and OPEC countries because this will help them to reach the target to stabilize the temperature at an increase between 1.5 and 2 degree Celsius. Vulnerable developing countries have argued that if they want to keep the temperature from rising above 2 degree Celsius, the commitment of the developed or Annex-I countries alone will not be adequate to reach the goal because emerging developing countries are producing 40 percent of global emissions. According to the UNFCCC's statistics the BASIC and oil producing countries are responsible for more than 50 percent of emissions.²⁹⁷ Therefore, the LDC, AOSIS and African countries have argued that the participation of the advanced developing countries is very important to stabilize temperature and stabilize emissions. Even if developed countries accepted drastic reductions, it would not make any sense to reduce emissions. This dissertation assumes that if emissions

²⁹⁷ UNFCCC website. www.unfccc.int

from advanced developing countries are not checked, by the end of the century temperatures will rise by 4 degree Celsius because advanced developing countries and oil producing countries are producing emissions in the same way that developed countries have for the last two centuries.

There is a clear division among developing countries. The BASIC and LMC are more interested in CBDR. But the AOSIS, LDC and poor African countries are most affected by severe climate change, such as severe storm, flood, drought and other natural disasters and are in a stronger position to introduce the “respective capabilities” term with CBDR (Common but differentiated responsibilities). According to respective capabilities, BASIC and LMDC countries should cut emissions along with the Annex-1 countries. But advanced developing countries are trying to introduce more issues, such as equity, CBDR, and so on, to hinder the negotiation process.

Earlier, the BASIC countries had influence on LDC, AOSIS and African countries, but the influence is gradually diminishing on many items on the agenda. That is why advanced developing countries are trying to create some divisions among the LDC and AOSIS. This dissertation found that LMC is the result of division-making politics. Some very influential members of the LDC and AOSIS are also members of the LMDC. For example, Sudan, Pakistan, Tanzania, Philippines, Venezuela, Bolivia, Saudi Arabia, and Mali were very active in the negotiations as LDC members. Since the creation of LMDC, Sudan and Mali speak for the LMDC. The creation of LMDC not only weakens the LDC, AOSIS but also weakens the G77&China.

At the same time, BASIC members have always maintained strategic relations with the US, the EU, the Umbrella group and other developed countries. For instance, China made a joint statement with the US and EU. Recently, BASIC countries shifted

their position on the mitigation process. In a joint statement with the US, China expressed its intention to reduce emissions by 2030. China also offered financial aid to vulnerable countries in 2009 at the Copenhagen conference. But vulnerable developing countries have accused China of not following through with their announcement. Observers have argued that these were tactics of the BASIC countries to create divisions among the vulnerable poor countries. One negotiator from Bangladesh said that after the creation of LMDC, they did not pledge any commitments. For example, in Copenhagen, developed countries announced a \$30 billion fund for adaptation. At that time, advanced developing countries guessed that LDC and AOSIS countries would go with the developed countries and sign the Danish Draft. Therefore, the BASIC countries also offered financial support to the LDC and AOSIS countries for adaptation action. But they did not deliver a single dollar. Some developed countries also strongly argued in the recent COP that that they would not make any new commitments to the new agreement without commitments from the advanced developing countries. But the advanced developing countries have consistently refused to make any commitments along with their groups.

Conclusion: This section examines the “limiting alternatives for opponents” strategy in the negotiations. It is evident that there are four major groups of countries in climate negotiations. Generally, they are divided into two groups according to convention: Annex and non-Annex. Annex countries are divided in two blocs: the EU and the US led blocs. The EU is a bit willing to take more responsibility to cut emissions and provide more assistance to vulnerable developing countries. But the US led bloc countries, such as Canada and Australia, are very rigid and unwilling to take any action on mitigation and financial assistance. On the other hand, China dominated the G77& China and is very active in opposing any responsibility to cut emissions. AOSIS and LDC countries argue that all countries should take

responsibility according to their capacity. This conflict among parties has brought BASIC countries to the center of climate negotiations.

One of the main characteristics of climate negotiations is that BASIC has close relations with all players - vulnerable developing countries, the EU and the US. They issued joint statements on many issues with the EU, US and other developing countries. This is clear evidence that the group dynamic is bringing some changes to a normative global power structure centered on BASIC. BASIC is in the center of the group dynamic in climate negotiations. For instance, BASIC has emerged as a blocking power in the climate negotiations since 2009. BASIC countries blocked the Danish draft at the Copenhagen conference. BASIC members want to get a free ride; they want to avoid compliance and responsibility. Sometimes they accept proposals from developed countries such as the US and the EU, while at other times they create friction among the vulnerable developing countries to limit the options for Annex-1 countries. For example, the LMDC appeared as also very influential actors in the negotiations. BASIC and LMDC jointly represent the maximum influential developing countries in the negotiations. It is reality in the negotiations that any decision reached has to be accepted by the BASIC and LMDC members. Negotiations history reflects that it is not possible for the Annex-1 countries to adopt any decision without considering BASIC and LMDC members.

5.3: Change in normative structure: new leadership and economic adjustment

One of the senior officials of the UNFCCC said that emissions are power in climate negotiations. But other respondents argued that along with the emissions rate, other factors matter, for instance energy consumption and security, economic growth, population size, and development trajectory. These have made some actors in

climate negotiations key players. Anthony Breton marks these as great power in the climate negotiations. He argued that economic competitiveness, energy issues and security, financial mechanism diverted countries from hardheaded negotiations and made some of them great powers in climate politics.²⁹⁸ Considering the negotiations variables, outcomes of the negotiations this dissertation identifies five actors as major players or leaders in the climate negotiations as such the US, the EU, China, India and Brazil. The following part will discuss major players and their climate policies based on their positions in climate negotiations.

5.3.1: The US

Negotiations background reflects that the US is one of the most influential players in climate negotiations. As a global leader, the US is one of the top emitters and the top energy consumer. Its emissions, energy consumption trends, and size of economy matter in the negotiations. The US has a population of over 316.1 million, a US\$ 16.17 trillion GDP and a US\$ 53, 570 per capita GNI. The US emits 17.5 metric ton per capita annually with an average of 6.5 million metric to equivalent CO₂ emissions per year.²⁹⁹ Though the US economy is energy-efficient and has low carbon intensity compared to other top emitters, the US is one of the largest emitters due to its oil and coal-based energy matrix. US emissions increased by 4.7 percent from 1990 to 2012. Since 1990, US emissions have annually increased at an average rate of 0.2 percent.³⁰⁰

By analyzing US positions in climate negotiations and domestic policies, this dissertation has found that the US is a very conservative actor in climate negotiations. Viola, Franchini and Rebeiro also consider the US to be a moderate conservative due

²⁹⁸ Breton, A. 2013. Great Powers in climate politics. *Climate policy*. Vol. 13:5. Opp 541-546

²⁹⁹ World Development Indicator. The World Bank. Available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states>

³⁰⁰ United States Environment Protection Agency. (2012). *Trends in Greenhouse Gas emissions*. 2012.

to its low-carbon economy transition and its medium vulnerability to climate change.³⁰¹ The US might be a moderate conservative according to low carbon economic transition policy but as the leader of the industrialized countries, it has historical responsibility. The USA has to deliver something more in the climate negotiations than others. Viola, Franchini and Rebeiro argue that would not be easy because the US has some difficulties. The US tries to protect its own interests in climate negotiations and this has turned out to be the biggest blocker in the negotiating process. To some extent, it took the lead in blocking the Kyoto protocol. It was expected by all that the US would play a leading and more active role in cutting emissions and delivering assistance to developing countries.

According to interviews conducted among negotiators, most of the respondents argued that the US needs to change its domestic politics and policies so that it can easily ratify agreements that they negotiate and often seek concessions or stay out of the negotiation process. The US is a country that acts in International negotiations in a clear and coherent way. They have internal policies that are very influential in international negotiations process. It is very difficult for the US negotiators to be able to receive a mandate to negotiate with something that can be dealt with in Congress afterwards. So the US is a more cautious negotiator, even more cautious after the problem with the Kyoto protocol because the US negotiator watered down the Kyoto before they could sign it. Unfortunately the US was not able to ratify it. The lead negotiator from Brazil said in 2012 that they had watered down the Kyoto to have the US inside the protocol system.³⁰²

Another significant US position is that the US government was reluctant regarding climate negotiations and commitments during the Bush Administration

³⁰¹ Viola, E. Franchini, M. Ribeiro, T. L. (2012) Climate governance in an international system under conservative hegemony: the role of major power. *Brazil International Politics*, vol: 55 (special edition), pp 9-29.

³⁰² Interview

(2001–2008), after leading the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol alongside the EU during the Clinton Administration (1993–2000). This changed when Obama took office and his administration signaled to the rest of the world that President Obama's administration would boost the decarbonization of the economy.

The role of the US is very clear, as they are the second largest economic power and one of the big emitters. The US and China together represent about 40 percent of global emissions. They are the leading actors and powers in the negotiations. Of course, the EU and others are also very strong actors in negotiations. The EU is a group of 28 countries. And others are joining the EU. In spite of that, the US still is the strongest power in the negotiations from the developed world. And then also the EU cannot probably alone balance power like other countries because China, India and Brazil are together.

A Japanese negotiator explained the US position by arguing that the US does not believe in top-down UN lead processes.³⁰³ The US simply does not want to address the issue of climate change within the UN agreement. The US is more keen for bilateral or compromise between top emitters. For example, recent statements with China and the Copenhagen accord explain the US approach to avoid a multilateral approach. Some of the respondents said that the US acts as an obstructionist and is hobbled by its Congress. One negotiator argued that Obama has more power outside the US than in the US. Obama faced strong opposition in the congress on emissions cuts. The congress argued that emerging economies did not announce any formal commitment to cut the emissions, especially China. Climate change has become an issue of debate between Democrats and Republicans, along with abortion and gun control.³⁰⁴ They believe that energy security and economic

³⁰³ Interview

³⁰⁴ Viola E. Franchini, M. Ribeiro, T, L (2012) Climate governance in an international system under conservative hegemony: the role of major power. *Brazil International Politics*, vol: 55 (special edition), pp 9-29.

growth is a factor in the US climate policy and negotiations and the Senate plays an important role in any decision on climate change.

According to the views of the respondent, the US does not lead these negotiations, though they are the strongest player. Generally, the negotiations are led by parties like China, India, Brazil, and the EU. They have the influence to control the negotiations process. Of course the US has influence in the negotiations, but they have less than others like China, India, Brazil, and the EU at this moment. Even, some respondents think that they have failed to take the lead in negotiations because of its internal difficulties in accepting climate change a central issue in their own policy. “So if you cannot have this as key issue in your own policy, it’s even more difficult to have it as an important issue internationally and to have leadership where you can act inside in your own country” said a respondent from Japan.³⁰⁵

Respondents stated in the interviews that US domestic policy determines its foreign policy. Many domestic factors account for failures in climate negotiations. Strong bipartisan polarization in Congress, a high unemployment rate, the extreme cold winter of 2010 in the East Coast, demagogically used by the Republican Party as an example of the excesses in the assessments of global warming threat, strong lobbying by oil, coal, steel, cement and electricity industries against the climate bill arguing that it would make the American industry less competitive.³⁰⁶

Observers argue that many other social and economic factors also account for US climate politics. They are divided into liberal and fundamentalist in terms of social issues, conservative and reformist in terms of economic and domestic politics. Viola, Fannichi, Rebeiro explain that the US society is strongly divided into liberal and conservative group. “One part is liberal and sensitive to globalization and the

³⁰⁵ Interview

³⁰⁶Viola E. Franchini, M. Ribeiro, T, L (2012) Climate governance in an international system under conservative hegemony: the role of major power. *Brazil International Politics*, vol: 55 (special edition), pp 9-29.

other is more closed and fundamentalist, and resorts to a semi-isolationist ideology. It is also observed as a deeper movement, the progressive erosion of the basic American values, steaming from the weak and uncertain economic recovery, the constant unemployment crisis, and the increase of social inequality and the growing stagnation of social mobility – possibly the most powerful driving force of American culture”³⁰⁷. These are also influential factors in US domestic climate policy.

One respondent from an EU country said that the private sector is a very important factor in the US. They have effective influence in formulating climate policy in the US. Viola, Fannichi, Rebeiro argue that oil companies, thermoelectric utilities, and the car industry are known to be conservative about cutting emissions. They are more interested not to move for cutting emissions. On the other hand, solar, wind and nuclear energy sectors, the information and technology industries like Google, Microsoft, Apple, Oracle and CNN, biotechnology, engine and capital goods, like General Electric, and the big retail chains, like Wal-Mart and green construction suppliers are the reformist poles. They would like to introduce renewable energy to reduce emissions. States can be divided into reformist and conservative approach. Some states, like New England, New York, Maryland, California, Oregon, Washington and Illinois, have already introduced climate friendly legislation. The rest of the states are conservative in taking initiative to tackle climate change. Civil society, scientists, media are also divided in the open and conservative notions. The US has the highest number of scientists advocating to make commitments to tackle climate

³⁰⁷ Viola E. Franchini, M. Ribeiro, T, L (2012) Climate governance in an international system under conservative hegemony: the role of major power. *Brazil International Politics*, vol: 55 (special edition), pp 9-29.

change while on the other hand the most climate skeptical think tanks are also based in the US³⁰⁸.

Observers believe that the US has great potential to become the climate leader in the negotiations by applying its technological advancement. It can reduce its emissions through wind, nuclear and solar energy expansion, and bio-fuel, avoid the coal and oil based technology, increasing the capacity to carbon capture and storage (CCS) facilities and so on.³⁰⁹

When Obama became president, it was expected that his administration would take more action domestically and internationally because he campaigned for comprehensive climate legislation. It was also expected that the US would form the leadership with the EU from the industrialized group. In 2009, observers were optimistic when a bill was placed in the house known as the “Waxman Climate and Energy Bill” and passed. But the development was not very favorable because the bill was committed to reducing emissions by only 3% compared to 1990. That is clearly very far from the EU proposal of 20% to 30-40% by the IPCC. At last the US abandoned this emissions reduction project in 2010 in a legislation known as Kerry-Boxer bill³¹⁰.

This dissertation assumes that it would not be said that the US lost the leadership competition, but they were not always number one. Sometime the EU has been, as one negotiator explained thus: “One thing is during the Bush administration probably they had lost generation or lost decade for experiencing the domestic work. But some states like California, New York, they have their own strong policy. They introduced and implemented strong policy. But at the federal states it seems to

³⁰⁸Viola' E. Franchini, M. Ribeiro, T, L (2012) Climate governance in an international system under conservative hegemony: the role of major power. *Brazil International Politics*, vol: 55 (special edition), pp 9-29.

³⁰⁹ Interview

³¹⁰ Micneil, R (2006). Alternative climate policy pathway in the US. *Climate policy*. Vol: 13, no: 2, pp: 259-276

compare to other country, they have a lot domestic experiences of reduction or verification process. The EU has lot of experience of domestic practice to reduce the emissions. But the US does not have a strong kind of policy, they have lost huge amount of time”.

And then this is actually when we try to leave these negotiations by explaining the domestic experiences either for reflection of the international assistance or transferring the experience to other country like a developing country. This is something very important to US and which accounts for their weakness in the negotiations. The US is trying very hard to recover from this, and quite a number of people in the US do not understand the scientific factor behind climate change.

Actually, the US was for many years not committing to the negotiations to expect any outcome. They did not come forward until president Obama came into office. They have a major role in trying to basically convince everyone that they would take responsibility. If we consider US diplomacy in the climate negation in short, it acts as blocker in the climate negotiations. Respondent consider the US foreign policy as conservative to reduce the emissions, skeptical and interested to impose the responsibility on the emerging economy. The US is keener on implementing emissions reduction actions in developing countries through CDM and other UNFCCC instruments. The main points of the US climate diplomacy are: i) inclusion of advanced developing countries in binding commitment ii) replacement of the KP emissions limit iii) revision of compliance system and iv) market based mechanism for emissions reduction. US negotiators have repeatedly insisted on modifying the emissions reduction mechanism, targeted and included advanced developing countries since the Kyoto conference. The US always argues that partial emissions reduction will cause adverse impact to US economy and competitiveness. We can consider the US as a rational actor for not joining the Kyoto protocol with regards to

its national interest because it is clear that the US does not want to reduce its emissions, which would have implications for its national economy. The US also shows one type of power based structural leadership in climate negotiations. Power-based leadership is a function in which an actor can apply their strategy, energy and status to influence the bargaining process in negotiations. It depends on the actor's ability to deliver threats and promise to affect the incentives to other actors in negotiations to protect self-interest.³¹¹ The Kyoto protocol and Copenhagen Accord are very good examples of the US's structural leadership. In Kyoto, the US threat was to not accept the Kyoto protocol without a market mechanism. The Market mechanism was included but the US did not ratify the KP. And in Copenhagen the US delivered a set of promises along with other top emitters to developing countries on financial assistance.

5.3.2: The EU

The European Union (EU) is a transnational identity in the climate negotiations consists of 28 member states. It has around 500 million people. According statistics the EU GDP is US\$ 15.8 trillion and a per capita GDP of US\$ 31,500. The EU emissions rate is 5.7 billion tons of CO₂e – 11% of global emissions a year – and 11 ton per capita figures and 0.36 tons of carbon for US\$ 1,000 of GDP. The EU is not vulnerable like developing countries and has strong tendency towards low carbon technology.³¹²

According to the views of respondents to a questionnaire, the EU has been driving the negotiations since Copenhagen. They are effective and very active. The EU

³¹¹ Andersen, S & Agrawala, S. 2002. Leaders, pushers and laggards in the making of the climate regime. *Global Environment Change*. Vol: 12. pp 41-51

³¹² Viola' E. Franchini, M. Ribeiro, T, L (2012) Climate governance in an international system under conservative hegemony: the role of major power. *Brazil International Politics*, vol: 55 (special edition), pp 9-29.

does not want a competitive disadvantage. They are more ambitious than the US. The EU has been taking the lead, but it should be taking more actions. The EU has a very complicated situation. It is a group in which every country has a different type of problem. For example, old EU member countries and the new members have different types of problems. Poland has a coal and lignite-based industry. They have German-funded coal projects. But the EU plays a role in influencing the developing countries to avoid coal-based economies. The EU tries to achieve best practices in terms of climate negotiations. The EU is in a very different position from US and developing countries because the EU has a decision-making structure that is very different from the US domestic policy-making process. They have been able to have a very positive method about climate change. But they make a very strong impression among developing countries that they do much less than they say they are doing. Developing countries see that they could do more because they have financial and technological resources. They have a very unique position among all different negotiations groups. For instance, the elimination of the Umbrella group, which was initiated by US and Canada, created an opportunity for them to become the leader. And also the leadership they have taken by creating European emissions trading system and their linking to the CDM. And because the EU buys huge amount of credits, this is the reason they are actually controlling the developing countries. The EU was very successful in the first commitment period. The EU has reduced 18% of its emissions since 1990 in the first period of the KP.³¹³ Respondents to a research questionnaire saw the EU as having a strong influence in carbon market through developing countries. It is the same scenario with climate finance. For example, the EU planned to buy 1.2 billion tons of CO₂ (or the equivalent amount of N₂O or PFCs) between 2008 and 2020. By the end of 2012, EU bought over 1 billion by investing in

³¹³ EU action on climate, Available at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/eu/index_en.htm, accessed on 17 May 2014

many projects in developing countries except nuclear power plant, afforestation or reforestation activities and projects involving the destruction of industrial gases.³¹⁴ But in terms of climate finance Japan and the US are the largest contributors compared to the EU.

One member of the Japan delegation to the climate negotiations made an analogy that if we contribute finance as people desire, this will make it look like a burger: if you contribute more than expected, they will reduce more. In terms of the market, the EU has made a very interesting position to attract attention. But now, the market is itself in a transition period due to the second commitment period of the KP and expected deal in 2015. So that the market price of carbon credit is very low. And the EU is not buying at this time. Negotiators expect that there will be a big phase where in the EU will have strong leadership in that area. But in that time because of the transition period of the first commitment period to the second commitment period of the Kyoto protocol, it would not be easy for the EU to reflect its strong influence on developing countries.

By character the position of the EU is heterogeneous in the climate negotiations according to per capita emissions and carbon intensity. It has low emitters such as the Nordic countries, Germany, the UK and France. Spain, Belgium and Italy as medium emitters. East European countries are in the top position as emitters on this continent.³¹⁵ The EU's emissions increase at a 0.5% annual rate, as a result of stable emissions figures from Germany, the UK and Sweden, and the fast increase of emissions in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Eastern Europe countries – the later countries are still below their 1990 baseline.³¹⁶ But observers argue that the

³¹⁴ European Commission (2013). The EU emissions trading system.

³¹⁵ Essential background of climate change, UNFCCC, available at: http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php

³¹⁶ Viola' E. Franchini, M. Ribeiro, T, L (2012) Climate governance in an international system under conservative hegemony: the role of major power. *Brazil International Politics*, vol: 55 (special edition), pp 9-29.

economic crisis has impact on lower increase of emissions in Europe and the US as well.

The EU is in the leading position among the Annex-I countries that take emission reduction seriously. They have strong commitment to mitigate the climate change problem despite the different levels of emissions and commitment. EU leaders are committed to transforming Europe into a highly energy-efficient, low carbon emitting economy. In order to introduce the low carbon economy the EU introduced the Emissions trading system (ETS) in 2005. The EU ETS covers 11,000 power stations and manufacturing plants in 28 member states. In total, 45% of EU emissions are limited by ETS.³¹⁷

Under the Kyoto Protocol, the 15 countries that were EU members before 2004 ('EU-15') are committed to reduce their collective emissions to 8% below 1990 levels by the years 2008-2012. Emissions monitoring and projections show that the EU-15 was well on track to meet this target. Most Member States that have joined the EU since 2004 also have Kyoto reduction targets of 6% or 8% (5% in Croatia's case) which they are on course to achieve. For 2020, the EU has committed to cutting its emissions to 20% below 1990 levels. This commitment is one of the headline targets of the Europe 2020 growth strategy and is being implemented through a package of binding legislation. The EU has offered to increase its emissions reduction to 30% by 2020 if other major emitting countries in the developed and developing worlds commit to undertake their fair share of a global emissions reduction effort. In the climate and energy policy framework for 2030, the European Commission proposes that the EU set itself a target of reducing emissions to 40% below 1990 levels by 2030. For 2050, EU leaders have endorsed the objective of reducing Europe's greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% compared to 1990 levels as part of

³¹⁷ European Commission. (2013). The EU emissions trading system.

efforts by developed countries as a group to reduce their emissions by a similar degree. The European Commission has published a roadmap for building the low-carbon European economy.³¹⁸

By countries, the UK and Germany are in the leading position to reduce emissions. For instance, the UK passed a law on carbon budget in 2008 and the carbon transition plan in 2009, thereby leaving the UK in an advanced position in the drive to reduce carbon emissions in Europe. They announced that they will reduce the emissions in 34% by 2020 by implementing these guidelines compared to 1990.³¹⁹ The liberal coalition government took office in 2010 and continues the new law towards low carbon-emitting society. In the negotiations the UK was always very active particularly during the Tony Blair and Gordon Brown administrations.

Germans are also very active in the transition to low carbon society. Germany has the unconditional target to reduce minus 40 % emissions to the 1990 level. And 30 % EU wide reduction in GHGs by 2020 translates into around minus 40 % for Germany. It requires a reduction of 250 million t/a GHG compared to emissions volume in 2007. In order to achieve this target Germany introduced the Renewable Energy Act (EEG), Ecological Tax Reform (in 1999), and Energy Saving Ordinance (effective instrument mainly for new buildings). They reformed the (regional) rail transport system.³²⁰ France has low per capita emissions and dependent on a nuclear based energy mix.³²¹ The Danish Government recently presented a strategy on how to achieve independence from fossil fuels by 2050. The strategy is a first of its kind in the world; fully financed, while still taking full account

³¹⁸ EU action on climate, Available at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/eu/index_en.htm, accessed on 17 May 2014

³¹⁹Viola' E. Franchini, M. Ribeiro, T, L (2012) Climate governance in an international system under conservative hegemony: the role of major power. *Brazil International Politics*, vol: 55 (special edition), pp 9-29.

³²⁰ Treber, M. Bals, C and Kier, G. Climate Policy in Germany: A brief overview

³²¹Viola' E. Franchini, M. Ribeiro, T, L (2012) Climate governance in an international system under conservative hegemony: the role of major power. *Brazil International Politics*, vol: 55 (special edition), pp 9-29.

of Danish competitiveness and making sure that the average Danish household will not pay a huge extra bill.³²²

Poland is one of the top emitters in Europe because of its dependency on a coal-based economy. It has average per capita emissions in Europe. Until 2007, Spain also had a negligent position, but gradually, it admitted that their growing emissions during the last decades were an issue.

The economic crisis in 2008 and its aftermath weakened the ability of Europe to move towards a low carbon society. But it still has the leading position in the negotiations as transnational identity with the potentials to move to the low carbon society. Only the EU established climate governance between 1996 and 1998. But after this period it did not work.

After the Durban conference, the EU brought some radical changes into their climate policy. Now they are bit far from the US conservative attitude and try to isolate them from the West. Surprisingly, the EU is closer to China or other emerging economies and is flexible regarding any strong commitment from China particularly.

Finally, by nature the EU is habituated with some environmental regulations. The EU does not have any policy for cheap energy. Green parties are very influential in many EU countries. They have very strong civil power that places them at the forefront of demanding deep emissions cut. Antony Breton considers the EU to be a progressive liberalist in the climate negotiations.³²³

The EU is the green leader in climate negotiations with its directional and instrumental leadership. Since the beginning of climate negotiations, the EU has been very active to protect the environment. Over time, the EU has improved its position by introducing many domestic policies and regulations. Directional

³²² Independent from fossil fuel by 2015, Available at :<http://denmark.dk/en/green-living/strategies-and-policies/independent-from-fossil-fuels-by-2050/>, accessed on 10th May 2014

³²³ Breton, A (2013). Great Powers in climate politics. *Climate policy*. Vol: 13:5, pp: 541-546

leadership of the EU insists that other negotiators move towards the emissions reduction process.³²⁴ For example, the EU was not influential in the formulation of the KP. It was mainly the US and emerging developing countries that were very influential in arguing for the inclusion of conditions in the KP. But the US did not ratify the KP; on the other hand most of the EU members ratified the KP by 2004. Instrumental leadership is also common in US climate strategy. In instrumental leadership, the actor amplifies the intellectual idea and convinces other actors regarding the merit of the idea, to understand the problem in order to achieve the common goal of solving the problem.³²⁵ For example, the EU convinced the G77&China to support a binding commitment for emerging developing countries in COP-17. By examining the EU strategy in climate negotiations, this dissertation assumes that the EU always applies soft leadership strategy in the climate negotiations.

5.3.3: China

China is the world's most populous country with the largest economy. China could be seen as a hero or villain, whatever, but they are the top emitters and its economy is highly dependent on fossil fuel or carbon.³²⁶ Therefore, a top exporter and with the highest foreign currency reserve, China has very strong influence in climate negotiations. The number of total population is 1.35 billion people, a US\$ 9.3 trillion GDP and a US\$ 8,110 per capita GNI, emits 10.9 billion tons of CO₂e a year – 21% of global emissions, 6.2 tons per capita emissions.³²⁷ Among the top emitters, China is the most vulnerable country due to climate change. Already some part of China faces

³²⁴ Oberthür, S. & Kelly, C. 2008. EU leadership in international climate change policy: Achievement and Challenges. *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*. Vol: 43.3, pp: 35-50.

³²⁵ Andersen, S & Agrawala, S. 2002. Leaders, pushers and laggards in the making of the climate regime. *Global Environment Change*. Vol: 12, pp: 41-51.

³²⁶ World Bank, IEA. Country profile.

³²⁷ World Development Indicator (2013). The World Bank.

extreme weather fluctuations. China is highly dependent on coal and oil and low energy efficiency. But as it has a huge population, per capita emissions are lower than others.

According to this scenario, observers think that it was not easy for China to take any action to become a low carbon society. If China wants to maintain its current development model, it will be very expensive for China to reduce emissions. Chinese development policy would have to be revised. Though China already took some actions, as in 2007 the country was reluctant to take action at the domestic and international level. China was considered conservative till 2007.³²⁸ But China released its first national climate change plan in June 2007. Chinese National development and reform commission outlines the strategy to address climate change through national programs, including mitigation, adaptation, science and technology, research and increasing public awareness. China brought some dramatic change in March 2011 in its 12th five year plan (FYP). It insisted on reducing dependence on fossil fuel and the promotion of low carbon energy sources and the restructuring of the Chinese economy. Ultimately, the Chinese main target was to capture the carbon trade market. The main features of the 12th Five year plan were:

to reduce the energy intensity by 16 percent (energy consumption per unit of GDP)

increasing non-fossil fuel energy to 11.4 percent of total energy use and

a 17 percent reduction in carbon intensity (carbon emissions per unit of GDP)³²⁹

³²⁸ Viola' E. Franchini, M. Ribeiro, T, L (2012) Climate governance in an international system under conservative hegemony: the role of major power. *Brazil International Politics*, vol: 55 (special edition), pp 9-29.

³²⁹ Energy and climate goals of Chinas 12th fifth year plan <http://www.c2es.org/international/key-country-policies/china/energy-climate-goals-twelfth-five-year-plan>

Chinese initiatives clearly indicate that the Chinese government changed its policy and moved onto renewable energy dependency to get more CDM projects in China. It encouraged increasing energy efficiency by using solar, wind, nuclear and hydropower. China is still the highest consumer and producer of coal in the world because of its huge population and size of its economy.

With the high fossil fuel-dependent economic growth Chinese position in the climate negotiations is always conservative. China tries to distance itself from any strong commitment in the negotiations process. This is in spite of the fact that when addressing the UN General Assembly in September 2009, President Hu Jintao announced that the country was willing to take responsibility in the fight against global warming and signaled the goal of reducing China's carbon intensity in its GDP at a yearly rate of 4–5%, between 2005–2020.³³⁰ Other than that, China is still reluctant to commit to a peak of emissions and to a stabilization year prior to 2020 – as claimed by the international scientific community, the EU, the United States and Japan. This fact increases the ammunition of the conservative groups in the American Congress.

This dissertation identifies a shift in Chinese climate diplomacy. Since the signing of the UNFCCC, China has accepted the need for a protocol, an accepted voluntary target for developing countries; develop a road map for emissions reduction target, international monitoring system for developing countries activities. But a major shift in Chinese climate diplomacy was in 2011 when it signed the Durban Platform to complete negotiations on new comprehensive and inclusive legal instrument by 2015.³³¹ China left its longstanding opposition to legally binding agreements for developing countries in 2011.

³³⁰ World Development Indicator (2013). The World Bank.

³³¹ Stally, P. (2013). Principled strategy: The role of equity Norms in China's Climate Change Diplomacy. *Global Environmental Politics*. Vol. 13.No. 1. pp. 1-8

This dissertation assumes that China is a rational actor on climate negotiations. Ida Björkum explained the Chinese position as a unitary rational actor (URA) model.³³² URA is a rationalist interest-based explanatory foreign policy approach to make decisions in global politics. URA assumes that each actor has specific and prioritized objective of foreign policy based on the consequence of each available alternative. Throughout the negotiations, in 1970s and 1980s China always pushed the responsibility to developed countries. Chinese main object was to avoid any responsibility in order to develop and continue the economic growth based on the traditional development trajectory. Recently however, China shifted its position on emissions cut by announcing that it will reduce emissions by 2030 and it has reflected in Paris agreement. China is the largest economy and top emitter. Therefore, as China has adjusted its economy, it can explore the alternative of emission reduction.

By examining Chinese strategy, this dissertation also identifies directional leadership in Chinese climate diplomacy. China is at the forefront to direct the negotiations since the beginning. China always insisted on imposing all emissions reduction responsibilities on Annex-1 industrialized countries. It is evident in this dissertation that Chinese directional leadership reflected in the KP, the Bali action plan, the Copenhagen accord, and the Durban platform making process.

5.3.4: India

India is one of the major actors in climate negotiations with very strong position on legally binding agreement. But India does not want to be part of any new obligatory agreement along with other advanced developing countries. India argues that the UNFCCC convention itself is a legally binding document. Countries should

³³² Björkum, I (2005). China in the International politics of climate changes. The Fridjof Nansen Institute report.

follow the convention and take action to cut emissions because current emissions trends could put huge pressure on India to limit its emissions in the near future.

India has the second highest number of population in the world with 1.2 billion people, 17% of the global population. Its GDP is US\$ 4.5 trillion with the fifth-largest economy of the world and a per capita GDP of US\$ 3,700. Annual emissions rate in India is 3.6 billion tons of CO₂e, and per capita emissions are about 3 tons, and 0.8 tons for every US\$ 1,000 of GDP.³³³ India has a low per-capita emissions and high carbon intensity due to its low energy efficiency and large population. Indian energy matrix is largely based on coal. Electricity generation processes in India is based on coal power plant. India has the insufficiency of energy and one fourth of India's population has no access to electricity.³³⁴ Therefore, India has been exploring its energy security, as the energy demand will surge in future. Considering the socio-economic trajectory, coal is the cheapest energy source for India. Already, India is the third largest supplier and fifth in reserve of coal with 298 billion tons. At the same time India is the third-largest oil consumer in Asia after China and Japan. Oil meets its 36% of total energy demand.³³⁵

Indian energy security is largely based on fossil fuel mainly on coal. But India is also looking for clean energy options. India has mega projects to produce electricity from hydro in the northeastern part. And it has also some project on solar photovoltaic and wind energy. Indian clean energy transition is faster than Brazil, but slower than China. Overall, carbon transition in India is very low, because renewable energy will not be affordable for their poor socio-economic society. In terms of this, India is a conservative player in climate negotiations and in relation to its economic growth, number of poor people, and development trajectory India's main objectives

³³³ World Bank (2013). development indicator, 2013.

³³⁴ International Energy Agency (2012). Understanding Energy Challenge in India: Policies, players and issues.

³³⁵ Energy statics (2014) Ministry of Statics and programme implementation. India.

of state policy is to eradicate poverty and continue the development process. India adopted an inclusive development policy to remove income inequality coupled with economic growth with sustainable development. But Indian emissions are rising.

India's emissions growth is about 6% every year. According to statistics of the Ministry for Environment and Forestry of India, per capita GHG emissions will reach 5.00 tons from 2.00 tons of CO₂ in 2030-31 in India. Studies are estimating that India's GHG emissions per capita will stay under 4 tons per capita by 2020. This may be compared to the 2005 global average per capita GHG emissions of 4.22 tons of CO₂ per capita. In other words, studies project that even two decades from now, India's per capita GHG emissions would be well below the global average 25 years earlier. However, it will be 2.5 times higher in the year 2030, resulting in the approximate figure of India accounting for 10% of the increment in global emissions.³³⁶

A number of policies and measures have been taken in India to tackle climate change. *The Economist* reported that India announced its voluntary commitment to reduce the emissions of GDP in 20-25% by 2020 compared to the level of 1990.³³⁷ But India released its national action plan (NAPCC) in 2008 to tackle climate change and the action plan says it maintains the economic growth with high priority. As Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh said in 2008, "Emphasizing the overriding priority of maintaining high economic growth rates to rise living standards, the plan identifies measures that promote our development objectives while also yielding co-benefits for addressing climate change effectively".³³⁸ But scholars are critical of the NAPCC. It is totally silent on adaptation and mitigation processes. The NAPCC did

³³⁶ India's GHG emissions profile: Result of five climate modeling studies, ministry of environment and forestry, available at http://www.irade.org/GHG_report.pdf

³³⁷ The Economist. 2015.

³³⁸ Indian national action plan on climate change, available at: <http://www.c2es.org/international/key-country-policies/india/climate-plan-summary>

not specify low-carbon development process. As a matter of fact, it was based on outdated data and statistics based in 1994.³³⁹ However, India argues for financial and technical assistance to implement domestic policies.

India's main argument in the climate negotiations is the right to development and per capita emissions. Data shows that India's per capita emissions will not exceed that of the top emitters in the future.³⁴⁰ Therefore, India will be consistent in its development goals. An Indian diplomat justifies their conservative position in negotiations by arguing that they have low per-capita emissions and have a development imperative. Poverty eradication is one of its major issues for reaching the development goal; 470 million people have to be taken out of poverty³⁴¹. And another issue that has to be considered is that India has high population growth rate, and the fertility rate in India is 2.8 children per woman. India has the highest birth rate among the BASIC countries.³⁴² Domestically, India is under intense pressure to follow the conventional development trajectory based on cheap fossil fuel based economy. For example, cheap fuel used for small and medium enterprise accounts for two third of its industrial and commercial activities and large number of employment. These family-owned or cooperative SMEs produce huge GHGs and it is very difficult to regulate them.³⁴³

This dissertation argues that India is also a rational actor in climate negotiations to protect its self-interest based on domestic pressure. The main argument of the Indian strategy is that Annex-1 countries should take responsibility

³³⁹ Bidwal, P (2012). Climate Change: India and the global negotiations. *Social Change*. Vol: 42.3, pp: 375-390

³⁴⁰ Indian national action plan on climate change, available at: <http://www.c2es.org/international/key-country-policies/india/climate-plan-summary>

³⁴¹ Viola' E. Franchini, M. Ribeiro, T, L. (2012) Climate governance in an international system under conservative hegemony: the role of major power. *Brazil International Politics*, 55 (special edition), pp 9-29.

³⁴² The Economist. *Pocket World in Figures*. Profile Books Ltd., London, 2011.

³⁴³ Hallding, K. Olsson, M. Atteridge, A. Vihma, A. Carson, M. & Roman, M (2011). *Together Alone: BASIC countries and climate change conundrum*. Nordic council of ministers. Copenhagen.

to cut emissions and provide financial assistance to developing countries. Over time, India has altered its position, but the core position has not been altered. Based on data and interview, the Indian position on climate negotiations has been divided in two parts: i) 1992-2007 and ii) 2007-onwards.

In the first part of negotiations India was very firm on a few arguments: common but differentiated responsibility, right to development, financial and technological assistance, not to be part of any legal instrument, equity for resource distribution. The term “equity” was a reflection of former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the 1972 Stockholm human development conference, that socio-economic development and environment development are competing priorities.³⁴⁴ But India shifted its position in 2007 a bit by announcing in a world economic forum meeting and including the NAPCC in 2008 that per capita emissions would not be exceeded compared to Annex-1 industrialized countries. India also announced in 2009 that it would reduce emissions 20-25% by 2020 as voluntary action. Besides these, India supported many changes in negotiations; particularly in Durban conference they supported the “Durban Platform” for future inclusive binding instrument.

By examining the Indian position in negotiations, this dissertation assumes that India shifted its defensive conservative strategy toward mixed flexible strategy. India’s flexibility became clear after the Bali conference. India also took directional leadership in negotiations with China and US with its influential capacity. India advocated for legally binding document for Annex-1 industrialized countries. Still India is arguing for more financial and technical assistance for mitigation, adaptation and loss & damage. Based on the decisions that have been adopted in UNFCCC conferences, it is evident from the above mentioned discussion that Indian

³⁴⁴Hallding, K. Olsson, M. Atteridge, A. Vihma, A. Carson, M. & Roman, M (2011). Together Alone: BASIC countries and climate change conundrum. Nordic council of ministers. Copenhagen.

directional leadership has been reflected in some decision of UNFCCC for instance decisions on emission reduction, financial package, technology transfer and so on.

5.3.5: Brazil

Brazil, an emerging South-American economic giant, is another influential player in climate negotiations with a long-standing position on sustainable development. As a very active player in the climate negotiations, the Brazilian position always revolves around three issues: every country's sovereign right to development; opposing any proposal on Amazon rainforest to take international control for protection, and historical responsibility of industrialized countries for emissions.³⁴⁵ But Brazil changed its position in 2006 by accepting discussions on forests. Brazil later announced as well that it would take voluntary action to join the emissions reduction process. Based on the observation and data, this dissertation suggests that new international context and domestic policy level change assisted Brazil to bring changes in its position.

Brazil is little less populated compared to India and china. It has only 195 million people. The total amount of GDP is 2.3 trillion and a per capita GDP is of US\$ 11,800. Brazil emits 2 billion tons of CO₂ annually; it is the 4.5% of global emissions. Per capita emissions in Brazil are 0.9 ton for every US\$ 1,000 of GDP.³⁴⁶

Brazilian policy makers claim that its energy dependency is largely based on green sources. But data shows that oil consumption is increasing in Brazil. Oil and other fossil fuel supply 58% of total energy. Renewable energy consumption has decreased from 44% in 2012 to 42% in 2013.³⁴⁷ Brazilian energy matrix is changing

³⁴⁵ Hallding, K. Olsson, M. Atteridge, A. Vihma, A. Carson, M. & Roman, M (2011). Together Alone: BASIC countries and climate change conundrum. Nordic council of ministers. Copenhagen.

³⁴⁶ World Bank (2013). Key indicators, 2013

³⁴⁷ Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (2014). Brazil: Country of the future or has its time come for natural gas?.

due to positive economic performance. Brazil accounted for 7.4 growths in 2010 since 1990, the highest growth of Brazilian growth.

Therefore, Brazilian climate diplomacy is largely determined by the national self-interest. If we look at the Brazilian position in climate negotiations, Brazil is in different positions compared to China and India as developing countries. Brazil has very strong cooperation with other two emerging economies - China and India. However, while industrialization is the main source of emissions in China and India, in Brazil it is different. Deforestation, mainly in the change in use of land, is the major source of emissions. 80% of total emissions come from the LULUCF.³⁴⁸ In order to reduce the emissions, Brazil started to take the initiative since 2005. For instance, there was an action plan for the prevention and control of deforestation in the vast Amazon area and other places, an action plan for consolidation of a low carbon economy in agriculture, another action plan for emissions reduction in the steel sector and an action plan for energy sector reformation. In 2009, Brazil announced its target to reduce emissions by 36% to 39% compare to projected emissions in 2020. Brazil sold the world the idea of “Green Economy” and arranged the Rio+20 conference based on this new ideology. Brazil also initiated many domestic policies to control the emissions.


However, the Brazilian government has taken positive moves. But these initiatives have been suffering significant setbacks. Brazil, a fast growing economy like China and India, became the sixth largest economy in 2011 and surpassed the UK. GDP growth was 0.9% in 2012. According the World Bank forecast, it will be 3.2% in 2016. It had an annual average growth of 4.5% in last five years.³⁴⁹ Brazil achieved great social development through its agro-based economy. According to a

³⁴⁸ Viola' E; Franchini, M; ThaísLemosRibeiro, T, L (2012) Climate governance in an international system under conservative hegemony: the role of major power. *Journal of International Politics*, Brazil. Vol. 55(special edition). pp 9-29.

³⁴⁹ World Bank (2014). Development Indicator. 2014

Brazilian diplomat, his country has almost eradicated extreme poverty. But Brazil is caught between its commitment to tackle climate change and a growing demand for energy. The growth in consumption and production has made Brazil the eighth largest energy consumer. Recent hydrocarbon discovery in Brazil made the climate problem more complicated.

Figure 13: Brazil liquid fuels consumption, 2002-2014



Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

The emissions scenario in Brazil is not the same as China and India. But Brazil has the same development trajectory. Conventional development trajectory increases the energy consumption because its growing economy has shifted its position in the recent couple of climate conferences. As a rational actor in climate negotiations, Brazil did not accept any decisions that would limit its development goals.

Brazil also has a defensive conservative position in climate negotiations as the US, China and India due to its economic development and security. Brazil is also a strong advocate for the imposition of emissions responsibilities on Annex-1 industrialized countries. Brazil shows its directional leadership in negotiations by proposing two ideas – the CDM and CBDR. These two contributions of Brazilian delegation served the collective interests of developing countries in negotiations. Particularly, the CDM has huge implications in developing countries in infrastructure development activities. Brazil’s efforts in climate negotiations indicate its desire to

play more roles at the international level. Hence, during the Lula's presidency Brazil joined the India, Brazil and South Africa forum (IBSA) and argued to reform the United Nations especially the Security Council. Some scholars view the IBSA as a starting point in the drive to improve South-South cooperation.³⁵⁰ By adopting the above-mentioned strategy Brazil has become the global spokesperson for developing countries.

Conclusion: This section has assessed the appearance of new leadership and their economic adjustment during the climate negotiations process. One can question that new leadership provides the scope of economic adjustment or economic adjustment brings new leadership to climate negotiations. Considering the domestic policies and international strategies, this dissertation assumes that both are interconnected and provide opportunities to each other. It is evident in the climate negotiations that fast economic development has changed scenarios in China, Brazil and India. Economic growth is almost double prior to 1990. China, India and Brazil were very cautious since the beginning of negotiations to avoid any legal obligation to continue the current development path. Therefore, they emerged as blockers in negotiations on many occasions. The tendency to protect their own economy made them new leaders in global politics and brought them together. The following sections will provide an empirical overview and how new leadership helps to form new identity for both state and non-state actors.

5.4: Groupism and new Identity

This dissertation adopted three criteria (see chapter 2) to examine the power shifting process: i) controlling agenda ii) winning negotiations and iii) limiting alternatives in climate negotiations. Previous chapters explained agenda-setting

³⁵⁰ Hallding, K. Olsson, M. Atteridge, A. Vihma, A. Carson, M. & Roman, M. (2011). Together Alone: BASIC countries and climate change conundrum. Nordic council of ministers. Copenhagen.

process and the influence of emerging powers in negotiations. This section has empirically examined how emerging powers are getting new identities in global politics by limiting alternatives to rivals.

BASIC- the pact of the rivals

Comparatively a new group, BASIC appeared in the Copenhagen conference as a very powerful and influential player. The BASIC is the group consisting of China, Brazil, India and South Africa. Since their appearance, this new international constellation strikes the new deal for GHG reduction. Many observers view that the BASIC countries particularly China, and to some extent India, exert great influence in the much hoped top-down agreement on climate change as it was done by US at the beginning of negotiations. At the same time this group played a pivotal role in enabling a new dimension to the climate negotiations, which resulted in the Copenhagen Accord. It brought changes to the idea of a global deal and produced incremental bottom-up approach.³⁵¹

Some observers consider this as the negative approach of the BASIC countries in Copenhagen conference to make legal instruments to cut emissions. Hurrell and Sengupta mentioned this as the era of great irresponsibility³⁵² But the BASIC countries argued that they have made significant and ambitious changes in their domestic climate policies. They do not need to be part of any legal instrument. However, the BASIC became very dominant since its emergence. Though the BASIC appeared in Copenhagen conference, China, India, Brazil and South Africa were very close since the beginning of the negotiations. Especially China, Brazil and India had the same position and statement on some specific issues. They became closer in the

³⁵¹ Hallding, K. Atteridge, Carson, M. & Jürisoo, M (2013). Rising power: the evolving role of BASIC countries. *Climate policy*. Vol: 13:5, pp: 608-631.

³⁵² Hurrell, A and Sengupta, S (2012). Emerging powers, North-South relations and global climate politics. *International affairs*. Vol: 88.3, pp: 463-484.

negotiations. But the BASIC member's initial communication began in the mid-2000. Since 2000, the BASIC ministers met occasionally to discuss their climate strategy.³⁵³

But the BASIC members did not leave the other group. The BASIC countries assured in negotiations that they are firmly with the G77 & China. Ultimately, BASIC emerged from the normative root of G77. The G77 therefore is a result of the political economy of North-South division in the 50s and 60s.³⁵⁴ Many respondents expressed the view that it was surprising to see China, India, Brazil and South Africa together as they have a lot of competing national interests and strong rivalries on some global political issues. Some predicted that this alliance would be for the short-term, and a split would be imminent after the 2015 conference because it is a strategic cooperation of friendship between rivals.

In particular, some observers viewed that as a counter movement against the EU proposed leaked Danish Draft in Copenhagen. Finally the BASIC group emerged as very influential and powerful block in the negotiations with its strategy and position. This dissertation considers BASIC's movement as successful and very effective in the climate negotiations. For example, the Copenhagen Accord was a deal among the top negotiators, particularly between the BASIC and the US. Much later in Cancun, Durban, Doha and Warsaw, BASIC members became the decisive factors in the negotiations. The Durban platform was known as the BASIC platform due to the strong role of the BASIC countries even though at the onset India did not accept some conditions of the Durban Platform.

The BASIC also played a strong constructive role in the Cancun conference to create agreements which were known as the Cancun Agreements. BASIC was more flexible on some issues in addition to interaction with other developing countries

³⁵³ Hochstetler, K & Milkoreit, M (2013). Emerging power in the climate negotiations: Shifting identity conceptions. *Political Research Quarterly*, pp: 1-12

³⁵⁴ Hallding, K. Olsson, M. Atteridge, A. Vihma, A. Carson, M. & Roman, M (2011). Together Alone: BASIC countries and climate change conundrum. Nordic council of minister. Copenhagen.

such as such African group, G77. BASIC took this strategy to achieve wider outcomes for the developing world. For example, the BASIC countries accepted MRV to secure pledges from Annex-1 countries on financial assistance and technology transfer.³⁵⁵

This dissertation attempts to identify the reason and result of togetherness of the BASIC countries. First of all, all of the BASIC countries share a common third-world identity. Therefore, the emergence of BASIC was rooted in shared identity of third world countries and the relation among BASIC member generated from same aspiration to travel from poverty towards increased wealth and new status in global politics.³⁵⁶ Though they did not share any common political agenda, but most of them had the same economic and development trajectory. Some countries may have conflicting relations in some fore but they were more collaborative in some areas to each other in the climate negotiations. For example, regarding financial assistance, technology transfer, CDM project, India and China are competitors. But for mitigation action, their common position brought them together. Apart from these commonalities, the BASIC members are G77 members and shared common long standings norms and rational interests to oppose donor dominance in international financial mechanisms.³⁵⁷

Most of the respondents to the research questionnaire argued that in order to find the reason for the togetherness of the BASIC countries, it is important to recognize the very unique character of the climate regime, which is all about power. Negotiating power in this process is not based on military capabilities as in other areas. Economic wealth and emissions are the power in the negotiations process. Major emitters and large economies had influence in the negotiations. Being a major

³⁵⁵ Qi, X (2011). The Rise of BASIC in UN climate change negotiations. *South African journal of International Affairs*. Vol. 18, no.3, pp: 295-318.

³⁵⁶ Hallding, K. Olsson, M. Atteridge, A. Vihma, A. Carson, M. & Roman, M (2011). Together Alone: BASIC countries and climate change conundrum. Nordic council of minister. Copenhagen.

³⁵⁷ ibidem

emitter and having a strong economy was more likely to be able to distract the negotiation. If a country was a major emitter, it would have more power because the whole idea was geared towards convincing a people to change their lifestyle and to lead a lower carbon-emitting society.

It is clear from the above discussion that the OECD and the major developing countries contribute more GHGs to the system, while the BASIC is mainly responsible for the largest percentage of current emissions. BASIC members became top emitters during the negotiations since 1992. In the course of the negotiations, most of the developing countries urged global leaders to make a deal, including all major emitters. But the BASIC members strongly opposed this proposal, which included major developing countries in the mitigation process, for example, the Danish Proposal of 2009.

According to the economic and energy security trajectory, the BASIC had some similarities and differences to Annex-1 industrialized countries. This was not a relationship of similar objective between the BASIC and Annex-1 countries but a relationship of big emitters. They were all going to face the need to reduce emissions as opposed to the rest of the World which is more focused on either adaptation to the impact or to receiving the resources necessary to revamp their energy systems. But it gave them some domestic advantages like energy independence. The BASIC countries have the same problem; they had to change their future energy trajectory but at the same time they were very much interested in technology as opposed to financial gain because, if someone gets IPR of any technology, then it can be replicated in billions. It will give those millions of dollars to and will help a certain number of people. This is something common between the developed and major advanced developing countries.

But what they do not want to share? Primary data collected by interview shows that it is much more on principle aspect of debate, which is related to responsibility for mitigation action. If we consider the economic growth in China, India and Brazil, then they would be major emitters. But China, Brazil and India argue that BASIC is not the source of the problem, that the industrial revolution over the last 200 years emitted GHGs. They argue that the developed world should take more responsibility for changing the emission pattern. BASIC countries will do even if BASIC is not at the same level. Emerging economies argue that the developed world has benefited so much over the last 200 years: they have emitted into the atmosphere, and therefore they have to give something in return.

One senior official of the UNFCCC said in his interview that Brazil demands to get payments so stop deforestation. China demands free technology that it can use without paying license fees. That is the situation where negotiations are facing the balance of power.³⁵⁸

This is a significant dimension of the negotiations. When the agenda was setting in the late 80s, the economics were different. China, Brazil and India were not that what they are today. They were much closer to the G77&China. Now they are much closer to becoming richer; development indicators show that they have gained technological, economic development, especially China, Brazil and India. They are investing to tackle climate change from their own funds, not dependent on outside funds. They are using money from their national budgets for adaptation and mitigation rather than wait. More or less, this is the approach of all the BASIC countries.

But why are they together and what brings them together? Qualitative interview surveys have been conducted to find the answers and results show that

³⁵⁸ Interview

commonality of priorities of the major economies has brought them together. There are very strong commonalities of priorities among the large developing countries. For example, the BASIC countries are related to each other in terms of economic development, energy security and poverty eradication. They have similar development trajectories and growth. Some scholars argue that the BASIC countries are not homogenous but their climate diplomacy is determined by a unique set of domestic and foreign policy considerations.³⁵⁹ The BASIC countries have the same challenges, which are different from the small developing countries:

- Economic growth
- Large number of people
- Large income disparities.

The BASIC countries share 40% of total global population. Each country is a regional power. For example, South Africa owns 31% of GDP in sub Saharan Africa, Brazil has 38% of GDP in Latin America, India accounts for 80% of GDP in South Asia and China accounts for 35% of GDP in East Asia and Pacific.³⁶⁰

The four countries jointly share 12% of global GDP in 2009. Their collective share has grown in 2009 to 12.6% for merchandise exports and 7.6 % for commercial exports. Since 1990 the BASIC countries have enjoyed double growth, much faster growth than that of the US, EU or any IECD countries.³⁶¹ Therefore, economic growth and politics of stability are the main factors to eradicate poverty in China, India and Brazil.

Due to these commonalities, the BASIC brought together four countries: China, Brazil, India and South Africa. The BASIC works to coordinate their position.

³⁵⁹ Hallding, K. Olsson, M. Atteridge, A. Vihma, A. Carson, M. & Roman, M (2011). Together Alone: BASIC countries and climate change conundrum. Nordic council of minister. Copenhagen.

³⁶⁰ *ibidem*

³⁶¹ World Bank Report. 2010

One negotiator from Brazil said in an interview that it is not a negotiating group but a coordinating group of emerging economies to protect their own interests and achieve preferences. In the primary stage of the negotiations, the G77&China try to combine developing countries together and influence negotiations. But the G77&China is a very large group and it seems that some specific countries have some specific challenges. This dissertation assumes that some specific countries such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa decided to have this group. They co-operate with each other in the negotiations as big players and emitters.

Therefore, major developing countries are taking the directional leadership in negotiations as part of the developing world. All BASIC members are part of the largest negotiating group, the G77&China and other groupings of developing countries. BASIC members are also the focus on national interests in all respects and adopted strategies to influence negotiations over the years in COPs. So the alliance is strong but shifting. For example, in the Copenhagen and Durban conferences, China and India were very rigid in making any commitment on emissions cut together with any voluntary commitment. But recently China, Brazil, South Africa announced that they would implement voluntary emissions reduction process by 2020 or 2030. Potentially they are to be very powerful in any agreement, very active and vocal in the negotiations. Under new circumstances however they are much more influential compared to 15-20 years back, even when compared to the UN and WTO. According to the BASIC position on many issues in negotiations, the formal alliance between China, Brazil and India is robust and plays an important role in BASIC, LMDC and the G77&China. Even the emergence of the BASIC is a reflection of ongoing power

shift in global politics because climate negotiations turned to the BASIC-US compromise from the US-EU agreement.³⁶²

Some respondents argued that this alliance is natural and includes Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia and many other developing countries to form a collective identity. In fact, the relations between emerging economies, particularly China, Brazil and India, help to create a bond among other developing countries. Some observers see them as being allied on some but not on all issues. For instance, they seem to be very close in negotiations having joint positions on the ADP. For example, India and China have common interests in getting a fair agreement according to their opinion. They have different priorities but common priorities on mitigation. They want to see leadership from developed countries to cut the emissions. Quite striking is that India is following the like-minded countries. India is very close to the like-minded countries on many issues. India sometimes fears being in the same box as China. Someday it should be expecting that India would have to contribute to mitigate climate change and China will become the main game changer.

In general, they share common interests but they potentially conflict with each other on issues such as HFC, technology transfer and financial allocation. For example, China and India are both HFC producers and emitters because they have the same semi-conductor industries for domestic demand.

On the other hand, different reasons and factors have forged them to come closer to each other. One of the major reasons is that the Annex-1 countries were targeting the emerging developing countries to include emission-reduction process since the beginning of negotiations. For instance, in 2007, the European parliament temporary committee on climate change suggested the inclusion of developing countries in the mitigation process. Especially, the committee singled out China,

³⁶² Qi, X (2011). The Rise of BASIC in UN climate change negotiations. South African journal of International Affairs. Vol:18, no.3, pp: 295-318

Brazil, India and South Africa as fast growing developing countries as regional leaders and GHG emitters.³⁶³ In addition, on many issues like the question of assistance to countries and technology transfer, the concern of advanced developing countries was similar. China, Brazil and India are emerging countries, and face similar multiple challenges along with their rapid economic growth. At the same time, they are expected to set the example of development in the new pattern in response to climate change by many developing countries as well as developed countries. While representing the interests of developing countries, BASIC countries have unique characteristics that distinguish them from other developing countries. On the other hand, BASIC members are developing countries and major emitters.

Therefore, other developing countries also expected that BASIC members to also make commitments similar to developed countries, historically responsible for climate change and have not done enough to address it.

The reasons why there are alliances between developing countries are very clear. The assumption is that their alliances could be more powerful and effective instruments, to fight the Annex-1 countries rather than risking isolation. Regarding the initial stage of formation of BASIC, a senior diplomat from the BASIC countries said, “We all started with our national communication since 2000, we decided to work together. We saw together that we had some internal challenges. This makes us allies in negotiations but this is not alliance in the sense that we had in the BASIC as a negotiating group”.³⁶⁴

Some respondents argued that this is a strategic cooperation. The most important thing is how they will cooperate in the future. It seems that they will work together as strategic partners on some issues. But they are developing joint strategies

³⁶³ Qi, X (2011). The Rise of BASIC in UN climate change negotiations. *South African journal of International Affairs*. Vol. 18, no:3, pp: 295-318

³⁶⁴ Interview

for the whole set of negotiations because they have different views in some cases and they engage slightly differently. However, in terms of market mechanisms or targets to reduce emissions, sometimes they do not have any commonalities.

So, there has been a formal and an informal partnership for a while in the climate negotiations among the developing countries. And this is very significant in the negotiations. Being developing countries, they are more interested in developmental activities. This gradually makes them top consumers of fossils and makes them major emitters than developed countries.

This dissertation identifies that there is cooperation among them because their economy is growing; their contribution to emissions is increasing. The world is looking to them for more contribution: already they have started the action plan. But they should participate with G8, to mean the G8 plus group G20. It can be said that this sort of committing alliance would not bring them together. In some areas, they all have concerns, which is where they have a common platform of taking responsibility to cut emissions.

This dissertation considers that that common platform assisted the major developing countries to initiate strategic alliances between emerging economic powerful countries. They try to secure their interests by collectively putting all the blame on the industrialized countries. The main issue is to strongly resist efforts that would increase the responsibility of big greenhouse gas emitters like China, Brazil and India to contribute to the solution and accept binding commitments. After the Conference in Copenhagen in 2009, emerging economies noticed that the world was looking up to them, and the support they had in the past as leaders of the developing world was fading due to the strong desire of small island states, least developed countries and African states for big emitters from North and South to take up their responsibility. This is why they formed, together with South Africa and Brazil, the

BASIC group and later LMDC of more developing countries to limit the alternative of opponent such as Annex-1, AOSIS, LDC and African group.³⁶⁵

Besides, they all seem to be at the same stage of development are currently in; most of them have become big emitters and have large population of poor people. They also share common stands on the issue of adaptation objective, mitigation and overall perspective. By sharing many commonalities, they emerged as the most powerful group in the negotiations.

The BASIC countries use their strength to support each other in the negotiations process in many ways. For example, China, Brazil and India take the front seat on mitigation responsibility and assistance for adaptation and technology transfer throughout the negotiations. Similarly, they expect to be assisted financially and technically to undertake reduction commitments since this would affect their development in the way that the developed world was affected.

The BASIC countries have similar political argument and cooperation. For instance, they argue that developed countries should take the lead to cut emissions. It can be common but differentiated responsibilities to all. When it comes to the question of common but differentiated responsibilities, they always supported it very strongly and they support each other in many respects. They do not want to be singled out. They want to do that unless everybody else is also taking on board additional responsibility. So they cooperate and support each other's position. The BASIC members are very loud regarding their right to development and the right to be sure that they will be able to provide their populations a high quality of life. They think they can come together and coordinate the negotiations that favor of them.

It has been mentioned in this research that BASIC group works as a coordination group. The first question in the coordination process of the developing

³⁶⁵ Interview

countries is whether they accept the international commitment or not. That's a very fundamental and basic factor. As have been mentioned, in international politics or international relations, this is the degree to how much they accept the obligation on commitment. How much can the international regime bind them on commitment? They BASIC members do not want to make any commitment that is legally binding for member of UNFCCC. This, and theoretically, on the other hand, the BASIC countries want to push the US or EU or other developed countries to accept the international obligation including the emissions reduction, technology transfer, financial assistance and so on. It is a matter of fact that BASIC countries can substantially work together.

It is evident in the negotiations that they cooperate on the ADP negotiations on the new agreement with a message that the new agreement should not change the way they understand the principles of common but differentiated responsibility and respected capabilities. BASIC members argue that the current practice where the responsibilities divided on the basis of annex-I and non-Annex-I should continue. They also argue a lot around the principle and the interpretation of the principle on framing the new agreement. That seems to be close cooperation with other countries as well, and this cooperation explicitly expresses the desire to close the emissions gap by developed countries after 2020. In those areas BASIC members seem to cooperate very closely.

This dissertation identifies that the most significant **outcome** is the emergence of the BASIC pact. Creation of BASIC reflects that climate negotiations increasingly provide elite emitters a controlled negotiation structure rather than a multilateral one. Some groups have sub-groups to limit the alternatives of their opponents. For example, some developing countries share the same views with BASIC countries. Therefore, there are many new groupings of developing countries

with close cooperation with BASIC such as the LMDC. One senior negotiator said, “We have ILA and we have like-minded country (LMDC). This new grouping is reflecting increasing fragmentation like we used to be called The G77&China”. There are many sub-divisions now. China, Brazil, South Africa and India are coordinating these sub-groupings in the negotiations. Small and sub groups are also changing negotiations scenario.

According to some respondents, the practice of group politics has implications for climate negotiations. Countries from developed or developing world, like the US, EU or other groups like Japan, Australia or Russia, have to be a part of a group. This is essential because it is for any one country to influence the negotiations processes and achieve preferences. The main actors in climate negotiations adopted the strategy to push their own preferences in the common platform along with other actors. They wanted to shape their own preferences as common objective of the negotiations.

One senior diplomat explained further that, “We always need to have some consensus. We always need to have some like-minded country so that we tried to find some common and like-minded country”.³⁶⁶ But, in the case of advanced developing countries China, Brazil and India, population wise or international political wise they have been in strong position and also not only strong against the US but the EU as well. This does not pertain to China, India and Brazil. Other developing countries like the Philippines, Venezuela and other African countries have very strong voices as well. This dissertation considers that by forming a common alliance by few countries, they can also influence the other developing countries against the developed countries. It can strengthen their position.

Regarding the implication of togetherness, or closeness or friendship of advanced developing countries to global politics, even this temporary relation will

³⁶⁶ Interview

help to remove problems among the developing countries. It is guessed that the new interaction among developing countries provide an opportunity between China and India to come closer and remove the long standing mistrust. To some extent, it certainly strengthens the mutual trust among developing countries.

As has been previously mentioned , BASIC countries have many constraints to coming together as long as the developed countries did not expect that the developing countries will accept the leadership by China, Brazil, India and others. Even the developing countries, for example China and India could expect to do more. Their closeness in the climate negotiations will foster mutual trust even though both of them have impact on their national image. Sometimes there are hard negotiations and sometimes they have different domestic settings and policies.

China and India have to deal with their domestic policy as well. Both of them will look for the adaptation fund and finance for technology transfer. But in general, it fosters trust between them. Because they have the same objective, this should help them build trust for future relationship. BASIC and BRICS are widely known terms in the mass media. They emerged as very influential and strong groups in global politics. This group provides a new national image for developing countries in the global arena. This demonstrates that they are allies with respect to the size of their economies and emissions, their influence and their power.

Considering their strategies and domestic policies it is clear that the BASIC members are securing their own national interests of pursuing bilateral or group alliances. So it is convenient - in diplomacy it is always convenience too. The common interest is that they are asking developed countries to do their best, to do their share which they do not feel they should do. Another finding of this dissertation is that the BASIC members also act like spokespersons of the people, representing the rest of the world. And a common interest is to achieve final protection but not at any cost. This

will help them to form a new identity. It makes them active players in the negotiations. They are major parties in the negotiations. They are large emitters. For that BASIC member have to be taken into account as new global player. So, their alliances, their group politics in the negotiations is providing new position and identity to advanced developing countries in the global politics. Already they have the new identity. The new identity shows that the biggest emitters are closely in step.

But the new identity formation also depends on the Annex-1 countries' strategies and preferences. Whether Annex-1 countries take the total responsibility for emissions or not, the dimension of climate negotiations will not remain the same. But as Annex-1 countries do not accept responsibility for emissions, therefore China, India and Brazil emerged as new global leaders. This initiative will lead them to a new collective and individual Identity. It gives them more weight in the global politics as pressure groups, even though some consider them as blockers. For instance, during the time of the recent economic crisis people were looking to BASIC and BRICS markets. They appeared more reliant and important.

In particular, climate negotiations will help us to understand the new identity of China, Brazil and India in the globally changing situation. Especially China and India have security problems and so on. Therefore the creation of BASIC or recently BRICS announced that they are going to establish an International development cooperation bank or financial institute. This is a reflection of a new era and identity. Interestingly, China and India are the core parties of almost 20 parties or developing countries in the climate negotiations. The negotiations history and outcomes indicate that they have very strong voices in the negotiations for accepting less binding commitments in terms of the identity formation that is very strong. But strategically China and India do not act only by two governments. They try to do something but are surrounded by many other small countries. That is their strategy. China used to

be much unspoken at the multilevel negotiations. For example, in the Security Council in 1999, regarding environmental protection China was obsessed by the responsibility of mitigation. But after 1999 China made very impressive reviews at the multilevel environmental negotiations. They have done a lot and became active at global negotiations. The Ozone protection regime is another one example. They are very successful in this regard. Most of the “Montreal fund” goes to China. A lot of money is involved, and maybe it was identity or maybe it is history that will review their position. But one thing remains clear; they are making new identities in international politics and the financial flow system.

This dissertation assumes that global political order is changing. It is evident that the BASIC group is also to some extent has expressed it’s desire to be more recognized as an emerging power in many way in the climate negotiations. Emerging developing countries take the climate problem seriously, but of course, they take national issues seriously as well. The change and the role of India, Brazil and China really started in Copenhagen in 2009 and have been going on for a few years now. But the creations of new identities reflect the fact that perhaps India, Brazil and China might differ in position and they could not have the same identity. China is trying to form a new identity with trying to build a leadership role in global negotiations. As a result, it is possible to know that how China is developing technologically and piloting carbon trading schemes through its new leadership position in global politics. India has different challenges than China and Brazil. They have lower income levels, larger number of populations, and problems with poverty. That’s their identity.

Some expert on climate negotiations expected that the major developing country alliances will certainly help strengthen and broaden the cooperation of the major developing countries, and at the same time it can generate impact on global

politics. They are top emitters and emerging economies and they have effective influence in the regional geo-politics as well. It is a question of conjecture if this will push the developed countries to do more. But very interestingly they did one thing: they slowed down the negotiations.

Basically, the alliance of the major developing countries has effective impact on global politics. In many other global negotiations process we do not have the Annex-I and non-Annex-I countries divide and therefore discussions have been different. Major developing countries particularly China, Brazil and India have keen interests and it could create more polarization actually.

For example, the BASIC and LMDC advocate for emerging economies by protecting their interests and preferences. The BASIC countries indeed have their weight in the climate negotiations both in terms of its carbon stocks and carbon emissions growth, and at the same time it remains a developing country with millions of people living under grinding poverty. In this regard, China, Brazil and India see each other as members of a developing country group, even although they attach great importance to the unity of the group. China, Brazil and India all are in the G77. Inside the G77 they have much more capacity to influence each other. Therefore, China, Brazil and India are largely in the leading position because of common interests in the national and international level. And, of course it will have great impact on global politics.

At the same time, it is responsible for positioning of the actors in the global order. China, Brazil and India are aligning closely sometimes like the like-minded developing countries. Three countries, China, India and Brazil particularly have been seen as global leaders among other global leaders. China obviously has a very influential role and is one of several leading economies. They have effective influence in the politics of climate change. But it is in substantive terms that they are global

leaders in some sort of area like renewable energy, CDM, adaptation. But they might not play any leading roles at the implementation level such as mitigation.

Some respondents think that it will not be possible to get a new agreement if global community fails to make a flexible interpretation of the climate convention in favor of emerging economies. It has to be rewritten. Top like-minded developed countries may not recognize this, but China has made an incredible economic development and has become a major emitter. The alliances among the developing countries need to be recognized.

The emerging developing countries are not in a single alliance. They are engaged in many alliances, if we see much broader range of perspectives, broader range of interest. Developing countries have not the same interest. Whether it is a large country or a small one, when it comes to climate change agreements and the need for global agreements, there are usually differences of interests.

Most of the small and poor parties concentrate on adaptation. But emerging developing countries will look for energy transformation and technology transfer. In that case, as big emitters and rapidly emerging economy, China has been accepted as the leader of the developing world to some extent. Advanced countries are important voices, not positively, but getting strong position in global politics. Interestingly, China is important but is not leading the climate negotiations to positive solution. The reality is that everybody is counting on China. There is fear of China among the parties in climate politics. Some experts argue that China has to reduce emissions than many developed countries.

According to a respondent's view the Chinese, Indian and Brazilian position has to be considered not only for their power but also for its actions. China, Brazil and India are global leaders in the climate negotiations in many terms but not in terms of the US or EU. It is a question of definition. Leaders not only lead in the

decision-making process, they should lead in the implementation process as well. Especially China and Brazil are implementing many domestic policies to mitigate emissions. Even though the EU has adopted domestic implementation process, the USA has failed to implement domestic action like other top actors.

Regarding the future of BASIC alliances, some respondents argue that the BASIC countries may have many differences but there have not been many conflicts. Even though, China and India have many historical territorial issues. Therefore, the question is: how does India deal with China becoming more powerful through climate negotiations?

Here, for the case of China and India, their cooperation is limited to climate negotiations. Only addressing climate change is not purely about politics, but more about cooperation. Sino-Indian relations only started to improve since 2000. The two countries share same development related energy security challenges and huge pressure from Annex-1 countries to reduce emissions.³⁶⁷ That created an opportunity for China and India to work together. Climate change removes politics and security boundaries between China and India. While India and China have common interests in climate negotiations, on the other hand, they have conflicting interests. For example, China and India are considered rivals in many geo-political aspects such as control over the Indian Ocean and border issues. But they are not like India-Pakistan or South Korea-North Korea. They have different nature of problems which are related to global and regional security. Sometimes they are rivals in security issues. Sometimes they grumble about certain geopolitical issues. But at the same time, they have enough to contend with individually as they do not want to spend time on each other.

³⁶⁷ Hallding, K. Olsson, M. Atteridge, A. Vihma, A. Carson, M. & Roman, M (2011). Together Alone: BASIC countries and climate change conundrum. Nordic council of minister. Copenhagen.

Regarding the question of geopolitics and security the commonality between China and India is the presence of the US in the Indian and Pacific Ocean. India and China are yet to reach the same level of wealth with the US and this why perhaps they come together to fight against US hegemony on security and geo-political issues. Environment politics create windows of opportunities for countries in conflict to cooperate and work together. The politics of environment gives them the opportunity to compete with a global hegemony.

Simply, we can think about cooperation on environmental issue between former the Soviet Union and the former communist country and western European countries. In the 90s or 80s, countries in Baltic region, for example Poland and West Germany, Sweden and other Nordic countries and Soviet Union cooperated with each other for the improvement of the water quality in the Baltic Sea. This was made possible because this was not a political issue. It was more about the environment. But the Baltic water issue brought the Soviet Union and her rival West European countries together only for a while. So actors shifted their attention from the international security issue to environment or other issue.

But now, climate change is a big political issue. It is not a territorial or geopolitical matter and that may be why countries like China-India can get close to each other. Primary strategy can be common position on some issues in the climate negotiations for coalition or alliances. The two countries communicated with each other and deepened their bilateral relations by visiting each other's countries.

For example, in 2014 Chinese president Xi Jinping visited India. Scholars argued that it was an opportune to resolve many unsettled often troubled relations of

two populous countries and disagreement on demarcation on border areas and a war fought in 1962.³⁶⁸

But the closeness among the major developing countries raised tension in small developing countries. The LDC feels that there would be no solution if the developed and emerging countries are not willing to agree on their contribution to mitigation process. Because the contribution from the developed and major emerging countries is essential in order to avoid climate change impact. It seems that both China and India are strategically better positioned to work together in climate change negotiations because of their common interests even if they do not have the same common interests elsewhere.

We do not often see China and India being very clearly in any alliance but here, in the climate negotiations we find out that they are talking together and stand on some common ground. The closeness among the major developing countries creates a new vista of bilateral relationships in global politics.

So China, Brazil, India and other developing countries are seeking to build a group of their own to set themselves apart from other countries. But there is another opinion, which comes from some negotiators: the alliance between the major economies or advanced developing countries may not work in the long term because of different growth trajectories and models of the development. But they will not be divided in the near future. It will take time to restructure the climate negotiations. For example, India is a strategic partner of the US in the South Asian geopolitics, but very close to China in climate negotiations and shares some common positions. Respondents assume that it would take another five to seven years for India to look for new partners in climate negotiations. This dissertation assumes that by

³⁶⁸ BBC (2014). Chinese President Xi Jinping begins India visit. Sept. 18.

anticipating this probability emerging major economies especially China took the initiative to form a new group of developing countries such as the Like Minded Countries group (LMDC).

The alliance of like-minded developing countries appeared three years back in 2012 at the Doha climate conference. The group met in Beijing in 2012 just before the Doha conference. It includes Bolivia, China, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and Venezuela. According to observers, around 20 countries are included in this group, although it is not clear which countries these are. India mostly spoke on behalf of the LMDC at the conference. The Philippines is also very active as a member of this group. LMDC always insists on holding to the principles of the 1992 Rio convention. They are very rigid on the 1992 position. They have accused the industrialized developed countries of not following the Rio convention. Members of the LMDC hold the same position as the BASIC economies: that developed countries should mitigate emissions according to the Rio convention.

According to the qualitative data, LMDC members believe that mitigation is the responsibility of the developed countries. There should be a specific commitment from the Annex-I countries. As it was decided in the Bali Action Plan, everybody should enhance their mitigation efforts. Developed countries should do this according to the MRV and developing countries should enhance their mitigation actions based on financial aid and technological support from developed countries. It has been observed in many meetings that LMDC members are very aggressive in trying to get financial and technological help from the developed countries. For example, developed countries promised to pay \$10 billion a year from 2011 to 2013 to developing countries as financial support to adapt with consequences of climate change. Now, the LMDC is asking for additional and new predictive, progressive

commitments from the developed countries. But this would not be the part of the development aid. For example, LMDC said in a statement at the Lima conference that finance is a central issue at the core of the success of COP. Annex-1 countries should increase pre-2020 financial support under the Convention in a clear and transparent manner, clarity long-term finance, including a clear roadmap from developed countries on meeting their commitment to provide US\$100 billion per year by 2020.³⁶⁹ They also demanded to get a waiver in IPR in the statement.

Since the beginning of negotiations the main argument of the BASIC countries was CBDR based on equity. They argued that emissions reduction is the only responsibility of Annex-1 countries. But recently BASIC members announced that they would take volunteer action to reduce emissions. China announced a reduction of emission by 2030 by 30%. Brazil would reduce 36 % by 2020. and South Africa will reduce 34% by 2020.³⁷⁰

5.5: NGO and epistemic diplomacy- knowledge as power

This dissertation hypothesized that power is shifting from the global North to the global South, inter alia from Annex I parties to emerging countries in the research context. This dissertation also hypothesises that power is shifting from state to non-state actors in global politics. We see some sort of transformation of power in the global politics. This chapter will discuss activities of non-state actors in climate negotiation and identify their position in global politics.

States are the main actors in global politics that interact with each other. From the recent perspective of International Relations, there is another very active agenda-setting and implementing entity in global political negotiations which influences public opinion on climate change activities. These are non-state actors, especially

³⁶⁹ LMDC Opening Statement COP20, displayed on UNFCCC website, 1 December 2014, Lima.

³⁷⁰ Minas, S (2013). FPC briefing: MASIC position major emerging economies in the UN climate change negotiations.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), civil society organization (CSO) and the epistemic academic community. Steiner Andresen and Lars H Gulbrandsen divided NGOs and epistemic communities in two groups: i) activist group and ii) pure research based groups or i) insider and ii) outsider.³⁷¹ Earlier, non-state actors were involved in global politics, as well but rather as part of a state's activities. But now, non-state actors run parallel global political activities in many sectors.

Nature and the character of NGOs have changed over time. In the 1970s, non-state actors NGOs worked to improve the capacity of state but nowadays they directly participate in the policy-making process. The Emergence of NGOs in global negotiations is widely considered a most dynamic phenomenon of international relations. To some extent, they have control-agenda setting since the early 1980s in partnership mode with state actors.³⁷² At that time environmental NGOs and researchers were concerned about environmental degradation. Peter Hass introduced the term 'epistemic community' in the global negotiations in 1992. He described the epistemic community as the broader integration of different factors such as government officials, researchers, experts and politicians who can share knowledge in order to solve environmental problems.³⁷³ This dissertation identifies them as the knowledge society.

NGOs and the epistemic community were engaged in the policy-making process through their knowledge, capacity and research as knowledge-based communities, for example the IPCC. It is evident in climate negotiations that NGOs CSOs and the epistemic community are very active in agenda setting, strategy building, allocation of available resources in the development sector, information

³⁷¹ Andresen, S & Gulbrandsen (2003). The Role of Green NGOs in Promoting Climate Compliance. Fridtjof Nansen Institute report.

³⁷² Gough, C & Shackley, S (2001). The respectable politics of climate change: the epistemic communities and NGOs. *International Affairs*. Vol 77.2 pp 329-345

³⁷³ Hass, P (1992). Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination. *International Organization*. Vol, 14.1, pp. 1-36

flow, formatting information frequency, articulating information in useful forms and the formalization of relationships in international relations. NGOs form a growing community in the global political arena and they may influence climate negotiations and governance. Ultimately, NGOs and the epistemic community have reshaped global politics by applying intellectual power. The Conferences of the Parties (COPs) provides a very significant case study to understand the role of non-state actors in global politics. This chapter has measured how and to what extent NGOs and epistemic community influence negotiations relative to outcomes.

NGOs and CSOs and members of the epistemic community are part of the UNFCCC according to convention article 7.6.³⁷⁴ NGO, CSO and member epistemic community have access to the conference venue, attend the meetings, and can influence intervention during the meeting, lobbying with delegate members as corridor politics and distribution of documents to delegates and media and public relations. Currently, more than 750 NGOs are allowed to join the COP holding as observers. NGOs can also form alliances based on similar perspectives and common interests. Groups within the NGOs are known as “the constituencies”. The following groups of the NGO are formally acknowledged:


- Business and industry NGOs (BINGOs) (the term already existed before COP-1);
- Environmental NGOs (ENGOS) (the term already existed before COP 1);
- Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations (IPOs) (since COP 7);

³⁷⁴ Article 7.6: The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers thereto not Party to the Convention, may be represented at sessions of the Conference of the Parties as observers. Anybody or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non- governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object. The admission and participation of observers shall be subject to the rules of procedure adopted by the Conference of the Parties.

- Local Government and Municipal Authorities (LGMAs) (since COP 1)
- Research-oriented and Independent Organizations (RINGOs) (since COP 9).

But many other types of NGO are not involved in this grouping, such as trade unions and political parties. UNFCCC provides options for other types of NGOs to attend COPs. But their permission to attend a COP depends on the decision of a subsidiary body of the UNFCCC. The nature and purpose of the NGO and availability of the resources is significant to their ability to attend the COP. The Chair of the Subsidiary Bodies plays a key role in deciding whether and how many observers will be invited. NGO representative can attend only the open meetings of the COPs according to decision 36/CMP.1 since 2006.

Figure 19: Non-state actors in climate change



Source: Author compiled

This dissertation identifies that NGOs are involved in the global climate negotiations in two ways which Andresen, S & Gulbrandsen considered as inside and outside strategy.³⁷⁵ Based on the observation, this dissertation identified that four activities of non-state actors in climate negotiations: i) lobbying ii) idea generation iii) knowledge and innovations and iv) campaign and advocacy.

³⁷⁵ Andresen, S & Gulbrandsen (2003). The Role of Green NGOs in Promoting Climate Compliance. Fridtjof Nansen Institute report.

Non-state actors are involved in **lobby** to achieve their preferences with Annex-I and non-Annex countries. In the developed world and mainly in the Annex-I countries, on the one hand side, they are directly involved in policy-making process as inside strategists. For example, the World Resource Institute, Natural Resource Defense Council, Environmental Defense, The Woods Hole Research Centre are very close to US policy makers and the UN in formulating strategy on climate negotiations.³⁷⁶ German Watch is very close to German policy makers and Oxfam, IIED has influence with the UK government. And many other international NGOs do lobby for policymaking processes of their own countries.

This research project's hypothesis is that internationally operating NGOs have influence to shape domestic and foreign policy. For example, in 1995, the US-based NGOs Development GAP, Oxfam USA and Friends of the Earth suggested to the US government to reform and reshape its foreign aid policy.³⁷⁷ Actually they suggested to the US government how much finance will be pledged at the COP for developing countries for financial assistance. Recently, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation urged the US government to provide more assistance to developing countries.³⁷⁸

On the other hand, in the developing countries, NGOs are mainly engaged in capacity building and the implementation processes, taking for example Tata Energy research Institute, Centre for Science and Environment in India. Bangladesh center for advanced studies was involved in "Bangladesh Climate Change strategy and Action plan". Local NGOs are highly donor-dependent, for they usually do not receive public financial support from their domestic governments.

Some governments of developing countries officially include NGO activists in their national COP delegation team as such Bangladesh, Philippines, Bolivia, or the

³⁷⁶ Andresen, S & Gulbrandsen (2003). The Role of Green NGOs in Promoting Climate Compliance. Fridtjof Nansen Institute report.

³⁷⁷ Interview

³⁷⁸ Interview

Gambia. NGOs sometimes directly work with the COP negotiators and influence them politically. They also provide information to negotiators and media based on their research activities in order to construct knowledge on policy solution and expert advice.³⁷⁹ Some countries have close relation with the NGOs. BASIC and LMDC have strong connection with the Stockholm Environment Institute, International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), South Centre and Third World News. One delegate from Bangladesh stated regarding the NGO activities that so many NGOs are very active in the civil front of the BASIC and LMDC countries.

Therefore, we find some correlations between the frameworks used by NGOs and in statements by negotiators on many occasion in conferences.³⁸⁰ Their activities may include drafting legal documents. Sometimes NGOs intervene during the negotiations and submit their proposal to the convention, such as when Climate Action Network (CAN) submitted a proposal regarding financial mechanism during COP 8 in 2002.

NGOs in both developed and developing countries have been very active in developing new **Ideas** to influence the negotiations since the Rio conferences. Sometimes NGOs push an agenda through the civil society and governmental delegation to the negotiations process such as compensation for loss and damage. The issues of loss and damage has been accepted in the COP and parties agreed to provide financial assistance at the Warsaw conference on 2013. NGO activists started campaigning since the Cancun conference that Annex-1 industrialized countries should provide financial assistance for loss and damage as compensation to vulnerable developing countries. Another example is mainstreaming the compliance

³⁷⁹ Andresen, S & Gulbrandsen. 2003. The Role of Green NGOs in Promoting Climate Compliance. Fridtjof Nansen Institute report.

³⁸⁰ Bastill, M. and Corell, E (2008). *NGO diplomacy. The influence of Nongovernmental organizations in International Environment Negotiations*, Cambridge: MIT, pp: 39-45.

system. Compliance was not a top issue before COP-7 in Marrakesh, though it was adopted in the KP. At that time, parties were busy with emissions reduction targets, time tables and financial assistance. The Center for International Environment Law (CIEL) and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) arranged a joint seminar in 1999 on meaningful compliance. CIEL and WWF proposed that they introduce a two level approach to compliance: one is a facilitative body to assist the parties to comply with their commitment and another, an enforcement body. The idea of compliance was accepted and endorsed by all parties in the Marrakesh Accord.³⁸¹ The idea of “Contraction and Convergence” was also developed by non-state actors Global Common Institute and Globe International. This proposed an equitable emissions reduction process by allocating the burden of GHGs emissions based in per capita emissions and under an emissions reduction regime. This proposal was accepted by developing countries, especially by China, India and African countries.³⁸² This dissertation has found that NGOs are involved in issue framing, agenda setting and decision-making process in COPs by analyzing the negotiations history.

Non-states actors have been **Campaigning** since the beginning of climate negotiations for better deals. NGOs and research organization arrange many side events. NGOs also have more advocacy and awareness programs, issuing press releases, arranging press conferences or seminars, inviting journalists to attend the conference and publishing the conference news to develop public opinion. Sometimes NGOs arrange demonstrations. NGOs brought out huge demonstrations in Copenhagen in 2009 when they showed their power in the mass protests.

NGOs are also investing tremendous effort to create awareness on climate change issues. For example, CAN publishes the very influential bulletin on climate

³⁸¹ Andresen, S & Gulbrandsen. 2003. The Role of Green NGOs in Promoting Climate Compliance. Fridtjof Nansen Institute report.

³⁸² Gough, C and Shackley, S (2001). The respectable politics of climate change: the epistemic communities and NGOs. *International Affairs*, vol, 77.2, pp: 329-345.

negotiations named “ECO”. International Institute of Sustainable Development (IISD), a member of CAN, publishes the bulletin.³⁸³ ECO appeared every day during the conference; it kept all participants updated with the latest situation. CAN acts like a political forum of the NGOs promoting their agenda among the negotiators. Everyday CAN selected one country as the “Fossil of the Day” which had been the main obstructionist of yesterday’s negotiations, thus working out a strategy of blame and shame. Besides these, ENGO members organised huge demonstrations outside the Bela Conference centre in 2009 at the Copenhagen conference to force top emitters to make a deal. Some other organizations, such as farmers’ organizations or trade unions, have also been very active.

Climate Action Network (CAN) is the main platform of the around 300 NGOs which attended the climate conference. CAN proposed to emphasize projects which have local and national benefits as well as global ones. Once commitments are made to fund projects, disbursements must be timely to avoid increased costs and loss of focus. They claimed that the GEF must develop better methodologies for identifying funding priorities. Projects should be selected systematically, rather than on an ad-hoc or first-come-first-served basis, with an emphasis on local needs and abilities.³⁸⁴

The Environment NGO constituency, the ENGO played a very active role in the Kyoto Protocol making process. ENGO proposed along with others to make a time frame to cut the emissions. ENGO also strongly opposed the proposal to cut emissions by carbon trading for the developed countries. CAN also rejected the idea for the developed countries to get credit for emissions absorbed by sinks.

³⁸³ Bastill, M. and Corell, E (2008). *NGO diplomacy. The influence of Nongovernmental organizations in International Environment Negotiations*, Cambridge: MIT, pp: 39-45.

³⁸⁴ CAN submission displayed at UNFCCC website (2002). www.unfccc.int

A senior COP negotiator from Oxfam, said that NGOs bring the community's perspective to climate negotiations as it is they who mainly work with affected communities. Sometimes, representatives of affected communities have directly joined the COP negotiations process.

By realizing findings on climate change, the epistemic community has contributed to Knowledge development. The IPCC assessment is the most prominent example of epistemic activities. Besides, WWF, Green Peace, World Resource Institute release reports on effects of climate change and bio diversity. WWF has released many weighty reports on effect of climate change. Green Peace has reviewed the economic, ecological and social impacts of pacific coral reefs in the report "Pacific in Peril". NGOs collate the work of scientist to provide evidence to the world.

Quite a number of NGOs are working on the vulnerability of climate change. They are building the picture of vulnerability from the local level to the global stage. For example, German Watch released a report on vulnerable cities in the world in 2009. Risks analysis institute Verisk Maplecroft has commissioned a report on the risk level of the world due to climate change.

Some NGOs publish research articles on specific areas, e.g. the Wuppertal Institute. Such "grey" literature is not peer reviewed but most of it comes from the well-known institutes.³⁸⁵ NGOs work in partnership with academic or policy research organizations. For example, Green Peace worked with Dutch research organization RIVM (National Institute of Public Health and Environment) to develop "Safe landing Concept" on health and climate change.³⁸⁶ These activities refer to contribution of NGOs and epistemic community to knowledge construction in climate negotiations.

³⁸⁵ Gough, C and Shackley, S (2001). The respectable politics of climate change: the epistemic communities and NGOs. *International Affairs*, vol: 77.2, pp: 329-345.

³⁸⁶ *ibidem*

Considering the position of non-state actors in climate politics this dissertation observed intellectual leadership among non-state actors in negotiations and a tremendous growth in the number of NGOs participating in international negotiations during the last two decades and made a difference in global environmental politics.³⁸⁷ Over the time, the role of NGOs and the epistemic community has shifted. At the beginning of discussions, NGOs and the epistemic community were involved in the knowledge construction process. Gradually, they have become involved in the decision making process. Now they are stakeholders in climate negotiations.

5.5: Conclusion

The chapter four has identified security concerns as key actors in climate negotiations. These security issues motivated the key actors to adopt strategies for achieving preferences. Self-help system among the actors due to security concern has also been observed in the chapter five and its implication explained relative to climate politics. This dissertation assumes that security concerns motivate actors to bring some shift in focus of the negotiations and form alliance as groups to develop the self-help system. It is evident from this chapter that economic development, energy security and hegemonic conflict influenced China, India, Brazil and other actors for greater co-operation in climate negotiations against the developed countries. China, Brazil and India emerged as new economic leaders in the climate negotiations. If we consider the economic development since the beginning of negotiations, there has been tremendous economic adjustment particularly in these three countries. They eradicated significant level of poverty, and economic growth has increased. Today they are fast growing economies and challenge the US and EU leadership in global

³⁸⁷ Chatterjee, P. and Finger, M. (1994). *The Earth Brokers. Power, Politics and World Development*, Routledge, London,

position. In order to get new economic leadership or hold the leadership, energy security is very important. And the intention to get new leadership and keep the leadership assisted major players to be involved in hegemonic conflicts. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the world became a uni-polar system with a US hegemony. But there is clear evidence in climate negotiations that US hegemony has been challenged by some emerging powers.

This dissertation finds that there is the appearance of new actor's, state and non-state actors. This dissertation professes that agenda control, the influential and limiting alternative capacity of emerging powers has brought dynamism into the normative political structure of global politics, especially the formation of new groups of emerging powers such as BASIC, LMDC, BRICS, G-20, South-South cooperation, and this indicates changes in the global political structure and limited alternative options for Annex-1 developed countries. Group politics has implications for climate politics and the adoption of decisions on different issues. Major actors are involved in many groups in climate negotiations. Since the beginning of climate change negotiations the G77&China, AOSIS, LDC and Umbrella groups were the dominating entities. At that time, most of the member countries were connected to these groups. For example the G77&China is a group of 130 developing countries. But over time, a reconstruction process in the negotiations delivered many new very influential groups of main actors or top emitters such as BASIC and LMDC. This chapter has discussed the position of BASIC, the reason for the formation BASIC and LMDC and their influence to climate negotiations.

This dissertation has found that the emergence of BASIC and LMDC reshaped the division among the states in climate negotiations. At the beginning of negotiations, states were divided in two groups: developed and developing. But the BASIC directed the negotiations in three groups. Now states are clearly divided into

three groups as developing, developing and emerging powers. Emerging powers play a central role in climate negotiations. Some scholars consider the emergence of BASIC as the momentum for the emerging powers.³⁸⁸ The BASIC as an emerging power has close relation to other developing countries as LMDC, the EU and the US. BASIC members also got a new identity along with an individual identity. Kathryn Hochstetler and Manjana Milkoreit considered this joint identity based on collective interests.³⁸⁹ And some scholars have identified them as blockers rather than negotiators.³⁹⁰

This dissertation conceives that the emergence of BASIC has significant implication to global politics. The BASIC maintains the leadership of the global south. The most significant point is that Brazil, India and South Africa are candidates for a permanent seat at the Security Council and the reform of the UN Security Council is the top object of its foreign policy thrust. The Establishment of BASIC is a follow up of the activities of IBSA and BRICS members. Some scholars assume that the formation BRICS - China, India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa - is another front as BASIC is active in climate politics to influence the global politics. Ultimately, the BASIC is elite club of G20 members.

Finally, it is also evident in climate negotiations that by influencing the international negotiations and domestic policy of states, non-state actors are becoming more dominant in global politics. Joseph Nye describes it as a new horizon in global politics. The emergence of a transnational force or non-state actors suggests

³⁸⁸ Hallding, K. Atteridge, Carson, M. & Jürisoo, M (2013). Rising power: the evolving role of BASIC countries. *Climate policy*, vol: 13:5. pp 608-631.

³⁸⁹ Hochstetler, K & Milkoreit M (2013). Emerging powers in the climate negotiations: Shifting Identity Conceptions. *Political Research Quarterly*. Pp. 1-12

³⁹⁰ Hallding, K. Olsson, M. Atteridge, A. Vihma, A. Carson, M. & Roman, M (2011). Together Alone: BASIC countries and climate change conundrum. Nordic council of ministers. Copenhagen.

major changes in global political horizon as well.³⁹¹ Not only in climate negotiations, but activism on environmental issues since 1980s. As such The International Campaign to Ban Landmines in 1997 and the *Médecins Sans Frontières* in 1999 has highlighted the emergence of these organizations as "new" forces in international politics.³⁹²

³⁹¹ Nye, J (2015). American Hegemony or American Primacy? Project syndicate, March 9. Available at: <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/american-hegemony-military-superiority-by-joseph-s--nye-2015-03>, accessed on 3rd April.

³⁹² Ahmed, S. and D. Potter (2007). *NGOs in International Politics*. International Journal of voluntary and nonprofit organizations. Vol: 18(1), pp: 93-95.

Chapter 6: Power shift: Comparative analysis and concluding remarks

This dissertation questions two main ideas i) the political aspect of the prolonged climate negotiations and ii) its implication to the global politics as a case study about the power shifting process. Considering the emergence of new powers from regional to global leaders, from domestic to international (non-state actors), this dissertation conducted research on the mechanism that transfers power to new actors. The researcher emphasized three conditions to identify power shift mechanism: i) controlling agenda ii) winning then negotiations and iii) change in the normative structure are necessary to measure the power shifting process. These conditions are very crucial to explaining and measuring the emergence of new powers in the contemporary political system. This chapter will review the finding of the research and figure out the position of new global powers through the three mentioned factors. It also evaluates the role of new powers in the climate politics.

Power shift: This dissertation considers that the emergence of China, India and Brazil made the predominantly field of political economy of climate change an anarchic situation by influencing and winning negotiations. Ultimately, major economies are the main players of climate negotiations. Future agreements will depend on the willingness of top emitters like the US, the EU, China, Brazil and India, who will consider the negotiations as a challenge to their economy and national security.

This dissertation conceives the idea that the US, EU, China, Brazil and India are very rational actors to achieve preferences and are desirous to protect national interests. All major economies or emitters or major players in the climate negotiations act as obstructionist powers as nobody wants to give anything in return to check the growth of GHGs. The obstructionist position of major players threaten

the future of new agreements that will make or mar the global effort. Finally, top emitters especially BASIC countries accepted Paris agreement, but it is not fully legally binding agreement.

Agenda controlling or **Influence** of developing countries has been increased in the negotiations over time. Empirical data shows that developing countries and non-state actors are more successful to include many issues in the negotiations agenda, such as CBDR, assistance for finance and technology, meaningful compliance, CDM, loss and damage and so on. Not only have the advanced developing countries controlled the agenda but also most of the major decisions have been in favor of advanced developing countries. **Winning negotiations also** shows the increasing strength of advanced developing countries in the negotiations such as the exclusion of developing countries to legally binding instruments, acceptance of developing countries' rights to develop. Acceptance of the right of developing countries to develop their economies seems to give them approval to emit GHGs as well.

These are clear successes for developing countries particularly for the BASIC members as emerging economies and emitters. Agenda controlling and winning negotiations approach of advanced developing countries and non-state actors has been discussed and explained in previous chapters. This chapter will specially attempt to figure out the implication of agenda controlling and winning negotiations of advanced developing countries and non-state actors to global politics.

This dissertation accepted security concern as independent variables and position-strategy of actors in the climate negotiations as dependent variables. Agenda controlling and winning processes clearly show the relationship between independent and dependent variables. It evident in this study that foreign policy of actors in


developing countries is largely guided by security concern, the domestic policy and strategy of opponents.

Considering the implication of agenda control and winning negotiations, it is evident that it brings some changes into the normative structure of global politics. Empirical data shows that China, India and Brazil are leaders in the climate negotiations in many respects. For example if we consider the role of China, it is very much influential in some aspects as the propagator of the developing world. China is a country on a development path that must be more sustainable than other countries in the past that are now developed. China is a country that went through such an impressive change in recent years and that has been using the movement of world economy in such positive way for their growth. For China to find the balance between normal growth to eradicate poverty and to find the effort to have a more sustainable economy was a very big challenge. China has all the big numbers: big population, high emissions and they have the biggest growth globally.

Hence, China is the “big player” in the negotiations process. They have the biggest pollution in cities probably at the same time the biggest country investment in renewable energy. China invested US\$ 58.3 billion in 2013, the highest investment in renewable energy sector worldwide.³⁹³ China represents the new step of the world economy. It is a reality: the global community would have to deal with this and China has been very engaged in this process. At least they have created a low carbon society because China would be the hope of many other developing countries, if they show the way to develop an environmentally friendly society. Other countries may take a cue from China in the move towards renewable energy.

³⁹³ Global Trends in renewable energy investment (2014). FS-UNEL centre for climate & sustainable energy finance. Frankfurt School.

Figure 20: Investment for renewable energy



Source: Author compilation

Recently China agreed to reduce its emissions intensity, the first step to check the growth of GHGs. It has been ascertained that China is the one country that continues to do more than any other country to achieve the objectives of the Convention. At the conventions to discuss top emitters, mitigation, adaptation, and with the adaptation process, China now occupies a pride of place. Initially, China was not at the center of the beginning of negotiations. Since nobody believed that China would become such a big economy in the world, nobody believed China would become the biggest emitter in the world, and nobody believed that China would become so rich. Now in the negotiations, China is very vocal, whereas earlier China was not so in the past. From the perspective of other nations and groups, nothing much was initially expected from a developing country like China, to take responsibility and contribute to the mitigation of GHGs. But now China is playing a leading role and achieved this within the last 6/7 years. Two other top actors, India and Brazil, have been very active, while protecting their interests. They have similar interests like other emerging economies. India and Brazil are next to China as countries that have done more than other developed countries. India is in a very much different situation in climate politics than China and Brazil. Brazil has been very successful in recent years with regards to sustainable development and the reduction of poverty. India has the largest percentage of its population living in

extreme poverty, and that perhaps in why it needs much more time than China to be able to eradicate poverty. This obviously has equity as a key point. India is a well-known and special case and this obviously favors the defense of its economy and right to economic development.

India is in a way deferring their importance as a large power and large emitter, although at the same level as China, because India has a large level of poverty and less per capita emissions. The expectation from India should not be the same as China and Brazil. India is very concerned about that. Their role is in trying to balance those concerns. Also their role is to put forward that view that India is trying to talk about half of the developing countries. Politically India may not be always on same phase with China.

Though there have not been any joint positions with China, Brazil and India, they operate as one group with the BASIC. That is the smallest but strongest group. There is no bilateral discussion between China, Brazil and India in any coordinated way. So they cooperate in that context with each other based on their independent variable. Dependent variables foster them to adopt specific strategy in climate negotiations and control the agenda setting process in order to secure independent variables. But it is quite normal for affiliations to be different from one negotiating group to the next. Therefore, sometimes there are spillovers and sometimes there is significant harmony among them.

This dissertation assumes that climate negotiation is the largest ongoing negotiations as a process. Even larger than armaments, human rights movement, as a process it is the largest and most complex one. One cannot categorize the environment or a single sector in the negotiations because it covers everything and hence it has very complicated alliances. Agriculture, energy security, water management, and economic policy - all these are related to climate change. For that

reason, a numbers of alliances are emerging in the negotiations based on independent variables. For instance, the agricultural position of a country is different from energy policy, and from water management.

Therefore in the negotiations process, it is very difficult to say that this is the division. There is a tendency to think that the next mitigation regime is the BASIC countries, is facing the similar pressure, as Annex-I countries have currently to mitigate climate change. They have the common challenge of revamping their current emissions. These common challenges brought them together to influence and control agenda.

Change in the global structure: and finally emerging economies are becoming the major economic powers, and even because some have nuclear power. There is also a rise of Asia, particularly, since Japan used to be the only power house in Asia. With time Asia is rising again and will have the power to influence global politics particularly because of its huge population and size of economy. Now China is the leader in green technology, and has extended its hand to Africa and South America.

Therefore, emissions and commitment are the main factors that control climate negotiations. High GHG emitting countries are the major powers in the climate negotiations. Their level of emissions and their commitment to reduce GHGs make them major actors in the negotiations process. Emissions and commitment integrate the power in the negotiations process. Here power refers to influence, limiting alternatives capacities of actors on some specific issues. This capacity brings changes in normative power structure and because of climate issues, the development literature and narrative has changed. Since the beginning of negotiations countries were divided into developed and developing. The negotiations track has changed. Now developed and developing narratives have been revised. All parties should

determine its own plan to cut emission according to news deal. In 1992, the main objective was mitigation. But a lot of issues have been included. Most of the issues were included by the major emerging economies to protect their interests.

There has been debate over objective and principle of climate negotiations. Now climate negotiations are based on principal than to reach the objective. In 1992, it was predicted that climate could be changed. Now in 2016 it is reality. It is happening. The world is facing the consequences of climate change. There was only the KP as a legal document, but all the parties have not implemented it. Now we have Paris agreement and it is not a fully obligatory document as well.

The volume of emissions of emerging economies is much higher than emissions in 1990. All things are based on the 1990 calculation. Now the question is this: is history static or dynamic? History is not static, but it seems that the climate negotiations are static. It is evident from the empirical analysis that the major players have stalled the negotiations process to make a legally binding agreement for all. Emerging economies like China, Brazil and India have become the major powers in the climate negotiations along with the US and the EU.

This dissertation considers that climate politics is highly dependent on the position of three new emerging global powers. Whether the deal will be made or not, whether mitigation or investment in green technology will be the focus, the emerging powers are leading the way. There is a new kind of collective directional and intellectual leadership in the global stage through the China, Brazil, Indian strategy and the emergence of non-state actors in global politics. The main structural change is that a new South-South hegemony brings a balance against the US-EU hegemony in global politics.

Co-constitution, inter-subjectivity, structural change, rationality, political morality, struggling behavior are the main features of theoretical consideration of this

dissertation. These features are clearly reflected in the climate negotiations through the agenda-controlling, winning negotiations and limiting alternative processes.

Constructivist-realism analysis suggests that there is different phase of hegemonic balance or balance of power in the climate negotiations. This dissertation observes that a new power balance or power shift started since the negotiations for the KP. But the shift vividly appeared in the COP-15 in Copenhagen again in Paris COP-21. Some negotiators have explained that China, Brazil and India mainly derailed the negotiations process. They were the main obstacles to reach a deal in Copenhagen. But as a reply to this argument, the BASIC members accused the developed countries and strongly opposed the Danish draft. Because, BASIC countries were included to reduce emission in Danish draft. Their argument seems to be that the US refused to ratify the Kyoto protocol. First, the KP would have to be implemented before another deal would be brokered. But BASIC countries agreed to sign Paris agreement when they found the self determined reduction process.

This dissertation posits that there is no strong and effective governance system to oblige the major parties to maintain their commitment to reduce their emissions what brings the anarchic institution in climate negotiations even though Paris agreement adopted. Though the UNFCCC was formed in 1992, it does not have any executive power. It works as a facilitator. Climate governance is complex and has diversified dimension- economic, environmental and security issues. Many actors are very active in the negotiations process as state and non-state actors. State actors are the main players but at the same time non-states actors are very active in trying to reshape global political structure. Till 1992, developed countries such as the US, the EU, Russia, Japan and China were the major global players in any negotiations process in the UN, WTO or IMF. But the global political negotiations scenario changed in the 1992 at the Earth Summit. Developed countries faced strong

challenges from the developing countries in any global negotiation. Findings show that advanced developing countries dominate the negotiations throughout the process. And it will continue for few decades because the consumption capacity is increasing, export which will give them strong position in global politics and help to secure national security. Ultimately the BASIC is another front of advanced developing countries such as the BRICS and the G20.

Now, the question is: how would the emerging power be viewed in global politics? Ross Terill has introduced three criteria to identify the new hegemony in global politics: i) intention to be number one, ii) capacity to achieve the preferences and iii) acceptance by other opponents.³⁹⁴

Considering this dynamics of climate negotiations, in 1992 most of the developing countries formed alliances against the developed countries, the G77&China, LDC and AOSIS. But the G77&China and LDC was not a new alliance among the developing countries. However, The G77&China and LDC were initially trying to establish a balance in the climate negotiations. In 1992, developing countries jointly rejected the developed countries' argument and forced the conference to accept the argument of developing countries. But the dynamics of the group formation was changing because advanced developing countries were becoming major emitters. Pressure was increasing on emissions reduction from both side Annex-1 and vulnerable developing countries on BASIC countries. Thus, advanced developing countries founded their own group, which appeared in 2009 in Copenhagen as BASIC. They had already started collaborating since 2000 however.

If we analyze the negotiations process since 1992, it shows that advanced developing countries controlled and diverted the negotiations process so as to achieve preferences and pursue security. They tactfully avoided the reduction responsibility.

³⁹⁴ Terrill, Ross (2005). What does China want? *Wilson Quarterly*, No.4 (Autumn 2005), pp. 50-61.

According to the UNFCCC, a developed country is responsible for reducing emissions whereas currently advanced developing countries are the top emitters together. One significant fact of the negotiations is that major actors are re-forming their position regards to the negotiations. Though most of them are conservative, especially Brazil, India and China, yet they have shifted their positions on the mitigation actions. Even though their reformation process is somewhat slow, it has helped advanced developing countries to limit the alternatives for developed countries and achieve their preferences.

They formed their own group, the BASIC, while at the same time many sub-groups such as LMDC, SIDS, AILAC, ALBA, and SIRCA have been created. China and Brazil and India may not be members of these groups but they surely helped to influence their formation. Sometimes these sub-groups represent the interests of emerging economies. These groups work as *blockers* against the developed world. They highly criticized US hesitation to take any drastic action to reduce emissions. Some experts promote the view that a new treaty is not virtually possible unless top emitters like the US, China, Brazil and India agree to reduce emissions. It is required to quantify emissions target from the top four emitters. And the economic and security dimensions of the international system have such a huge role in the climate negotiations. When the economic crisis started in 2008, it relegated the climate issue to the background. Emerging economies therefore took the opportunity of the economic crisis to adjust their economies.

Finally, Emerging powers took the first step of balancing power at the onset of the climate negotiations and gradually maximized power and became strong factors in the negotiation process. And formation of new alliances helps them get new identity in the negotiations process and acceptance as major players in the negotiations.

Another important aspect is, if we count OECD and BASIC emissions that practically make them the majority - OECD and the BASIC produces 80% of the world emissions. It is assumed by observers that global agreements are not needed, but just need an agreement among the US, China, Brazil and China like Paris agreement. These observers support their observation with the fact that the Copenhagen Accord was an Accord brokered by some elite emitters. But so far there is the tendency to still accept the global nature of these negotiations because the remaining 150 countries believe that if top emitters will get together and agree, then the other developing countries will lose their funding for adaptation. The rest of the world will likely be uncomfortable if they are not a part of solving the carbon emission problem and that is why all countries have to get together to sign the Copenhagen Accord. And it was same in the Paris conference. Paris agreement is also deal of elite emitters and rest of the world accepted it.

In practical terms however, this is the reality of what is happening in negotiations: the cost will be much higher for developing countries, and countries that have less commitment over mitigation including the LDC will be given special provision to do it at their own phase. In that wise, a country's contribution to the global mitigation would be negligible.

The polluter countries from the both sides of the divide do not want to take the responsibilities not as compensation or obligation. They formed different types of informal alliances and groups to control the negotiations process. Some countries are in many groups, for example China, India and so on. The formal partnership between China, Brazil and India is very significant in the global politics. Historically China and India are rivals in the geo-political equation of Asia but in the climate politics they are together on the same platform and position.

This dissertation considers that the new scenario would not say that the developed countries lost their leadership role, but they are not always number one. It might be considered that during the Bush administration the US probably lost a generation or a decade to initiate domestic work. Some states like California, New York, they have their own strong policy. They introduced and implemented strong policies. But at the federal levels, they have a lot of domestic experiences on reduction or verification. The EU has a lot of experience of domestic practice to reduce the emissions. But the US on the other hand, does not have that strong kind of policy and that is why they have lost a lot of time. And then this is actually when they were trying to leave these negotiations by explaining the domestic experiences either for reflection of the international assistance or transferring the experience to other countries like the developing countries. This is something very important in the case of the US and, which explains their weakness. Actually, the US was for many years not committing to the negotiations for them to have any outcome. They did not come forward until president Obama came into office. They have a major task in trying to convince everyone that they would take responsibility.

On the other hand the EU has been in a driving position in the negotiations, but not always. The EU did not want competitive disadvantage. They are more ambitious than the US. The EU had been taking the lead, but it should have been taking more actions. The EU plays a role to influence the developing countries. It tries to achieve best practice. The EU is in a very different position than the US because the EU has a process mechanism to make decisions inside their structure different from the US. They have been able to have a very positive outlook about climate change. But there is a very strong impression that they do much less that they say than they do. They could do more because they have the financial and technological resources. With that they could do more. They have very unique position among all

the different groups that are negotiating on climate change. For instance, the EU's indirect influence to eliminate the umbrella group was founded by the US and Canada. With the creation of European Emissions Trading system, the EU took the leadership role in CDM mechanism. And because the EU buys huge amounts of credit, they want to use this to reflect their control of most developing countries. The EU was very successful in the first commitment period. If the EU wants to stay, they have very strong influence in the carbon market through developing countries. The same thing is more about climate change finance. But in terms of climate change finance, Japan and the US are the largest contributors compared to the EU.

The US and EU reluctance and the intention of the advanced developing countries to be major players foster the global power shifting process. Power shift in climate negotiations is rooted in the economic dynamics of actors and transform to the political power. Recent data shows that all indicators are increasing in emerging economies. Consumption capacity is increasing in China, India and Brazil compared to the US and EU. Therefore energy consumption and emissions is also increasing in the BASIC countries.

Some scholars hold the view that “the locus of economic power has continued to shift; the world has witnessed newly industrializing countries edging toward the center of climate negotiations”.³⁹⁵ The Copenhagen Conference showed the appearance the BASIC countries. The emergence of the BASIC countries sidelined the EU. Ultimately, BASIC and the US were the main negotiators in Copenhagen and in Paris. BASIC members used the Bali conference as a preparatory field and in Copenhagen they entered into fully into the diplomatic race. In Durban, Cancun, Doha, Warsaw and Paris BASIC leadership continued to get an equitable global deal according to their view.

³⁹⁵ Qi, X. 2011 (2011). The Rise of BASIC in UN climate change negotiations. *South African journal of International Affairs*, vol: 18. No.3, pp: 295-318

It is evident that the most serious implication of the emergence of BASIC is the acceleration of Beijing centrism global politics. BRICS and IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) were initial evidence of power shift. BASIC adds a new dimension to the power shifting process. IBSA and BRICS are clubs representing just a few countries. Though BASIC is also a group of four countries, many other developing countries have indirect connection to these groups. BASIC is another front of BRICS and IBSA member countries. The BASIC members are also members of other groups in climate negotiations. BASIC has influence on other actors in the climate negotiations.

This dissertation conceives the idea that the multi-polar world is getting reshaped through the Beijing centric global politics. This new multi-polar dimension drives US-China led politics. Some scholars argue that this is evidence that the post-cold war new liberal world order based on “Washington Consensus” is facing a challenge by the “Beijing Consensus” based on Chinese growth dependent economic model.³⁹⁶ It refers to a transformation in global leadership. Bass and Riggo have considered that the transformation in leadership has helped to stimulate and influence followers of both ideologies, achieve expected outcomes and develop their own leadership capacity.³⁹⁷ In climate politics, China not only emerged as the new global power but also influenced and stimulated its followers India and Brazil, to achieve their preferences and become new leaders in the climate negotiations.

Finally, it should be noted that power is shifting and new identities are in making. And this dissertation did not make any hypotheses on the decline of power. It highlighted the emergence of power, something new in the horizon along with the existing hegemony. Scholars consider this as big changes in the global political

³⁹⁶ Hallding, K. Olsson, M. Atteridge, A. Vihma, A. Carson, M. & Roman, M (2011) Together Alone: BASIC countries and climate change conundrum. Nordic council of ministers. Copenhagen.

³⁹⁷ Bass, B.M. and Riggo, R, E (2005) Transformational Leadership. Routledge. London

arena.³⁹⁸ This dissertation examines the power shifting process by analyzing the climate negotiations. But climate negotiation is large and complicated interaction process among state actors. This dissertation mainly concentrates on power shifting processes based on state-actor behavior, to some extent non-state actors as well. But climate negotiations clearly reflect that non-state actors are also emerging as new powers in global politics. This is very significant and it has implications in the redefinition of the role of non state actors in global politics, particularly for constructivist and realist scholarships. It requires further study and research to figure out the role and implication of non-state actors in anarchic global politics.

³⁹⁸ Nye, J (2015). American Hegemony or American Primacy? Project syndicate, March 9. Available at: <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/american-hegemony-military-superiority-by-joseph-s--nye-2015-03>, accessed on 3rd April.

List of interviewees

Andres Pirazzoli, Negotiation officer, Climate Change office, Santiago, Chile.

Alessandor Vitelli, Bloomberg News, London.

Ahsanuddin Ahmed PhD, Executive Director, Centre for Global Change, Dhaka , Bangladesh.

Antinio Canas, adviser to minister, El Salvador.

Augus Prunomo, Special Staff to the president for Climate Change, Secretary, Indonesia.

Burhan Gafoor, Chief Negotiators for Climate Change, Singapore,

Collin D. Beck, Ambassador, permanent representative to UN, Solomon Island.

Cheton Chauhan, Associate Editor, Times of India, Delhi, India.

Chen Ji, negotiator, China

Clifford Mahlung, Meteorologist/Lead Negotiator, Jamaica.

Daniel Vicente Ortega Pacheco, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Integration, Ecuador.

Dewi Naidu Dylander, Head of Department, Danish Ministry of Climate, Energy and Building, Copenhagen.

Dr. Salimul Huq, IIED, London

Franz Xaver Perrez, Ambassador for the Environment, Federal office for the Environment, Berne, Switzerland.

Helmut Hojesky, Director, Air, soil and Climate Change, Federal Ministry of Agriculture, forestry, Environment and Water Management, Vienna, Austria, 15th November, 2013

Ian Fry, International Environment Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Environment and Labour, Tuvalu.

Jo Tyndall, Climate Change Ambassador, Environment division, Ministry of Foreign affairs and trade. New Zealand.

Karine Hertzberg, Senior Adviser, Department for Climate Change and Pollution Control, the Ministry of Environment, Oslo, Norway.

Li Gao PhD, Deputy Director, Department of climate change, National Development and Reform Commission, China.

Makato Kato, Director, Overseas Environmental Cooperation Centre, Japan. Abibgail Blue, Lead Policy Analyst, Seatrust Institute, Washington , USA.

Marcel Berk, Senior Policy Officer, Ministry of Housing, Spital Planning and the Environment, The Hague, Netherlands.

Michael Kühn, Politics and External Relations, Hunger Free World, Bonn.

Mizan R Khan, Department of Environment Science and Management, North South University, Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Noel Casserly, UNFCCC Focal Point, Climate Change Policy Unit, Ireland.

Prokash Mehta, Chair, LDC group at the UN climate Change Negotiations, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment, Nepal.

Paul Watkinson, Head of climate negotiation team, department for European and International Affairs, France.

Prof. Dr. Ainun Nishat, former vice-chancellor, BRAC University, Bangladesh.

Shogo Yoshitake, Senior Negotiator, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, Tokyo.

Sarah Conway, Climate Finance Negotiator, US Department of State, Washington.

Teige Cahill, Deputy Team Leader, Climate and Environment Division, Department for International Development, London, 12th June, 2013

Talieh Wögerbauer-Mamdouhi, Division V/4, Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management, Vienna, Austria, 15th November, 2013

Tulio Cesar Mourthe De Alvim Andrade, Chief Negotiator for Climate Change, Division for Environment Policy

TS Tirumurti, Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, India.

Vita Valiunaite, Strategic Sectors Policy Division, Economic Secretary Policy Department, Vilnius, Lithuania.

Youssef Nassef, UNFCCC, Bonn.

Zaheer Paul, Head of external Relations, Department of Environment, South Africa.

Questions for interview

1. How do you see the alliance between China and India in the climate negotiations?
2. Do you think that they are strategic partners in the climate negotiations?
3. How and why they have forged an alliance in the negotiation process?
4. What are the reasons that make them allies in the negotiations?
5. In what way and in which area do they substantially co-operate with each other?
6. To what extent does this strategic cooperation impact their national image? Does it foster mutual trust?
7. What is their common interest in the climate negotiations?
8. Does it help to form a new identity for China and India in the global politics?
9. What is the impact of Sino-Indian alliance in climate negotiations on the global politics more generally?
10. How do you consider the alliance among the developing countries in the climate negotiations led by China?
11. Do you think that China has been accepted as global leader?
12. How can the strategic cooperation between China and India reconciled with view that they are often considered rivals in the realm of geopolitics and regional security?
13. Do you think that is there any conflict in climate negotiations between developed and developing countries?
14. Which factors do mainly drive the conflict between the developed and developing countries? Please elaborate a bit on your answer.
15. How do you explain the role of the USA in the negotiations process?
16. Has the USA failed to take the lead the negotiations? If so, why?
17. How do you explain the role of EU in the negotiation process?
18. Do you think that USA and EU are the main barriers to reaching a deal to stabilize the GHG emission.
19. How do you explain the role of China in the negotiation process?
20. How has China's role during the negotiations evolved over the last 20 years?
21. How do you explain the role of India in the negotiation process?
22. Do you think that India is a follower of China in the climate negotiations? What is the policy of India in the climate negotiation?
23. Finally, do you see any shift in the climate negotiation?
24. Are the adaptation, technology transfer, loss and damage more focused than mitigation in the negotiation process?

25. How do you see the power play in the negotiation? Shift in the negotiation is the outcome of power play?

26. How do you see the role of non state actor in climate mechanism?

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Appendix-1

The Parties to this Convention,

Acknowledging that change in the Earth's climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of humankind,

Concerned that human activities have been substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, that these increases enhance the natural greenhouse effect, and that this will result on average in an additional warming of the Earth's surface and atmosphere and may adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind,

Noting that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs,

Aware of the role and importance in terrestrial and marine ecosystems of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases,

Noting that there are many uncertainties in predictions of climate change, particularly with regard to the timing, magnitude and regional patterns thereof,

Acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions,

Recalling the pertinent provisions of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, adopted at Stockholm on 16 June 1972,

Recalling also that States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,

Reaffirming the principle of sovereignty of States in international cooperation to address climate change,

Recognizing that States should enact effective environmental legislation, that environmental standards, management objectives and priorities should reflect the environmental and developmental context to which they apply, and that standards applied by some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and social cost to other countries, in particular developing countries,

Recalling the provisions of General Assembly resolution 44/228 of 22 December 1989 on the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, and resolutions 43/53 of 6 December 1988, 44/207 of 22 December 1989, 45/212 of 21 December 1990 and 46/169 of 19 December 1991 on protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind,

Recalling also the provisions of General Assembly resolution 44/206 of 22 December 1989 on the possible adverse effects of sea-level rise on islands and coastal areas, particularly low-lying coastal areas and the pertinent provisions of General Assembly resolution 44/172 of 19 December 1989 on the implementation of the Plan of Action to Combat Desertification,

Recalling further the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 1985, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987, as adjusted and amended on 29 June 1990,

Noting the Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference adopted on 7 November 1990,

Conscious of the valuable analytical work being conducted by many States on climate change and of the important contributions of the World Meteorological Organization, the United Nations Environment Programme and other organs, organizations and bodies of the United Nations system, as well as other international and intergovernmental bodies, to the exchange of results of scientific research and the coordination of research,

Recognizing that steps required to understand and address climate change will be environmentally, socially and economically most effective if they are based on relevant scientific, technical and economic considerations and continually re-evaluated in the light of new findings in these areas,

Recognizing that various actions to address climate change can be justified economically in their own right and can also help in solving other environmental problems,

Recognizing also the need for developed countries to take immediate action in a flexible manner on the basis of clear priorities, as a first step towards comprehensive response strategies at the global, national and, where agreed, regional levels that take into account all greenhouse gases, with due consideration of their relative contributions to the enhancement of the greenhouse effect,

Recognizing further that low-lying and other small island countries, countries with low-lying coastal, arid and semi-arid areas or areas liable to floods, drought and desertification, and developing countries with fragile mountainous ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change,

Recognizing the special difficulties of those countries, especially developing countries, whose economies are particularly dependent on fossil fuel production, use and exportation, as a consequence of action taken on limiting greenhouse gas emissions,

Affirming that responses to climate change should be coordinated with social and economic development in an integrated manner with a view to avoiding adverse impacts on the latter, taking into full account the legitimate priority needs of developing countries for the achievement of sustained economic growth and the eradication of poverty,

Recognizing that all countries, especially developing countries, need access to resources required to achieve sustainable social and economic development and that, in order for developing countries to progress towards that goal, their energy consumption will need to grow taking into account the possibilities for achieving greater energy efficiency and for controlling greenhouse gas emissions in general, including through the application of new technologies on terms which make such an application economically and socially beneficial,

Determined to protect the climate system for present and future generations,

Have agreed as follows:

DEFINITIONS*

For the purposes of this Convention:

1. "Adverse effects of climate change" means changes in the physical environment or biota resulting from climate change which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human health and welfare.
2. "Climate change" means a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.
3. "Climate system" means the totality of the atmosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere and geosphere and their interactions.
4. "Emissions" means the release of greenhouse gases and/or their precursors into the atmosphere over a specified area and period of time.
5. "Greenhouse gases" means those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation.
6. "Regional economic integration organization" means an organization constituted by sovereign States of a given region which has competence in respect of matters governed by this Convention or its protocols and has been duly authorized, in accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the instruments concerned.
7. "Reservoir" means a component or components of the climate system where a greenhouse gas or a precursor of a greenhouse gas is stored.

8. "Sink" means any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere.

9. "Source" means any process or activity which releases a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas into the atmosphere.

* Titles of articles are included solely to assist the reader.

ARTICLE	2
OBJECTIVE	

The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.

ARTICLE	3
PRINCIPLES	

In their actions to achieve the objective of the Convention and to implement its provisions, the Parties shall be guided, INTER ALIA, by the following:

1. The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and

respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.

2. The specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and of those Parties, especially developing country Parties, that would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the Convention, should be given full consideration.

3. The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. To achieve this, such policies and measures should take into account different socio-economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors. Efforts to address climate change may be carried out cooperatively by interested Parties.

4. The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development. Policies and measures to protect the climate system against human-induced change should be appropriate for the specific conditions of each Party and should be integrated with national development programmes, taking into account that economic development is essential for adopting measures to address climate change.

5. The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change. Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.

1. All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, shall:

(a) Develop, periodically update, publish and make available to the Conference of the Parties, in accordance with Article 12, national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, using comparable methodologies to be agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties;

(b) Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change;

(c) Promote and cooperate in the development, application and diffusion, including transfer, of technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol in all relevant sectors, including the energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste management sectors;

(d) Promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including biomass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems;

(e) Cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change; develop and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone management, water resources and agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by drought and desertification, as well as floods;

(f) Take climate change considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in their relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions, and employ appropriate methods, for example impact assessments, formulated and determined nationally, with a view to minimizing adverse effects on the economy, on public

health and on the quality of the environment, of projects or measures undertaken by them to mitigate or adapt to climate change;

(g) Promote and cooperate in scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and other research, systematic observation and development of data archives related to the climate system and intended to further the understanding and to reduce or eliminate the remaining uncertainties regarding the causes, effects, magnitude and timing of climate change and the economic and social consequences of various response strategies;

(h) Promote and cooperate in the full, open and prompt exchange of relevant scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and legal information related to the climate system and climate change, and to the economic and social consequences of various response strategies;

(i) Promote and cooperate in education, training and public awareness related to climate change and encourage the widest participation in this process, including that of non- governmental organizations; and

(j) Communicate to the Conference of the Parties information related to implementation, in accordance with Article 12.

2. The developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex I commit themselves specifically as provided for in the following:

(a) Each of these Parties shall adopt national¹ policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. These policies and measures will demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objective of the Convention, recognizing that the return by the end of the present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol would contribute to such modification, and taking into account the differences in these Parties' starting points and approaches, economic structures and resource bases, the need to maintain strong and sustainable economic growth, available technologies and other individual circumstances, as well as the need for equitable and appropriate contributions by each of these Parties to the global effort regarding that objective. These Parties

may implement such policies and measures jointly with other Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the Convention and, in particular, that of this subparagraph;

(b) In order to promote progress to this end, each of these Parties shall communicate, within six months of the entry into force of the Convention for it and periodically thereafter, and in accordance with Article 12, detailed information on its policies and measures referred to in subparagraph (a) above, as well as on its resulting projected anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol for the period referred to in subparagraph (a), with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. This information will be reviewed by the Conference of the Parties, at its first session and periodically thereafter, in accordance with Article 7;

(c) Calculations of emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases for the purposes of subparagraph (b) above should take into account the best available scientific knowledge, including of the effective capacity of sinks and the respective contributions of such gases to climate change. The Conference of the Parties shall consider and agree on methodologies for these calculations at its first session and review them regularly thereafter;

(d) The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, review the adequacy of subparagraphs (a) and (b) above. Such review shall be carried out in the light of the best available scientific information and assessment on climate change and its impacts, as well as relevant technical, social and economic information. Based on this review, the Conference of the Parties shall take appropriate action, which may include the adoption of amendments to the commitments in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above. The Conference of the Parties, at its first session, shall also take decisions regarding criteria for joint implementation as indicated in subparagraph (a) above. A second review of subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall take place not later than 31 December 1998, and thereafter at regular intervals determined by the Conference of the Parties, until the objective of the Convention is met;

(e) Each of these Parties shall :

i) Coordinate as appropriate with other such Parties, relevant economic and administrative instruments developed to achieve the objective of the Convention; and

(ii) Identify and periodically review its own policies and practices which encourage activities that lead to greater levels of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol than would otherwise occur;

(f) The Conference of the Parties shall review, not later than 31 December 1998, available information with a view to taking decisions regarding such amendments to the lists in Annexes I and II as may be appropriate, with the approval of the Party concerned;

(g) Any Party not included in Annex I may, in its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or at any time thereafter, notify the Depositary that it intends to be bound by subparagraphs (a) and (b) above. The Depositary shall inform the other signatories and Parties of any such notification.

3. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in complying with their obligations under Article 12, paragraph 1. They shall also provide such financial resources, including for the transfer of technology, needed by the developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs of implementing measures that are covered by paragraph 1 of this Article and that are agreed between a developing country Party and the international entity or entities referred to in Article 11, in accordance with that Article. The implementation of these commitments shall take into account the need for adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds and the importance of appropriate burden sharing among the developed country Parties.

4. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.

5. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to

implement the provisions of the Convention. In this process, the developed country Parties shall support the development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and technologies of developing country Parties. Other Parties and organizations in a position to do so may also assist in facilitating the transfer of such technologies.

6. In the implementation of their commitments under paragraph 2 above, a certain degree of flexibility shall be allowed by the Conference of the Parties to the Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market economy, in order to enhance the ability of these Parties to address climate change, including with regard to the historical level of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol chosen as a reference.

7. The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties.

8. In the implementation of the commitments in this Article, the Parties shall give full consideration to what actions are necessary under the Convention, including actions related to funding, insurance and the transfer of technology, to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the implementation of response measures, especially on:

(a) Small island countries;

(b) Countries with low-lying coastal areas;

(c) Countries with arid and semi-arid areas, forested areas and areas liable to forest decay;

(d) Countries with areas prone to natural disasters;

(e) Countries with areas liable to drought and desertification;

(f) Countries with areas of high urban atmospheric pollution;

(g) Countries with areas with fragile ecosystems, including mountainous ecosystems;

(h) Countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export, and/or on consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products; and

(i) Land-locked and transit countries.

Further, the Conference of the Parties may take actions, as appropriate, with respect to this paragraph.

9. The Parties shall take full account of the specific needs and special situations of the least developed countries in their actions with regard to funding and transfer of technology.

10. The Parties shall, in accordance with Article 10, take into consideration in the implementation of the commitments of the Convention the situation of Parties, particularly developing country Parties, with economies that are vulnerable to the adverse effects of the implementation of measures to respond to climate change. This applies notably to Parties with economies that are highly dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export, and/or consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products and/or the use of fossil fuels for which such Parties have serious difficulties in switching to alternatives.

ARTICLE

5

RESEARCH AND SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATION

In carrying out their commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1(g), the Parties shall:

(a) Support and further develop, as appropriate, international and intergovernmental programmes and networks or organizations aimed at defining, conducting, assessing and financing research, data collection and systematic observation, taking into account the need to minimize duplication of effort;

(b) Support international and intergovernmental efforts to strengthen systematic observation and national scientific and technical research capacities and capabilities, particularly in developing countries, and to promote access to, and the exchange of, data and analyses thereof obtained from areas beyond national jurisdiction; and

(c) Take into account the particular concerns and needs of developing countries and cooperate in improving their endogenous capacities and capabilities to participate in the efforts referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above.

ARTICLE

6

EDUCATION, TRAINING AND PUBLIC AWARENESS

In carrying out their commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1(i), the Parties shall:

(a) Promote and facilitate at the national and, as appropriate, sub-regional and regional levels, and in accordance with national laws and regulations, and within their respective capacities:

(i) The development and implementation of educational and public awareness programmes on climate change and its effects;

(ii) Public access to information on climate change and its effects;

(iii) Public participation in addressing climate change and its effects and developing adequate responses; and

(iv) Training of scientific, technical and managerial personnel.

(b) Cooperate in and promote, at the international level, and, where appropriate, using existing bodies:

(i) The development and exchange of educational and public awareness material on climate change and its effects; and

(ii) The development and implementation of education and training programmes, including the strengthening of national institutions and the exchange or secondment of personnel to train experts in this field, in particular for developing countries.

ARTICLE

7

CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES

1. A Conference of the Parties is hereby established.

2. The Conference of the Parties, as the supreme body of this Convention, shall keep under regular review the implementation of the Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt, and shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the Convention. To this end, it shall:

(a) Periodically examine the obligations of the Parties and the institutional arrangements under the Convention, in the light of the objective of the Convention, the experience gained in its implementation and the evolution of scientific and technological knowledge;

(b) Promote and facilitate the exchange of information on measures adopted by the Parties to address climate change and its effects, taking into account the differing circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and their respective commitments under the Convention;

(c) Facilitate, at the request of two or more Parties, the coordination of measures adopted by them to address climate change and its effects, taking into account the differing circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and their respective commitments under the Convention;

(d) Promote and guide, in accordance with the objective and provisions of the Convention, the development and periodic refinement of comparable methodologies, to be agreed on by the Conference of the Parties, inter

alia, for preparing inventories of greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks, and for evaluating the effectiveness of measures to limit the emissions and enhance the removals of these gases;

(e) Assess, on the basis of all information made available to it in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, the implementation of the Convention by the Parties, the overall effects of the measures taken pursuant to the Convention, in particular environmental, economic and social effects as well as their cumulative impacts and the extent to which progress towards the objective of the Convention is being achieved;

(f) Consider and adopt regular reports on the implementation of the Convention and ensure their publication;

(g) Make recommendations on any matters necessary for the implementation of the Convention;

(h) Seek to mobilize financial resources in accordance with Article 4, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, and Article 11;

(i) Establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary for the implementation of the Convention;

(j) Review reports submitted by its subsidiary bodies and provide guidance to them;

(k) Agree upon and adopt, by consensus, rules of procedure and financial rules for itself and for any subsidiary bodies;

(l) Seek and utilize, where appropriate, the services and cooperation of, and information provided by, competent international organizations and intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies; and

(m) Exercise such other functions as are required for the achievement of the objective of the Convention as well as all other functions assigned to it under the Convention.

3. The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, adopt its own rules of procedure as well as those of the subsidiary bodies established by the Convention, which shall include decision-making procedures for matters not already covered by decision-making procedures stipulated in the Convention. Such procedures may include specified majorities required for the adoption of particular decisions.

4. The first session of the Conference of the Parties shall be convened by the interim secretariat referred to in Article 21 and shall take place not later than one year after the date of entry into force of the Convention. Thereafter, ordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties shall be held every year unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties.

5. Extraordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties shall be held at such other times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference, or at the written request of any Party, provided that, within six months of the request being communicated to the Parties by the secretariat, it is supported by at least one third of the Parties.

6. The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers thereto not Party to the Convention, may be represented at sessions of the Conference of the Parties as observers. Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non- governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object. The admission and participation of observers shall be subject to the rules of procedure adopted by the Conference of the Parties.

ARTICLE

8

SECRETARIAT

1. A secretariat is hereby established.

2. The functions of the secretariat shall be:

(a) To make arrangements for sessions of the Conference of the Parties and its subsidiary bodies established under the Convention and to provide them with services as required;

(b) To compile and transmit reports submitted to it;

(c) To facilitate assistance to the Parties, particularly developing country Parties, on request, in the compilation and communication of information required in accordance with the provisions of the Convention;

(d) To prepare reports on its activities and present them to the Conference of the Parties;

(e) To ensure the necessary coordination with the secretariats of other relevant international bodies;

(f) To enter, under the overall guidance of the Conference of the Parties, into such administrative and contractual arrangements as may be required for the effective discharge of its functions; and

(g) To perform the other secretariat functions specified in the Convention and in any of its protocols and such other functions as may be determined by the Conference of the Parties.

3. The Conference of the Parties, at its first session, shall designate a permanent secretariat and make arrangements for its functioning.

ARTICLE

9

SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVICE

1. A subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice is hereby established to provide the Conference of the Parties and, as appropriate, its other subsidiary bodies with timely information and advice on scientific and technological matters relating to the Convention. This body shall be open to participation by all Parties and shall be multidisciplinary. It shall comprise government representatives competent in the relevant field of expertise. It shall report regularly to the Conference of the Parties on all aspects of its work.

2. Under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties, and drawing upon existing competent international bodies, this body shall:

(a) Provide assessments of the state of scientific knowledge relating to climate change and its effects;

- (b) Prepare scientific assessments on the effects of measures taken in the implementation of the Convention;
- (c) Identify innovative, efficient and state-of-the-art technologies and know-how and advise on the ways and means of promoting development and/or transferring such technologies;
- (d) Provide advice on scientific programmes, international cooperation in research and development related to climate change, as well as on ways and means of supporting endogenous capacity-building in developing countries; and
- (e) Respond to scientific, technological and methodological questions that the Conference of the Parties and its subsidiary bodies may put to the body.

3. The functions and terms of reference of this body may be further elaborated by the Conference of the Parties.

ARTICLE

10

SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR IMPLEMENTATION

1. A subsidiary body for implementation is hereby established to assist the Conference of the Parties in the assessment and review of the effective implementation of the Convention. This body shall be open to participation by all Parties and comprise government representatives who are experts on matters related to climate change. It shall report regularly to the Conference of the Parties on all aspects of its work.

2. Under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties, this body shall:

- (a) Consider the information communicated in accordance with Article 12, paragraph 1, to assess the overall aggregated effect of the steps taken by the Parties in the light of the latest scientific assessments concerning climate change;

(b) Consider the information communicated in accordance with Article 12, paragraph 2, in order to assist the Conference of the Parties in carrying out the reviews required by Article 4, paragraph 2(d); and

(c) Assist the Conference of the Parties, as appropriate, in the preparation and implementation of its decisions.

ARTICLE

11

FINANCIAL MECHANISM

1. A mechanism for the provision of financial resources on a grant or concessional basis, including for the transfer of technology, is hereby defined. It shall function under the guidance of and be accountable to the Conference of the Parties, which shall decide on its policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria related to this Convention. Its operation shall be entrusted to one or more existing international entities.

2. The financial mechanism shall have an equitable and balanced representation of all Parties within a transparent system of governance.

3. The Conference of the Parties and the entity or entities entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism shall agree upon arrangements to give effect to the above paragraphs, which shall include the following:

(a) Modalities to ensure that the funded projects to address climate change are in conformity with the policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria established by the Conference of the Parties;

(b) Modalities by which a particular funding decision may be reconsidered in light of these policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria;

(c) Provision by the entity or entities of regular reports to the Conference of the Parties on its funding operations, which is consistent with the requirement for accountability set out in paragraph 1 above; and

(d) Determination in a predictable and identifiable manner of the amount of funding necessary and available for the implementation of this Convention and the conditions under which that amount shall be periodically reviewed.

4. The Conference of the Parties shall make arrangements to implement the above-mentioned provisions at its first session, reviewing and taking into account the interim arrangements referred to in Article 21, paragraph 3, and shall decide whether these interim arrangements shall be maintained. Within four years thereafter, the Conference of the Parties shall review the financial mechanism and take appropriate measures.

5. The developed country Parties may also provide and developing country Parties avail themselves of, financial resources related to the implementation of the Convention through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels.

ARTICLE

12

COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION RELATED TO IMPLEMENTATION

1. In accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1, each Party shall communicate to the Conference of the Parties, through the secretariat, the following elements of information:

(a) A national inventory of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, to the extent its capacities permit, using comparable methodologies to be promoted and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties;

(b) A general description of steps taken or envisaged by the Party to implement the Convention; and

(c) Any other information that the Party considers relevant to the achievement of the objective of the Convention and suitable for inclusion in its communication, including, if feasible, material relevant for calculations of global emission trends.

2. Each developed country Party and each other Party included in Annex I shall incorporate in its communication the following elements of information:

(a) A detailed description of the policies and measures that it has adopted to implement its commitment under Article 4, paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b); and

(b) A specific estimate of the effects that the policies and measures referred to in subparagraph (a) immediately above will have on anthropogenic emissions by its sources and removals by its sinks of greenhouse gases during the period referred to in Article 4, paragraph 2(a).

3. In addition, each developed country Party and each other developed Party included in Annex II shall incorporate details of measures taken in accordance with Article 4, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5.

4. Developing country Parties may, on a voluntary basis, propose projects for financing, including specific technologies, materials, equipment, techniques or practices that would be needed to implement such projects, along with, if possible, an estimate of all incremental costs, of the reductions of emissions and increments of removals of greenhouse gases, as well as an estimate of the consequent benefits.

5. Each developed country Party and each other Party included in Annex I shall make its initial communication within six months of the entry into force of the Convention for that Party. Each Party not so listed shall make its initial communication within three years of the entry into force of the Convention for that Party, or of the availability of financial resources in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 3. Parties that are least developed countries may make their initial communication at their discretion. The frequency of subsequent communications by all Parties shall be determined by the Conference of the Parties, taking into account the differentiated timetable set by this paragraph.

6. Information communicated by Parties under this Article shall be transmitted by the secretariat as soon as possible to the Conference of the Parties and to any subsidiary bodies concerned. If necessary, the procedures for the communication of information may be further considered by the Conference of the Parties.

7. From its first session, the Conference of the Parties shall arrange for the provision to developing country Parties of technical and financial support, on request, in compiling and communicating information under this

Article, as well as in identifying the technical and financial needs associated with proposed projects and response measures under Article 4. Such support may be provided by other Parties, by competent international organizations and by the secretariat, as appropriate.

8. Any group of Parties may, subject to guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties, and to prior notification to the Conference of the Parties, make a joint communication in fulfillment of their obligations under this Article, provided that such a communication includes information on the fulfillment by each of these Parties of its individual obligations under the Convention.

9. Information received by the secretariat that is designated by a Party as confidential, in accordance with criteria to be established by the Conference of the Parties, shall be aggregated by the secretariat to protect its confidentiality before being made available to any of the bodies involved in the communication and review of information.

10. Subject to paragraph 9 above, and without prejudice to the ability of any Party to make public its communication at any time, the secretariat shall make communications by Parties under this Article publicly available at the time they are submitted to the Conference of the Parties.

ARTICLE	13
RESOLUTION OF QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION	

The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, consider the establishment of a multilateral consultative process, available to Parties on their request, for the resolution of questions regarding the implementation of the Convention.

ARTICLE	14
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES	

1. In the event of a dispute between any two or more Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, the Parties concerned shall seek a settlement of the dispute through negotiation or any other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the Convention, or at any time thereafter, a Party which is not a regional economic integration organization may declare in a written instrument submitted to the Depositary that, in respect of any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, it recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any Party accepting the same obligation:

(a) Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice, and/or

(b) Arbitration in accordance with procedures to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties as soon as practicable, in an annex on arbitration.

A Party which is a regional economic integration organization may make a declaration with like effect in relation to arbitration in accordance with the procedures referred to in subparagraph (b) above.

3. A declaration made under paragraph 2 above shall remain in force until it expires in accordance with its terms or until three months after written notice of its revocation has been deposited with the Depositary.

4. A new declaration, a notice of revocation or the expiry of a declaration shall not in any way affect proceedings pending before the International Court of Justice or the arbitral tribunal, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree.

5. Subject to the operation of paragraph 2 above, if after twelve months following notification by one Party to another that a dispute exists between them, the Parties concerned have not been able to settle their dispute through the means mentioned in paragraph 1 above, the dispute shall be submitted, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, to conciliation.

6. A conciliation commission shall be created upon the request of one of the parties to the dispute. The commission shall be composed of an equal number of members appointed by each party concerned and a chairman chosen jointly by the members appointed by each party. The commission shall render a recommendatory award, which the parties shall consider in good faith.

7. Additional procedures relating to conciliation shall be adopted by the Conference of the Parties, as soon as practicable, in an annex on conciliation.

8. The provisions of this Article shall apply to any related legal instrument which the Conference of the Parties may adopt, unless the instrument provides otherwise.

ARTICLE

15

AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION

1. Any Party may propose amendments to the Convention.

2. Amendments to the Convention shall be adopted at an ordinary session of the Conference of the Parties. The text of any proposed amendment to the Convention shall be communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least six months before the meeting at which it is proposed for adoption. The secretariat shall also communicate proposed amendments to the signatories to the Convention and, for information, to the Depositary.

3. The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed amendment to the Convention by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment shall as a last resort be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the meeting. The adopted amendment shall be communicated by the secretariat to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all Parties for their acceptance.

4. Instruments of acceptance in respect of an amendment shall be deposited with the Depositary. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 above shall enter into force for those Parties having accepted it on the ninetieth day after the date of receipt by the Depositary of an instrument of acceptance by at least three fourths of the Parties to the Convention.

5. The amendment shall enter into force for any other Party on the ninetieth day after the date on which that Party deposits with the Depositary its instrument of acceptance of the said amendment.

6. For the purposes of this Article, "Parties present and voting" means Parties present and casting an affirmative or negative vote.

ARTICLE

16

ADOPTION AND AMENDMENT OF ANNEXES TO THE CONVENTION

1. Annexes to the Convention shall form an integral part thereof and, unless otherwise expressly provided, a reference to the Convention constitutes at the same time a reference to any annexes thereto. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 14, paragraphs 2(b) and 7, such annexes shall be restricted to lists, forms and any other material of a descriptive nature that is of a scientific, technical, procedural or administrative character.

2. Annexes to the Convention shall be proposed and adopted in accordance with the procedure set forth in Article 15, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4.

3. An annex that has been adopted in accordance with paragraph 2 above shall enter into force for all Parties to the Convention six months after the date of the communication by the Depositary to such Parties of the adoption of the annex, except for those Parties that have notified the Depositary, in writing, within that period of their non-acceptance of the annex. The annex shall enter into force for Parties which withdraw their

notification of non-acceptance on the ninetieth day after the date on which withdrawal of such notification has been received by the Depositary.

4. The proposal, adoption and entry into force of amendments to annexes to the Convention shall be subject to the same procedure as that for the proposal, adoption and entry into force of annexes to the Convention in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 above.

5. If the adoption of an annex or an amendment to an annex involves an amendment to the Convention, that annex or amendment to an annex shall not enter into force until such time as the amendment to the Convention enters into force.

ARTICLE	17
PROTOCOLS	

1. The Conference of the Parties may, at any ordinary session, adopt protocols to the Convention.

2. The text of any proposed protocol shall be communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least six months before such a session.

3. The requirements for the entry into force of any protocol shall be established by that instrument.

4. Only Parties to the Convention may be Parties to a protocol.

5. Decisions under any protocol shall be taken only by the Parties to the protocol concerned.

ARTICLE	18
RIGHT TO VOTE	

- 1. Each Party to the Convention shall have one vote, except as provided for in paragraph 2 below.

 - 2. Regional economic integration organizations, in matters within their competence, shall exercise their right to vote with a number of votes equal to the number of their member States that are Parties to the Convention. Such an organization shall not exercise its right to vote if any of its member States exercises its right, and vice versa.
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ARTICLE	19
DEPOSITARY	

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of the Convention and of protocols adopted in accordance with Article 17.

ARTICLE	20
SIGNATURE	

This Convention shall be open for signature by States Members of the United Nations or of any of its specialized agencies or that are Parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice and by regional economic integration organizations at Rio de Janeiro, during the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, and thereafter at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 20 June 1992 to 19 June 1993.

ARTICLE	21
INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS	

1. The secretariat functions referred to in Article 8 will be carried out on an interim basis by the secretariat established by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 45/212 of 21 December 1990, until the completion of the first session of the Conference of the Parties.

2. The head of the interim secretariat referred to in paragraph 1 above will cooperate closely with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to ensure that the Panel can respond to the need for objective scientific and technical advice. Other relevant scientific bodies could also be consulted.

3. The Global Environment Facility of the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Environment Programme and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development shall be the international entity entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism referred to in Article 11 on an interim basis. In this connection, the Global Environment Facility should be appropriately restructured and its membership made universal to enable it to fulfill the requirements of Article 11.

ARTICLE

22

RATIFICATION, ACCEPTANCE, APPROVAL OR ACCESSION

1. The Convention shall be subject to ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by States and by regional economic integration organizations. It shall be open for accession from the day after the date on which the Convention is closed for signature. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

2. Any regional economic integration organization which becomes a Party to the Convention without any of its member States being a Party shall be bound by all the obligations under the Convention. In the case of such organizations, one or more of whose member States is a Party to the Convention, the organization and its member States shall decide on their respective responsibilities for the performance of their obligations under

the Convention. In such cases, the organization and the member States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under the Convention concurrently.

3. In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, regional economic integration organizations shall declare the extent of their competence with respect to the matters governed by the Convention. These organizations shall also inform the Depositary, who shall in turn inform the Parties, of any substantial modification in the extent of their competence.

ARTICLE 23
ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. The Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
2. For each State or regional economic integration organization that ratifies, accepts or approves the Convention or accedes thereto after the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit by such State or regional economic integration organization of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 above, any instrument deposited by a regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those deposited by States members of the organization.

ARTICLE 24
RESERVATIONS

No reservations may be made to the Convention.

ARTICLE

25

WITHDRAWAL

1. At any time after three years from the date on which the Convention has entered into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from the Convention by giving written notification to the Depositary.
 2. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year from the date of receipt by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as may be specified in the notification of withdrawal.
 3. Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also having withdrawn from any protocol to which it is a Party.
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ARTICLE

26

AUTHENTIC TEXTS

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary- General of the United Nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect, have signed this Convention.

DONE at New York this ninth day of May one thousand nine hundred and ninety- two.

ANNEX I AND ANNEX II COUNTRIES

Annex I

- Australia
- Austria
- Belarus*
- Belgium
- Bulgaria*
- Canada
- Czechoslovakia*
- Denmark
- European Economic Community
- Estonia*
- Finland
- France
- Germany
- Greece
- Hungary*
- Iceland
- Ireland
- Italy
- Japan
- Latvia*

- Lithuania*
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- New Zealand
- Norway
- Poland*
- Portugal
- Romania*
- RussianFederation*
- Spain
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- Turkey
- Ukraine*
- United Kingdom or Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- United States of America

*Countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.

Annex II

- Australia
- Austria

- Belgium
- Canada
- Denmark
- European Economic Community
- Finland
- France
- Germany
- Greece
- Iceland
- Ireland
- Italy
- Japan
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- New Zealand
- Norway
- Portugal
- Spain
- Sweden
- Switzerland

- United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- United States of America

Note: Turkey was deleted from Annex II by an amendment that entered into force 28 June 2002, pursuant to decision 26/CP.7 adopted at COP.7.