DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSES AND URBAN POOR

A Comparative Study of Slums of Islamabad and Brasilia

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List of Abbreviations

AGEFIS	*Agência de Fiscalização do Distrito Federal* (Inspection Agency of the Federal District)
ArPDF	*Arquivo Público do Distrito Federal* (Public Archives of Federal District)
AFP	Alliance for Progress
CAF	*Corporación Andina de Fomento* (Development Bank of Latin America)
CDA	Capital Development Authority
CODEPLAN	*Companhia de Planejamento do Distrito Federal* (Planning Company of Federal District)
CODHAB	*Companhia de Desenvolvimento Hatacional do Distrito Federal* (Housing Development Company of the Federal District)
CIAM	*Congres Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne* (International Congress of Modern Architecture)
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
FDA	Federal District Administration
FIA	Federal Investigation Agency
GEB	*Guarda Especial de Brasilia* (Brasilia's Special Guard)
GDF	*Governo do Distrito Federal* (Government of Federal District)
HIID	Harvard Institute for International Development
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
ICT	Islamabad Capital Territory
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MCI	Metropolitan Corporation Islamabad
NAB	National Accountability Bureau
NOVACAP	*Companhia Urbanizadora da Nova Capital do Brasil* (Company for Urbanization of New Capital of Brazil)
SEGETH	*Secretaria de Estado de Desenvolvimento Urbano e Habitação* (State Secretariat for Urban Development and Housing)
SEAC	*Secretaria de Estado de Atendimento À Comunidade* (State Secretariat of Community Services)
SEDRM	*Secretaria de Estado de Desenvolvimento da Região Metropolitana* (State Secretariat for the Development of Metropolitan Region)

SEDUH	*Secretaria de Estado de Desenvolvimento Urbano e Habitação* (Secretariat for Urban Development and Housing)
SEMA	*Secretaria de Estado do Meio Ambiente do Distrito Federal* (State Secretariat for the Environment of Federal District)
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
TERRACAP	*Companhia Imobiliária de Brasília* (Real Estate Company for Brasilia)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

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Abstract

The post-World War II period has been marked with global, political and economic restructuring in which forces of capitalism and modernist planning flourished. International development institutions like the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Alliance for Progress (AFP), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), and Ford Foundation worked synergistically and post-colonial societies like Pakistan and Brazil became celebrated partners of this development regime. The influence of global capitalism is shown in the inevitable urban restructuring and management of Pakistani and Brazilian societies. Islamabad and Brasilia were planned and projected as model cities for the Global South to offer solutions to the urban problems in a hitherto underdeveloped world. The planning and construction of both cities were celebrated both nationally and internationally as the embodiment of development, progress, and growth that is approved by the Global North through its army of international consultants, advisory groups, funding organisations, and scientific experts. This research is an attempt to understand how the urban poor are being treated and represented in such cities where free-market forces and capitalist ideologies are naturalised by celebrating developmentalism and modernist planning. Focusing on Islamabad and Brasilia as the case study, this research is an attempt to understand how the urban poor are being represented in the development discourse of the Capital Development Authority (CDA) and Federal District Authority (FDA). Using labelling theory as the theoretical framework for the study, this research finds that the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia are represented through various labels like poor, encroachers, invaders, environmental threat, favelados, slum dwellers, and mafia. Based on archives, in-depth interviews, and ethnography, this research argues that this form of representation of the urban poor establishes them as a socially deviant group that is subjected to control, surveillance and segregation from the rest of society. Using Critical Discourse Analysis as a methodological toolbox, this research shows that the dominance of discourse reflects power hierarchies in society. The purpose of this research is to dislocate and unsettle the legitimised hegemonic discourses to provide a tool against structural exploitation and domination. In this way, this research attempts to engender various sets of possibilities to read texts in their socio-political contexts. It is in this way that the public policy discourse can be judged, criticised, and democratised to make societies more inclusive.

Kurzfassung

Die Nachkriegszeit ist gekennzeichnet durch globale, politische und ökonomische Umstrukturierungen, in denen der Kapitalismus und die modernistische Stadtplanung treibende Kräfte darstellen. Postkoloniale Gesellschaften wie Brasilien und Pakistan wurden zelebrierte Partner der gemeinsamen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit von internationalen Organisationen wie den Vereinten Nationen (UN), dem Internationalen Währungsfonds (IMF), der Allianz für den Fortschritt (AFP), der Wirtschaftskommission für Lateinamerika und die Karibik (ECLAC) und der Ford-Stiftung. Der Einfluss des globalen Kapitalismus wird unausweichlich im Stadtumbau und in der Organisation der pakistanischen und brasilianischen Gesellschaften sichtbar. Sowohl Islamabad als auch Brasilia wurden als Modellstädte für den globalen Süden geplant, um die urbanen Probleme in einem Entwicklungskontext zu lösen. Die Planung und der Bau beider Städte wurde national und international als Inbegriff für Entwicklung, Fortschritt und Wachstum gefeiert, die von dem globalen Norden, respektive internationalen Beratungsunternehmen, Fördermittelgebern und wissenschaftlichen Experten, allgemein befürwortet wurden. Vor dem Hintergrund der Naturalisierung der Kräfte des freien Marktes und kapitalistischen Ideologien durch Übernahme von Wirtschaftstheorien wie dem Developmentalismus und der Anwendung modernistischer Planungsprinzipien in diesen Städten, zielt die vorliegende Forschungsarbeit darauf, ein Verständnis der Darstellung und Behandlung der armen Bevölkerung (the urban poor) zu erlangen. Diese Fallstudie versucht, zu verstehen, wie die urban poor in Islamabad und Brasilia im Entwicklungsdiskurs der Stadtentwicklungsbehörden (Capital Development Authority, CDA) und der Hauptstadtdistriktbehörden (Federal District Authority, FDA) dargestellt werden. Als theoretischer Rahmen dieser Studie wird der Labelling-Ansatz (Etikettierungsansatz, labelling theory) genutzt. Es zeigt sich, dass die urban poor in Islamabad und Brasilia durch verschiedene Labels dargestellt werden, z.B. als Arme, Eindringlinge (encroachers), Invasoren, Umweltbedrohung, Favelados, Slumbewohner, Mafia. Anhand von Archivdaten, Tiefeninterviews und ethnografischen Methoden kommt diese Studie zu dem Ergebnis, dass diese Darstellungsform der urban poor sie als eine sozial abweichende Gruppe erscheinen lässt, die sich einer Kontrolle, Überwachung und Segregation von der restlichen Gesellschaft unterwerfen muss. Weiterhin zeigen die Ergebnisse der kritischen Diskursanalyse, dass die Dominanz dieses Diskurses Machthierarchien in der Gesellschaft widerspiegelt. Der Zweck dieser Forschung ist es, an den legitimierten hegemonialen Diskursen zu rütteln und diese aufzuweichen, um letztlich struktureller Ausbeutung und Herrschaft entgegenzuwirken. So

versucht diese Dissertation, Möglichkeiten bereitzustellen, um Texte in ihren sozio-politischen Kontexten zu lesen. Auf diese Weise kann der öffentliche politische Diskurs besser beurteilt, kritisiert und demokratisiert werden, mit dem übergeordneten Ziel, inklusive Gesellschaften zu erreichen.

Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION

> (1) ISLAMABAD: A safe haven for kidnappers, terrorists and other criminals, slums in the federal capital have become a nuisance for law enforcement agencies and the city administration. Around 98,000 people are illegally living in 24 slums of the federal capital, said an official in the Ministry of Interior. Illegal residents also include foreigners, including some with criminal records and whose activities are being closely monitored by law enforcement agencies, said the official (*The Express Tribune*, 3 March 2014).

> (2) BRASILIA: A lot of things happen here [in slums]. A lot of projects, like music schools, memory initiatives, recycling initiatives, initiatives for books [collection], a lot of visible things but it does not matter. We are not presented for our works. What we are presented through is 'violence'. It is the same as 'a bad name is worse than a bad deed' (Aidaba, a resident of slum, interview, 28 August 2018).

Excerpt 1 is from a leading daily newspaper, *The Express Tribune*, where the news was published under the heading "Capital's slums: A nuisance for officials, a haven for terrorists" with the sub-heading "98,000 illegal residents live in katchi abadis [slums], some with links to terrorist organisations". Citing official sources, the language used in the news reflects how the urban poor of Islamabad are perceived and presented by both officials and other social actors. Almost three years after the newspaper article and from a different part of the world, Brasilia, Aidaba[1] (excerpt 2) stated that those perceptions and presentations remained part of the problem facing her community in Brasilia.

Even a cursory reading of both the excerpts shows that the language is more than a tool of communication. It is a social action. It constructs and deconstructs; it shapes and reshapes; it is how we make sense of the world and how people make sense of other people. Excerpt 1 reflects the relationship between slums, the urban poor, and the urban administrative authorities concerned with the planning and development of Islamabad and Brasilia since the inception of the cities in the 1960s. It will not be an oversimplification, as this research finds,

[1] Pseudonyms are used to protect the identity of the interviewees.

to see excerpt 2 as representative of Brasilia's slums and excerpt 1 representative of the view held by Islamabad's development authorities. This reflects broader political economic structures and the life of the urban poor vis-à-vis development discourse that has been naturalised for the Global South as a 'road to redemption' from the vices of underdevelopment, disorder, chaos, and economic stagnation.

Developmentalism infused with the scientific rationality of modernism has been rendered a global process of the post-World War II period Radice, 2011). In the wake of decolonisation, the so-called third world and a new task called development has emerged. Embedded in Cold War dynamics, development, as a discourse and political project, was focused on combating communism by proposing universal values like industrialisation, urbanisation, modern state structures, capitalism, and liberal democracy. The revolutionised role of capitalism coupled with the drive for development has assumed a dominant form in the restructuring of social, political, and economic spheres of countries, which divides the globe into "developed and underdeveloped spheres" (Esteva, 2010, p. 2).

State-led economic growth and development inspired by the experiences of the Global North, processes of urbanisation and urban development began to take a wide currency throughout the Global South. This development model and its trajectories were exported to the so-called underdeveloped world through the unparalleled flow of planners, technocrats, scientists, and advisers working with international institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Harvard Advisory Group (later renamed the Harvard Institute for International Development – HIID), Ford Foundation, Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean (ECLAC), Alliance for Progress (AFP), and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). These institutions were working like a web transmitting both technical, economical and human resources to restructure the global political economic landscape.

Countries of the Global South were very strategic in their interaction with the development drive aiming to restructure and reshape respective societies. The relationship, as Ahiwa Ong (2007) argues, was very strategic and had political implications. Many countries in the Global South were open to Rostow's (1960) stages of economic growth and development but remained aloof to democratic norms, political inclusion, and democratisation of the policies. The most dominant influence of the development discourse was urbanisation and urban development believing cities as engines of growth.

Being celebrated partners and recipients of global developmentalism, the Pakistani and the Brazilian states collaborated with the above-mentioned international institutions (see, Almandoz, 2016 for Brazil; and Daechsel, 2012, 2015 for Pakistan). Reforms were introduced in almost every sector of Pakistani society – from agriculture to macroeconomic structures, and from weather radar systems to urban policies. It is not surprising that both Islamabad and Brasilia were rendered as symbols of modernity, development, economic prosperity, and postcolonial identity markers of Pakistan and Brazil respectively.

Brasilia is planned along the lines of modernist urban development outlined by the International Congress of Modern Architecture/*Congres Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne* (CIAM) presented by a French-Swiss architect Le Corbusier (1887–1965) under the title of the *Athens Charter* ([1943]1973). The CIAM model intends to transcend class boundaries while aspiring egalitarianism and principles of equality in urban planning. It is not organic to the Global South as CIAM was an outcome of European avant-garde movements contesting the dominance of capitalism and social stratification.

Lucio Costa (1902–1998) and Oscar Niemeyer (1902–2012) were the chief architects and planners of Brasilia; both hailed from Brazil and were considered as the fathers of modernism in the country. However, their modernism and urban development ideals were strongly influenced by Le Corbusier whose book, *Athens Charter,* was called a "sacred book of architecture" by Lucio Costa (Holston, 1989, p. 36). Both architects had worked alongside Le Corbusier on the United Nations (UN) Secretariat Building before their later work on Brasilia. Constructing a modernist Brasilia in the hinterland was not an ordinary urban project. Rather, its planning, rationality, and objectives were infused with that of developmentalism, i.e. a step towards modernity and development that is in line with the Global North. The impetus for development was so strong that the city was constructed in the record time of about three years. Started in 1957, Brasilia was inaugurated on 21st April 1960 – the same year as when a Greek modernist architect Constantinos A. Doxiadis (1913–1975) was hired by the Pakistani state to prepare a master plan of Islamabad.

Like Costa and Niemeyer, Doxiadis was also known for his modernist inclinations and unshaking belief in the power of architecture and development as the only way to ensure progress in the Global South. Doxiadis' Athens based firm Doxiadis Associates*,* was operating in more than 20 countries including Egypt, Ghana, United States, Brazil, and the Middle East

(Daechsel, 2015). Doxiadis' interaction with the Pakistani state did not start with the planning of Islamabad. Earlier, he had been advising the Pakistani state as a member of the Harvard Advisory Group which played a key role in (re)shaping Pakistan's economy. Doxiadis also served as an architect and designed the then largest low-income housing scheme Korangi in Karachi after the massive slum clearance programme of the then President General Ayub khan (1958–1969) (Daechsel, 2012, 2015).

In both cases, the construction of new capital cities in hinterlands were not ordinary urban projects. Both Islamabad and Brasilia were framed and presented as a 'take-off' to prosperity, economic growth, modernity, and development. In each case, the construction of the capitals was led by both international and domestic political concerns in which modernity, global ambitions of capitalism, transformation, and restructuring of the societies through master plans, scientific rationality, and architecture were given prime importance and were regarded as a natural way of progressing and developing (for Brasilia, see Almandoz, 2016; Holston, 1989, 2009; for Islamabad, see Daechsel, 2015).

Contrary to the general understanding of capital cities as cities for bureaucracy, public offices, and politicians, it is important to highlight that Brasilia and Islamabad are more than this. These cities are home to people hailing from all socio-economic groups and political status; from students to professionals, political leaders to voters, high-ranking bureaucracy to refuse collectors and sanitary workers. They are not only national monuments and development symbols, they are also spaces of diversity, heterogeneity, urban experiences, struggle, appropriations, collaborations, and contestations. It would be wiser to see these cities as assemblages and embedded networks owing to their master plans and strict zoning regulations, with hierarchised, structured, and controlled urban spaces.

Cities are not confined to their built environments. It is not that the planning, material resources, and spatial organisation of cities are a mere technocratic process. The spatial organisation of the cities is not a separate product from the sociological processes. Rather, cities are sociological processes inscribed spatially as rightly remarked by assemblage authors (see, among others, McFarlane, 2011, 2011a; Farías & Bender, 2010; Amin, 2007). Islamabad and Brasilia, in this research, are understood as structured and hierarchised spaces. This notion of urbanism is inspired by scholars like Harvey (2008, 2006, 1985), Lefebvre (1991), and Scott (2006, 1998). According to them, urban spaces are contested terrains and represent the

spatial inscription of socio-economic realities. Therefore, urban space is seen as both the product and processes shaping social relations and actions. It is because of this very nature of urbanism that cities need administrative machinery to manage and govern urban space.

1.1 Urban Development of Islamabad and Brasilia: An Offshoot of International Developmentalism

Following the logic of development and its discourse baggage this research argues that urban municipalities often regulate power relations and socio-economic inequalities in the name of 'development'. Like development on a global scale, urban development by the local state authorities can be regarded as a set of strategies to establish and sustain certain power relations in society. Since power is inherently spatial and geographical, therefore, the development can be described as a form of control and domination over space. Linking a capitalist state to the reproduction of a capitalist mode of production, Chouinard (1989, pp. 390–391) argues that state authorities, using a set of legal codes and practices for the protection of private property, regulate "class conflicts and competition" thereby making urban space a "contested terrain" where people without capital are reduced to bureaucratic identities like the poor, slum dwellers, working class, labourers, etc. The development logics and discourse of governing authorities are translated into urban planning and urban development by respective municipalities and urban development agencies (Banerjee-Guha, 2010). This research is focusing on two such planning and development authorities, i.e. the Capital Development Authority (CDA) of Islamabad, Pakistan, and the Federal District Administration (FDA) of Brasilia, Brazil.

The CDA, a bureaucratic and technocratic institution, came into being with an ordinance in 1960. As a statutory body, the CDA consists of bureaucrats and technical experts with the sole purpose of the construction and development of Islamabad (CDA Ordinance, 1960). The CDA was to both develop and govern Islamabad with cabinet oversight. The CDA Ordinance of 1960 outlines the power of the CDA in which the institution is given autonomous status for making land use policies, zoning regulations, historical preservation and the beautification of Islamabad. Along with core urban functions, the authority has also jurisdiction over industrial development, road construction, telecommunications, railways, water streams, and other natural resources inside the capital territory (CDA Ordinance, 1960, pp. 15–17).

In 2013, the Local Government Act was introduced in the National Assembly (lower house of the parliament) to introduce a local government system in Islamabad. In this system, the Mayor of Islamabad will lead the Metropolitan Corporation Islamabad (MCI). This did not subsume CDA into the MCI. Rather, they are enacted to work in their jurisdiction along with the Islamabad Capital Territory Administration (ICT Administration) which directly deals with the day to day affairs of the administration. All of the institutions, the CDA, the MCI, and the ICT Administration work in close coordination but in their specific jurisdiction and with a given mandate. For example, issues related to municipal infrastructure and services largely fall under the MCI. The MCI is responsible for street lighting, slaughterhouses, improvement of municipal infrastructure, sanitation, sewage treatment and disposal, maintenance of art galleries and museums, and collection of taxes and penalties. The ICT Administration is responsible for the maintenance of law and order, excise and taxation, labour laws, and food quality.

Everything related to land use planning, the development of Islamabad, housing sectors, development of roads and other infrastructure, and the master planning of Islamabad come under the domain of the CDA. Before 2013, the CDA also had municipal powers, which makes the authority the most important actor in the urban space of Islamabad. The transition of municipal powers from the CDA to MCI is not yet completed, as many interviewees remarked. There is still considerable confusion within these institutions about the exact jurisdiction and transfer of the necessary data to the respective offices. To date, the CDA is more organised, infrastructurally developed, and administratively well equipped to carry out the necessary functions, and has enough human resource to materialise its plans. The CDA has seven wings and directorates of which the Estate Wing, Engineering Wing, Planning and Design Wing, and Environment Wing are the most important ones and directly relevant to this study. It is these wings and directorates that make the CDA more important for this case as compared to the ICT Administration and the MCI.

Out of a total of 906.5 square kilometres of the metropolitan area of Islamabad, 220.2 square kilometres form the urban area where more than half of the population of Islamabad lives. According to the 2017 census, the total population of the Islamabad district is around two million, out of which more than one million people reside in Islamabad urban areas (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2018). Since Islamabad is a planned city, therefore, the CDA, because of its power vis-à-vis master planning and the sectoral development of Islamabad, remains the

most important institution for this research. Also, the CDA has a dedicated office called the Katchi Abadi Cell within its Planning Wing to regulate and plan for the urban slums of Islamabad.

Despite the larger share of the data for this research originating from the CDA, data was also collected from the MCI and the ICT Administration. As such, the arguments and findings of this research (as will be shown in the rest of the dissertation) are representative of the development discourses of the urban administrative authorities of Islamabad vis-à-vis the urban poor and slums of the city.

Like Islamabad, the journey of planning and development of Brasilia begins with a bureaucratic and technocratic institution called Companhia Urbanizadora Da Nova Capital Do Brasil (NOVACAP – Urbanisation Company of the New Capital of Brazil). NOVACAP was created by the executive order of the then President of Brazil, Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–1961). Law No. 2874 of September 19, 1956, establishes NOVACAP with the sole purpose of the construction and management of the new capital of Brazil. Even after the completion of Brasilia, NOVACAP continues to exist as a public company with 48% shares of the Federal Government of Brazil and 52% shares of the Federal District Government of Brasilia. To date, NOVACAP is one of the most important organs of the FDA working in close coordination with the State Secretariat of Infrastructure and Public Services.

Unlike Islamabad, Brasilia's administrative structure is much more centralised as the Federal District Government of Brasilia has powers of both municipality and the state according to the constitution of the country. The executive power of the Federal District belonged to the mayor's office until 1969. Later on, the position was transformed into a governor who would be the chief executive of the Federal District. Along with a representative part of the administration, Brasilia has a vast range of technocratic and bureaucratic organisations, secretariats, and regional administrations to develop and govern a total of 5,802 square kilometres with more than four million people. More than 90% of the population of Brasilia lives in urban areas of the Federal District of Brasilia. Most of the slums are located here, providing housing for the urban poor of Brasilia.

Given the scale of planning and development, the whole of the federal territory of Brasilia is being governed by a number of different departments with different expertise and mandates.

Nevertheless, their purpose is the development of Brasilia and its governance to ensure a smooth and happy urban experience as a model for the rest of the world – echoing the development logics of Brasilia, i.e. a model of development for the rest of Latin America. All of the different departments, institutions, and organisations in this research, are referred to as the Federal District Administration (FDA).

The Federal District of Brasilia is divided into 32 administrative units called Administrações Regionais (Regional Administrations). Regional Administrations are more like administrative units working under the government of the Federal District without autonomy. Along with them, the Federal District of Brasilia has various secretariats, departments, agencies, and institutions with relative autonomy in their respective fields but are strongly interdependent. For example, the Secretaria de Estado de Atendimento À Comunidade (SEAC – State Secretariat of Community Services) provides public services to the inhabitants of Brasilia. The Departments of Military and Civil police are endowed with responsibility for maintaining law and order in the federal capital. The Secretaria de Estado de Desenvolvimento da Região Metropolitana (SEDRM – State Secretariat for the Development of Metropolitan Region) is responsible for the overall planning and development of the region. The Secretaria de Estado de Desenvolvimento Urbano e Habitação (SEDUH – Secretariat for Urban Development and Housing), previously known as Secretaria de Estado de Gestão do Território e Habitação (SEGETH – Secretariat for the Territorial Development and Housing) is responsible for the urban development of Brasilia as well as dealing with housing problems and opportunities. The Secretaria de Estado do Meio Ambiente do Distrito Federal (SEMA – State Secretariate for the Environment of Federal District) responds to environmental questions related to the planning and development of Brasilia.

Along with many other secretariats, some autonomous institutions are directly related to this research. Along with NOVACAP, there is another important institution called Companhia Imobiliária de Brasilia (TERRACAP – Real Estate Company of Brasilia), which is regarded as the owner of the land of Brasilia. Created in 1972, TERRACAP is a public real estate company of the government of Brasilia which is in charge of the real estate related functions of Brasilia. TERRACAP is the authority concerned with the acquisition, selling, development, and administration of the land in Brasilia. Their role is more like a development agency aiming to support and promote the economic and social development of Brasilia via different programmes related to real estate. TERRACAP deals with land that is to be developed for

middle- or higher-income groups. For low-income groups, the real estate development and land management largely fall under the Companhia de Desenvolvimento Habitacional do Distrito Federal (CODHAB – Housing Development Company of Federal District). CODHAB is linked to SEDUH and is mandated to provide projects for low-income housing and to ensure the well-being of economically deprived communities of the Federal District of Brasilia. The regularisation of slums, provision of basic facilities, development of housing policies for the urban poor, and reporting on illegal slum development fall under the domain of the CODHAB.

Unlike Islamabad, Brasilia has a dedicated institution to conduct research on a variety of aspects of urban development of Brasilia, thus aiding the planning and development process of the capital. Companhia de Planejamento do Distrito Federal (CODEPLAN – Planning Company of the Federal District) is mandated to produce and disseminate information and studies on different aspects of urban development. For example, CODEPLAN engages with studies related to social development, economic policies, urban and regional planning, environmental impacts, and therefore, critically evaluates public policies for the government of Brasilia. The role is advisory, and CODEPLAN works in close collaboration with every department and secretariat of the government of Brasilia.

Another very important organ of the government directly relevant to this research is called Secretaria de Estado de Proteção da Ordem Urbanística do Distrito Federal (DF-Legal – State Secretariat for the Protection of the Urban Order of the Federal District). DF-Legal, established in 2019, has taken over the Agência de Fiscalização do Distrito Federal (AGEFIS – Federal Inspection Agency). This agency has a mandate to bulldoze illegal housing or any illegal construction. During the time of the fieldwork in 2018, AGEFIS worked independently, therefore, interviews were conducted with AGEFIS officials. Now, with Law No. 6302 of May 16, 2019, AGEFIS has been dissolved into DF-Legal with all the powers, mandates, and responsibilities (Governo do Distrito Federal, 2020). This, however, does not change the character of the administration vis-à-vis slums and the urban poor of Brasilia. All the powers of AGEFIS, its officials and resources are now assets of the DF-Legal with the same mandate, i.e. protection of public spaces, operations against encroachments on public land, and combating irregular housing and occupation of public land by slum dwellers and others.

All of the secretariats, agencies, companies, and other institutions are collectively represented as the FDA in this research. All of the data collected for this research is from different actors and institutions directly dealing with urban policies, urban planning, and urban development vis-à-vis the urban poor. The arguments and findings of this research (as will be shown in the rest of the dissertation) are representative of the development discourses of the urban administrative authorities of Brasilia vis-à-vis the urban poor and slums of the city.

1.2 Operationalisation of the Key Concepts

Following constructivism as an epistemological foundation for this research, it is perhaps important to reflect on some of the key terms that will be used extensively throughout the text. This research revolves around three important concepts simplified as development, slums, and the urban poor.

1.2.1 Slums and the Urban Poor

Slums and the urban poor are usually used interchangeably in many academic and policy texts. The way both 'slums' and the 'urban poor' are used to identify a socio-economic group in any urban settlement shows that they are more like labels, i.e. categories and convenient images to identify and essentialise a certain social group and physical environment that has been associated with them (see chapter 2 for detailed discussion on labels and their implications in society). The purpose of labels is to create identities, socially homogenous groups, and individualisations to identify gaps and to intervene in the name of development, progress, planning, or governance (Silver, 2010; Eyben, 2007).

Before going any further with slums (largely projected as an urban phenomenon) and the urban poor, it is of the utmost importance to discuss poverty, its meanings, and associated assumptions. Normally, poverty is defined and understood as a lack of economic resources to meet fundamental human needs like food, shelter, clothing etc. Not having enough to consume (be it food or clothing) is certainly a misrepresentation of the plight and experiences of the so-called poor. Rahnema (2010, p. 174) discredited the concept of poverty (as it is generally referred to as an economic condition) as "a myth, a construct and the intervention of particular civilization" to establish scientific truths of global developmentalism. At the core of this construct is the neo-liberal understanding of deprivation, which is always defined through

economic indicators. For example, UN agencies define poverty as a denial of choices like food, clothing, land, and other resources. All of the problems are then quantified through economic quantifiers. For example, an income of less than USD 1.90 per day is regarded as a condition of extreme poverty or deep poverty because, with this income, a person cannot fulfil his/her basic needs of food, water, sanitation, shelter, and education (UN, 2021). Labelling someone as poor is like blanketing their experiences that are difficult to quantify in economic language, for example, countless types of vulnerabilities, deprivations, stigmatisation, etc. Esteva (2010) argues that labels like poverty, poor, deprived, etc. are economically quantified to give poverty universal meanings and scientific rationality. In a similar way the urban poor have been predominantly identified with slums, informal settlements, and squatter settlements (among others, see for example the works of Liu, Din, & Jiang, 2020; Branco & Miranda, 2018; Hüning, 2015; Hackenbroch, 2013; Baena, 2011; Watson, 2009). This homogenisation and oversimplification of the urban poor are partially contested in this research.

This research argues that not every slum dweller falls into the category of the urban poor nor can every poor person in urban areas be categorised as a slum dweller. The fieldwork for this research shows that not every resident of slums is necessarily poor (economically) and not all those who are economically poor live in slums. In the case of the slums of Islamabad and Brasilia (locally called katchi abadis and favelas respectively), many residents of the slums are financially better off and own certain resources or sets of resources to make money, for example, by renting out their homes or constructing new homes in other slum settlements. Similarly, many people are economically poor but unable to live in slums owing to their limited resources or mobility-related challenges. They live in homeless circumstances, or in temporary huts and shacks. Therefore, the use of slums and the urban poor in this research refers to a group of people who are vulnerable to the demolition drives of their respective development agencies, state structures, and socio-economically segregated by the state and society alike. Their vulnerability, as this research shows, stems from the denial of their housing rights since the planning of Islamabad and Brasilia (chapters 5 and 6). Also, the majority of the people are living in the respective cities since the early days of construction and largely employed by informal economic sectors.

The social stigma that is attached to them and the socio-economic vulnerability defines slums and the urban poor in this research (chapter 7). This understanding of the urban poor and their embodiment through slum settlements is derived from the data collected for this research. It

is equally important to mention that the use of the word slum is not equivalent to the local name for these settlements. However, to avoid confusion, the word slum is used for both katchi abadis and favelas unless in cases where exact meanings are to highlighted to enrich discussion and analysis. Slums, for example, are roughly described as impoverished neighbourhoods with no or few civic facilities for the residents. Slums can be legal, i.e. the people living in them might have security of tenancy, legal claims to their homes, or administrative support that may not be available to, for example, informal settlements or squatter settlements. This, however, is not the case with katchi abadis or favelas. Despite the differences in legal status, availability of public services, or legal claims, they all are represented under a single label, that is, katchi abadis in Islamabad, and favelas in Brasilia.

It is also important to mention that the conceptualisation of slums and the urban poor as interchangeable entities is not derived from the existing literature. The interchangeable use of slums and the urban poor has been found consistently in the archives of the 1960s, policy documents of later periods, as well as interviews conducted in 2018 (Brasilia) and 2019 (Islamabad).

The status of the urban poor and slums as the Other of Islamabad and Brasilia has not been changed since the construction of the cities. Throughout their stay in Islamabad and Brasilia, the urban poor have to accept the conditional programmes of the respective development authorities to ensure their stay and access to the opportunities offered by the cities. They have to internalise and sometimes reproduce the power hierarchies and their segregation as a deviant group to continue their living in Islamabad and Brasilia (chapter 6 and 7).

1.2.2 Development

Islamabad and Brasilia are rendered as symbols of development and progress by the respective state authorities. After the completion of the construction, both cities were celebrated as a model of modern development for the Global South (Chapter 4). The urban planning and development model embodied through Islamabad and Brasilia is represented as the beginning of the age of universal and scientific development free from any political biases and political implications. Disregarding the socio-political and economic diversities of societies like Pakistan and Brazil, development was projected as a ‘one size fits all’ modality of governance, growth, and progress. Development appears to be a new way of making sense of the world. It

was a new order laden with scientific rationality and universal values. Someone like Foucault (2005) would have called it a discourse, a label, given the objectives, desires, and results to be achieved by development (for a detailed discussion, see chapter 4).

Development means different things to different people and it strongly depends on who is talking about what, when, where, and why. Conceptually, development lacks any fixed meanings yet it encompasses every sphere of life: agriculture, industry, politics, economy, constitution, poverty, urban planning, democracy etc. What can be found common in all of its connotations is that the development is future centric. It conveys an image of a better tomorrow. The widespread use of the label 'development' to justify almost all kinds of interventions on all levels and in every sphere of life makes it something more than a better tomorrow (Esteva, 2010).

Development, as we know it today, begins with the famous speech of the US President Henry Truman in 1949 who was believed to be the pioneer of the internationalisation of development both as a discourse and as a label (chapter 4). Since then, the concept of development has been given a new lease of life every decade: we have development as a basic frame of reference since the 1960s, i.e. the UN's Development Decade (1960–1970) to the 2015's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to have a better future for all. Camouflaging the political landscape and political ambitions intrinsically linked to the development discourse, the label development creates a convenient image and unquestioned assumptions that demand no less than compliance. It projects a social order based on scientific rationality and universal values while claiming an apolitical character of its own. This understanding of development is strongly criticised by post-development scholars like Ferguson (2006) and Ziai (2013) (see chapter 4).

In this research, development is taken as a discursive construct. In the words of Foucault (1972, pp. 21–22) development as a discourse allows us "to group a succession of dispersed events, to link them to one and the same organizing principle, to subject them to the exemplary power of life" so that the discovery of a "principle of coherence" and "future unity" can be made possible. Therefore, development is understood as a project and a political manoeuvre, disguised as scientific rationality and universal values, to control, regulate, and maintain the existing socio-economic hierarchies as well as unequal social relations when it comes to the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia.

1.3 Research Puzzle and Research Questions

Despite the distinct histories of the master plans and the different political and ideological convictions of the planners, both Islamabad and Brasilia symbolise the future of urban development and the power of scientific values. Despite the capitalist orientation of Doxiadis and the communist inclinations of Costa and Niemeyer, both master plans were regarded as the embodiment of modernist urban planning, developmentalism, and a solution to the urban problems of the Global South.

One of the key principles of developmentalism and architectural modernism is the semi-divine role of the planner, expert knowledge, and scientific values. For Islamabad and Brasilia it is not an old story. At least in 2019, the administration of both Brasilia and Islamabad still believed that scientific planning was the only solution to urban problems. One of the glaring problems was the rise of slums, socio-economic segregation of the urban poor, and spatial segregation of impoverished social groups. Despite the establishment of local governments and democratically elected leadership, major powers regarding urban planning and development lie with bureaucratic and technocratic institutions like the CDA and NOVACAP, TERRACAP, CODHAB, CODEPLAN, etc.

This makes an interesting case to look into both the technocratic-cum-bureaucratic and representative character of development in two different cities existing across the seas yet connected through the imagery of development. The rise of slums and their growth ever since the construction of Islamabad and Brasilia offers an opportunity to see the impact of development there and the kind of development discourses that exist vis-à-vis the urban poor. The existence and living conditions of the urban poor in the planned, model, and scientifically designed cities – supposed to be the solution to the urban problems of the Global South – raises several questions that serve as the motivation for this research: why is it so? Is something wrong with the planning? Is that how the cities have been planned to ensure poverty in secluded and segregated spaces? Is it the socio-economic and political ideologies that govern the master planning of the cities? Or, is it the patronisation of socio-economic inequalities and their regulation camouflaged in the development discourse under its rubric of scientific rationality, capitalist modernism, and universalisation of market economy?

It is perhaps impossible to respond to all of the questions above. Nevertheless, having labelling theory (chapter 2) and Critical Discourse Analysis (chapter 3) as an analytical and methodological framework, this research aims to touch upon most of them by focusing on the representations of the urban poor in the development discourse of Islamabad and Brasilia. It discursively analyses the development processes and rationales shaping the fate of urban poor concerning where they live and the way they are labelled in development policy discourses. The guiding questions for this research are: How are the urban poor represented and labelled in the development discourse of the urban administrations of Islamabad and Brasilia? How do development discourses, labels, and rationales shape the fate of the urban poor in relation to where they live, and their access to social and physical resources?

1.4 Chapterisation

To formulate a structured response to the research questions, this research is divided into a total of eight chapters. This chapter, that is, chapter 1, starts with two excerpts outlining the focus of the research, i.e. representations of the urban poor and slums and the implications of labelling them essentially a socially deviant group in the modernist, scientifically designed, and planned cities of Islamabad and Brasilia. Afterwards, this chapter introduces the broader context of the developmentalism in which both Islamabad and Brasilia were conceived and developed as model cities. This chapter also outlines the administrative structures and institutions of Islamabad and Brasilia which are dealing with the slums and the urban poor of the cities. It then presents guiding research questions to be answered with the help of the labelling theory and Critical Discourse Analysis approach in the remaining dissertation.

Chapter 2 discusses in detail the epistemological and theoretical foundations of the study. Given the complexity of studying urbanism, especially from different perspectives developed in the traditions of modernism and postmodernism, this chapter first outlines theoretical insights based on the experiences of the Global South by scholars like Roy (among others, 2011, 2009, 2005), Yiftachel (2015, 2009), Holston (2008), Miraftab (2009), Oliveira (1997), Amin (2007), and McFarlane (2011, 2011a) and their limitations vis-à-vis the case of Islamabad and Brasilia. After problematising the concept of space with the help of insights offered by Harvey (2008, 2006, 1985), Lefebvre (1991), Brenner, Madden, & Wachsmuth (2011), and Zieleniec (2007), this chapter presents labelling theory – based on social constructivism – as a theoretical framework of the study while outlining the concept of a label,

the process of labelling, the relationship between labellers and labelled, and the relevance of labelling theory for the study of the relationship of urban development authorities and the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia.

Chapter 3 offers a detailed discussion on the methodology, analytical tools and framework for this research. It also presents the methods of data collection, the corpus of the study, as well as establishes the discourse territory that informs the later empirical and analytical discussions. This chapter starts with outlining the relationship of discourse (as a theory and a method), symbolic interactionism and social constructivism. After providing a brief overview of Foucauldian discourse based on the writings of Michel Foucault (among others, 2005, 1977, 1972), this chapter establishes urbanism as a discursive construct where both discursive and non-discursive elements combine to construct and stabilise broader symbolic order. Urbanism is seen as a dialectical interplay between actors producing statements, structurations and socio-historical meanings. Afterwards, this chapter outlines Critical Discourse Analysis as a methodological framework and a set of analytical tools for this study. Unlike Foucauldian discourse, Critical Discourse Analysis highlights the relationship between discursive (semiotic) and non-discursive (non-semiotic) elements in which language is seen as social action. After discussing various approaches to Critical Discourse Analysis (for example, see, Dijk, 2010, 1997; Wodak, 2001; Leeuwen, 2008, 2007, 1995), this chapter explains Critical Discourse Analysis discussed by Fairclough (among others, 2013, 2003, 1995) – known as the Dialectical Relational Approach – as the primary set of analytical tools. Details regarding data collection through archival research, ethnography, and interviews are an important part of this chapter. Before concluding, this chapter discusses in detail the questions related to the ethics, language, and positionality of the researcher.

Chapter 4 marks the setting of the stage for empirical and analytical discussions and findings. It discusses international developmentalism as the context in which Islamabad and Brasilia were planned and constructed as model cities. This chapter is divided into two major sections. First, it discusses in detail the concept of development, its historical roots and its socio-economic and political baggage in the post-World War II world and the role and operations of international institutions like the UN, ECLAC, AFP, and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The second part of the chapter discusses the interaction of Brazil and Pakistan with international developmentalism through the above-mentioned institutions, which ultimately led to the creation of Islamabad and Brasilia. Based on the archival data, this

chapter concludes that Islamabad and Brasilia were projected and celebrated as markers of modernist urban planning, urban development, and urbanisation – key markers of developmentalism and its discourses.

Chapter 5 discusses the spirit with which Islamabad and Brasilia were envisioned and planned. While critically evaluating the assumptions and assumed neutrality of scientific planning and developmentalism, this chapter discusses the master plans of both cities to see how the urban spaces of Islamabad and Brasilia are planned to reify existing class boundaries and to reproduce socio-economic hierarchies under the guise of rationality and scientific development. Based on the planning documents and archives from the CDA Library, Iqbal Hall, Islamabad and the Arquivo Público do Distrito Federal (ArPDF – Public Archives of the Federal District), this chapter concludes that the developmental state, by naturalising capitalism and the capitalist mode of production, reproduces socio-political and economic inequalities by regulating urban spaces. This chapter finds that the construction of homogenous neighbourhoods and socio-spatial segregation of different socio-economic groups in Islamabad and Brasilia are the logical outcomes of capitalist and scientific developmentalism. This chapter also shows that the institutional character of a developmental state plays an important part in patronising the social inequalities as well as in the regulation of class conflicts in the urban spaces of Islamabad and Brasilia.

Chapter 6 presents the rise of slums and socio-spatial segregation of the urban poor in both cities. Based on extensive studies of planning and policy documents, oral history, and interviews, chapter 6 argues that slums as unplanned settlements were planned informally by the state officials and institutions. As the urban poor contributed little to the economy of the newly planned cities of Islamabad and Brasilia they were deliberately ignored by the planning authorities. Slums are not unplanned, rather, they are planned to be unplanned. Chapter 6 concludes that slums and the urban poor are planned and represented as categories of underdevelopment, i.e. settlements of disorder, threat, and social stigma and have always been informally patronised by the state institutions and officials.

Chapter 7 offers more nuanced findings regarding the development discourses of the urban development authorities vis-à-vis the urban poor and slums. Based on semi-structured qualitative interviews from a wide range of officials (low- to high-level bureaucrats, technocrats, consultants, and planning professionals) and ethnography, this chapter discusses

the forms of representation of the urban poor through various labels (like encroachers, invaders, criminals, favelados, mafia, etc.) and discursive strategies (like reference, nomination, metaphorisation, naturalisation, essentionalisation, stigmatisation, etc.). The purpose, as this chapters outlines, is to stigmatise, essentialise, and construct the urban poor as a socially deviant group – the Other – and the embodiment of underdevelopment. These particular forms of representation are not neutral or policy choices but reflect the politics involved. Representing the urban poor through categories of underdevelopment and social deviance implies a set of regulations and surveillance for their physical as well as social spaces. This chapter concludes that the labelling of the urban poor and their discursive representations legitimises the difference; in this way the discrimination, segregation, exclusion, and socio-economic inequalities can be naturalised. These interventions are often disguised as development.

Based on the findings and discussions extended over seven chapters, chapter 8 offers concluding remarks in which research questions are revisited to present the final remarks of the research. Chapter 8 concludes not only the journey of the research but also offers insights on the contributions of the thesis for theoretical, methodological, and empirical studies on urbanism, urban planning, and planning discourse. This chapter also highlights prospects and opportunities for future researchers. The ultimate aim, as the concluding remarks maintain, is to understand how the urban poor are represented in the development discourse of the administrative and development authorities of Islamabad and Brasilia. Through the representation of the urban poor, this research finds the planning processes and development rationales politically implicating; therefore, it encourages the democratisation of urban policies and scientific discourses vis-à-vis urban planning and urban development.

Chapter 2: EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY

This chapter will present an overview of the key actors of the study i.e. the urban poor and public policy-making with the help of different theoretical approaches and frameworks based on empirical and theoretical studies from the Global South. Cities have been regarded as engines of growth (Black & Henderson, 1999) and provide an opportunity to study the implications and distributions of growth and development. An urban settlement in this regard is also very important because it spatially accommodates skilled and unskilled workers and labourers due to its trends of industrialisation or expanding service sectors (Duranton, 2008). To address the complexities and diversities within an urban settlement, this chapter will comprehensively discuss different theoretical approaches that have been developed and utilised by different scholars along with their strengths and weaknesses for our case of Islamabad and Brasilia. Following this, the chapter will discuss in detail the labelling theory, its epistemological orientations as well as its relevance to our present study of the urban poor, slums and the development discourses of the CDA (Capital Development Authority of Islamabad) and the FDA (Federal District Administration of Brasilia). This chapter offers a comprehensive theoretical framework based on the labelling theory and its approach to the slums and planning of Islamabad and Brasilia.

2.1 Understanding Urbanism: Reviewing Theoretical Perspectives and Approaches from the Global South and their Limitations

Needless to say, it is virtually impossible to comprehend and discuss all of the theoretical and methodological approaches that can be used to operationalise and conceptualise this research. These vary from the classical critical urbanism traditions rooted in Marxist political economy to newly established notions of postmodernism where cities have been understood as assemblages, complex networks of different actors as well as combinations of different and often varying elements of social and material infrastructure. All of these approaches and theoretical premises seem both relevant and formidable. Notions like ‘gray cities’, ‘informality’, ‘insurgent citizenship’ and ‘insurgent planning’ empower a researcher to investigate the questions related to the urban poor, planning rationalities, the urban poor’s

organised and unorganised struggle vis-à-vis the organised and institutionalised power structures of urban municipalities like the CDA and FDA. Before offering a comprehensive theoretical framework and model for this study, it is important to review the existing theories which have been developed based on the experiences of the Global South. Their merits and limitations are discussed to make a case for the relevant theoretical model for this study.

Rooted in the traditions of postmodernism, the assemblage approach believes that the understanding of urban spaces and urban social life lies in understanding the dynamics and interlinkages of human (social) to non-human (material) actors. This approach believes in the importance of the socio-materiality of urban assemblages because of the growing interaction of humans with their material surroundings (see, for example, Amin, 2007; Brenner, Madden, & Wachsmuth, 2011; Farias, 2010; Graham, 2009; McFarlane, 2011, 2011a; Ong, 2007). The assemblage theoretical approach and Actor-Network Theory (a stabilised notion of the actor-network) for the study of urban spaces and urban social life are based on post-structuralist epistemologies, therefore, dismantling the metanarratives and structural explanations of the urban social. Instead of being fully functional and developed, this approach is still progressing and dealing with issues related to hierarchies and imbalanced power structures within both the urban context and the context (both spatial and temporal) within which urbanism is in the process of, as McFarlane (2011a, p. 651) calls it, "*assembling* – rather than the noun, the *assemblage"* [italics in original].

While criticising the post-structural episteme of the assemblage approach, Brenner, Madden, & Wachsmuth (2011, p. 234) argue that the "context of context" becomes more important especially when we conceptualise urban spaces and urban social life vis-à-vis organised and institutionalised forms of power i.e. urban municipalities, technocratic rationalities of governance, scientific planning regimes, and policy implementations, as this research intends. This limitation of the assemblage approach and its propagated Actor-Network Theory has been duly noted by the assemblage scholars as well. For instance, McFarlane (2011a, p. 655) argues that the urban assemblage, as a concept, is:

> structured, hierarchised and narrativized through profoundly unequal relations of power, resources and knowledge. Rather than a kind of crude opposition to structural hierarchy, the spatialities and temporalities of urban assemblages – for instance, in relation to policy or development formations –

> can be captured, structured and storied more effectively and with greater influence by particular actors or processes than by others.

In their critique on the assemblage approach Brenner, Madden and Wachsmuth (2011) consider it naïve because of its ignorance of the “context of context” (p. 234) i.e. globalised urbanisation and globalised economic and political structures. This context of context becomes even more important when we are dealing with the cities of the Global South because of their peripheral and dependent status on the global landscape. Brenner, Madden and Wachsmuth (2011, p. 234) argue that “without a sustained account of this *context of context*, the analysis remained radically incomplete” [italics in original]. To further their argument, Brenner, Madden and Wachsmuth (2011) explain that the squatter settlements in urban societies are historically influenced by the broader political institutions like the legacies of colonialism, postcolonial statecraft and sometimes by the different forms of interventions of imperial powers. This context of context is important, especially for the cases of Islamabad and Brasilia, not only because of global urbanisation trends but also because of the unprecedented role of international developmental agents and global institutions like the World Bank, UNDP, IMF, and IADB.

For Islamabad and Brasilia, this research not only conceptualises each city as an assemblage of assemblages but also as hierarchised, structured and narrativised spaces through technocratic planning in the hinterlands of their respective countries. Their explicit orientation and adherence to modernist urban planning virtually establish them as a global success of developmentalism and scientific rationality. This research, by no means, disregards the importance and usefulness of the assemblage approach but in the cases of Islamabad and Brasilia, the context of context is too important to be taken for granted. The influence of the Global North and global institutions were, and to a greater extent to date are, continuously shaping and reshaping the urban spaces and development rationalities of Islamabad and Brasilia. This influence can be seen through a continuous flow of ideas, technocrats, planning rationalities, and economic ideals along with powerful alliances and transnational cooperation aiming at political and economic restructuring. The recent examples, in this case, will be the hiring of a new international consultant firm for the revision of the master plan of Islamabad, which federal cabinet has approved in 2019. Similarly, use of ‘Matrix’, developed by a Polish scientist, for the removal of unauthorised settlements in Brasilia. It is difficult to say what are the factors involved and how that ‘Matrix’ works because the researcher was denied access to

related documents as it is highly sensitive and confidential, therefore, it cannot be shared with anyone.

This research conceptualises and establishes Islamabad and Brasilia as processual and fluid urban settlements (closely related to ideas of the assemblage approach) connected and responsive to, since inception, structures of global political economy (for Islamabad, see Daechsel, 2012, 2015; and for Brasilia, see Jatoba and Cidade, 2004; Almandoz, 2016). Therefore, urbanism in this case is a product of social, economic and political forces that articulate, regulate and surveil the activities of those who inhabit urban spatialities. Unlike the assemblage approach, the idea of urban spaces as contested terrain is closely associated with Marxist traditions of political economy where political and economic structures and contexts play an important part. This understanding of urbanism and urban space is largely influenced by the ideas of Harvey (1985, 2006, 2008) and Lefebvre (1991). In the context of Islamabad and Brasilia, it is argued that the cities are centres of administration, development, [and] intellectualism which generate capital along with problems like uneven growth, therefore demand administrative machinery to govern the urban space.

Apart from the assemblage approach, there have been other theoretical models and approaches that are derived exclusively from the urban experiences of the Global South. It is important to mention that some of the scholars like Holston (2008), Caldeira and Holston (2005) and Oliveira (1997) developed their arguments through their studies on Brazilian cities. The basic argument of the 'theories from the south' or what Yiftachel (2009) refers to as south-east is rooted in postmodernist critiques of urban governance and planning processes. According to postmodernism, urban settlements are a complex mix of different socio-economic and material realities rendering them incomprehensible by metanarratives like the Marxist political economy, capitalism, democracy and governance etc. The most important conceptualisations in this regard are the 'insurgent citizenship' of Holston (2008); 'insurgent planning' of Miraftab (2009); 'peripheralization' of Oliveira (1997); and 'contingency planning' of Caldeira and Holston (2005). According to these notions, the evolution of slums and other informal settlements is related to active citizenry in which the urban poor contest their exclusion from mainstream urban society by occupying public spaces. Their occupation of public spaces (insurgent citizenship) forces authorities to plan a new settlement (insurgent planning) for them or to grant land titles and rights to those who occupied the space in the first place (contingency planning).

Political struggles, everyday negotiations with authorities and the survivalist strategies of the urban poor that are being reflected and conceptualised through the above-mentioned notions have two basic issues which are important to our discussion. The most important one is that these notions reflect the underpinnings of ‘right-based’ discourses that certainly depend on the state institutions to get legitimacy and approval. The second one is that the success or failure of these urban movements, struggles and strategies are seen through the lens of property ownership. For example, it is only through the legalisation of tenure or grant of ownership rights to a piece of land (i.e. the state’s legalisation and recognition of rights) that it will be established if the insurgency is qualified to be called ‘insurgent citizenship’ and the related planning is qualified to be called ‘contingency’ or ‘insurgent’ planning.

Conversely, Yiftachel (2015, 2009) offers a rather broader picture of urban citizenship and ethno-racial or religious denominations of segregated and apartheid-ridden neighbourhoods. He came up with the notion of ‘gray cities’ to describe informality as a new device of state institutions to govern their urban spaces. Yiftachel (2015, 2009), based on his work on Arab settlements of a Bedouin tribe around Jerusalem, propagates the concept of ‘gray cities’ which neither fall into the domains of white i.e. legal, accepted, appreciated and secured nor into black i.e. illegal, rejected, excluded and vulnerable to destruction. These ‘gray cities’ show permanent temporariness and would depend on the mercy of state institutions through their interpretation of the law and necessity for the cities. Such sites are potential sites of politics to further the state’s own political or corporate interests under the labels of development, restructuring, upgradation and economic regeneration.

Similar to the ideas of Yiftachel (2015, 2009), Roy (2011, 2009, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2005) offers the most comprehensive and elaborated theoretical approach of ‘informality’. Roy (2009, p. 8) defines informality as “a mode of production of space, defined by territorial logic of deregulation”. Informality, according to Roy (2009a, p. 86), is not an exception in urban planning and governance processes, rather it is a product of their “distinctive rationality”, which is very common in the urban idioms of the Global South. Yiftachel’s and Roy’s conceptualisations do widen up the horizons through which we can understand the dynamics involved in urban citizenship, right-based struggles and spatial configurations as well as the rationalities and processes of urban governance. Both believe that the state of temporariness that is bestowed by the state institutions through planning opens up the broader dynamics of urban struggles among and within different socio-economic groups regulated by the state and

its institutions. The conceptualisations of 'gray cities' and 'informality', appear to be formidable and very relevant, and demand a critical review in the cases of Islamabad and Brasilia.

The conceptualisations of both Roy and Yiftachel are reductionist in their point of departure. Both scholars consider cities and their historical experiences as somewhat linear and evolutionary but that due attention is not given to cities' interaction with national and global politico-economic structures and the extent to which they are and can be influenced. This also holds for Holston, Miraftab and Caldeira. For instance, the logic of urban governance, appropriation and regulation of urban spaces are certainly influenced by the growing role of cities in the circulation and accumulation of capital and logics of the global market economy (Harvey, 2008, 2006, 1985; Silver, 2010; Zieleniec, 2007; Lefebvre, 1991). In the case of modernist planned cities like Islamabad and Brasilia where planning processes are shaped and rooted in international developmentalism, it is not possible to understand urban governance, planning logics, governmentality and regulation of urban space without considering the broader context of cities vis-à-vis their national, regional and international positions and aspirations.

Therefore, the planning (contingent or insurgent) or the logics of informality are not smooth infrastructural developments or acceptance of rights or legalisation of tenure, but are linked with discursive representation of the urban poor in the development discourses of the urban municipalities. These development discourses are rooted in the structural logic of development in the Global South – so that the 'order of things' can be legitimised, naturalised and proved to be an inevitable approach to run urban affairs without major interruptions and contestations.

The case of Islamabad and Brasilia – while being sensitive to the limitations of approaches discussed above – demand a much more nuanced and comprehensive approach to understand the dynamics of historical development, planning and subsequent governance of the cities. Such an approach should also be critical of public policy-making as a process as well as a product through which the cities of Islamabad and Brasilia came into being. Islamabad and Brasilia are to be understood not as linearly evolved cities but as a product of public policy and bureaucratic rationalities. They are constructed first through language and in public policy

before getting their material shape on the ground. The social construction of Islamabad and Brasilia preceded the material construction of the cities – an aspect that is not accounted for in the above reviewed theoretical and conceptual approaches.

2.2 Epistemological and Theoretical Underpinnings for Studying the Urban Poor of Islamabad and Brasilia

2.2.1 Epistemological Considerations

Constructivism is an epistemology, learning and meaning-making theory that explains the nature of knowledge and how human beings make sense of their world. It maintains that individuals create or construct their understanding of knowledge through interaction with their social world. This understanding is both produced and reproduced in and through everyday language which is both constructing the social realities as well as representing the social world. Therefore, constructivism believes that knowledge is "temporary, developmental, socially and culturally mediated, and thus non-objective" (Brooks & Brooks, 1993, p. vii). It is not to suggest that knowledge and its development is passively received or continues unobstructed, rather it is built up by cognising subjects (Glassersfeld, 2002); therefore, knowledge cannot be found anywhere but it is always constructed by individuals i.e. subjects (Boghossion, 2006).

This research is based on social constructivism, an approach implying that: (1) everything is subject to interpretation and hence leads to the social constructions often called reality; (2) every interpretation is pronounced, reproduced and articulated through discourse; and (3) the socially constitutive world is not only a product of social knowledge but also serves as a reciprocal relationship to sustain the existing order of the constructed realities (Guzzini, 2010, pp. 11–12; Teater, 2015). The permanence of any interpretation is merely a matter of power and not the truth. Power, imbalances due to inequalities (social, political and/or economic) in an institutionalised form i.e. modern state apparatus and structures as well as socio-economic or religious institutions or sets of practices, is of prime importance in the mediation and articulation of social realities through discourse while portraying their character and essence as something apolitical. Power here is understood as a capacity to control discursive space and influence over the articulation and production of meaning. Discourse, as argued, "is primarily about the production of meaning", a system of representation and reproduction of social

realities so that the world can be experienced and governed (Baaz, 2005, p. 11). Discourses are not about understanding the world in terms of some meanings but also an attempt to believe that "all objects are objects of discourse" which are constructed through language with the articulation of meanings (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 107). Therefore, the infinite possibilities of meanings lead to infinite possibilities of interpretations and reduce the possibility of closure of one meaning over the other. Hence, it can be argued that the discourses are not monolithic in their capacity and they are "inherently open-ended and incomplete" (Doty, 1996, p. 6). Hence, in social constructivism, the importance of the language cannot be denied in the process of understanding and (re)structuring of the world.

Social constructivism thus renders space social in which there is and will always be a struggle to fix meanings – a struggle to shape and fix meanings would create a contestation, leading to another struggle to fix some other meanings aiming at constructing reality. This process would be infinite and the constructivists stress the fragility of meanings attached to words, which come to us through discursive practices. The "temporary fixation" (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 3) of the meaning and their containing terms (for example, labels), when reproduced by different social actors, serve as a map to identify and understand power relations and inequalities in societies. This production of meanings and their reproduction through different discursive practices is hegemonic given the inherent elements of inclusion, exclusion, segregation, assimilation and interaction in social life in attempts to govern the social space. The construction of discourses and discursive practices involve the exercise of power because of the subsequent processes of legitimation, omission, assimilation, inclusion and marginalisation (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, pp. 93–113) in the society where structural inequalities are patronised by state institutions like the CDA and FDA.

How, then, is meaning produced and sustained? According to Laclau and Mouffe (2001), discourse works through language by a process called articulation. In this process, a 'signifier' word is attached to another 'signified' word which is a concept or an understanding that the signifier refers to. Since there are many possibilities of 'signified' the articulation helps to reduce the other possible options that are present in society. This process of creation of certain meanings of certain words is simultaneously reductionist while limiting the options, therefore, serving the dominant discourse. For instance, 'invasion' in Brasilia is a signifier signifying illegal occupation of public land for the purpose of housing or commercial activities. Invasion can be used to refer to any form of unwelcome intrusion, however, in the research interviews

with public officials it signified the slums and settlements of the urban poor rather than illegal and unauthorised housing and condominiums. This is similar to the case in Islamabad where 'katchi abadis' are signifiers signifying the illegal, badly shaped and environmentally threatening slums of Islamabad as a nuisance and threat to the planning of Islamabad. However, this signifier, a label, is not applied to illegal and unauthorised private gated communities and apartment buildings in Islamabad.

2.2.2 Symbolic Interactionism and Labelling Theory

Symbolic interactionism and labelling theory render public policy and public administration as a discourse (Burnier, 2005; Wood, 1985; Fox & Miller, 1995). Policy-making is neither conceived as "rational analysis nor politics but [a] struggle for meaning capture in which policy actors – elected officials, administrator, elites, interest groups, citizen, and the media – use metaphors, narrative, and strategic argument to establish their particular construction of reality as definitive" (Fox & Miller, 1995, p. 10). The struggle of meaning fixing and meaning capturing "create and recreate" public policy in and around "fields of social discourse", especially in the implementation of the policy (Fox & Miller, 1995, p. 10). Such fields are constituted in and through discourse, therefore, political and administrative realities are socially constructed in and through language.

Since public policy and administration, from a symbolic interactionist perspective, are continuous processes of meaning negotiations and meaning construction, the public policy that emerges from this process represents only the official definition of a problem which is not independent of the broader social, cultural, political and economic context. Therefore, the interactionist approach emphasises that the current situation and policy analysis should be seen in close connection to prior situations. These prior situations, if not determine, certainly modify, constrain or otherwise influence the present context of interaction (Blumer, 1969).

If policy as discourse is a continuous and fluid process, then how is it stabilised to be implemented on the ground? This is where the social hierarchies and power imbalances come in to establish and sustain dominant discourses that are then sustained and propagated through various discursive strategies employed in the language and practices of public policy. In this equation of interaction, the state is in a privileged position of power as it acts, defines policy parameters, controls and distributes resources. As Halls (1985, p. 315 cited in Burnier, 2005,

p. 508) puts it, one party "provides the values, meanings, social definitions and social construction of reality" for the other parties in that process. For instance, the CDA and NOVACAP are technocratic institutions who have been established solely for the purpose of planning and constructing Islamabad and Brasilia respectively. Therefore, the actual task is to explore how a definition is imposed in the organisation of asymmetric relationships. This is something that can be identified and seen through the use of language as a medium of discourse as this research proposes.

As Burnier (2005, p. 499) argues, "policy and administrative actors do not just respond to their bureaucratic and political environments. Rather, they actively construct these environments as meaningful through the actions they take, the language they use, the stories they tell, and the symbols they select to represent their actions". While employing various linguistic strategies and framing techniques, labelling reduces subjects of policies to mere objects of policies. Symbolic interaction certainly empowers the institutionalised form of power as it aims at detaching the public from politics, thereby creating a vacuum to be exploited by powerful interest groups and technocrats through their scientific rationalities.

Following the symbolic interactionist approach, which highlights the social construction of realities and political discourses such as those related to the urban poor and urban development, the labelling theory has been selected as a prime theoretical lens for this study to identify the forms of representation of the urban poor in the development discourses of the CDA and FDA. Analysing these representations and discursive constructions will help to map and understand the place of the urban poor within different development processes, rationales and discourse. These forces position the urban poor in society and determine where they live and their access to resources – both physical and social.

2.3 Labels and Labelling Theory

Historically, labelling theory has been used to study deviant behaviour in a society where society labels the deviant individuals to restrain them and establish them as nuisances and a source of discomfort or threat to the order of society. The basic ideas of labelling theory can be seen in the works of Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934) who understood labels as designations and identity markers with profound consequences for the labelled individuals in their social life. Early scholars of labelling theory (like Becker, 1963; Blumer, 1969; Lemert, 1967;

Garfinkel, 1956) have developed the labelling theory by focusing on criminology, the criminal justice system and legal apparatus dealing with socially deviant individuals. Labelling theorists found that both formal and informal labelling is expected to encourage deviant behaviour. The process of labelling is much more visible with deviant labels i.e. criminal labels which are usually associated with stigma and crime. This stigma and designated deviance are based on the mainstream cultural values where society attaches specific, negative images or stereotypes to deviant labels (Link & Phelan, 2001). This mainstreaming of culture is part of early childhood socialisation that usually takes places through films, TV serials, books, folk tales and stories, and most importantly through daily language. According to classical labelling theory and its underlying assumptions, once a person is labelled as deviant, the images and stereotypical evaluation of him/her may become a master trait i.e. it may override all the other traits a person might have (Becker, 1963). This stigma and stereotype attached to a person through criminal labelling promote widespread distrust for a labelled person (Travis, 2002).

It is also true that every trait of deviant behaviour is not and cannot be labelled as such. For instance, juvenile deviance is not labelled or seen as deviance by other juveniles. However, there is some anticipation of some reactions because of the larger social audience that would label the behaviour. Therefore, the formal labelling is a salient source of labelling and that formal labelling is a domain of the state who has a monopoly over the defining, labelling and sanctioning of deviance (Garfinkel, 1956). This formal labelling, an aspect recognised by most of the classical labelling theorists, influences individuals because of its potential to trigger labelling and stigmatisation in everyday social life i.e. informal labelling (Paternoster & Iovanni, 1989). So much so, the social audience may impose deviant labels on actors even in the absence of formal labelling (Matsueda, 1992).

During the 1970s it was widely believed that the labelling approach was deterministic, simplistic, ideological and vague, therefore, it was neither suitable nor sustainable for empirical studies (Tittle, 1980; Hirschi, 1980; Wellford, 1975). Later, the works of Wood (1985) and Matsueda (1992) gave new life to the labelling approach and theory by re-establishing its relevance both for understanding symbolic interactionism as well as its implications and contributions to study the interaction of labellers and labelled alike. Today, the use of labelling theory continues to grow to study other aspects of deviance, symbolic interactionism and its role for the policymakers and bureaucratic management of societies.

This research is using the labelling approach from a perspective where it is not confined to study crimes or criminal behaviour but broader societal and symbolic interactions that are established, propagated, sustained and reproduced through public policy and institutionalised power structures like that of the state and society alike.

In this regard, the labelling theory belongs to the group of action theories, albeit combining elements of structural theories, focusing on "perspectives of deviance and social control" (Petrunik, 1980, p. 214). The traditions of labelling theories have become part of the thinking of government officials and other resource distribution agencies. Even a cursory view can show labels like 'poor', 'favilados' (people living in favelas), 'slum dwellers', 'invasions', 'encroachments' etc. in policy-related documents and the researcher's interviews with the public bureaucracy of the CDA and FDA. These labels usually became a significant part of the discourse related to the urban poor especially in defining and addressing urban problems related to planning and developing the cities. These terms are labels with preconceived sets of meanings, shaping specific perceptions and thus leading to, sometimes even demanding, a specific sort of policy response to what are predominantly labelled as 'problems'.

Labels are embedded in specific regimes of stereotypes. They originate out of specific power imbalances and dispensations, informing definitional aspects of public policy that are the prerogative of the state bureaucracies. Therefore, the labelling processes and labels empower state institutions over the other actors involved in public policy and governance. The legitimate (not necessarily representative institutions like the CDA in Islamabad and CODEPLAN in Brasilia) body makes policies for the urban poor and informal housing in urban settlements and they often do so without the representation of the poor in policy formulations and debates. It became apparent to the researcher during the research fieldwork in Brasilia and Islamabad, that sometimes the community members from the slums are merely selected by officials to represent the slum residents instead of by any elections or due process. According to Wood (1985, p. 13), since state institutions are primarily concerned with resource allocation and resource distribution, their definitions and labels categorise people into different socio-economic groups. For instance, the people living in slums in Islamabad and Brasilia are always stigmatised and labelled as 'invaders', 'criminals', or 'encroachers' regardless of the structural issues of inequality as well as the diversity within those slums. The problems of the urban poor and their stories are reduced to 'cases' by employing universal and exclusive labels. Wood (1985, p. 347) believes that despite the apolitical claims and

appearances of labels, they are highly political and their political implications cannot be ignored. Drawing on Wood (1985), Zetter (1991, p. 40) highlights that "[i]nterventionary and definitional practices of states and their political interests" clearly show that the assumed neutrality of labels is imaginary.

Labels do not only demarcate social deviance but are also important in constructing and communicating social identities of different nature, which are represented, replicated, reproduced and negotiated in public policies, legal norms as well as in urban planning processes and the organisation of urban spaces. Indeed, social identities are always fluctuating like less viscous liquids or currency values but labels tend to be rigid and unchanging. Labels attempt to "achieve and establish normativity" through their use of the binary coding of 'us' and 'them' in a way to attribute responsibility for a solution on the "labellers" while condemning the "labelled" (Cornwall, 2010, p. 2). Labelling theory argues that it is a matter of power, not truth, that uplifts labels from mere words or expressions to normative bars (Zetter, 1991, p. 40) and their continuous resonance in development discourse creates a legitimacy to enforce compliance from society.

This process also has another dimension i.e. the self-interest of institutional agents. Continuous labelling and problem-centred labels ensure legitimacy for authority figures to remain in office, in charge of solutions as well as in control of resources. Bureaucracies, both of state institutions like the CDA or FDA and "Aidland"[2] (Eyben, 2007, p. 32) exist with varying degrees of power because they derive their legitimacy from the problems that exist so that solutions can be provided as per professional expertise. For example, in the case of the research topic, the CDA and FDA exist because the urban spaces of Islamabad and Brasilia are to be managed and secured from any kind of deviance from the proposed master plans of the respective cities. Within the CDA, for instance, there is a Katchi Abadi Cell whose employees are being paid, funded and provided with certain powers because of the existence of slums in Islamabad. Therefore, it is safe to argue that the particular forms of problems are presented in a particular way so that particular forms of solutions are provided by professional bodies. These bodies then assume a powerful position in the discursive space because of their

[2] Eyben (2007) conceptualises Aidland as the world of international aid comprised of numerous international development institutions and agencies like UN, UNDP, IMF, WB and many more. For a detail discussion on how Aidland operates and how it works as global discourse, see Eyben, R (2007). Labelling people for Aid. in J. Moncrieffe & R. Eyben, *The Power of Labelling: How people are categorized and why it matters* (pp. 33–48). London: Earth Scan

scientific expertise, training and mandate to define, operationalise and solve any problem. This is how a political aspect is added to the apparently non-political institutions, apolitical development agencies and technocratic institutions. Linked to this aspect is the problem of sustainability of certain labels and their definition. Since labels are juxtaposed with certain bureaucratic rationality and vested interests to continuously influence the definition and use of labels, they intend to uphold the binary position of those who label and those who are labelled to maintain the former's existence and superior positions.

Labelling theory has been developed and used by some scholars (see, for example, Schaffer, 1975, 1985; Wood, 1985; Zetter, 1991, 1988; Cornwall & Fujita, 2007; Gupte & Mehta 2007) as a theoretical model for public policy discourse analysis and its implication on the socio-spatial organisation of society. Employing labelling theory as the theoretical framework would enable the research to investigate in depth the bureaucratic management of resources, public policy discourses vis-à-vis the development of the city along with the formation and reproduction of respective labels to deal with the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia. This also entails an analysis of how labels are deployed as a tool to keep societal power relationships intact and outside the realm of everyday public debate. Further, it will also be helpful to understand the resonance of particular discourses while rejecting or underplaying others and how labels are constituting the labelled and their social space in public life. Labels as a conceptual tool-box will enhance understanding of the interplay of interests of the "labellers" and "labelled" along with the politics of public policy at the point of "organization connection" (Schaffer, 1975, p. 7).

Labelling is fundamentally a social process: we all label and in response get labelled. The question here does not relate to social identities and groups that we all manage through labels like 'kids', 'adults', 'men', 'women' etc. but the implications of bureaucratically reproduced ones that transform socially acquired identities to bureaucratic identities like 'slums', 'legal', 'illegal', 'normal', 'owner', 'encroacher' etc. When a label survives and is continuously replicated and reproduced in respective discursive spaces, it eventually forms a corresponding social identity both in public policy and social life that is continuously affected by the public policies in a larger social context (Zetter, 1991; Silver, 2010). For instance, 'target group' or 'poor' in development discourses usually implies economic poverty and means to address that poverty through developmental aid, economic assistance, technocratic rationality and economic mobilisation of resources. The 'poor' and 'target group' of any policy implies that

responsibility lies on those who are 'non-poor' or outside the specified 'target group' including state bureaucracies and public policy officials. Further, such labels not only designate the inferior social position in social relationships but also construct clients and cases of public policy regardless of the stories or structural problems that make them poor or dependent.

In this regard, Clay and Schaffer (1985) highlight the importance of studying why few labels survive and the need to identify which labels appear significant in the agenda of development of the Global South. According to them, state labelling is a source of legitimacy and ultimate power in the management of a society which in turn deeply affects socially acquired identities and has huge structural impacts through creation, production, reproduction and reinforcement of the ideologies of institutions through which we all are managed in one way or another. The argument of Wood (1985, p. 347) is similar:

> Labelling is a way of referring to the process by which policies are established, propagated and represented in a specific way which, later on, become a *convenient image* to be perceived and believed by others [emphasis added].

The "convenient image" is a result of the process of stereotyping that involves the formulation and standardisation of categories empowering state bureaucracies due to their position of being resource distributors. Subsequently, this categorisation that is achieved through labels is designed to appear scientific, rational, natural, apolitical and inevitable to legitimise the management of scarce resources. The choice of designation and attribution is significant for the labelled who are mostly the excluded, marginalised and criminalised urban poor because of the state's endorsement in and through public policy discourses. The labels serve as a tool to control the behaviour of the urban poor and regulate their social spaces.

These attributions and categorisations control the access of people to resources. In this sense, labels are a "set of rules for inclusion, exclusion, determining eligibility, defining qualifications and eligibilities" (Wood, 1985, p. 352). Further, the delinking capacity of labels is employed by stakeholders to keep structural issues such as those of class inequalities and economic and social exploitation out of public debates by creating an arena of legitimacy. In this arena of legitimacy, the legality of the debate and the justification and employment of

labels is determined and propagated through several direct and indirect, structural and non-structural as well as discursive ways. Subsequently, labels represent hegemonic discourses by organising, reorganising and sometimes disorganising social groups. For instance, the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia are being criminalised and represented through various labels like 'poor', 'low-income group', 'encroacher', 'slum dwellers' during urban development issues and organisation of the urban spaces of Islamabad and Brasilia. In doing so, the urban poor have been marginalised and are segregated (both physically and socially) from 'high-income' groups in the name of the scientific and architectural planning of the cities. In this way, different socio-economic groups are spatially organised in the urban spaces of Islamabad and Brasilia to avoid intermixing, i.e. inequalities are reified through the spatial distribution and management of the urban spaces of Islamabad and Brasilia. This spatial segregation among different socio-economic groups is so stark that these were my immediate observations on the journey from Brasilia airport to Vila Planalto (lower- to middle-class neighbourhood in Brasilia) where I planned to live for the research fieldwork.

"Labelling is in part a scientific (taxonomic) act", but it is also an act of valuation and judgement involving prejudices and stereotyping (Wood, 1985, p. 348). Therefore, according to Wood (1985), it is more accurate to see a label as a designation. These designations are not limited only to linguistics but are also manifested and reified through the material allocation of resources. The discriminatory distribution of material resources (including space that is both material and discursive) creates both physical and mental borders for different classes in society. An interesting example in this regard would be of low-income housing schemes that usually are hailed as a developmental policy of the state and its institutions. Such schemes would create permanent physical structures that would permanently represent the inhabitants of such subsidised housing schemes as somewhat different from the rest of the urban community. The low-income housing schemes and subsidised distribution of plots to the 'deserving poor' would them imply particular responses from society and the state institutions. The immediate binaries in such cases would be the 'deserving poor' and the 'undeserving poor', 'us' and 'them'. The physical and material manifestations of lingual labels ultimately create substantial effects for the residents of the plots and housing community. In the case of Islamabad and Brasilia, whole cities can be regarded as material manifestations of lingual labels like 'high income', 'low income', 'workers', 'market', 'slums', 'development'.

Associated with this transformation of lingual labels to physical labels are employment opportunities, industrial development, mobility of capital and market activities. Due to the social stigmatisation and stereotyping associated with the labelling, most of the capital circulation would remain in areas of high-income groups or where people with large plot sizes and apartment buildings are living because of their assumed ability to purchase the commodified urban spaces. Subsequently, these discursive and material borders initially laid down by the state's public policy and urban planning will transform to social borders for the broader urban community.

However, the implications of labels in either case (be it lingual or physical) are the same. Public policy is often aimed at delivering public goods and facilitating social interaction, first, by proposing development plans and policies, later, by executing them. Lingual labels first appear in policy considerations, recommendations, deliberations and societal organisation of subjects of the policy. Tangible and physical labels are external manifestations of the considerations and deliberations, often expressed and transmitted as 'facts', considered during policy formulation and recommendations. However, it is important to note that lingual labels are not mere words, rather their communicated information carries problems imbued with solutions. This inherent 'problem-solution' orientation and implication of labels transform taxonomic labels to tangible labels which then regenerate and sustain the 'convenient image' embedded in labelling. For example, in the case of Islamabad and Brasilia, the urban poor are represented as the 'target group' in low-income housing schemes. These schemes – presented as a solution to lack of affordable housing – consist of small and subsidised plots with a similar architecture of buildings and housing units. Houses built in such schemes reflect the 'problem-solution' nature of labels, which once appeared in texts, and now physically pop up in the urban landscape representing the poor classes and embody their existence in the cities of Islamabad and Brasilia.

Labels are not only umbrella-terms or empty containers to be filled but are also a manifestation of power patterns in any society. Foucault observed that we are governed "not by right, but by technique; not by law but by normalisation; not by punishment but by control" (Foucault, 1978, p. 89). Labels serve as tools for the same purpose: labellers occupy a powerful position, produce and reproduce discourse about labels and labelled, which is powerful in inviting predetermined or desired solutions without considering the 'story' behind the 'case'. Labels in such cases are tools to create bureaucratic stories about different subjects to standardise,

homogenise and blanket the differences to create legibility to enhance state powers (Scott, 1998).

Further, the options for the people labelled to raise their voices or even to participate in whole processes of policy formulations and execution are rather limited, especially in the countries of the Global South. If by any means they manage to resist and contest their assigned category, their behaviour would be labelled 'deviant' because of the assumed legality and neutrality of labels. For instance, as the research data shows, when the residents of slums in Islamabad and Brasilia contested the demolition proposals from the respective urban authorities, they were asked to provide a legal base and legal documents to prove their property ownership which they did not have. Therefore, the state institutions labelled them 'invaders' and 'encroachers' and their settlement as an 'invasion', thereby denying their right to contest and to secure their fundamental right for housing and shelter. The labelling process and its stereotypical categorisation of the urban poor was so strong that even the media reports and the public were repeating that the 'invaders' should be removed and the 'mafia' of encroachers should be prosecuted in the court of law.

This is not to suggest that labelling is a one-way process, or too authoritative even to be contested or challenged. The works of Wood (2007), Schaffer (1985), Gupte & Mehta (2007), Haan (2007), Zetter (1991, 1988) and Waldman (2007) demonstrate that labelling is not a process without contestation from the labelled. However, opposition is itself controlled and limited because of the associated gains and resource distribution mechanism set by the labelling authorities. Since bureaucratic labelling is primarily concerned with the management and distribution of resources, especially in the case of the urban poor, the labelled will always attempt to reduce any adverse impact. Because of their continuous propagation and reproduction, the labels are usually internalised by the labelled as a viable and legitimate route to access state resources. Sometimes the contestation of the urban poor would lead them to be categorised as 'non-deserving poor'. This label is either directly or indirectly created by emphasising the 'deserving poor', 'clients' or 'target-groups' in discourse. The resulting conflict would then be limited to lingual labels i.e. demanding changes of names and nomenclature, attributes, definitions and qualifications, instead of the physical aspects of labelling, which is one of the potential sources of creating "spatial polarization" among different classes in the same city (Murdie, 1998, p. 79). The research at hand shows

empirically that social interaction between different classes of society is largely influenced by labels and the labelling process once they are put to practice by society and social actors.

Labelling, as a conceptual metaphor, also aims at studying the societal management of resources, which is primarily done by the state bureaucracies. Therefore, representation of the urban poor in discourses of state bureaucracies can be studied with special reference to bureaucratic identity (trans)formation. The theoretical assumption related to inequality and power imbalances can also be extended to class analysis to investigate the development discourses of state institutions, the theme not explicit enough in most of the works of the labelling scholars. While debating the process of labelling, Wood (1985) argues that the survival of some labels only marks the inequality of power relations in society. Drawing upon Wood, labels can be deconstructed as a mode of social and spatial production in which state bureaucracies, in particular, and civil society organisations, in general, reify socio-spatial polarisation among different socio-economic groups in a society. Taking insights from Marxist political economists and urban scholars (like Harvey, 1985, 2006; Lefebvre, 1991), class analysis in this research will help us to understand the dynamics of class relations, class borders and the spatial division of different classes producing and reproducing class differences. For instance, in the case of Islamabad and Brasilia, the distribution of urban spaces creates homogenous neighbourhoods of different income groups. In doing so, both Islamabad and Brasilia ended up having different socio-economic groups distributed exclusively throughout the urban spaces with limited mobility and social interaction. Therefore, both Islamabad and Brasilia are socially and spatially polarised cities implying different responses and policies from the same state institutions. As mentioned earlier, it is virtually impossible not to note this segregation in Islamabad and Brasilia as it is too stark and evident to be ignored.

Further, the survival of some labels and their continuous reproduction create a multiplier effect that can be read as a deliberate attempt to freeze otherwise fluctuating boundaries of different classes and socio-economic groups in a society. Labels, in this regard, can be read as tools to ensure class stability in a society along with generative and regenerative capacity to maintain the stability of class inequality through normative bars. Labelling assumes the nature of a scientific, apolitical, inevitable, natural and rational method to organise and distribute scarce resources. For example, the CDA and FDA have distributed the available urban space of Islamabad and Brasilia to provide public facilities (playgrounds, parks, schools, pedestrian

paths, vehicular roads etc.) for nearby residential communities. The needs and demands of residents of various communities and apartment buildings are assumed based on their social and income status calculated by socio-economic surveys. It is also important to mention that both cities are planned differently with different infrastructural schemes. For example, a major difference is that Brasilia is primarily planned for apartment buildings that are to be distributed among different socio-economic groups. On the other hand, the planning of Islamabad is based on different sizes of plots for different socio-economic groups (a detailed discussion on the primary distribution of urban space in Islamabad and Brasilia will be provided in Chapter 5). Similarly, roads, pedestrian and cycle lanes, picnic spots and parks are also distributed differently in respective cities, according to architectural preferences. However, the basic principle of hierarchy and differentiation among different areas inhabited by different socio-economic groups is predominant in the overall planning of Islamabad and Brasilia. The stratification and categorisation of residents is generalised for the planning and distribution of whole urban spaces of Brasilia and Islamabad. In doing so, strategic segregation is put into practice which marks the inter-class, and sometimes intra-class, boundaries. This socio-spatial segregation can also be read as a strategy of shock absorbers to fluctuating class boundaries. The normalisation and naturalisation of labels by the CDA and FDA have strong implications for the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia, especially in relation to where they live and experience development discourses of the CDA and FDA.

The labelling theory has been operationalised as a theoretical framework for this research and through this framework the development discourses of the CDA and FDA have been analysed and investigated. Labels, in this case, are technologies of power, which are manifested in the development discourses of the CDA and FDA – one of the prime arguments of the research at hand. It is through these labels and the power of labellers that Islamabad and Brasilia have become socially stratified and segregated cities with different urban experiences for different socio-economic groups. Further, through the deployment of these labels, resources are allocated, urban space is distributed and commodified along with (re)defining and (re)shaping the social space of the 'target-groups' (in this case, the urban poor).

Studying labels and labelling processes in bureaucratic policy documents and discourses has always been of great interest and a tool to make public policy more democratic, interactive and inclusive. However, this research aims to study labels that are reproduced in the policy documents of the CDA and FDA as well as in their discourse. This analysis will help to

understand how bureaucracies' approach towards the labelled influence the reproduction of labels in public policy, which then is implemented by the same bodies in their respective domains.

Having said that, it is important to highlight that the CDA and FDA are not working independently of their national and international context. They have to follow the federal legislation and decisions by the executive body representing the federal government. Also, the CDA and FDA are not immune to the influence of global developmentalism, which is being produced and reproduced by international institutes like UN-HABITAT, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UNDP, IMF, the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) or The Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF-Development Bank of Latin America). Despite that, both the CDA and FDA have significant authority and autonomy over the management, planning, and development of Islamabad and Brasilia as model urban cities and capitals of their respective countries. During the research fieldwork, interviews with officials and reading of policy documents suggest that both the CDA and FDA are largely autonomous and can devise their own laws and regulations while following the broader policy frameworks, for example, related to education, health and environment. However, the planning of the cities, auction of plots, development of new sectors, management and distribution of open spaces (grounds, parks, walk trails, preservation of national parks etc.) largely falls under the jurisdiction of the CDA and FDA. Therefore, it would be interesting to see how in the CDA's and FDA's development discourses different labels are employed to represent different socio-economic groups of Islamabad and Brasilia while planning, developing and celebrating both cities as modernist cities of the 21st century.

2.4 Framework of the Study: What does Labelling Theory mean for Islamabad and Brasilia

Figure 2.1 shows how labels and labelling act as a technology of power, which is being used by the CDA and FDA to categorise and essentialise different socio-economic groups differently. In addition, the labels serve as guiding tools and strategy to allocate and distribute different resources to the inhabitants of Islamabad and Brasilia. In this way, the urban spaces of Islamabad and Brasilia are built and continuously governed by the state authorities. Further, it is also shown that labels play a pivotal role in defining the agency and social spaces of those who are being labelled – formally by the state and informally by the rest of society.



Figure 2.1 Theoretical Framework

2.4.1 Labels and Physical Space

Space is one of the most celebrated and discussed subjects in the arenas of social theory. Despite ontological and epistemological difficulties, several theorists and scholars theorise and conceptualise space from multiple dimensions. Space, in this research, is understood as both the product and process that shapes social actions and defines social relations. This idea of space as a politically charged arena working as both a product of social relations and a process generating social relations is influenced by the scholarly contributions of Harvey (1985) and Lefebvre (1991). Both believe space is not a neutral entity as it is a product of social, economic and political forces operating within that space and which in turn regulate and articulate activities through the spatial organisation.

The CDA and FDA have categorised different socio-economic groups under different labels, reducing the subjects of the policies to mere objects. Being objectified, essentialised and homogenised, the different groups' demands, needs and requirements are assumed and calculated by policymakers, planning professionals and architects to distribute their share of

urban space in Islamabad and Brasilia. Hence, it can be argued that the practical implications of labels are not mere "geographical and geometrical" but instrumental because space has become a "quantifiable commodity" and is subject to market forces and market dynamics like any other commodity (Zieleniec, 2007, p. 67).

Labels are also influential when it comes to providing access to space. In the case of Islamabad and Brasilia, the planning and development of both cities allocate different income groups a different share of urban space. In the case of Islamabad, F-series sectors have bigger plots, which are very expensive in open bidding; therefore, they essentially remain high-income areas as compared to the G-series sectors. Similarly, in the case of Brasilia, the South Wing and North Wing apartment buildings series 100, 200, and 300 are large and spacious providing housing for high-income residents while series 400 are small, less spacious apartments originally designed for low-income groups. This way of organising urban space and regulating access to commoditised space segregates and discriminates among different income groups, therefore, redefining social spaces and social relations while reifying social inequalities.

This physical segregation and distance that is ensured through planning have direct social consequences and the ability to (re)shape the social spaces of the inhabitants of both cities. This physical segregation can also be viewed as a form of class segregation depicting a colonial logic of urban development by substituting racial biases with class-based hierarchies. A practical example from the case of Islamabad and Brasilia would be of the central commercial markets of both cities which are situated close to rich neighbourhoods. The Blue Area (commercial centre of Islamabad) of Islamabad and *Setor Comercial* (Commercial Sector with food courts, restaurants, market places and shopping plazas) of Brasilia are public spaces, i.e. can be accessed by everyone. However, the capitalists virtually control the space because its purpose has been redefined as consumption, which is regarded as an economic activity. Therefore, capitalists control and regulate that space through different investments (hotels, restaurants, shopping centres, plazas, corporate offices, wholesale markets and expensive commercial property). These investment functions, celebrated and patronised by the state under the rubric of growth and development, (re)shape the space and its social composition by controlling the access i.e. allowing limited people for limited functions (consumption and commercial purposes). This public space, as understood by Harvey (2006,

p. 320), is seen as “exclusionary space” by the urban poor because of their inability to utilise that space.

In modern capitalist societies like Pakistan and Brazil, the political economy of space cannot and should not be separated from social relations. Like any other commodity and private ownership of resources, ownership of space is also an instrument of production or at least is part of a set of instruments of production. The ownership of space legitimises the regulation, control and capital accumulation, which, by implication, positions different social actors differently in the socio-economic landscape of society. This different positioning of various actors means unequal opportunities like market value addition, access to public facilities like roads, parks, markets, hospitals, bus stops etc. Such physical aspects of space are directly linked to the social space of the inhabitants not only materially but also socially because urban architecture surely has “influence upon how we are situated” in urban space and how we “think and act politically accordingly” (Harvey, 2006, p. 17).

2.4.2 Labels and Social Space

Labels, as argued, are essential elements of a bureaucratic management of society for the regulation, reproduction and distribution of resources. Among all of the resources, physical or otherwise, social space, and to some extent agency, is of prime importance in our case. Like space, social space is also very complex to be comprehended. In this research, social space refers to the interaction among different classes and socio-economic groups. Understanding social space as a venue and avenue of social interaction and intermixing can be understood as a contested terrain for different classes and socio-economic groups in which every group tries to occupy a maximum position. This contestation and conflict lead to struggle among different groups making spatial segregation an inevitable resulting product Gregory, 1981; Harvey, 1985; Bourdieu, 1989; Lefebvre, 1991). Social differences are spatially inscribed in the world as we see it. Therefore, social space is a highly political entity that shapes the social consciousness through a combination of social and material structures (as Bourdieu (1990) calls it habitus) of different classes and social groups. Here the relationship is dialectical where structures and social consciousness are mutually constitutive of and reinforce each other. The distribution of space, a commoditised product in capitalist economies like Pakistan and Brazil, is a “flexible system of production, consumption, exploitation, spatialisation and social control” which (re)shapes the political and social life of the people especially of those who

are being exploited, spatialised, marginalised and hence socially controlled (Zieleniec, 2007, p. 180).

Labels, especially criminal labels like ‘encroachers’, ‘invasions’, ‘mafia’ etc. are highly influential in determining the social role, social status and societal response towards the labelled. For instance, to be labelled as criminal also implies several connotations specifying and making auxiliary traits more prominent in day-to-day social interactions with other social actors. Such labels serve as a bar and filter for others to judge and react towards the labelled accordingly. For instance, Travis (2002) finds that the stigma attached to criminal labels promotes widespread distrust and social discomfort for the labelled people. Moreover, once a person is formally labelled with a criminal label by state institutions, like ‘encroacher’ or ‘threat’ in the case of Islamabad and Brasilia, it is highly probable that other social actors or audiences may impose other deviant labels on the individuals. This consequence of formal labelling can be called informal labelling that is supported by formal social and political structures. The informal labelling then itself serves as a tool at the hand of the social audience whereby they can label even whole communities and treat them accordingly.

Hence, labelling can be understood as a process of ensuring the social exclusion of those who are being labelled, whether formally or informally. For instance, once slum dwellers of Islamabad and Brasilia are labelled as ‘encroachers’ and a ‘threat’, they will be seen as deviant others by the rest of society. Subsequently, their deviant status would not only hinder their relationship with others but would also serve as a barrier to legitimate opportunities. Other social actors (peers, friends, family, schools, teachers, colleges, public officials etc.) who are also gatekeepers in the opportunity structures of society may reject, devalue or degrade the labelled person. Because of the labels employed, the reaction of society may be driven by fear, contempt, mistrust and biased judgements towards the labelled.

Labels carry various assumptions and socially constructed realities that are powerful enough for dehistorification and decontextualisation of the labelled (Glaser, 1985, p. 414). Usually, labels are non-participatory, especially when coming from state bureaucracies, therefore, redefining and reshaping the agency and social space of the labelled i.e. the urban poor living in slums in Islamabad and Brasilia. This reshaping processes of the social space of the urban poor through systematic production and reproduction of labels not only influences individual lives but is also very instrumental in shaping their relationships with other socio-economic

groups in the cities. For example, employing labels like ‘criminals’, ‘robbers’, ‘threat to law and order’ would stigmatise and essentialise urban poor. This reduces the urban poor to mere criminals and illegal inhabitants, which then encourages other people to keep a ‘safe distance’ from them. During the research fieldwork in Islamabad and Brasilia the researcher was frequently told to avoid all slums for fear of robbery or murder. The research assistants in Brasilia refused to accompany the researcher into the slums because of the preconceived impressions of slums created, produced and reproduced through the media and also in some interviews with public officials. It is interesting to note that neither they nor any of their immediate friends had any experience of visiting slums or had been involved in law and order situation related to slums.

Further, several studies (like Winnick & Bodkin, 2008) have found labelled persons suffer a loss of self-confidence which might lead them or sometimes even whole communities (of a common race, ethnicity, religion or language) to social withdrawal due to anticipated denial, devaluation or rejection. As found by Winnick & Bodkin (2008), labelled persons are likely to avoid routine social encounters and interactions which are vital to maintain social bonds and close connections with the gatekeepers of the opportunities society has to offer. This, in turn, exacerbates the social exclusion which has been forced upon labelled individuals and communities. In many interviews with slum dwellers during this research, the interviewees stated that they are looked down upon by other members of society because of their poor status and residence in slums.
According to Zetter (1991, p. 43), labels demand compliance by the labelled, hence they serve as a tool to control and survey the social spaces of the labelled, their agency as well as their positions in the political landscape. For example, in cases of upgrading policies or rehabilitation programmes in Islamabad and Brasilia, the urban poor are given subsidised plots or other infrastructure in slums. The programmes enforce harsh mandatory conditions (fixed monthly instalments, ambiguous legal frameworks, blind adherence to proposed architectural requirements and limited time to construct homes). These empower state authorities and bureaucracies simultaneously reduce the urban poor to the position of clients of the policy. Therefore, the urban poor are required to accept all the terms and conditions so that they may be designated as the “deserving poor who are eligible for softer charitable measure[s]” as compared to those who might be labelled as “undeserving” and should be subjected to coercive methods (Schaffer, 1985, p. 385).

While dealing with the urban poor and slums, the CDA and FDA produce and reproduce labels that ascribe a 'target group' (in our case the urban poor) a specific position. This specific position is coerced and is infused with the strategies of distribution of resources like upgradation and rehabilitation of slums. Therefore, the urban poor have a limited capacity to exercise their agency to resist, contest and challenge the discriminatory labelling. Human agency, as understood in this research, is both the capability and capacity of an individual to make their own decisions, priorities and act upon them while shaping their social life. It is different from independence or liberty; it is freedom as conceptualised by Bauman (1988) i.e. a condition where an individual's motive and ideas shape their actions and where those actions produce desired outcomes. This agency and social space are always related to and influenced by structures like religions, ethnicities, caste, tribe, political systems, economic systems etc. Therefore, the agency is practically shaped cognitively over time through an individual's own experience of and interaction with the structures around them (Gregory, 1981). Through different communicative actions and available means of influencing discursive spaces and practices (meetings, public notices, media reports, press conferences, planning documents, field surveys), the CDA and FDA reproduce labels (like encroachers, invaders, invasions, illegal) that play an instrumental role in defining and regulating the social space and agency of the urban poor under the guise of development.

2.4.3 Labels: Segregation and Homogenisation of Neighbourhoods

The planning of cities and urban spaces has always been a political tool of state institutions to increase their powers and ability to control and surveil. Through planning, state and municipal institutions exert their control to regulate, monitor and police its citizens (Scott, 2006, pp. 251–253). The situation becomes problematic and complex when one group of society starts controlling the other groups because of its position and access to certain resources in a given socio-economic hierarchy.

Labels are bureaucratically defined social groups and in our case guiding symbols for segregation because of their inherent capability of suggesting and reifying differences and homogenisation. This segregation is directly linked to attribution of different shares of space to different socio-economic groups. Those groups who are at the margins or neglected altogether (for example labourers and construction workers of both Islamabad and Brasilia) in the distribution of these resources (space being the most important one) are the ones who

would probably contest the new socio-spatial composition of the newly built cities as happened in Paris in 1848 where the poor fought in favour of the social republic. After the revolution was suppressed, Baron Haussmann was made prefect of Paris (1853-1870) and undertook massive slum clearance in the city, destroying poor neighbourhoods and restructuring Paris at an unprecedented scale. Haussmann stigmatised and ignored the urban poor by virtually pushing them to the outer skirts of Paris for fear of them being a threat to law and order (Harvey, 2006).

Similarly, the neo-liberal development discourses of the CDA and FDA serve the purpose of capital and capitalists by circumscribing the access of the poor to urban spaces merely by commodifying space. After commodification and awarding ownership rights, the CDA and FDA are, in essence, serving the interests of the bourgeoisie by not opening up these spaces to those who would probably challenge the status quo. The segregation, which is ensured, reproduced and rationalised through labels and labelling processes, is serving as a tool to control the access of certain socio-economic groups to avoid contact and conflict while allowing socio-economic and political structures to operate independently so that the class inequalities, social hierarchies, and unequal power relations in Islamabad and Brasilia can be maintained.

During the planning and development of Islamabad and Brasilia, this segregation was technocratically and scientifically rationalised through labels. As mentioned earlier, socio-economic groups and classes like ‘elites’, ‘high income’, ‘leaders’ and ‘public officials’ were assumed to have similar needs, requirements, and approach towards life as well as social compatibility to interact among each other. Therefore, the apartments and/or plots for them were planned and developed close to each other. On the other hand, the people who were labelled as ‘middle income’, ‘low income’ or ‘workers’ were given residential options remote from high-income groups (Chapter 5). In this way, the homogenisation of the labelled, as well as homogenisation of the neighbourhood, has been secured to regulate the broader urban spaces. Labels, in this case, do not serve only as tools to create and stabilise homogenous neighbourhoods of different socio-economic groups but also serve as a tool to ensure socio-spatial segregation among the inhabitants of the same city.

For instance, the apartment buildings of series SQS and SNS 100 and 300 are large and spacious with wide open spaces around the buildings so that small parks and green spaces are

to be enjoyed by the residents. The apartments are expensive and are planned for higher level bureaucrats, public officials and the richer segments of society. Similarly, the F-series sectors have large plot sizes (not less than 605 square yards on average) and are planned with wider streets and roads for vehicular traffic. Their location, size and architectural planning has made them exclusive for the people who are regarded as 'VIP' or 'higher-class' in the planning documents of Islamabad. These neighbourhoods are both homogenous and exclusive for specific socio-economic groups of the habitants of the city. This homogeneity and segregation can also be seen as a continuation of a colonial form of urban planning where racially segregated urban planning ensures the legitimacy and reproduction of unequal power relations as well as stigmatisation of natives and the poor – a history both Pakistan and Brazil share.

2.4.4 Labels and Resource Allocation

The need for public policy displays a potential scarcity of resources. Therefore, labels in public policy serve as a primary tool for social organisation and the distribution of resources according to bureaucratically constituted socio-economic groups. Even a cursory survey of the public policy of Pakistan and Brazil – and maybe for every country – would show labels and categories like 'low-income group', 'high-income group', 'rich', 'poor', 'workers', 'legal', 'civil servants', 'officials', 'leaders', 'encroachers', 'invaders', 'formal', 'informal' and so on.

Labels, as argued by Wood (1985), are categories and compartments through which different people are differently managed based on their assumed needs, demands and sometimes their assumed contributions towards society. Accordingly, the whole resource allocation process is influenced by the assumptions which labels carry within them. Further, with the help of labels, the authorities like the CDA and FDA guide themselves about the production, reproduction, distribution and redistribution of resources along with fiscal and bureaucratic control over the whole process. This control (through fiscal, monetary and legal apparatus) creates numerous imbalances in power relations that would attempt to freeze otherwise fluctuating class inequalities and class boundaries in society.

Based on the assumptions embedded in labels, the resources are allocated differently and often discriminatorily among different socio-economic groups in society, as shown by the current research. The articulation of resources through allocative actions, guided by labels, is then

further sustained by reallocation and repetitive allocative actions, often under the emblem of 'development'. Further, these processes of allocation and reallocation of resources are further strengthened by the policing of the state institutions through field officials, quality control inspectors, architects and engineers aiming at upholding the existing settings.

This link of label and resource distribution is instrumental in the case of Islamabad and Brasilia because of their celebrated status as planned capital cities of Pakistan and Brazil. Both cities were planned, constructed and developed from scratch and the organisation of the inhabitants has been envisioned a long time before the physical structure. In this process, the future population was categorised and labelled into different socio-economic groups and classes like 'high income', 'bureaucrats', 'workers', 'elite', 'leaders'. These categorise not only represented the socio-political composition of the future inhabitants of the cities but also served as a road map to allocate resources, plan the neighbourhoods and the provision of different resources and amenities (like parks, public places, roads, street lights) according to the assumed needs of the 'high income', 'bureaucrats', 'workers', 'low income', 'elites'. Therefore, the labels in the planning and development of Islamabad and Brasilia serve as guiding tools and rationale to allocate different resources and opportunities to differently labelled groups within the population.

2.5 Limitations of the Theoretical Framework

This theoretical framework, like any other, also has multiple limitations given the empirical and methodological constraints of this research. Apart from recognising the positivist impact of labelling and its structural description so far, it is important to note that labelling as theory and practice has many other significant dimensions. This research does not deal with some of those very interesting aspects. Labels are not self-fulfilling prophecies or an objective reality. Labels are formed, sustained and deliberately reproduced in both material and discursive spaces. The formation and the sustenance of the labels embody politics and complex processes both complementary and contradictory. In this regard, this research has limitations and will not deal with questions like: (1) why some of the labels have global reach while others are in a continuous process of reformulation; (2) how labels are formed in the first place and from where and why they originate i.e. historical development and social roots of various labels; (3) how intra-organisational and inter-organisational struggle and contestation influence labelling processes and labels before their translation as policy documents or legal cases in

both national and international domains; and (4) how often labels are contested, reproduced, admired or sustained by the labelled themselves.

Chapter 3: METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE STUDY: DISCOURSE, CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS, AND CORPUS OF THE STUDY

This chapter offers a detailed discussion on the methodology, analytical tools and framework put forth in this dissertation. It also presents the methods of data collection and analysis. The chapter establishes a broader overview of the discourse analysis and its various dimensions and forms by drawing on different scholars on the subject. Afterwards, a methodological framework is developed arguing for Critical Discourse Analysis as the best set of analytical tools, establishing a link between the discourse and labelling theory – both epistemically linked with social constructivism. This chapter argues that Critical Discourse Analysis offers us interesting theoretical insights which presents discursive (semiotic) and non-discursive (non-semiotic) elements in a dialectical relationship. This dialectical relationship thus allows the researcher to go beyond 'language games' and comprehend the material implications of discursive constructions and articulation of realities – an argument directly linked to the theoretical foundations of this study on the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia. This is followed by a detailed discussion of the process of data collection that includes archival research, in-depth interviews with policymakers and public servants as well as residents of different neighbourhoods of Islamabad and Brasilia. Extensive ethnographic fieldwork was conducted in both Islamabad and Brasilia to reveal the dynamics involved. The chapter closes by describing the nature and form of collected data, its translation, coding, as well as reflections on the positionality of the researcher in the field.

3.1 Discourse, Symbolic Interactionism and Social Constructivism

Ontologically, discourse theorists believe in the existence of multiple realities that are socially constructed instead of any objective reality that is to be established or discovered (Paul, 2009). Therefore, the purpose of discourse analysis is to pay attention to the contingency of meanings instead of looking for any fixed, established and naturalised meanings or realities. Epistemologically, discourse theory falls under the paradigm of social constructivism, i.e. any possibility of the existence of or access to unmediated facts or truths is denied. Hence, there is no possibility of explaining events or social interactions in any universally accepted manner. In the case of policy analysis, as this research intends, meanings and the production of

systemised knowledge occur in interaction, thereby discourse (semiotic) and practice (non-semiotic) are inseparable. According to discourse theory in critical policy studies, agency and structures should always be considered as a contingent part of the discourse that makes it possible for them to exist. This anti-essentialist understanding of agency and structure is conceptualised as 'dislocation' by Laclau (1990). Dislocation is a moment in which the structural openness of a social system is revealed showing both impossibilities of disclosure and possibilities of (re)articulation and (re)generation of discourses. This dislocation, in the context of policy analysis, has been called an "institutional void" by Hajer (2003, p. 176).

This research, as discussed earlier, takes a constructivist and symbolic interactionist approach by focusing on discourses and discursive representations. The constructivist approach renders discourse an essential medium of social and common meanings which emerge from a group of individuals (Mead, 1934). Further, Mead (1934) argues for the primacy of communication and discourse that always, historically, come before social actors. In this way, the socio-symbolic order of urban settlements is not settled but forever remains in the process of ordering. This ordering then requires cognitive individuals as a prerequisite for the development of consciousness (through discursive or non-discursive means) to adhere to the established and desired order. For instance, Islamabad and Brasilia are not historically evolved cities; they are planned cities that came into being first in the language of public policy and planning documents and then as material urban realities. These cities first existed in a discursive (semiotic) sphere. They were then realised as material (non-semiotic) cities to be inhabited by people of the respective countries as mentioned in almost all interviews and archival documents collected for this research.

Discourse is, as defined by Dijk (1997, p. 3), "language use" and discourse analysis is the study of "talk and text in context". Therefore, text producers, text implementers, text interpreters and text consumers become radically important in studying and analysing the discourse of public administration of Brasilia and Islamabad. This discursive approach to study urbanism is methodologically challenging, given the diverse discursive dimensions of policies and the subsequent administration and governance of the urban spaces. Therefore, discourse in this study is understood as a complex of concepts and ideas, establishing meanings to a specific phenomenon – be it planning of Islamabad and Brasilia or discourses vis-à-vis slums of both cities.

3.2 Discourse and Foucault: A Brief Overview of Foucauldian Discourse

Before providing an elaborated discussion on urbanism as a discursive construct, it is vital to discuss discourse theory in general to understand some of the basic concepts involved like power, space, truth, realities and the relationship among discursive and non-discursive elements with the help of contributions made by Foucault (1972, 1984, 1978, 1977).

Social life and all of its discursive realities and truths are products of a socially mediated human way of approaching nature often summed up as knowledge. The concept of knowledge refers to everything that is supposed to exist, for example, ideas, language, practices etc. in both discursive and non-discursive domains. Based on social constructivism, knowledge is a social construction, and this construction is an ongoing and never-ending activity, performance and process (Keller, 2005). Therefore, it can be argued that the social history of knowledge, its structures, forms as well as its content are closely interlinked. This interlinkage is an important point whereby discourse analysis and discourse theory help us to understand the dynamics in which actors of the discourse are working to stabilise what is termed as the "order of discourse" (Fairclough, 2003, p. 24). The order of discourse in this sense should be understood as a historically situated knowledge order within any society that is being internalised, produced and reproduced via acts and institutions of socialisation, and the related socio-political apparatus of any society. Language, being an essential medium of socialisation and communication, works as a medium through which realities are both communicated and constructed.

Michel Foucault offers us a radical approach to understand and analyse social discourse. Foucault's *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972) is particularly illuminating in this regard. For Foucault, discourses are to be seen as socio-historically located practices and not ideas or lines of argumentation. Foucault liberated the discourse analysis from its reductionist linguistic issues by making 'analysis of problematisation' his primary concern (Foucault, 1984). In this regard, every fixed meaning represents dynamics of power in social relations in a given time and space within a social process that is ideally capable of generating an endless variety of meanings, interpretations and subjectivities (Foucault, 1972, 1984). Discourse, therefore, is an attempt to freeze meanings to shape broader symbolic order and its stabilisation through different means. It is in this regard that the processing of discourse in society can be

understood as a dialectical interplay between actors producing statements, structuration and socio-historical meanings.

The constitutive character of discourse is further elaborated by Foucault (1972) while explaining his understanding of discursive events or statements. A statement is a function, not a sentence or inscription of what is being said or communicated. It is the function in which an act of formulation can be recognised and isolated, for example of structures, structuring, individual actions or their relationship to others. For instance, the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia have often been formulated, constructed and represented as a threat to the environment and are problematised as a threat to urban order. This kind of representation is often framed and articulated in policy documents as if it is natural. The function of statements in this regard is to formulate urban poor and slums as a 'threat', 'nuisance' and 'problem' in the past, present and future of Islamabad and Brasilia. Discourse in this sense is both structured (a result of previous structuring processes) and structuring (shaping upcoming future discursive events).

A statement is a discursive junction in which both words and things intersect and become invested with particular relations of power (Butler, 1990). Therefore, a statement is considered as a "special mode of existence" enabling "groups of signs to exist and enables rules or forms to become manifest" (Foucault, 1972, p. 88). In this way, the ultimate objective of the discourse is to naturalise what is otherwise socially constructed (Diaz-Bone et al., 2007). The constitutive effects of statements result in the construction and description of disorders and categories, which serve to provide the human sciences with a locatable object of scrutiny (Foucault, 1972). It is not to suggest that the statement defines "objects, fully formed and armed" (Foucault, 1972, p. 42) but instead "enables [the object] to appear, to juxtapose itself with the other objects, to situate itself in relation to them …in short, to be placed in a field of exteriority" (Foucault, 1972, p. 45). In this sense, discourse structures are power structures, and discursive conflicts are power struggles about the power of interpretation and action.

Power, as per Foucault's understanding, is insidious and is masked in the forms of proclaimed truth and knowledge. Power is neither fixed nor vested in one actor; rather, it is dispersed and is exercised from multiple points. In this way the agents of disciplinary power are many, like social scientists, psychologists, teachers, planners, policy analysts, bureaucracy, politicians, religious leaders, international institutions etc. Power consists of the radical acts of institutions

drawing lines of inclusion and exclusion and therefore, producing practical and social relations. Also, power is involved in reproduction and sedimentation of social relations through various discursive strategies like ideologies and fantasies (Howarth, 2010). The fundamental purpose of these discursive techniques is to conceal the contingency of social relations and to naturalise relations of domination. Power is both productive and constitutive of identities and social relationships. Given the dispersal nature of power, it is important to understand the broader context within which the local centres operate and exercise local power relations. The power is not fixed, and it is always in the process of getting fixed through discourse which produces and reinforces it.

Knowledge and truth, according to Foucault (1978), is a function of power. Foucault (1978) believes that the truth is socially produced by the interplay of knowledge and power, which not only produces it but also sanctions it. In this regard, those who are charged to establish or sanction the 'truth' gain a political status because of the power they hold, for example, through scientific discourse or their institutional affiliations. For instance, as previously discussed, the labellers occupy a strong discursive position vis-à-vis the labelled because of their access to the distribution of resources and training in scientific discourses of architecture, planning, governance and administration. Through these resources they make truth claims about the urban poor through an interplay of their knowledge and power. The technocratic rationality in policy processes and urban planning are likely to be appropriated, presented and established as truth through the exercise of power:

> [W]e must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discoursive elements that can come into play in various strategies. It is this distribution that we must reconstruct, with the things said and those concealed, the enunciations required and those forbidden, that it comprises; with the variants and different effects – according to who is speaking, his position of power, the institutional context in which he happens to be situated – that it implies; and with the shifts and reutilizations of identical formulas for contrary objectives that it also includes. Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences are (Foucault, 1978, pp. 100–101).

As enunciated in the above quotation, Foucault understands discourse as the medium within which power and knowledge are deployed. Discursive formations constitute effects of power, and the purpose of discourse analysis is to identify these discursive formations so that the power can be identified. While doing so, discourse is further limited and limiting with a series of different principles like rarefaction (making things less available to everyone, rare), the canonisation of specific texts like planning maps, planning rationalities, statistical studies, policy deliberations and classification of discursive sets (making some discursive sets available and shown while hiding the others). Different exclusionary procedures are used like taboos on various subjects and arguments and disqualification of certain discourses. Discursive production, therefore, is a structural subject where subjects are assumed as producers of their discourse, but they are the ones who are subjected to it (Pêcheux, 1995).

Generally, Foucauldian discourse fundamentally refers to two things: (1) the act of a language event (for example, a meeting or a speech etc.) and the use of language within that event (what kind of concepts are constructed, terms employed, framing techniques employed and rhetorical strategies used etc.); (2) the use of discourse to refer to groups of utterances and texts which belong to the same social domain. The purpose of focusing on linguistic aspects of discourse is to identify the patterns of utterances or texts to see how the use of language might legitimise power inequalities (Hastings, 1999). In this sense, Foucault makes some critical claims on the relationship between power and discourse. First, power is prior to knowledge, according to Foucault's later works, especially in *Discipline and Punish* (1977). With this approach language is understood as a reflection of power. Second, language use is the central way in which power relations are realised, i.e. discourses serve power by concretising it or making it real, for instance, implications of labels and truth formations embedded in labels (like 'encroacher', 'threat', 'invasions' etc.) used for the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia. Discourse, in this sense, concerns itself with the working of language to understand how, through language, meanings are produced and how specific kinds of subjects and objects are produced through which particular relations of power are realised (Luke, 1999). These power relations and their realisations are referred to as a "grid of social regularities" which is both "epistemological and ontological" because it constructs a problem group and how the group is seen or known as problems by others (Scheurich, 1997, p. 107). This labelling of a problem group, as the urban poor in our case, is critical to the maintenance of social order.

Butler (1997, p. 5) declares that "one 'exists' not only by virtue of being recognized, but, in a prior sense, by being recognizable" [emphasis in original]. Therefore, it is important in my case to see how the urban poor are being made recognisable objects of the discourse of urban development in Islamabad and Brasilia through various enunciative statements, labels and their existence in the field of exteriority. This objectification is very problematic because it serves "no longer a monument for the future memory, but a document for possible use" (Foucault, 1977, p. 191), and is therefore, reductionist.

In this research, labels are understood as 'statements' within the development discourses of the CDA and FDA, which are used to describe, articulate and represent the urban poor as recognisable objects of discourse. These discursive formations vis-à-vis the urban poor serve as discursive truth-objects through the description of labels like 'encroachers', 'invasions', 'slums', 'environmental threats', 'dangerous' in the context of Islamabad and Brasilia. Labels, in the Foucauldian sense, gradually alter from being transitory or descriptive categories to construct and reveal the truth about the labelled individuals. Through the process of objectification and more or less accurate repetition, individuals not only come to occupy space in the social hierarchy but also come to know and accept their place vis-à-vis others in the same cities. In this way, labels as statements are things said and verified that would privilege particular ways of seeing and codifying certain practices. The privileged position and dominance of such statements show a particular constituting field of power-knowledge which not only justifies the practices derived from such statements but also disguises the exclusionary and discriminatory logic of such practices under apolitical and presumably desired labels such as 'development', 'growth' and 'progress'.

Conceptually, there are different understandings and definitions of discourse focusing on language, performance, action, power, narrative, semiotic and non-semiotic aspects. Foucauldian discourse is comprised of all of them but is neither synonymous nor reducible to any one of them. All of them have different conceptual and epistemological underpinnings. Foucault's ideas in his *Archaeology of Knowledge* have provided the analytical framework for the study of urban questions and public policy in Graham (2006), Garrity (2010), Jansen (2008), and Hastings (2000). According to Foucault, at least in his earlier work the *Archaeology of Knowledge*, discourse focuses on the structural process of subject formation because discourse is a dispersion instead of a narrative. Therefore, there are numerous possibilities of different subjects as well as different understanding and structuring of

discourses. For instance, in our case, the subjects are the citizens of Islamabad and Brasilia, especially the urban poor who are subjected to disciplinary power, or subjects that are both constrained and enabled by discursive boundaries of which they are inescapably a part (Garrity, 2010). The formation of subjects and objects of discourses are of prime concern for Foucault because he aims to describe discursive formation instead of interpreting them. Foucault (1972, pp. 138–139) describes his archaeology as a description of discourse and discursive formations:

> It [archaeology] does not treat discourse as *document*, as a sign of something else, as an element that ought to be transparent […], it is concerned with discourse in its own volume, as a *monument.* It is not an interpretative discipline: it does not seek another, better-hidden discourse. It refuses to be 'allegorical' [italics and emphasis in original].

In this regard, an object is not a reality that exists outside the discourse; instead, it is part of the discourse itself. It is through discourse that it becomes nameable and describable – a label with the baggage through which objects and subjects appear, described, given status as well as designations by authorities like urban municipalities. While doing so, concepts and strategies are employed with consistency to construct objects of discourse, for instance, labels, disciplinary vocabulary, meta-narratives like development, growth, progress etc., justifying, constructing and naturalising object formation and their position in broader societal discourse. In this regard, as Foucault (1972) reminds us, it is important to keep in mind that such themes, labels, discourses and strategies are not mutually exclusive. Rather, a single theme, for instance, that of criminality, and two types of discourses or multiple discourses and one theme (like exclusion) is very much possible.

According to Foucault (2001, p. 237), discourse analysis aims to dissect and disrupt the familiar with the help of interrogation of "the discourses of true and false…the correlative formation of domains and objects […] the verifiable, falsifiable discourses that bear on them; and it is not just their formations that interests me but the effects in the real to which they are linked". It is in this regard that the discourse of Foucault is different from that of Habermas (1987) who believes in modernist rationality ensured through communicative rationality. Following Habermas' (1987) notion of rationality, as argued by Richardson (1996), our obsession becomes focused on establishing or disproving rationality and its credentials. This

obsession then blinds us to the fact that urban and regional policies, like any other policy, are shaped by arguments based on knowledge claims which may be reasonable or unreasonable. On the other hand, Foucault's understanding of discourse is not about objective truth, proving or disproving the arguments but about how power appropriates knowledge and weaves it into discourse. It is the interface of power and knowledge that is of prime importance in Foucault's understanding of discourse.

3.3 Critical Discourse Analysis and Its Assumptions

There are many approaches to discourse analysis because of the rich theoretical traditions in social theory and critical social sciences (for example, Dijk, 1997, 2001; Wodak, 2001, 2009, 2012, 2014; Krzyzanowski & Wodak 2009; Fairclough, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2013; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). Critical Discourse Analysis differs slightly from Foucauldian perspectives on discourse and discourse analysis. Critical Discourse Analysis enables us to establish and analyse the links between discursive and non-discursive constructions whereby language is to be seen and understood as a medium of both communication and social construction while producing and reproducing power hierarchies in any society. According to the fundamental principles of Critical Discourse Analysis, discursive practices directly contribute to the making of social identities, social realities and social relations. Therefore, the linguistic analysis of discourse should be informed by a broader social context.

As mentioned above, Critical Discourse Analysis has different approaches dependent upon different ontological and epistemological approaches. Briefly, there are four significant approaches: the Sociocognitive Approach; Discourse Historical Approach; Social Actor Analysis; and Dialectical Relational Approach. All of these approaches are discussed briefly before elaborating the Dialectical Relational Approach that has been selected as the prime methodological and analytical tool for this study.

3.3.1 Sociocognitive Approach of Critical Discourse Analysis

According to the Sociocognitive Approach, discourse is understood as 'mental models' and 'context models' that are present in the episodic memory of the language users. This approach is developed and propagated by Dijk (1997, 2010) who defines mental models as a subjective representation of any event, situation or actions. Similarly, context models are understood as

subjective interpretations and understandings of social environments. According to this approach, the mental models and context models through which humans interact are primarily products of the social dimensions of discourse and cognitive mental functions. These models then serve as bases through which text and talk are both produced and comprehended by individuals (Dijk, 2010). It is not to suggest that these models are static or fixed. Rather they are continuously in the process of updating or forming new models based on the discursive interaction between individual and his/her surroundings. In this way, the Sociocognitive Approach attempts to link up discourse structures with social structures. Therefore, the analysis informed by this approach distinguishes between semantic macrostructures and microstructures in a text. For instance, semantic macrostructures, according to Dijk (1988), will be headlines and lead lines in a newspaper which are helpful in constructing global meanings and ideologically informed discourses that interact with semantic microstructures, i.e. the socially shared beliefs of speakers in a text, therefore, forming a dominant or hegemonic discourse.

3.3.2 Discourse Historical Approach

As the name suggests, scholars engaged with the Discourse Historical Approach keep the focus on the historical and social context in which discursive events happen. In this regard, it is believed that all stages of analysis should be embedded in and informed by the context:

> In investigating historical, organizational and political topics and texts, the discourse-historical approach attempts to integrate a large quantity of available knowledge about the historical sources and the background of the social and political fields in which discursive 'events' are embedded [emphasis in original] (Wodak, 2001, p. 65).

The context, which is of prime importance in the Discourse Historical Approach, is comprised of language used, intertextual relationships, social variables and frames as well as the broader socio-political and historical context surrounding discursive events. The Discourse Historical Approach maintains that the content of the data should be seen together with discourse strategies and their linguistic aspects in all levels of context and analysis. It is not an archaeological exercise about discovering meaning-making events in history but an

interdisciplinary engagement informed by multiple insights from different methodological and theoretical approaches to provide contextually situated and informed analysis.

3.3.3 Social Actor Analysis

In studying and understanding discourse, Social Actor Analysis focuses on humans as central actors in discursive events. According to this approach, the involvement of humans in discursive events plays a pivotal role in analysing and forming discourses and discursive events. This approach is propagated by Theo van Leeuwen (1995, 2007, 2008) along with the contributions of other scholars like Lamb (2013) and Koller (2012). Given the power dynamics involved in the articulation and production of discourse, Social Actor Analysis focuses on the representation and positioning of individuals and social groups in actions and interactions in a given time to uncover the power relations and power dynamics involved. The focus of Social Actor Analysis on representation and the position of social actors and their actions provides us with an opportunity to bridge the gap between discourse (re)produced and the broader context of socio-political structures. For instance, the formative effects of discourse like inclusion, exclusion, personalisation etc. of social actors are recognised by Social Actor Analysis along with discursive manifestations of social actions and practices.

Social Actor Analysis has given us the means to understand the relationship between discourse, power and social actors. In this regard, Koller (2012) has further developed Social Actor Analysis to understand the processes of identity construction while focusing on power relations among different social groups. Similarly, Lamb (2013), while drawing on the Social Actor Analysis approach, studied immigration discourses in the United Kingdom (UK). Lamb (2013) came up with details on multiple forms of representation of migrants by different social groups and organisations in the UK. In doing so, Lamb (2013) shows how different social actors have different arguments and discursive positions vis-à-vis migrants and refugees in the country.

3.3.4 Dialectical Relational Approach

Unlike the approaches mentioned above, the Dialectical Relational Approach of Critical Discourse Analysis understands discourse as part of the social process. In this sense, it is dialectically related to the social relations, power, institutions, political structures, cultural

norms, language and beliefs in any society. According to this approach, language, ideology, power and social actions are linked, and their relationship constitutes discourse. Therefore, discourse should be seen as part of the social process that exists within a broader social setting (Fairclough, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2003).

According to Fairclough (1992, 1995), Critical Discourse Analysis is comprised of text analysis, discursive practices and social practices. In this regard, text analysis is understood as the scrutiny of grammar cohesion, vocabulary, concepts and labels along with the structure of the text. By thorough analysis of the text the researcher will be in a better position to understand how new concepts and categories are constructed, used and propagated by the policymakers. For instance, labels like 'encroachers', 'invasions', and conceptualisation of 'threat' and 'problem' which are used in reference to the urban poor of Brasilia and Islamabad are not mere words but are categories through which certain social groups and individuals are viewed and realised by state institutions. Similarly, analysis of discursive practices is understood as an analysis of the processes in which texts are framed and represented; for example, analysis of the context in which statements are made and how these statements are linked, reified and produced through their link with other debates and texts. For instance, occupation of public land by the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia is usually linked to environmental threats regardless of the size, location and composition of the settlements. Their residential strategies are discouraged and criminalised through linking them with environmental debates and discourses, which are not linked to social empathy or marginalisation of the urban poor in Islamabad and Brasilia at all.

While giving due importance to text and discursive practices, Critical Discourse Analysis focuses on social practices as well analysing wider ideological and power structures in society. Social practices constitute social fields, institutions, and organisations which ultimately lead to the formation of the 'order of discourse' (Fairclough, 1992). According to Fairclough (1992), intertextuality can only be understood while giving due attention to the context in which text is produced, discursive practices are taking place, and social practice is shaped and experienced. In short, the Critical Discourse Analysis of Fairclough is summarised in the following way:

> Critical Discourse Analysis, then, aims to explore the relationship between discursive practices, events, and texts; and wider social and cultural

> structures, relations and processes. CDA explores how texts construct representations of the world, social relationships, and social identities, and there is an emphasis on highlighting how such practices and texts are ideologically shaped by relations of power (Taylor, 2004, p. 435).

Critical Discourse Analysis combines the external and internal relations of text. Fairclough (1992, 2013) refers to the 'order of discourse', which is understood as a "particular configuration of different genres, different discourses and different styles. An order of discourse is a social structuring of semiotic difference, a particular social ordering of the relationship between different ways of making meaning – different genres, discourse and styles" (Fairclough, 2013, p. 180). For example, in our case, the network of social practices that constitute the field of the urban poor and urban governance can be understood semiotically as an order of discourse as they are comprised of discursive markers like linguistic contrasts, reproduction of qualification, normative bars, declarations and distance markers to sustain the 'order of the things'.

It is also important to mention that the Dialectical Relational Approach of Critical Discourse Analysis focuses on various dimensions of power following a Gramscian approach to power and hegemony. In this way, the Dialectical Relational Approach views discursive practices as social struggles in which social actors struggle to hegemonise orders of discourse. Scholars have used this approach to analyse and discuss the discourse related to globalisation and neo-liberal capitalist ideologies in the British context see, for example, Fairclough, 1995; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999 and Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 2010).

Unlike Foucauldian discourse, Critical Discourse Analysis and its Dialectical Relational Approach understand discursive practices and their relationship with subsequent social constructions. That is why Critical Discourse Analysis focuses on language because of its dual character, i.e. communication and construction at the same time; therefore, language is seen as social action (Wetherell, 2001). The Dialectical Relational Approach asserts that language should be seen and analysed within socio-political and cultural contexts. Discourse, in this sense, is understood as the controlling force to sway and influence individuals and social groups (Wodak, 2001). This research intends to use Critical Discourse Analysis in the critical evaluation of policy documents and texts in Islamabad and Brasilia, to help to expose how

discourse influences individuals and social groups in the larger discursive spaces of Islamabad and Brasilia.

3.4 Critical Discourse Analysis and Public Policy: An Analytical Framework

All of the streams of Critical Discourse Analysis mentioned above are critical of the assumed neutrality of language and its implications on the social world. However, the Dialectical Relational Approach and the contributions of Fairclough (1992, 1995, 2000, 2003, 2013) are particularly important for this research. Fairclough believes that discourse not only (re)produces or alters knowledge, identities or social relations but also is shaped and influenced by pre-existing social structures, norms, values and beliefs. For instance, the dialectical character of language and its relationship with the social world is described as follows:

> Viewing language use as a social practice […] also implies that language is a socially and historically situated mode of action, in a dialectical relationship with other facets of the social. What I mean by a dialectical relationship is that it is socially shaped, but is also socially shaping – or socially *constitutive.* Critical discourse analysis explores the tension between these two sides of language use, the socially shaped and socially constitutive, rather than opting one-sidedly for one or the other [italics in original] (Fairclough, 1995, pp. 54–55).

Drawing on Fairclough (1995), speech acts are performative acts of language in which language is understood both as a social construction as well as an agent of constructing social practice. This idea and understanding of language, of which discourse is a part, is directly based on the epistemological foundations of this study, i.e. social constructivism. In this sense, as Flick (2014) pointed out, social constructivism is the theoretical foundation of discourse analysis wherein language occupies a central position.

In analysing discourse, especially related to policy and urban governance, it is important to be aware of power relations because of the different objectives, motives, interests and preferences of the different social actors involved. Power, in the context of policy analysis, is more than decision-making (Richardson, 1996): it includes the power of creation, production,

reproduction, reinforcement, and validation of specific social and political values and practices in its ambit. Lukes (2005) adds another dimension, i.e. to shape, reshape and influence people's preferences so that the conflicts in any society may be regulated. Given his radical understanding of power, Lukes (2005, p. 28) asks:

> Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things…?

Knowledge claims within such systems are validated and established through discursive construction and argumentation. Hence, the role of power remains central to the analysis because knowledge production, as well as its exchange and dissemination, are infused with ideological and political practices. These practices and ideologies are not so democratic insofar as they protect some while exploiting others (Richardson, 1996). Having said that, Critical Discourse Analysis places the micro-operations of power and practices in a broader socio-political and ideological context. Planning debates, policies and discursive aspects in them both shape and get shaped by broader discourse. In this regard, policies should be considered as debates shaped by dominant discourse and not as a result of some deliberation and consensus via communication.

Despite different streams and focal points within Critical Discourse Analysis, the underlying assumption remains the same: discourse is understood as a meaning-making activity; therefore, it is an integral part of social processes; language remains an important area of analysis and inquiry which is linked with broader social structures and norms, and; discourse is a way of seeing and explaining a given set of circumstance. In short, Critical Discourse Analysis is all about discursive elements (semiotic/linguistics) and their relationship with non-discursive (non-semiotic) elements of society like institutions, socio-political structures as well as ideologies etc. In this way, Critical Discourse Analysis aims to not only level a normative critique or to explain existing realities but evaluates them.

How does Critical Discourse Analysis and its assumptions work methodologically? First of all, as Fairclough (2013) mentions, the essential task is to problematise the various issues under consideration. Problematisation is also part of a discourse, or at least represents a

discourse. For instance, it is needed to problematise the problematisations of CDA and FDA in which the urban poor are normatively labelled, judged and designated as truth-objects and the source of problems for Islamabad and Brasilia. Problematisations of public bureaucracy are two-edged swords because of their dual character of identifying and constructing the problem as well as demanding and implying certain forms of solutions. Therefore, Critical Discourse Analysis treats and understands discourse as elements in the social actions of social actors instead of analysing them somewhat in isolation from the actions. Discourse provides external reasons for action; therefore, they should be seen together and not separately (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012). For example, discourse related to buzzwords like 'development', 'growth', 'governance', 'poor' etc. are usually transnational in countries like Pakistan and Brazil because of their dependent status on international financial institutions and unequal relationships with the Global North. In such cases, as this research shows, discourses are the external reasons for actions which add both authenticity and admiration to the actions of state institutions like the CDA and FDA.

In critical policy studies and the treatment of the texts produced by urban municipalities, Critical Discourse Analysis helps to highlight the relations between semiotic and extra-semiotic factors. These extra-semiotic factors will not only provide a context but would also help to analyse the semiotic elements because of their direct influence on the selection, retention and production of specific strategies and ideologies while downplaying the others. This is how the dominant discourse is served, and hegemony is established over the contingent discourse so that the 'order of discourse' can be sustained.

The social process is regarded as an interplay of at least three levels of social reality: social structures; social practices; and social events (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). The interplay among them guides the analytical strength of Critical Discourse Analysis. Social practices are not seen as independent of the context which comprises both social structures and social events (discursive or otherwise). Social practices in this regard are understood as networks constituted by social fields, institutions, and organisations etc. Social practices, therefore, mediate the relationship between presumably abstract and general social structures and concrete and situated social events. The focus of Critical Discourse Analysis is "on two dialectical relations: between structure (especially social practices as a more concrete level of structuring) and events (or: structure and action, structure and strategy); and, within each, between semiotic and other elements" (Fairclough, 2013, p. 179).

Further, Critical Discourse Analysis maintains that a concrete relationship exists between semiotic and other elements. Therefore, Fairclough (2013) argues that there are three significant ways in which the semiotic category is related to other elements, i.e. social practices and social events. The three ways are described as a “facet of action”, “representation of aspects of the world” and “constitution of identities” (Fairclough, 2013, p. 179) and the corresponding discourse-analytical or semiotic categories are genre, discourse and style. Genres are defined as semiotic ways of action and interaction, for example, job interviews, publicity, public notices etc. On the other hand, discourses are understood as semiotic ways of representation or construction of aspects of the social world (can be physical or mental). The identification of discourse is then linked to different positions and perspectives of different socio-economic groups and actors. For instance, in the case of Islamabad and Brasilia, it is important to see which social group’s aspects and positions are dismantled and rejected by the state while it reinforces, acknowledges and ratifies other social groups. Corresponding to genres and discourse, styles are identities or “ways of being” (Fairclough, 2013, p. 179) in their semiotic aspects, for example, ‘manager’, ‘administrator’, ‘expert’, ‘consultant’.

The semiotic dimension of social practices, including social fields and institutions, is what Fairclough (1992, 2013) has referred to as the ‘order of discourse’. Similarly, the semiotic aspect of events is understood as ‘text’. The order of discourse, in this way, is a particular set of configurations of multiple genres, discourses and styles. In this sense, the order of discourse is assumed to have a stabilised existence. It can be considered as “social structuring of semiotic difference, a particular social ordering [and hierarchy] of relationships between different ways of making meaning” (Fairclough, 2013, p. 180). For instance, the network of social practices that constitute urban governance and planning in Islamabad and Brasilia is considered as an order of discourse. Similarly, ‘text’ is to be seen in its all-inclusive sense. Text exists in a written form like policy reports or planning documents but includes other forms of acting and interacting as well, such as conversations, interviews, visuals, sound, images, banners as well as the mediums through which they are performed like body language, pathways, social distancing, and also the physical and social capacity of the different actors involved.

It is important to mention here that discourses that originate or are hegemonic in one social field carry within them the possibility of recontextualisation in other fields. This is a kind of

appropriation of so-called 'external' discourses (Fairclough, 2013) and a strategy of particular agents and actors in the field where recontextualisation has been done. For example, as discussed previously, the very idea of a new, modernist and model city like Islamabad and Brasilia is very much rooted in discourses of developmentalism where urbanisation and industrialisation have been regarded as engines of growth, development and progress. The ideas of modernism were very much part of the post-colonial world order in which forces of capitalism and international financial institutions were guiding the Global South states like Pakistan (Daeschel, 2015), India, Brazil, Peru and Argentina (see, for example, Almandoz, 2016).

Discourses, according to the Dialectical Relational Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis, are operationalised and put into practice in different ways in the case of Islamabad and Brasilia. They are enacted as new ways of action and interaction because both Pakistan and Brazil were developing and constructing new capital cities from scratch for the first time. While doing so, they were reproducing and concretising new identities like 'threat', 'invasions', 'encroachers' in the urban context of Islamabad and Brasilia. Further, all of these were physically materialised where new urban spaces were created (architecturally), social relations were regulated, and social spaces were organised according to the socio-economic status of the inhabitants. It is precisely in this sense that Critical Discourse Analysis argues for a focus on both semiotic and extra-semiotic aspects of the discourse.

In our case, the metaphorisation and structuring of the relationship of 'us' and 'them' are two of the most important discourse strategies that are employed by the bureaucracies of Islamabad and Brasilia. Metaphor, in critical discourse studies, is a linguistic representation that causes semantic shift according to the preferences and intentions of language users. Use of metaphors signify the "ideologies underlying language" that can be unearthed by critically analysing metaphors and their relations with the wider ideology and power structures in society (Charteris-Black, 2011, p. 45). Metaphorisation as a discursive strategy also helps what Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 4) have referred to as "plugging in", which is defined as a process by which one discourse or text is connected to another to make (or unmake) claim to a discourse territory. In this research, Critical Discourse Analysis of metaphor and metaphorisation is informed by the socio-political and cultural frames of the context in which they are employed. For instance, using metaphors related to cleaning and hygiene repeatedly

is an attempt to pursue specific social roles and political objectives, which is the construction of the urban poor as a socially deviant group in our case.

Another important aspect is the discursive structuring of the relationship of 'us' and 'them'. The purpose of the categories of 'us' and 'them' is the normalisation of the subjects by positioning them in relation to one another so that the relationship of inclusion and exclusion, in-group and out-group, of self and others can be structured to sustain social hegemonies and hierarchies (among others, see Wirth-Koliba, 2016; Fairclough, 2015, 1995, 1992; Sowińska & Dubrovskaya, 2012; Wodak, 2008; Pandey, 2004; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). Individuals, in either of the categories, see themselves vis-à-vis others. They no longer see themselves in their "individualities but in their individualization" so that the deviance can be constructed, regulated, and controlled exclusively based on their "enumeration and classification" (Camargo, 2009, pp. 912–913). In the case of public bureaucracy and official policies, the construction of 'us' and 'them' legitimises the intervention, and establishment of agreements among different individuals and social groups to stabilise and reproduce social interactions. 'Us' and 'them' are at the same time mutually exclusive as well as dependent on each other. It makes 'us' look at 'them' not to see them-selves but us-selves. These categories are usually based on conventional, cultural, and social understandings and concepts that are simultaneously constructing, creating, and reifying the constructed realities.

Further, the discourse of classification, which is articulated through the collective as argued by Laclau & Mouffe (2001), also reproduce a certain set of qualifications of 'us' and 'them'. These qualifications and the differences they imply are visible in the linguistic contrasts, i.e. positive self-representation versus negative other presentation (Dijk, 1997). In this regard, proximation came up as another discursive strategy with the sole purpose of legitimising the interventions (Cap, 2008, 2010). While creating homogenous categories and essentialising them, proximation emerges as a discourse strategy so that the controlling measures and interventions can be proposed, justified, and legitimised for a certain group of individuals, like the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia. Homogenising and monologic terms, for example, us, they, them etc. then appear to be the proximation strategies, generalisations, and distance markers to reify and reproduce the differences between various socio-economic groups (Pandey, 2004).

For example, the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia are labelled and presented as an objectionable, disvalued, threatening, and annoying social group in the discursive landscape of urban planning, development rationale, and governance since the inception of the city (for details, see chapter 7). Their labelling and presentation are not value-free, rather, the parameters, normative claims and values through which behaviour is to be judged are context specific and socially constructed and reflective of power hierarchies and social inequalities (Dodge, 1985; Garland, 2001). The purpose of such social constructions, especially related to social deviance, is primarily related to the control and regulation of society while camouflaging the power relations and socio-material inequalities (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009). In this regard, essentialisation and criminalisation are two important markers through which the socially deviant status of the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia is established, propagated and naturalised.

In the case of state institutions, the discourse leaves less room for contingent discourse, therefore, it assumes a dominant position and is reflective of the hegemony of discourse communities that are defined as "sociorhetorical networks that form in order to work towards sets of common goals" (Swales, 1990, p. 9). This can also be seen in contrasting similarities and/or differences, where multiplicity interacts and results in dominant patterns of the construction of policy objects and subjects in urban spaces (Fricke & Guallini, 2017) (see chapter 7). Apart from internal instabilities that are inherent to any discourse, the larger discourse order that has been stabilised by continuous repetition and reproduction is monologic despite being in a field of significant differences (Howarth, 2010). The stabilisation of discourses in a field of significant differences through various discursive strategies as discussed above aims at controlling and constructing the subjects and the objects of the policy.

This is not to claim that this research is a holistic attempt to understand the urban poor and corresponding development discourses of the CDA and FDA in Islamabad and Brasilia, respectively. It is virtually impossible to comprehend and analyse all of the discourse and discursive events. What this research attempts to do is to merely "provide a coherent and consistent explanation of events" (Jacobs, 1999, p. 208) because public policy discourse is a system of meaning and, by implication, a strategy for action (Healey, 2006). Using Critical Discourse Analysis and insights from Foucauldian discourse analysis as discussed above, this research aims at explaining power imbalances and their implications for the urban poor in relation to where they live, i.e. slums. While doing so, the corpus of the study has been

critically analysed, and certain discursive practices, statements, and events are identified in various labelling devices and framing techniques employed by the CDA and FDA. Discourse analytic categories of nomination, prediction, argumentation, framing, constructivism, scientification and naturalisation have been identified in the corpus of the study showing power imbalances in favour of state institutions in their relationship with the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia.

In addition, textual and intertextual analysis of the data is performed at all stages of data collection and data analysis in order to contextualise the debates, policy documents and the lived experiences of those who are objects of CDA and FDA policy, i.e. the urban poor. While doing so, significant themes like criminalisation, threat, encroachment, social deviance, essentialisation, homogenisation and naturalisation of socio-economic hierarchies are identified which are directly linked to the demarcation of physical and social spaces of the urban poor in both cities. According to the fundamental premise of Critical Discourse Analysis, the semiotic and non-semiotic elements are linked with the help of both the semiotic characters of the texts as well as their major constructions and representations of the urban poor in the real world where they live and interact with rest of the society – an argument in line with the labelling approach and its implication.

3.5 Challenges of Engaging with Discourse Analysis: Some Limitations

Like all methodological approaches, Critical Discourse Analysis also has some limitations and challenges which should be duly noted. The research fieldwork and data collection were conducted with due consideration of such challenges and limitations, which will be discussed in the rest of this chapter.

Discourses are neither situations nor the context of situations but are parts of the situations (Clarke, 2005). Similarly, discourse is not one event; therefore, it cannot be established or discarded by one event (Keller, 2012). Discourse can be understood as a sum of variations of discursive events, actualisations and practices regarding a particular object or subject of discourses. In this way, it is not an easy task to territorialise the corpus where discourse analysis is performed and arguments are grounded. Despite the post-structural basis of discourse analysis, the analysis involves a kind of structuration of the context. In this way, a necessary hypothetical construct for discourse analysis will be unity of the structuring context

which has to be established by the discourse researcher. For instance, researchers like myself have to consider the urban poor and state institutions as a unit regardless of different individual positions, experiences and preferences.

With the extensive and multiple use of the term ‘discourse’ and its conceptual baggage, discourse is understood as a concept, which means everything from language to ideology. Therefore, it is certainly not possible to limit its meanings in any conceivable manner. It is therefore very likely that different meanings of the term may be invoked during the process of analysis and its operationalisation, thereby questioning any stable or theoretical understanding of the term. It is because of such issues that discourse analysis, be it critical or otherwise, faces considerable criticism from multiple theoretical approaches, especially in analysing urban policy (Jacobs, 2006).

The first and most important criticism is that discourse analysis tends to be reductionist. Discourse analysis, as a methodological framework, reduces everything to discourse without considering the countless material realities of life (Imrie, Pinch & Boyle, 1996). Due to limited resources (financial or otherwise), the analysis and discussion will always be based on a limited data set; therefore, the questions related to research biases and researcher’s biases remain very important. These limitations have also been acknowledged by Critical Discourse Analysis scholars like Fairclough, Jessop & Sayer (2004), and others like Garrity (2010) and Hitzler & Keller (1989).

To address the limitations mentioned above, the researcher must remain self-reflexive and explicit about the discourse territory (the wider context in which the discourse analysis is rooted and based on). The self-reflection of the researcher should not only be an important factor in analysing the corpus of the study but should also guide the process of selection and collection of data to remain as unbiased as possible. Together with self-reflection, discourse territory should be understood and established with the help of knowledge of the wider context. To do so, an extensive literature review and adopting multiple methodologies at the same time are necessary steps for anyone engaged with discourse analysis. For example, in this research the researcher has not only extensively reviewed both theoretical and empirical literature on urbanism in Islamabad and Brasilia as well as on discourse theory and discourse methodology but has also adopted multiple methods to collect data. The data collection process for this research involves archival research, ethnographies of slums and public offices

of Islamabad and Brasilia and in-depth semi-structured interviews with a wide range of actors (public officials, policymakers, professional architects, residents of different neighbourhoods, residents of slums and some oral history accounts of construction workers and early settlers of both cities). This has been rendered as a viable and more scientific process of selection and retention of the text because it is noticed and found out to be "dominated, stable and homogenous in production", as suggested by Pêcheux (1995, p. 236).

3.6 Data Collection

Critical Discourse Analysis demands rigorous and often challenging methodological considerations. Description and operationalisation of discourse theory as a methodology is one part of it. The second and most important part is the selection and collection of the data set that is to be analysed. Discourse territory, the corpus of the data where discourse analysis is to be conducted, should be defined and demarcated to have a grounded analysis and provide the findings of any research. Given the methodological challenges and limitations of discourse analysis as a research methodology, the data collection for this research is carried out via three different but complementary methods. Data collection is done through archival research, in-depth semi-structured interviews and ethnography for a comparative study of the slums of Islamabad and Brasilia. The data collection started in September 2014 for my Master's dissertation at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. My thesis at that time was more like elementary work about the slums of Islamabad. After completion of my Masters, I remained connected to my field and started working on my PhD proposal; therefore, the data collection process continued in one way or another to get as much data as possible from Islamabad.

Before explaining data collection in detail, it is important to mention that the 'case study' in this research is understood as an analysis of an aspect of a "historical episode" instead of the "historical event itself" (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 18). For instance, the making of Islamabad and Brasilia and the rise of slums within them is a historical instance of many different types of historical events of the 1960s like international developmentalism, urbanisation, scientific rationality, capitalism and state-led growth under the supervision of international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and World Trade Organization etc. The most important aspect in analysing the historical episode is to find an analytical equivalent in cases of both Islamabad and Brasilia. In this research, that analytical equivalent is comprised of the slums, the urban

poor, and their representation in and through the development discourses surrounding them since the inception of Islamabad and Brasilia.

3.6.1 Archival Research

As mentioned briefly earlier, the archival research for this study started in September 2014. The archival data collection has two principal sources: desktop research where online archives and sources could be accessed, for example, official websites of the CDA and various departments of the FDA; and physical visits to an archival collection of the CDA in Iqbal Hall, G-7/3-4 Islamabad and the Public Archives of the Federal District (Arquivo Público do Distrito Federal – ArPDF) in Brasilia. It was in January 2016 when I formally started collecting archival data for my research proposal. Since then, the collection of documents and other archives has been in progress to this day. However, it was during 2018 when I became able to go to Brasilia for my fieldwork. From June 2018 to November 2018, I formally started collecting my data from Brasilia. I could access archival material and documents, like the master plan of the city, survey reports, historical photographs, memoirs and oral history interviews that were kept by the ArPDF. In the next round of fieldwork, I collected the archival material and documents from the library of the CDA in Islamabad from December 2018 to June 2019.

Planning documents, policy manuscripts and official maps, in the case of Islamabad and Brasilia, construct the agenda of community housing, slum rehabilitation, urban planning, urban development, and provision of infrastructural development (roads, parks, public spaces, streets, public transport, educational institutes, health facilities and law and order related institutions etc.). Therefore, the first part of my discourse territory is comprised of the planning and policy documents. In this regard, it is important to mention that the documents collected from Brasilia are not collected from one office or department of the FDA. As mentioned earlier, the FDA is comprised of many departments and organisations like SEGETH, CODEPLAN, TERRACAP, NOVACAP, AGEFIS, and CODHAB etc. These documents were selected from hundreds that were available in the ArPDF but access to the latest documents, especially after the 1980s, was virtually impossible because of my non-citizen status in Brazil. I was told several times that the documents are 'sensitive' and 'confidential'; therefore, they cannot be shared. To avoid the researcher's biases and collection of any biased material from the archives, the theoretical model of the research and discourse theory served

as a fundamental guide. While doing so, all of the documents that are related in one way or another to the planning and development of Brasilia and its territorial management were collected. In addition, policy documents regarding the urban poor and slums, especially documents related to anti-encroachment campaigns, upgrading or rehabilitation of slums, have been collected by using a digitalised database accessible to the researcher in ArPDF.

The FDA planning and policy documents were of many different types because of the different mandates of different organisations and offices working for the administration of Brasilia. These documents are comprised of public notices, newspaper clippings (that were collected and referred to in the official planning documents), official press releases, planning maps, surveys, demographic studies, low-income housing projects, the administration of land in Brasilia as well as housing developments in Brasilia. In this regard, some documents were also collected from consultants who are working in close collaboration with the FDA given the heritage status of Brasilia. The publications of officials, for example, from CODEPLAN, which is associated with demographic studies, were also collected as they were referred to in the interviews. Further, ArPDF also had transcribed interviews from some of the *candangos* (the people who built the city of Brasilia as construction workers and planners) and early planners of Brasilia like Lucio Costa and Israel Pinho, the first head of NOVACAP – the construction company of the federal capital Brasilia. These interviews were also collected as they carry first-hand official perspectives of the construction days of Brasilia and its immediate future.

3.6.1.1 Photographs

Apart from policy documents and interviews, ArPDF also has another very valuable form of data, i.e. photographs taken during the construction of Brasilia. The photographs provided visual aids to understand and comprehend issues like the discrimination among different ranks of candango, the evolution of early slums and construction camps and the plight of poor construction workers who were living in miserable and dangerous conditions. These issues have been referred to several times in the literature, interviews and some of the newspaper clippings that I collected from ArPDF. Therefore, finding photographs of those times and their labelling in the database provided valuable information for the data collection and subsequent analysis. For instance, all of the photographs showing the habitations of poor construction workers or residences of the early urban poor of Brasilia were labelled as ‘invasão,’ i.e.

invasion or encroachment or ‘favela,’ i.e. slum. Sometimes, the description is also comprised of labels like ‘ocupação,’ i.e. occupation or possession.

Before going further into data collection from the second site of my fieldwork, i.e. Islamabad, it is important to mention the challenges and hurdles that had influenced my archival research in Brasilia. Presidential elections in Brazil were scheduled for October 7, 2018; therefore, the collection of some documents was simply not allowed due to legal regulations regarding general elections in the country. I was advised by my respondents (public officials of both low or high rank), that during these times they could not share any kind of planning or policy-related documents regarding new or ongoing projects in Brasilia. It is not that I was an outsider, but the access to such documents was equally denied to citizens of Brazil as well. Both of my research assistants were also denied access to any such information.

In addition, as expected, I was denied access to all kinds of documents from different state institutions and departments on the pretext of me being non-Brazilian. I was told many times that policy documents contain financial information, policy deliberations and the personal data of hundreds of people, especially in cases of low-income housing projects or demographic surveys. Therefore, my access to such documents was restricted, and I was allowed to access only those documents that have already been made public, i.e. either present online in web portals or sent to ArPDF. This predicament was shared with colleagues from the University of Brasilia with which I had been associated as a ‘visiting scholar’ to facilitate my navigation in public offices and to get in touch with the most relevant people. My colleagues there told me that accessing public documents is undoubtedly not an easy thing because of the high level of corruption in the public offices of Brazil. It proved to be accurate as well given the corruption scandals and everyday debates in Brazilian society where corruption has almost become a synonym of public office. In my conversations with university students, graduates and other young people, the ideal job in Brazil, and especially in Brasilia, is to work for the state as a public servant. Being a public official, job security is ensured along with very flexible working hours because of the typical indifferent attitude of most of the officials towards the general public or their prescribed work. In this regard, it was tough to differentiate between Pakistan and Brazil. One of the perks of being a government official, as I was told, is the possibility of making lots of money through illegal and corrupt practices.

Similarly, accessing planning and policy documents from Pakistan is also not an easy task. Despite my previous research experience with Pakistani bureaucracy, especially with the CDA, it was equally difficult for me to get recent documents or project related information in Islamabad. My formal fieldwork for my PhD started in December 2018. Like the ArPDF in Brasilia, the archival documents of the CDA are available and kept in Iqbal Hall, CDA Library, where public access to the documents is ensured. Unlike Brasilia, the documents here are not digitalised; therefore, the collection and selection of documents have to be done manually without any prior guidelines or index list. All of the documents related to the master plan of Islamabad were prepared by Doxiadis Associates – the consultant firm for the planning and construction of Islamabad – for the CDA and the government of Pakistan. Along with the documents, they also prepared an index list outlining the name and number of reports that have been submitted. However, the library contains many other documents as well that I could find while looking in dusty shelves of the cupboards.

To standardise the data collection process for both Islamabad and Brasilia, the selection of documents was informed and guided by the same theoretical and methodological considerations. Similar to Brasilia, all of the documents on the planning and territorial management of Islamabad were collected while keeping the focus on the urban poor and slums of the city. All of these documents, given the theoretical and methodological focus of this study, were related to urban development, urban planning, infrastructural development, upgrading and rehabilitation of slums of the city. Documents comprised of the surveys, official planning maps and studies conducted during or immediately after the construction of Islamabad discussing such issues as the distribution of urban space, the construction of workers' camps or labour camps and provision of different kinds of facilities to different neighbourhoods of the city.

Unlike Brasilia, the CDA in Islamabad is one bureaucratic institution having different directorates and departments (Engineering wing, Planning wing, Katchi Abadi Cell, Sanitation etc.) headed by a senior bureaucrat called the Chairman of the CDA. Therefore, the collection of documents from Islamabad was not as difficult as in the case of Brasilia. However, this is not to suggest that archival research was easy in case of Islamabad. Unfortunately, the archives of the CDA were in poor condition. Documents and the list of documents remained unchanged from those seen during my fieldwork for my MPhil in 2014. The documents were stuffed in cupboards without any order. Documents were given a

catalogue number, but the order with which they were put in cupboards did not correspond to the catalogue numbers. Therefore, I adopted a traditional approach and started looking for the documents in the cupboards one by one. I used to sit down on the carpeted floor of the library and start combing through all the documents one by one to find those that are relevant to this study. It is by this process that I could collect almost 50 documents. The remaining documents were collected when any one of my interviewees suggested, named or referred to any document or interview.

Like the Brasilia, the process of both interviews and archival research in Islamabad proved to be a difficult task, especially at the end of 2019 because of a new wave of judicial activism in the country. In those days, Pakistani bureaucracy was facing three main challenges: The National Accountability Bureau (NAB); excessive *suo motu*[3] cases taken up by the then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan; and the unprecedented rise of electronic media as a political player and influencer in Pakistani society. Despite being a citizen of the country, I was viewed as an 'agent' of the media or an 'informer' of NAB. I was told explicitly by my interviewees that they were not feeling safe or confident about anyone at that time as they may lose their jobs if anything associated with them became public or taken up by the NAB or the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The fear was not only because these institutions were dominating the public debates and news headlines in those days but also because of the high levels of alleged corruption in public offices of Pakistan. The CDA was not immune to corrupt practices, as I was told by one of the senior officials during my interviews. Nonetheless, I kept asking and looking for documents from different offices other than the CDA archives in Iqbal Hall, CDA Library. It is unfortunate but not unexpected that the access to documents was denied and I was told that the public documents could either be accessed at Iqbal Hall or they could not be accessed at all. Like Brasilia, access to documents was denied on the pretext of them being 'sensitive' or 'confidential'. When I discussed my situation with the librarian of CDA Library, who I became familiar with because of my daily routine visits, he told me that I needed to know someone of higher rank in the CDA to get access.

Given the importance of archival research and the challenges involved, a researcher should not only acknowledge the gaps within the data but also should reflect on the ways through

[3] Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan gives Supreme Court the powers to intervene in the matters related to the enforcement of the fundamental rights. These powers are referred to as suo motu. Literally, in Latin, *sua sponte* or *suo motu* means 'on its own motion' or 'own accord'.

which the data is collected. In this regard, the formal utterances that exist in the data are equally important to the issues related to their access and availability to the general public, especially in policy-related discourse analysis. As suggested by Sharp & Richardson (2001), textually oriented discourse focuses on the utterances of planners and policy professionals or planning documents. It is not that the discourse would be more representative or authoritative in one case or the other. It is more about the avenues where discourse is manifested and can be analysed. As highlighted previously in the limitations of discourse methodology (see also, Hitzler & Keller, 1989; McKenna, 2004 and Keller, 2012), the depth and span of discourse territory remain the only tool through which unbiased discourse analysis is possible. As discussed above, the limitations involved in archival research clearly demand other avenues to exploit. It is in this regard that the data collection process of this research involves the other two important methods, i.e. interviews and ethnography, to widen the discourse territory.

3.6.2 Interviews

Interviews have always been proved to be one of the most promising methods to get access to desired information among other data collection methods. As Flick (2014, p. 222) argues, "practices are only accessible through observation; interviews and narratives merely make the accounts of practices accessible". Many types of interviews and interview techniques have been employed by different scholars according to the kind of data, peculiarities of the field and other realities that they encountered in their field. For example, most of the scholars who would be interested in alternate historical accounts would more likely conduct oral history or biographical interviews. Scholars interested in quantitative studies usually go for surveys and closed-ended structured interviews. In the case of urban sociology and discourse analysis, qualitative interviews (semi-structured, open-ended, biographical, oral history etc.) hold an important position for creating both concrete and relevant data (Cruickshank, 2012).

In discourse analysis, qualitative interviews cannot be regarded as a traditional method of data generation alone but as a source of empirical data which is to be further analysed. Unlike other studies, discourse studies usually do not differentiate among different methods or sources of data. In discourse studies, all of the interviews, texts, and observations are considered to be an empirical base for subsequent analysis. In discourse studies, the basic unit of the study comprises "one main type; text" (Cruickshank, 2012, p. 42). Qualitative interviews, hence,

proved to be an essential source of empirical data for this study in both research sites, i.e. Islamabad and Brasilia.

Based on my previous research experience with Pakistani bureaucracy, in-depth semi-structured constructivist interviews were selected as the form of interviews to be conducted in both Islamabad and Brasilia. Constructivist interviews are those interviews in which emphasis is placed on the "participant's definition of the terms, situations, and events and try to tap his or her assumptions, implicit meanings, and tacit rules" (Charmaz, 2006, p. 32). Constructivist interviews are selected because of the focus of the study, which is the official discourse of development vis-à-vis the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia. Therefore, it is necessary to understand how the terms and situations are understood and reproduced by those who are primary producers of the discourses in Islamabad and Brasilia. These interviews were conducted in an informal environment to reduce the pressure of interview settings. This approach has also been recommended and appreciated by other scholars like Seidman (2013), Petty, Thomson & Stew (2012) and Rubin & Rubin (2005) to maximise the access to information. This approach to interviewing also considerably facilitated the researcher because of the time constraints and restricted access to high-ranking officials, especially in Pakistan. As I have experienced, many government officials are reluctant to openly talk and respond to questions in formal settings. During the interviews officials frequently told me that they needed to prepare their answers or that they felt I had more knowledge because actual office work is different from theory. This sense of challenge felt by interviewees during any interview has serious implications for the information and data one may gather from such an interview.

Therefore, semi-structured interviews or informally structured conversations with public officials appear to be a better strategy to access information. The most important part of any interview is to cater for the convenience of the interviewee. For example, most of my interviews were conducted outside the official domain, for instance in restaurants, cafes, office canteens and also in seminar rooms where officials feel more secure, and so able to be more open and frank. These locations were recommended and suggested by the interviewees themselves. For example, the Secretary of SEGETH in Brasilia wanted me to have an interview with him over lunch in a restaurant instead of his office. Contrary to that, all of the high-ranking officials in Pakistan talked to me in their offices with their staff outside to ensure that nobody entered, except their senior colleagues. But most of the middle- and low-ranking

officials preferred to talk to me outside their office buildings in less formal environments where they could drink, eat or smoke during the interview.

3.6.2.1 Sample size and sampling technique

As mentioned above, interviews can be performed in several ways. For this study, semi-structured and unstructured interviews were conducted with 25 participants each from Islamabad and Brasilia. Semi-structured interviews were particularly helpful in this regard because they are well planned, focused and flexible, allowing the follow up of exciting and unexpected avenues that may emerge during interviews (Blandford, 2013).

For this study, participants from both Islamabad and Brasilia were selected partly through snowball sampling and partly through purposive sampling. Priority, however, was given to purposive sampling so that a relevant selection of officials from the CDA and FDA can be made. Since this research is dealing with the labelling approach and discourse theory, therefore, the selection of interviewees for discourse territory plays a vital role. The selection of the participants aims at the selection of “good informants” (Morse, 1998, p. 73, cited in Flick, 2014). Good informants are understood to have the necessary knowledge and experience of the issues required to answer fundamental research questions (Flick, 2014). Among all of the officials, the most relevant departments and directorates were selected before narrowing down to the individual officials. It is not necessary for purposive sampling to work alone, given the time constraints and availability of high-ranking officials. Therefore, snowball sampling served another way through which interviewees were selected in the sample. The snowball sampling employed in this research is not a traditional snowball method because the individuals for possible recruitment were named and mentioned by the researcher to the colleagues. This proved to be an advantageous and productive technique for interviews from Pakistan, where public bureaucracy was not very open to interviews.

In this way, purposive sampling proved to be a useful tool of sampling where interviewees were selected from a wide range of official cadres. Out of 25 interviewees from each research site, individuals were selected from all levels of administration, i.e. high-ranking officials (directors, deputy directors, heads), middle-ranking officials (assistant directors, research officials, deputy-heads), and low-ranking officials (sanitary workers, supervisors, field officials, field inspectors). In this way, 25 interviews with CDA officials (from November

2018 to June 2019) and 25 interviews with FDA officials (June 2018 to November 2018) were considered to provide a representative sample to understand the development discourse of respective urban administration and their relationship with the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia. Although a total number of 50 interviews are considered to be a representative sample for PhD studies (Mason, 2010), yet the selection of the total number of interviews was decided based on theoretical as well as empirical saturation of the data. In addition, ten interviews were conducted based on random sampling from slums and other residential neighbourhoods in Islamabad and Brasilia. The purpose of these interviews is not only to validate the information shared by the bureaucracy but also to comprehend the experiences and social implications of the labels on the ground. In this regard, random sampling was coupled with purposive sampling so that information from community leaders, community workers and residential associations can also be collected. In this way, interviews and empirical data enable the researcher to comprehend the ground realities and lived experiences in a much more objective manner. A brief discussion follows on the conduct of interviews from each site to give a clear picture of how interview-based data was collected.

The experience of conducting interviews was very different in both research sites. In the case of Brasilia, the fundamental problem was about accessing key informants because of my language limitations and lack of understanding of bureaucratic working in Brasilia. Therefore, research assistants were hired and trained to conduct qualitative interviews. All of the interviews from Brasilia were conducted either by myself or in my presence by my research assistants. To overcome the language barrier and to remain focused on desired information, the task given to at least one of the research assistants was to take notes in English so that I could follow the conversation. Most of the interviews were conducted in Portuguese because participants preferred this language. However, most of the high-ranking officials were comfortable with English and preferred the same language for the interview. Nevertheless, all of the interviews were recorded with the explicit consent of the participants. Despite the permission to record interviews, a protocol of taking notes was followed by myself and my research assistants. In fact, after every interview, we used to have a session to discuss nuances like facial expressions, interview settings and possible confusions in the way of posing a question or in respondents' answers. Having local research assistants also proved beneficial when a respondent was using typical Portuguese words which might not have synonyms or words in the English language. All of the interviews from Brasilia were recorded, which were later on transcribed and translated to English manually, i.e. without any software support.

Since the study is using discourse as the methodological framework, therefore special attention was given to language, its cultural meanings and its everyday use so that translations provide as literal meanings as possible.
As mentioned earlier, Brasilia is a modernist and planned city which is architecturally very famous and has been designated as a World Heritage Site by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The construction and glory of Brasilia have been taught in schools; therefore, each one of my respondents (official or otherwise) was not only familiar with the basic planning and history of Brasilia but also held an opinion about it. Therefore, the interviews in Brasilia were not only productive and relevant but also offered me an in-depth understanding of Brasilia as a planned city which is different from what I found in the literature. Therefore, the whole set of interviews was not confined only to officialdom but also contained added perspectives from slum residents, middle- and high-class residential neighbourhoods so that the analysis about the discourse can be better informed.

All of the precautionary measures that were undertaken in Brasilia were also the preconditions of interviews in Islamabad. As mentioned earlier, Pakistan bureaucracy at the time the fieldwork was undertaken was very concerned with the role of the NAB, electronic media and the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Further, public bureaucratic figures, especially of high rank, are very difficult to access in their offices. I could not get access to any high-ranking official without knowing someone or establishing a personal connection with someone. Their staff, as I experienced, typically respond that "*sahib meeting main hain"* (Sir is in the meeting). Therefore, accessing potential interviewees and making them agree to an interview was not an easy task at all. Here purposive sampling coupled with snowball sampling proved to be an effective strategy.

After trying unsuccessfully to establish contacts for over a month, I finally engaged my friends and colleagues to help me find someone in the CDA. A friend told me about his cousin, who has been working in CDA's engineering wing. I met him and explained the scope of my research. As expected, he also told me that they all were afraid of the NAB and the Supreme Court those days. Therefore, in order to make sure that my research was purely for academic purposes, he asked for my university identity card and a letter from the department stating the purpose and scope of my research and fieldwork. It is only after this surety that I could express my desire to have interviews with officials from different directorates and departments of the CDA. As mentioned earlier, I already had made a list of the offices and persons whom I would

like to interview. All I asked of him was to set up an appointment with those officials whom I had purposively selected but accessed through snowballing.

He remained one of the most important assets during my interviews with the CDA. He introduced me as his friend who is working on slums and the role of the CDA in planning and developing Islamabad. After that, officials would not only trust me to talk to me but also make sure that they remained accessible. This is why most of the interviews with the CDA were not taken in offices but other places, especially in the canteen or in the offices of their colleagues. Some of them explicitly asked if I would ever share these interviews with anyone outside the university or someone in the media. Very few interviewees from the CDA allowed their interviews to be recorded. Some participants would not allow notes in my diary so that I had no proof of talking to them. Use of original names or their departments within the CDA was strictly forbidden as, according to many interviewees, it might cost them their jobs.

A total of 25 interviews from the CDA were collected between December 2018 to June 2019. During the same period, five other interviews were also conducted with the residents of slums and other residential areas of Islamabad to have a better informed and rooted analysis of the lived experiences of the urban poor. Interviews were conducted in either Urdu or Punjabi as they were preferred by all of my interviewees except one. As mentioned earlier, choosing a suitable language is one of the most important aspects of qualitative interviewing where the purpose is to collect as much information as possible. Since I speak Urdu, Punjabi and English, I decided to not involve any research assistants with the interviews this time. This was also a strategy so that interviewees remain relaxed during the interviews, and they do not have to deal with two persons. Also, it might have represented the researcher as an employer and a member of a higher socio-economic group. This kind of representation would radically change the relationship between the researcher and my research participants which will not be suitable for interview settings. All of the interviews in Islamabad were conducted by myself. Recording was not allowed, except in a few interviews, mainly with slum residents; therefore, I took extensive notes, relied on memory protocols and did immediate transcriptions so that most of the information could be retained.

Like Brasilia, all of the interviews were transcribed and translated manually without the use of software. Similarly, due attention has been given to the language used by my respondents so that the translation may represent their thoughts as accurately as possible. Especially,

grammatical rules were followed and are reproduced in translations as well. Special attention has been given to the culturally rooted meanings of various words and phrases which might not have synonyms or accurate alternatives words or concepts in the English language.

3.6.3 Ethnography

Ethnography has always been one of the most important methods of data collection in traditional anthropological studies. Unlike participant observation, ethnography is a method and strategy where participation and observation are interwoven (Flick, 2014). In this method, the ethnographer participates in community life, overtly or covertly, to observe people's daily lives and to interact with them to collect the data and information required to answer research questions (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). Like Critical Discourse Analysis, ethnography is also concerned with the understanding of meanings in social life. This is done through sustained involvement in the research site with the help of extensive and thick fieldwork and "thick description" (Geertz, 1973, p. 6). The thick description is understood as a recording of the social activity with all of its complexity and uncertainties. Since the data collected through ethnography is usually messy, thick and complex its analysis demands innovative and multiple approaches described as "thick analysis" by Evers & Staa (2010, p. 753). Thus, an integration of critical discourse and the ethnographic approach is promising for new and innovative avenues of research along with the enrichment of concrete empirical research (Wodak & Savski, 2018).

Since ethnography is primarily about understanding social meanings in everyday social practices and social interaction, it is directly linked to the objectives of Critical Discourse Analysis and is hence a useful tool to examine discourse production (Macgilchrist & Hout, 2011). Language use and corresponding socio-material structures, a central concern of Critical Discourse Analysis, can be best understood by looking at the situated use of language and face-to-face interaction between the participants of the research (Spencer, 1994). Therefore, the combination of ethnography with Critical Discourse Analysis is regarded as very useful for "revealing the connections between the multiple players of policy activity" (Johnson, 2011, p. 267). Further, the combination of Critical Discourse Analysis and ethnography is beneficial to examine intertextual and interdiscursive links between policy texts and discourse and to understand how they are recontextualised from macro to micro level and woven into daily social activities and practices.

For this study, multi-sited ethnography has been undertaken to access data and to capture the social realities and physical environments in which 'text' for discourse analysis is produced, articulated and experienced by the people. The first ethnographic site was that of Brasilia, Brazil. Given the colonial and racial history and historiography of Brazil, it was imperative for me to explore the modernist and planned city by myself. During June 2018 to November 2018, countless field visits were made to slums, public offices, middle- and high-class neighbourhoods. My ethnographic method was comprised mainly of participatory and observatory tools in which extensive field notes and photographs were taken. My appearances in Brazil were not alarming to anyone as I could easily blend in; I preferred to stay and walk in neighbourhoods and public offices without any research diary or notebook. All of the observations and participation were captured either through a mobile camera or notebook in my mobile phone.

To have more direct contact with the urban poor of Brasilia and to experience their daily life, I choose to live in Vila Planalto – an ex-construction campsite where construction workers used to live during the time of construction of Brasilia. Vila Planalto has now been gentrified to some extent because of its ideal location, i.e. close of the centre as well as Paranoá Lake (artificial lake in Brasilia). However, this area is still considered as "not original Brasilia" and is regarded as a slum or residential area of working-class people. Living there also added considerable perspective, information, and context to the information that I gathered because of the experience of living in Vila Planalto and noting down the weird responses from others when I told them about my accommodation in the Vila Planalto.

During my fieldwork and visits to official buildings, I was always accompanied by my research assistant(s). They transcribed and translated interviews for me; therefore, it was important that they should remain focused and sensitive towards the data. However, fieldwork in slums was carried out by myself alone. My research assistants refused to join me on the pretext of slums being dangerous areas of Brasilia. Also, I did not want them to accompany me because of the ethical considerations involved, primarily due to the assumed law and order situation in slums. Nevertheless, ethnography of slums and field visits are required as slums are what inspired this research in the first place. Therefore, the ethnography of slums was conducted alone by myself, and for security purposes, few photographs were taken as it might have had some implications for myself and my research.

During the ethnography of Brasilia, especially of slums, I relied heavily on public transport which is a common source of transportation of the urban poor. Public transport, in general, is very slow, time-consuming, crowded and very expensive in Brasilia. Nevertheless, it is presumably the only mode of transportation available for the urban poor. I used to spend hours on buses and waiting at bus stops especially in the morning and late afternoon. I noticed that the buses were crowded in these times because of the in-flow and out-flow of informal workers from slums to central Brasilia. In the evening, most of the bus stops, especially in Lago Norte and Lago Sul (mainly high-income residential areas), and Pilot Plan (mainly upper-/middle-income residential areas) were full of women who came to those areas for domestic work (cleaning, household tasks, washing, cooking etc.). As I have observed and mentioned, they usually have to travel more than two hours daily to get to their work and back home. Relying on public transport gave me another important site in Brasilia for my ethnography, i.e. Rodoviária (Central Bus Terminal of Brasilia). It is here one can truly see the misery of homelessness, the urban poor, public transport and in-flow and out-flow of the urban poor and working-class people of Brasilia.

Other important sites where ethnographic visits were made comprise of entertainment-related areas of the city, for example, the lake, commercial centre, shopping malls, hotel sector; public parks, theatres, museums; and the Exio Monumental (Monumental Axis) where ministerial buildings, chambers of legislature, the Presidential Palace, and the Central Church designed by Oscar Niemeyer are located. The theoretical and methodological framework of this study largely informed the choice of ethnographic sites; therefore, entertainment areas and other social gathering avenues are given special attention in this research. A particular focus was placed on analysing the social implications of labelling and discursive constructions that guide the planning and distribution of the urban space of Brasilia.

Islamabad is architecturally very different from Brasilia, not only in its outlook but also in the geographic inscription of social realities. For instance, slums in Islamabad are located as pockets inside the central urban territory of Islamabad. On the other hand, slums in the case of Brasilia are located quite far from the central city; therefore, ethnography had to be done differently. In the case of Islamabad, public transport is appalling, not only is it time-consuming and expensive but also it is not available or poorly available. The dominant mode of transportation in Islamabad is either a personal vehicle or cabs/taxis, which are expensive for working-class people. Since I am engaged with multi-sited ethnography and comparative

case research, therefore I followed the same theoretical and methodological framework to guide my ethnographic work in Islamabad.

Being a resident of Islamabad, I had certain advantages in terms of mobility and accessing areas with much more convenience as compared to Brasilia. Keeping in view the economic and time-related cost of the study, I preferred a motorbike as my method of transportation in Islamabad. Having a motorcycle also helped my access to small streets and into the slum pockets inside central Islamabad. Using a bike also enabled me to offer free rides to the workers who would be walking towards their homes in the evening. They prefer to walk because of the absence of public transport in areas like the 'red zone' (the area where the secretariat, Supreme Court, Parliament, Judicial Colony, State guest houses, four- and five-star hotels along with some other residential buildings are located) and the expensive cost of using cabs and taxis.

Like Brasilia, extensive ethnographic visits were paid to central commercial areas and other areas offering entertainment opportunities like cinemas, cafes, hotels, public parks and residential markets. It is important to mention that the public spaces in Islamabad, like Brasilia, appear to be gentrified and highly exclusive. A large number of people can be seen in these areas during the day engaged in various economic activities. However, in the evening and sometimes late at night, it is very common to see people moving out to their homes. In-flow and out-flow from slums in Islamabad show similar patterns, i.e. massive out-flow in the early morning and massive in-flow in the evening. It was important to see and to look at the patterns of interaction of the urban poor with the city because, as theory and methodological assumptions show, the labelling approach and discursive practices of the urban municipality has directly impacted the real-life experience of living in the city. These patterns and impacts were mentioned in all of the interviews with slum residents.

Ethnographic research in Islamabad and Brasilia enabled me to understand the context and real-life vibrations of both cities. In this way, all of the collected data, interviews and archival research help to conceptualise urban development patterns and development discourses both in their semiotic and non-semiotic or extra-semiotic aspects. All of the data has been collected to address and understand the development history and planning of Islamabad and Brasilia that include the mechanism of distribution and development of urban space, agendas of community housing, rationale and aspiration of municipal administrations; the evolution of

slums in Islamabad and Brasilia, their living conditions and socio-economic implications of being labelled and associated with slums; and, patterns and forms of discursive constructions of problems related to the urban poor and slums and their construction as social deviance in the otherwise well planned modernist cities of Pakistan and Brazil.

3.7 A Note on Translation and Transliteration

Language plays an important role in daily communication; therefore, it is central to any kind of discourse analysis, especially Critical Discourse Analysis. In this research, as already mentioned, the data set comprises four languages: Portuguese (language in Brazil); Urdu (the national language of Pakistan and also an official language); Punjabi (a local language spoken by the majority of the population of the country); and English (the official language of Pakistani bureaucracy and documents).

All of the interviews were conducted in the language preferred by the respondents. In the case of Portuguese, translation and transcription were done while paying due attention to preserve the integrity of thought and expression. When necessary, Portuguese words are also mentioned in the excerpts, along with their translation in English. Translations from Urdu and Punjabi were made by myself, keeping in view the cultural meanings and baggage of the terms used by my respondents. Therefore, confusion in selecting suitable words or switching languages is not visible in data as all of the data is translated into English before analysing it. It is essential to mention that not all grammatical and syntactic features of the native language could be translated into the English language. However, analysis is still informed by the cultural context of native languages to preserve the integrity of thoughts expressed in documents and interviews.

In cases of the use of Punjabi, Urdu or Portuguese in the text, it is accompanied by an English translation so that readers may remain contextually and linguistically informed throughout the thesis. Some of the words, for example, katchi abadis (slums) and favela (slums) are used to differentiate the culturally rooted meanings of such settlements in the everyday language of both research sites. Their English alternatives are confusing because of the scholarly debates and different contexts in which such settlements are discussed. For example, ‘slum’ can be alternatively used for ‘informal settlements’, ‘undocumented neighbourhoods’, ‘shanty town’, ‘ghetto’ etc. (for details on different conceptions of such neighbourhoods, see Davis, 2006).

In such cases, I preferred to use local language words which do not differentiate among them in both legal and social spheres.

3.8 A Note on the Coding of the Data

Codes and ideas should earn their way in analysis through data. Therefore, the coding techniques employed in this research are done primarily on two levels: theoretical and grounded, which are then linked both to abstraction (theory) and empirical levels. For coding and thematic analysis of the data, Atlas.ti version 7.1 has been used in this research. According to social constructivists, the starting place for any analysis includes a person's understanding of other's role and response during all kinds of interaction (Charmaz, 2006).

First of all, extensive and detailed coding has been done on the data based on the theoretical and methodological insights discussed above. The codes from one data set were constantly compared to other sets of data to avoid any poor or unsustainable codes. This is followed by "focused coding" (Charmaz, 2006, p. 42) to point out significant and salient categories and themes for theoretical integration of the data. Themes and predominant patterns found in the data are representative of the entire coding process and serve as the base for subsequent analysis and theoretical claims made in the empirical chapters of this thesis. Predominant themes include homogenised neighbourhoods, stigmatisation and criminalisation of the urban poor through labels, naturalisation and reification of socio-economic inequality and blind faith and acceptance of the free-market economy.

3.9 A Note on the Researcher's Positioning, Ethics, and Reflexivity

This dissertation is engaged with questions concerning the influence, power dynamics and interaction of various actors in different socio-economic and political positions. Therefore, it is important to reflect on questions related to the researcher's positions and ethical considerations, as well as the importance of reflexivity in doing discourse analysis.

As mentioned above, this research is also informed by the ethnographic method; therefore, it is necessary to engage with reflexivity in this research (among others, Marcus, 1994; Chaudhary, 2006). Self-reflexivity and sensitivity are very important to counter the binary of subject and object in any kind of ethnographic research. Following the importance of self-reflection and positionality, it is important to reflect a little on my positionality in this research.

I, being a formally educated person and student in one of the leading universities in Europe, am no innocent or distant subject in the production of knowledge emerging through this dissertation. Pakistan is my home, and I have my ideological as well as personal limitations and biases towards the colonial legacies of bureaucracy, statecraft, administration and the legal system of the country. My assumptions of legal injustices and discrimination towards weaker segments of the society (women, poor, marginalised and racially branded ethnicities) were surely influencing my overall approach towards the study of the urban poor. One of my prime motivations to opt for this research area is to conduct such a study.

In the case of Brasilia, I was a foreigner having language limitations as well as lesser resources to exploit all of the possibilities of the research. Nevertheless, I remained a privileged individual in terms of economic resources as well as in my status of an international researcher studying in a European university. This undoubtedly had an impact on my interviewees, who would feel intimidated by my presence. Their responses were more articulated and well-phrased as compared to their usual way of talking and engaging in discussions. In this way, the knowledge that is produced by this interaction has its limitations and biases, which would not allow me to make any objective and generalised claims based on my fieldwork. Like Islamabad, the issue of the urban poor remains somewhat emotional to me even in Brasilia where they are not only criminalised but also racially discriminated against since European colonialism.

Another important aspect to be mentioned here is related to ethical challenges and dilemmas, which I experienced in this research. To uphold higher ethical standards, no commitments have been made with any of the participants. All of the information that is collected is preceded by explicit consent. To protect their identity and to respect their right to privacy, as previously disclosed, no original names have been used in this research, especially of respondents from Islamabad. In the case of Brasilia, all of my respondents permitted me to use their original names except a couple of respondents. But ethical challenges were not limited to these standard research practices. The issues of corruption, bribery and criminal negligence that I witnessed put me in an awkward position to respond to such incidents. In the case of slums, stories related to emotional violence and discrimination from state authorities were surely beyond my control but had made my fieldwork very challenging and emotionally very difficult.

While talking to me, many low-ranking officials and slum residents looked at me as a kind of saviour who can help them either financially or facilitate them in their negotiations with corrupt officials. I was perceived as a privileged person having resources and access; therefore, I was supposed to work for the betterment of their lives instead of doing impractical work like researching for my PhD. In this way, I felt as if the research study exploited their energies and time for my gain. To counter this perception, I always tried to engage with my respondents on a personal level and make them feel comfortable while talking to me. In this regard, I interacted with them by sitting on the floor, drinking and eating with them and sometimes asking them to accompany me to lunch or tea. Also, sometimes I had to buy things from vendors and small shops so that they do not feel exploited or used.

Researchers should feel responsible for the people and places they studied (Madison, 2012). I tried and am still trying to meet feelings of responsibility and conduct impartial and objective analysis while writing this thesis. To do so, I uphold theoretical and methodological claims as a moral compass to avoid any personal judgements, biases and interpretations. While doing this, I depersonalised my data and observations through continuously self-reflecting on my approaches, discussions with colleagues and my participants in the research. The barrier of the subject-object binary is negotiated to a greater extent in the analysis, but it might not be true for fieldwork, especially for interviews. I ensured transparency and access to all of my informants so that they may access my claims, analysis and findings of the research after its publication.

3.10 Critical Discourse Analysis and Corpus of the Study: Summarising Research Method and Research Methodology

Critical Discourse Analysis is about analysis of the text in context. All of the social actors and their actions are of great importance to understand and analyse the discourses they are subjected to, producing or reproducing. Also, the discourse is not about the language alone but is to be understood in its broader sense, i.e. discourse comprises both semiotic and extra-semiotic elements and has real-life implications and structuring effects. In this way, Critical Discourse Analysis plays an important role in understanding structurally unequal societies like that of Islamabad and Brasilia. However, as discussed above, using Critical Discourse Analysis as an analytical and methodological framework demands an innovative approach to

the research methods employed for data collection to establish an unbiased and representative discourse territory. Keeping in mind the limitations and challenges, this research used three main approaches to collect data. The corpus of this study is comprised of archives (planning and policy-related documents, planning maps, surveys, public notices etc.), in-depth semi-structured interviews and ethnography of the different neighbourhoods of Islamabad and Brasilia and public offices therein.

The corpus is studied to uncover constructed realities and discursive strategies that are employed to naturalise and essentialise the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia as social deviance. This has been done primarily through focusing on the representations of the urban poor in CDA- and FDA-led discourses vis-à-vis the urban poor and slums of Islamabad and Brasilia. Drawing on the labelling approach, the analysis is aimed at identifying discursive strategies like argumentation trends, framing practices of problematisations, the specific use of language, scientific claims, application of concepts, the formation of identities, criteria of inclusion and exclusion, normative bars and assumptions made through employing various kinds of labels in policy and planning documents.

Chapter 4: SETTING THE STAGE: ARRIVAL OF 'DEVELOPMENT' AND CONSTRUCTION OF MODEL CITIES IN PAKISTAN AND BRAZIL

This chapter sets the stage for contextualisation of the international development and construction of Islamabad and Brasilia as 'model cities' and is divided into two parts. The first part will discuss in detail the concept of 'development', its historical roots and its socio-political and economic baggage in a post-World War II world. It is important to stress that the character of 'development' has been largely shaped in the midst of the post-World War II global restructuring and political reordering of the world led by the United States of America (USA) and international development institutions like the World Bank, IMF, UN, UNDP, ECLAC and AFP. The second part of this chapter will focus on international development in Pakistan and Brazil, which ultimately led to the creation of Islamabad and Brasilia as model cities. These model cities were planned, propagated and materialised to appear as emblems and products of modernist urban planning and urbanisation – key symbols of international developmentalism that were exported to the Global South to achieve what was hitherto unknown 'development'.

4.1 Understanding Development

To understand development is perhaps one of the most challenging tasks given the widespread and multiple uses of the term during the last two centuries. Development is defined, understood and articulated in numerous ways because of the multitude of "developers" who are engaged in the "task of development" throughout the world (Cowen and Shenton, 2005, p. 3). Historically, in the 18th century, the word development was used interchangeably with the evolution and biological growth of an organism to its full genetic potential (for example, in *The Origin of Species* by Charles Darwin published in 1859). It is important to mention that the transfer of a biological metaphor to the social sphere is not without profound consequences and a set of assumptions. The most important one is to give the impression that social history also follows some natural laws and is subjected to universally applicable rationality and scientific planning.

For instance, Herder (2002 [1774]) combined the theory of nature and philosophy of history in order to create a unified story of the development of organisational forms. This legacy was continued and reified by the works of Karl Marx (1818–1883), whereby development was understood as a historical process by fusing both the Darwinist concept of evolution (that is, natural selection based on the innate abilities of organisms) and the Hegelian concept of history (that is, history as a process of self-discovery) (Esteva, 2010). This metaphor and understanding of development as a central concept took a colonising power in the vernacular. The fundamental idea of development was rooted in the 19th-century concept of Trusteeship. Trusteeship, as the word implies, means entrusting someone with responsibility and authority for doing a task because of his/her assumed superior status, position, or qualifications. For instance, the relationship between colonisers and colonised was based on this fundamental principle, i.e. those who believe themselves developed undertook the task of developing the 'other'. In doing so, the developed could act and could determine the process of development for the supposedly less developed based on their assumptions of development as a natural progression and an inevitable stage of history. In this way, historical development was considered as a natural development of human societies (Esteva, 2010).

Therefore, the historical process was converted into a definite and inevitable programme. For example, the industrial mode of production became a benchmark and terminal stage of social evolution, which was to be understood as development. A classic example of this programme in practice is the enunciation of the Colonial Development Act 1929 by the British government, where trusteeship and colonial protectorate were not only institutionalised but also given positive meanings and moral authority. Later on, the series of Colonial Development Acts were transformed into Colonial Development and Welfare Acts (like in 1940, 1945, 1950). According to Trusteeship ideals, colonisers were now responsible for both the development and well-being of colonies all over the world without any regard of cultural, religious or political diversities.

In spite of its Eurocentricity, development was understood and propagated as a magic wand to construct order out of disorder anywhere in the world. The disorder is mostly understood as issues related to urban migration, poverty, unemployment, education etc. In those early years of development in the 19th century, development and progress are seamlessly stitched together (Cowen and Shenton, 2005). Development, as a concept, even took over the role of other concepts like growth, in classical economics, and progress, in the Enlightenment

(Aseniero, 1985). It has been stated that "development has become the central organizing *concept* in terms of which historical movement and direction of social systems are *analysed, evaluated* and *acted upon*" [emphasis added] (Aseniero, 1985, pp. 54–55). Resultantly, as Harris (1989) pointed out, development appears to be a celebration of the movement of history whereby societies are transforming towards industrialisation, commercialisation, urbanisation and scientific planning. As mentioned above, the fundamental idea of Trusteeship has always been in play vis-à-vis development even before it became a global aspiration in the post-1945 attempt to improve postcolonial countries like Pakistan, India, and Brazil.

4.1.1 Development: A Continuation of Colonialism

Despite the widespread use of the term development, the actual meaning of development is still obscure. The message this term conveys principally depends on the context in which it is used (Rist, 2010). Today, it is employed and used in countless contexts, from agriculture to international and industrial production. It has become a professional gimmick since Truman's inaugural address (Rist, 2010, p. 19) in 1949. Development, therefore, has become a performative word justifying almost everything based on the assumption of making life better. Even in the 1960s, the era usually referred to as the Development Decades (1960–70 and 1970–1980), there was no concrete understanding of development. As Hayter (2005, p. 89) noted, "there was an unquestionable assumption that development, whatever it was, could lead to improvement in the situation of poor [*sic*]" all around the world.

Things changed radically once development was considered as a prime medium for engagement with the rest of the world in post-1945 settings. Global reordering had put the USA as a self-assumed leader of the free world taking an unprecedented position in the socio-political and economic restructuring of the world. Harry Truman's inaugural speech as the USA President presents the unparalleled role of development as a political and economic model that is to be exported to the rest of the world, especially newly independent countries like Pakistan. Development is put forth not only as an economic model, but its elusiveness made it an encompassing concept subsuming everything – social, cultural, economic aspects. President Truman, in his inaugural address, said:

> *We* must embark on a bold new *program* for making the benefits of *our scientific advances* and *industrial progress* available for the improvement and

> growth of *underdeveloped* areas. The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in *our plans*. What *we* envisage is a *program of development* based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing [emphasis added] (Truman, 20 January 1949).

In his speech, President Truman not only assumed the leadership role of the US but also invoked the idea of Trusteeship, therefore taking responsibility for those who are presumably underdeveloped. Further, the emphasis and lexical relationship of "scientific advances" and "industrial growth" with the "program of development" was established in the form of an exportable idea by dismantling the diversity and colonial experience of what he termed as "underdeveloped areas". With this speech, as noted by Rist (2010), the relationships between colonisers and colonised were transformed, and both were made part of the same family, i.e. more or less developed. However, for countries like Pakistan and Brazil, development was not colonialism's redeemer, but it assured its continuation by making it natural, scientific and flexible to cross the colonial to postcolonial divide easily.

Like colonialism, development also invoked Trusteeship and attempted to improve today's underdeveloped areas instead of yesterday's colonies. Underdevelopment was invented to secure legitimacy in the post-1945 world, which was to be led by the USA. The division on the scale of development is akin to the colonial logic of expansion and control. With Truman's speech, the colonial logic of "civilising the uncivilised" is replaced with "developing the underdeveloped" (Ziai, 2013, p. 128). This is not to suggest that the term 'underdevelopment' was first used by Truman. Before him, Wilfred Benson is perhaps the first person who used 'underdevelopment' in an international political treatise when he was a member of the Secretariate of International Labour Organisation in 1942 (Esteva, 2010, p. 2). In making development the central theme of his inaugural address, Truman "took development on an unsuspected colonizing virulence" (Esteva, 2010, p. 2).

In this way, development became delinked from colonialism by delinking and scientifically projecting economisation as a key marker for a better future. Through employing a scientific vocabulary (like GDP, GNP, Growth, Per Capita Income, Poverty, etc.), development was understood and projected mainly as the salvation and natural process of the historical evolution of societies without any regard to diversity. All over the world, development provided shelter to capitalist intervention and has managed to reduce commons into resources,

man into labour and tradition into burden (Polyani, 1944). It is important to note that ever since its inception, the concept of development is used as a synonym with salvation, a better life, moving forward etc. In doing so, the division between the colonisers and colonised is not only reified but also aggravated by making colonies responsible for their 'underdevelopment' – a synonym for backwardness, traditionalism, poverty, disorder and chaos.

In 1962, the proposed actions of the first UN Development Decade (1960–1970) established that the "problem of the under-developed countries is not just growth, but development", whereby development is "growth *plus* change; change, in turn, is social and cultural as well as economic, and qualitative as well as quantitative. It should no longer be necessary to speak of 'economic and social development', since development – as distinct from growth – should automatically include both" [italics in original] (UN, 1962, pp. 2–3). Taking a lead from Truman's idea of development, international organisations gave a new and sustainable life to the concept and made it all too flexible for every society and every situation around the world. That is precisely why Esteva (2010, p. 10) has called development an "amoeba" concept having no definitive shape or content.

4.1.2 Development: A Discourse and Label

No other concept has such a contested history and resilience as development. Especially in the post-1945 world, development is given a central position in the reordering of the world under the leadership of the USA (Bernstein, 1973). Development is not a set of performative actions, but is presented, produced and reproduced over the years as a discourse (in the Foucauldian sense) that operates through a variety of categories of knowledge. This, probably, is the reason why it is almost impossible to agree on one definition of development; therefore, it is hard to resist the baggage with it. Even a cursory reading of texts propagating development (be it academic or otherwise) shows that development hides an identifiable source of power (Daechsel, 2015). Development as a discourse assumed the role of a collective identity like religion wherein it became a shared goal to be achieved by every society in the world. Like Durkheim's religion and its role in society as discussed in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* ([1912] 1995), development assumed the role of indisputable truth, which is required for social cohesion and social progress. In this way, development is not taken as a political programme (as mentioned by Truman) but as a set of beliefs that operate beyond political

ideologies and any dispute. Anyone who disagrees with development risks the possibility of becoming socially outcast.

Development is produced by simultaneously creating categories of underdevelopment. Both development and underdevelopment are stitched together; one cannot appear without illicitly or explicitly creating its own 'other'. As Cowen and Shenton (2005, pp. 7–8) noted the "underdevelopment that appeared in [the] 1960s was part of the theory of capitalist development", therefore underdevelopment is simultaneously part of the development and its processes. For instance, if the Global South requires development, they first have to believe they are underdeveloped. In this way, underdevelopment is being constructed and exported through international organisations and US leadership since the end of the Second World War. For example, the concept underdeveloped is exported to Pakistan through the Colombo Plan (1950), Harvard Advisory Group (1962), USAID (1961), and the Ford Foundation (1936). These organisations were working on different levels and in different fields for the capacity building and institutional development of the country. The Harvard Advisory Group and Colombo Plan were working primarily to strengthen economic and social development. USAID and the Ford Foundation were primarily engaged in the socio-cultural and educational development of the country including infrastructural development. Similarly, in Latin America, underdevelopment is exported through initiatives and organisations like the Peace Corps (1961), AFP (1961), and The Point Four Program (1949) aiming at revitalisation of economic restructuring, social and political institutionalisation as well as infrastructural development through aid and technocratic experts. While providing a development programme for Colombia, the World Bank reasserts the power and legitimacy of development in the following words:

> Equally inescapable is the conclusion that with knowledge of the underlying facts and economic processes…a great deal can be done to improve the economic environment by shaping economic policies to meet scientifically ascertained social requirements…In making such an effort, Colombia would not only accomplish its own salvation but would at the same time furnish an inspiring example to all other underdeveloped areas of the world (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1950, p. 615).

Development evolved in the Global North, and when it is implemented and exported to the Global South, it produces "socio-economic and cultural configurations that we describe today as underdevelopment" (Escobar, 2010, p. 145). Escobar (2010) concluded that development in the Global South came through international organisations and technical experts from the Global North while simultaneously creating underdevelopment. As Foucault reminds us, "Enlightenment played a dual role: in its republican aspect, it was the very embodiment of liberty; in its military aspect, it was the ideal schema of discipline" (Foucault, 1977, p. 146). Similarly, development as a discourse whereby it redefines social and economic life according to capitalist rationality and Western morality has nothing to do with the diversity of the Global South. Therefore, its application and assertion is actually an attempt to homogenise the underdeveloped world. The relationship between development and underdevelopment illuminates the role of development as a discursive construct and how the power of the concept of development has taken a new lease of life at the end of every UN Development Decade.

Like any discursive construct or sociological label, development also creates a commonsensical meaning in one's mind. The convenient image that development constructs is based on certain assumptions of different categories of knowledge through which it operates and hides its identifiable source power. To understand development as discourse it is necessary to understand its operations throughout the world, especially in the post-1945 global politics and socio-economic restructuring. The logics and rationalities that had been propagated by the Global North to develop the underdeveloped were later on used by state institutions in countries like Pakistan and Brazil to shape their political structures and reordering of their societies to be categorised as developed, or at least developing, in the eyes of the Global North. In this way the processes of industrialisation and urbanisation were glorified and naturalised by countries like Pakistan and Brazil by creating local Trustees to carry out the tasks of development or to hide their own exploitative and extractive state institutions. Before focusing directly on the case of Pakistan and Brazil as objects of international development discourse, let us understand the discursive nature of development that is established through its core assumptions.

4.1.2.1 Fundamental tenets of development discourse

Development, as a hegemonic and homogenising concept, emerges from its core existential assumption in which it functions as a frame of organisation and conceptualisation. It organises

diverse phenomena like social, political, and economic aspects into a unified and homogenous process of development. In its organising capacity, development reduces all kinds of diversity to one predictable reality. In the words of Foucault, development:

> group[s] a succession of dispersed events, to link them to one and the same organizing principle, to subject them to the exemplary power of life (with its adaptations, its capacity for innovation, the incessant correlation of its different elements, its systems of assimilation and exchange), to discover, already at work in each beginning, a principle of coherence and the outline of a future unity (Foucault, 1972, pp. 21–22).

In its power of conceptualisation, development has the ability to make sense of diverse phenomena, and interpret them and judge them on a universal scale of development. The concept of development makes the:

> image of the ragged poor of Asia thus become legible as markers of a stage of development, while the bloated bellies of African children are the signs of social as well as nutritional deficiency. Within this problematic, it appears self-evident that debtor Third World nation-states and starving peasants share a common 'problem', that both lack a single 'thing': 'development' (Ferguson, 1994, p. xiii).

Along with that, development also carries within it a strong sense of normativity and practicality. Discursively, the label development implies itself as something normative, i.e. good and a thing which is desirable. In this way, development not only discriminates against the underdeveloped but also constructs them as social deviance that should be discouraged and punished by the community of the self-assumed developed. For instance, development is regarded widely as both an inevitable and good change (see, for example, Truman, 1949; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1950; UN, 1962; Chambers, 1999; Ziai, 2013). Making a vaguely described 'good change' as a central element of development, it surely discarded stagnation or the absence of 'good change' as evil, morally wrong, and socio-politically unacceptable. This normativity that development implies is not only a semantic constellation but imbued with practicality. The 'good change' in the form of development is not only superior but is also materially practical. Therefore, development is

not only an ideal target that should be realised by everyone on the globe, but there is also a possibility of achieving it. Development becomes a global web capturing every society regardless of the socio-political and cultural diversities and different historical legacies of nation-states.

Methodological assumptions are also linked to development. This methodological supposition is more than mere conjecture and has been constructed as an objective truth which forms the basis for all development indicators. Every international development organisation produces a hierarchy of societies and nation-states based on the scale of development (underdeveloped, developing or developed). In doing so, all of the units, i.e. nation-states, are considered as homogenous entities which are then compared to each other according to their status of development. This further implies that there is some universal objective scale of development against which units (nation-states) are measured and then placed on the ladder as developing, underdeveloped or developed (Ziai, 2013).

These fundamental assumptions of development (both as a discourse and a label) are not objective categories of knowledge used by international organisations and donor countries of the Global North. In fact, these assumptions are providing the modalities of governance and restructuring both at national and international levels. Countries, such as Brazil and Pakistan, also employ these assumptions through their policies, laws and regulations to create legibility which is then used to legitimise intervention, categorisation of different geographical and social units and subsequent creation of objects of development. For instance, the categorisation of urban areas into slums, middle-class neighbourhoods and rich condominiums is a localised version of underdeveloped, developing and developed areas within the urban setting of Islamabad and Brasilia. As the research data shows (detailed discussion will follow in later chapters) slums or underdeveloped areas are projected and believed to be the areas of stagnation where ‘good change’ is needed to be introduced by technocratic rationalities and scientific expert knowledge, similar to what Truman (1949) was proposing for the Global South in the post-1945 world.

This is not to suggest that development has assumed this discursive power and professional gimmick status merely by the assumptions and self-fulfilling prophecies discussed earlier. The specification of goals, processes and the inherent legitimacy of processes of development renders development an exportable truth of the modernist era of the 1960s and onward. Since

the end of the Second World War, development has become a global goal to be achieved without even understanding what development is. In doing so, the Global North and international organisations like the UN and World Bank also proposed universal values and processes to reach development. In spite of being traditional societies and agricultural economies, economic growth, industrialisation, modernisation and urbanisation have been proposed for Pakistan and Brazil as inevitable and promising processes to reach the goal of development. In fact, all of the international development discourse was a positivist venture implying unconditional subscription to the modern ideals coming from the Global North (see, for example, the classic text of Rostow's *Stages of Economic Growth* (1960)).

As mentioned earlier, development operates through Foucauldian categories of knowledge along with performative actions. In terms of knowledge production, the whole process of specification of goals and methods is providing societies with legitimacy through the creation of categories of underdevelopment. For instance, the entire development discourse and labelling processes are projected under the paradigm of scientific rationality and modernity; therefore, the expert knowledge is believed to be not only true but irrefutable even if it contradicts any social knowledge and historical experiences of societies like Pakistan and Brazil. Use of surveys, maps, economic categorisation of social life and capital flows are camouflaged under the guise of expert and scientific knowledge. It is argued that since it is scientific knowledge it should be accepted as such and should be considered as a legitimate way of looking at things. In this way, not only are the origins and social settings of such expert knowledge neglected, but its Western roots are appreciated – a strong postcolonial trait and complex that we find in the vernacular of the Global South because of their colonial experiences (Fanon, 2008).

From the discussion above it can be reasonably argued that development is not only a concept or term referring to 'good change'. In fact, development, ever since its coinage and usage in the post-1945 world, provides a contingent way of constructing reality. This constructed reality has "Eurocentric, depoliticising, and authoritarian implications" (Ziai, 2013, p. 127) that are providing governing modalities and tools to control people and populations despite their diversity. Development is Eurocentric because it assumed and projected European and North American societies as ideal models by designating them as developed. European cultures in this way are considered as evolutionary superior societies as compared to other inferior societies referred to as underdeveloped. Underdevelopment, in this sense, would serve

as a label constructing a convenient image of backward and inferior societies. In short, underdeveloped societies are a kind of inferior version of developed societies reifying the constructed normative categories of the developed and underdeveloped world. This hierarchy of societies once justified the colonial expansion of European states (see, for example, the works of Nandy, 1992; Blaut, 1993) and now provide legitimacy to intervention under the guise of development.

4.1.3 Planning: A Defining Component of Development

Perhaps the essential component of the whole development discourse is planning – both as a technique and a practice. Various forces (for example, organisations, planners, consultants, initiatives, development banks, transnational institutions, etc.) of development are realising goals and objectives through large-scale planning of the underdeveloped world. Like development itself, it is believed that planning also encompasses the first step of any kind of intervention in any sector of society: be it industry or agriculture, education or health. Planning techniques and practices define the whole task of development. In our case of Brasilia and Islamabad, the planning process provides us with glimpses of what development is and how it has been materialised and institutionalised with the help of an international army of consultants, experts, institutions and philanthropic organisations on a global scale. It is essential to discuss planning as a component of the development discourse instead of taking it as a universal way of doing things.

Planning techniques and practices, as Escobar (2010) reminds us, have been central to development since its inception. Planning embodies a systematic application of scientific and expert knowledge in the public sphere. Since the scientific rationality and expert knowledge of modernity are considered to be divine and apolitical in the development discourse of the post-1945 world, therefore, planning and planners assumed a semi-divine role in transforming underdeveloped societies. In this regard, planning not only brings legitimacy to development but also amplifies the hopes and trust of people in the development enterprise. Like development itself, planning also serves as a belief system reifying the modernist ideals that social change is something that can be engineered, induced and controlled at will. Planning itself serves as a tool to construct the 'other' of development and civilisation since colonial times. For example, the planning of new suburbs and cantonments near old towns in Pakistan and Brazil have always been hailed as monuments of colonial superiority over the native

populations. Planning is believed to be a tool to bring order to the disorder of colonies, which are generally referred to as the Third World or underdeveloped world under the rubric of international developmentalism.

Historically, planning evolved as a set of practices of European states of the 19th century to deal with the problems of growing industrial cities. The cities were regarded as engines of growth; therefore, their planning became a chief concern for European states both at home and in colonies. This can be seen, for example, in the case of Lahore (Glover, 2008), Karachi (Lari & Lari, 1997), Delhi (Spodek, 2013), Bombay (Hazareesingh, 2007), and Rio de Janeiro along with various other cities of Brazil (Naritomi, Soares & Assuncao, 2012). To deal with the issues related to urbanisation and industrialisation, as the fundamental stages of development as discussed above, planning became the most important tool through which the positivist goals of development and assumed natural processes of social transformation are to be ensured with the help of professional and scientific intervention in societies. This principle of scientific intervention and social change is present in all forms of planning, i.e. from economic planning to social or urban planning around the world.

In international development, the role of planning is then to redefine social, cultural and economic life according to scientifically determined "criteria of rationality, efficiency and morality, which are consonant with the history and needs of capitalist [and] industrial society" (Escobar, 2010, p. 148). It is not suggested that scientific planning is a product of the post-1945 era. Long before that, in the early 20th century, scientific planning originated from diverse historical and political landscapes like Soviet Planning, or the scientific management movement in the US in the Fordist era. However, during and after the Second World War, the role of planning and planning techniques underwent a significant change. It is precisely in the post-1945 world where planning is believed to be an important medium of interaction among countries placed differently on the development scale. Planning now has become a rational solution to the problems without any doubt, and used by the whole army of consultants and institutions engaged with development:

> The ground has been cleared for a non-doctrinaire consideration of the real problems of development, namely saving, training and planning, and for action on them. In particular, the advantages in dealing with the various problems not piecemeal, but by a comprehensive approach through sound

> development planning, became more fully apparent…Careful development planning can be a potent means of mobilizing these latent resources for a rational solution of the problems involved (UN, 1962, pp. 2, 10).

Drawing on the excerpt above, the history of planning and development follows the same trajectory and same zeal to realise Truman's vision when he regarded development as a programme. Through institutionalisation in the developing or underdeveloped world, planning has been deployed to bring the promised 'good change' in every society where it was introduced in its new vigour. Planning, a discourse itself and a component of the discourse of development at large, constructs its own subjects, its own 'other' in both local and international contexts of development.

Having said that, it is essential to highlight that international development came into contact with Pakistan and Brazil through the above-mentioned agents of discourse and its categories of knowledge. Among them, planning in general and urban planning, in particular, embodied the medium and level of intervention. International development in Pakistan and Brazil is realised through propagation and institutionalisation of scientific and rational planning. The role of urban planners and architects (primarily concerned with the scientific planning of urban settlements) were, therefore, considered as the semi-divine embodiment of modernism and development. Backed with institutional support and financial aid, these planners were at the helms of affairs to transform their host societies. In doing so, first, they constructed them as 'underdeveloped' through the categories of expert knowledge of development so that the intervention can be legitimised and justified; second, they introduced planning as a technique and ideal model of desirable, guided and controlled transformation leading to development.

4.2 International Development Impacting Pakistan and Brazil

International development exists as a set of discursive practices within a political programme. The political agenda of development is hidden under its projected apolitical nature (Ferguson, 2006). Moreover, even in a local context, development is considered to be a highly political programme empowering the state over society through governing modalities like surveys, maps, planning and architecture – promising aspects of scientific rationality and modernity (Scott, 2006). The following part of the chapter will discuss this relationship of development from an ambiguous and vaguely defined concept to its concrete material manifestation on the

ground in Pakistan and Brazil. It will identify how the underdeveloped are being developed and what aspects of their social and political spheres were given primacy over the others. Later on, as shall be discussed at length throughout this dissertation, these very ideals of development, its priorities, its categories of knowledge and its operations on the ground are taken as strategic tools by the governments of Pakistan and Brazil. They use them to further control and organise their populations in Islamabad and Brasilia under the guise of development and modernist planning.

4.2.1 International Development and Pakistan

In the 1960s, Pakistan became famous for some massive restructuring and development projects like comprehensive slum clearance, urban restructuring, modernist university campuses, hydroelectric dams, the green revolution and construction of the new city and administrative centre Islamabad – a crowning jewel of development in the Global South (Daechsel, 2015). As mentioned above, all of these developments were deemed necessary and inevitable to represent the development symbolically. Massive slum clearance and socio-economic restructuring were the responses to disorders, backwardness, and chaotic society. The order, development and growth were to be shown physically in the shape of vast suburbs, high-rise buildings, international modernist ideals of organising and planning new cities, new university campuses and dams, along with modernising the agricultural sector. It is also important to mention that Pakistan was ruled by the military in those times under the leadership of Field Marshal General Ayub who has been closely associated with the US and was considered to be a pro-West and pro-capitalist leader of the newly independent country of Pakistan (for details on Ayub's inclination towards the US and West, see Lerski, 1974; Amin, 2010; Khan, 1967; Sattar, 2019). The power and symbolic representation of development were so strong that even today his era is usually regarded as the 'golden era' of Pakistan despite the glaring failures of the 1965 war with India and the rise of political discontent in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) that resulted in secession in 1971.

The change that was coming in Pakistan was not a result of the domestic political climate and change in leadership. In fact, it had a lot to do with the international development that came to Pakistan as transnational projects through individuals and institutions that had been absent in history before. Unlike conventional diplomatic missions in the past, now there was a breed of development agencies, consultants and funds from the US, Canada and other regional and

international organisations like the World Bank working like a web on the ground in Pakistan (Daechsel, 2015). International organisations like the UN, Colombo Plan, Ford Foundation and the US International Cooperation Administration (USICA) set up their offices in Pakistan. They were not only engaged in their institutional capacity as observers but were actively involved in advising the government on various projects as well as providing them with funds to execute those projects. For instance, the Koranji Township Project in 1958 (a vast suburban development and construction of houses to accommodate the evacuees of massive slum clearance in Karachi) was financed by the Ford Foundation and USICA (the forerunner of USAID). The Korangi Project was designed and overseen by a Greek architect Constantinos A. Doxiadis (1913–1975). Doxiadis was not only the consultant architect for the Korangi Project, but he was also a member of the Harvard Advisory Group (later the Harvard Institute of International Development). The Harvard Advisory Group was very active in Pakistan and played a crucial role in the first-ever Five-Year Plan for the economic progress and development of the country. This group also had one of the most influential development economists, Gustav Papanek, (born, 1926) who hailed from Harvard University (Waterston, 1963).

The flow of international aid to Pakistan, especially from the US, played a significant part in the country materialising its social, political and economic dreams. In the initial years of Pakistan, the aid was given for both military and civilian purposes. By 1963–1964, over all bilateral aid to Pakistan from the US was USD 2 billion (Zaidi, 2011, p. 104). So much so, the overall percentage of the international aid was 5% of the Pakistan's GDP – the highest ever in the history of the country. Similary, the development assistance from the World Bank in 1964 is reported to be more than USD 500 million (World Bank, 2020). Further in the same era, the external drainage scheme for Islamabad was sponsored by the Government of Canada (Doxiadis, 2015). This trend of international aid and development assistance still plays an important role in Pakistan. For example, in 2017, Pakistan was the largest recipient of the UK's development assistance, amounting to 402 million pounds (Department for International Development, 2018). Along with the development assistance and international aid, the rate of corruption (financial or abuse of power by public officials) was also increasing; however, it existed at the lower level of bureaucracy (Niaz, 2014). This corruption was instrumental in overall aid management of the host country but its impacts were not that visible in the early 1960s as far as the mega-projects like Islamabad are concerned. However, as argued by Niaz (2014), the 1970s proved to be a tipping point from where the corruption entered even the

higher echelons of the Pakistani bureaucracy and political leadership. Its impact in our case of slums, Islamabad and development rhetoric is very important and shall be discussed moderately in chapter 6.

In Pakistan, nobody can demonstrate international development better than Doxiadis whose company (based in Athens) worked in 20 other countries including Egypt, France, US (Bromley, 2003), Ghana, Middle East (Daechsel, 2015) and Brazil (Rio, 2009). The very idea of *Ekistics* (a self-claimed 'science of human settlement' by Doxiadis) was based on scientific rationality and propagated as a scientific truth aiming to create order out of disorder, i.e. development out of underdevelopment (Doxiadis, 1970). Just to get an idea of the power of consultants and their role in exporting the values of development, scientific rationality and modernism, one of his contemporaries, perhaps more famous than Doxiadis, Le Corbusier (1887–1965) was also travelling all over the orient world in order to study them and propose universally applicable solutions through modernist architecture and planning (Daechsel, 2015; Holston, 1989). Doxiadis, however, was the most prominent name associated with development. He had immense influence, not only as an architect introducing the ideals of development into Pakistan, but also, working in a personal capacity to negotiate between local politics, state bureaucracy and international funding organisations to ensure the smooth transformation of the host society.

Doxiadis was not the only consultant working in Pakistan embodying international development. There was a British firm, Minoprio-Spenceley-MacFarlane, that was assigned under the Colombo Plan also working in Pakistan for the sake of development. Further, Otto Koenigsberger, a modernist urban architect and planner and later Head of the Department of Development and Tropical Studies at University College London (Liscombe, 2006) was also present in Pakistan working for the UN. Similarly, John Zemanek (1921–2016) and John Bell both architects and planners, were also operating in Pakistan during the 1950s from the platform of US Foreign Operations Administration in the capacity of architectural advisers to the government of Pakistan (Department of State, 1955). Along with them, Michel Ecochard (1905–1985), a French architect and urban planner who had worked in Syria and Morocco under the French Protectorate in the 1950s, was also working in Pakistan while being attached to the UN for housing studies in the country (Verdeil, 2012). In Pakistan, Michel Ecochard redesigned one of the biggest universities in the country, the University of Karachi, based on the ideals of Le Corbusier.

Along with consultants and experts like Doxiadis, international institutions like the UN, UNESCO, Colombo Plan, and Ford Foundation were also working in Pakistan pursuing a development agenda. In fact, the status of underdevelopment of Pakistan was created by the Colombo Plan implying the introduction of development in the country. The Colombo Plan was a first formal initiative in which international experts and commentators "began to measure the depth of its problems and the extent of its progress" through "universal development indicators" like poverty, the standard of living and per capita income (Daechsel, 2015, p. 53). The outcome of the Colombo Plan was a declaration that Pakistan needed development that meant a complete transformation of the society in its all social, political, cultural and economic aspects. An interesting example in this regard would be the award of master plans for Lahore and Dacca (now Capital of Bangladesh) to Minoprio-Spenceley-MacFarlane, and the Colombo Plan provided the funding.

Even before the arrival of Doxiadis, UNESCO took over the role of developing the underdeveloped. In 1952, UNESCO published a pamphlet with an emotional title "They can't afford to wait" to convey the problems of the development consultancy (Daechsel, 2015, p. 68). In this report, an act of benevolence was lexically linked to development discourses by emphasising that the newly established Pakistan Meteorological Department needed help so that scientific agricultural techniques could be introduced to safeguard against natural catastrophes. In a similar report, "Mr Underdeveloped Region" was established through the personification of the region, therefore denying any socio-political and cultural distinctiveness of the areas labelled as underdevelopment (Daechsel, 2015). These institutions, along with their experts and consultants, were the physical manifestations of Rostow's modernising theory (Rostow, 1960) which was believed to be a universal plan to stay on the road of development.

In the era of international developmentalism (mainly, 1960–1970 and 1970–1980), the UN was also engaged in constructing Pakistan as an underdeveloped country which needed immediate rescue. The UN was primarily responsible for the travel arrangments as well as giving briefings to consultants who were travelling to far off places without any prior experience. The lack of experience, instead of a disqualification, proved to be a qualification for the job as their lack of knowledge made them unbiased and scientific in introducing development in regions like Pakistan. Through briefings and information packages, the UN

not only presented the territories where development was needed but would also justify and construct the needs and kinds of developments required for that place:

> A good many people brought up in *our* civilization fiercely resent the idea of exploitation because they have learned that men are born free, and equal, and are entitled to pursue happiness. That is by no means an oriental idea. The oriental idea is rather that you are born in a certain caste of a layer of society…and your only chance for happiness is to fulfil your function in that place [emphasis added] (UN, 1953, cited in Daechsel, 2015, p. 73).

What we see here is a reproduction of colonial traditions of outrightly rejecting the South Asian culture and religion as inferior, primitive and exploitative, which should be rescued by 'our civilisation'. This extract was taken from the briefing papers usually given to the consultants who would be travelling to the orient to measure societies against the universal scale of development. Doxiadis, himself was given this on his way to India and later on to Pakistan (Daeschel, 2015, p. 73).

The Ford Foundation, like the Colombo Plan, the UN, UNESCO and the World Bank also contributed in shaping the first UN Development Decade (1960–70) in Pakistan even before the decade was announced and acted upon. Doxiadis is a classic example showing the role of the Ford Foundation in articulating and constructing development as an inevitable and scientifically proven historical process for Pakistan. In fact, the very first interaction between Doxiadis and Pakistan was actually sponsored and funded by the Ford Foundation through the formation of the Harvard Advisory Group for Pakistan. The Ford Foundation was working on a global level with total endowments of around 417 million US Dollars in the1950s (Abbott, 1952). The Ford Foundation was actually an extension of US foreign policy with international and non-governmental flavour. Indeed, the success of Doxiadis and his categories of knowledge through which he was constructing Pakistan as underdeveloped is directly related to the Ford Foundation. As Daechsel (2015) maintains, Doxiadis would get approval for his project first from the Ford Foundation to secure funds before offering it as a necessary development intervention to the Pakistani authorities.

In the later period, the Ford Foundation funded only those projects in which there is an element of education and training because of its stated goals of promoting planning practices as an

opportunity to extend training to the human resources of underdeveloped countries. The Korangi Project, as mentioned above, was also funded because of its projection as pedagogic models to train Pakistani architects and planners in the science of *Ekistics* (Daechsel, 2015, p. 126). In 1961, a massive school building programme was initiated in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in which about 10,000 schools and training institutes were to be built; that too funded by Ford Foundation. In addition, the construction of an agricultural university in Faisalabad and Rawalpindi Polytechnic Institute were also funded by the Ford Foundation to facilitate the universal values of industrialisation, technical education and agricultural transformation.

As briefly discussed above, the role of international development institutions and international consultants shows the very character of development in practice. This development discourse is not only exported to Pakistan as a small set of ideas or suggestions but as a normative value, undeniable truth and inevitable way to achieve development. In doing so, development was championed through the work of consultants and organisations in almost every sector of Pakistani society. From economy to education, from foreign policy to agricultural policy, and from the humanitarian crises of refugees to the construction and planning of new administrative centres and cities, development discourse was present. It existed in the categories of knowledge and the practitioners of that development in the form of experts and consultants equipped with scientific truth and an all-encompassing solution for a better future or ‘good’ change.

4.2.2 International Development and Brazil

Like Pakistan, international development arrived in Brazil as part of global restructuring and anti-communist foreign policy under the leadership of the USA. This leading role of the US was ensured through international institutions as well as a direct influence of US policies and its export of scientific rationality and modernism through a global army of consultants, US-based philanthropic organisations and institutions. Similar to Pakistan, Rostow’s (1960) conceived stages of growth were considered an equally viable and practical approach to development in Brazil. It was argued that since development is a scientific, neutral, modernist and technical programme, its role should be accepted without any contestations or political scepticism. As mentioned earlier, development is primarily believed as a ‘good change’, and it encompasses everything in any society with the almost same zeal and certainty.

In the case of Brazil, similar to Pakistan, development generally referred to the modernisation and transformation of every social aspect. Development was meant to ensure economic growth, agricultural transformation, and the introduction of industrialisation and urbanisation as universal values to cure the already constructed 'other' of development, i.e. underdevelopment. Like Pakistan, the 1960s in Brazil is also considered as a golden era in which Latin America's biggest country was not only prospering economically but also showed positive trends in industrialisation, infrastructural development, urbanisation and vibrant capital flows across its national boundaries.

International development created underdevelopment in Brazil. The physical manifestation and discursive baggage of development that arrived in Brazil, or in all of Latin America for that matter, can be seen in the number of US-based initiatives in the country. The agenda of modernisation and *desarrollismo* (development) was primarily shaped after the 'Good Neighbour Policy' in the whole region of Latin America in 1933 by the then President, Franklin D. Roosevelt. However, immediately after the end of World War II, this policy was given a new lease of life by the creation of several international organisations and agencies to further the cause of development. Among many of them, the Organisation of American States (1948) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (1948) are most important. Both of them were sponsored by the UN and served as unsung protectors of the US' ideological, economic and political interests (Almandoz, 2014). Among all of them, the UN-sponsored ECLAC, with its headquarters in Chile under the leadership of professional economist Raul Prebisch, is considered as the cornerstone of Latin America's developmentalism. One of the fundamental aims of ECLAC was to ensure consolidation of Import Substitution Industrialisation and the corporate nature of the state in countries like Brazil. Concerning political transformation, a strong sense of nationalism and populism was promoted by ECLAC so that transnational political ideologies like communism could be curbed. The amalgam of nationalism and populism was ensured through massive industrialisation in countries like Brazil (Roberts, 1978).

Despite promising prosperity, the Cuban revolution of 1959 shows the volatility of the region during the Cold War. To avoid any such events again in the region, President John F. Kennedy, who was closely associated with President General Ayub of Pakistan for his anti-communist position and pro-development stance, promoted the AFP in 1961 as a development programme for Latin America (Dunne, 2016). Taking further the development objectives of

industrialisation and urbanisation, AFP also aimed at land reforms, agricultural development, regional development and reduction of social inequalities with the help of US finances and technical expertise. According to the Charter of Punta del Este (1961), which began condemning communism, the first objective of AFP while summing up the whole development discourse and echoing the UN mandate as arbitrator of international development was stated as follows:

> To achieve in the participating Latin American countries a substantial and sustained growth of per capita income at a rate designed to attain, at the earliest possible date, levels of income capable of assuring *self-sustaining development*, and sufficient to make Latin American income levels…to the *levels of more industrialized nations* [emphasis added] (The Charter of Punta del Este, 1961, p.8)

While emphasising the importance of development and projecting it as a route to salvation, it further stresses that:

> [D]ifferences in income levels among the Latin American countries will be reduced by *accelerating the development* of the relatively less developed countries and granting them…*international cooperation* in general in evaluating the *degree of relative development*, account will be not only of average levels of real income and gross product per capita, but also of indices of infant mortality, illiteracy, and per capita daily caloric intake [emphasis added] (The Charter of Punta del Este, 1961, pp. 8–9).

Contrary to Pakistan, Brazil, and Latin America in general was believed to be more prone to communism, which was not in the interest of the US and capitalist development in general. Therefore, the distribution of income, financial aid as well as technical support to Brazil was much more than that of Pakistan. However, the categories of knowledge through which underdevelopment is constructed, and development is perceived remain shockingly similar. The idea of meeting the development criteria was set according to the same standards, i.e. 'more industrialised nations' and the only optimal and scientifically proven path is that of 'accelerating the development'. Since modernisation and development have always been regarded as a complete package, therefore, its measurement also follows the same universally

applicable scale measuring and judging societies through scientific categories and the expert knowledge of ‘illiteracy’, ‘per capita caloric intake’ and ‘gross product per capita’.

In this regard, Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) played a significant role to achieve at least three development targets of the era: industrialisation; urbanisation; and integration into the international market. The processes of industrialisation and modernisation were believed to be at least a 50-year-long strategy of the “modernizing societies” so that they may achieve the “drive to maturity” in their political, social and economic spheres (Almandoz, 2016, p. 32). Unless they (societies in the process of development) reach maturity, they were to be considered as “developing countries” or “transitional societies” as compared to their counterparts in Europe and North America (Almandoz, 2016, p. 32; Reissman, 1964). With the ISI as a technocratic and scientifically fruit-bearing strategy, technocratic and economic experts took the lead in Brazil in making the economic and social policies of the country.

Aiming for socio-political and economic transformation, international initiatives and institutions were leading Brazil on its way to development. Among them, and directly relevant to our case, the most iconic one is the scientific planning and modernist rationality in urbanism and urbanisation (both academic and policy related) of the country. According to Almandoz (2016), US-sponsored developmentalism literally transformed *urbanismo* (urbanism or town planning) into *planejamento* (planning, or regional planning) following the US traditions of regional planning. Massive urban restructuring and the construction of large-scale infrastructural projects (like Brasilia) were imported to Brazilian soil under the guise of technical modernity. *Urbanismo,* which arrived in Brazil because of European colonialism, is now replaced with modernism and the scientific rationality of master plans, zoning laws, the institutionalisation of planning, and flow of foreign consultants working with different organisations and institutions of development (Almandoz, 2010). For example, Town Planning Associates (TPA), a US-based firm, was very active in Latin America under the initiative of the ‘Good Neighbour Policy’. They offered considerable technical expertise as well as carried out various architectural projects like Tumaco (1948), and the planning and construction of Cidade dos Motores (City of Engines) in 1943.

As mentioned earlier, international development did not only travel through aid and institutions but also through luminaries. In the case of Brazil, no other foreign consultant or architect could match the influence of Luis-Joseph Lebret (1897–1966) who institutionalised

the transition of urbanism into planning. Luis-Joseph was a Frenchman who advocated the role of surveys, field studies and regional planning to control urban issues. He also founded the Society for the Graphical Analysis and Applied Research of Social Complexes (SAGMACS). Similarly, Le Corbusier, a French-Swiss architect, was very influential. He was not only a contemporary of Doxiadis from Athens but also an urban theorist who strongly influenced and propagated the power of architecture and modernity in the transformation of any society all over the world. Le Corbusier was not only followed in Latin America, especially in Brazil, where he was a constant visitor in various capacities, he also travelled to India where his ideas were translated into the construction and planning of Chandigarh (Evenson, 1966), the capital city of the Indian states of Punjab and Haryana in 1960. This was the time when Islamabad was in the process of construction and Brasilia had already been inaugurated as the new capital of Brazil.

Modernism, especially manifested through planning, infrastructural development and architecture, is an integral part of the ideology of development. Like development, modernism in architecture and planning is also aimed at the transformation of societies in a universally acceptable manner based on scientific rationality and expert knowledge. Like development, it also believes in the natural progress of human societies in which modernity is deemed a vital status and marker of change. This development-induced modernism has a long history in Brazil, however, reified in the post-World War II era. In terms of architecture and urban planning, modernism claims an international legitimacy in the cause of development by building new kinds of cities. Islamabad and Brasilia are both regarded as modernist cities in the sense of having transformational capacity. In Brazil, modernism can be traced back to the formation of the International Congress of Modern Architecture (CIAM) in 1928. Le Corbusier, later on, codified the principles of CIAM in his famous *Athen's Charter* ([1943] 1973) that was agreed upon by over 100 delegates from 20 different countries (Holston, 1989, pp. 39–40).

Like other consultants from the Global North, Le Corbusier's influence and his ideological appeal drastically changed the development and planning of cities and towns to planning based on scientific techniques and modernist rationality. For instance, the project of the City of Engines by the TPA was awarded to the American firm on the pretext of it being a modernist and developmental project (Almandoz, 2016). Since CIAM was itself part of avant-garde movements of Europe, therefore, its celebration as an essential step towards the development

of Brazil clearly shows the working of the international discourse of development through both institutions and individual consultants and professionals. CIAM principles were very effective and celebrated in other countries of Latin America as well, like the construction of Ciudad Guayana in Venezuela (Almandoz, 2016). The influence was that great that Lucio Costa (1902–1992), the master planner of Brasilia, calls the *Athen's Charter* a "sacred book of architecture" while claiming the power of modernism and modernist architecture to achieve development (Holston, 1989, p. 36).

Like Islamabad, Brasilia was also considered as a shared success of international development discourses. Many visitors from all over the world were encouraged to visit the power of development and modernism in the transformation of Brazilian society. In this regard, the French cultural minister, André Malraux (1901–1976), is reported to have called Brasilia "the capital of hope" (Williams, 2009, p. 95). Like other developers (both individuals and organisations), CIAM was also rooted in the Western experiences of capitalism, industrialisation and urban crises; therefore, it put forth an inevitable scientific programme of urban development and regional integration for underdeveloped countries like Brazil (Acioly, 1992). Translation of CIAM ideas on the ground in the form of Brasilia was also coupled with US-inspired zoning regulations and functionalism; therefore, the whole project was regarded as embodying the Western ideals of development (Almandoz, 2016). As development aimed at bringing order out of disorder, similarly, CIAM also proposed to create order out of disorder through its geometric calculations and vast spread of streets and road networks (Scott, 1998).

Having attained a significant position in the field of developmentalism and modernism, Brazilian architects and planners joined the ranks of the global army of consultants propagating modernism and developmentalism as a technical expert knowledge aimed at creating order, progress and development. Oscar Niemeyer (1907–2012) and Lucio Costa were commissioned to design the UN's headquarters in New York in 1948 (Williams, 2009). Further, Oscar Niemeyer and Roberto Burle Marx (1909–1994), modernist architect and landscape architect, respectively, from Brazil, were also competing with Doxiadis for the project of Islamabad (Daechsel, 2015, p. 135). Similarly, Doxiadis, who was active in several countries at that time, was equally known as an international development consultant architect and was considered by Brazilians for the master planning of Rio de Janeiro. In 1965, Paulo Francisco Torres (1903–2000), the 47th governor of Rio de Janeiro (term in office, 1964–

1966), hired his firm to develop a new master plan for the city of Rio de Janeiro (Rio, 2009) which, however, was not implemented.

The construction and planning of Brasilia, like that of Islamabad, shows the power of international developmentalism and a blind belief in the power of modernist architecture, scientific rationality and urbanisation – following European and North American modernist ideas and development programmes – to transform societies according to Rostow's (1960) modernisation theory and stages of growth. The ideas of modernism, industrialisation, and urbanisation were different components in the broader scheme of development that was exported to the Global South following the end of the Second World War. For instance, the construction of Islamabad and Brasilia were strongly related to the ideas of industrialisation and modernisation in which capitalist growth, like car manufacturing (Volkswagen, Ford, General Motors, etc.) were booming. World capitalists were also desperate to find new markets and more robust socio-economic and political integration to maximise capital flows across the globe. Having development as a project and a goal, international developmentalism in all its forms were giving protection to US capitalist ideology and the economisation of social life. For example, and this holds for Islamabad as well, Brasilia represents American capital consumerism through its spatial organisation and development model (Williams, 2009). The whole development debate and development gauges can be reduced to economic denominators, making the economy and capital ultimate markers for development (Sachs, 2010) without any regard for power imbalances, global and local distribution of incomes, rising poverty, authoritarianism as well as the traditions and cultural norms of the otherwise diverse Global South.

4.3 Urban Planning and International Development: Genesis of Islamabad and Brasilia

The processes and discourses of development, especially in the post-World War II period, proposed the universal values of industrialisation, urbanisation and mega-development projects and master plans for the reconstruction of the, then believed, underdeveloped regions of the world. These universal values were largely centred around combating communism and promoting capitalism with blind faith in the power of the market economy to guide the state towards a better future. Therefore, the division of the globe into developed and

underdeveloped spheres created new relationships and modalities of ‘good change’. In these times, as this research argues, the process of urbanisation and urban development began to take on a wide acceptance throughout the Global South in order to follow the universal scientific values of the Global North.

Before further discussion, this is not to suggest that the Global South was merely at the receiving end of processes or that it was docile. In fact, the whole interaction was very strategic and selective in a sense that Rostow’s (1960) prescriptions for economic growth and industrialisation were accepted and celebrated but without any regard to the principles of democratic governance (Ong, 2007).

Nowhere can development and its physical manifestation be as visible as in the urbanisation and urban development of both Pakistan and Brazil. Cities have always been regarded as ‘engines of growth’ and models of the power of development in transforming any society on the globe. Given the context as extensively discussed above, the planning and development of Brasilia and Islamabad enable us to dig deeper into the role of development at the international level as well as on the national level. The development that impacted Pakistan and Brazil celebrated the construction and planning of both Islamabad and Brasilia as modernist model cities providing the solution to all of the urban problems these countries have. This development and its baggage continue to guide the relationship of state and society in these planned cities in a similar manner as it once guided the relationship of the developed and underdeveloped. Since the focus of this research is on development discourses and the urban poor, therefore, it was important to discuss the origins of the whole development debate, its baggage, its knowledge categories and its tools of realisation. The professional gimmick of ‘development’ which was once used by Truman to camouflage his political ambitions actually gave a road which was to be followed by municipal administrations of these modernist, planned and developed cities of the Global South.

Before debating further how the development discourses in Islamabad and Brasilia are creating their own ‘other’ and what rationales are taken as natural, scientific and inevitable, it is still needed to explicitly place Brasilia and Islamabad within the international development context. Both of the cities were widely celebrated development projects showing the power of development to scientifically induce a change in otherwise underdeveloped, stagnant and disordered societies.

Ever since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has been looking for a new administrative capital to host new administrative machinery required by the newly independent country, as Karachi was not only very big but was also very congested. It was clear to almost everyone that Pakistan would need a new capital or an administrative city. Having new cities and towns as a symbol of political power was not new in the subcontinent. Previously, many rulers have asserted their control through the building of new cities from scratch. For instance, Mughal Emperor Akbar constructed Fatehpur Sikri in 1571 (for details, see Gupta, 2013), Maharaja Jai Singh constructed Jaipur in 1727 (for details, see Sachdev & Tillotson, 2002) and Chandigarh which was completed in 1960 (for details, see Kalia, (1999). Pakistan also needed new symbols of sovereignty, dominance, control and, above all, development to embark its journey towards a better future.

While justifying the planning and construction of Islamabad, an official document states:

> Every Government [*sic*] that takes to heart the development and evolution of the nation it serves, demands of the administration that it should play its assigned part to the best of its ability. [while disregarding Karachi as a capital city, the report further asserts that] The population of Karachi is cosmopolitan in nature…all this would be eliminated if the Capital [*sic*] were to be a Capital only, without any non-official civilian population… (Doxiadis Associates, 1960, p. 27 [DOX-PA-88]).

Despite poor economic conditions and hostile relationships with neighbours along with political uncertainty and a secessionist movement in the Eastern wing of the country, the planning and execution of such a large project for the "development and evolution of the nation" clearly reflects that the purpose was not only to construct a new administrative centre but a crown jewel of development. The hiring of international consultant Doxiadis for the job ensured the scientific rationality of the planning techniques and that construction took place in accordance with the functionalism of modernist ideology.

The most logical explanation for such an ambitious project by a country like Pakistan is that the development discourse and massive support from the Global North made it possible. Following the modernist principles of *Ekistics*, the construction and planning of Islamabad reflected the position of the Pakistani government vis-à-vis international developmentalism

of that time. Doxiadis, who was given the project, was not only a member of the Harvard Advisory Group (giving economic plans to the country) but was also the owner of Doxiadis Associates, a Greek firm working in over 20 countries. Along with many other architectural and urban reformation projects in Pakistan, the construction and planning of Islamabad were celebrated across the globe as a model city and a solution to underdeveloped urbanism. After the partial completion of Islamabad, US President Eisenhower (1890–1969) took an inspection flight over the site of Islamabad in 1959 (Daechsel, 2015, p. 174). Other heads of state, for example, President Diosdado Macapagal from Philippines and Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda were also taken to see Islamabad on their visit to Pakistan. The list of visitors to see the embodiment of a better future, as the development discourse implies, also included Muhammed bin Saud Al Saud, the Defence Minister of Saudi Arabia, and Thi Han, the Foreign Minister of Burma (term in office, 1962–1969). The list goes on to include royalty, for example, Princess Beatrix, before she became the Queen of Netherlands in 1980, and Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah, the King of Nepal were also shown Islamabad as a model city coming to life.

Since Pakistan had only a short history before the construction of its new capital, Islamabad, it would suffice to argue, as discussed above, that the role of international development and its linkages with the country provided a strong context for the creation of Islamabad. This, however, is not the case with Brasilia. Contrary to Pakistan, Brazil has a long history and relatively different colonial experiences when ruled by the Portuguese. Hence, the very thought of having a new capital, instead of Rio de Janeiro that has been the administrative centre since colonial times, was long in process and consideration.

In Brazil, very much like Pakistan, the basic idea of having a new capital has a lot to do with postcolonial nation-building and the symbolism of the Brazilian state free from the yolk of Portuguese colonialism. Immediately after the independence of Brazil in 1822, the very thought of having a new capital started growing, as suggested by a document entitled "Memoir on the Necessity and Means of Building a new Capital in the interior of Brazil" (Nascimento, 2006, p. 151). This proposal could not attract much attention from the people and ruling elite until an Italian Catholic priest, Dom Bosco, had a dream on 30 August 1883 in which he saw the present location of Brasilia as the "promised land of milk and honey, of inconceivable richness" (Silva, 1971, p. 34, cited in Holston, 1989, p. 16). He is not only considered as the

Patron Saint of Brasilia, but his dream of the 'promised' land is recognised in official history and also in public memory.

Soon after Bosco's dream, the idea of having a new capital as the embodiment of progress and Brazil's independence from the vices of colonialism attained a legal status in the Republican Constitution of 1891. For the first time, an area of 14,400 square kilometres in central Brazil was reserved for the future capital of the country (Holston, 1989). For decades to come, the constitutional directive and the reservation of the site for the new capital could not get much attention. However, the idea was not completely rejected or ignored. In fact, many commissions were convened, for example, in 1892, 1946, and 1953, to carry out studies and chart out the prospects of the future capital of the country. The constitutional provision for the new capital remained intact in all the other constitutions of 1934 and 1937. So much so, a symbolical foundation stone was also laid in 1922 to ceremonially inaugurate the construction of Brasilia (Holston, 1989; Nascimento, 2006). It was not only an ambitious project but also demanded considerable resources, political stability and security of tenure for any political leader to undertake such a huge project. Also, people were not really looking forward to having a new city. Instead, they were more concerned with economic security, political stability and better law and order conditions in the country.

However, things changed after the Second World War. Amid the growing influence of international organisation and the US in Brazil, the demand for a new capital as a symbol of the Brazilian movement to development grew stronger. The Federal Capital Commission was appointed by Getúlio Dornelles Vargas (1882–1954), the President of the republic (1930–1945 and 1951–1954), to pursue the construction of a new capital of the country. With Juscelino Kubitschek (1902–1976) as the emerging leader of Brazil, the idea of Brasilia became part of everyday discussion in the public sphere. During his presidential campaigns, he pledged to build the new capital, which later on became the central goal of his administration (1956–1961). Kubitschek, contrary to Vargas, was open to foreign capital and was a firm believer in industrialisation and development – echoing international developmentalism under the leadership of the US. His campaign slogan was *50 anos 5* (50 years in 5). Following the models of international development institutions, he promoted continental funding which later on became the Inter-American Bank of Development with many rich states like France, Germany, the UK and the US as non-borrowing members. Also, his ideas and his undertaking in bringing development to Brazil through the construction of

Brasilia was very much influenced by the theory of development brought to the country by ECLAC.

Kubitschek saw an opportunity in the construction of Brasilia to overcome underdevelopment. The creation of Brasilia would also initiate other massive infrastructural projects like highway construction, hydroelectric generation, production of steel, and new means of communication and capital flow – a complete package through which developmentalism represents itself. According to Kubitschek, Brasilia would not only be a new capital but, as developmentalism rhetoric would put it, "a pole of development" for the nation and "a stone cast to create waves of progress" in all the country (Holston, 1989, p. 18). In his campaigns and defence of the construction of Brasilia, Kubitschek has always employed New World mythology and development theory. According to them, Brasilia is the foundation of a new Brazil, a successful launch to development, order out of disorder, and a 'good change' instead of stagnation.

Similar to that of Islamabad, Brasilia was also celebrated internationally as a modernist urban project embodying developmentalism and the transformation of the society according to Rostow's modernising theory. In the early years of Brasilia, many journals (for example, the Architectural Review, Journal of Royal Institute of British Architects, etc.) had special issues on Brasilia. Like Islamabad, many notables and dignitaries visited Brasilia. For example, Pope John XIII gave radio message, André Malraux, a French cultural minister, and a French philosopher and writer Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) visited the city to witness the claimed miracles of development (Williams, 2005). So much so, UNESCO regarded Brasilia and its modernist planned area as a World Heritage Site in 1987.

The construction of Islamabad and Brasilia has been considered as a shared success of international developmentalism. Both cities were not only celebrated as symbols of a postcolonial national identity and symbolic representation of the state for society but as a success story of development. They were considered as a hallmark of development and the power it holds to transform traditional or underdeveloped societies towards development, progress and a 'better future'. This embodiment of international developmentalism is, however, not without profound implications on multiple levels. While accepting the inferior position of underdevelopment, these countries have put themselves at the mercy of the experiences of the Global North and market rationality. Development first provided the

justification for the intervention of international capitalist forces and socio-spatial reorganisation of the societies of the Global South. Later, it provided power to the postcolonial governments of Pakistan and Brazil to regulate, manage and control populations while employing the same knowledge categories once provided by international development discourse. On a global level, one may argue, that the categories of knowledge and nature of development have largely been changed but, as this research intends to show in forthcoming chapters, this change is not visible in countries like Pakistan and Brazil. In fact, the same discursive techniques and labels that once created underdevelopment in the world are continuously creating underdevelopment in the cities of Islamabad and Brasilia. The categories of disorder, tradition, filth, savagery, underdevelopment continue to echo in the development discourses of the municipalities of Islamabad and Brasilia while defining, understanding, projecting and executing development based on scientific truth, expert knowledge and the undeniable power of scientific planning.

Chapter 5: *CIDADE PARA QUEM?* (CITY FOR WHOM?): THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMABAD AND BRASILIA

This chapter will discuss the planning of Islamabad and Brasilia. It is argued that the urban spaces of Islamabad and Brasilia were designed and planned to reify the existing class boundaries and socio-economic hierarchies in Pakistan and Brazil. This chapter exposes the socio-political undertones of the assumed neutral, scientific and apolitical planning that has been promoted all over the globe under the guise of development. The chapter is divided into two major parts focusing on firstly the spirit of planning of Islamabad and secondly that of Brasilia. It will conclude that the creation of homogenous neighbourhoods and naturalisation of socio-political and economic inequalities show the institutional character of the state in patronising social inequalities and regulating class conflicts in the urban spaces of Islamabad and Brasilia since their inception. It is essential to mention that all organisation and planning of urban spaces were performed under the paradigm of capitalism where commodification and the market economy played a vital role in the shaping of Islamabad and Brasilia – an ideological pillar of the post-1945 development discourse.

5.1 Creation of Islamabad and Discourses for Public Consumption

Soon after the creation of Pakistan in August 1947, Karachi, a port city, was selected as the national capital. The city of Karachi was believed to be fully equipped (in terms of infrastructure) and representative (in terms of ethnic diversity). However, it was soon realised that the spatial and social character of Karachi as the federal capital was not suitable for the administrative machinery to carry out the necessary national functions (Ansari, 2005). The population of Karachi increased from a mere 400,000 in 1947 to almost 1.3 million by the end of 1953 with most of the people living in shanty towns and overcrowded informal settlements (Ansari, 2005; Nilsson, 1973). Along with the steep rise in the population, ethnic conflicts, and an influx of refugees, the administration of the newly created country further deteriorated due to conflicts between the provincial government of Sindh and the federal government of Pakistan. Karachi, being the capital, was dealing with a number of issues on multiple levels. There was political uncertainty about the future of the government as well as the rift between centre and province over the constitutional powers to run affairs in their respective domains (Talbot, 2009). In addition, a number of issues were related to the national and regional

languages that were translated as conflicts among different linguistic and ethnic identities (Toor, 2005; Kothari, 2009; Ansari, 2005).

General Muhammad Ayub Khan (1907–1974) assumed power, declared martial law in the country and became the president of Pakistan (1958–1969). To address the political uncertainty and chaos in the country, Ayub Khan vowed to govern the country along modernist and developmentalist lines. He initiated large-scale modernisation and developmental plans including urbanisation, industrialisation and agricultural transformation. After a few months in the office of presidency, Ayub Khan announced that the nation was in dire need of a new capital city as a symbol of the nation's independence as well as of its movement towards developmentalism and modernism (Doxiadis Associates, 1960, p. 163 [DOX-PA-88]). His dislike for Karachi as a federal capital is evident from the report of his experiences as Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani army (1951–1958) in his political autobiography. He says, "I would come back from my occasional visits to Karachi depressed and distressed…It used to take me three or four days to recover from a Karachi visit" (Khan, 1967, p. 39). Based on his experience of Karachi he concluded that the country was chaotic, in ruins and full of factions. Therefore, once Ayub Khan assumed a position of power, he immediately constituted a commission to consider the relocation of the capital. The commission was chaired by Major General Yahya Khan (1917–1980), the then Chief of General Staff (1957–1962). The only aim of the commission was to find a new location for the capital of the country based on strictly scientific and rational principles. Doxiadis, a Greek architect, was hired as an adviser to the commission. The Potohar plateau (in the north) was selected as a site for the new capital (Daechsel, 2015; Harper, 2010; Doxiadis Associates, 1960 [DOX-PA-88], 1961, p. 5 [DOX-PA-127]).

In 1959, Ayub Khan announced that the new capital would be built closer to Rawalpindi, a garrison city since British rule (Spaulding, 2003) and Doxiadis was hired to prepare a master plan of the new modernist city. The symbolism and the aspirations with which the construction and planning of Islamabad were presented to the public are of the utmost importance to our case. It was stated explicitly in the report titled 'The Spirit of Islamabad' that:

> It [Pakistan] needed a new capital for many reasons, for all those reasons for which every nation needs a capital. But here we had one more overriding need, the need to have a capital which would be the symbol of its newly won

> independence. A symbol of an age-old nation, which yet was also a young nation, as it has only recently acquired its independence. A symbol of a nation which is striving to *develop* its country so as to serve all of its people in the best possible way [emphasis added] (Doxiadis Associates, 1961, p. 2 [DOX-PA-127]).

Together with this, the idea of Islamabad, its planning and purpose were also projected as a potential source of leadership and guidance to the country. It was envisaged that the city would not be just a symbol of independence or development but also a representative city to which other cities and people will look to for guidance. In a secret report prepared by the Federal Capital Commission,[4] it is mentioned that:

> The capital of a country is not merely another city; it is a LEADER amongst cities…From this city flows the inspiration which pulsates life into the nation. It is a symbol of our hopes. [the purpose and aims are further elaborated as] It should, therefore, reflect our national character in a manner that would impress a visitor and give him an insight into the inner springs of our life (Federal Capital Commission, undated, p. 3).

The idea of having a new capital as a source of inspiration, a symbol of national unity and development, as well as the material manifestation of the monumentality of the Pakistani nation, has been discussed at the start of almost every report and public document prepared by or prepared for the Pakistani state. This is especially evident in early reports where the construction and planning of Islamabad are discussed (for example, CDA, 1983, unpaginated, undated(a), pp. 1-2; Doxiadis Associates, 1960, p. 164 [DOX-PA-88], 1960a, p. 1 [DOX-PA-72], 1961, p. 2 [DOX-PA-127]).

5.2 Scientific Planning, Modernism and Development: Spatial Organisation of Islamabad

The overall master plan of Islamabad is comprised of thousands of pages in more than 100 documents. The length of the master plan itself shows the tiny details considered by the

[4] This report is without any dates. However, the first page of the report as found in archives carries a quotation from King Solomon, which says, "Where there is no vision the people perish."

planners, from the spatial organisation to the social composition of the city (Doxiadis, 1965, p. 2). The plethora of documents and thousands of pages not only represented the future city but also the tools through which the legitimacy and reliability of the modernist planning and rationalisation of development were established. Such a master plan, in the words of Mitchell (1991), is a manifestation of structural modernity, which has the power not only to demarcate streets and roads but also the whole social life around them. Planning on such a scale implies that individuals stand apart as if planning pre-exists them in the form of truth and reality. Echoing the fundamentals of modernity and developmentalism, the planning of Islamabad and its scientific organisation of urban space reflects that the city was planned for its existence outside the social sphere – an empty slate which was to be given life by the architects and scientific planning brought to Pakistan by international experts like Doxiadis himself.

The total metropolitan area that was appropriated for the new capital city of Islamabad is 906.05 square kilometres, which is divided into Islamabad proper (urban and rural areas for habitation) and the National Park (Figure 5.1[5]). The National Park includes Rawal Lake, Margalla Hills (north of the city) and Shakarparian hills (to the south). The National Park ensured smooth supply of agricultural products as well as the provision of recreational facilities like hiking areas, zoo, botanical gardens, national sports centre, national university and other research institutes of national importance (CDA, 1983, unpaginated). Along with the National Park, Islamabad proper was envisioned as an area that was reserved for residential and industrial development, including the capitol complex, i.e. the presidential palace, supreme court, parliament, and the national secretariat etc. If we look closer at the Figure 5.1, the National Park serves as a boundary on the south-eastern side of the city. Therefore, the capitol complex is considered as the starting point of the city from where Islamabad proper starts growing and expanding towards the west, north and south.

In this research, the focus will remain on Islamabad proper – the area where the city thrives and assumed its status of an urban settlement with all the diversities of income and class, professions and expertise, education and experience, ethnicity and nationalities, as well as technocratic and democratic institutions.

[5] The area towards the south-west of the National Park belongs to the neighbouring city of Rawalpindi. Initially, the grid pattern was extended to Rawalpindi as well but later on the master plan was revised and Rawalpindi was excluded. This, however, did not change the character or principles of the planning of Islamabad.



Figure 5.1 National Park and Master Plan Source: *Doxiadis Associates (1960, p. 385) Modified by Author*

Following the modernist principle of *dynapolis* (dynamic city), the city was designed in a way to accommodate the temporal scale in its planning. Growth of the city over time was already planned and envisioned in the planning of the city (see Figure 5.2). The grid-patterned city of Islamabad was planned in a way to regulate and control its extension along Khayaban-i-Quaid-i-Azam, commonly known as the Blue Area towards the south-west. This avenue is planned as the main centre accommodating the commercial and business needs of the city. The avenue is a central artery north and south of residential areas. This fundamental idea of a linear city that is extending over time towards a fixed direction is central to Doxiadis' concept of *dynapolis*. The Blue Area was given the utmost attention in the planning of Islamabad because it guides the future growth and extension of the city. It will continue to expand south-west, and along with it, the residential sectors will also be growing so that the fixed trajectory can be followed.

5.2.1 Grid Pattern and Residential Sectors of Islamabad

Following the modernist principles of planning the residential sectors of Islamabad were planned on a grid pattern (see Figure 5.3). The whole city was designed in a rigid grid pattern

of 2 km times 2 km. According to Doxiadis (1965), the grid pattern is a modernist attempt to connect city inhabitants with their community and neighbourhood. It is interesting to note that the rationalisation of scientific principles of geometry and its socio-cultural and religious roots were exploited to frame the whole grid pattern not only as modern but also religiously and culturally sensitive:

> Finally, Islamabad, a symbolic city of Islam, cannot ignore the rules of design and synthesis which are characteristic of Islamic culture. Every large and important synthesis of Islamic culture is based on pure geometry…For all these reasons the only pattern of axes which can serve and represent Islamabad is a pattern of straight axes running vertical to each other (Doxiadis Associates, 1960, p. 254 [DOX-PA-88]).

While talking about Islamic culture and the importance of geometry, Doxiadis deliberately ignored the diversity of architecture and planning in different Muslim countries. Further, there has been no true or authentic Islamic culture when it comes to planning a city or a building. Here, the lexical relationship that Doxiadis developed is to justify his modernist interventions. These interventions and actual adherence to modernism and developmentalism were apparent in the naming of residential sectors. Contrary to history and culture, neighbourhood sectors were not named after any persons, places or religious symbols but apolitical numbers and letters of the alphabet.

The whole modernity project and developmentalism stand on their adherence to neutral, universal and scientific principles. In the case of Islamabad, this ideal was upheld in the naming of the sectors with a letter of the alphabet followed by a number. The letters provided a position on the east-west axis of the Blue Area while numbers showed the position along the Blue Area starting from the capitol complex:

> This naming has been based on the 2,100 yards square sector, surrounded by the main highways, which is the modulus of the Metropolitan area. The diagram [see Figure 5.3] shows this naming of sectors, which will be known as A1, A2, A3, A4 or B1, B2, B3, B4 etc. (CDA, 1983, unpaginated; Doxiadis Associates, 1960, p. 380 [DOX-PA-88]).

The residential sectors of 2,100 square yards were further divided into four subsectors to plan the distribution of resources as well as the number of housing units per sector which were labelled as a community. For example, sector F6 was divided into F6/1, F6/2, F6/3 and F6/4 and G6 into G6/1, G6/2, G6/3, and G6/4. These sectors and subsectors were dealt with as communities of different classes, housing a different number of people depending upon the distribution of spaces and plot sizes. Therefore, it has been maintained that the "size of each community determines the degree of servic [read civic] services the former randers [*sic*] to its inhabitants" (CDA, 1983, unpaginated).

These communities are classified as follows: a small group of houses with a common connecting factor, a street or a square (CDA, 1983, unpaginated) or same income level (Doxiadis Associates, 1960b, p. 8 [DOX-PA-90], 1959, p. 14 [DOX-PA-29], 1960, p. 283 [DOX-PA-88]) would constitute community class 1; several communities of class I with higher facilities or a common element, like an elementary school, would make community class II; similarly, several communities of class II with a higher order and facilities, such as a market place, mosques or parks would constitute communities of class III. In this hierarchy of communities, simply speaking, each sector would be a community of class IV. It is important to mention here that the community in this case should not be understood merely as a physical category of grouping a different number of people into different groups. Rather, these community classes are also reflective of the socio-economic composition of the same 2,100 square yards sector. For example, G6, as a middle-income area has more people as compared to F6 (area of higher-income groups). Still, both of them have the same status of community class IV and subsequently the same public facilities, if not better for F6.

5.2.2 Labels and Neighbourhoods: Organisation of Urban Spaces

Naming the sectors of Islamabad as representative of the scientific principles of planning and adoption of the universally assumed destination of development is more than a mere organisation of urban spaces for the sake of management of resources. Naming different sectors differently conceals the socio-spatial composition of these sectors under the guise of apparently rational, neutral and apolitical numbers and letters of the alphabet. On the ground, in Islamabad, each sector has different kinds of neighbourhood units, plot sizes, provision of roads, streets, public parks, schools, and neighbourhood markets. Based on the labels, for example, related to occupation, income, social status and other social identities, the whole

urban space of Islamabad is stratified in a hierarchical order showing that the city is different for different people who might be living in Islamabad.



Figure 5.2 The Ideal City and Islamabad Source: Doxiadis Associates, 1960, p. 278 Modified by Author



Figure 5.3 Naming of Sectors Source: Doxiadis Associates, 1960, p. 281 Modified by Author

As mentioned earlier, labels and labelling as a process tend to create a convenient image of the labelled. It is like a box in which an identity of a subject is reduced to a mere object of the policy of the state. Neighbourhood planning and the provision of different public services in Islamabad is a classic example of labelling at work. Labelling is of profound consequence to the labelled in the case of Islamabad as it reifies the social hierarchies and translates them into physically demarcated areas within the city. It is not a matter of evolution of the city but a vision that has been realised through the modernist urban planning of Islamabad.

While planning Islamabad and organising its future population, the CDA and Doxiadis generated three fundamental labels: low income; middle income; and high income. In addition, other social identities like "VIPs" (Doxiadis Associates, 1960, p. 290 [DOX-PA-88]; CDA, 1983, unpaginated) and "intellectual leadership" (CDA, 1983, unpaginated) were assumed to be a part of the high-income group. Labels and categories are the fundamental premises based on which the socio-spatial planning of Islamabad is realised. It is essential to reflect on the origins of these categories. None of the documents or interviewees when asked, described the meaning of VIPs or intellectual leadership. However, contextually and culturally it can be inferred that both of the labels refer to members of an elite class in their respective fields like science, politics, industry, civil or military bureaucracy, and landlords (Federal Capital Commission, undated, p. 3). None of them offered any source to gauge their economic value; therefore, the whole idea of placing such people in a higher-income category is based on the assumptions of them having a lot of money. The rest of the categories were based on the 1960 Socio-Economic Survey of Rawalpindi and Civil Service Survey (Doxiadis Associate, 1960, p. 286 [DOX-PA-88]). These surveys were referred to in all of the 60 documents that could be collected for this research.

Based on the surveys and questions regarding family size, monthly income, and rank in public bureaucracy, justifications regarding the planning of sectors and plot sizes were made. While doing so, the income level assumed a natural position and a scientific category based on which the modernist planning of the city would be conducted (among many others, CDA, 1971, p. 10; CDA, undated(a), unpaginated; CDA, 1983, p. 2; Doxiadis Associates, 1960b, pp. 6, 67 [DOX-PA-90], 1960, p. 290 [DOX-PA-88]; also see Tables 5.1 and 5.2). For instance, different income groups were labelled as low-, middle- and high-income groups and their needs, physical spaces and provision of public services were assumed because of the scientific categories that took them as a successful 'system':

> In the development of different forms of communities, a system has already been tried, in accordance with the income to which these communities correspond. For example, for the lowest income groups…there may be no necessity at all for cars to pass through such a small community. These communities can be served by roads passing at their extremities, while the houses can be on both sides of narrow or wider pedestrian lanes (Doxiadis Associates, 1959, p. 14 [DOX-PA-29]).

On the other hand, for higher-income groups, the same report maintains:

> Communities of higher income group need a road for car traffic. In this case there is no need for a small square as people live in houses of higher standards, with their own gardens in which their children can play (Doxiadis Associates, 1959, p. 14 [DOX-PA-29]).

These broad and general categories of middle-, low- or higher-income groups are further elaborated by another set of categories corresponding to their assumed economic status. For example, the housing types (single-storey, double-storey, detached or semi-detached, etc.) were associated with the socio-economic categories even among the officers. These categories ranged from Category A (the highest, for example for ministers) to Category H (the lowest, for instance for clerical staff) symbolising the division even among the bureaucracy and the differences they have among themselves. Following the colonial logic of governance where 'colonisers' and 'colonised' were divided along racial lines, the planning of Islamabad divides the society and inhabitants along class lines (see Table 5.1).

The difference between house type A and house type H is more than the size. All of the houses of types A, B, and C are located in low-density neighbourhoods of the F series sector in close proximity to both the administrative centre and the Margalla hills. The houses are planned to be bigger, with access to vehicular roads and in close proximity to the spaces of work and leisure (Doxiadis Associates, 1961a [DOX-PI-17]). On the other hand, houses of types D, E, F, G, and H were located in relatively high-density areas of the G series sector at a distance from places of work and the National Park. Also, they were given limited access to vehicular roads as it was assumed house occupants would be poor and without cars. Also, the number

of rooms for E, F, G or H type houses were limited to an average of 1–2 as compared to an average of 4–5 rooms for A, B, and C type houses.

Table 5.1 Scale for the Size of Plots *Source: Doxiadis Associates (1960c, p. 14)*

Post	House Type	Plot Size (in square yards)
Ministers	A	9,680
Secretaries, Joint Secretaries, Heads of Departments and equivalent	A	4,840
Deputy Secretaries, Deputy Directors and equivalent	B	2,420
Section Officers (seniors) and equivalent	C	1,210
Section Officers (junior) and equivalent	D	605
Clerical Staff (Rs. 276–400)	E	453.75
Clerical Staff (Rs. 120–275)	F	302.5
Clerical Staff (Below Rs. 120)	G	211.75
Other Class IV Staff	H	151.25

Table 5.2 Income Level and Size of Plot *Source: Doxiadis Associates (1960b, p. 42)*

Income group	Annual Family Income in Rs.	Percentage breakdown of families requiring the following plot (in square yards)						Average Plot in sq. yards
		Up to 120	121–200	201–300	301–500	501–1000	1000 & over	
A	Up to 1200	36.0	46.1	7.2	7.3	2.0	1.1	130
B	1201–2400	10.4	43.3	18.1	21.9	4.7	1.6	230
C	2401–3600	2.3	27.0	17.0	37.9	13.2	2.6	350
D	3601–4800	1.8	16.8	13.2	38.9	25.0	4.3	430
E	4801–7200	0.1	7.8	9.5	29.7	40.8	12.1	690
F	7201–9600	0.9	3.7	4.0	20.4	56.7	14.3	790
G, H, I	9601 & over	0.6	2.4	1.8	5.9	36.8	50.5	-
Total		9.3	27.8	12.5	24.1	17.9	8.4	-

It is important to mention here that the idea of housing requirements and the area designated for each official class is based on the urban planning of the British colonial rule in which civil lines and cantonments were planned for the colonial ruling class in the cities of Rawalpindi and Lahore (King, 1976). However, for the civilians and non-official classes, the fundamental principle of hierarchy and social stratification is reified while taking income as a fundamental principle to organise and distribute urban spaces (see Table 5.2).

As we can see in Table 5.2 above, categorisation of different socio-economic groups in fixed categories and groups is directly related to their share in the urban spaces of Islamabad. The principle of hierarchy is established and reproduced here as well. The labels of the income group signify the assumptions and requirements for housing for each group. As mentioned earlier, the requirements of housing for each economic group is directly relevant to their geographic location in Islamabad. For instance, higher-income groups (G, H, I) will have bigger plots, therefore will be located most likely in the F series sector along with ministers, high-ranking officials and VIPs. Lower-income groups (A, B, C) will be allocated their spaces in the I series sector designed for lower-income groups as per the master plan of Islamabad. In this way, taking income as a fundamental factor for the social organisation of the urban spaces of Islamabad is represented as a natural and scientific way to reproduce social hierarchies, segregation and homogenous neighbourhoods in Islamabad.

All of the planning of Islamabad as a federal capital is based on the principles and surveys mentioned above. In all of the documents that could be collected for this study, almost each one of them refers to the results of these surveys as a natural, scientific and rational source of organisation of the urban space of Islamabad while dealing with multiple issues like plot sizes, house types or provision of public facilities like roads and streets (for example, CDA, 1983, unpaginated, 1971, p. 10, undated(b), pp. 2–4, undated(a), p. 5; Doxiadis Associates, 1960b, pp. 34, 42, 67, 71, 75 [DOX-PA-90], 1960, p. 290 [DOX-PA-88], 1959, pp. 14, 20 [DOX-PA-29], 1960d, p. 15 [DOX-PA-85], 1961b, p. 22 [DOX-PA-146], 1961c, p. 4 [DOX-PA-150]). It is unfortunate that they completely ignored issues like corruption and bribery in the public offices that have been present since the creation of Pakistan, even during the times of construction of Islamabad (see, Niaz, 2014; Hull, 2009). Because of the corrupt practices, it is safe to assume that the actual income of the people in these surveys may differ as everyone tries to evade tax and is engaged with one or another kind of informal economy.

Corruption or abuse of power by public officials is an open secret in Pakistan. The researcher has personal experiences in this regard. Multiple interviewees attested that corruption has become a new normal in Pakistan. Giving bribes for work (irrespective of it being legal or illegal) has become a common sense approach to deal with public officials. Therefore, it is safe to assume that income-based data of any kind in Pakistan is unlikely to be accurate as people tend to hide their true income and financial status to avoid taxes. This is the practice of most people, irrespective of their status or profession (see, for further details, Hull, 2012, 2008; Niaz, 2014; Khan, 2007; and Aftab, Khan & Ali, 2020). The role of corruption and informality as a practice in the development and governance of Islamabad will be discussed in chapter 6.

5.3 The Spirit of Islamabad in Brief

As mentioned above, a community of varying levels is considered to be a fundamental unit through which social realities are spatially inscribed in Islamabad (Doxiadis Associates, 1960b, p. 8 [DOX-PA-90]). It is perhaps important to recall the meanings of community in the planning of Islamabad. Community is understood as a number of urban families of the same income level grouped together. This community is considered as a "primary unit in an interlocking hierarchical system of communities" (Doxiadis Associates, 1960b, p. 8 [DOX-PA-90]), i.e. the whole city.

Labels that have been generated while defining and understanding community or identifying a common factor among different social groups are primarily economic in their nature. Low-income or high-income categories are naturalised with a specific set of assumptions about the people categorised with these labels. The whole purpose of planning and labelling is to determine who deserves and needs what, where and why. The entire city was planned to have a different outlook for different classes and social groups; therefore, different urban experiences are available for different social groups while living in Islamabad:

> It is obvious that the size of plots also depends on the income of the families concerned, because this determines an essential part of the cost of the house (Doxiadis Associates, 1960, p. 284 [DOX-PA-88]).

Based on the income level, it has been stressed that the corresponding outlook, planning and facilities to the communities may be provided. In that process, labels of high income and low income were considered to be a natural and neutral source of information and scientific foundation on which the city was to be developed:

> Communities of higher income group need a road for car traffic. In this case, there is no need for a small square as people live in houses of higher standards, with their own gardens in which their children can play (Doxiadis Associates, 1959, p. 14 [DOX-PA-29]).

However, for the lower-income groups, it has been maintained in the same report that:

> [F]or the lowest income groups, the income group A and even income group B, there may be no necessity at all for cars to pass through such a small community. These communities can be served by roads passing at their extremities, while the houses can be on both sides of narrow or wider pedestrian lanes (Doxiadis Associates, 1959, p. 14 [DOX-PA-29]).

Based on these labels, the processes and provision of public facilities and planning rationalities translated the social identities into bureaucratic labels and categories which were finally transformed into physical labels as the areas where higher-income groups are living (as in F or E sectors) have wider roads, greenery and a view of the Margalla Hills. On the other hand, the middle- or low-income groups live in areas with no view of hills, messy streets, small roads and parks in poor conditions. Since attitudes, requirements and needs are assumed based on the income of inhabitants, therefore the logic of planning demanded the division and segregation of the city along class lines as shown in Figure 5.4.

This segregation and division are further ensured through the strategic planning of roads and parks so as to offer physical boundaries among different areas of Islamabad. If we look at Tables 5.1 and 5.2, we can see their distribution on Figure 5.4 in which higher-income groups (G, H, I) are accommodated along the Margalla hills and lower-income groups (A, B) are given spaces close to the industrial sector along the Murree Highway. Like the classical hierarchy according to Marxist traditions, between both extremes lie the middle-income groups (C, D, E, F).



Figure 5.4 Distribution of Income Groups in Islamabad Source: Doxiadis Associates (1960b, p. 161) Modified by Author

It is not a mere coincidence that the central roads and grid pattern happen to be lines dividing and dissecting the population into different income groups. In fact, this has been a deliberate part of the plan and was considered as a success, rationale and ideal model of the development and urban planning symbolised through Islamabad (Doxiadis Associates, 1960, p. 218 [DOX-PA-88]). The summary of the Master Plan and Programme of Islamabad that was prepared by the CDA for the cabinet maintains that:

> [T]he future population of Islamabad is *organized* in a manner that avoids both complete segregation and excessive interaction among people belonging to different income groups [emphasis added] (CDA, undated(a), p. 2).

It is this organisation, "self-contained well-integrated communities" (CDA, undated(a), p. 1) and urban planning that we see in Figure 5.4. This principle of segregating different kinds of

people because of their different income status clearly marks the trajectory of the future of Islamabad as a modernist urban project where one of the first issues was about the people who were not categorised at all, i.e. the urban poor.

5.4 Kubitschek's Slogan of 50 *Anos* 5 (50 Years in 5) and the Construction of Brasilia

The need for a new capital of Brazil was present early in its history as the country became a republic and free from the Portuguese colonial yolk in 1822. A new capital as a symbol of freedom and nation-building was first presented in 1823 in the "Memoir on the Necessity and Means of Building a new Capital in the interior of Brazil" (Nascimento, 2006, p. 151). Decades later, Dom Bosco (1815–1888), an Italian Catholic priest, also presented his dream to the wider public in which he saw the new capital Brasilia as a "promised land" (Holston, 1989, p. 16). The idea of having a new capital could not attract public attention or economic resources from the state until the age of developmentalism and modernity arrived in Brazil, as discussed in detail in the previous chapter. It is no wonder that two of the presidents of Brazil who assumed the task of constructing Brasilia were serving the nation in the post-1945 world. Many commissions and reports have articulated different arguments in favour of the current location of Brasilia, but the master plan proposed by Lucio Costa took it for granted. His entry to the commission, which was later on selected by a jury comprised of experts from the USA and UK under the leadership of Dr. Israel Pinheiro da Silva (1896–1973), maintains that "…in 1823, José Bonifácio known as the Patriarch proposed that the Capital be transferred to Goiás [the state where the Brasilia was created], and suggested the name of Brasilia" (Costa, 1957, unpaginated [ArPDF NOV-B-1]).

Making a new capital for Brazil has always been an aspiration of the people and political leadership of the country. The idea of a new capital was mainly discussed as a symbol of post-coloniality and nation-building. However, after assuming power, Kubitschek started regarding Brasilia as a project of development and modernity that would eventually mark a historical point of Brasilia moving towards its final destination, i.e. development. During his tenure, Kubitschek raised the slogan of *50 anos* 5 (50 years in 5) marking the beginning of the journey towards development. His ambitions were clear and ambitious as he wanted to secure the development and progress of 50 years in his brief term of five years. The only physical manifestation of this political slogan could be the construction of Brasilia in such a brief time

as the modernist city has been designated as an embodiment of development. This idea of development as an ultimate objective to be achieved is well stated in the master plan of Brasilia:

> Founding a city in the wilderness is a deliberate act of conquest…because the city will not be a result of regional planning but the cause of it: its foundation will *lead*, later, to the *planned development* of the whole region [emphasis added, see Figure 5.5] (Costa, 1957, unpaginated [ArPDF. NOV-B-1]).

The projection of Brasilia as a city that would lead the 'planned development' echoes the modernist belief system in which architecture and scientific planning are considered as a cornerstone. As shown in Figure 5.5, Brasilia is projected as a "pole" from which radiating surges of development and modernity will "create waves of progress" (Holston, 1989, p. 18). It is also important to mention that this map has been a permanent part of promotion pamphlets (Story, 2006, p. 37) and is reproduced in school textbooks even today (Holston, 1989, p. 19). All of the research interviewees have known the map shown in Figure 5.5 from their school education. During the period of construction of Brasilia (1956–1960), an estimated 2–3% of the GDP was consumed for implementation and publicity of the project (Lafer, 1970).

Figure 5.5 Brasilia as Radiant Pole of Development Source: Holston (1989, p. 19) Modified by Author

In his speech in 1951, Kubitschek maintains that "New Brazil [referring to Brasilia]" will bring "necessary and speedy transformation in the Brazilian way of life, making them more attracted to private enterprise" so that the goal of development and socio-political and economic change can be achieved in line with the IMF's measure of combating inflation (NOVACAP, 1956, pp. 1–2 [NOV-D-4-2-Z-0001-3d]).[6] Apart from official speeches and publications promoting Brasilia as a pole and centre of development and progress, the city's planners made regular appearances on television shows, national radio, and national newspapers defending the ambitious project of Brasilia (Story, 2006; Holston, 1989).

Similar to Islamabad, Brasilia was not only planned as a mere administrative centre. In fact, as the development rhetoric would put it, it was planned as a complete and model urban settlement, which not only addressed current urban problems but provided solutions and led the country, if not the Global South, for all the times to come. In this regard, the status of Brasilia was more like a leader city or a model city to which leadership of all sorts (cultural, political and economic) would come. Costa succinctly summed up in his master plan, in a normative and assertive manner, what Kubitschek and others have been promoting ever since the announcement of Brasilia:

> The city should be planned for orderly and efficient work…be both vital and pleasing, suitable for reverie and intellectual speculation; it should be such a city as…not only the seat of government and administration, but also one of the more lucid and distinguished cultural centres in the country (Costa, 1957, unpaginated [ArPDF NOV-B-1]).

The lexical relationship of Brasilia with modernity, development, leadership, post-colonial nation-building and a source of transformation of society is very much present throughout the proposed plan of Costa. As compared to Islamabad, the master plan of Brasilia is relatively brief (comprised of only 23 points). However, the debates, memoirs, school textbooks, interviews with the architects and planners of the city (like Dr Israel Pinheiro, Oscar Niemeyer, Lucio Costa etc.) as well as the interviews with public officials conducted by the researcher reproduce the same monumental character of Brasilia. In fact, Brasilia's modernist

[6] These excerpts are from a speech of Juscelino Kubitschek delivered in São Paulo during *Primeira Semana Nacional Mudancista.* The speech is reproduced in the official magazine of NOVACAP named Brasilia (Issue no. 3, March, 1957).

planning, its aims and objectives have been appreciated by all 26 interviewees (including residents and officials). In Costa's brief master plan, the celebration of modernist planning principles and character of Brasilia as game-changer is referred to 12 times in the eight pages.

5.5 Constructing Development and Realising Modernism: Spatial Organisation of Brasilia

In the project of Brasilia, both Kubitschek and Costa found an opportunity to be a permanent part of the history of modernism and development. For Kubtischek, the most vital objective to achieve was development. He was not clear of the meaning of development and the extent of its struggle or, as he mentioned in an interview, if the "fight for development" was viable (cf. Story, 2006, p. 54). Pinheiro regarded the construction of Brasilia as a revolution to get rid of the colonial past and expand opportunities of unlimited expansion in the future of the country (Pinheiro, 1973). For Costa and his student Niemeyer, Brasilia was an opportunity to practise their modernism on such a large scale for the first time in human history. They saw a central plateau of roughly 2,250 square miles as a canvas where they would be constructing both the city and society. The structural modernity referred to by Mitchell (1991) and Le Corbusier ([1943] 1973), was put into practice by a world-renowned architect and planner, i.e. Niemeyer and Costa respectively under the guise of modernity and development in traditional societies like Brazil. Kubitschek himself was fond of Niemeyer and Costa as practitioners of modernism. Kubitschek believed that modernist architecture and urban planning were inevitable for Brazil if the country was to be freed from the vices of tradition and underdevelopment (Papadaki, 1960). While making sense of Brasilia, Costa in his master plan emphasised that it will not be dealing with "*urbs* [a normal city or urban settlement]" alone, but its purpose will also be related to "*civitas* [refers to the active citizenry and organised community]", [italics in original] (Costa, 1957, unpaginated [ArPDF NOV-B-1]).

Assumptions and the powers of architecture and scientific planning, as a source of liberation, freedom, civilisation and, above all, development and progress are what makes the role of the planner and scientific knowledge divine. It is in this regard that Doxiadis and Costa, Kubitschek and Ayub, the CDA and NOVACAP follow the same principles, aspiring to the same objectives and realising the same dream continents apart.

Following the modernist principles of urban planning as enunciated by CIAM and the *Athen's Charter* ([1943] 1973), Brasilia was planned not only as an urban settlement but as a source of social transformation. The division of Brasilia into different zones for different purposes is the realisation of CIAM principles codified in the *Athen's Charter*, which was "a sacred book of architecture" according to Costa (Holston, 1989, p. 36). While adhering to the scientific principles of geometry (as Doxiadis did for Islamabad), the city was created on two axes running north-south and east-west, like a cross (Costa, 1957, unpaginated [ArPDF NOV-B-1]) or an aeroplane (see Figure 5.6). Along these axes, all of the urban functions were planned and situated according to US-inspired zoning laws and zoning regulations (Almandoz, 2016; Carvalhal, 1997).



Figure 5.6 Lucio Costa's Drawing of Pilot Plan Source: Costa (1972, unpaginated) Modified by Author

The key characteristic of Costa's planning is the distinction among the four scales: monumental, residential, concentrated and bucolic. Along the monumental axis, east-west, lie buildings of national character. On the residential axis, north-south, all of the residential districts are placed. On the intersection of both axes, the entertainment centre of the city has restaurants, theatres, cinemas, shopping malls and vast empty green spaces along with car

parking areas (Costa, 1957, unpaginated, ArPDF NOV-B-1). The *Rodoviária* (central bus station) is situated here to provide access to the centre as a starting point for any visitor coming to the city (see Figure 5.6).

Like Islamabad, the monumental axis starts with the capitol complex having *Praça dos Três Poderes* (Three Power Plaza), i.e. congress, executive, and judiciary, at the eastern end designed by Niemeyer. Further west on the monumental axis lies *Esplanada dos Ministérios* (Esplanade of Ministries) having high-rise buildings of the same appearances housing different ministries and offices designed by Niemeyer. After the esplanade, there lie iconic buildings like the Cathedral of Brasilia, the National Museum, and National Library. Further west, there are the monumental Television Tower and JK Memorial (in the memory of the founder of the city, Juscelino Kubitschek).

5.5.1 Residential Axis and Supraquadras (Superblocks)

One of the fundamental differences in the spatial organisation of Brasilia and Islamabad lies in superquadras of Brasilia. Superquadras are superblocks having apartment buildings raised on *pilotis* (pillars or columns). Following the modernist and rational principles of urban planning, Costa believed that superquadras would bring both innovation and order to the city without any ornamental structures. In this way, raising simple high-rise buildings would address the functional aspects of housing without any cultural or traditional flavours. Following the US' modernist architecture, high-rise buildings were believed to be the ideal way to address the functional aspects of any building while using minimum land and modern technologies of construction. The vision of Costa's superquadras implies the construction of uniform apartment buildings in designated areas so that the uniformity of the residential area can be ensured. Raising all of the buildings on *pilotis* would keep the surface free from any building thus keeping it open and public for all of the residents as opposed to the individual houses where land and access is privatised. In this way, the city may be prevented from urban vices like that of slums, disorganised growth and expansion as well as the mushroom growth of urban structures (both social and physical). It is here where we can see the spirit of Brasilia and its scientific modernism and development vis-à-vis socio-economic and political implications.

Costa has regarded superquadras as one of the “most important achievements in Brasilia” (el-Dahdah, 2005, p. 11). Along the residential axis of 12 km east-west running monumental axis, there lie rows of large (six-storey) residential blocks commonly known as superquadras. Following the idea of the ‘Radiant City’ (Corbusier, 1933) and ‘Garden City’ (Howard, 1902) these superquadras were envisioned to create smooth social co-existence among the residents of buildings so that they can freely access all the opportunities the city has to offer (leisure, offices, work, health, religion, education, etc.).

It is essential to discuss in detail the grammar of the superquadras as they are more than designated spaces for apartment buildings. The master plan of Brasilia maintains that the apartment buildings can be arranged in varying manners, but two principles must be observed at any cost: uniform height (a maximum of six storeys raised on pilotis); and the separation of pedestrian traffic from motor traffic (Costa, 1957, unpaginated [ArPDF. NOV.B.1]). The size of each superquadra varies anywhere between 75 to 93 square metres. This, like Islamabad, also creates a grid pattern in the residential zone along the residential axis. Market areas are present adjacent to each superquadra on the motor traffic lanes but face the apartment buildings so that the access is easy and possible by foot for the residents. Now, all of the shops are facing roads, a violation that occurred since the early days of Brasilia. On the intersection of four superquadras, there is interquadra strip of 200 by 80 metres where community facilities like sports areas, recreational facilities, educational facilities or churches are provided for the residents. Each neighbourhood unit, i.e. four superquadras were planned as self-sustainable and complete in all of the social aspects.

As mentioned earlier, naming the sectors and urban spaces was an essential part of the modernist and scientific urban planning discourse in which functionalism is preferred and universal truths can be established by claiming the apolitical form of urban planning. In this sense, modernist architecture was a manifestation of both scientific principles and universal truths embodied in urban planning. The projection of urban planning in the universally recognised and value-free numbers and alphabet is itself part of the discursive constructions around urban settlements. The idea of naming and numbering was so crucial that Costa discussed it in his rather brief master plan of Brasilia. In fact, out of 23 total points of the master plan, number 21 was solely dedicated to explaining the naming and numbering of the residential blocks and apartment buildings:

> The superblocks would be known by numbers, the residential buildings by letter, and finally the apartments would be designated in the usual way, so that an address would read, for example, N-S3-L, apt. 201 (Costa, 1957, unpaginated [ArPDF NOV.B.1]).

For instance, in the above example, N designates north of the monumental axis, S3 shows the number of superquadra, i.e. superquadra 3 and L shows the number of the apartment building where apartment number 201 is placed on the second floor. Today, the logic suggested by Costa is still followed for address details for all of the superquadras. For example, SQS refers to the superquadras on the south of the monumental axis and SQN on the north shown by letters S and N respectively. In addition, the three-digit row number has also been allotted to show the location of the superquadra on the residential axis. For example, rows 100 and 300 are on the west side, and rows 200 and 400 are on the eastern side of the residential axis. In each superquadra, each apartment building is assigned a letter of the alphabet (up to J and/or K – an unusual tribute to Juscelino Kubitschek) in which each apartment is given a number, the first digit of which represents the floor number. A complete address according to Brasilia's master plan would be, for example, SQS 103, Building K, Apt. 607.

However, the apparently modernised, scientific and neutral organisation of the urban space of Brasilia, in essence, naturalises and reifies the socio-economic hierarchies of Brazilian society. The construction of apartment buildings, their sizes, location, and the socio-economic composition of the residents in those apartment buildings are discriminatory, therefore creating physical labels and different social experiences for the people living in those superquadras. It is not an unintended outcome, rather, as this research argues, part of the plan:

> Social gradation can easily be *regulated* [*dosada*] by giving a higher value to certain blocks, such for example as the single blocks bordering on the embassy district [emphasis added] (Costa, 1957, unpaginated [ArPDF NOV.B.1]).

Further, the master plan naturalises the division while adhering to the free-market principles of the real estate industry:

> Along the residential highway axis, the blocks closer to the highway will *naturally* be valued more highly than the inner blocks, that will permit gradations inherent to the economic system. Nevertheless, superblocks in sets of four will favor a *certain degree* of social co-existence, avoiding *undue* and *undesirable* class distinctions [emphasis added] (Costa, 1957, unpaginated [ArPDF NOV.B.1]).

While acknowledging the working of the market economy and naturalising its outcomes, the master plan of Brasilia asserts and celebrates the 'certain degree' of social co-existence which seems like regulation of class interests and class conflicts. Further, the purpose is not to eliminate it altogether but only 'undesirable' parts of it. Therefore, the 'social gradations' that we see in Brasilia are so-called desirable class distinctions that end up providing different urban experiences for other social groups living in the same scientific settings of superquadras.

This gradation can be seen in the buildings of superquadras, especially of the series SQS 300 and SQS 100 where more than 76% of the people living there are categorised as either rich or upper-middle class having an average income of nearly 2,700 USD per month (Holanda, 2010, p. 5). During the fieldwork for this research, these series of superquadras were not only costly but also carried a particular kind of social status and a marker of difference for the people of Brasilia as pointed out by respondents during interviews. One of the respondents, while talking about superquadras where she used to work for over ten years, asserts that "it [Pilot Plan, referring to superquadras] is not a place for poor people" (Aidaba, slum resident, interview, 28 August 2018). The responses from two high-ranking officials were also similar. They maintained that for the "212 North [SQN series], the apartments are smaller…three bedroom apartments of 80–85 square metres [therefore, cheaper than others], and this makes the density of the superblock a lot higher than every other one" (Onailluig and Onurb, interview, 21 September 2018).

As mentioned above, the master planning of Brasilia, like that of Islamabad, adhers to the principles and logic of the free-market economy; therefore, the differences among superquadras and apartment buildings, being a part of the planning, shows discrimination along class lines. These differences are reproduced and patronised in the master planning of Brasilia camouflaged in an attempt to neutralise them:

> [D]ifferences in standards between one block and another will be neutralized by the urbanization plan proposed…Such differences will be the result of a greater or lesser density, of more or less space allocated to each individual and each family, and of the choice of building materials and quality of the finishing (Costa, 1957, unpaginated [ArPDF NOV.B.1]).

These differences patronised by the plan serve as markers of the quality of urban space. Following the market logic, areas of 'lesser density' and 'more space' cater for the needs of the higher classes and placing them together, therefore, creates homogenous neighbourhoods like that of Islamabad. The areas of 'greater density' and 'less space' are considered as crowded, for example, 312 North, and are, therefore, of lower economic value. Instead of referring to the market economy multiple times in the proposed plan, the casual description of differences is a discursive attempt to downplay the patronising role of the planner and the scientific planning of Brasilia. As suggested in the master plan, instead of "selling off lots of lands, the unit should be sold in quotas" (Costa, 1957, unpaginated [ArPDF NOV.B.1]) and the buyers can then plan and construct their apartment buildings after getting approval from the relevant state organisations, like NOVACAP, SEGETH, TERRACAP, etc. Many corporations and public sector institutions constructed their own apartments for their officials. For example, the *Banco do Brasil* (Bank of Brazil) built SQS 308 and SQS 114, and they are still of higher economic value as compared to same-sized SQS 307.

Similar situations exist with *Lago Norte* (North Lake) and *Lago Sul* (South Lake), high-income neighbourhoods with their isolated and individual plots. These areas are elite-class neighbourhoods in the whole of the Brasilia because of their proximity to the Pilot Plan and Lake Paranoá. In the original plan it was forbidden to construct any residential options in that area so that the lake remains open and accessible to the public. Only clubs (Golf Club, Yacht Club), hotels, restaurants and resorts are allowed to function in that zone. However, in a revision to the master plan, both *Lago Norte* and *Lago Sul* acquired legal status in the Territorial Organisation Structural Plan of 1978 whereby both regions have been expanded towards the Pilot Plan (Costa & Lee, 2019). This is not to suggest that Costa did not plan single-family houses or that there was no provision for them. The master plan of Brasilia states that "isolated residential districts have also been planned, surrounded by trees and open countryside, to be sold in lots for single-family homes" and they should be constructed "with high architectural standard – regardless of their size" (Costa, 1957, unpaginated [ArPDF

NOV.B.1]). By raising the standards and making single-family homes less available, the lots and their location rendered them exclusive and exclusionary. This, perhaps, is the vision that one can see in today's Brasilia while going through *Lago Norte* or *Lago Sul* "present as early as the 1960s" (Inaivap and Abotaj, high-ranking officials, interview, 31 August 2018).

5.5.2 Labels and Brasilia: Socio-spatial Distribution of Residents

Unlike Islamabad, the master plan of Brasilia is relatively brief, simple and a spontaneously evolved idea, as Costa himself stated at the start of the plan submitted for the competition. In the master plan of Brasilia there is little detail regarding the future population of the city, the reasons why the country needed a new capital and why it was necessary to provide accommodation for people belonging to different socio-economic groups. However, the master plan does provide the foundations for the future socio-spatial organisation of the city. While planning a modernist city, Costa, before describing his idea for Brasilia, was explicit in explaining the role of the city and planner in which he asked for nobility, monumentality, civilisation and order as a few of the most desired elements. In the same eight-page master plan of Brasilia, Costa acknowledged and hinted at the role of private capital and the market economy 13 times. Also, references to cultural and economic consumerism were made and justified by citing examples like Piccadilly Circus (London), Champs Elysees (Paris) and Times Square (New York) from the Global North (Costa, 1957, unpaginated [ArPDF NOV.B.1]). Since the plan is silent about why the market economy or private capital was so important, therefore, talking to professional architects who have worked with NOVACAP during the construction of Brasilia and officials of different planning related departments (like SEGETH, TERRACAP, CODEPLAN etc.) is particularly helpful. Labels and labelling are part of the thinking of bureaucracy (Wood, 1985) so as to organise and distribute resources. It is in the interviews that we see labels and the role of labelling in the organisation of urban spaces of Brasilia echoing that of Islamabad.

Similar to the case of Islamabad, in all of the interviews with public officials, the planning of Brasilia, the design of apartment buildings, and provision of public facilities is based on income-related labels, i.e. 'low income', 'upper or high income', and 'middle income'. In addition, other labels were also generated like 'public officials' and 'higher-level people' (referring to the people with higher capital, i.e. both social and economic, like ministers,

judges, company directors, mayor etc.) without clearly enunciating their meaning, the kinds of capital they have or the range of their incomes.

When asked about the dynamics of the decisions related to the provision of public facilities or prioritising the area in which state intervention is considered, Ogaiht (high-rank official, interview, 24 August 2018) responded that "all areas are classified as low-income and upper- and middle-income class" and dealt with accordingly. According to an architect of CODEHAB (concerned with popular housing), "it's a city designed for the middle class and up [upper class], not down [lower class]" and Tanguatinga was built "to receive those low-income workers" (Siul, mid-level official, interview, 28 September 2018). Further, he stated that the construction of Brasilia was for "habitational settings of middle-high class, high class" where the "poorest poor have no place" (Siul mid-level official, interview, 28 September 2018). While talking about illegal housing settlements, they too are categorised as "low income" and "middle classes or upper classes" by high-ranking officials of the government real estate company (Onailluig and Onurb, interview, 21 September 2018). Despite their absence in the master plan of Brasilia, all of the other documents that deal with construction, revisions, extensions or provision of public facilities also based their arguments on these categories. For example, the Master Plan for Territorial Planning (PDOT – *Plano Diretor de Ordenamento Territorial*) has defined the regularisation areas as:

> Specific Interest – areas occupied predominantly by middle and high-income population; and Social Interest – areas occupied predominantly by low-income population (Governo do Distrito Federal (PDOT), 2009, unpaginated).

Similar references to the income-based labels are present in other documents concerning housing and the territorial management of the Brasilia (see, for example, CODHAB/DF, 2017, pp. 6, 41; CODHAB/FD, 2015, p. 2; NOVACAP, 1960, unpaginated [NOV-B-2-3-0055(5)d], 1960a, unpaginated [NOV-B-2-3-0056(2)d]). It is perhaps the management of these socio-economic groups labelled as low- or high-income groups and classes, which Costa took for granted, and assumed natural and justified when he asserts that "social gradation can easily be regulated by giving a higher value to certain blocks" (Costa, 1957, unpaginated [ArPDF. NOV.B.1]).

Costa dealt with social gradation and naturalised and reified it by taking it for granted and assuming it as a scientific way to organise and plan a city of the future. One of the significant changes in his plans also embodied this fact when he extended and added superqaudras of series 400 to his master plan to accommodate the low-income groups in Brasilia (Holston, 1989; el- Dahdah, 2005; Holanda, 2010). SQS/SQN 400 are constructed and planned according to the assumptions that are carried with labels like 'low income', i.e. people having fewer needs, poor aesthetic taste, having no mechanised transport, and a poor quality of life. That is why these superquadras are on the eastern end of the Pilot Plan with poor building materials. They do not have to meet the conditions which are required by law for the superquadras of series 100, 200 and 300. For example, there is no condition for apartment buildings to be placed on *pilotis* (pillars); it is not mandatory to have parking spaces there, and the buildings are smaller as compared to their counterparts in the other series. In this way, the SQS/SQN 400 series serves as a physical label for residents of the whole Brasilia because it serves as a reference point to show where low-income people are, in Costa's words, 'regulated' in the planning of Brasilia. Despite the gentrification process, these apartments are still considered to be of low quality, and many of the research respondents from the Pilot Plan did not choose to live in this area because of its low quality, inadequate infrastructure and poorly managed public facilities (parks, open gyms, playing areas etc.).

If we look closely at the Figure 5.7, it is possible to see how the social gradation has been regulated in Brasilia according to the rational organisation of space, modernist planning and by creating the discursive categories and labels to organise, distribute and regulate the urban spaces of Brasilia. People who are differently labelled are accommodated differently and on different geographic locations with different physical structures of habitation. Apparently, the master plan of Brasilia suggested the same superquadras and apartment buildings for the provision of homes as a universally applicable, democratic and equalitarian system of urban planning. But, it reifies the class hierarchies that are present in Brazil. In the end, instead of having an egalitarian model city of the future, Brasilia came forth as a socio-spatial inscription of the social inequalities of the country.

To further demarcate these boundaries and divisions among the residents of different apartments, like Islamabad, infrastructure (trees, roads, lanes, etc.) has been employed to serve as a boundary. Costa himself acknowledged this kind of use as an alternative to walls. In an interview Costa said, "Quadras are defined in space not by rampart-like walls that enclose the

space completely but by continuous rows of trees, which in time came to demarcate" (cf. Zapatel, 2005, p. 19).



Figure 5.7 Income Distribution in Pilot Plan of Brasilia Source: Author, based on Interviews and Master Plan

It is also possible to see how it works on the ground even today. The trees are aligned densely and strictly along the borders of superquadras, but loosely distributed at the edge of interquadras. In a similar way roads of different orders run through superquadras of different series and different numbers among the same series create a grid pattern on a smaller scale. The residential axis provides the division between series 100, 300 and 200, 400. These series are themselves divided by vehicular roads, for example, Via W1 (*Norte* and *Sul*) divides the superquadras series 100 and 300, and Via L1 (*Norte* and *Sul*) divides the superquadras series 200 and 400. Therefore, homogenous and standardised neighbourhoods are created in Brasilia as we have in Islamabad despite the different architectural and physical planning of the urban spaces in the name of development.

It is this organisation, referred to as "social gradation" that was easily "regulated" in the urban planning of Brasilia that we see in Figure 5.7 (Cost, 1957, unpaginated [ArPDF NOV.B.1]). This principle of different kinds of people fit into categories because of their different socio-economic status clearly marks the trajectory of the future of Brasilia as a modernist urban

project where one of the first issues was about the people who were not categorised at all, i.e. the urban poor who were residing in *acampamentos de construção* (construction camps) well before the inauguration of Brasilia.

5.6 Segregation and Homogenous Neighbourhoods: Politics of Master Plan of Islamabad and Brasilia

The planning of Islamabad and Brasilia, as discussed above, shows that the cities are little more than the mere spatial inscription of social inequalities and socio-economic hierarchies. The creation of homogenous neighbourhoods, segregation of different socio-economic groups and the possibilities of their interaction or mixing has been carefully planned under the guise of scientific planning and developmental rationalities. In this regard the labels and discursive techniques used serve as an attempt to naturalise, neutralise and regularise the class conflicts so that, as Foucault would put it, *the order of things* (Foucault, 2005) can be maintained.

The planning of homogenous neighbourhoods and the segregation of these neighbourhoods is of profound consequence when it comes to social life and social experiences. As discussed above, the discursive construction of homogeneity and segregation as scientific principles of planning and a route to development is embedded in capitalist modernity. In doing so, the urban spaces of Brasilia and Islamabad have been commoditised and made available to the market and capitalists in a similar way to that discussed by Polyani in his epic work *The Great Transformation* (1944). Since the master planning of Islamabad and Brasilia naturalised capitalism and socio-economic hierarchies, therefore, it is believed that the physical spaces they draw in the planning are directly related to social spaces in the daily lives of the cities. Shaping, organising or planning one directly implicates the other.

Social spaces, social process and physical spaces are reciprocal to each other. Instead of working in isolation, they work together to make social experiences and construct social realities. To understand the relationship between social and physical, social construction and structuration of social life better, Gregory (1981, p. 15) suggests we should consider they both "depend on a prior *materialism*" [italics in original]. Social processes shape physical spaces and, in turn, are influenced by physical spaces. This process of influence is itself

acknowledged by both Costa and Doxiadis, who believed in the power of architecture to transform social life.

Hence, the segregation and creation of homogenous neighbourhoods in Islamabad and Brasilia are not only organisations of physical spaces but aimed at the socialisation of people according to capitalist modernism and developmentalism. In the case of Islamabad and Brasilia strategic physical planning ensures segregation of people as they are channelled and regulated through a particular means of interaction (for example, common squares, markets, mosques, churches, playgrounds etc.). Peters and Skop (2007, p. 155), in the context of urban planning, have described segregation as an arrangement that "stresses social distance and interaction between socio-economic groups" – a theme prominent in the neighbourhood planning of Islamabad and Brasilia. As stated earlier, urban planning in Pakistan and Brazil have always segregated different socio-economic groups since colonial times. However, in the planning of Brasilia and Islamabad, the reproduction of socio-spatial segregation, like any other social reproduction as Giddens would argue, is instead a "skilled performance" (Giddens, 1993, p. 168) to recreate the socio-spatial structures that govern the respective societies. In this way, the social life of the people is governed and controlled through a particular configuration of structures that surround them all of their life through the creation of segregated homogeneity. The configuration of structure is referred to as the combination of the subjectivities of social actors, their access to different resources and the symbolic world through which they comprehend their lives (Esser, 1991).

Further, segregated homogeneity is more than a mere socio-spatial organisation of urban life. Segregation and homogenous neighbourhoods are directly linked to different urban experiences for different socio-economic groups inhabiting Islamabad and Brasilia. The pockets of homogenous neighbourhoods, when segregated through infrastructural development and market rationality, create spaces of 'social closure' in which different social hierarchies are patronised and legally determined as the zoning and development of Islamabad and Brasilia shown in our case. Weber (1978), while discussing basic sociological themes, argues that, in a society, a social group would always strive to maximise its benefits by enunciating discriminatory channels of distribution and access to resources. Socio-political institutions and structures then regulate this distribution. Thus, as Weber argues, "regulation and closure are relative concepts" (1978, p. 45).

Apart from the private spaces, in principle, the public spaces are free for everyone in Islamabad and Brasilia, but virtually they are "exclusionary spaces" as they cannot be utilised, appropriated and accessed by lower-income groups, especially the urban poor (Harvey, 2006, p. 20). In this sense, social closure would then be attained with the help of politico-economic structures and institutions through which selected eligible and low-status people are legally and socially defined. Unlike traditional institutions of monarchy, fiefdom and nobility, it is the modernist planners who have reproduced and protected these social closures and exclusionary spaces in Islamabad and Brasilia with the help of discursive identities and scientific expert knowledge – labels. This positioning of different socio-economic groups differently in the urban landscape with the use of rigid architecture determines the social aspects of the lives of people. As argued by Harvey, the urban architecture "surely has some kind of influence on how we are situated in the world and how we think and act politically within it" (2006, p. 18). Therefore, segregation and homogenous neighbourhoods are not given, or evolutionary outcomes in Islamabad and Brasilia but are results of structural and discursive inequalities under the guise of development, modernity, scientific planning and expert knowledge.

5.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter has discussed at length the founding principles and essence of the planning of Islamabad and Brasilia. Based on the master plans of Islamabad and Brasilia, this chapter finds that the socio-spatial planning of Islamabad and Brasilia reify and patronise socio-economic hierarchies and class inequalities. Critical analysis of the master plans brings forth the socio-political implications of the otherwise presumed neutral, scientific, apolitical, and expert planning that has been the hallmark development discourse since World War II. The creation of homogenous neighbourhoods, naturalisation of segregation of different socio-economic groups, and strategic distribution of urban spaces to different social groups show the institutional character of Pakistani and Brazilian governments as regulators of class conflicts and social inequalities. These homogenous neighbourhoods and segregations have created social enclaves and social closures in which it is planned that differently labelled people have different urban experiences and different opportunities to maximise their social, political and economic capital, i.e. different opportunities of social reproduction of classes and inter-class relations. In doing so, different spaces have been earmarked differently with the help of the principles of the market economy and discursive techniques of labelling, naturalisation,

normativity and appeals to universal scientific values. All this has happened under the guise of development – a universal destination for all the societies of the world.

Chapter 6: *CIDADE DE DEUS* (CITY OF GOD): PLANNING OF UNPLANNED – GENESIS OF URBAN POOR IN ISLAMABAD AND BRASILIA

In this chapter it is argued that the evolution of slums and the urban poor (both as categories of underdevelopment) was a direct consequence and deliberate act of planning Islamabad and Brasilia. Despite the visibility of the labour force (lower echelons of the labour employed in the construction work and other menial jobs), planning authorities labelled this group as a temporary requirement for the development of Islamabad and Brasilia. Since they were not categorised in any of the income-centric labels discussed in the previous chapter, their social and physical needs were ignored. While doing so they were labelled as 'labour' and 'construction workers' as a social group. Their housing demands were addressed through the establishment of temporary *campos de trabalho* (labour camps) or *acampamentos de construção* (construction camps). Labour camps in both Islamabad and Brasilia were the embodiment of the future of the urban poor in both cities. Camps were congested, built of inferior construction materials and were continuously surveilled and policed to keep strict control over them. Not only were the construction workers segregated from the other socio-economic groups but they were also criminalised and stigmatised to bestow a condition of permanent temporariness upon them. These temporary settlements for the urban poor, informally patronised by the state institutions, proved to be the forerunners of slums. This research conceptualises them as the planning of unplanned, recreated and patronised like the *Cidade de Deus* (City of God – one of the biggest slums in Rio de Janeiro) and the *Khuda ki Basti* (Settlement of God – a resettlement project in Karachi for slum dwellers) in the planned cities of Brasilia and Islamabad respectively.

6.1 Accumulation by Dispossession: Appropriation of Space for Islamabad

Islamabad, a symbol of development and progress, has been rendered as the city "twelve miles from Pakistan", implying its non-representative status of urban Pakistan (Harper, 2011, p. 64). It is difficult to locate the origins of slums in the other cities of Pakistan and Brazil. However, in the case of Islamabad, the origins and evolution of slums and the urban poor as a socio-economic group and "underclass" (Wilson, 1987, p. 283) can be traced back to development

discourses and the master plan of the city. The conceptual category of the underclass[7] is used here to conceptualise the urban poor as a social group, a "common category" that is ranked lower than the traditional working class (Coser, 1965, p. 142). Wilson (1987) asserts that the creation of an underclass is directly linked to the socio-economic and political structures that give birth to segregated ghettos and slums in urban spaces. It is crucial to analyse the interaction between poverty and residential segregation to understand where and why the urban underclass arises (Massey, 1990; Massey & Denton, 1993).

Preliminary studies, geographical maps, as well as the master plan of Islamabad maintained that the land where construction of new capital city would take place was generally empty with "about 129 hamlets and small villages scattered over 250 square miles of the capital site" (Federal Capital Commission, undated, p. 12). Further, it was reported that a fraction of this population "will be displaced as a result of the construction of the capital" (Federal Capital Commission, undated, p. 12). However, two of the villages, namely Nurpur Shahan and Saidpur, were preserved as a "token of traditional village life" (Hull, 2008, p. 506). In these 129 scattered hamlets and villages, nearly 54,000 people were displaced with the appropriation of land for the construction of Islamabad and were labelled as "oustees" (CDA, undated, pp. 4, 6). The processes of appropriation, fixation of prices and auction of the developed plots showed how the city had become anti-poor even before its inception.

The mechanisms of appropriation of the land for Islamabad were discriminatory and capitalist in their orientations. The price for the expropriation of land was fixed for the capital territory to avoid property speculation and an increase in the overall cost of the project Islamabad. However, when the land was sold on, the principles of the free-market economy were adopted, and the plots would be sold to the highest bidder in an open auction administered by the CDA. In all of the residential sectors of Islamabad, it was made clear that the cost of construction and development would be divided between government and private citizens. The government paid only 20%, and the rest was generated by selling plots in open auction (Doxiadis Associates, 1960, pp. 320–325 [DOX-PA-88]; CDA, 1983). A government official reported that subsidies were given to overseas Pakistani people to accelerate the whole process of 80%

[7] Historically, the concept of an underclass has been developed and discussed largely in the context of racial segregation and ghettoisation of African-Americans in the urban areas of the USA. The concept as such is not limited to racism or racial segregation and discrimination in urban spaces. For details on the sociological perspectives on the urban underclass and its links to segregation, see Marks (1991), Wilson (1985, 1987, 1989), Wacquant & Wilson (1989), and Massey & Denton (1993).

investments in the real estate property of Islamabad (Rafaz, high-ranking official, interview, 27 February 2019).

The appropriation of space for Islamabad was more than the mere buying and selling of the land by the state. Study of the process allows us to look deep into the relationship between the CDA and the oustees. The whole process of appropriation was not completed overnight. Both the oustees and the CDA were engaged in a continuous process of eviction and resettlement. Because of scepticism vis-à-vis state institutions and also to exploit opportunities to obtain more money, oustees and the villagers were forced from one place to another (Pakistan Times, 1971, cf. Hull, 2008, p. 507). The state strategy of maximising the benefits of appropriation was indirectly supported by the policies and officials of the CDA. A slum resident in Islamabad, who has been living in the city since the time of construction, recalls:

> They [officials of the CDA] asked us to leave from there [one settlement] and make a new settlement somewhere else…They allowed us to construct our homes here [hypothetically referring to one place]. Then, some other officials would come and ask us to move somewhere else. Then [to make sure we are given another space], we have to provide them *kharcha pata* [typical way of referring to bribe] (Maza, slum resident, interview, 14 March 2019).

The CDA sold the remains of demolished houses (*malba*) at the price of "15 percent of the house value" so that people could build new homes in outskirts of Islamabad without any cost to the CDA (Hull, 2008, p. 506). The encouragement to use poor construction materials, maintaining the informal economy and patronage of temporary housing for poor villagers, marks the exploitation and exclusion of poor people from Islamabad.

The discriminatory and anti-poor policy of appropriation of land led to strikes, processions and contestation from the future urban poor of Islamabad. Their exclusion and resilience have not been recorded in archived documents or given attention in the policy documents because the land of the future capital was mostly projected as empty, barren, and open for development. However, in his ethnographic account, Hull (2008) argues that displaced poor villages were agreeing to sacrifice their land at lower rates for the sake of Islamabad. Still, they were denied the acquisition of land in favour of "capitalists" and "for clubs, racecourses, golf courses and for favoring the rich and bureaucracy" (Hull, 2008, p. 506). This policy of

land appropriation made almost 1,100 families vulnerable to the demolition and eviction drive of the CDA which led to the mushroom growth of 700 "unauthorised constructions" in the metropolitan area of Islamabad (Doxiadis Associates, 1962, p. 3 [DOX-PI-28]). It was only in 1961, two years after construction started in Islamabad, that the planning authorities responded to the plight of the urban poor by constructing "temporary labour camps" (Doxiadis Associates, 1961d, p. 3 [DOX-PI-5]).

6.2 Labour Camps: Template of Future Slums of Islamabad

In many interviews from Islamabad it has been mentioned that the growth of slums is directly related to rural-urban migration and the overall population growth of the country – unanticipated factors. Archival reports, however, suggest this was not the case. The whole process of labour migration for the construction of Islamabad was not only anticipated but was appreciated and considered one of the essential factors to realise the dream of development. In the master plan of Islamabad the low-income group was given due attention but the "large force of skilled and unskilled labour" available at "cheaper rates" for the construction works and other menial jobs was ignored (Federal Capital Commission, undated, p. 16). In another report where labour camps were discussed for the first time, it was mentioned:

> It will, therefore, be necessary for a lot of labourers to move into the Islamabad area from other more remote parts of the country…most of whom will possess the necessary skills to contribute to the erection of the city (Doxiadis Associates, 1961d, p. 1 [DOX-PI-5]).

These labourers first included everyone from low-ranking clerks and peons to sweepers, garbage collectors, housemaids, daily wagers, vendors, and launderers who were deemed necessary for the "secondary functions" of the city (CDA, 1983, p. 10). They were considered to be a temporary necessity for the 'erection of the city'. It will be unfair to assume that they were required only for the early years of Islamabad. In fact, as late as 2000, the upgradation and rehabilitation of slums required workers for menial jobs in the city (for example, see, CDA, 2000, pp. V, 25, 8). The presence of unskilled workers in the city in recent years has also been mentioned in interviews (Ahsnam, high-ranking planner, interview, 6 March 2019). Another high-ranking official referred to the present-day catering facilities for labourers:

> You might see that there are kiosks on green belts in Islamabad. It also has some psyche [read: logic. In everyday communication, this word signifies a plan, a logic, and a rationale behind one's act] behind. These kiosks are in different sectors, even in Markaz [markets], on the green belts so that they [labourers] can get cheap food. This actually was necessary at that time (Looar, high-ranking official, interview, 8 February 2019).

Almost 700 informal settlements sprung up in the city to cater for the construction workers and semi-skilled or unskilled labourers who were informally welcomed and patronised by the CDA, along with the expansion of the non-appropriated villages of Said Pur and Nurpur Shahan. This growth was deemed a rational way of managing urban development and construction by patronising the urban poor who are usually represented through the impersonal pronoun 'they'. In addition to construction work the urban poor were also associated with a wide range of businesses (vendors, tea shops, kiosks, roadside restaurants) and service provision (daily wagers, maids, security guards, gardeners, sweepers, etc.).

In response to the mushroom growth of informal settlements, the CDA constructed temporary labour camps in an attempt to "organise and guide the new arrivals [labourers]" to avoid a "slum-city made up of various kinds of shelters" (Doxiadis Associates, 1961d, p. 1 [DOX-PI-5]). Here, a 'slum-city' is projected as the antithesis of development and progress that should be discouraged and controlled by any means. Among all the labourers, only the construction workers would be accommodated temporarily. It has been mentioned time and again that the "camps are of temporary nature" to prevent the "settlement of persons not having anything to do with the construction of Islamabad" (Doxiadis Associates, 1961d, p. 3 [DOX-PI-5]). Construction camps were planned as temporary settlements through planning, construction materials, and their locations. For example, a report on the accommodation of the labour force asserts that:

> It should again be stressed that these camps are of a *temporary nature* and *will be removed to other sites* later on when the development of the city will have reached a stage at which the camps might be considered as forming part of it. It is for this reason that the camps should be constructed of the *cheapest possible material*, e.g. mud-bricks, canvas tents, etc. [emphasis added] (Doxiadis Associates, 1961d, p. 3 [DOX-PI-5]).

These temporary labour camps were the physical labels constructing new identities and categories in Islamabad. Comprised of the working poor, temporary labour camps emerge in the policy documents and in interviews as 'temporary' arrangements, which should be removed as soon as they are 'forming part' of Islamabad. Therefore, keeping the working poor segregated from Islamabad is an attempt to keep camp residents from becoming residents of Islamabad unless they can afford to contribute to the 80% private investment required for completion of the project Islamabad. In contrast to the poor construction workers, all of the high-class workers like engineers, planners, architects and CDA officials were living in the neighbouring city of Rawalpindi in private or government houses.

Based on these principles, the CDA created two labour camps. One of them was constructed near the shrine of Bari Imam, close to the administrative sector, and the other one was built in G-8, at the current location of the biggest hospital in the region, the Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences (PIMS). Both of these construction camps were strictly controlled, demarcated, and surveilled on the pretext of them being poor in "sanitary and hygienic" conditions (Doxiadis Associates, 1962, p. 3 [DOX-PI-28]), a source of insecurity (Doxiadis Associates, 1961d, p. 1 [DOX-PI-5]), and threat to the "aesthetic appeal of the new capital" (Doxiadis Associates, 1961d, p. 3 [DOX-PI-5]). Therefore, it was decided that each camp should be surrounded by walls so that they did not look "unpleasant" and "detrimental to the city's overall aesthetic appearance" (Doxiadis Associates, 1961d, p. 3 [DOX-PI-5]).

The case of the Muslim colony (one of the largest and oldest of all the slums of Islamabad inhabited by more than 20,000 people) is worth mentioning here. In a report about the regularisation and upgradation of the slums of Islamabad, partially funded by UNDP, it has been noted that the Muslim colony has its roots in a former "labour colony" that was founded by the then President of Pakistan Muhammad Ayub Khan with the "prime intention to provide the cheap labour force for the development of [the] newly planned Capital" (CDA, 2001, p. 9). The Muslim colony of today is the replacement of the labour camp of yesterday.

Following the logic of segregation and homogenous neighbourhoods of the master plan, the issues of working classes and labourers were addressed in a similar manner. Discursively, the colonies of the urban poor were not only criminalised in their semiotic aspects but also in non-semiotic aspects where they are lexically connected to the source of troubles, nuisances and

as the antithesis of development as reflected in the quotes above. It is in this way that the settlements of the poor are criminalised so that surveillance strategies can be devised and justified to regulate their lives as well as bestowing on them the permanent status of temporariness in both public and official discourse. For instance, it was ensured that both labour camps should have a "police force" to ensure that the "requisite law and order are kept" and "not allowing piling up of rubbish etc." (Doxiadis Associates, 1961d, p. 3 [DOX-PI-5]). That is why this research refers to the labour camps as the forerunners of slums in Islamabad as the latter followed the same process both in terms of infrastructure as well as the scepticism of state institutions in which criminalisation and anti-development discourses vis-à-vis slums prevail even today as we shall see in the next chapter.

6.3 Planning of Unplanned: Evolution of Slums in Islamabad

The planning and construction of labour camps, their discursive representation, labelling strategies and formation of bureaucratic identities are a broader set of rationalities and normative assumptions through which the urban poor are introduced in the development discourses of Islamabad. Their spaces and places in the future city of Islamabad carry within them normative assumptions as argued by Watson (2009) while comprehending the relationship between urban spaces, urban planning, and the urban poor. In this regard, it is argued that both formal (low- to high-class neighbourhoods) and informal settlements (slums) in Islamabad are not planned and unplanned, respectively. They are planned in different manners, with different priorities and for different socio-economic groups. Considering the urban poor and their settlements as a necessary evil, in a temporary setting, and labelling them as unauthorised "allows most authorities to ignore them as having full planning rights to the city" (Yiftachel & Yakobi, 2003, p. 217).

The slums of Islamabad today represent the continuity of the vision of labour camps. During the construction, labour camps served as labour pools from where labour could be extracted according to the needs of the city. After the completion of the construction work, for example of the administrative sector of Islamabad, it was proposed to remove the labour camp of Bari Imam on the pretext of it being a security threat to the Red Zone (capitol complex). Similarly, the second labour camp located in G-8 was removed so that it could be replaced with the PIMS, constructed in the late 1970s. In both cases, no alternative schemes, housing options or

settlements were planned to accommodate the urban poor. Since then, the urban poor of Islamabad have informally been told to construct their temporary houses in different parts of the city under the patronage of CDA officials. One of the residents of a labour camp told the researcher that they had been offered places elsewhere in the city. He remembered that some camp residents had moved to the F-series sector, some to the G-series sector and others to the I-series sector, laying the foundations of the slums of today (see Figure. 6.1).



Figure 6.1 Katchi Abadis of Islamabad (the 1980s) Source: Akhtar Hameed Khan Resource Center (2015, p. 4) Modified by Author

This is not to suggest that the process of relocation and removal of those early labour camps went smoothly and were accepted blindly by the urban poor, as residents resisted in cases where no alternatives were offered. A police operation was used to evacuate one camp which led to the casualties of three to five people (Akhter Hameed Khan Resource Center, 2015, p. 12). As a result, a process of informal negotiations started, and the CDA allowed the creation of slums in different parts of the city without taking any responsibility to provide public facilities like water, sewerage or electricity.

Currently, the city has more than 31 slums out of which only ten have been regularised so far. According to a recent study based on geosensing, the landmass of slums has increased from

5.53 square kilometres in 1998 to 28.98 square kilometres in 2018 (Liu, Din, & Jiang, 2020). It is important to reflect on the number of slums in Islamabad as the recognised number varies in every interview. One of the officials from Katchi Abadi Cell (a designated department within the CDA for slums established in 1998) told the researcher that every organisation reports a different number of slums. The FIA (Federal Investigation Agency, a civilian intelligence agency) recognises a different number than the Islamabad Capital Territory Administration. The total number, according to estimates made by various city and state-level institutions, suggests that slums are anywhere between 30 to 50 in Islamabad capital territory. However, only ten of them were recognised and legalised in 1999 (more than three decades after the inauguration of Islamabad) by the CDA. The rest of the slums are labelled as illegal and unauthorised.

6.4 Informality: A Mode of Production of Space in Islamabad

As mentioned above, the rise of slums in Islamabad is directly linked to ignoring the urban poor while planning the city and the unofficial and corrupt practices of officials. It would be impossible to understand this growth of slums through the lens of corruption alone. According to the interviews across different tiers of the urban administration, it is argued that informal patronage and financial corruption both played their part and produced a parallel space for the urban poor along with the formalised, legitimised and planned process of the production of space.

Informality in this regard is more than mere corruption or unfair practices that one might see in urban administration. Informality, as Ananya Roy (2009) argues, is a logical attempt to create space, patronise social relations and regulate different socio-economic groups in urban settlements. Informality is to be understood as a "distinctive rationality" which is very common in the urban development of the Global South (Roy, 2009a, p. 86). Roy defines informality as a specific "mode of production of space" which is "defined by territorial logic of deregulation" (2009, p. 8). In this way, the informality practised by officials is a deliberate act of planning and regulation of the affairs in their specific domain. For example, the intentional disregard of the urban poor in the master planning of Islamabad appears to be a rational choice made by the planners. Similarly, officials from the enforcement department

choose to dislocate the urban poor and resettle them in other areas to secure both their personal needs and the needs of the city.

While talking about the Muslim colony, the site of the former labour camp, one of the high-ranking officials confirmed that the government had appropriated the land. However, it remains a slum because they do not want to remove it:

> [The] Capital Development Authority did not see it appropriate to vacate the entire population. Maybe because of the law and order situation 50 years ago or whatever… So that is one slum we don't want to remove…state is not giving them any special services. I think they don't have even gas there, no water supply and no road network and no sewerage network or nothing (Taaqfahs, high-ranking official, interview, 23 January 2019).

Unofficial inertia or informality allows the slum to continue even today. The case of hawkers is similar; vendors are legally not allowed to have stalls along highways and roadsides, as well as in markets, but are informally patronised and accommodated.

Informality as a calculated and deliberate part of planning is directly linked to the financial corruption of the officials. The inhabitants of the slums have to pay regular bribes to officials whenever they are doing any kind of construction in their homes. Sometimes, even to rent out a room, residents have to pay money to officials in one way or another. On average, for every new house in a slum, inspection officials would get an average of USD 120. In cases of a legalised slum, the price is higher because it would then involve official paperwork and approvals from the relevant officials and departments. Since its inception, Hull (2008) notes that malpractices and corruption remain an integral part of the CDA.

This mixture of informality and corruption goes hand in hand in the creation of the segregated spaces of the urban poor. In this space they are labelled both socially and physically which entails their financial and social exploitation. This holds true for all the 15 slums visited during the research. However, the history of Maskeen Colony (a slum in G-8) is particularly crucial in this regard to represent the whole picture. Maskeen Colony was formed in 1995–96 by eight low-ranking officials of the CDA. One of them narrated during an interview that they decided on the location and started making some houses there for themselves and their friends. When

an attempt was made to demolish this colony, the interviewee, Idirfa, had his officer-in-charge call the enforcement inspector to stop the demolition:

> I defended these five people [referring to the people who constructed the first houses] for approximately a month or two…Demolition party went there, but I told them to be considerate. I used to say, ‘be kind, they are like my kids’ (Idirfa, low-ranking official, interview, 12 March 2019).

During his tenure as a supervisor in the I-series sector, Idirfa had accommodated people in Essa Nagri (a slum in the I-9 sector). He remembered a person who constructed seven houses for himself in five months. One of the houses was designated for CDA officials who would spend their afternoons in that house:

> We were enjoying [ourselves] a lot. He used to cook chicken for us. We used to sit and eat in a relaxed environment. He used to think that all the inspectors were coming there, so nobody would bother to ask him about his homes. He used to give us weekly treats and parties. He did not build for himself or his family. He rented them [houses] out and lied to us that they [tenants] were his family. We also did not bother as we were getting a relaxed environment, tea and cooked food (Idifra, low-ranking official, interview, 12 March 2019).

It is essential to mention here that the nexus of informality and corruption operates even on a higher level of administration. It is more than mere patronage of slum residents or seeking money from them. In centrally located slums, like the France Colony (in F-7 sector) and the 100 Quarter Colony (in F-6 sector), many high-ranking officials have investments in the form of houses which generate income. In response to the interview question related to corruption and patronage of slums in Islamabad, an ex-director of enforcement disclosed that:

> We have some officers of director level who are living in katchi abadis [slums]. They have their homes, and some of them are two storeys. They rent out [portions or homes] and earn money. Every new house in katchi abadi is a potential source of income for someone in the Capital Development Authority (Dihahs, high-level official, interview, 6 March 2019).

Having access to public office certainly increases the reliability and security of someone living in slums. Going further into it, it was realised that the whole real estate market mechanism operates differently in slums as compared to other regularised areas. Here, the ownership of a house by an official of the authority increases the rental value. Along with that, the dweller does not need to pay regular monthly bribes to officials as everyone knows that the owner of the house is a colleague, if not a senior official. Looking at slums as a ‘potential source of income’ certainly changes the whole approach through which the city administration deals with the issues of slums and the urban poor.

This is not to suggest that officials are the only ones who have been taking benefits by extending their patronage. Property (land) owners, entrepreneurs of small and medium scale and employers in the city also work in parallel to exploit and criminalise the urban poor by connecting themselves with the state authorities in Islamabad. In this regard, I would like to share an example from my fieldwork in the E-series sector of Islamabad, of a slum comprised of almost 50 houses. This settlement has no name, and it was on private land. Talking to the residents revealed that the empty piece of land had been rented out to them by the owner of the plot in exchange for USD 12 per month per home. That means the owner of the property was making around USD 600 per month in 2019 without providing any facilities except security from the authorities. When asked about their interaction with the CDA, residents indicated that “*ye to sahib janay aur wo. Hum tak koi nai ata* [This is known to the owner and them [authority]. No one comes to us]” (Raqfiluz, resident of slum, interview, 17 March 2019). They told me about many such settlements in the neighbouring E-series sector where construction work was then going on.

The case of shop owners and entrepreneurs in Islamabad markets is similar, especially in the more significant markets of F-6, F-7, G-6, G-7, G-8 sectors as well as in the Blue Area, a central commercial artery of the city. All of the markets are designed in a way to ensure the smooth flow of pedestrian traffic by keeping hallways, corridors and parking areas empty. No stalls, display of goods or economic activities are allowed outside the designated areas. However, all of the corridors, pathways, sidewalks and hallways are occupied by street traders because those places were rented out by shop owners and officials. In addition to paying the officials around USD 90 per month, street traders also pay monthly rent to the shop owner of anywhere between USD 150 to USD 250. When asked about the nexus of shop keepers and

enforcement officials of the authority, an official said that “it happens, but it does not happen all the time” (Dihahs, high-level official, interview, 6 March 2019).

While sharing his experience in the enforcement directorate, Dihahs reported that the dynamics on the ground are very different, especially in market areas. Usually, the enforcement directorate does not bother unless there have been many complaints or the matter gets reported in the newspapers or TV channels. The interviewee went on to say that most of the time, the shop owners use the officials to threaten these street traders so that they can increase the rent. It usually happens with new vendors. Vendors pay rent to the shop keeper who, after getting money, betrays the vendor by reporting to their contacts in the CDA. Once removed by officials, the vendor cannot claim his money back, and the shop keeper most likely rents out the vacated space to someone else after a couple of days or a week. These exploitative structures of governance and society together push the urban poor of Islamabad into the margins. Dihahs concluded the story by simultaneously summarising that “this is how it is, and it is happening. Everyone knows what is happening and how it is happening. You can see by yourself how bad things are in Abpara, Karachi Company, Melody [names of the markets]”.

It is imperative to highlight the nexus of the higher classes and the CDA that played a critical role in the overall development and growth of the city over time. The CDA discriminates among different socio-economic groups in Islamabad. The evolution of mosques, growth of housing societies and construction of district courts and lawyers’ offices in the market of sector F-8 are all illegal. All of them show a different segment of society, and none of them can be regarded as the urban poor. Despite their illegal status, none of the interviewees mentioned them as a source of problems or antithesis to development. In response to general questions about the master plan of Islamabad and its implementation, slums are first mentioned as a problem. Housing societies, lawyers’ offices or mosques were made part of the discussion only when the researcher specifically asked by citing some examples. This already shows that the official version of antithesis of development or the unplanned comprises only of slums and the urban poor of the city.

When asked, officials responded and agreed that many mosques in the city are actual encroachments and violations of the master plan as well as of the fundamentals of planning in Islamabad. For example, the one in G-7, closer to a slum, has been mentioned in an interview

as an example of the illegal construction of mosques. F-8 Markaz where lawyers and judges have made their offices and courts on supposedly public pathways are similar cases.[8] Since religious groups and judiciary in Pakistan are potent institutions and can afford to pressurise state institutions and individuals, therefore, their encroachments are not only accepted as such but have been patronised differently. Here, officials do not seek any bribes, they do not criminalise them, and they ensure the provisions of necessary facilities like water and electricity. This, however, is not the case with slums.

Other groups which escape persecution are "99% of private housing societies who don't have their LOP [layout plan] approved by the Capital Development Authority" in Islamabad (Dihahs, high-ranking official, interview, 6 March 2019). Despite such glaring inconsistencies, private housing societies are developing and growing. They are a strong and powerful group as they are not only comprised of investors and property tycoons but also have state officials as their stakeholders, similar to that of Brasilia. One interviewee explained their powerful status as the "guys who make those housing societies are like my officers or of the same level of my officers [referring to them as a group of powerful and rich people]. Similar are those who live in those societies" (Dihahs, high-ranking official, interview, 6 March 2019). That is why "a person like me [referring to his rank] cannot do anything" (Dihahs, high-ranking official, interview, 6 March 2019). While discussing their influence, reach and impact on the urban planning of Islamabad, another official asserted in an interview that "these housing societies even pay the Capital Development Authority not to develop Islamabad so that their business flourish along with the housing crises in Islamabad" (Idhem, mid-level official, interview, 5 March 2019).

Those who were labelled and categorised in the master plan of Islamabad were given a share of urban space. However, the labelling of the urban poor was not part of Islamabad unless hundreds of unauthorised settlements began to emerge on the map of the city before its inauguration. Unlike other social groups, the working poor were labelled as 'construction workers' and 'labourers' who were justified as a necessity for the city. This necessity was then naturalised, operationalised and rationalised according to the needs of the city and its

[8] In February 2021, Islamabad High Court ordered the CDA to demolish lawyers' chambers as well as court offices constructed on a football ground close to F-8 Markaz. The rest of the chambers and court offices located in F-8 Markaz were neither demolished nor declared as encroachments and a violation of the master plan of the city. They continue to exist.

inhabitants. Discursive identities and categorisation of the urban poor proved to be an exploitative arrangement for them as their lives would depend on the apathy and unofficial patronage of state authorities instead of possessing any permanent rights and position in the city. It is this patronage and informality that served as the alternate planning of the city in which unplanning is deliberately planned, sustained and is reproduced over the years. This, however, is not the case with encroachments of religious groups, expansionist aspirations of capitalists, and their patrons in the state institutions. The difference in responses to similar problems and the discriminatory practices of state institutions show a broader picture of politics of representation of the urban poor in the development discourses and its implications that shall be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

6.5 Appropriation of the Space of Brasilia: Bursting the Myth of Barren Hinterland

Developing Brasilia in the hinterland of the country was a huge project aiming to help Brazil progress and develop. Making Bosco's prophecy a central part of the discourse for public consumption, the project was presented as a divine story of development and progress in Catholic Brazil. This mythologising narrative was more than a political gimmick to harness support from the people: it was the official narrative. Costa's master plan for Brasilia was presented as a divine creation, an intervention that is beyond the human domain, which carries within itself the capacity to grow and take shape. Costa reproduced the narrative in the master plan by stating that the "present solution [master plan] was born, took shape and resolved itself" (Costa, 1957, unpaginated [ArPDF-NOV-B-1]).

The myth of divine intervention was further reinforced by emphasising the construction of the urban settlement in a vast empty stretch of land commonly described as the *cerrado* – a vast tropical savanna or shrubland without any human settlements. The myth of barren land was an essential part of the official and popular discourse and has been reproduced over the years by academic texts and narratives as well. For instance, two of the most authoritative academic accounts on Brasilia also portrayed the region of Brasilia as arid savannah with no human habitation (among many, see, for example, Holston, 1989; and Williams, 2009). This, however, is not the case. Brasilia was not created *ex nihilo*. The area, especially the neighbouring state of Minas Gerais and Goiás was already known for its agrarian economy and evolving middle-class society (Ferreira, 2010). Minas Gerais, for example, was known as

an “agricultural powerhouse” in the region where road networks, trade routes and urban settlements were present even before Brasilia (Palazzo & Saboia, 2012, p. 31). So much so, Goiânia, capital of the state of Goiás, was constructed as a planned settlement by Attilio Corrêa Lima (1901–1943) back in 1933 (Rego, 2016).

Like Islamabad, the story of appropriation of land for the construction of Brasilia is critical and relevant to make sense of the evolution of slums in the city. As mentioned, the land was neither free nor empty. Many agricultural farms were spread throughout the central plateau. Similar to Islamabad, some people accepted the fixed price of appropriation, and some rejected the offer. A high-ranking official of the enforcement department narrated in an interview that the government decided that the “land don’t belong to you [people] anymore. So, they [government] paid. But, some people said they don’t want it [expropriation]” (Xela & Anaicul, high-ranking officials, interview, 4 October 2018). For example, sometimes the state paid for 100 acres but actual calculations with modern equipment show that the land was actually 108 acres. Therefore, the remaining eight acres are the personal property of an individual who halted the whole process by filing a case in the court of law. This “incomplete appropriation process” has enormous implications for the future growth of Brasilia and for the evolution of informal settlements in the capital territory (Ogaiht, high-ranking official, interview, 24 August 2018).

This appropriation of space for the construction of Brasilia was done on the fixed rates of that time. When asked in interviews, nobody was able to confirm the prevailing price at that time. It is safe to assume that the difference between prices of the land before and after the construction of Brasilia was huge, as narrated by all of the interviewees while stating the market economy as a natural reason. Siul, a mid-ranking official of the popular housing, said, “this comes from the urban logic. If you have the main road, this road will be better to live in; the plot will have more value” (Siul, mid-ranking official, interview, 28 September 2018). The naturalisation of the market economy and neo-liberal logic of property valuation described by Siul echoes one of the objectives of the master plan of Brasilia, i.e. “dispose of the land and make it accessible to private capital” (Costa, 1957, unpaginated [ArPDF. NOV-B-1]).

Another important aspect of incomplete appropriation or misappropriation, is the strategy that was employed by the owners of the land during the process, called *grilagem* (literally:

cricketing). Historically, this has been the practice of the affluent and educated who would forge property documents to show their ownership of the land. In *grilagem*, property documents are prepared and then put in a box full of crickets (*grilos*). Crickets would then eat, and discharge excrement on those papers turning them parched, yellow and distorted so that they look old and authentic to show ownership by the family for generations. A person who practices *grilagem* is referred to as *grileiro*. It was mostly done by educated people in collaboration with state officials to make a lot of money. As mentioned by a high-ranking official, *grilagem* "is very profitable, millions [referring to money] are involved in this kind of transaction" and it "was not dealt with as it should be" (Aiduálc, high-ranking official, interview, 26 September 2018).

Nevertheless, the area was sparsely populated to undertake as big a project as Brasilia. Therefore, the influx of labour of all kinds was encouraged and called for early in the construction. As already mentioned, the master plan of Brasilia is a brief sketch of fundamental principles for Brasilia and its final shape. Therefore, insights into the construction period, organisation of labour force as well as their experiences in the early years are available to us through archives, oral historical accounts, official interviews and some academic texts. The following sections will discuss the trajectory of the construction of labour camps and the evolution of slums and the urban poor in Brasilia along with the growth and development of the city.

6.6 *Acampamentos de construção* (Construction Camps): Templates of Future Slums of Brasilia

Construction workers (especially semi-skilled or unskilled) were invited and encouraged to come to Brasilia, but their future was not planned in terms of their housing. Like Islamabad, the construction camps of Brasilia were intended as temporary settlements comprised of shacks and wooden barracks. These camps were controlled and planned in a way to accommodate the maximum number of male workers. Only males were allowed to lodge in those camps, and they were discouraged from bringing their families to ensure that the workers did not see Brasilia as their permanent home.

Construction of the new capital was monitored by NOVACAP that divided the whole area into two broader zones for the temporary occupation of all the people involved in construction

work. The first zone was designated to the physical construction of the city where the operational base of NOVACAP was set up along with the accommodation options for administrative and technical staff. Further, in the same zone, different construction companies constructed camps to house labourers. The camps were located outside the Pilot Plan area of Brasilia on the southern side close to the settlements of Candangolândia and Vila IAPI (removed later in the 1970s during massive slum removal operations in Brasilia). The second zone was designated for commercial activities and to provide construction workers with opportunities for entertainment and food. The commercial settlement in the second zone was known as *Cidade Livre* (the Free City) because of the government's patronage through tax holidays for four years. Officially, the settlement is called Núcleo Bandeiranteand was not only supported by NOVACAP administration but also by the then President Kubitschek (1956–1961) (Negreiros & Andrade, 1960 [NOV-D-4-1-Z-0033(9)D]). Here, all of the commercial activities and businesses of all kinds were free from taxes, and many construction workers started living there as well. Despite the violation of zonal regulations, the informal arrangement of inviting and accomodating more and more construction workers became part of the plan, and the Free City started growing because of hotels and other lodging opportunities for the newly arrived workers (Holston, 1989; Cardoso, 2004; Derntl, 2019).

Both the construction camps and the Free City were labelled and represented as temporary arrangements to address the needs of the construction of Brasilia. The settlements of the urban poor were constructed through temporariness in both discursive and material aspects. For example, they have always been labelled and referred to as "temporary settlements" (Siul, mid-level official, interview, 28 September 2018), "informal settlement" (Onailluig & Onurb, high-ranking official, interview, 21 September 2018), and "*barracos* [wooden shacks]" (Negreiros & Andrade, 1960 [NOV-D-4-1-Z-0033(9)D]. This temporariness was materially inscribed on the urban poor via the poor construction materials that have been used to construct their accommodation. Most of the shacks were not built by construction workers alone but by the companies who employed construction workers for the job. Further, rooms were made smaller so that the workers could not bring their families and plan to settle in Brasilia permanently. In addition, a special force named *Guarda Especial de Brasilia* (GEB – Brasilia's Special Guard) was established to prevent families entering and living in the camps. Recruits of GEB were chosen from workers, giving them power to enforce law and order without any training or preparation.

6.6.1 Labelling Construction Workers: Candangos or Pioneiros?

The labelling process in Brasilia, like that of Islamabad, started the moment the master plan of Brasilia was taking its final shape on the paper. Labelling, as an attempt to create identities and categories, proved to be a strategy to organise the different kinds of labourers employed in the construction work. All of the labour force was segregated and discriminated against by the labels used to categorise them. These labels, as the labelling approach would imply, created convenient images and suggested different kinds of facilities and resources for different categories. Every one of the early migrants to Brasilia was labelled as either *candango* or *pioneiro*. During the construction period they were used interchangeably, although they carry different social values, cultural baggage and social hierarchy within them (Holston, 1989). *Candango* refers to the low-skilled or unskilled construction worker employed in physical labour or menial jobs. On the other hand, *pioneiro* signifies the higher category of workers like engineers, technical staff, officials of the administrative machinery and, sometimes, investors and entrepreneurs of the Free City.

The label *candango* has its origin in Africa and is believed to be derived from the term *candongo* used among the tribes of Africa (present-day Angola). It is perhaps the slave trade of the Portuguese colonisers that brought this term to Brazil's north-eastern sugar plantations. As racial as it is, the term has been employed to refer to any man of lower stature, poor qualities, docile and a vagabond (Scott, 1998). The term was derogatory, "almost offensive" as it signifies a man "without culture", "lower-class", and "low brow" (Holston, 1989, p. 209). In the Brazilian context, the label *candango* became a general term for the people of the interior, especially the poor labourers who, even today, comprise a large part of the population of north-east Brazil. These people are usually referred to as *nordestino* (north-eastern), implying racial and economic inferiority and the majority of the *candango* who came to Brasilia originated from this region (Blake, 2011).

In contrast, the label *pioneiros* reflects the national ideals of progress and development of which Brasilia was an embodiment. *Pioneiros* signifies a social group comprised of workers who were neither lower class nor without culture. They are the ones who were to be celebrated as the real heroes because they were engineers who designed and materialised Brasilia. *Pioneiros* were the civil servants who ran the administration of the city since the first day,

and they were the entrepreneurs who addressed the needs of the city and made it liveable through their investments and businesses.

Despite the contradictions, both of the terms were used interchangeably to refer to construction workers. This is not to say that society was transforming or the people who were constructing Brasilia were casting off their centuries-old racial prejudices and class inequalities. The modernisation discourse that surrounded Brasilia in the construction period, as well as the necessity to invite massive armies of construction workers from the north-east, were the reasons for which Kubitschek dignified both construction and *candangos.* In his speeches and interviews, he would always prefer to use the term *candangos* over *pioneiros*:

> Future interpreters of Brazilian civilization, in analyzing this period of our history, must dwell with astonishment before the bronzed figure of this anonymous titan, who is the *candango*, the obscure and formidable hero of the construction of Brasilia (Kubitschek, speech on 5th January 1960, cf. Holston, 1989, p. 210).

While referring to the 'anonymous titan' as the 'formidable hero' of Brasilia, Kubitschek resignified *candango* as a discursively constructed category of identity on a national scale. He dehistoricised, decontextualised, and depoliticised the term to smooth the migration of the construction workers and to create a unified identity that would encapsulate everyone from the administrators, technical experts, and planners to the construction workers. In this way, "human solidarity" and "a great family, without prejudice and inequality" was created in the construction camps (Niemeyer, 1961, p. 64).

The notions of 'human solidarity' and 'a great family' to describe construction camps are directed at elite-class workers who should better be understood as *pioneiro*. The experiences of a *candango* were quite different as he would see himself and his camp as inferior to the "high society [*soçaite*] of engineers living in their own camps" (Holston, 1989, p. 214). This difference between *pioneiros* and *candangos* has a social significance that continues to be reproduced even today. During an interview with a former construction worker in *Vila Planalto*, a former construction camp, the interviewee called himself *candango*. On the other hand, in interviews with the architects who had been working with Niemeyer and Costa, they called themselves *pioneiros* while explaining the difference between the two categories.

The difference was discursively diluted and subsumed under the broader discourses of change, development, progress, and modernity while defining and justifying Brasilia. However, in its material aspects, two social categories were differentiated spatially during the construction. Though engaged in construction work on the same sites, both groups retired to their dwellings to have different experiences of Brasilia. *Candango* were not allowed to bring their families, and the services provided to them were of inferior quality. There were many complaints about the quality of food and shelter, along with complaints about denial of the physical needs of intimacy (Pires, 2013). For *pioneiros*, the construction camps were better in shape and size. They were allowed to bring their families, and temporary schools and play areas were provided for their children. One of the research respondents said that he came to Brasilia as a child with his father who was an engineer and lived in Vila Telebrasilia – another construction camp for engineers and high-skilled workers of that time.

Different labels mean those outside the two social classes looked at them differently and the groups were assumed to have different needs and demands. Beyond the social baggage that they had to carry, there was a stark physical segregation between the two social classes that was naturalised and presented as a solution to smoothly regulate the construction process. Dwellings of high-ranking NOVACAP officials and technical staff like engineers and architects were located at a distance from the barracks of *candangos*. *Candangos* were assumed to be dangerous, and a threat to security; the camps of the *pioneiros* were protected by barbed wire and regular patrols of the GEB (Holston, 1989). The dwellings of *candango* were more like barracks with shared bathrooms and without any internal divisions. The men were grouped together in unsanitary, congested and overcrowded shacks. This was not the case with *pioneiros*. High-ranking employees and workers were given camps with internal subdivisions allowing each person to live in privacy. They were also given indoor bathrooms. The higher group of managers, architects, engineers, and planners were given individual houses, and they lived with their families in a homogenous neighbourhood with their camps and club facilities (Ribeiro, 2008). One of the construction workers reported that "the engineers in the camps had the best houses; each had its core [núcleo – referring to a complete neighbourhood with all facilities] within the camp" (Haine, 2000, p. 15).

A similar situation occurred with the provision of transportation, health, and food facilities for the construction workers. *Pioneiros* were provided with exclusive jeeps and other individual transport to go to the construction sites while *candangos* had to travel in open

trucks, carts or sometimes by foot. Resources were discriminatorily allocated to both social groups as the provision of health facilities and food was of substandard quality for the *candangos*. However, *pioneiros* were provided with better quality and clean canteens, better quality meals, private cooks and also dining halls.

Like Islamabad, the construction camps of *candangos* were segregated, controlled and surveilled through GEB. Further, putting barbed wire around the camps of the *pioneiros* was an indirect way to criminalise *candangos*. To reinforce the lens of criminality and to reproduce the discourses of social deviance, the camps of *candango* were policed by a large number of GEB and police officials to ensure the requisite law and order. There were organised and regular inspections at the entry gates of camps to search for alcohol or other drugs. This, however, was not the case with construction camps of *pioneiros* based on the assumptions of the inhabitants being morally upright, educated, and of higher value.

Atrocities, logics of segregation, and the discrimination that went on in the construction camps laid the foundations of the future of the urban poor, hitherto *candango*, in Brasilia. Final remarks on the plight of the future urban poor of Brasilia would be presented by an infamous incident that happened in the construction camps of *candangos*. The event is widely remembered as the Pacheco Fernandes Incident that occurred in February 1959 during the celebrations of the carnival. It is essential to mention that the incident has been removed from the official history of Brasilia and is usually dismissed as misinformation, legend and the exaggeration of the workers.

Pacheco Fernandes was a company, among many others like Rabello, engaged with the construction of Brasilia that had established camps and lodging quarters for its workers. It was the responsibility of the companies to provided lodging facilities and food for its employees free of cost or at very nominal prices. Unlike the camps of *pioneiros*, complaints about substandard food and poor living conditions were common in the camps of *candangos*. On 8 February 1959, workers, being dissatisfied with their food, started a protest and demanded better services. It was not the first protest or strike in the construction camps by *candangos*. What happened differently this time was that the GEB opted ruthless methods to deal with the protest; they launched a full-scale operation on the camp that led to many casualties, the exact number of which is still unknown and a mystery (Pires, 2013).

The following description of the events that took place is based on the oral historical account of Eronildes Queiroz – a *candango* – who arrived in Brasilia in 1957 and was working as a cook with Pacheco Fernandes (Queiroz, 1991). His account is still present in the public archives of Brasilia. According to Queiroz, GEB officials entered the premises of the camp, arrested the protesters, and took them to the jail. Afterwards, a larger group of men entered the kitchen and dining halls demanding the release of their colleagues and protesting against the mishandling of the workers. Meanwhile, news of an alleged assassination of a police officer broke out and reached GEB headquarters from where a huge number of GEB personnel were dispatched to the campsite of Pacheco Fernandes.

To control the situation, GEB invaded the camp and opened fire on unarmed *candangos*. Queiroz himself hid in the kitchen from where he could see the workers dying and their dead bodies dragged out by the officers. Eventually, the military was called in by the higher authorities of the administration who then controlled the situation along with GEB officials. The actual damage and the casualties are still unknown. It is widely believed, in the research interviews as well, that people were killed, and their dead bodies were dumped in different areas so that proof of the massacre can be virtually removed from the site of Brasilia. Queiroz stated that a truck driver, Manoel, was given a new Ford F-600 in exchange for his role in dumping the bodies and keeping silent on the matter. Allegedly, Manoel accepted the offer and helped the authorities in dumping the dead bodies into the lakes of *Lagoa Feia* and *Lagoa Formosa* in the state of Goiás.

It is still not known how many of the workers lost their lives in the incident. Exact details may vary, but there is a general agreement that the event had happened, and many workers were killed. In response to the question about the incident, Israel Pinheiro, the then chief of NOVACAP, responded that he had no idea of actual casualties. The rumours he heard, as he mentioned in his interview, were of around 200 deaths out of nearly 1,300 workers in the Pacheco Fernandes camp. However, Pinheiro categorically said that the event might be "invented" with the evil intentions of defaming Brasilia because, in politics, the "opponent invents everything" (Pinheiro, 1989, p. 36). His narrative of the event is in line with most of the *pioneiros* and contrary to that of *candangos* – reflecting hierarchies and the relationship among different socio-economic groups within the broader categories of workers building Brasilia.

6.7 From Slums to Satellite Cities and Regional Administrations: Planning of the Unplanned in Brasilia

Similarly to Islamabad, the historical trajectory of slums in Brasilia is as old as the city itself. The evolution of slums in Brasilia runs parallel to the construction of temporary labour camps and permanent Brasilia. Almost every construction camp of Brasilia was surrounded with slums which were informally accepted by the authorities. The informal arrangements between NOVACAP authorities and slum dwellers led the latter to stay and grow over the years. Costa, while remembering the growth of slums in Brasilia, asserts that "the NOVACAP and others decided to proceed like that [patronising slums] because there were favelas surrounding every construction site in the city which involved the families of workers" (Acioly, 1992, p. 14). However, the future trajectory of the growth of slums, their relation with state authorities, and the proposed solutions are different than that of Islamabad. Here in Brasilia, the policies of dealing with slums, provision of necessary facilities, and their upgradation or rehabilitation became part of the administration even before the inauguration of Brasilia. Further, this relation was a potent mix of both formal and informal structures and logics of governance.

As mentioned earlier, *candangos* were not allowed to bring their families to the construction site. One of the first reported slums, labelled as *invasões* (invasions), was *Vila Sara Kubitschek* – named after the then first lady of Brazil. The settlement was present at the entrance of the Free City in front of the gates of the city. Four to five thousand people improvised their lodgings right in front of the barricades installed by the police forces to prevent them from entering construction camps and the Free City. To survive and to add security to their settlement, residents of *Vila Sara* put up banners thanking Sara Kubitschek and honouring her by naming their settlement after her name. Using Sara's name created an image of legality and acceptance, therefore, a sense of security. This prompted a big exodus of both *candangos* and *pioneiros* (engineers, skilled workers, entrepreneurs from the Free City etc.) towards the settlement that outnumbered GEB officials. In this way, the attempt to remove them turned out to be a futile effort (Holston, 1989).

In 1958, President Kubitschek visited the construction site to see the work in progress. On his arrival, the residents of *Vila Sara* launched a massive demonstration asking for legalisation of the settlement and provision of basic facilities. Kubitschek, who was promising modernity and development for everyone through the construction of Brasilia, could not ignore the

settlements of thousands of people at the entry of his future city. He approved the relocation of the settlement, however, at a considerable distance of 25 kilometres from the centre. The distance and the policy of relocation announced by Kubitschek and executed by NOVACAP set the future trajectory of the slums of Brasilia and the ideal solution for the state to deal with the urban poor. Magnificent Brasilia had no place for the urban poor and their status with Brasilia will always remain one of patronage, dependence and benevolence by creating planned centre-periphery hierarchies representing the social gradations of the future inhabitants of the city. A new city that was built 25 kilometres away from the centre was named as the satellite city of Taguatinga, which was inaugurated in 1958 – two years before the inauguration of Brasilia itself. Officially, the name satellite city (*cidade satélite*) is not used any more; it is called *Administração Regional de Taguatinga* (Regional Administration of Taguatinga).

As mentioned above, every construction site had its own slums outside its gates. *Vila Sara* that eventuated in the satellite city of Taguatinga was not the only case in hand. The satellite city of Soradinho, the result of the relocation of *Vila Amaury,* is another example that shows how the urban poor were regularised, dealt with and accommodated in Brasilia. *Vila Amaury* is also important in a sense that it shows how the officials were patronising the informal settlements and seeking personal benefits out of it. Leaderless, exploited and unemployed masses were not only a nuisance for the beauty of Brasilia but were also economic and political opportunities for the officials. Evolution of *Vila Amaury* as a slum settlement was the initiative of a staff member of NOVACAP who wanted to become state deputy for the Brazilian Labor Party (Holston, 1989, p. 263). Amaury de Almeida proposed and organised the construction of a new settlement close to the construction camps (Negreiros & Andrade, 1960 [NOV-D-4-1-Z-0033(9)D]). For NOVACAP, it was beneficial as they could get rid of many small invasions; for Almeida, it was an opportunity to create a strong political base.

Like Islamabad, all of the arrangements made for the urban poor of Brasilia were temporary and fragile. *Vila Amaury* is no exception in this regard. NOVACAP allocated a place destined to be Lake Paranoá for the settlement so that it could be removed later on for the construction of the lake. Once the settlement was created, the residents, following *Vila Sarah*, started demanding permanent places and legalisation of their lots as their right in Brasilia. Knowing that the existing site was designated for the lake, the residents asked for a permanent solution and land titles where they may not be regarded as temporary or a nuisance anymore. Having

the support of the political party (Brazilian Labor Party) and their deputies in parliament, the link of patronage was established that would serve as a medium through which thousands of residents could be rescued from the rise of water in the lake.

Following a similar trajectory, the master plan of Brasilia was not changed. Instead, another satellite city named Sobradinho was inaugurated 22 kilometres away from the centre in 1960. The urban poor and their demands were accepted at the cost of relocation to a far-off place from where they could not easily commute to their workplaces daily. One of the residents of the *Vila Amaury* and a former construction worker told the researcher that the current location of *Vila Amuary* is right on the banks of the lake, i.e. half of it outside and half inside:

> It was *Vila Amauri*. It wasn't invaded [by the forces to remove the settlement]. The dam [Paranoá Dam] was built following a standard. So, it rained and it [the site] filled up [with water], and the village backed further and further away. The village was called *Vila Amauri* (Barbosa, *candango*, interview, 20 July 2018).

Instead of using any force or law enforcement authorities, the location of *Vila Amaury* was planned and accepted so that the removal of the urban poor can be ensured later on by the lake itself. It is essential to mention that the story of the move from *Vila Amauri* to Sobradinho is not of a mere simple relocation. Even today, as told by many residents of Brasilia, it is believed that the lake still has the remains of the village. People were not given enough time to collect their valuables and household goods from their shacks. They were overtaken by rising water levels. The whole settlement was flooded with the lake water causing immense damage to life and property:

> Some of the dwellers already drowned in the lake for not knowing how to swim. Kids were bitten by the snakes. [Further] The artificial lake of Brasilia is filling, swallowing thousands of favelados [slum dwellers] and putting people on the streets near Palácio da Alvorada [Presidential Palace] and Brasilia Palace Hotel (Negreiros & Andrade, 1960, unpaginated [NOV-D-4-1-Z-0033(9)D]).

The story of *Vila Amaury* and that of *Vila Planalto* offers us interesting insights on the issues of discrimination between *candangos* and *pioneiros*. *Vila Amaury* was constructed in the lower levels where the lake was planned. Close to the site of the lake and almost in the neighbourhood, there was another construction camp called *Vila Planalto* that was exclusively for *pioneiros,* i.e. engineers, architects and planner. *Vila Planalto* was constructed at a safer distance from the lake and was on a higher level so that it could neither be flooded nor damaged by the water in the lake. Later on, *Vila Planalto* was regularised on its existing site while *Vila Amaury* was moved 22 kilometres from the centre. When asked about the discrimination in the construction camps, two of the high-ranking officials responded:

> The poor were always the one on [read: in] the lake. Vila Amaury. I think it's kind of cruel how it happened. Because, the settlements the *temporary settlements* for the workers, some of them were built down the lake. Then the lake could go up, and they will be forced to move. So, Vila Planalto was for the architects and for engineers and stuff, so it was already on upper level [emphasis added] (Onurb & Onailluig, high-ranking officials, interview, 21 September 2018).

Assuring temporariness for the urban poor and their subsequent relocation to distant areas has dominated the first two decades of Brasilia. The intensity of the regime of discrimination has been increased many fold during the military rule (1964–1985). However, it did change the fate of the urban poor, but only for the worse. During these times, the discursive constructs of *candangos* and temporary settlements were replaced by intense derogatory labels that have been associated with the violent slums of Rio de Janeiro, i.e. '*invasão*' (invasion) and 'favelas' (slums, mainly used in the context of Rio de Janeiro). Having no democratic base to draw their powers from, the military junta decided to launch one of the most extensive slum eradication programmes (*erradicação de favelas*) in Brasilia. Instead of relocation or rehabilitation, the solution was labelled as 'eradication' that implies reproduction of the socially deviant status of the urban poor. Eradication implies the complete destruction and elimination of something terrible and dangerous. For instance, in discourses of development today, it is poverty that is to be eradicated because it is believed as the mother of all social ills. Eradicating slums implies the same intensity where Brasilia was at stake because of the plague of slums and the urban poor.

During this time, it is interesting to note that the problem of slums, as well as the housing of the urban poor, was discussed while creating new categories, demanding different solutions, and forming specialised organisations. All of the interviewees and documents, especially during this time, described slums as “favelas” and their residents as “favelados” (the one living in a favela) instead of *candangos* (GDF, Secretaria de Serviços Sociais, 1973, p. 13). New labels were not neutral or mere new categories for an efficient administration. Using favela and favelados for the urban poor of Brasilia makes them synonymous to that of the slums in Rio de Janeiro where gang wars, drugs, rapes, homicide rates are still the highest all over the region. The new labels given to the urban poor of Brasilia were crimonyms legitimising the massive slum clearance in Brasilia.

The birth of Ceilândia as a new settlement for the urban poor of Brasilia in 1970 is perhaps the most representative example of the new discursive strategies employed by the state institutions. Unlike Sobradinho and Taguatinga, Ceilândia was the result of what has been referred to as “*transferência de favelas* [Transfer of Favelas]” in which many “invasions” like Vila Tenório, Vila Esperança, Vila Bernardo Sayão, and Morro do Querozene were transferred nearly 30 kilometres away from the centre (GDF, Secretaria de Serviços Sociais, 1973, p. 13). Here the lexical relationship between invasions and favelas has been established by the report defining slums in both social and legal contexts. Favelas, socially, and invasions, legally, are both categories of social deviance. The existence of slums, socially and legally, has been categorised and represented as a social evil that should be discouraged and eradicated by the state. This discursive strategy provided ample room for the state authorities to invoke other labels like “remoção [removal]” and “erradicação [eradication]” as a solution to the problem (GDF, Secretaria de Serviços Sociais, 1973, pp. 14, 32). Removal and eradication, instead of relocation as in the case of Sobradinho and Taguatinga, imply achieving the desired condition by removing or eradicating undesirability in its physical and non-physical forms.

For the first time in the history of Brasilia, the government constituted an exclusive commission to deal with the slums of the city. The *Campanha de Erradicação das Invasões* (CEI – Slum Eradication Commission) was created in the early 1970s to free Brasilia from its slums. The task of the commission was to remove all the slums from the city and transfer them to the outskirts. In fact, the name Ceilândia comes from CEI-lândia, i.e. the land of the CEI. Ceilândia came into being as a result of removal operations by the commission in which more than “80.000 *habitantes* [habitants]” and nearly “15.000 *mil barracos* [shacks]” were to be

removed (GDF, Secretaria de Serviços Sociais, 1973, p. 13). The process of removal appeared to be the only option in those days. Removal and eradication were seen as a legal and moral "obligation" by one of the officials interviewed who assisted the process back in the 1970s (Inaivap, high-ranking official, interview, 31 August 2018). The creation of CEI and its output in the form of Ceilândia appears to be a strong example of discrimination against the urban poor, and the state-imposed segregation of different socio-economic groups in Brasilia.

The legacy of treating the urban poor and their settlements as undesirable invasions is present even today. All of the research interviewees, when asked about the history of slums in Brasilia and the latest examples, refer to these settlements as invasions on public land. The use of language and referential strategies by highlighting crime in the description of these invasions have not changed over the years. The latest example narrated to the researcher is the regional administration of Itapoã almost 25 kilometres from the centre. It has been regarded as one of the poorest regions in the whole of the Federal District. The creation of Itapoã is directly linked to the dislocation of the people from the land that was expropriated to construct the Paranoá dam for Lake Paranoá. Instead of formally allocating them alternative lands for their housing, like Islamabad, they were asked to make their habitation in the area that is now Itapoã:

> In the beginning, we have Paranoá [former slum, now administrative region]. It was like a site of the dam at the base of the Lake Paranoá. People were removed for the plateau, which is straight [refering to empty land] and *arranged people* to live there. Now, one of the favelas is there, Itapoã. It has more than 100,000 people [emphasis added] (Inaivap & Abotaj, high-ranking officials, interview, August 2018).

Although Itapoã was recognised as a regional administration in 2005, the settlement of the poor is still referred to as favela echoing the rationale, baggage and discourses of the 1970s. The sole purpose is to keep the urban poor at a distance while patronising them with alternative opportunities almost forming state-led and state recognised favelas – territories of contempt, disgrace, poverty, and vices.

The cases of Ceilândia, Sobradinho, Itapoã and Taguatinga are representative in a sense that they help us travel from the oldest (Taguatinga) to the newest (Itapoã). The majority of the

total 33 satellite cities, now administrative regions, are the embodiment of how the urban poor have been treated and dealt with in the history of Brasilia. It is not suggested that all the regional administrations or satellite cities are poor and have not prospered since their inception. Creation of these satellite cities adds up to the segregation, socio-physical distance, and homogenisation of neighbourhoods along the class lines. For instance, the administrative region of Águas Claras (20 kilometres from the centre) was created in 2003 and has been designated as a pro-middle-class neighbourhood of Brasilia. The area has high-rise apartment buildings and is known as a *cidade vertical* (vertical city), with a population of more than 100,000 people.

Differences between administrative regions like Águas Claras and Itapoã relate to the social baggage they carry despite their same legal status. Even in 2018, during the research fieldwork, Itapoã was referred to as a slum, as shown above, but a region like Águas Claras represents modernity, development, and a progressive solution to the urban problems of Brazil. With a few exceptions like Águas Claras and Jardim Botânico (administrative regions mainly comprised of private condominiums), it can be safely stated that most of the regional administration followed a similar trajectory in their history. They were first labelled as invasions, then satellite cities and are now regional administrations. Gama, Guará, Samambaia, Varjão, São Sebastião and Paranoá are a few examples in this regard. One of the officials responded to the researcher's observations in the following words:

> There was this policy. Whenever there was a new slum, they [urban poor] would be removed, and they [government] would build a new city for them [urban poor] (Onurb, high-ranking official, interview, 21 September 2018).

Like any other city, Brasilia is also growing with each day. There are still many slums in the city; many removal operations are carried out every day, and many protests take place (these aspects will be discussed in the next chapter). There are settlements which are in the process of moving up the ladder to reach the status of the regional administration. In this process, slums are not alone. There are many housing societies, condominiums and gated communities that are also illegal and unauthorised, hence invasions. Like Islamabad, informality as a logic of governance is also contributing to the creation of new spaces in Brasilia.

6.8 Informality and Corruption: A Mode of Creation of Space in Brasilia

Similar to that of Islamabad, practices of informality and corruption play an important part in the overall development and production of urban spaces in Brasilia. In the case of Brasilia, it is more than the mere production of space: it is also a logic and practice of discrimination among different socio-economic groups and the spaces they inhabit. From the above discussion, it can be seen that the spaces of the urban poor, or *candangos* in the early years, were created both discursively and materially. This, however, does not mean that the *invasão* was done by the urban poor alone. This has been a practice of the *pioneiros* and other higher classes as well. However, it was not described to the researcher as *invasão* or *usupação* (invasion or usurpation). The discrimination between the invasions of the rich and that of the poor is naturalised and understood differently in Brasilia. The difference, like Islamabad, is incomprehensible unless informality and corruption are seen together as a process governing the creation of the urban space of Brasilia.

The settlements of the urban poor, like *Vila Sara* and *Vila Amaury,* began under the patronage of NOVACAP officials. They deliberately ignored their development to allow the construction of the city. Construction camps offered accommodation to those who were engaged in construction work alone. How about the maids, cooks, launderers, security guards and cleaners who were working for the high-ranking officials of construction companies? Creation of those early settlements also served the interests of the officials. They provided the officials with domestic help as well as a set of opportunities to increase their financial income. From a project manager to the local officials working in the field to implement construction work, the menace of corruption was everywhere, which led to the exploitation of construction workers as well as the urban poor. Despite the acceptance of corruption as very much rooted in Brazilian politics and public services, none of the research interviewees provided personal or eye-witness accounts of the financial exploitation of the urban poor during the construction. However, some scholars have contributed a little on the subject (for example, Couto, 2008; Tamanini, 2003; Jönsson, 2014).

Apart from the invasions of the urban poor during the construction of Brasilia, there were invasions of the upper and middle classes as well. For example, the neighbourhoods of *Lago Norte* and *Lago Sul* were not planned neighbourhoods. They were invasions by the higher officials of the NOVACAP and other construction companies. Contrary to the invasions of

the urban poor, both neighbourhoods of *Lago Norte* and *Lago Sul* were legalised in their existing locations and subsequently planned as the wealthiest neighbourhoods of Brasilia. When asked about the history of invasions in Brasilia, the response from officials and the adopted referential strategies constructed different categories for the invasion of different socio-economic groups. For example, while talking about Itapoã and Paranoá, the reference was made by labelling them as "favelas", and for *Lago Norte* and *Lago Sul* a neutral label of "place" was used (Inaivap & Abotaj, high-ranking officials, interview, 31 August 2018). In legalising the neighbourhoods of the rich (both legalised in the early 1960s), they sold the legalised plots to those who were already living there, instead of making any public auction (Noslig, high-ranking official, interview, 10 September 2018).

Even in 2018, informality and corruption play an important part in organising and producing urban spaces in Brasilia. Like Islamabad, there has been a mushroom growth of *condomínios* (condominiums, gated communities, housing societies) in Brasilia offering high-class housing opportunities for the middle and higher classes. Most of the housing societies also started as illegal and should be better labelled as invasions, but this does not happen. Instead, whole aspects of encroachment and invasion by the private housing societies are patronised by state officials in Brasilia. In all of the interviews conducted during the research, when asked for a single example in which rich invasions like that of private housing societies had been removed, the answer was always 'none'. Interestingly, interviewees used to think for a while and found it surprising that they could not come up with any such example. Housing societies like Jardim Botânico VI, Solar de Brasilia, Condomínio Estância Quintas da Alvorada, among many others on the south-east of the lake, are of dubious legal status and started as invasions as told by a resident there (Sacul, resident of a condominium, interview, 9 September 2018).

None of the interviewees has used the label invasion for a development by a private housing society; they referred to them as condominiums or informal settlements, which is a kind of approval and less stigmatising as compared to invasion. The researcher has seen apartment buildings where the nameplate has mentioned condominium for the SQS 312 apartment building designed by Niemeyer. The growth and sustainability of these high-class neighbourhoods are directly linked to the malpractices and informality that has been practised by the state authorities since construction days. Most of the officials of urban municipalities also live in these neighbourhoods. So much so, many of the judges, politicians, bureaucrats, and military personals live there, therefore making them formidable and secure as compared

to any invasion by the urban poor. The elite groups use their social capital, some others use their economic capital to secure their homes and neighbourhoods as they have invested millions in them. One of the high-ranking officials explained the situation in the following words:

> We have judges that actually live in *informal settlements*. You have public servants, and public employees who live in those *informal settlements*. You have everybody. Everybody has a cousin or relative or even parent living in those *informal settlements*. So, it became *kind of legitimate* to live in this kind of situation [emphasis added] (Ogaiht, high-ranking official, interview, 24 August 2018).

Instead of using the label invasion or encroachment, Ogaiht preferred to call them 'informal settlements'. In the same interview he employed labels like invasions, encroachments, and slums for the urban poor. The difference is more than semantic. It reflects the approach with which officials look at the different socio-economic groups. When he was talking about illegal condominiums, he was virtually looking at a mirror because many of his subordinates or seniors could be living in one of those neighbourhoods. No doubt, the kind of patronage he was extending by accrediting them with 'a kind of legitimate situation' is a favour he has been extending to his socio-economic group.

Informality, malpractices and corruption in the case of Brasilia represent and reproduce similar discrimination and segregation that has been planned, constructed and given a naturalised, modernised and scientific status in the development discourses of Brasilia. Using informality as a territorial logic of producing space, Brasilia's segregationist tendencies have been further reinstated along the class lines in which the middle-class values of housing, planning and neighbourhood are being protected, encouraged and patronised in the form of condominiums. Conversely, the patronage extended to the invasions of the poor is of a temporary nature. Their representation is discursively stigmatised and criminalised providing the state institutions with justification for removing them to far-off places. The discursive strategies and labelling through which the urban poor are represented imply justification for the control and regulation of their social life – an aspect discussed in the next chapter.

6.9 Chapter Summary

This chapter illustrates that the evolution of slums and the urban poor is a direct outcome of the development rationales and planning of Islamabad and Brasilia. Despite the visibility of the labour force, they were discursively and materially labelled as a temporary arrangement. Since they were not categorised in any of the income-centric labels, as discussed in the previous chapter, they were consigned to a social category of inferior status and labelled as 'labour' and 'construction workers'. Their housing demands were addressed through the establishment of temporary *campos de trabalho* (labour camps) or *acampamentos de construção* (construction camps). Like that of the cities of the future, the camps also ensured segregation and division among different socio-economic groups in which the urban poor were deprived of both social and physical rights and equal status. The construction workers, labourers, and *candangos* of the construction periods were the future urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia. They were also criminalised and stigmatised to bestow a condition of permanent temporariness upon them. These temporary settlements, informally patronised by the state institutions, proved to be the forerunners of slums – an urban ill for which Islamabad and Brasilia were supposed to provide a cure.

Chapter 7: LABELS, DISCOURSE, AND POWER: POLITICS OF REPRESENTING THE URBAN POOR OF ISLAMABAD AND BRASILIA

This chapter will discuss representations of the urban poor in the development discourses of the public authorities of Islamabad and Brasilia. In both cities the urban poor are represented through various labels (e.g. encroachers, invaders, criminals, *favelados*, etc.) and discursive strategies (e.g. referential, nomination, metaphorisation, naturalisation, etc.) in which they are stigmatised, essentialised and constructed as socially deviant and an out-group. With the help of critical discourse analysis, this chapter argues that the labelling of the urban poor is more than bureaucratic identity formation for resource distribution. It appears to be a discursive regime through which they are controlled, surveilled and discriminated against by the state institutions. This politics of representation brings forth the broader consequences for the social spaces of the urban poor in which they are naturalised as an out-group that is excluded and essentialised. Because of the repetition of discourses of criminalisation and essentialisation, the categorisation and classification of the urban poor as a socially deviant group are naturalised as permanent conditions. Further, the use of labels and the discursive strategies employed by the state institutions legitimise the differences; in this way discrimination, segregation, exclusion, and socio-economic inequalities can be established.

Social and physical boundaries are not spatial facts: they are social facts expressed spatially. In the case of Islamabad and Brasilia, physical spaces that are planned for the urban poor are created discursively as well as materially in the master plans of the respective cities, as discussed earlier in this research. Discursively, the slums of Islamabad and Brasilia are constructed as spaces of deviance, disgust, and abnormality. Social deviances are those acts that are rendered as objectionable, forbidden or disvalued and viewed as annoying, threatening or even offensive by the society at large (see, for example, Dodge, 1985; Krohn, Lizotte, & Hall, 2009; Clinar & Meier, 2011; Stark & Bainbridge, 2012). This is not to suggest that all behaviour that diverges from usual or accepted standards is negatively perceived. Some deviances are positively appreciated by society and are believed to be heroic, for example, patriotism, braveness, piousness, or martyrdom. However, it is certain that social deviance is context-specific and is a product of the socio-economic and political structures of society. It is socially constructed to control and regulate social behaviours (Goode & Ben-Yehuda,

2009). The types of behaviour permitted or discouraged reflect the power patterns and social hierarchies in societies. In the case of Islamabad and Brasilia, like any other state, the social deviance of the urban poor is socially constructed to control and regulate their physical and social spaces. The control and regulation are practised both formally (by the state institutions like the police, planners, policymakers, inspectors, etc.) and informally (by the social norms and social structures like social behaviours, social interactions, family, peer group, etc.).

The discursive construction of the urban poor as exhibiting social deviance is primarily done through the essentialisation and criminalisation of the poor in the development discourses of the municipal authorities. Labelling the urban poor in Islamabad and Brasilia restricts the lives of the poor not only in terms of their access to physical resources but also their access to larger urban social spaces. Labelling, in this regard, is understood as a discursive strategy to categorise various socio-economic groups so that the social hierarchies can be sustained and naturalised. Labels, when applied by bureaucracies and planners, are convenient image perceptions and attributions to regulate society and legitimise the interventions. For instance, development is an intervention required for the images and attributions put forth by the label underdevelopment. Like development, underdevelopment itself is a social construction achieved through scientific discourse and categories as discussed earlier in chapter 4.

Development discourses in Islamabad and Brasilia vis-à-vis slums and the urban poor also operate through the construction of various categories (social and/or physical). These categorisations are not organisational schema or a bureaucratic necessity for the administration and distribution of the resources. Rather, they are the specific forms of representation of the urban poor and their neighbourhoods (slums) that created them as socially deviant, therefore, implying control, segregation and contempt by both state and society. Construction of social deviance is directly related to social inequalities that are reproduced by attributing different social values to labelled categories (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). Historically, as in the case of Islamabad and Brasilia, the negative attributions and representational patterns are often aimed at people holding a less privileged status in society, like the homeless and the urban poor, to reduce them to mere objects of the policies (Toft, 2014). Representation and labelling, in this regard, serve as an instrumental strategy of control, governance and patronisation.

7.1 Dirt, Drugs, and Danger: Urban Poor and the Construction of Social Deviance in Islamabad

The urban poor of Islamabad are constructed and represented as a socially deviant group. Not only is their housing devoid of state constructed legality but also their standing as a social group is criminalised by lexically connecting them to dirt, drugs and danger – key pillars of social deviance in a society like Pakistan. Labelling (see chapter 2 for a discussion on labelling theory) them as encroachers, illegal, informal, and mafia is further reinforced by the "linguistic strategies" employed by the state authorities to implement the desired interpretations and meanings of the labels (Toft, 2014, p. 785). In a slum upgradation and rehabilitation report of the CDA (for details on archival data collection, see 3.6.1 in chapter 3), the first-ever attempt was made to formalise and legalise slums in Islamabad. In that report, the representation of slums and the urban poor have been made in the following words:

> Compared with other Pakistani cities Islamabad still offers a degree of contrast but forty years on the earlier dream of Islamabad does not match the present-day reality. Today Islamabad faces environmental pollution and natural resources degradation problems. The urgent challenge before the city managers and its citizens is to face up to and respond to the great threat to the urban environment relating to the un-authorized and un-planned growth of human settlements (CDA, 2000, p. 7)

In the above quotation, the urban poor of Islamabad are constructed as a socially deviant group. Their representation as a source of discomfort and threat is achieved by both labelling and discursive strategies to formulate their convenient images as a source of trouble that demands an immediate solution. Multiple frames, referential strategies, predication, labelling and discourses (see chapter 3 for discourse analysis as both a theory and a method) are adopted to legitimise the construction of the urban poor as a problem of both the environment and terrorism. For instance, the report mentioned that the "urgent challenge" for the "managers" and "citizens" is a "threat" to the urban environment. This threat is further explained by referring to and nominating slums as the cause of environmental degradation. Simultaneously, the construction of the problem of environmental threat constructs problem groups by labelling them as "un-authorised" and "un-planned". This predication and reproduction of stereotypical images of the urban poor and their housing are described in present indefinite tense – an argumentative strategy aimed at establishing facts and their positivist interpretation

(Fairclough, 2010). Another important aspect of this quote is the creation of in-group and out-group. The “urgent challenge” is not described as the sole domain of the “city managers” but also of “citizens” implying the creation of an out-group, i.e. the people who are living in unauthorised and unplanned settlements. Creation of in-group and out-group (‘us’ and ‘them’) as a discursive strategy will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.

Similar forms of representation and the construction of the urban poor as a socially deviant group can be seen in other parts of the same document. For instance, in the executive summary of the official report discussing upgradation and rehabilitation of the slums in Islamabad, it was stated that:

> [D]ue to [the] market mechanism, the areas, especially in the private sector, which are originally intended to accommodate low-income families, finally were occupied by economically better households as the low-income population either got [a] better price for their other needs or could not afford payment for the services and maintenance of such plots/housing units which resulted in [the] growth of squatter settlements/katchi abadis. This can primarily be attributed to the paucity of affordable plots for the urban poor and also laxity in control and enforcement of regulations. Katchi abadis have become sources of environmental degradation, contamination of natural streams and deforestation (CDA, 2000, p, 8).

The nomination of slums has been explicitly made where the threat to the environment is further explained. The report states that the slums are sources of “environmental degradation, contamination of natural streams and deforestation”. In the same document, labels like katchi abadis*,* unauthorised, unplanned, informal, illegal are used interchangeably to represent slums. Despite the technical and academic differences among these terms, in the local language, they are all referred to as katchi abadis or *katchi basti* diluting the difference between formal and informal, legal and illegal. As seen above, “katchi abadis” are stated as the source of the threat to the environment showing that the matter is not merely of legality or planning but the very dwellings of the urban poor have been stigmatised as a threat.

One of the high-ranking CDA officials was asked during an interview about how he sees the existence of slums in the planned city of Islamabad. His response was not surprising as he

echoed the same tone and disgust for the slums and urban poor as we saw in the above quotations from the policy documents. He categorically remarked that:

> You can see how a slum looks like. It is an unhygienic place potentially very distasteful and full of disease. It will always be at the bank of *nullah* [open sewerage]. Slums are congested places (Ahsnam, high-ranking official, interview, 6 March 2019).

Drawing on colonial discourses of disease and contempt where natives were rendered uncivilised (Bhattacharya, 2012), the urban poor of Islamabad are also described as harbingers of "disease" and nuisance owing to their living conditions and the "unhygienic place" they inhabit. The discourses of nuisances are not criminalising urban poor but demoralising them and establishing them as uncivilised. Like diseases that need a cure by surgical procedures, the urban poor are also designated a similar status to justify intervention by the state authorities. Plugging in the discourses of civilisation and human values, the urban poor of Islamabad are represented through the categories of underdevelopment, i.e. uncivilised, chaotic, disordered, unhygienic, and backward (for details on categories of underdevelopment and development as a discourse, see chapter 4).

Another important aspect of socially constructed deviance is the use of metaphors of cleaning and clearing. A metaphor is a discursive strategy in which one thing is understood in terms of another, therefore, its use in discourse is politically charged and socially implicating (for details on metaphorisation as a discursive strategy, see 3.4 in chapter 3). Construction of the urban poor of Islamabad as dirty or filthy is not only conceived as a sense of threat to the environment but also as a problem and threat to social values and the norms of cleanliness, order, purity and sanitation. In both archival documents and interviews, the urban poor of Islamabad and slums are represented through the metaphors of cleaning and clearing. In an official report on the slums of Islamabad, the CDA celebrated its role as a body who removes and eradicate slums in the city owing to the threats posed by the poor settlements:

> A scheme was also prepared to upgrade a few selected slums through more efficient land use planning and more performance oriented design standards aimed at improved public sector recovery. But the project could never take off properly due to shortage of funds, non-availability of land, community

> and other resistance to the project. Recently CDA has been active again and has taken a series of initiatives in slum clearing but the main thrust of the programme has been on eviction and bulldozing (CDA, 2000, p. 10).

Both mid-ranking and high-ranking officials interviewed during the research also believe slums to be the ultimate source of impurity and nuisance in the city. When asked about the existence of slums and the development of Islamabad, slums are negatively portrayed and essentialised through the metaphors of cleaning and clearing:

> Slums, whether legal or illegal, look unclean to a person. Of course, the way they [urban poor] are living is a threat to the environment: so much uncleanliness, heaps of rubbish, and so many people living in congested neighbourhoods. No one knows who is living and who is not (Dihahs, mid-ranking official, interview, 6 March 2019).

Also:

> Professionally speaking, the basic criteria for planning is site selection and accountability. Both of these were not considered in the case of Farash town [a failed rehabilitation project that is still not completed since its inception in 2000]. They [CDA] were just in a hurry as they had to clean Islamabad (Ahsnam, high-ranking official, interview, 6 March 2019).

Slums in this regard are understood as undesired settlements that are to be cleared from the surface of Islamabad. The CDA assumes the role of cleaner and has taken the initiative of "slum clearing". It has made a series of efforts both in the past and the present because slums are, according to Dihahs, "unclean" as per the social standards of society. It has been objectified and naturalised that the slums, whether legal or illegal, are unclean for everyone. Further, making a normative claim about the cleanliness – metaphorically invoking uncleanliness and dirt – the urban poor are constructed as socially deviant persons because they do not see themselves as unclean. Discursively, cleanliness is constructed as a desired and normative objective that can only be achieved by slum clearing. Therefore, anyone who does not see slums as unclean is a socially deviant person posing a threat to the cleanliness of Islamabad.

To summarise the intended meanings of the cleanliness-related metaphors, another official summarised the discussion by labelling slums as *daagh* (spots/stains) on the otherwise reasonable [read clean] sector of Islamabad. One of the high-ranking officials from the environment directorate of the CDA responded to the existence of slums in the following words:

> Actually, this [having slums in Islamabad] is also a requirement. What is the requirement? This [having slums] is certainly wrong, right, in a way, there is a reasonable sector, and there is, you can say, a *daagh* [spot/stain], a slum [on it] but it is a necessity. It has some advantages and also some disadvantages. Advantages are: you get cheap labour (Loosar, high-ranking official, interview, 8 February 2019).

The meanings of spot/stain must be understood in the social context of Pakistan where *daagh* is normally understood as a stubborn spot or stain on clean clothes which are difficult to remove (for example, stains of oil, tea, coffee, cooked oily food, fruit juices, etc.). *Daagh* reflects the carelessness of people who then will be judged for their behaviour. This way, *daagh* is culturally unacceptable and is an embodiment of deviant behaviour. *Daagh* is also used to signify stains that are beyond repair. For example, it is not uncommon to use this word in the context of professional life and personal/family honour. Any act of professional misconduct (bribe, corruption, irresponsibility, etc.) or social misconduct (especially related to love affairs, sexual relationships, family honour etc.) is also referred to as a *daagh* (spot/stain) on an otherwise clean, socially upright, and morally sound member of society. In this sense, *daagh* is understood as irreparable damage and a spot on a person's character.

Using *daagh* as a metaphor to represent uncleanliness and irreparable damage to the cleanliness and social stature of the development of Islamabad signifies underlying political objectives in which the urban poor are constructed as a category of social deviance. When asked about the slums in Islamabad, Loosar responded that the slums are *daagh* on the face of Islamabad. All of the sectors without slums are labelled as a "reasonable sector" while indirectly providing us with the definition of unreasonable sectors. The only difference between reasonable and unreasonable development, therefore, is the existence of a *daagh* embodied through a "slum". In the above-mentioned quotation, both reasonability and *daagh* are "structures of presupposition" to evaluate the urban poor as dirt, damage, uncleanliness,

and a threat to the societal norms, social values and socio-political aspirations of development (Resende, 2009, p. 373). Using *daagh* and reasonable as opposed to each other reflects the cause and effect relationship in which the urban poor (represented as *daagh*) are causing damage to the clean, planned and socially desirable Islamabad (represented by reasonable sectors); therefore, implying a strict control and check on the urban poor of the city.

Similar referential strategies and labelling can be seen in the interviews where the urban poor of Islamabad are associated with the broader themes of drugs and danger. Drugs, in a society like Pakistan, are not only illegal but also a strong stigma in the cultural and religious sense. In everyday life, drug abusers (including alcohol consumers and smokers) are looked down upon and condemned by society at large. Normally, people would not discuss their habits of drug abuse outside their peer group or very close friends. Although it is common and everyone knows that there are many people abusing drugs the societal response is still very strong. A lexical connection has been established between slums and drugs by the officials of both higher and lower ranks. When asked about the issues Islamabad is facing because of slums, association of the urban poor with drugs and security threats dominated the narratives of the officials:

> It is a fact that such settlements would bring problems related to drugs and environmental degradation. I am not saying this, you can see this on your own, you can read about it in newspapers. It is obvious that such settlements would be having problems like this. As a matter of fact, unplanned settlements are expected to be the home of drugs and threats to the peace of the city, especially given the state of security in Pakistan. There has been a lot of street robberies, and many illegal persons [people who are believed to be criminal] residing in those congested neighbourhoods (Nahsor, high-ranking official, interview, 28 January 2019).

A low-ranking official who has never been to slums in either a personal or professional capacity establishes the connection between slums and drugs in the following words:

> There is a grave danger of robbery and theft because of the katchi abadis. People often complain about theft and robberies because of their neighbouring katchi abadis. It is true to a greater extent. I don't have any

> personal experience but when they are illegal…of course it is safe to do such illegal acts of drugs, and theft (Takuohs, low-ranking official, interview, 30 January 2019).

The association of slums and drugs is represented as a natural liaison by making it part of what Gramsci (1999, p. 433) has termed as "common sense" as shown in the quotations from the interviews of Nahsor and Takuohs. While describing the relationship of slums and drugs, phrases like "of course" and "as a matter of fact" were used by both low-ranking and high-ranking officials as if it is an established fact. In discourse, the presentation of fact is equal to naturalisation (Fairclough, 2010) as well as popularisation (Bhatia, 2015). During the interview, when Takuohs was asked in a follow-up question about the relationship of drugs, crime, and slums, he looked surprised as for him, it was an obvious and well-known fact.

In contrast to previous findings, the research fieldwork and interviews with slum dwellers show an entirely different picture. The researcher had been told that most of the people in slums are too poor to run a drug business although some do work for drug and alcohol suppliers. Many people and also an official stated that the larger portion of drug sellers and drug consumers lived in upper-class areas of Islamabad as they can afford to conduct such businesses both economically and socially. As discussed in chapter 6, people living in the higher-class or planned areas of Islamabad are usually seen as important by the CDA and Islamabad Capital Administration. The more affluent areas are safer than slums and people there can afford to use or abuse drugs. Despite that, all of the officials interviewed have talked about the connection between slums and drugs. So much so, except for one low-ranking official, all of the officials associated the urban poor with drugs.

Representing the urban poor as a threat and danger to society is another important aspect of the development discourses of the CDA. Katchi abadis of Islamabad are described as a threat to the peace and security of Islamabad by framing them within the broader discourses of terrorism in Pakistan.[9] Understanding of terrorism in Pakistan is largely associated with international terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda, ISIS, or *Tehreek-i-Taliban* (Taliban Movement). Taking this context into consideration, seeing the urban poor of Islamabad and

[9] For details on the terrorism, radicalisation and the Pakistani state and society, see Ahmed, Yousaf, & Zeb (2018), Ahmed (2016), Abbasi (2013), Nawaz (2016), Murphy (2013), and Gunaratna & Iqbal (2011).

their neighbourhoods as safe havens for the terrorists and source of terrorism depicts the mindset with which the officials approach the existence of slums in the city. For instance, one of the high-ranking officials asserts that:

> Given the environment these days [terrorism], they [slums] are safe havens for terrorists. They can do anything illegal and then enter in slums. All of them are the same [slum dwellers and terrorists]. Obviously, they [slums] are posing a threat [related to law and order] and source of refuse that would make the whole city look like rubbish (Dihahs, mid-ranking official, interview, 6 March 2019).

Similarly, the excerpt from Nahsor's interview reflects similar essentialisation where he grouped slums and terrorism together. This clearly marks the translation of international and national discourses to the urban context of Islamabad. Instead of naming any terrorist organisation or extremist group in Pakistan, the urban poor are foregrounded as a threat to the peace of the city while backgrounding "the state of security in Pakistan" by Nahsor. These narratives of threat, security and the state of war are usually used by the Pakistani military and civilian establishment to describe their arch-enemies like India, Israel, and Terrorism with whom they are in a constant state of war in one way or another. Using similar framing strategies for the urban poor of Islamabad not only shows the insensitivity towards their plight but also the way in which the life of the urban poor is sensitised and essentialised. Similarly, the threat of them being robbers and drug abusers is further elevated to the level of "terrorism" by casualisation of the term by Dihahs in his interview. It is essential to see that a causal relationship has been established between the urban poor and terrorism by predicting the evolution of the slum and slum dwellers from a source of environmental pollution to becoming a safe haven of terrorism.

Despite the differences (legal, social, religious and economic) among the slums and slum dwellers of Islamabad, all of them are referred to as "katchi abadis" blurring the diversity and making them a uniform object of policy. Further, the use of pronouns like 'it' and 'their' mask the differences and diversity to create a convenient image of social deviance. This homogenisation of the urban poor of Islamabad in the official discourses creates a single socio-economic group while eradicating diversities of all sorts. As Ziai (2013) mentions, homogenisation is an important aspect of development discourse where all of the diversities

are reduced to categories of underdevelopment. The development discourses of the CDA also create a category of underdevelopment in which the urban poor of Islamabad are constructed as socially deviant by representing them as the antithesis of normative discourses of environment, law and order, security, civilisation, and peace.

In the above-mentioned quotations, one can also see that the construction of deviance is achieved through specific categories where both officials and citizenry can be engaged to control, surveil, and regulate the geographies of contempt. In Pakistan, almost every person holds an opinion on dirt, danger, and drugs. Similarly, these categories are also present under the purview of the law of land. The categories with which the urban poor are associated fall in the domain of both state and society. In this way, surveillance of the one social group (urban poor) is not only expected to be done by law enforcement agencies and public prosecutors but by every fellow citizen. The stigma that has been attached to the urban poor would then be reinforced by fellow citizens during their interaction with the different socio-economic groups in the city. This, it is argued, is not an unintended outcome of the discursive strategies; rather, it is exactly what the "city managers" and "citizens" are emotionally appealed to do while describing the "urgent challenge" to Islamabad (CDA, 2000, p. 7).

Following the principles of economic hierarchies in the master planning of Islamabad (see chapter 5), officials and state institutions are producing, reproducing, and naturalising the social hierarchies in the urban spaces of Islamabad. By constructing the urban poor of Islamabad as a deviant social group they are presented as an inferior social group posing a threat to the overall aesthetic, social, economic, and political order of the society. In the development discourses, the urban poor stand opposite to the rest of the society, which is depicted as socially and morally superior and the custodian of social values, law and order, and progress of the city.

7.2 Discursive Constructions of 'Us' and 'Them': Structuring the Relationships of Inclusion and Exclusion

Constructing categories of 'us' and 'them' in a discourse is an attempt to structure the relationship of inclusion and exclusion, in-group and out-group, of self and others to reproduce the social hegemonies and hierarchies. The categories of 'us' and 'them' are part of discursive

strategies through which one can identify the power patterns and social categorisations that have specific impacts for actions (for a detailed discussion, see 3.4 in chapter 3). Their true purpose is to create recognisable objects of the policies. Therefore, discursively, the construction of 'us' and 'them' "categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes individual subjects" (Foucault, 1982, p. 781). The sole purpose of such discursive formations is to have a means of "correct training" of the individuals (Foucault, 1977, p. 170).

Before beginning with the discourse analysis, it is important to highlight the generic understanding of 'us' and 'them' in the discourse of the CDA. While stating the reasons for the evolution of slums in Islamabad, one of the CDA high-ranking officials categorises the inhabitants of Islamabad in the following words:

> Since it is a capital city, here [in Islamabad], bureaucrats and big businessmen and others are living [here] and they need services. Now, who is running a business also needs low-grade employees. Now, this is an expensive city as well. Accommodation here is unaffordable for a common man. This becomes a reason for the development of slums (Loosar, high-ranking official, interview, 8 February 2019).

Loosar's interview identifies two discursively homogenous social groups. Bureaucrats and businessmen are the broader categories that are described as the opposite of the "common man". In this way, we can safely assume that people in Islamabad are normalised as either common man or uncommon man. Despite the glaring differences and the heterogeneity among the broader categories, slum dwellers and non-slum dwellers are constructed as opposite camps where unaffordability for the "common man" is described as the sole reason for the evolution of slums in Islamabad. A common man has been lexically connected to the slums while "bureaucrats" and "businessmen" are given an entitled position of living in Islamabad. For both of them, Islamabad is claimed as a common ground – a discursive strategy (Wirth-Koliba, 2016) – aiming at reifying interpersonal relationship as well as the opposition between the 'us' and 'them'.

Further, categorising different socio-economic groups is an attempt to normalise the differences. While creating different in-groups and out-groups, the specific forms of representation and discursive strategies are employed to naturalise the normative assertions as well as the socially constructed symbolic order:

> They [slum dwellers] are illegal and we [CDA] cannot allow them to invade the public space. They are not victims at all…Whenever we remove them, they start protesting against us. They would start a strike. It is not acceptable, yet they continue to live in Islamabad almost for free. They don't have to pay for anything. On the other hand, I have a very low salary scale but I have to pay a lot in terms of my rent. So much so, I cannot afford to bring my family with me here in Islamabad. But they are living with their families. They construct their homes (Nid, low-ranking official, interview, 7 February 2019).

The urban poor are referred to as "they" who are characterised as the people who "invade" and are "illegal". The statement of Nid is a declarative statement in the present tense with assertion, authority and completion as discursive objectives achieved. Fairclough (2001, p. 259) classifies such statements as "reader-directive" because they represent authority, completion, and less changeability. Using the present tense and invoking legality as a normative frame, the statement is made synonymous with an irrefutable fact. Further, using "they" multiple times shows the pronominalisation of the urban poor to represent them as a broad, fixed, and homogenous category of invaders. In addition, a normative assertion is presented that made "they" as "not acceptable" to live in Islamabad "for free". While making the normative claims, "it", a dummy subject, is used as an impersonal pronoun therefore reducing the urban poor to an unacceptable phenomenon.

The urban poor are categorised as an out-group, i.e. excluded because of the normative claims and the frames of legality that are employed by Nid. However, without directly referring to the subject(s) for whom they are not acceptable, an in-group is constructed as opposed to the urban poor. For example, the urban poor are not acceptable because they are living in Islamabad "almost for free". This, however, is not true. Nid himself is low-ranking official and he mentioned in his interview that he has been paying his rent, i.e. he is not living for free in Islamabad. So is the case with all the slum dwellers interviewed during the research. Contrary to the urban poor, all those who pay or at least are not living for free in Islamabad,

constitute another category of ‘us’ for Nid. It is this category to which the phrase “it is not acceptable” is directed, implying the moral responsibility to find and implement the solution. In this way “we” in the excerpt is used as an inclusive personal pronoun. “We” and “they” are the two camps constructed by an official who, by using “we”, claims the representation of all those who pay to live in Islamabad.

While describing who constitutes an out-group and how they remained the Other of Islamabad since the inception of the city, a high-ranking CDA official remarks:

> As far as katchi abadis are concerned, as I have mentioned earlier, that it was a weakness in MP [master plan] that we did not construct low-cadre colonies. The cleaners, sweepers, *naib-qasid* [most junior clerk], and security guard level people who work in Islamabad have no colony. In your MP you cannot say that this colony is for low-cadre employees. You will find some colony and residential accommodation for officers and also of some other staff. Private housing is, obviously, for big level [referring to higher classes] (Nazmar, high-ranking official, interview, 8 March 2019).

Similar discursive strategies have been adopted by high-ranking officials in which a description is made about who constitutes the out-group. We can see that Nazmar constructed the category “we” including everyone who is not “low-cadre”. Low-cadre in Pakistan is the term for the low-ranking officials of the state institutions. Here, accumulation of capital (social, political, or economic) appears to be the bar with which distinction is made between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The low-cadre group, according to Nazmar, comprises of “cleaners, sweepers, and security guard level people” who work in Islamabad. Unlike low-cadre, the notion “security guard level people” operates culturally and socially beyond the domain of public employment. This notion, derogatory in some cases, invokes the broader classification of people in the society of Pakistan where different social, economic and political levels are constructed based on the access and/or accumulation of respective forms of capital. “Security guard level people” is a homogenising phrase that refers to all of the poor, menial jobholders, and poorly educated people. Therefore, all such classes are not part of “we” and they have not been catered for during the construction and development of Islamabad. Like Nid, Nazmar also places himself with high-cadre officials and those who are higher than “security guard level people”.

Another important aspect of the discourse of the CDA is the use of linguistic contrasts to mark inclusion and exclusion. These markers of inclusion and exclusion are embodied through positive self-representation versus negative presentation of the other. One of the high-ranking officials of the CDA categorises 'us' and 'them' through linguistic contrasts in the following words:

> The CDA deals with the regularised katchi abadis only. We don't deal with all of them. What we did actually is that we paved the streets for those [katchi] abadis and provided them with common water taps. We also issue NOC [No Objection Certificate] so that they can get electricity connections. Although the streets are narrow there, they [slum dwellers] have houses made up of brick and cement. That means people living there are not really poor. They just pretend to be poor so that they can get sympathy. It is complicated (Rafaz, high-ranking official, interview, 27 February 2019).

Rafaz, in the above-mentioned excerpt, represented the us-group by the personal pronoun "we". We, the officials and the CDA are positively represented against the negatively represented excluded group – the urban poor – by the impersonal pronoun "they". The dichotomy that is established and reproduced in the present tense here is an attempt to normalise the compartmentalisation and categorisation in which "they" are projected as liars and cheaters. The inclusive group, "we", represents the development authority who have performed their duties of paving the "streets for those settlements" and providing "them with common water taps", therefore, it must be morally upright and honest. In the description of "they" normative bars are established by the authority through which ideal livelihood conditions – "houses made up of brick and cement" – are represented as the ultimate goal based on which moral calls are to be made. Since they live in houses made up of bricks and cement, therefore, they cannot be considered as poor. They are essentialised as the ones who pretend; they are not victims, but play the victim. The statement placed emphasis on "they" and the way "they" are living in Islamabad; the categories of 'us' and 'them' are serving as markers of moral values and difference. Therefore, the urban poor are designated as morally inferior as compared with the officials of the authority.

This normative construction of the us-group and them-group is further emphasised by another low-ranking official who described "they" as people who "occupy land" and labelled them a "mafia":

> Slums are, no doubt, a very serious problem in Islamabad. They occupy land worth billions of rupees. What the CDA does is to issue notices to the residents of those settlements for their removal. This is the best way of dealing with them. If there is an encroachment, it should be removed. Right? So, the CDA removes and bulldozes those settlements to solve the issue. But, they [slums and slum dwellers] always re-emerge in other parts of the city. It is working like a mafia supported by politicians…this mafia is operating in Islamabad without any hindrance. No one is there to question them. This is not true with us as we are poor but employees of the CDA, so we are easily answerable (Lida, low-ranking official, interview, 30 January 2019).

Since the urban poor are excluded as a morally corrupt and deviant social group in Islamabad, the in-group is presented as exactly opposite to them. Without describing the qualities or positive representation of self, Lida constructed morality, legality and the qualifications of inclusion by criminalising the Other of Islamabad. By remarking "this is not true with us", Lida categories everyone who is not occupying land or not working as mafia as an ideal, morally upright and legally justified in-group. By using "mafia" in lexical connection to the urban poor, Lida employed another important discursive strategy called proximation to threaten "them" on the discourse stage. Here, proximation also shows the difference and distance between "us" and "them" because "us" are constructed as custodians of truth, law and morality whereas "them" are presented as a general category "mafia". The kind of use of the monologic terms (they, them, and us) employed by the speaker are generalisations used as distance markers among different socio-economic groups.

Further, the categories of 'us' and 'them', in-group and out-group, and desirable and undesirable are reproduced by naturalising the divisions in terms of priority and importance. In response to the question about the living conditions of sanitation workers in the slums of Islamabad, Idhem (a mid-ranking official of the MCI) framed the issue by plugging in the discourses of the cast system in which hierarchies are produced, reproduced and justified by the cultural experiences and centuries-old social practices in Hindu and Sanskrit cultures:

> MCI [Metropolitan Corporation of Islamabad] is having all the workers of the sanitation department previously employed by the CDA. It is just a change of name and no additional funds. For that matter, for us, sanitation workers are *achoot* [untouchables]. We are not concerned about them. We have a lot of other things to do and better things to do (Idhem, mid-ranking official, interview, 5 March 2019).

Drawing on such a long history is an attempt to reify the cultural norms and reproduce symbolic order to justify the position of privilege and power. Sanitation workers, since they are living in slums, are regarded as "*achoot* [untouchables]". Discourses of untouchability and outcast largely draw on the discourses of power to regulate the dissent, differences, deviance, and social symbolic order favouring the relationship of power (Pollock, 1990; Guru, 2009). In the cultural context of Pakistan and India, *achoot* also refers to immoral, impure, and dirty bodies that must be condemned and socially discouraged as they are contagious. Since most of the slums in Islamabad are not recognised by the CDA, the waste management department does not collect refuse from those neighbourhoods. Rubbish heaps, poor sanitary conditions, and accumulation of dirt in those neighbourhoods are primarily because of the poor city administration. This, however, is not mentioned in any of the interviews except the one with a low-ranking sanitary worker. Despite that, their association with dirt and the physical spaces they inhabit is presented as their identity marker – untouchables. Because of their *achoot* status, it has been made clear that "we" – the inclusive group – is "not concerned for them". Dealing with them or planning for them is not even part of "other things" let alone "better things" in terms of the development of Islamabad as enunciated by Idhem.

Implying undesirability and contempt, the stereotypical evaluation of the urban poor is monologic across the different ranks in the CDA. While responding to the question about alternative housing options for the urban poor, Idirfa responded with an unshaken belief about the character and essence of the urban poor:

> At the age of 53, I have seen countless people who used to sell milk on bicycles now come in Pajero [SUV/Jeep from Corolla]. They move from one katchi abadi to another katchi abadi. They received money [by selling the] plot of one katchi abadi. Everything they got [in terms of money] and they

> bought a car, Pajero, for the sake of fashion and show off, but next, I am talking about Golra [a village inside the administrative region of Islamabad], what they did is that they move to another katchi abadi. I am not exaggerating, I still know many of those people. They say, "we can adjust only in katchi abadi". And, whatever amount they got at that time [during relocation or appropriation process], they could easily buy a house of 5-7 marla in I-10, that is clean area. But, they got that amount, they did get up and move further to [another] katchi abadis (Idirfa, low-ranking official, interview, 12 March 2019).

Like Idhem, Idirfa also essentialises the urban poor as an out-group and the Other of Islamabad. "They will" move to another slum, as "those people can only adjust" in slums. Use of the modal verbs "can" and "will" signifies the conviction of the speaker and the judgement calls s/he is making about the other groups. In addition, the living conditions of the urban poor, their settlements, and their housing are constructed as a matter of choice instead of circumstances. They are naturalised and categorised as people who can only live in slums. In this way, the use of "will" and "can adjust only there" naturalises the conditions of the urban poor as permanent and a matter of choice. That is, they are not temporarily living in slums as they seek to live in slums; they belong to slums as they can "adjust only there".

Another important distance and difference marker that has been naturalised in the discourses vis-à-vis the urban poor of Islamabad is related to socio-material circumstances. In this case, 'us' and 'them' are understood by the physical surroundings and material allocation of the resources to different neighbourhoods. Takuoahs, a low-ranking official of the CDA who has been in service for more than 30 years at the time of the interview, describe the socio-spatial difference in Islamabad in the following words:

> Why are you asking us? Isn't it obvious when you see Islamabad? It is clear if you see and move around the city. Rich people are having better facilities like hospitals, schools in their closer vicinity. Better facilities are not about the roads or educational institutes. Of course, anyone can use the roads, anyone can go to any public educational institutions or hospitals. It is more about the centre [market place] in those rich neighbourhoods and in poor

> neighbourhoods (Takuoahs, low-ranking official, interview, 30 January 2019).

According to Takuoahs, the difference between "our" and "their" are constituted based on the materiality that reinforces and represents the socially constructed realities. In a way, both social and physical constitute each other to realise the symbolic and material ordering of social practices. Takhuoahs is representing his world and belonging and presenting the belonging of others in the same city:

> They [rich neighbourhoods] are entirely different than ours. So much so, a rich man would not be coming to our centre, never. But in their centre, you will find officer-level facilities, that is, everything you need. On the other hand, we are being ignored. They [CDA] don't give us much attention (Takuoahs, low-ranking official, interview, 30 January 2019).

The neighbourhoods of the rich are "entirely different than ours", and the difference is not social but material as "their centre" have "officer-level facilities". Use of the word "entirely" reflects the emphasis and the intensification of the arguments made in the statement. This also reflects the surety and completion of an act of judgement based on the personal experiences of the speaker. "Theirs" and "ours" are possessive pronouns in this statement reflecting determiners of belonging and possession. It represents the two socio-material worlds inhabited by two different socio-economic groups. "Officer-level facilities" that are available in "their centre" is a socio-cultural way of referring to high quality, better, and modern facilities that are exclusive, expensive and beyond the reach of poor. The difference between both neighbourhoods is emphasised by the adverb "entirely". The material difference paved the way for discursive reproduction of the mental borders that exists among 'us' and 'them' as the rich would "never ever" visit the geographies of the urban poor. Here, control of the social interaction and social mixing is a result of deliberate discrimination that has been ensured by providing different facilities to different socio-economic groups in Islamabad.

Another important aspect of the discourse of classification, which is articulated through collective identities, is the reproduction of the qualifications of 'us' and 'them' through the global discourse of development itself. Like international development (see, among others, Ziai, 2013; and chapter 4) development in the case of Islamabad is projected, understood, and

conceptualised as an antithesis of underdevelopment. In a report on the upgradation and rehabilitation of the slums of Islamabad, funded by UNDP, the problem of having slums in the city is described in the following words in the executive summary of the document:

> Katchi abadis have become a continuous source of environmental degradation, contamination of natural streams and deforestation. A majority of the dwellers of the abadis are Sanitary Workers or are doing other menial jobs in the private sector. While they [slum dwellers] are themselves living in miserable conditions without basic facilities, they are also a source of discomfort for the residents of the surrounding areas (CDA, 2000, p. V).

In the development discourses of the CDA, development is embodied and represented through 'us' that stands opposite to 'them' presented as underdevelopment or the areas where intervention is necessary. In the above quotation, "they" are represented as geographies of contempt and misery – categories of the global discourse of underdevelopment – without any "basic facilities". Not only are "they" living such a life, but they are also a "source of discomfort for the residents of the surrounding areas", i.e. a threat to the comfort of planned neighbourhoods – categories through which development is conceptualised. Despite the difference between illegal and legal slums in Islamabad, the pronoun "they" is used to create a homogenised category of underdevelopment in Islamabad that has threatened development. Using emotional and subjective terms, "miserable" and "discomfort", categories of underdevelopment are described to create a convenient image of development in the minds of the readers. "They" are underdeveloped as compared to the residents that constitute the other category, i.e. developed. To intensify the difference, distance markers are also employed in the statement where slum dwellers are referred to with the impersonal pronoun "they" who apparently are not eligible to be called "residents" – a label used for those who live outside the slums.

Representation of slums and the urban poor as the antithesis of development is further elaborated in the same report by reifying the differences and differentiations between the in-group and out-group:

> This low-income population is mostly engaged in unskilled jobs, labor, domestic help and menial jobs to get shelter on nominal charges. In the

> absence of low-income housing for such a non-planned section of [the] population, they squat on the government owned marginal lands or the lands which are designated for planned uses and are still unutilised. These squatters on katchi abadis with the passage of time proliferate to become sizeable communities [*sic*] (CDA, 2000, p. 8).

In the above quotation, similar notions and discursive strategies have been employed by borrowing them from the global discourse of development. Non-planned, squat, and proliferation are used to represent the urban poor and slums of Islamabad. Because of the "non-planned section of [the] population", lands for "planned uses" are "unutilised". Non-planning is designated as an evil and a synonym of disorder in the development discourses that should be addressed via scientific planning to ensure and realise order and progress. The urban poor and slums are framed as the antithesis of development, therefore, a threat to the development of Islamabad. Another important aspect is that underdevelopment is described as a phenomenon that is proliferating. Slums are described by using the verb "proliferate" that represents speed and a rapid mechanism of growth and spread. Metaphorically, in social sciences, proliferation is normally used to describe threats on a global scale, like nuclear proliferation or pandemic proliferation. Here proliferation is used to describe the growth of underdevelopment which is posing a threat to development i.e. "planned uses" of the land.

In international development discourse, underdevelopment is presented as a threat to development, i.e. the relationship is of hostility, conflict, and a continuous war that should be fought in every possible manner (material and/or discursive). Like development and underdevelopment, both 'us' and 'them' in Islamabad are mutually exclusive but simultaneously identify themselves in comparison to each other. Without one, the other cannot exist. They do interact and their interaction is very instrumental. Despite the discursive contempt and the physical segregation of the urban poor they are needed for both material and discursive needs of the development of the city:

> Rich people live in F6 sector and for the poor there are slums. It is obvious that they [poor] are needed too for the cleaning of the houses…We have different classes living in the different parts of the city making the whole city very exclusionary and segregated. This is linked to the planning but not entirely to the master plan [of Islamabad]. I think because of the shortage of

> housing, expensive housing, and the absence of affordable housing in Islamabad is one of the prime reasons for the growth of katchi abadis. It is because of the illegal housing schemes like abadis that we have katchi abadis today in Islamabad. (Ahsnam, high-ranking official, interview, 6 March 2019).

As mentioned by Ahsnam, the urban poor are needed for the "cleaning" of houses – houses that represent development, planning, and order. Similarly, "they" are "needed" for the residents who are the morally upright and planned section of the population. The urban poor in Islamabad is constructed as a socially deviant group embodying the Other of the development discourses of the CDA. Despite the lack of affordable housing in Islamabad and other reasons Ahsnam mentioned, he also stated that the illegal and poorly planned neighbourhoods of urban poor were a reason for the growth of slums in the city. In the above quotation, Ahsnam contrasted the planning of Islamabad and the lack of planning in the city embodied through F6 sector and slums respectively. In this way, the urban poor are needed for both the material needs of the city, i.e. "cleaning of the houses" as well as the discursive needs to visualise and construct both development and underdevelopment. Like development that creates its categories of underdevelopment on a global scale, the planning and development of Islamabad create and feed on its localised categories of underdevelopment represented through slums and the urban poor of the city.

It should be noted that the categorisation is not homogenous in the case of the officials but that the same officials construct homogenised categories when they are talking about the urban poor. For instance, look at the following two quotations from the same interview with Takuoahs:

> There is a grave danger of robbery and theft because of the katchi abadis. People often complain about theft and robberies because of their neighbouring katchi abadis. It is true to a greater extent. I don't have any personal experience but when they are illegal…off course it is safe to do such illegal acts of drugs, and theft (Takuohs, low-ranking official, interview, 30 January 2019).

And:

> Rich people are having better facilities like hospitals, schools in their closer vicinity. Better facilities are not about the roads or educational institutes. Of course, anyone can use the roads, anyone can go to any public educational institution or hospital. It is more about the centre [market place] in those rich neighbourhoods and in poor neighbourhoods (Takuoahs, low-ranking official, interview, 30 January 2019).

In the first quotation, Takuohs identifies himself as part of "we" – morally upright and better – when constructing the urban poor as a socially deviant group. There, he is not associating himself with the urban poor of Islamabad but with the position of power and privilege derived from being an official of the CDA. When talking about facilities and discrimination by the socio-political structures beyond his domain, Takuohs tends to become part of those who are discriminated and neglected by the state institutions. For Takuohs, in his second statement, both 'us' and 'them' are a part of the CDA, which is a larger in-group vis-à-vis out-group comprised of the urban poor as shown in the first statement of Takuohs.

A similar case occurs with Dihahs, a mid-ranking official. Dihahs is constructing the urban poor as an out-group while essentialising them as a source of terror and threat:

> Given the environment these days [terrorism], they [slums] are safe havens for terrorists. They can do anything illegal and then enter in slums. All of them are the same [slum dwellers and terrorists]. Obviously, they [slums] are posing a threat [related to law and order] and source of refuse that would make the whole city look like rubbish (Dihahs, mid-ranking official, interview, 6 March 2019).

In the above quotation, Dihahs is constructing urban poor as an out-group and essentialises them as an embodiment of social deviance. However, in another statement, while describing the illegal development of gated communities and housing societies, Dihahs represented himself as a member of the out-group who has been controlled and disciplined by higher socio-economic groups:

> Whoever can use his sources [money or likewise], he does so. It is obvious. For example, 99% of the housing societies don't have their LOP [layout plan] approved by the Capital Development Authority, but they are still there, working, and developing. A person like myself cannot do anything about such people [powerful and resourceful people]. My officers or the people at the same level [social and/or economic] are the ones who construct and live in those societies (Dihahs, mid-ranking official, interview, 6 March 2019).

Despite his mentioning of "illegality" as a frame to present "housing societies" constructed and/or inhabited by officers and rich people, Dihahs did not criminalise this socio-economic group the way he did with the urban poor. Comparison of statements by Takuosh and Dihahs show that the discourses of discrimination, criminalisation and development are understood and practised differently for the different socio-economic groups in Islamabad. Despite the internal divisions and non-monolithic discourses, the dominant discourse serves those who hold power in the larger discursive spaces – social and/or material. As far as the urban poor are concerned, it can be seen that the discourses about them are monolithic, dominant, naturalised and individualised. They are produced, reproduced and shared by all the discourse producers of the authority. This discourse is present both in its material as well as non-material aspects and it is internalised by the actors as shown by the repetition across the discourse stage. This organisational discourse then guides bureaucracies at all levels in the CDA to approach the city from different standpoints and for different purposes.

7.3 Dirt, Danger, and Threat: Urban Poor and the Construction of Social Deviance in Brasilia

Despite the difference between cultural, political, and social institutions and historical legacy, it is astonishing how the urban poor in Islamabad and Brasilia are subject to similar vocabulary, concepts, strategies, and outcomes. Brasilia, where, for example, alcohol consumption is not as strong a social stigma as in Islamabad, nevertheless shares similar categories of social stigmatisation. Due to substantial differences in infrastructure and funds at the disposal of municipal offices and individuals' training in urban development and planning, Brasilia's spatial and social outlook reflects some stark differences. For example, the general standard of living, average income, the standard of living and access to

fundamental services like health and education are a lot better as compared to Pakistan. Nevertheless, aspirations of capitalist development, mobility, growth, and the rationality of planning to attract resources (financial or otherwise) generate some striking similarities – the life of urban poor being one of them.

Like Islamabad, the urban poor and slums of Brasilia are constructed as spaces of social deviance that stand in opposition to the rest of the society. The urban poor of Brasilia, like that of Islamabad, are presented as an objectionable, disvalued, threatening, and annoying social group of society in the discursive landscape of urban planning, development, and governance since the inception of the city. The purpose of the social constructions, especially related to social deviance, are primarily related to the control and regulation of society while camouflaging power relations and socio-material inequalities. This part of the chapter shows that the urban poor of Brasilia and their neighbourhoods are represented through topoi of social deviance. The use of topoi and the discursive construction of the urban poor as socially deviant is reflective of socio-economic inequalities that are reproduced by attributing different social values to labelled categories (for theoretical discussion on social deviance, labelling, and discursive construction, see chapter 2 and chapter 3).

The urban poor of Brasilia are criminalised by lexically connecting them to the categories of social deviance, i.e. dirt, danger, and environmental threat. Labelling them as invaders, invasions, encroachments, favelados, slums, informal, and illegal (key pillars of social deviance) is an attempt to construct them as Others of Brasilia. This othering of the urban poor is further reinforced with the help of various "linguistic strategies" employed by state institutions to implement the desired meanings and interpretation (Toft, 2014, p. 785). Linguistic strategies, among various other strategies, are a part of "multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play" and are reflective of the power patterns (Foucault, 1978, p. 100). In the case of state institutions, the discourses leave less room for contingent discourses, and therefore, assume a dominant position and are reflective of the hegemony of discourse communities. Policy documents and interviews with officials are discussed below (for details on data collection, see chapter 3 – 3.6.1 for archival documents, 3.6.2 for interviews and sampling, and 3.6.3 for ethnography) to provide an understanding of the position of the urban poor in the planned city of Brasilia.

The urban poor of Brasilia are constructed as a socially deviant group with the help of various labels and discursive strategies. How the urban poor are labelled, explained, and positioned determine the plausibility of their contextualisation as social deviance and a threat to society. Such construction of problems is an attempt to reify the existing socio-economic hierarchies as well as to stabilise the dominant discourses put forth by state institutions and officials. For instance, the urban poor of Brasilia have been referred to as a threat to the natural environment of Brasilia by one of the high-ranking officials of the federal district administration of Brasilia:

> Right at the beginning that was the village [referring to Varjão], they [authorities] did not want it to expand anymore, right? The North Lake [high-income settlement *Lago Norte*] did not want the village to go forward [grow and expand]. I did not even want the village to exist, to continue as it is. That's what Jean [her colleague] said. It was built, there were springs that were destroyed to build houses. So, that's what they [authorities] were thinking about. Since there were streams, if it [village] was allowed [to exist], the streams would have been closed. The villagers would have already taken it all. Jean was recently there, but there was an invasion that was demolished. That [invasion] was practically inside the stream. They were already making the sheds inside it and it was demolished (Eneliram, high-ranking official, interview, 5 October 2018).

Similarly, another mid-ranking official from the territorial management department of the administration labelled the urban poor as occupiers and a threat to the environment:

> Yeah, but sometimes it is more difficult to legalise the lower-income settlements, the slums, because they occupy some difficult places in our territory with some difficult topography. For example, really close to water sources that cannot be legalised. So, we have to make some transfers. They occupy here and we have to transfer [them] to other places, this is called environmental licensing. Sometimes it is more difficult because the areas are really sensible [read sensitive], in terms of environment sensibility (Onailluig, mid-ranking official, interview, 21 September 2018).

The presentation of the urban poor and their settlements as an environmental concern for Brasilia is based on the predication strategy employed by the discourse producers where stereotypical images of the urban poor are reproduced. The whole argument, as in the case of Islamabad, is presented in the indefinite tense that implies naturalisation of the facts. It is interesting to note that both officials have never been associated with the environmental wing of the administrative machinery. When asked, neither had seen any springs in the areas nor could quote any concrete example of the environmental damage they are both suggesting. Another important aspect is that the urban poor as a source of environmental damage has been constructed as a phenomenon that was historically present and will continue to exist in the future. “The villagers would have already taken it all” by Eneliram implies that if the urban poor had not been controlled they would have destroyed everything. Similarly, “they occupy”, the present indefinite tense, essentialises the urban poor as occupiers of an environmentally sensitive area, therefore causing environmental degradation. This framing of the urban poor as a threat to the environment is not new, in fact, this has dominated the development discourse since the 18th century (Gray & Moseley, 2005).

Further, establishing the cause-effect relationship of the urban poor and an environmental threat is not confined to spatial aspects of Brasilia. The urban poor of Brasilia have been presented as a socially deviant group in this regard as they do not have a positive attitude towards the environment or environmental sustainability. For instance, one of the recent interventions in the slums of Brasilia holds environmental education as one of the six objectives of the programme:

> [The purpose of the operation] is to promote changes in attitude towards the *ambiental* [environment], heritage, and *vida saudável* [healthy living] strengthening the critical perception of the population about the aspects that influence their quality of life along with reflection on socio-political factors. Keeping into consideration cultural and economic factors, this intervention aims to achieve environmental and social sustainability (CODHAB/DF, 2017, p. 15).

The objective states that the urban poor should be educated so that their “attitude towards *ambiental* [environment], heritage, and *vida saudável* [healthy living]” can be changed to “achieve environmental and social sustainability” (CODHAB/DF, 2017, p. 15). The urban

poor of Brasilia are constructed as a socially deviant group by stating their attitude towards the environment and healthy living to be undesirable. In all of the documents and interviews there is no mention of the desirable changes or values that need to be instilled in the urban poor. Unlike other members of society, the urban poor of Brasilia are designated as insensitive and uncivilised vis-à-vis healthy living and the environment. Interventions such as these are reifying and reproducing the stigmatisations that we see in the words of Eneliram and Onailluig. Aligned with the meta-frames and global development discourses of environment sustainability, the urban poor are presented as a threat to the environment, i.e. problematising them both socially and legally in the eyes of both society and state with the help of what Resende (2009, p. 373) calls "structures of presupposition".

Similarly to Islamabad, the urban poor of Brasilia are constructed as exhibiting socially deviant behaviour with the help of metaphors of cleaning and clearing. While responding to the question about dealing with slums, one of the high-ranking officials of the AGEFIS (the agency that was responsible to fight against illegal land use, now DF-Legal) states:

> We have dozens, hundreds of *operações de desobstrução* [clearance operations] now in DF [Brasilia Federal District]. In all administrative regions, AGEFIS monitors the entire territory. We have established criteria for clearing the public lands and the issue of repossession [of land]. AGEFIS is more active when the area is public. The repossession process is coordinated with TERRACAP when the area belongs to TERRACAP. In particular areas, we go only accompanying the military police because the repossession is done by the police (Aiduálc, high-ranking official, interview, 26 September 2018).

The institutional mandate of AGEFIS is to monitor Brasilia so that all kinds of informal housing or construction can be stopped. Their purpose, according to Ana Aiduálc, is "clearing the public lands" from all kinds of unauthorised housing. Metaphors of clearing and cleaning have been used concerning the neighbourhoods of the urban poor implying their deviant character and not-normal housing. It is stated that the solution for slums and informal housing of any kind is "*operações de desobstrução* [clearance operations]". It is important to note that the implications for such metaphors are both material and social.

The act of cleaning as a moral activity and a highly valued social norm becomes a responsibility so that anything contrary to "clean" should be reduced to "zero":

> Brasilia has one of the lowest informality rates [formation of slums or informal housing] in the whole country, comparing to other metropolitans. Most of the metropolitans have those rates above 40–45% of the whole land occupied. In Brasilia…we have now like 33%. We have like more perhaps more four or five regularisation processes that are coming and its [informality rate] going down to 27–28%, we hope…So in four, being very sceptical in five years, with a responsible and coherent mandate, you can almost clean the field, almost making the irregularity probably close to zero (Ogaiht, high-ranking official, territorial management department, interview, 24 August 2019).

Along with many others, both Ogaiht and Ana Aiduálc use the metaphor of cleaning to construct social values and shared beliefs that would serve as a normative bar to determine social deviance. Since state authorities intend to clear and clean the lands of Brasilia, therefore, their role and their stance must be socially desirable. At the same time, this social desirability and moral superiority are enhanced by indirectly constructing an opposite camp, i.e. those who bring uncleanliness, mess, dirt, and irregularity to the city – the urban poor. As uncleanliness, mess, and irregularity are against the social norms, therefore, they must be condemned and cleared from the surface. Employing morally charged metaphors and naturalising the descriptions, the urban poor are constructed as a threat to social norms and social values. The problematising of the urban poor in this manner legitimises and justifies interventions like "hundreds of *operações de desobstrução*" as narrated by Ana Aiduálc.

Another important aspect of the construction of social deviance is the association of the urban poor of Brasilia with refuse and rubbish. The metaphor of cleaning, rubbish, is used to present the urban poor as a socially deviant group causing uncleanliness in Brasilia:

> Nowadays, with the regulations [empowering regional administrations], at least here we could do a lot. Because Varjão's problem is refuse. If you pay attention there, [you will find] a person throwing rubbish on the street because he knows that at some time or another someone will pick it up; and

> constructions [of homes/shacks] on the streets because it is a custom now (Noskcaj, mid-ranking official, interview, 5 October 2018).

Varjão is a slum turned regional administration in the federal district of Brasilia. Despite its legal and administrative status as regional administration, Noskcaj, an official of Varjão's administration, quoted the settlement as an example of a slum in Brasilia. Noskcaj problematises and essentialises the whole settlement of the urban poor as a source of rubbish and uncleanliness. Noskcaj presents the problem not as a subjective opinion but as a fact by using the present indefinite tense. The problem of Varjão, according to Noskcaj is "refuse" because people here "throwing rubbish on the street". Phrases like "If you pay attention" and "person throwing rubbish" are discursive markers of scientific discourse because they are claiming facts, objectivity, examples, and reasons that are actually knowledge claims established through discourses. Further, in the words of Fairclough (2013, p. 191), "circumstantial premise" is established by Noskcaj to represent and problematise "the context of action", therefore, legitimising and justifying the solutions that have been proposed by the discursive community, i.e. refuse and sources of rubbish must be cleaned and cleared.

Similarly, the urban poor are represented as a source of nuisance not only for themselves but also for others living in Brasilia. Problematisation of the urban poor and their housing as a source of environmental pollution is clearly shown in the words of Ana Aiduálc when she describes the slums as a problem of Brasilia:

> Because of what has been done for the last 20 years, we have a serious problem, which generates a very high cost to the government. Urbanising an invaded area is three times more expensive than using a clear area to make a housing index there. You have a big public health problem because that population [urban poor] settle down in the place without any kind of infrastructure, which makes the dust return. We have a problem with the schools because its vacancies were planned for the existing population, but now we have to deal with the new children, and we don't have the necessary infrastructure for them (Ana Aiduálc, high-ranking official, interview, 26 September 2018).

Not only do the poor need to have training and education for *vida saudável* (one of the objectives of the policy intervention in slums as discussed above) implying their deviant lifestyle, but also they bring a "big public health problem" because they make "dust return" according to Ana Aiduálc. The urban poor are presented as a problem of and for everyone while framing the whole issues through metaphors of cleanliness. The urban poor are associated with dust that is described as a big health problem for the public; therefore, necessary actions must be taken because of the moral and political responsibilities of the state institutions. Constructing them as uncivilised and socially deviant, as they make Brasilia dusty, simultaneously constructs state institutions and the general public as morally superior and desirable. The urban poor, in this regard, are constructed as deviant others who are a big – another way of saying the most important – problem for public health and the social norms of cleanliness, sanitation and hygiene. The responsibility for environmental damage is laid on the shoulders of the urban poor and not on the institutions who did not provide them with any kind of infrastructure. The absence of infrastructure is backgrounded while the urban poor's dust and public health concerns are foregrounded.

In addition, the urban poor of Brasilia are constructed as socially deviant because they are believed to be an embodiment of uncivilised behaviour, nuisance, and discomfort for everyone. One of the early reports on the slums of Brasilia published in a newspaper became part of the federal archives of Brasilia:

> 10 km from Pilot Plan, in the centre of the free city where pioneers lived in their wooden houses, is located one of the Brasilia's largest slums with 300 shacks, nearly two thousand people, and the chapel where the first Mass to Mr Juscelino Kubitschek was prayed. The slum dwellers, mostly half-naked and shoeless, live between sewer pits, flies, insects, putrefied food leftovers, watering holes, mud and bad smells. They live in wooden shacks with an average length of less than 2 metres. (Negreiros & Andrade, 1960, unpaginated [NOV-D-4-1-Z-0033(9)D]).

In this report the urban poor of Brasilia are labelled as "slum dwellers" who then are introduced as "half-naked and shoeless" people who "live between sewer pits, flies, insects, putrefied food leftovers, watering holes, mud and bad smells". In this statement the urban poor are represented with the topoi of disorder and disease. The conditions of the urban poor are

constructed as arising from a matter of choice by those who prefer to live in mud amid bad smells. The use of the determiner "the" for the slum dwellers makes the definition and description in the statement specific, definite, and explicit against which all slum dwellers are to be judged. This essentialisation and homogenisation are presented as a fact which creates a naturalisation effect. Themes of disease and immorality for the urban poor also represent the colonial traditions of control and contempt in which natives were designated with socio-morally inferior status who are to be civilised, developed and rescued by colonial authorities (see chapter 4). Without making any comments about the responsibility of the state and society, living in slums is described as the permanent condition of the poor. That is, the urban poor prefer to live in such inhuman conditions because that is how they live and that is what makes them "the slum dwellers" (Negreiros & Andrade, 1960, unpaginated [NOV-D-4-1-Z-0033(9)D]). The attributive and definitional aspects through which their living conditions are described mean that they are not temporary, as they permanently belong with "sewer pits, flies, insects" and are only fit to live with "mud and bad smells".

The criminalisation of poverty and the poor is achieved through various discursive strategies of which linguistic production of the urban poor is an important part. The construction of the urban poor of Brasilia as a socially deviant homogenous group is also achieved through discursively and materially framing them as a threat to the social norms and social values of peace, security, and safety. In response to the description of the research project and fieldwork intended in Brasilia, the first interviewee from the department related to urban transportation and integration initiative provided a warning about the slums and the urban poor:

> I am not a mad person [to go to slums]. There is no law and order in slums. They don't care whoever you are. They rob you, they can kill you; even police don't go there. They do everything from drugs to armed robberies. Slums here are not safe at all. You should also not go there whatsoever; don't even pass by them (Qaithsi, low-ranking official, interview, 1 July 2018).

Similar comments were delivered by a medical professional who has been working in the public hospital in Brasilia and living in the city for over 15 years at the time of the interview:

> Whenever the police force would go to favela even in Brasilia, they will not be going there to inquire. They usually go there with the decision that

> criminals are living here [in favelas] and we need to arrest them. They would go there differently as compared to anywhere else in Brasilia. I have heard a lot of stories from those people who have been going through such situations and are living in those realities. Generally, society does not care about them [urban poor]. They stick to their stereotypes and the state is discriminating for sure. One can see that (Euqirneh, mid-ranking official, interview, 14 July 2018).

Despite the different professional backgrounds, official responsibilities, and departments, both Euqirneh and Qaithsi labelled the urban poor of Brasilia as “criminals”, people who “rob” and, their neighbourhoods as sites where everything from drugs to robberies are expected. Criminalisation is itself part of the construction of social deviance used to reinforce the dominant standards in a society, therefore, implying control.

Despite his 12 years of living in Brasilia, Qaithsi has never been robbed even when he was working in the slums. Even then, his description and classification of the urban poor and slums as a territory without “law and order” reflect the reach of criminalisation discourses vis-à-vis the urban poor of Brasilia. Also, he presented the urban poor and slums as dangerous communities by intensifying and supporting his claim through the phrase “even police don’t go there”. Going there, where even the police fear to go, is constructed as a practice of madness. Not only did the interviewee label them as robbers and killers, he also associated them with organised crimes, armed robberies and drugs. The urban poor of Brasilia are represented through crimonyms and metaphors associated with danger, deviance, and threats like “rob”, “kill”, “police”, “drugs”, “armed robberies”. Along with the description, a moral duty has also been performed by stopping the researcher from going there. Being an outsider in Brasilia, the researcher should not even pass by them as they “don’t care” because they essentially are criminals. Use of “should” implies not only a moral call about the urban poor but also sets standards and normative bars about interacting with them. Since they are criminals, robbers, and killers, therefore, the researcher “should also” avoid passing by them like everyone else.

Without having his own experience, the claims and the authoritative argumentation that we see in the comments of Qaithsi and Euqirneh reflect the shared belief of all the actors of the discourse community, i.e. officials. The idea of the urban poor as a threat to peace and security

is shared across the different departments and rank and file of the officials. Two of the high-ranking officials from the research and planning department of the federal district administration maintain slums as a source of threat to peace and security:

> I think it's more the fear of the people about [their own] safety and security. I think, in Brasilia, poor people are different from Rio. The rich people and poor people in Rio, they live together, and they learn to live more or less together but there are fears of security too. But, in Brasilia, I think this [fear] is greater. It is more or less a general fear from the [poor] people because the government does not put guards and police in this space [referring to slums and neighbourhoods of urban poor] (Abotaj & Inaivap, high-ranking officials, interview, 31 August 2018).

The poor are not only seen as a threat to "safety and security" by the officials but also by the larger public. Without surety, Abotaj and Inaivap provided a general statement on behalf of the people asserting that they are afraid of slums and the urban poor because they are not sufficiently controlled by the state institutions. In the above statement of Abotaj and Inaivap, the circumstantial premise has been established by representing the problem along with the claim premise where a solution and course of action have been proposed. Both circumstantial premise and claim premise are articulated as a naturalised fact to create a totality and a coherent picture in which the social deviance of the urban poor, as well as structures of interventions, are established. The only solution, in the eyes of both state and society, is to put guards and police in the neighbourhoods of the urban poor. This material intervention further reproduces the stereotypical images of the urban poor. In this way, both discursive and material aspects complement each other. I personally felt the material translation of discursive constructions and their power when I visited a slum called Vila Estutural. Right at the entrance of the settlement a police station with barricades controlled everyone entering and leaving the settlement. This is the only time I felt afraid as the material outlook of the slums is reifying and reproducing all the images that were described to me in interviews and news.

It is also not true that the police do not go into slums in Brasilia as told by Qaithsi. However, the approach, methods and objectives with which they enter the slums of Brasilia are worth mentioning. In Brazil, there are two types of police force with which people may interact while living in the country. One is called the Military Police (*Polícia Militar*) and the other is called

the Civil Police (*Polícia Civil*). The Military Police is primarily responsible for maintaining law and public order whenever there is a threat. The Civil Police is primarily responsible for the investigation of crimes and criminal law enforcement duties. With the urban poor, the very exercise of policing criminalises them on multiple levels. For instance, operations by both civil and military police signify and amplify the assumed threats posed by the urban poor. They are not only criminals but are also a threat to the public order of society. It is less likely that police would go into the slums for investigation. In fact, they believe that "criminals are living" there, and whenever they go there, they make arrests as described by Euquirneh. Knowledge claims have been made that criminals are living in favelas while blanketing the economic, social, or racial diversities. Knowledge claims such as these are representative of ideologies and political interests that protect the powerful while confusing and criminalising the powerless. This may not be the case with other neighbourhoods, as Euqirneh (posted in a slum at the time of interview) told the researcher, but this is surely the case with slums as the criminals are living there. Since they are believed, understood, and categorised as criminals, therefore, the only purpose of the police in those neighbourhoods is to arrest criminals – not to investigate or keep intra-slum public order.

Like Islamabad, the construction of social deviance in Brasilia also embodies the urban poor. The categories and norms through which social deviance of the urban poor is produced and reproduced come under the purview of both state and society. The ways of stigmatising and problematising the urban poor of Brasilia imply a strong response from both state and society, therefore, discrimination, segregation, exclusion, criminalisation, and isolation appear to be naturalised responses in the discourses. Both state and society, in their domains, would keep on reproducing the discourses of criminalisation and social deviance vis-à-vis urban poor as witnessed and experienced during the research fieldwork.

7.4 Discursive Constructions of 'Us' and 'Them': Structuring the Relationships of Inclusion and Exclusion in Brasilia

The discursive construction of categories of the us-group and them-group aims at structuring the relationships of inclusion and exclusion to reproduce, justify and legitimise social inequalities and power hierarchies (see 3.4 in chapter 3). 'Us' and 'them' play an important part in the articulation of these constructed identities so that the "symbolic order" is

meaningfully attained amid the "field of significant differences and similarities" (Howarth, 2010, p. 313). In our case, 'us' and 'them' are attempts to construct recognisable objects of policy and discourse in relation to one another. In this way, interventions, problematisation, and classifications are justified while reproducing the relationship of inequalities, exclusion, contempt, and othering.

Like Islamabad, constructing an us-group and them-group is another way of forming categories of inclusion and exclusion, positive and negative, desirable and undesirable, legitimate and illegitimate, and admiration and contempt. Linguistic strategies like contrasts, distance markers, positive/negative representation, essentialisation, individualisation, homogenisation and naturalisation have been employed to justify the segregation, control, and regulation of the urban poor of Brasilia. Similarly to the case of Islamabad, the urban poor of Brasilia are constructed as a homogenous group that is represented as an opposite to other socio-economic groups. Discursively, as discussed below, the two groups are categorised and naturalised to maintain the socio-economic and political order of the Brasilian society.

First of all, it is important to determine who constitutes the us-group and them-group in the discourse of public officials of Brasilia vis-à-vis the planning and development of the city. In his description of the overall socio-spatial composition of and segregation in Brasilia, one of the high-ranking officials of the territorial management department of Brasilia comments:

> So, you don't really regularise the rich and middle-class [illegal] settlements, but you guarantee them a very stable situation and a very safe situation that the price of the land, even [if it is] irregular, comes almost to the same price as a regular piece of land in Brasilia. You understand? They are kind of a safe passage, or safe conduct, because of the state of things, especially because of the empathy that the government created around them…So, the one responsible for fiscalização [fiscalisation, i.e. imposing fine for violation of law], and the one responsible for many [other] things, the public agent generally empathise with the situation of the same class. It's a kind of mirror. He may even be living in the next condominium there (Ogaiht, high-ranking official, interview, 24 August 2018).

We can see that the public officials who are called “public agents” by Ogaiht are described by using the metaphor of the socio-economic categorisation “class”. Public officials are described as a member of middle- and high-class groups in Brazilian society because of their political, social, and economic commonalities. In this way, Ogaiht associated himself with the class whose qualification is that they live in “condominiums”. Irrespective of the legal status of the condominiums, as many of them are by definition illegal and informal, living in a condominium is described as an identity marker because it is like a “mirror” from where “public agents” see themselves. While using the third-person pronoun Ogaith represented almost all of the officials, including himself. By constructing a class-based category with geographical and physical living conditions, Ogaiht constructed another social group, i.e. people who are neither middle/high class nor living in a condominium.

A similar situation exists with Siul, a mid-ranking official from the department of social housing for the urban poor of Brasilia. Siul also naturalises the difference between the different classes inhabiting Brasilia by categorising the population into two homogenous groups, i.e. lower classes and higher classes:

> Obviously, when you put technicians [referring to planners and officials] in contact with this reality, with these poor people, with this reality that is different from ours, because technicians tend to be of higher classes who were able to go to university. You get in direct touch with this reality that is not yours and if you are slightly sensitive, you have a huge reality that you need to help transform, qualify, and improve. When you [being an official] have to get out of the Pilot Plan [to go to slums] and [imagine if we] make the other way round [how poor are commuting to and from Pilot Plan] because it is very common for people to get out of Sol Nascente, which is 40 Km away, and they have to be here [centre] by six o’clock in the morning, seven o’clock in the morning to work in the rich areas (Siul, mid-ranking official, interview, 28 September 2018).

Using “obviously” at the start of the sentence reflects the naturalisation of the fact presented. The label “technicians” used by Siul is an over generalisation of the people who are the practitioners of scientific discourses (planners, officials, architects, etc.) and the classes to which they belong. With the help of the cause-effect structure of the sentence, two groups are

presented as a fact and naturally different from one another. Technicians, who tend to be of higher classes, constitute one group who have to deal with an alternate reality, that is, the reality of poor people. In this way, the lexical connection of the technicians and higher classes is represented as a homogenous group that is different from poor people – the people who are neither technicians nor belong to higher classes. Therefore, the differences and the experiences of the reality are naturalised as the reality of "poor people" is different from "ours [reality]" as Siul puts it. It is also important to reflect a little on the way through which this reality is realised. They need to be put in "contact" with one another to realise the differences of the realities both groups inhabit: the difference in the reality is more than the differences of materialities. The difference, as implied in the statement, is of both social and material nature.

This categorisation and homogenisation are further elaborated by Xela who is a mid-ranking official and is responsible for controlling illegal land use in Brasilia. In response to the differentiation of legal and illegal land use, Xela maintains:

> Yes, Yes. They [people who encroach/invade] know that they are doing wrong. But, it's like Russian Roulette. We, as an agency, respond to public justice. So, they [people] said "you have to take them out. It's your obligation to do that". If that [encroachment] is in a public area, we have to go there to take them out (Xela, mid-ranking official, interview, 4 October 2018).

Xela used "we" to represent broader categories of the us-group while indirectly constructing the them-group. Here, all of the officials, including their class members who live in condominiums are represented as custodians of "public justice". The response to public justice and public interest is led by two actors: "agency" who would take action and "they" who told the agency about the problem and held them accountable for not doing their job. In both the statements of Ogaiht and Xela, public agents, officials, agency and the people who are vigilant and making institutions accountable, are members of the us-group who are working, on different levels and in different capacities, against the Other of Brasilia, i.e. who are encroachers, invaders of public areas, and who, according to Xela, must be "taken out".

Both officials and the public are qualified to be part of the us-group because of the functions they perform. This discursive strategy has been called "functionalisation", referring to social actors by "an activity" or "role" they perform (Leeuwen, 1996, p. 54). For instance, Xela used

functionalisation to construct an us-group whose role and qualifications are positively described as custodians of public justice. Similarly, Ogaiht establishes qualifications with the help of the middle class, capitalist, and neo-liberal discourses that construct and naturalise private property and gated communities as an ideal, desirable, and socially approved way of living in Brazil.

At the same time, another group, "them", is constructed that stands exactly opposite to "we" because of the negative qualifications and predications that are produced about "them" as shown in the statement of Xela. They, the urban poor, in this case, are functionalised as encroachers who would take public land, i.e. engage in negative behaviour and moral delinquency. The them-group is constructed by predicating them with the help of stereotypical and evaluative attribution of negative traits, i.e encroachment. In this way, the other group is represented in topos of threats to public order and public justice. In this way, the solution proposed by Xela that "we have to take them out" is not only justified but also framed as a moral, legal, and public demand that has to be addressed, as shown by the use of "have" as an intensifier and modal verb.

Another important aspect of the construction of the us-group and them-group is the use of socially constructed normative bars and legality. While responding to the question about the relationship of slums and urban development in Brasilia, one of the high-ranking officials responded that:

> It's bad visual pollution. It's not what you want. It's accessibility, occupation, that is extremely important and that's what we have been working on a lot. The very disorder of irregular occupation, we have to work and we have to contain it in the city to bring the maximum quality of life for the *cidadãos* [citizens] (Aiduálc, high-ranking official, interview, 26 September 2018).

Ana Aiduálc, in the above excerpt, categorised the urban poor of Brasilia as a group of people who are engaged with "irregular occupation" that bring "disorder" for the "*cidadãos* [citizens]". In this way, both "disorder" and "irregular occupation" are the metaphors used to represent the urban poor as criminals and a problem group – the Other – of Brasilia who is threatening the "quality of life of the citizens". Since the threat is presented as natural, obvious, and inclusionary, the construction of the them-group is therefore justified as opposed

to legal occupation and occupants. Like Islamabad, the officials of the Brasilia's administration align themselves with the "citizens", the us-group, who together are responsible for the quality of life of the citizens. "Irregular occupation" and the agents causing "disorder" are constructed as an out-group who are not labelled as "citizens", but presented as a threat to the citizenry and the city. In this way, using words like "citizens", "disorder", and "irregular occupation", topoi of law, legality, and legal norms, the urban poor are constructed and represented as illegal and disordered aspects of the city. Further, the use of highly subjective concepts, like "quality of life" is understood as a norm that is expected to be shared by everyone who constitutes the group "citizen".

These normative bars through which the us-group and them-group are constructed are also presented by drawing on the discourses of the market economy and market rationality:

> We have still some one-third of our population living, one-third of our lots and plots of land [are] informal. We are doing now the biggest regularisation programme in the history of Brasilia…We are expected [to deliver] around 63,000 titles, property titles to the low-income people and we are, probably at the end of the year, going to issue something between 9,000 and 12,000 in the middle- and upper-class titles. There is a difference because lower-income classes, they receive it [land] for free, and middle and upper classes, they pay for the land they occupied irregularly [*sic*] (Ogaiht, high-ranking official, interview, 24 August 2018).

The urban poor are constructed as an out-group not only through criminalisation and crimonyms but also because they receive the land for free. The difference between 'us' and 'them' is naturalised based on the ownership of the land as well as the ability to become part of the market economy. The difference is because the lower classes receive land "for free" while the "middle and upper classes" pay for the land, despite that fact that both are "occupied irregularly". Framing the whole issue in terms of market rationality and neo-liberal urbanism, the difference comes down to the socio-political norms that are linked to the commodification of the land. By paying for the land, acquired through illegal acts, the middle and upper classes are represented as morally superior classes while the morally inferior people receive land for free. This constitutes one of the important differences among the us-group and them-group

because of the naturalisation of the market economy and housing as a commodity instead of housing as a right.

The essentialisation and functionalisation of the urban poor as a group who take land for free, i.e. breaking social norms and social values, is further elaborated by another high-ranking official whose description of the urban poor is akin to a description of parasites in school Biology:

> Despite being a small town [Varjão], right, the demand here is big. Because, the community [slum dewellers] was formed only in receiving, never contributing. Like, we want to give a rod to fish, but they want the rod, they want the fish, they want everything ready, right, so it's a kind of complicated. But Varjão, there are social projects here, but if we do an activity or something, there are few people who participate, because they have already become accustomed to participating more outside. Inside the community here, if there is an activity, a social project, there are few who participate, they prefer to go out, participate outside…Since I have already been working here for two and half years, we worked with several social projects in here, we have to go to their homes to persuade the people to actually participate. We have in the house of culture, where you were, we had some projects there of[fering] courses [technical and educational]. We stopped for lack of participation (Eneliram, mid-ranking official, interview, 5 October 2018).

The urban poor are labelled as the "community" who only receives and never contributes. The analogy Eneliram employed to describe the nature of the urban poor is interesting. Rod and fish denote both means and the product of the process, therefore, wanting them both means a desire to access resources, means and the product. The certainty through which the urban poor are essentialised by the use of the intensifier – "never" – signifies that the community is stigmatised as parasites who would only be feeding on others without giving any benefits to their host as they are "never contributing". Collectively, if we read excerpts of interviews with Ogaiht, Aiduálc, and Eneliram, we can identify that both legal and normative categories are naturalised through which members are either criminalised or individualised vis-à-vis each other. The urban poor, the them-group, are those who are irregular occupants and the cause of disorder for the citizens, i.e. a social group who pays for the land, contributes, and works along

with state machinery for the quality of life and to help others ("people who give the rod to fish"). This structuring of the relationship of inclusion and exclusion is based on the discursive strategies of naturalisation, labelling, and essentialisation where the urban poor are excluded and represented as the Other. This problematisation of the urban poor and their neighbourhoods implies the only solution, i.e. to "contain" (Aiduálc, high-ranking official, interview, 26 September 2018) – a metaphor for the containment of damage and disease.

Another important marker of the construction of in-group and out-group is the use of linguistic contrasts. Contrasting similarities and/or differences provide another way to discursively construct urban spaces showing how multiplicity interacts and results in dominant patterns of policy objects and subjects. In a document related to the planning and construction of Ceilândia – one of the first planned settlement to relocate the urban poor of Brasilia (for details, see chapter 6) – it is stated that the:

> [M]ismatch between demand and labour supply, between the demand for specialized labour and the unskilled labour offered, generate in the developed areas a demographic swelling that the urban structures are incapable of fully absorbing [and that] leads to the formation of agglomerations constituted by an amorphous, marginalised, doubly unproductive population. [To solve this dilema, the] Secretariat of Social Services of the Federal District Government developed a proposal at the national level to set up sorting centres, both in sending and receiving areas, in order to provide them with effective guidance and subsequently give them the opportunity to opt for places that harmonise with their personal aptitudes (GDF, Secretaria de Serviços Sociais, 1973, p. unpaginated).

This report outlines the reasons, policy interventions, and planning to understand the problem of slums in Brasilia and to outline solutions. It is mentioned that the slums in Brasilia grew due to the unskilled labour who migrated to the city during the construction phase. After a decade of construction of Brasilia, the housing of the urban poor was given attention on such a large scale that a whole new satellite city of Ceilândia was planned for them nearly 30 km from central Brasilia. In the above quotation, it can be seen that two groups, "specialised labour" and "unskilled labour", are represented in contrast to each other. The division and the difference between the two groups are structured as naturalised categories. In this

categorisation, unskilled labourers are presented negatively and labelled as "unproductive population".

As discussed earlier in the previous chapters, people who are represented here as "specialised labour" are the officials and higher classes who have been accommodated in the Pilot Plan or central Brasilia. Since they belong to higher classes, and despite their irregular condominiums and illegal housing along the lakeshore, they are not labelled as amorphous or marginalised. In fact, they are indirectly, positively represented by the direct negative presentation of the urban poor of Brasilia. The construction workers and unskilled labourers of Brasilia are homogenised under the label of "unskilled labour" who then are negatively presented as the reason for "the formation of agglomerations [of slums]". The use of the determiner "the" while describing the reason for slums in Brasilia construct "unskilled labour" as an explicit target of the stereotypical evaluation. Similarly, in the same statement, not only are the urban poor negatively presented as the cause of the evolution of slums in Brasilia, but they are also objectified and stereotypically evaluated as a "doubly unproductive population".

In this way, the birth of Ceilândia in the early 1970s was not a plan for urban development but an avenue where a marginalised and unproductive population could be dumped while keeping skilled labour in central Brasilia. The construction of Ceilândia is a physical manifestation of what linguistic contrasts intend. A mid-ranking official from the federal district administration related to the real estate development of Brasilia described the rationale of the planning and development of Ceilândia in the following words:

> Ceilândia is a satellite city, you may know already, that was created to accommodate these [poor] people that should be taken off, to be removed from the Pilot Plan. Ceilândia is called what is CEI [Campanha de Erradicação de Invasões – Invasions Eradication Company]. CEI is something about invasion removal, it's something like that. We can look for [the name] on the internet, but it was the abbreviation, the letters that make the name of the city show this function, that is, receive the people who made the city, who built the city, but they cannot live here because they are too poor (Ailicec, mid-ranking official, interview, 24 October 2018).

The urban poor who are labelled as “marginalised” and “unproductive population” are the antithesis of the skilled Brasilia (GDF, Secretaria de Serviços Sociais, 1973, p. unpaginated). Therefore, the urban poor were “taken off” and “removed from the Pilot Plan” because the Pilot Plan is supposed to house the skilled people, according to Ailicec. It is interesting to note that the linguistic contrasts and negative representation of the urban poor imply somewhat normative, moral, and a quick response. The use of “should” in relation to the removal of the urban poor from the Pilot Plan shows the compulsion and urgency such as we find in religious and moral discourses about the ideal human behaviour and normative standards people need to adhere to in their journey in life.

We see that the linguistic contrasts have been used as a discursive strategy to represent one group in relation to other to sustain the broader categories of in-group and out-group, inclusion and exclusion, us-group and them-group. Without positively representing the us-group directly, the them-group is negatively presented through the pronominalisation along with a judgement call made by Ailicec (“should be taken off”) and the labels “unproductive population”, “marginalised”, “unskilled labour”. This negative presentation of the urban poor, the them-group, is constructed through contrastive words so that the positive representation of us-group can be implied. For instance, the use of “unproductive population”, “unskilled labour”, and “marginalised” to describe the urban poor implies the presence of another group, which is an appreciated, productive population, and skilled labour.

Further, the categorisation of us-group and them-group is naturalised while setting different priorities for different groups. The prioritisation that has been discursively constructed is materially inscribed in everyday bureaucratic discourses, especially through resource distribution. While narrating the history of the construction of Brasilia and the evolution of slums, Onurb told the researcher that:

> Before Brasilia was built, they were already building the cities for the poor. Before the 1960s, they were already building satellite cities 30 km from pilot plan to receive poor people (Onurb, mid-ranking official, interview, 21 September 2018).

Labelling and proximation, as we can see in the statement of Onurb, are the most important discursive strategies that are employed. Labelling and proximation in this regard are more

than linguistic strategies; they are material manifestations. Therefore, urban poor in Brasilia are materially labelled as a them-group for which different kinds of solutions are justified and legitimised. For instance, "cities for the poor" were built before the inauguration of Brasilia and those cities were envisioned as territories of the homogenous population that are labelled as "poor people". In this way, not only were people labelled as poor but the whole idea of satellite cities is presented as a metonym of a poor neighbourhood. The linguistic label poor, therefore, is materially translated as satellite cities that would serve as a physical label creating a convenient image of the people who would inhabit satellite cities. All of the residents of satellite cities, despite their heterogeneity and diversity (income, class, race, etc.), would then be understood as poor because of the spaces they inhabit.

Since the poor are constructed as an out-group, therefore, the solution of having satellite cities "30 km from the Pilot Plan" is justified as a solution to "receive poor people". It is important to note that the planners devising such segregated cities for the poor are referred to as "they" in the statement implying anonymity of those who are responsible. Only the poor are presented as fixed, targeted, and clear objects of the policy while anonymising the subjects who were performing the action. Onurb, being a planner and official himself, disassociates himself from the us-group constructed as patrons of the housing of the poor in Brasilia. Distance markers, as Pandey (2004) describes them, are shown by using different signifiers ("poor" for the people of satellite cities, and "they" for the planners) are equally visible by the physical distance that has been planned between both groups. The difference between the in-group (who inhabit the Pilot Plan) and out-group (who inhabit satellite cities) is discursively constructed by the labels and materially inscribed and justified by proximation strategies for the interventions. The proximation strategies are visible through the themes of criminalisation, essentialisation, labelling, and construction of social deviance as discussed above.

Allocation of resources is another aspect that is guided by the labels and discursive strategies employed by the officials. Material allocation of resources, on the one hand, shows the implications of the discursive constructions of the urban poor, and on the other hand, reinforces the stereotypes and the othering of the urban poor. In this way, materiality and discourses are mutually constitutive of each other to sustain the discrimination and segregation (both social and physical). For instance, discrimination in the material allocation of the resources reifies the categorisation and the individualisation achieved through the construction

of us-group and them-group. One of the slum dwellers describes the segregation and reinforcement of it in the following words:

> And in those other cities, they do not [improve]. Look, for you to see, an example, the [Pilot] Plan is right there and the Vila Planalto is right here [referring to the close proximity], and there are complaints all the time [from the people in Vila Planalto]. The people of Vila Planalto, Estrutural, near the SAI there, that dump [refuse dump], Estrutural in itself is an ugly city, I find it an ugly city. So, it's close to the Pilot Plan, and then they only improve there, every time you pass there in the Pilot Plan, you will see a guy sweeping a street, the guy taking care of a garden. In other cities, here, no [they don't improve] (Ainke Síal, resident of a slum, interview, 27 September 2018).

Consideration of the way resources are allocated (both human and non-human) plays an important part in analysing how the us-group and them-group acknowledg existing material aspects. As shown in the statement of Ainke Síal, material distance markers are employed to construct the us-group and them-group based on the everyday experiences of governance and development. "They", i.e. the officials are represented as a group who would be allocating resources (manpower related to maintenance work, like street sweeping and gardening) only in the Pilot Plan, i.e. the spaces associated with non-poor classes. At the same time, the areas of the poor, represented by Ainke Síal (a resident of a slum), are devoid of any such investments and provision of resources. The naturalisation effect is further reinforced by Ainke Síal by framing it as a personal experience. By claiming that "you will see" – a grammatical structure used to express surety of future happening – the statement has been loaded with replicability and validity of the observations made.

Similarly, in the construction of the them-group, i.e. the urban poor, judgement and opinion are presented as a fact, i.e. "no [they don't improve]". In this way, the construction of 'us' and 'them' groups are based on the experiences of availability of material resources that are provided to both groups. During the research fieldwork before and after this interview, it was also observed that the waste disposal and waste management is significantly different in different neighbourhoods of Brasilia. For instance, dust bins and rubbish disposal points are usually clean and well managed in rich neighbourhoods like Lago Sul, Lago Norte, and Pilot Plan. In slums or regularised poor neighbourhoods like Itapoá, Paranoá, São Sebastião, and

Vila Estrutural, streets are not paved and rubbish disposal points are not well managed. During the fieldwork, the researcher also followed a rubbish collection truck in Itapoá. It was observed that the officials of the department were collecting rubbish arbitrarily. They were not thorough and dedicated and were only partially collecting the refuse. This, however, is not the case in rich neighbourhoods. The improvement (through the provision of human resources) is described as something exclusive for the neighbourhood of the rich. On the other hand, lack of improvement (non-provision of human resources) is associated with the neighbourhoods of the poor. In this way, the construction of the 'us' and 'them' groups is realised beyond the linguistic regime of the development.

The situation is similar in the eyes of officials as well. When asked about the disproportionate resource allocation for different neighbourhoods, one of the officials agreed it existed and categorically accepted the discrimination among different income groups and their neighbourhoods:

> It [Varjão] ends up lacking its due attention because the government itself has not yet realised that here is an independent city [referring to the Regional Administration status of Varjão], talking specifically about Varjão. That's what we feel here that all the programmes [funds, initiatives, planning, and resources] go out to everybody [refering to other regional administrations], but Varjão always gets kind of out of it. We have to fight [with higher officials and state institutions], "No, we exist too", [they usually respond] "No, but you are a village, are not you from Taquari?" (Noskcaj, mid-ranking official, interview, 5 October 2018).

As shown in the above statement, a slum is understood and labelled as a "village", and therefore, not given enough resources and attention in the planning. Noskcaj is a mid-ranking official of the regional administration that was as a village (Taquari) nearly 15 years ago. In 2018, the time of the interview, he still believed that the administration is being neglected and ignored just because of their village status. "We have to fight" signifies his everyday struggle with his higher officials to get resources for the development. It is important to highlight that "we" is a non-inclusive personal pronoun. It does not signify the inclusion of the whole regional administration and the people living in the settlement. "We" refers to the officials of the administration.

Poor resources for the Varjão, as indicated by Noskcaj, represent the power of the label "village" that reproduces conditions of marginality, segregation, and contempt that we see in the discourses. The broader categories of 'us' and 'them' are also present within the dominant official discourses. These discourse disjunctures are not destabilising the dominant symbolic order but reinforcing them at least in relation to the socio-physical and symbolic spaces of the Brasilia. For example, let us discuss in detail the following statements from Noskcaj:

> Nowadays, with the regulations [empowering regional administrations], at least here we could do a lot. Because Varjão's problem is refuse. If you pay attention there, [you will find] a person throwing rubbish on the street because he knows that at some time or another someone will pick it up; and constructions [of houses/shacks] on the streets because it is a custom now (Noskcaj, mid-ranking official, interview, 5 October 2018).

And:

> It [Varjão] ends up lacking its due attention because the government itself has not yet realised that here is an independent city [referring to the Regional Administration status of Varjão], talking specifically about Varjão. That's what we feel here that all the programmes [funds, initiatives, planning, and resources] go out to everybody [refering to other regional administrations], but Varjãs always gets kind of out of it. We have to fight [with higher officials and state institutions], "No, we exist too", [they usually respond] "No, but you are a village, are not you from Taquari?" (Noskcaj, mid-ranking official, interview, 5 October 2018).

Noskcaj in his first statement, while essentialising the urban poor as a source of environmental threat, associates them with refuse and rubbish. But, in his second statement, he is not associating himself with the poor people (despite being equally vulnerable to lack of resources) but with the officials who stand opposed to the higher officials. In this way, he constitutes "we" as a group of officials who are in a hostile relationship with both poor people and higher officials because he, along with his colleagues, has to fight on two ends: the plight of Varjão because of a "person throwing rubbish on the streets"; and the officials who label them a "village". He himself is an official and owing to his access to the resources (symbolic

and material due to his position), he disassociates himself from the people who throw rubbish and associates himself with those who are rescuing the city. A comparative analysis of Noskcaj's statements also shows that the categorisation of the us-group (officials and higher classes) is not homogenous even for the officials, but the them-group is constructed as a homogenous group of people who are stigmatised as the deviant Other of Brasilia.

The construction of collective identities like 'us' and 'them' and their articulation in the discourse (see 3.4 in chapter 3) is further elaborated and reproduced through the discourses of global development itself. Discourses of global or international developmentalism construct itself in relation to its Other, i.e. underdevelopment (among others, see Ziai, 2013; and for detailed discussion, see chapter 4). Qualifications for development were created through the categories of underdevelopment described as a disorder, chaos, stagnation, traditionalism, lack of planning, etc. The relationship of development and underdevelopment has always been described through a problem-solution structure wherein underdevelopment is constructed as a problem of which development is the solution, as a high-ranking official puts it:

> We don't have any poor people in Ceilândia, Taguatinga, Guará. Guará is a place of public servants and so we don't have very, very poor people. Very poor people live in Santa Maria, in Samambaia because the shape of the place is not planned (Inaivap, high-ranking official, interview, 31 August 2018).

In the development discourses of the federal district administration of Brasilia, development – a positive and desirable change – is represented through the us-group while negatively presenting the urban poor through categories of underdevelopment. For example, Inaivap labels slum dwellers as "poor" and constructs them as a group of people who are living in places that are "not planned". Opposed to the poor people, the us-group, signified by the inclusive personal pronoun "we", is comprised of the people who are living outside the non-planned area. Planning as a scientific intervention and a preliminary stage on the route to development is described as one of the most important categories through which development can be realised in any part of the globe (see chapter 4). Similarly, Inaivap draws on the discourses of international scientific development of which planning is an essential component. The categories Inaivap constructs and legitimised are based on the naturalisation of planning as a normative bar against which the social composition of Brasilia is to be understood. He constructed two camps by using the contrastive word (not-planned), which

signifies the existence of the planned. In this way, two social groups are structured in an antagonistic relationship with each other, i.e. “we don’t have poor people”, which means we do not have unplanned people. Similarly, the unplanned people are living in Santa Maria and Samambaia, the unplanned places, where “we” – the us-group – do not live.

The use of planning as a marker to construct identities and articulate their social existence clearly demarcates the physical and social boundaries that are produced and reproduced by the indigenisation of the global development discourses. Topoi of underdevelopment, i.e. not-planned and poor people are used to represent the urban poor of Brasilia. While sitting in the Pilot Plan, where the interview took place, Inaivap referred to the neighbourhoods of the poor as “not-planned” while naming Santa Maria and Samambaia as examples that are situated almost 30 km and 34 km away respectively. Constructing planning and planned neighbourhoods as a virtue where poverty does not exist, he essentialises all the other satellite cities as poverty-ridden because of their not-planned status. The problem of the urban poor is described as a result of lack of planning implying planning is an ultimate solution to the problem. This planning, as a global development discourse would imply, constitutes everything from urban planning to social and economic planning that is necessary for the needs of a capitalist society like Brazil.

The linguistic contrast Inaivap employed is rooted in developmentalism where not-planned is synonymous with disorder and lack of civilisation. On the other hand, planned is a synonym for order, prosperity, certainty, a promised future, and rational way of progress and growth (see chapter 4 for the categories of development and underdevelopment). The lexical connection that has been established between the poor, poverty, and planning is a discursive strategy not only to essentialise the urban poor as chaotic and uncivilised but also to construct them as the antithesis of development that is embodied through the us-group who is living in planned Brasilia.

Since the urban poor and their neighbourhoods are presented as a threat and antithesis of development, therefore, the solutions and the interventions are presented as acts of benevolence and moral superiority so that the underdevelopment can be controlled. Another high-ranking official summerises the situation of the planning, urban poor, and development vision in the following words:

> So, what happens today is that Brasilia had all its planning related to the issues about slums. What happens today is that we work with the regularisation…today we have Estrutural, we have Buritizinho, there are many regions [in Brasilia] that were being occupied by people. Today we don't have a place to take those people, so in the strategic plan, we work with the regularisation of the areas. So they go through a sieve that is environmental, judicial, the period of occupation, all the legal requirements (Oiválf, high-ranking official, interview, 18 September 2018).

Oiválf describes the urban poor while labelling them as occupiers, i.e. a threat to the planning and development of Brasilia. The constructed threat to the development can only be mitigated by the proposed solution, i.e. "regularisation of the area". Both the construction of the problem and the presentation of the solution is described as an act of benevolence, as when developmentalism came into contact with the Global South and ex-colonies of the Global North. Oiválf naturalises the absence of space to take his fellow citizens – whom he referred to as "those people" – in the fold of the planned and developed spaces of Brasilia. Nevertheless, the solution he supported is the regularisation of the areas that he labelled as "occupied by people". Intervention by regularisation is an attempt to introduce development to those non-planned areas of Brasilia that are inhabited by the poor people. The us-group, represented for example by Inaivap and Oiválf, is comprised of the people who are neither poor nor living in non-planned Brasilia.

Further, the group is comprised of the people and classes who do not occupy land and who always have a place in the planned Brasilia because they are significantly different from the other group. The them-group, presented as the occupiers and poor by Oiválf and Inaivap respectively, is comprised of the individuals and classes who are both poor and the embodiment of non-planning. The them-group is comprised of the people who occupy space and who could not be accommodated in the planned Brasilia. Therefore, regularising them is presented as a humane, sustainable, and practical solution to the problem. Regularisation, however, is akin to the naturalisation of their conditions of segregation, discrimination, and contempt. Socially, they would remain the Other of Brasilia. For instance, Santa Maria and Samambaia are both regularised neighbourhoods and satellite cities where thousands of people are living. Their regularisation, an intervention celebrated by Oiválf, is still regarded

as unplanned, therefore, a threat to the development, by Inaivap when he cited examples of non-planned areas.

The urban poor of Brasilia are constructed as a socially deviant group and the Other of Brasilia in the development discourses. They are not only needed for the menial jobs in the city, but they are also needed as objects of discourses through which development and underdevelopment can be constructed and propagated so that the existing order of things and power hierarchies can be sustained and legitimised. Employing various discursive strategies like labels, naturalisation, essentialisation, distance markers, qualifications and declarations, both categories of 'us' and 'them' are constructed in relation to each other. Like developmentalism that creates its categories of underdevelopment on a global scale, the planning and development of Brasilia create its localised categories of underdevelopment embodied and symbolised by the slums and the urban poor.

7.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter has discussed the representation of the urban poor in the development discourses of the development authorities of Islamabad and Brasilia. The urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia are represented through various labels (e.g. encroachers, invaders, criminals, *favelados*, etc.) and discursive strategies (e.g. referential, nomination, metaphorisation, naturalisation, functionalisation, etc.) in which they are stigmatised, essentialised and constructed as social deviance and an out-group. With the help of critical discourse analysis this chapter argued that the labelling of the urban poor is more than bureaucratic identity formation for resource distribution. Labelling of the urban poor, contrary to that of the higher classes, appears to be a discursive regime through which they are controlled, surveilled and discriminated against by the state institutions. This politics of representation brings forth the broader consequences for the social spaces of the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia in which they are naturalised as an out-group that is excluded and segregated. Because of the symbolic order that has been attained through more or less accurate repetition, this chapter shows that the categorisation and classification of the urban poor as a socially deviant group is naturalised as permanent conditions. Further, the use of labels and the discursive strategies employed by the state institutions legitimise and naturalise the discrimination, segregation, exclusion, and socio-economic inequalities under the emblem of planning and development.

Chapter 8: CONCLUSIONS

> There is an image connected to the word 'katchi abadi [slum]'. Without going deeper, people assume that: only thieves and dacoits live there [in katchi abadi]; alcohol will be sold in public; and the people are of inferior status. This is what kills us [read: damages us]. This [katchi abadi] should not be the label. I feel if there is no such label, half of our problems will automatically be gone (Dihsar, slum resident, interview, 12 March 2019).

Labelling implies an attempt to capture meaning so that the construction of reality can be made definitive (Fox & Miller, 1995; Chapter 2). In this way, public policy is itself a discourse i.e. the way through which meanings are ascribed to social phenomena. Therefore, labelling in public policy aims at (re)creating and (re)producing bureaucratic identities, objects of policy, and social discourses. Dihsar's words show that labelling is a lot more than a bureaucratic need for the organisation and distribution of resources. Labelling has socio-politically implications and directly affects the lives of the policy subjects. Categorisation and compartmentalisation are used by public policy officials to naturalise the construction of a hierarchised urban space. The effects of labelling expand beyond semiotic boundaries. They serve as a tool to translate socially constructed realities into spatially inscribed experiences. Dihsar offers us his lived experience and his belief in the effects of discursive labelling. Merely changing the representation by changing the labels, as Dihsar puts it, may solve half of the problems of the urban poor. The problems are not limited to the inadequate resources given to the urban poor by the urban administrative authorities but also related to their lived experience that "kills" them because of their labelling as "thieves", "dacoits", people of "inferior status" and alcoholics. This is how the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia are represented in the development discourses of the CDA and FDA; and this is how their lives are affected by their housing often being labelled as katchi abadis and favelas.

Labelling, as a process of convenient image construction, therefore, serves as a technology of power to attribute different social and physical resources to different socio-economic groups. Labelling is a scientific act as well as an act of valuation and judgement. It is a social as well as a bureaucratic need. We all label and in return get labelled. However, in public policy, the political and administrative realities are socially constructed through discourse where language plays a central role. To capture the processes and origins of public policy discourse

is perhaps impossible. However, the cases of Islamabad and Brasilia, as this research shows, provide opportunities to study how discourse and labelling are interconnected and how they shape the lived experiences of the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia.

Stabilised policies reflect nothing less than the dominance of a particular discourse. The dominance of any discourse further informs the existence and fragile permanence of social hierarchies and power imbalances. The state because of its privileged position defines policy parameters, controls, and distributes resources, therefore, provides the means, values, and meanings for the other parties involved in the state-society relationship of the provision and distribution of resources. This research demonstrated that the administrative actors actively construct political environments through their actions and the use of language along with the stories they tell and symbols they select to represent their and others' actions (Chapter 6 & 7). This study highlights that representation of the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia by their respective urban development authorities takes place through categories of social deviance and the discursive strategies of essentialisation, naturalisation, and metaphorisation. In this way the policy environment for the urban poor is constructed to ensure they remain segregated.

Discursive strategies like essentialisation, naturalisation, and metaphorisation aim to stabilise the existing order of things. For instance, essentialisation reflects the particular forms of representations in which a person or a social group is essentialised, stereotypically highlighting some aspects while downplaying others. As this research shows, the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia are essentialised through various categories of social deviance (alcoholics, unclean, unplanned, etc.) to essentialise their existence as a problem for urban spaces. Similarly, linguistic structures and reproducing essentialist evaluations regarding the urban poor create a naturalisation effect and represent their social deviance and segregation as natural order of things instead of reflecting the socio-economic and political structures of society. Metaphorisation, as highlighted in chapters 3 and 7, marks another way of representing the urban poor. The use of metaphor reflects ideologies underlying language that are connected to social structures in society. Representing the urban poor through metaphors associated with social norms, legal structures, and social deviance is an attempt to naturalise their essentialist representation that informs the broader discourse on the urban poor.

In doing so, as discussed in chapter 4, the CDA and the FDA are not deriving their legitimacy from their legal or institutional status as a part of the governing state structure alone. Rather, their position is socially, morally, and politically uplifted by the discourse they are producing through drawing on the discourse of international development and its knowledge categories. For instance, international developmentalism is based on a universal set of values like the GDP, GNP, poverty, planning, etc. Development, as this research shows, is not a set of performative actions, but it has been presented and (re)produced over the years as a discourse that operates through a variety of categories of knowledge. In this way, development hides an identifiable source of power yet continues to influence everyday life in the name of scientific knowledge, universal truth, and a natural way to progress towards well-being. Development, therefore, is not a political programme but a set of beliefs that operates beyond political ideologies. The unprecedented influence of international organisations and institutions like the UN, IMF, the World Bank, ECLAC, and USAID shows that the development discourse operates not only through various categories of knowledge but has assumed the role of Durkheim's religion as discussed in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* ([1912] 1995), i.e. an indisputable truth that is required for social cohesion and social progress. Anyone who disagrees with development might become, or risks becoming, socially outcast.

In this way, development and underdevelopment are not a mutually exclusive state of affairs. Rather, development presents itself through underdevelopment. Underdevelopment is itself a category of development. As discussed in chapters 5 and 6, the development of Islamabad and Brasilia was accompanied by underdevelopment represented through the urban poor and slums. The construction of the urban poor and slums as categories of underdevelopment legitimises the existence of scientific discourse and the universal truths of planning. There is a firm belief in the power of scientific interventions, camouflaged under the label development, embodied through institutions like the CDA and the FDA. Like the global restructuring in the post-World War II period, urban development in countries like Pakistan, India, and Brazil empowers the state institutions to restructure their societies along similar lines, i.e. capitalist modernity and capitalist development where social hierarchies are reproduced and social inequalities are regulated to naturalise the lived experiences of the urban poor.

The homogenisation of the Global South as underdeveloped is reproduced further while universalising the assumed objective scale of development against which different countries

are placed on the ladder as developing, underdeveloped, or developed (Chapter 4). These socially constructed categories provide modalities of governance and restructuring of societies on a global scale as well as a local urban scale as this research shows. In this sense, categories like the urban poor, slums, middle-class neighbourhoods, and affluent areas are localised versions of underdeveloped, developing, and developed areas within Islamabad and Brasilia (Chapters 5, 6 & 7). Slums and the urban poor are projected and represented through the categories of underdevelopment, i.e. stagnation, moral deviance, crimes, disorder, and disease where development – a good change – should be introduced by technocratic rationalities and scientific expert knowledge to redeem people.

To understand the relationship of categories of knowledge and the performative actions through which categories of knowledge are sustained and reproduced over time, Critical Discourse Analysis, based on the works of Fairclough (among others, 2013, 1992, 1995), provided the analytical and methodological foundations to this research. While explaining the relationship between discursive (semiotic) and non-discursive (non-semiotic) elements, Fairclough (2013) argues that any existing order of discourse represents a particular configuration of different genres, different discourse and different styles (Chapter 3). In this way, Critical Discourse Analysis, as in this research, enables the researcher to understand language as both the medium of communication and social construction while producing and reproducing power hierarchies in any society. In line with Critical Discourse Analysis, this research shows how discursive practices contribute to the making of social identities, social realities and social relations vis-à-vis the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia, and the CDA and the FDA.

The aim of Critical Discourse Analysis to explore the relationship between discursive practices, events, and texts along with social and cultural structures and institutions is ensured by establishing a wider discourse territory for the findings and analysis put forth in this research. The discourse territory for this research comprises text taken in its wider sense, i.e. written, oral, visual or multimodal. This includes the archives related to the planning, construction and development of Islamabad and Brasilia, oral history interviews, semi-structured in-depth interviews with officials, and the ethnography of slums in Islamabad and Brasilia (Chapter 3). Based on the labelling theoretical approach and the Critical Discourse Analysis of the discourse territory, this research finds that the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia are represented through various labels (encroachers, robbers, thieves, invaders,

criminals, etc.) and naturalised as such through various discursive strategies (nomination, metaphorisation, naturalisation, essentialisation, etc.) so that they are stigmatised and constructed as a socially deviant group. Unlike other socio-economic groups in Islamabad and Brasilia, the labelling of the urban poor appears to be a discursive regime through which they are segregated, controlled, and surveilled by state institutions. Therefore, the consequences are not limited to the distribution of physical resources (as during the early days of planning and development, see chapter 5) but also to the social spaces of the urban poor. Various categories of deviance that have been associated with the urban poor invite contempt both from the state and society alike. This discriminatory symbolic order has been attained and maintained by more or less accurate repetition ending up naturalising temporary conditions of the urban poor as a permanent state of affairs disguised as planning and development (Chapters 6 & 7).

Comparing Islamabad and Brasilia, cities from two different parts of the world with distinctive socio-political and economic histories, has been a methodologically challenging task. This has been the case not only in terms of collecting data and making sense of urban cultures but also in terms of bureaucratic institutions and different colonial experiences over the centuries. It is these methodological challenges that make this research contribute to the existing empirical literature on the urban Global South, labelling theory, and Critical Discourse Analysis as a method and theory.

Existing empirical literature on the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia has largely focused on studying the urban poor's neighbourhoods and impoverished housing. The main argument and the context that runs through the literature is based on Lefebvre's *Right to the City* (1996) and his understanding of urban space. Segregation of the urban poor and their living conditions are discussed at length by scholars (among others, Holston (2008), Resende (2009), Oliveira (1997), Holanda (2010), Branco & Miranda (2018) for Brasilia, and Kreutzman (2013), Mustafa & Sawas (2013), and Sultana (undated) for Islamabad). While appreciating the contributions of the scholars on the issues of slums and the urban development of Islamabad and Brasilia, this research argues that the works appear to be politically ambivalent. They did not discuss the role of planning ideologies, planning rationales, and the nature of the master plans of Brasilia and Islamabad that played an instrumental part in the evolution of slums and the urban poor in both cities.

Taking a step ahead, this research contextualises the whole issue of the urban poor and slums both in the national and international context and shows how global discourses play an effective part in shaping national and local urban spaces because of the dominance of scientific discourses and knowledge categories camouflaged in the label 'development'. By comparing the planned cities of Islamabad and Brasilia this research attempts to discuss the broader political and economic structures that help shape urban spaces and urban social life. In this way, this research offers insights on the political characteristics of planning processes, public policy discourses, discursive formations and their real-life effects by focusing on urban governmentality vis-à-vis the urban poor of Islamabad and Brasilia. This research also shows that the expert knowledge and scientific discourses embodied through planning agencies like the CDA and the FDA hide their source of power, therefore making opposition difficult from the people who are marginalised and condemned to live in spaces of fragile legality. It is not that they are merely ignored and condemned to live in slums, rather the spaces they inhabit are permanently categorised as underdevelopment. Development and the legitimacy of the CDA and FDA can only be gained by the juxtaposition of slums and the urban poor as the embodiment of underdevelopment.

Theoretically, this research extends the boundaries of the labelling approach with the help of Critical Discourse Analysis. Labels, in the traditional sense as discussed by Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934), are believed to be semiotic devices that have been used to study deviant behaviours in society (Chapter 2). Labels are designations and identity markers. While using labels in a traditional sense and using them as a source of analysis for public policy, this research proposes that the labels should be seen beyond their semiotic domain. They reflect discursive constructions not only in the semiotic but also in the non-semiotic (physical) domain. Physical labelling (Chapter 2) is an equally important aspect that should be considered in the labelling approach. Lingual labels and physical labels exist mutually. For instance, labelling someone as one of the urban poor is not limited to a taxonomic act or stereotyping, but is equally manifested and reified through the materiality that we see in slums. Labelling the urban poor as a socially deviant group is not limited to the mental borders but their spatial inscription (slums) provides tangible meanings to the labels like the urban poor and slum dwellers. Like the urban poor as a social category, low-income housing schemes also assume the status of the label as they also represent, designate, and identify a particular social group. These low-income housing schemes and buildings create permanent structures that represent inhabitants as somewhat different from the rest of the community, therefore,

like lingual labels, the physical infrastructure creates both mental and physical borders reifying the socio-spatial segregation and discrimination in society.

The labelling theory is to be approached as a theoretical explanation of not only socially constructed deviance but also of its material manifestation and reification through the allocation of different resources. Due to stigmatisation and stereotyping of the urban poor, their share in the physical resources has been significantly reduced, and this in turn reproduces and provides justification for the labelling in future policies. Therefore, labels, in a holistic sense of discursive and non-discursive aspects, provide an opportunity to study and analyse both discursive and non-discursive elements as mutually constitutive of each other. As the case of Islamabad and Brasilia has shown, the labelling of the urban poor in the master plans reflected in the materiality of these planned cities. While complementing each other, lingual labels and physical labels continue to shape the lives of the urban poor in Islamabad and Brasilia in which their segregation is naturalised by employing lingual labels as the justification for their physical conditions and vice versa.

The Critical Discourse Analysis, on the one hand, provides the basis for extending the labelling approach from its traditional boundaries; on the other hand, it comes as a difficult and challenging set of analytical tools to work with. This research finds that the Critical Discourse Analysis approach does not offer opportunities to generalise any findings or arguments. Based on a limited set of data, the analysis is rather reductionist and is prone to subtle changing even during the analysis. Therefore, this research is based on rather limited data as suggested by several scholars like Jansen (2008), Garrity (2010), Fairclough, Jessop, & Sayer (2004). This also highlights another aspect of Critical Discourse Analysis, that is, it is reductionist and reduces everything to discourse.

However, working with Critical Discourse Analysis and using insights from Foucaldian discourse, this research shows that the structuration of context is unavoidable; however, this should not be seen as a limitation of the approach but as a necessary hypothetical construct for sociological observation. This hypothetical construct, however, needs to be based on a rather rich discourse territory. Apart from the reflexive approach of data collection and data selection, understanding of discourse territory, i.e. the wider context, is of the utmost importance. Understanding and establishing the discourse territory for the subsequent analysis, as this research has done, involves both primary and secondary sources of

information. The extensive literature on the subject and different methods for data collection will open up multi-layered discourse operations and help researchers to ground their analysis. Since discourse is socially constituted, therefore, its modes of existence and its modes of operation are limitless.

As this research finds, discourse is an ensemble of ideas and concepts through which meaning is given to any social or physical phenomenon. This meaning-making activity is comprised of a different but identifiable set of practices. In this way, the discourse of development on the global level allowed the researcher to conduct a comparative analysis of Islamabad and Brasilia as an embodiment of the development discourse and a set of rationalities through which urban spaces are governed. While focusing on another category of development, that is, underdevelopment embodied through the urban poor and slums, the Critical Discourse Analysis as a theory, methodology, and a set of analytical tools allows the researcher to undertake a comparative study of two capital cities. For example, urban spaces are not ontologically settled, rather, as Critical Discourse Analysis would maintain, they are contested terrains constitutive of power dynamics and power relations.

Urban spaces are understood as the spaces where multiplicity of meanings interact and ultimately result in dominant socio-spatial patterns that construct urban spaces as policy objects. Urban spaces are socially constructed. Therefore, heterogeneity of social groups, contestations, social struggles and inequal power relations need to be accounted for. In the course of this research, the researcher has come across many such perspectives and levels which are otherwise referred to homogenously as Islamabad and Brasilia by the development authorities. As discussed in the empirical chapters, the forms of representations of the urban poor through multiple frames, metaphors, discursive strategies, and labels reflect the fragility of the social symbolic order of Islamabad and Brasilia.

Homogenisation has been rendered a bureaucratic tool to manage and distribute resources, regulate social inequalities and manage socio-spatial inequalities in Islamabad and Brasilia. Drawing primarily on the economic denominators (low class, middle class, high class etc.) and socio-cultural structures of discrimination among different socio-economic groups, the homogenisation through labels like the urban poor, slums, rich, middle class etc. is equivalent to essentialisation and naturalisation of the living conditions. Further, the creation of legible

categories of rich and poor certainly hides the heterogeneity and complexity of the contestations going on in the urban spaces of Islamabad and Brasilia.

Outside the officials, archives, the plethora of planning documents, and bureaucratic offices, there lies a more complex society than could be found in the documents. Though practising in a personal capacity as a member of the same society, the officials completely disregard the issues related to gender, ethnicity, race, education, and politics in the slums. While using labels, they could successfully disconnect the stories of the urban poor from their cases as policy objects. This, however, does not dissolve the variety of lived experiences and intersectionality with which the urban poor and other socio-economic groups make sense of their world. For them, Islamabad and Brasilia are structurally designed spaces that do not cater to their fluid identities. The urban spaces and their regulation by technocratic and scientific rationality, as the excerpt at the start of this chapter shows, is itself part of the problem. They need to be seen beyond the bureaucratic categories and socio-political and economic designations like the urban poor, slums, invaders, thieves, marginalised communities, encroachers, etc.

During the fieldwork for this research it was found out that experiences vary even among members of the same slums. For example, experiences of social and political violence by the state and society is entirely different for different genders living within the same slums. Women, in general, are the breadwinners in the slums of Brasilia mainly because of the stigmatisation and criminalisation of their male counterparts. Most of the economic opportunities are denied to men in slums because they are believed to be drug abusers and criminals. Therefore, the opportunities which then open up for the women make their life difficult on both domestic and public fronts. They are paid less and mostly work as maids in the rich neighbourhoods far from the slums in Brasilia. They spend an average of two hours a day travelling. Given the patriarchal structures in Pakistan and Brazil, these conditions make things very difficult for women in slums and they end up having broken or abusive marriages. This was very common to see in the slums of Brasilia. Given the discriminatory attitudes of the police towards slums in general, the crimes of husbands against their wives go unanswered. That is why, as Aidaba, a resident from a slum in Brasilia, told the researcher, one can find a lot of single mothers in the slums who happen to be fighting not only economically but also socially with stigmas related to divorce and living in slums.

Slums in Brasilia are religiously homogenous as a large majority of the residents are Catholic Christians. This, however, is not the case with the slums of Islamabad. Slums in Islamabad have two religious groups whereby Christians are in the minority with a large majority of Muslims living in separate slums or sometimes in the same slum. Being a minority is not easy living in countries like Pakistan, especially when it is coupled with poverty, stigmatisation, and criminalisation. Despite knowing the religious diversity and religious discrimination exist, the officials of the CDA and other administrative authorities do not reflect it in the public policy. They continue to homogenise them as slum dwellers and the urban poor without any regard for the provision of resources that are required for their religious identities and religious festivals. Muslims in this case are privileged as they share the religion of the neighbouring housing sectors. They can perform their prayers and other rituals along with the better-off section of society. This, however, is not the case with the Christian slum dwellers who either have to construct their prayer places and religious festivities after paying bribes to the officials or they need to travel to the recognised and legalised katchi abadis of Islamabad.

In addition, it was reported during the ethnography that the Christian slum dwellers face discrimination from the officials as well. Officials usually regard them as foreigners because of their faith. It was interesting to find that Muslim slum dwellers believe that their Christian counterparts are in a better position as many NGOs and foreign diplomatic missions in the country are sympathetic towards religious minorities. On the other hand, Christian slum dwellers believe that their Muslim counterparts are privileged as they share their religion with the rest of society and the officials. Living in Islamabad, and sharing the urban spaces that are equally criminalised and stigmatised by the officials, produces never-ending contestations and conflicts. New forms of identities and conflicts are generated by drawing on ethno-religious discourses that transcend national and regional boundaries without adhering to any universal truths like that of development and scientific planning. Christian residents of a slum are not only poor people, but they are also a religious minority who have been looked down upon by society at large.

Another important aspect that has been camouflaged by the development discourses of the CDA and the FDA is related to ethnicity and racism. Despite attempts on the part of the researcher, it was virtually impossible to find any such themes in policy documents and in interviews. Nevertheless, it does not mean that it does not exist. Participant observation and ethnography opened up these fractures in Islamabad and Brasilia. Race is one of the most

important elements when it comes to urban spaces and the spatial organisation of the cities of Brazil. Brasilia is no exception. The hostility and discrimination against the native Brazilians (having darker skin tone) can easily be seen while moving around in the urban settlements of the country. A lot of the criminalisation, stigmatisation, and stereotypes originated out of the country's colonial history where blacks were condemned to socio-spatial segregation. This continues to happen as the majority of the slum dwellers are of native origin. Despite this visibility, no official policy or policy documents represent those racial biases and problems in the public policy of Brasilia to make racially sensitive policies. Resonating with this fact, a respondent in Brasilia once mentioned that Brasilia is not for the poor, and when someone is both black and poor, s/he had better stay out of sight.

When it comes to skin tone, the racial tendencies in Pakistani society cannot be ignored. However, the issues related to ethnicity and ethnic origins are of significant importance in the slums of Islamabad. Some slums in Islamabad have a significant number of Pushtoons and people of Afghani origins. These slums, as compared to others, are widely believed as homes of terrorists because of the essentialisation and stereotyping of Pushtoons and Afghanis in society. The more vulnerable they are, the more exploited they get at the hands of officials and law enforcement agencies. It is more difficult for them to earn their livelihoods or to get even menial jobs in Islamabad. In 2015, Afghan Basti – a slum where most of the Afghan migrants and refugees were living – was bulldozed on the orders of the Islamabad High Court. Officially endorsed names of slums in Islamabad themselves reflect the socio-religious diversity of the slums. For example, Afghan Basti (the majority of the people are from Afghanistan), the Muslim Colony and Bahu Colony (the majority are Muslims), France Colony, Essa Nargi (Essa is the Quranic name for Jesus – the majority are Christians). Despite such visibility, the officials continue to rely on the homogenising categories (slums, the urban poor, encroachers, invaders etc.) where all such differences hide.

The heterogeneity that has been discussed above was always present in the case of Islamabad and Brasilia but the purpose of highlighting this diversity is to open up new opportunities and avenues where future research can contribute to the broader objectives of social science research. As this research highlights the ways through which these heterogeneities are camouflaged and systematically discouraged vis-à-vis urban governance and urban development to regulate socio-economic groups and social inequalities, it is equally important to dig deeper into the intersectionality of different identities, lived experiences, and different

conceptualisations of the urban spaces. Rendering urbanism as a social construct means deconstruction of the dominant discourses to render the strange familiar and the familiar strange.

As this research has shown, the dominance of discourse reflects power hierarchies in society. The purpose of this research is to dislocate and unsettle the legitimised hegemonic discourses to represent a tool against structural exploitation and domination. In this way, this research attempts to engender various sets of possibilities to read texts in their socio-political contexts. It is in this way that the public policy discourse can be judged, criticised, and democratised to make societies more inclusive.

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