Differential migration prospects, skill formation, and welfare
Differential migration prospects, skill formation, and welfare
Dokument öffnen (360.1KB)Datum der Veröffentlichung
12.2011Verlag / herausgebende Einrichtung
Center for Development Research (ZEF), University of BonnVerlagsort
BonnMetadaten
Zur Langanzeige
Zitierbarer Link (Handle URI) 
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/12252
Inhalt
This paper develops a one sector, two-input model with endogenous human capital formation. The two inputs are two types of skilled labor: “engineering,” which exerts a positive externality on total factor productivity, and “law,” which does not. The paper shows that a marginal prospect of migration by engineers increases human capital accumulation of both types of workers (engineers and lawyers), and also the number of engineers who remain in the country. These two effects are socially desirable, since they move the economy from the (inefficient) free-market equilibrium towards the social optimum. The paper also shows that if the externality effect of engineering is sufficiently powerful, everyone will be better off as a consequence of the said prospect of migration, including the engineers who lose the migration “lottery,” and even the individuals who practice law.
Schlagwörter
Heterogeneous human capital, Differential externality effects, Migration of educated workers, Human capital formation, Efficient acquisition of human capital, Beneficial brain drain
Klassifikation (DDC)
300 Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie, Anthropologie 320 Politik 330 WirtschaftErstpublikation
https://www.zef.de/fileadmin/user_upload/zef_dp_160.pdfReihe, Nummer
ZEF-Discussion Papers on Development Policy ; 160Stark, Oded; Zakharenko, Roman: Differential migration prospects, skill formation, and welfare. Bonn: Center for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn, 2011. In: ZEF-Discussion Papers on Development Policy, 160.
Online-Ausgabe in bonndoc: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/12252
Online-Ausgabe in bonndoc: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/12252
@techreport{handle:20.500.11811/12252,
author = {{Oded Stark} and {Roman Zakharenko}},
title = {Differential migration prospects, skill formation, and welfare},
publisher = {Center for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn},
year = 2011,
month = dec,
series = {ZEF-Discussion Papers on Development Policy},
volume = 160,
note = {This paper develops a one sector, two-input model with endogenous human capital formation. The two inputs are two types of skilled labor: “engineering,” which exerts a positive externality on total factor productivity, and “law,” which does not. The paper shows that a marginal prospect of migration by engineers increases human capital accumulation of both types of workers (engineers and lawyers), and also the number of engineers who remain in the country. These two effects are socially desirable, since they move the economy from the (inefficient) free-market equilibrium towards the social optimum. The paper also shows that if the externality effect of engineering is sufficiently powerful, everyone will be better off as a consequence of the said prospect of migration, including the engineers who lose the migration “lottery,” and even the individuals who practice law.},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/12252}
}
author = {{Oded Stark} and {Roman Zakharenko}},
title = {Differential migration prospects, skill formation, and welfare},
publisher = {Center for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn},
year = 2011,
month = dec,
series = {ZEF-Discussion Papers on Development Policy},
volume = 160,
note = {This paper develops a one sector, two-input model with endogenous human capital formation. The two inputs are two types of skilled labor: “engineering,” which exerts a positive externality on total factor productivity, and “law,” which does not. The paper shows that a marginal prospect of migration by engineers increases human capital accumulation of both types of workers (engineers and lawyers), and also the number of engineers who remain in the country. These two effects are socially desirable, since they move the economy from the (inefficient) free-market equilibrium towards the social optimum. The paper also shows that if the externality effect of engineering is sufficiently powerful, everyone will be better off as a consequence of the said prospect of migration, including the engineers who lose the migration “lottery,” and even the individuals who practice law.},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/12252}
}
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