Four Essays in Auction Theory and Contest Theory
Four Essays in Auction Theory and Contest Theory
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DissertationDate of Exam
06.07.2018Date of Publication
06.07.2018Advisor
Moldovanu, BennyCo-Referee
Tatur, TymonMetadata
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Abstract
This thesis consists of four essays that belong to the literature on the theory of auctions and the theory of contests. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are devoted to the research on auctions and study the role of symmetry in auction design. In Chapter 1, I show how the designer can favor one of the bidders by choosing auction rules even if the chosen auction has to be symmetric. In Chapter 2, the symmetric revenue-maximizing auction is completely characterized. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 contribute to the contest theory. In Chapter 3, the role of head starts in search contests is investigated. Chapter 4 finds optimal prize structures of elimination contests for a general form of the designer's objective.
Classification (DDC)
330 WirtschaftKnyazev, Dmitriy: Four Essays in Auction Theory and Contest Theory. - Bonn, 2018. - Dissertation, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn.
Online-Ausgabe in bonndoc: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-51320
Online-Ausgabe in bonndoc: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-51320
@phdthesis{handle:20.500.11811/7464,
urn: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-51320,
author = {{Dmitriy Knyazev}},
title = {Four Essays in Auction Theory and Contest Theory},
school = {Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn},
year = 2018,
month = jul,
note = {This thesis consists of four essays that belong to the literature on the theory of auctions and the theory of contests. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are devoted to the research on auctions and study the role of symmetry in auction design. In Chapter 1, I show how the designer can favor one of the bidders by choosing auction rules even if the chosen auction has to be symmetric. In Chapter 2, the symmetric revenue-maximizing auction is completely characterized. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 contribute to the contest theory. In Chapter 3, the role of head starts in search contests is investigated. Chapter 4 finds optimal prize structures of elimination contests for a general form of the designer's objective.},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/7464}
}
urn: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-51320,
author = {{Dmitriy Knyazev}},
title = {Four Essays in Auction Theory and Contest Theory},
school = {Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn},
year = 2018,
month = jul,
note = {This thesis consists of four essays that belong to the literature on the theory of auctions and the theory of contests. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are devoted to the research on auctions and study the role of symmetry in auction design. In Chapter 1, I show how the designer can favor one of the bidders by choosing auction rules even if the chosen auction has to be symmetric. In Chapter 2, the symmetric revenue-maximizing auction is completely characterized. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 contribute to the contest theory. In Chapter 3, the role of head starts in search contests is investigated. Chapter 4 finds optimal prize structures of elimination contests for a general form of the designer's objective.},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/7464}
}
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