Essays in Financial Economics
Essays in Financial Economics
Dokument öffnen (1.7MB)Art der Hochschulschrift
DissertationPrüfungsdatum
09.07.2021Datum der Veröffentlichung
30.08.2021Erstgutachter
Szalay, DezsöZweitgutachter
Mitkov, YuliyanMetadaten
Zur Langanzeige
Zitierbare Links 
Inhalt
This dissertation is composed of four self-contained chapters studying how financial markets affect the governance of public companies. The first chapter shows how large shareholders can engage in governance when there is an informational spillover to credit markets. In the second chapter, we investigate the role of strategic communication for the efficient allocation of control rights via takeovers. In Chapters 3 and 4, we study how financial markets affect corporate decision-making by enabling investors to decouple their voting power from their economic exposure. Chapter 3 provides a classification of different decoupling techniques, whereas Chapter 4 develops a cost-benefit analysis of the most prominent decoupling technique called vote trading.
Schlagwörter
takeovers, tender offers, cheap talk, signaling, blockholders, debt maturity structure, trading, exit, voice, decoupling techniques, empty voting, vote trading, majority rules, information transmission, shareholder activism
Klassifikation (DDC)
330 WirtschaftVoss, Paul: Essays in Financial Economics. - Bonn, 2021. - Dissertation, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn.
Online-Ausgabe in bonndoc: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-63688
Online-Ausgabe in bonndoc: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-63688
@phdthesis{handle:20.500.11811/9287,
urn: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-63688,
author = {{Paul Voss}},
title = {Essays in Financial Economics},
school = {Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn},
year = 2021,
month = aug,
note = {This dissertation is composed of four self-contained chapters studying how financial markets affect the governance of public companies. The first chapter shows how large shareholders can engage in governance when there is an informational spillover to credit markets. In the second chapter, we investigate the role of strategic communication for the efficient allocation of control rights via takeovers. In Chapters 3 and 4, we study how financial markets affect corporate decision-making by enabling investors to decouple their voting power from their economic exposure. Chapter 3 provides a classification of different decoupling techniques, whereas Chapter 4 develops a cost-benefit analysis of the most prominent decoupling technique called vote trading.},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/9287}
}
urn: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-63688,
author = {{Paul Voss}},
title = {Essays in Financial Economics},
school = {Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn},
year = 2021,
month = aug,
note = {This dissertation is composed of four self-contained chapters studying how financial markets affect the governance of public companies. The first chapter shows how large shareholders can engage in governance when there is an informational spillover to credit markets. In the second chapter, we investigate the role of strategic communication for the efficient allocation of control rights via takeovers. In Chapters 3 and 4, we study how financial markets affect corporate decision-making by enabling investors to decouple their voting power from their economic exposure. Chapter 3 provides a classification of different decoupling techniques, whereas Chapter 4 develops a cost-benefit analysis of the most prominent decoupling technique called vote trading.},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/9287}
}
Die folgenden Nutzungsbestimmungen sind mit dieser Ressource verbunden:
