

Ukraine - NATO Identity Politics 1997–2018
Representations of National Identity on the Question of Accession

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Abstract

This dissertation analyses the changes in national identity among the ruling political elites in Ukraine. Specifically, it argues that there is a constitutive relationship between changes in foreign policy and transformations in the discursive articulation of Ukraine's identity. The argument is developed on the basis of a longitudinal study on Ukraine-NATO identity politics from 1997 to 2018. Ukraine has been an outlier in the NATO enlargement process: it has had territorial disputes and a protracted armed conflict, it has neither reached a consensus on its Euro-Atlantic integration policy within the country nor has it ensured full support of NATO membership. Yet, despite the lack of a formal invitation to join NATO, Ukraine's ruling elites managed to adopt amendments to the Constitution, fixing the aspirations of NATO membership in 2019. This dissertation explores the intertwined nature of national debates on NATO accession, placing trends in national identity projects in their historical national and international contexts. It aims to contribute to the literature of Ukrainian national identity, bridging the gap between the national and international.

The research takes into account structural changes of Ukrainian politics and national identity articulation, applying a discourse-analytical approach to a wider political debate. The time framework is divided into four periods, which correspond to foreign policy shifts in regard to NATO accession policy. This periodization allows us to compare longitudinal changes in meanings attached to the national Self and constitutive Others, and to compare changes in the articulation of security in discourses. The study thus establishes a constitutive link between a change in national identity meanings and the adoption of distinct policy directions. Foreign policy is treated as identity politics.

The results of the dissertation provide a nuanced understanding of a variety of positions on Ukraine-NATO relations that were constructed within three basic discourses on NATO accession. Russia, NATO, and the U.S. are constitutive Others that shape identity representations of Ukraine into different projects of identity articulated by basic discourses. Representations which became incompatible with political realities and other national identity representations disappeared from those discourses. The national identity project constructed by the dominant pro-NATO discourse provided a justification for fixing NATO accession in the constitution.

Kurzfassung

In dieser Dissertation werden die Veränderungen der nationalen Identität der herrschenden politischen Eliten in der Ukraine analysiert. Insbesondere wird argumentiert, dass es eine konstitutive Beziehung zwischen Veränderungen in der Außenpolitik und Transformationen in der diskursiven Artikulation der ukrainischen Identität gibt. Das Argument wird auf der Grundlage einer Längsschnittstudie zur Identitätspolitik der Ukraine und der NATO von 1997 bis 2018 entwickelt. Die Ukraine war ein Ausreißer im NATO-Erweiterungsprozess - sie hatte territoriale Streitigkeiten und einen langwierigen bewaffneten Konflikt, sie hat weder einen Konsens über ihre euro-atlantische Integrationspolitik innerhalb des Landes erreicht noch hat sie die volle Unterstützung der NATO-Mitgliedschaft sichergestellt. Trotz des Fehlens einer förmlichen Einladung zum NATO-Beitritt gelang es den herrschenden Eliten der Ukraine jedoch, Verfassungsänderungen zu verabschieden, mit denen die Bestrebungen für eine NATO-Mitgliedschaft im Jahr 2019 festgelegt wurden. In dieser Arbeit wird die Verflechtung der nationalen Debatten über den NATO-Beitritt untersucht, wobei Trends in nationalen Identitätsprojekten in ihren historischen nationalen und internationalen Kontext eingeordnet werden. Sie soll einen Beitrag zur Literatur über die ukrainische nationale Identität leisten und die Kluft zwischen der nationalen und der internationalen Ebene überbrücken.

Die Untersuchung berücksichtigt die strukturellen Veränderungen in der ukrainischen Politik und die Artikulation der nationalen Identität, indem sie einen diskursanalytischen Ansatz auf eine breitere politische Debatte anwendet. Der zeitliche Rahmen ist in vier Perioden unterteilt, die den außenpolitischen Veränderungen im Hinblick auf die NATO-Beitrittspolitik entsprechen. Diese Periodisierung ermöglicht es uns, Längsschnittveränderungen in den Bedeutungen, die dem nationalen Selbst und konstitutiven Anderen beigemessen werden, sowie Veränderungen in der Artikulation von Sicherheit in Diskursen zu vergleichen. Die Studie stellt somit einen konstitutiven Zusammenhang zwischen einer Veränderung der Bedeutungen der nationalen Identität und der Annahme unterschiedlicher politischer Richtungen her. Außenpolitik wird als Identitätspolitik behandelt.

Die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit ermöglichen ein nuanciertes Verständnis einer Vielzahl von Positionen zu den Beziehungen zwischen der Ukraine und der NATO, die im Rahmen von drei grundlegenden Diskursen über den NATO-Beitritt konstruiert wurden. Russland, die NATO und die USA sind konstitutive Andere, die die Identitätsdarstellungen der Ukraine zu unterschiedlichen Identitätsprojekten formen, die durch grundlegende Diskurse artikuliert werden. Darstellungen, die mit den politischen Realitäten und anderen nationalen Identitätsdarstellungen unvereinbar wurden, verschwanden aus diesen Diskursen. Das vom vorherrschenden Pro-NATO-Diskurs konstruierte nationale Identitätsprojekt lieferte eine Rechtfertigung für die Verankerung des NATO-Beitritts in der Verfassung.

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List of abbreviations

ATO - Anti-Terrorist Operation
CDA – Critical Discourse Analysis
CEE – Central and Eastern Europe
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States
EU – European Union
FPA - Foreign Policy Analysis
G7 – Group of Seven
IR – International Relations
MAP – Membership Action Plan
MP – Member of Parliament
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP – Partnership for Peace program
SBU – Security Service of Ukraine
WEU - Western European Union

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INTRODUCTION

As a crucial component of a modern state, national identity has become a driving force of national and international politics. The phenomenon of national identity is inherently contingent on the definition of a nation. The way the nation is defined may provide grounds for actions, such as implementation of nation-building strategies, development of identity politics, the (re)definition of state boundaries or (re)formulation of foreign policy directions. Therefore, studying the transformation of national identity may contribute to an understanding of other political phenomena, particularly changes in foreign policy.

Unlike approaches to national identity as a psychological¹ and sociological² phenomenon, this dissertation studies national identity as a discursive construction.³ The reason being is that the meanings of what constitutes a nation are mostly articulated through discursive practices. The longitudinal study of national identity change in discourse intends to bring light to the intertwined nature of national identity and foreign policy. As such, the study of national identity shifts in political discourse may reveal how foreign policy choices are contested and justified. Focusing on a case study of Ukrainian debates on membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), this dissertation demonstrates the ways in which national identity construction contributed to the promulgation of NATO accession policies in Ukraine.

There has been a growing interest in national identity research due to the redefinition of territorial boundaries and the emergence of newly independent states

¹ William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

² Karl W. Deutsch et.al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1962); Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991); David D. Laitin, *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the near Abroad* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998).

³ Paul Ricoeur, "Narrative Identity," *Philosophy Today* 35, no. 1 (1991): 73–81; Iver B. Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1996); Wodak Ruth, Rudolf De Cillia, Martin Reisigl, and Karin Liebhart, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh University Press, 2009); Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver, *European Integration and National Identity. The Challenge of the Nordic States*, Vol. 29 (London and New York: Routledge, 2002); Stephen White and Valentina Feklyunina, *Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Other Europes* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Yael R. Kaplan, Tamir Sheafer, and Shaul R. Shenhav, "Do We Have Something Common? Understanding National Identities through a Metanarrative Analysis," *Nations and Nationalism* 28, no. 4 (2022): 1152–72.

in the post-Soviet period. After 30 years of independence, the territorial borders and national identities of the post-Soviet states are still in motion, which makes the research of the transformation of national identities a timely question.

Civil unrest and military actions are probably the most powerful factors in the process of national identity change, especially when the meanings of national identity are contested. After gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine experienced a series of turning points when its state borders and the meaning of a nation were challenged. This was particularly evident in 2003-2004 during the events known as the Orange Revolution, and in 2013-2014 during the events labelled as Euromaidan, which later resulted in a loss of control over Crimea by the Ukrainian government and followed by escalation of violence in Eastern Ukraine. Finally, the Ukrainian state faced a major challenge in 2022 after the initiation of overt military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The impact of these events on the transformation of the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian national identity together with a debate on their role in policy change have been an issue of academic inquiry.⁴ This dissertation contributes to this literature delving into domestic debates on foreign policy over the meanings of national identity among the ruling political elites.

In the post-Soviet period, nation-building in Ukraine has been a complex, multidimensional process which reflected the contestation of meanings of the new Ukrainian nation. The case of Ukrainian national identity has been characterised by the intertwined ethnic, linguistic, and regional identities that were associated with different understandings of the Ukrainian nation. As a result, after gaining independence, the formation of loyalties to a new state became central in the elite-driven identity politics agenda, which aimed to transform a heterogeneous Ukrainian society into a Ukrainian nation. *Identity politics* is defined as a set of activities of

⁴ Volodymyr Kulyk, "National Identity in Time of War: Ukraine after the Russian Aggression of 2014 and 2022," *Problems of Post-Communism* 71, no. 4 (2024): 296-308; Aaron F. Brantly, "Forged in the Fires of War: The Rise of a New Ukrainian Identity," *Policy Studies* 45, no. 3-4 (2023): 377-401; Murat E. Özgür, and Ayla Deniz, "Diaspora Mobilization and Identity Construction of Ukrainian Immigrants in Turkey: 'Ukrainians Started to Become More Ukrainian,'" *Nationalities Papers*, 52, no. 6 (2024): 1393-1412; Volodymyr Kulyk, "What Have We Learned about Ethnonational Identities in Ukraine?," *Nationalities Papers* 51, no. 5: Special Issue on Peripheral Elites in West European Central States' Apparatus (2023): 975-90; Erik S. Herron and Khrystyna Pelchar, "Undivided Ukraine: Evidence of Rallying Effects and an Emerging National Consensus," *Problems of Post-Communism* 71, no. 4 (2024): 283-295.

actors of the political processes that construct and shape national and other forms of identity. Identity politics includes but not confined to the implementation of new policies⁵, such as language policies⁶ and teaching of history⁷, as well as symbolic practices, such as memory politics⁸, among others. In the post-Soviet states, political elites played a major role in the construction of new national identities⁹, particularly, the ruling elites, who defined the new criteria of belonging to a national polity and redefined the role of the state in identity politics and in the international arena. National identity may be constructed by policies and practices, either purposefully or unintentionally, representations of which have been especially evident through the study of discourse.

In this dissertation, *national identity* is construed as a collective identity of a community that considers itself a nation. Criteria for communities that could be considered a nation are situated in a historical, political and religious context and have been changing over time¹⁰. In this dissertation, *national identity* is narrowly

⁵ Aleksey I. Miller, "Politika Stroitelstva Natsii - Gosudarstva na Ukraine," *Politicheskaya Nauka* 1 (2010): 76–99.

⁶ Dominique Arel, "Language Politics in Independent Ukraine: Towards One or Two State Languages?," *Nationalities Papers* 23, no. 3 (1995): 597–622; Taras Kuzio, "National Identity in Independent Ukraine: An Identity in Transition," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 2, no. 4 (1996): 582–608; Volodymyr Kulyk, "Language Identity, Linguistic Diversity, and Political Cleavages," *Nations and Nationalism* 17, no. 2 (2011): 627–48; Laura Eras, "War, Identity Politics, and Attitudes toward a Linguistic Minority: Prejudice against Russian-Speaking Ukrainians in Ukraine between 1995 and 2018," *Nationalities Papers* 51, no. 1 (2023): 114–35.

⁷ Nancy Popson, "The Ukrainian History Textbook: Introducing Children to the 'Ukrainian Nation,'" *Nationalities Papers* 29, no. 2 (2001): 325–50; Tamara Poleshchuk, "Obraz Rosii na Storinkakh Shkilnykh Pidruchnykyv z Istorii Ukrainy," *Pedagogichna Dumka* 3 (2010): 97–106; Anastasia A. Zhurukhina, "Politizatsiia Istorii na Postsovet'skom Prostranstve (na Primere Ukrain'skikh Uchebnikov Istorii)," *Vestnik RGGU. Seriya: Politologiya. Istorija. Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya* 1, no. 44 (2010): 180–92; Kateryna Pryshchepa, "Nation-Building and School History Lessons in Ukraine after 2014," in *The Politics of Memory in Poland and Ukraine*, ed. Tomasz Stryjek and Joanna Konieczna-Salamatin (London: Routledge, 2021), 120–35.

⁸ Sergey V. Kozlov, "Regionalnye Varianty Istoricheskoi Pamiati Postsovet'skoi Ukrainy," *Tsennosti i Smyslы* 6, no. 34 (2014): 20–31; Anna Wylegała, "Managing the Difficult Past: Ukrainian Collective Memory and Public Debates on History," *Nationalities Papers* 45, no. 5 (2017): 780–97; Tanya Zaharchenko, "Polyphonic Dichotomies: Memory and Identity in Today's Ukraine," *Demokratyzatsiya* 21, no. 2 (2013): 241–70; Tatiana Zhurzhenko, "A Divided Nation? Reconsidering the Role of Identity Politics in the Ukraine Crisis," *Die Friedens-Warte* 89, no. 1/2 (2014): 249–267; Oxana Shevel, "The Politics of Memory in a Divided Society: A Comparison of Post-Franco Spain and Post-Soviet Ukraine," *Slavic Review* 70, no. 1 (2011): 137–64; Artemii A. Plekhanov, "Istoricheskaya Politika v Gosudarstvennom Diskurse Ukrainy v Postsovet'skii Period," *Vestnik Permskogo Nauchnogo Tsentra* 5 (2016): 68–76; Maksym Kovalov, "When Lenin Becomes Lennon: Decommunisation and Politics of Memory in Ukraine," *Europe - Asia Studies* 74, no. 5 (2022): 709–33.

⁹ David Lane, "Identity Formation and Political Elites in the Post-Socialist States," *Europe - Asia Studies* 63, no. 6 (2011): 925–34.

¹⁰ Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background* (New York: Routledge, 2017); Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*; John A. Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press Book, 2017); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006); Smith, *National Identity*; Stein Rokkan, *State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan: Based on His Collected Works*, eds. Stein Kuhnle, Peter Flora, and Derek Urwin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Tim Endensor, *National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life* (London:

defined as a discursive construction of meanings about the nation, which can be articulated through a combination of discursive representations of Self, expressed and manifested through articulation of sameness, otherness, and boundary construction in articulation of security, danger, and threat.

Like any identity, national identity is relational and constructed with reference to Others, both internal¹¹ and external.¹² Therefore, examining the transformation of national identities presupposes research on re-articulation of constitutive Others in discourse, which may be othered on the basis of different ethnicity, political views, or foreign policy orientation. For Ukrainian identity, Russia and Europe have been regarded as the most significant external Others.¹³ The importance of international actors to the national Self makes the national identity of Ukraine intertwined with foreign policy.¹⁴ This is the reason why different foreign policy preferences across Ukrainian society were perceived as a problematic issue that split the national polity¹⁵ between the East and the West. For Ukrainians, the “European choice”

Bloomsbury Publishing, 2002); Serhii Plokhyy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

¹¹ Johnson, Corey and Amanda Coleman, “The Internal Other: Exploring the Dialectical Relationship between Regional Exclusion and the Construction of National Identity,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 102, no. 4 (2012): 863–80; Ararat L Osipian and Alexandr L. Osipian, “Regional Diversity and Divided Memories in Ukraine: Contested Past as Electoral Resource, 2004-2010,” *East European Politics and Societies* 26, no. 3 (2012): 616–42

¹² White and Feklyunina, *Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*; Mykola Riabchuk, “Ukrainians as Russia’s Negative ‘Other’: History Comes Full Circle,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 49, no. 1 (2016): 75–85; Iryna Zhyrun, “Ukrainian Discourses on NATO: Securitization, Otherness, and Their Effects on Russo-Ukrainian Relations,” *Russian Politics* 8, no. 2 (2023): 165–80.

¹³ Riabchuk, “Ukrainians as Russia’s Negative ‘Other,’” 75–85; Dariya Orlova, “‘Europe’ as a Normative Model in the Mediatized Discourse of Ukrainian Political Elites,” *Europe - Asia Studies* 69, no. 2 (2017): 222–41; Michał Wawrzonek, “Ukraine in the ‘Gray Zone’: Between the ‘Russkiy Mir’ and Europe,” *East European Politics and Societies* 28, no. 4 (2014): 758–80; White and Feklyunina, *Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*; Alema Vieira, “Ukraine, Russia and the Strategic Partnership Dynamics in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood: Recalibrating the EU’s ‘Self’, ‘We’ and ‘Other,’” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29, no. 1 (2016): 128–50; Anastasiya Pshenychnykh, “Ukrainian Perspectives on the Self, the EU and Russia: An Intersemiotic Analysis of Ukrainian Newspapers,” *European Security* 28, no. 3 (2019): 341–59; Salome Minesashvili, “Before and after 2014: Russo-Ukrainian Conflict and Its Impact on European Discourses in Ukraine,” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 23, no. 3 (2023): 416–87; Salome Minesashvili, *European Identities During Wars and Revolutions. Change Under Crisis in Georgia and Ukraine* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).

¹⁴ Ilyia Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine* Vol. 103 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Per Ekman, “Painful Moments and Realignment: Explaining Ukraine’s Foreign Policy, 2014-2022,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 71, no. 3 (2024): 232-244.

¹⁵ Mikhail A. Molchanov, “National Identity and Foreign Policy Orientation in Ukraine,” in *Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives*, eds. Jennifer D.P. Moroney, Taras Kuzio, and Mikhail A. Molchanov (London: Praeger, 2002), 227–63; Mikhail V. Ilyin, “Etapy Stanovleniya Vnutrennei Geopolitiki Rossii i Ukrainy,” *POLIS. Politicheskie Issledovaniya* 3 (1998): 82–94; Olga Popovych, “Ukrainska Identychnist mizh Zakhodom ta Skhodom u Politychnomu Dyskursi Vkonavchoi Vlady (1994-1999),” *Naukovi Zapiski [Nacionalnogo Universitetu Ostrozka Akademiya]. Ser.: Kulturologiya* 7 (2011): 334–41; Lilia V. Tomaichuk, “Vliyanie

seemed to be attractive, however, cultural, historical and economic ties to Russia were evident. The antagonistic nature of this choice became particularly salient during the presidential elections in 2004 and civil and military confrontations in 2013-2014.

Starting from 2013, the social and political events unleashed a number of ways in which national identity and state policies have been transformed. Consequently, in recent studies, researchers have raised the issues of national identity change at the level of the general population¹⁶, analysed the practices in consumption and culture¹⁷ and introduction of new symbolic practices¹⁸ by the ruling political elites. Researchers also approached the formation of the Ukrainian identity from new perspectives, analysing it as a source of security¹⁹ and studying identity as post-colonial development with an emphasis on the study of civilizational identity.²⁰ So

Natsionalnoi Identichnosti na Vneshnepoliticheskie Orientatsii Postsovetikh Respublik,” *Upravlencheskoe Konsultirovanie* 1, no. 45 (2012): 59–67.

¹⁶ Grigore Pop-Eleches and Graeme B. Robertson, “Identity and Political Preferences in Ukraine—before and after the Euromaidan,” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 34, no. 2–3 (2018): 107–18; Lowell Barrington, “Citizenship as a Cornerstone of Civic National Identity in Ukraine,” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 37, no. 2 (2021): 155–73; Dominique Arel, “How Ukraine Has Become More Ukrainian,” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 34, no. 2–3 (2018): 1–4; Andrew Wilson, “Ukraine at War: Baseline Identity and Social Construction,” *Nations and Nationalism*, 30, no. 1 (2024): 8–17; Brantly, “Forged in the Fires of War.”

¹⁷ Oleksandra Seliverstova, “‘Consuming’ National Identity in Western Ukraine,” *Nationalities Papers* 45, no. 1 (2017): 61–79; Maryna Berezutska, “Ukrainian Music in Shaping of National Identity: A 65-Years-Long Creative Path of a Bandura Ensemble in the Dnipro City’s Cultural Space,” *National Identities* 25, no. 1 (2023): 75–96.

¹⁸ Dmitry V. Berezniakov and Sergey V. Kozlov, “Simvolicheskaya Politika Postsovetsoi Ukrainy: Konstruirovaniye Legitimiruyushchego Narrativa,” *POLIS. Politicheskije Issledovaniya* 4 (2015): 34–45; Nadezhda M. Efemishch, “Proshloe v Konstruirovani Natsionalnoi Identichnosti: Grand-Narrativy Ukrainy,” *Vestnik Permskogo Universiteta. Politologiya*, no. 2 (2018): 77–90; Plekhanov, “Formirovaniye Kalendaria Gosudarstvennykh Prazdnikov i Pamiatnykh Dat v Postsovetsoi Ukraine,” 116–32; Lina Klymenko, “Choosing Mazepa Over Lenin: The Transformation of Monuments and Political Order in Post-Maidan Ukraine,” *Europe - Asia Studies* 72, no. 5 (2020): 815–36; Tatiana Zhurzhenko, “Fighting Empire, Weaponising Culture: The Conflict and the Restrictions on Russian Mass Culture in Post-Maidan Ukraine,” *Europe - Asia Studies* 73, no. 8 (2021): 1441–66; Oleh Poshtedyn, and Kateryna Kashchuk, “The Influence of the Decommunization Policy on the Formation of Ukrainian National Identity,” *Journal of Liberty and International Affairs* 9, no. 1 (2023): 364–73.

¹⁹ Lina E. Belovetska, “Problema Zberezhennja Natsionalnoi Identichnosti yak Skladovoi Duhovnoi Bezpeki Ukrainykoho Suspilstva,” *Duhovnist Osobistosti: Metodologiya, Teoriya i Praktyka* 2, no. 77 (2017): 6–14; Susanne Szkola, “The Self / Other Space and Spinning the Net of Ontological Insecurities in Ukraine and Beyond: (Discursive) Reconstructions of Boundaries in the EU Eastern Partnership Countries Vis-à-Vis the EU and Russia,” in *Crisis and Change in Post-Cold War Global Politics*, eds. Erica Resende, Dovile Budrite, and Didem Buhari-Gulmez (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 225–54; Michael Dunford, “Causes of the Crisis in Ukraine,” *International Critical Thought* 13, no. 1 (2023): 89–125.

²⁰ Tetiana S. Voropayeva, “Yevropeiska Tsyvilizatsiina Identychnist yak Chynnyk Konsolidatsii Gromadyan Ukrayiny u Postkolonialnu Dobu (1991–2018 rr.),” *Hileya: Naukovyi Visnyk* 138, no. 2 (2018): 139–46; Yana Prymachenko, “Antykolonialnyi Dyskurs OUN/UPA v Suchasnomu Ukrainskom Konteksti Borotby za Yevropeisku Identychnist,” *Ukrayinskyi Istorychnyi Zbirnyk* no. 17 (2014): 328–38; Oksana Khimyak, “Tsyvilizatsiyna Identyfikatsiya Ukrayiny,” *Ukrayinska Natsionalna Ideya: Realii ta Perspektyvy Rozvytku* 26 (2014): 156–63; Iuliia Tsyryfa, “The Formation of the European Identity of Ukraine: Key Factors and Principles,” *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, no. 30 (2013): 43–63; Bohumil Doboš, “The Tale of Two Empires: Ukraine between the West and Russia,” *Journal of Regional Security* 18, no. 1 (2023): 77–96.

far, the body of research on identity politics in Ukraine has been particularly focused on social and political transformations in society.

Despite a plethora of literature on the Ukrainian identity, some important problems have been overlooked. First, researchers have focused on the analysis of identity construction in a particular period. As a result, there is a lack of longitudinal studies that would illuminate the development of identity within a larger time framework. Second, due to the transformation of the security context in Ukraine after 2014, NATO has become an important Other in Ukraine's foreign policy. However, the construction of the Ukrainian identity in its engagement with NATO has not been thoroughly studied from an identity perspective. Instead, the views on NATO have been included as part of the European integration of Ukraine²¹ despite the fact that the European Union (EU) and NATO are different organisations with distinct goals, ambitions, and interests. Thus, the transformation of the regional security context and the increasing engagement with NATO could possibly have an impact on the construction of the Ukrainian national identity in relation to NATO as the Other. The study of national identity in the context of Ukraine-NATO relations may bring understanding to the nature of foreign policy debates in regard to NATO accession policy and a connection between discursive identity change and foreign policy. A possibility of NATO membership of Ukraine was claimed to be one of the reasons for escalation of military conflict with Russia that started in 2022. Third, recently there have been few studies that would pay attention to the issue of identity construction by the Ukrainian political elites and the constitutive role of identity in the policymaking process. Even though the reviewed studies provide evidence of different understandings of the Ukrainian national identity, there has been insufficient attention given to the changes in ruling political elites' consensus and the contestation on the meanings of national identity after 2014.

In the aftermath of the social, political and security transformations that took place in Ukraine after 2014, the study of national identity contributes to understanding those changes. What meanings of identity were contested and

²¹ See White and Feklyunina, *Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*, 150-161.

changed? How do these changes affect identity continuity? And how do the transformed national identity meanings contribute to or interfere with a policy of NATO accession? The constitutive role of the transformation of national identity meanings and their contestation among the Ukrainian ruling political elites lie at the centre of the inquiry. This work aims to contribute to the literature on the development of the Ukrainian post-Soviet identity. It intends to make a case for bridging the national with the international, demonstrating an interplay between the articulations of Self, Other, and the discursive struggle for meaning making by the political elites of Ukraine in debates about foreign policy on NATO accession.

Literature Review

The study of identity has been central in constructivist approaches in International Relations (IR) and Political Science, yet the notion of identity has not been confined to exclusively constructivist paradigm. In IR realist school there is an understanding of state's "status" (that can be interpreted as ascribing an identity) in the international system, such as "great power" or "superpower", "middle power" and "small states." The definition of the status is based on unequal distribution of capabilities in international system.²² Defensive realists argued that it was harder to conquer a state with a strong group identity.²³ Neoclassical realism added a nuanced treatment of domestic forces with the classical realist understanding of states and their behavior.²⁴ It put forward a perspective where national identity presented a nexus of symbols and strategies that provided the state with a "unique content of political culture, from which it can construct its national interests and orient its foreign policies."²⁵ For constructivists identity became central in their scientific endeavours, as Lebow put it, identity became what power was to realism and wealth to liberalism.²⁶

²² Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Updated edition)* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003).

²³ Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999).

²⁴ Amelia Hadfield-Amkhan, *British Foreign Policy, National Identity, and Neoclassical Realism* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁶ Le Richard Ned Lebow, "Identity and International Relations," *International relations* 22, no. 4 (2008): 473-492.

While scholars in International Relations addressed the role of identity in state behaviour at international arena,²⁷ in Political Science there was more emphasis on the notion of a nation and its construction “from within” through implementation of identity politics.²⁸ Introduction of identity into the study of politics offered new alternatives to rational assumptions about state interests,²⁹ the study of conflicts³⁰ and cooperative behavior.³¹ Formation of collective identity suggested peaceful relations between states and more successful integration into economic and political alliances.

One of the philosophical debates in International Relations is so-called “structure-agency” debate³² that has affected the understanding of the identity role across both non-constructivists and constructivist approaches. The question was to what extent the structural factors shaping international system and human agency altered foreign policy outcomes and decision-making environments.³³ Recognising the importance of identity in politics, the scholars differ in their assessment to what extent identity could be a causal factor in policy making. Some adopted the

²⁷ Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds. *The return of culture and identity in IR theory* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995); Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State* (New York: Routledge, 2008); Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*.

²⁸ Walker Connor, “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?,” *World politics* 24, no. 3 (1972): 319-355; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York: Verso Books, 2006).

²⁹ Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban missile crisis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999)..

³⁰ See Weldes, *Constructing National Interests*; David Campbell, *Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

³¹ Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 02 (1994): 384–96; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*. Vol. 67 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Emanuel Adler, and Michael Barnett, eds. *Security Communities*. No. 62. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Jae-Jung Suh, *Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliances* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

³² Chris Alden, Amnon Arran, and Ana Cristina Alves, *Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches* (London: Routledge, 2016).

³³ The issue was whether structure and agency can be distinguished discussed in the following works: Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” *International organization* 41, no. 3 (1987): 335-370; Alexander Wendt, “Levels of Analysis vs. Agents and Structures: Part III,” *Review of International Studies* 18, no. 2 (1992): 181-185; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, “Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations,” *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 4 (1991): 393-410; and Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, “Structure and Action: Further Comment,” *Review of International Studies* 18, no. 2 (1992): 187-188. Also debates between Doty R.L. and Wight C.: Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the Agent-Structure Problematique in International Relations Theory,” *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 3 (1997): 365-392; Roxanne Lynn Doty, “A Reply to Colin Wight,” *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 3 (1999): 387-390; Colin Wight, “Interpretation All the Way Down? a Reply to Roxanne Lynn Doty,” *European Journal of International Relations* 6, no. 3 (2000): 423-430; Colin Wight, “They Shoot Dead Horses Don’t They? Locating Agency in the Agent-Structure Problematique,” *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 1 (1999): 109-142.

dialectical relationship between identity and foreign policy where identity was causal to foreign policy decisions,³⁴ others viewed it as a result of international structure.³⁵

The “structure-agency” debate was the underlying theme within the subfield of International Relations - Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), theoretical underpinnings of which were based on positivist epistemology. The state and individuals were the main levels of analysis in FPA research that was rooted in assumption of rationality of individuals in the process of decision-making and implied establishment of cause-effect relations. As a key driver of political culture, national identity was thought as an intervening variable in Foreign Policy Research and could influence foreign policy behaviour of the state.³⁶ The study of states foreign policy was to explain the state behaviour, which was partly influenced by their domestic structure and particularity of decision-making process. For instance, democratic peace theory entailed more peaceful relations of democracies between themselves.

Constructivist school of thought brought identity study into Foreign Policy Analysis challenging the assumptions of foreign policy decision-making as a rational and linear process. It offered an alternative view to foreign policy emphasising the lack of transparency of the languages and underlying the power of discourse. Using discourse analysis in the study of foreign policy, constructivist scholars demonstrated how foreign policy had a co-constitutive role reproducing the notions of identity and national interest, which were also instrumentally used to provide the regime with legitimacy.³⁷ Identity and ideas are not independent variables in international relations, but “mediums” that in terms of national identity

³⁴ Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy*, 12-37; Ted Hopf, “Making Identity Count: Constructivism, Identity and IR Theory,” in *Making Identity Count: Building a National Identity Database*, eds. Ted Hopf, T. & Bentley Allan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 3–19.

³⁵ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425.

³⁶ See Hadfield-Amkhan, *British Foreign Policy, National Identity, and Neoclassical Realism*.

³⁷ Weldes, *Constructing National Interests*, 4; Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 3 (1993): 297–320; Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (London: Routledge, 2006); Marco Siddi, *European Identities and Foreign Policy Discourses on Russia: From the Ukraine to the Syrian Crisis* (London: Routledge, 2020).

make certain state actions in foreign policy “conceivable.”³⁸ In constructivist and particularly post-structuralist research, foreign policy process is thought as continually recreating national identity in a form of actions and authoritative declarations: “foreign policy is about national identity itself: about the core elements of sovereignty it seeks to defend, the values it stands for and seeks to promote abroad.”³⁹

Critical constructivists and post-structuralist researchers departed from assumptions that language and discourse also possessed a sort of power. In contrast with other strands of IR theorising, post-structuralist approach did not take key concepts (e.g. national interest) of International Relations as given, but implied that these make a point of contention in discourses.⁴⁰ Constructivists posited that discourse was understood as a cognitive structure⁴¹ that possessed a delimiting function provided the boundaries⁴² for policies within which the policy makers could formulate national interests and legitimately pursue foreign policies. Bringing the notion of contestation and questioning the pre-existent identities resulted in a growing role of empiricism aimed to bridge the gap between theoretical underpinnings and empirical evidence through elaboration of more rigorous methodologies of discourse analysis applied to the study of international politics.

Constructivist scholars differed in their evaluation of the extent to which discourse and foreign policy could be distinguished. Some separated discourse from foreign policy⁴³ and others considered foreign policy as discourse,⁴⁴ and argued for

³⁸ Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2002), 53.

³⁹ William Wallace, “Foreign Policy and National Identity in the United Kingdom,” *International Affairs* 67, no. 1 (1991): 65-80.

⁴⁰ Weldes, *Constructing National Interests*, 8-9.

⁴¹ See Siddi, *European Identities and Foreign Policy Discourses on Russia*.

⁴² Thomas Diez, “Setting the Limits: Discourse and EU Foreign Policy,” *Cooperation and conflict* 49, no. 3 (2014): 319-333.

⁴³ Henrik Larsen, *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe* (London: Routledge, 2005).

⁴⁴ Campbell, *Writing Security*; Lene Hansen, “Discourse Analysis, Post-Structuralism, and Foreign Policy,” in *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases 3*, 2nd edition, eds. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Timothy Dunne (Gosport: Oxford University Press, 2016), 94-112.

a discursive theory of foreign policy.⁴⁵ The variety of subjectively applied discursive approaches in IR produced criticism over lack of methodological rigor⁴⁶ which pushed for elaboration of discursive analytical frameworks,⁴⁷ new methodological techniques in IR constructivist research⁴⁸ which methodologically bridged IR foreign policy analysis and linguistics.⁴⁹

Discourse as a structure permits to certain extent overcome the dilemma of “structure-agency” problem. As a structure of meaning, discourse incorporates both structure and agency bringing several levels.⁵⁰ Larsen argued discourses did not mediate the pressures from external structures, instead, there was a mutual adaptation between external factors and discourses. He posited that discourse was primarily a domestic (not international) structural factor that framed foreign policy of the state.⁵¹ As a central concept in constructivist theorising, identity change is key for understanding foreign policy change. Identity constructions enable and constrain foreign policy agenda.⁵² Identity change has to do with the “structure-agency” problem and could be mediated treating identity as layered and “simultaneously constituted on mutually interacting levels of intersubjective meaning making.”⁵³ Therefore, theorised as a social and collective phenomenon, discursive study of foreign policy and identity may bridge the gap between individual agency of political decision makers and contribute to explanatory value of identity in formulation of foreign policy.

⁴⁵ Ole Wæver, “Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory,” in *European Integration and National Identity*, eds. Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 20-49.

⁴⁶ Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods,” *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 2 (1999): 225-54.

⁴⁷ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 17-36.

⁴⁸ Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations,” 225-54; Hopf, “Making Identity Count: Constructivism, Identity and IR Theory,” 3-19.

⁴⁹ See Senem Aydın-Düzgit, “Foreign Policy and Identity Change: Analysing Perceptions of Europe among the Turkish Public,” *Politics* 38, no. 1 (2018): 19-34; Senem Aydın-Düzgit, “Critical Discourse Analysis in Analysing European Union Foreign Policy: Prospects and Challenges,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 49, no. 3 (2014): 354-367; Siddi, *European Identities and Foreign Policy Discourses on Russia*.

⁵⁰ Larsen, *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis*, 26-27.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 198.

⁵² Linus Hagström and Karl Gustafsson, “Japan and Identity Change: Why It Matters in International Relations,” *Pacific Review* 28, no. 1 (2015): 1-22.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 6.

Depending on their understanding of identity, researchers apply different methodological approaches to the study of identity change. Some prefer sociological and statistical quantitative methods⁵⁴ that could provide a precise numerical measurement of the changes. These permit measurement of the change by identity components with an emphasis on ethnicity and language.⁵⁵ In Political Science, national identity change is often measured against the shifts within the civic/ethnic dichotomy,⁵⁶ in which identity may lean towards either its civic or ethnic extremity. Such an approach serves as a useful instrument to compare the changes that occur in the sentiment of national belonging. However, as a collective identity, national identity is more than just the aggregate number of individual identities. That is why it should be analysed in terms of change of meanings attached to the notion of a nation and their contestation by identity entrepreneurs.⁵⁷ As such, being a collective identity, national identity should be regarded as possessing a more complex structure of meanings and relationships than those provided by the sociological surveys with the pre-established categories in sociological approaches. Not only is it important *if* a change is taking place, but *how* this change allows identity continuity, and how the

⁵⁴ Marharyta Fabrykant, "Sravnitelnye Kolichestvennye Issledovaniya Natsionalnoi Identichnosti v Sovremennoi Sotsialnoi Psikhologii," *Sovremennaya Zarubezhnaya Psihologiya* 7, no. 4 (2018): 22–31; Volodymyr Kulyk, "National Identity in Ukraine: Impact of Euromaidan and the War," *Europe - Asia Studies* 68, no. 4 (2016): 588–608; Marharyta Fabrykant, "National Identity in the Contemporary Baltics: Comparative Quantitative Analysis," *Journal of Baltic Studies* 49, no. 3 (2018): 305–31; Pop-Eleches and Robertson, "Identity and Political Preferences in Ukraine—before and after the Euromaidan," 107–18; Christoph H. Steinhardt, Linda Chelan Li, and Yihong Jiang, "The Identity Shift in Hong Kong since 1997: Measurement and Explanation," *Journal of Contemporary China* 27, no. 110 (2018): 261–76.

⁵⁵ Ihor Stebelsky, "Ethnic Self-Identification in Ukraine, 1989–2001: Why More Ukrainians and Fewer Russians?," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 51, no. 1 (2009): 77–100; Valentin Todorov Mikhaylov and Stanisław Sala, "Subnational Identities in the Context of the Changing Internal Geopolitics. The Case of Post-Revolutionary Ukraine," *Bulletin of Geography. Socio-Economic Series* 39 (2018): 79–96; Stephen Shulman, "National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine," *Slavic Review* 64, no. 1 (Spring) (2005): 58–87.

⁵⁶ See Christian Albrekt Larsen, "Revitalizing the 'Civic' and 'Ethnic' Distinction. Perceptions of Nationhood across Two Dimensions, 44 Countries and Two Decades," *Nations and Nationalism* 23, no. 4 (2017): 970–93; Holley E. Hansen and Vicki L. Hesli, "National Identity: Civic, Ethnic, Hybrid, and Atomised Individuals," *Europe - Asia Studies* 61, no. 1 (2009): 1–28; Volodymyr Kulyk, "Language and Identity in Ukraine after Euromaidan," *Thesis Eleven* 136, no. 1 (2016): 90–106; Lowell W. Barrington, "Understanding Identity in Ukraine – and Elsewhere," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 34, no. 2–3 (2018): 179–82; Kulyk, "National Identity in Ukraine," 588–608; Gwendolyn Sasse and Alice Lackner, "War and State-Making in Ukraine: Forging a Civic Identity from Below?," *Ideology and Politics* 1, no. 12 (2019): 75–98; Volodymyr Kulyk and Henry E. Hale, "Imperfect Measures of Dynamic Identities: The Changing Impact of Ethnolinguistic Characteristics on Political Attitudes in Ukraine," *Nations and Nationalism* 28, no. 3 (2022): 841–60.

⁵⁷ Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott, "Identity as a Variable," *Perspectives on Politics* 4, no. 4 (2006): 695–711.

constructed identity facilitates or inhibits certain political actions. In order to detect changes in national identity meanings, discursive approaches are more suitable.

Within constructivists literature, the notion of identity has been linked to the concept of security⁵⁸ positing that “national security depends on national identity.”⁵⁹ Another body of literature connected identity with the notion of ontological security in International Relations. Being first coined by psychologist and introduced in sociology by Giddens, ontological security was defined as a sense of continuity and order in events⁶⁰ and security as being when it is possible to “answer fundamental existential questions which human life in some way addresses.”⁶¹ Identity is invoked by the officials to justify foreign policies, while policies inconsistent with identities and values are halted.⁶² The research program of ontological security adopted anthropomorphic approach to states that like people have a psychological need for a stable identity.⁶³ When emphasising the desire to maintain a stable sense of Self and its cultural properties, i.e. ensuring ontological security,⁶⁴ identity (of society or individual) is subject for security policy.⁶⁵ This raised the question of how to deal with the desire of stability in preserving identity in a changing context on the one hand and the notion of Self as evolutionary on the other.

The study of identity is conducted on different philosophical grounds which indicate differences in understanding/explaining identity phenomena. Identity research is situated on diverse scientific standpoints that range from positivist⁶⁶ to

⁵⁸ See Peter J. Katzenstein, Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security to *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) 1–27; Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests. A Sociology of International Relation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Suh, *Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliances*.

⁵⁹ Paul A. Kowert, “National Identity: Inside and Out,” in *Origins of National Interests*, eds. Glenn Chafetz, Benjamin Frankel, and Michael Spirtaz (London: Routledge, 1999), 1.

⁶⁰ Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 243.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁶² Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 27; Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” *European journal of international relations* 12, no. 3 (2006): 341–370.

⁶³ Harris Mylonas and Kendrick Kuo, “Nationalism and Foreign Policy,” in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis*, ed. Cameron G. Thies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 226.

⁶⁴ Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 2–3; Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics,” 341–370.

⁶⁵ McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, 81–100.

⁶⁶ Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” 384–96; Hopf, “Making Identity Count,” 3–19; Lebow, “Identity and International Relations” 473–92; Anne L. Clunan, *The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

post-structuralist ontologies⁶⁷ supported by varied methodologies. The positivist-based ontology assumes the cause-effect relation and the possibility to establish mechanisms between the national identity construction and other social processes, actors, and factors. On the contrary, post-structuralist researchers negate the possibility to establish a causal correlation between identity and other phenomena (e.g. foreign policy).⁶⁸ However, they do recognise that the way in which identity is articulated contributes to understanding of how certain political actions become possible and how discursive mechanisms of linking and differentiation help legitimise political actions.⁶⁹ In doing so, post-structuralist researchers assume a certain degree of impact of identity on the “real” world, which brings them closer to recognition of the constitutive role of identity in justification and (re)formulation of the foreign policy direction. Understanding of identity as constitutive occupies a middle ground between positivist and post-structuralist philosophical standpoints. These ontological distinctions are expressed in paradigmatic debates, however, in empirical research studies, the issues of ontology and epistemology are not always made explicit. Therefore, understanding research on identity change and interpretation of results requires a nuanced approach and insight into the researcher’s philosophical view.

With the aim of providing more flexibility for identity research, Bahar Rumelili and Jennifer Todd elaborated a framework of paradoxes⁷⁰ which would support development of a research programme on identity, especially identity change in conflicts.⁷¹ Rumelili and Todd sought to reject paradigmatic debates on

⁶⁷ See Hansen, *Security as Practice*; Hansen and Wæver, *European Integration and National Identity*; Justin Edward Gibbins, “British Discourses on Europe: Self/Other and National Identities,” PhD diss. (University of Birmingham, 2012); see Campbell, *Writing Security*; Erdem Ceydilek, “Not Necessarily Existential Threats: Identity Constitutive Role of the Foreign Policy on Distant Humanitarian Crises,” *Alternatif Politika* 15, no. 3 (2023): 445–70; Taylor Robertson McDonald, *Identity Discourses and Canadian Foreign Policy in the War on Terror* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023), 43–71.

⁶⁸ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 25–27.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 7–9.

⁷⁰ Bahar Rumelili and Jennifer Todd, “Paradoxes of Identity Change: Integrating Macro, Meso, and Micro Research on Identity in Conflict Processes,” *Politics* 38, no. 1 (2018): 3–18.

⁷¹ Jennifer Todd, “Understanding Identity Change: Conditions, Context, Concepts,” in *Identity Change after Conflict. Ethnicity, Boundaries and Belonging in the Two Irelands*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 17–42; Jennifer Todd, “The Politics of Identity Change and Conflict: An Agenda for Research,” *Politics* 38, no. 1 (2017): 84–93; Rumelili and Todd, “Paradoxes of Identity Change,” 3–18.

identity and analyse it using the paradoxes related with the identity notion such as *identity/difference*, *continuity/change*, and *consensus/contestation*. Such an analysis allows us to identify both rapid transformations and slow identity changes, as well as apply it to comparative research design.

Identity studies have adopted the basic premise of Social Identity Theory⁷² which states that the group membership takes its roots from positive in-group biases, therefore in-group unity generates an “other.” Constitutive Others and identification of boundaries between “us” and “them” have become vital elements of identity change. Researchers investigate national identity change by analysing transformations in the construction of the significant Other(s)⁷³ and the construction of security and threats⁷⁴ in discourses. A radical change of relations with the Other or its disappearance⁷⁵ may transform national identity, sharply reconfiguring the roles and relationships of all levels of the national community. Therefore, the analysis of how the Other is (re)presented in discourses and who the Other is makes up an important part of the research on developments in national identity.

The study of national identity in newly independent states has been considered crucial for predicting overall political stability and foreign policies choices. The researchers identified some of the possible problems for Ukrainian unity in the early years of independence, among them, there was a lack of national cohesion due to

⁷² Henri Tajfel, “Social Identity and Intergroup Behavior,” *Social Science Information* 13, no. 2 (1974): 65-93; Henri Tajfel, John C. Turner, and William G. Austin, “Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations,” *Annual review of psychology* 33, no. 1 (1982): 1-39; Marilyn B. Brewer, “The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implications for Political Psychology,” *Political Psychology* 22 (2001): 115-125.

⁷³ Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: ‘The East’ in European Identity Formation* (University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Bahar Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation,” *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 1 (2004): 27-47; Marco Siddi, “An Evolving Other: German National Identity and Constructions of Russia,” *Politics* 38, no. 1 (2018): 35-50; Vieira, “Ukraine, Russia and the Strategic Partnership Dynamics in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood,” 128-50; Riabchuk, “Ukrainians as Russia’s Negative ‘Other’,” 75-85; Daniel Esparza, “National Identity and the Other: Imagining the EU from the Czech Lands,” *Nationalities Papers* 38, no. 3 (2010): 413-36; Taras Kuzio, “Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine: Defining the ‘other’,” *Ethnicities* 1, no. 3 (2001a): 343-65; Wawrzonek, “Ukraine in the ‘Gray Zone,’” 758-80; Olga Malinova, “Russian Identity and the ‘Pivot to the East’: An Analysis of Rhetorical References to the American and Chinese ‘Others’ in Political Elite Discourse,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 66, no. 4 (2019): 227-39.

⁷⁴ Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics,” 341-370; Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 13-; Szkola, “The Self / Other Space and Spinning the Net of Ontological Insecurities in Ukraine and Beyond,” 225-54; Vakhtang Sh. Surguladze, *Politika Identichnosti v Realnykh Obespecheniya Nacionalnoi Bezopasnosti: Strategiya, Teoriya, Praktika* (Moskva: Analiticheskaya gruppa STK, 2019).

⁷⁵ Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy*, 33.

historically-formed regional types of identities,⁷⁶ the presence of a multi-ethnic and multilingual society,⁷⁷ and existing political divisions across the regions⁷⁸. Identity occupies an important place in explanation of the Ukrainian regionalism⁷⁹ shaped by historical developments.⁸⁰ After 2014, there was a new wave of interest in Ukrainian identity explained by the change of relations with Others, the succession of Crimea and the internal armed conflict in Eastern regions. Overall, in that period researchers extended scientific inquiries into Ukrainian identity politics intertwined with national identity, highlighting the role of ethnicity⁸¹ in society and conflict, the

⁷⁶ Aleksey I. Miller, "Dualizm Identichnostei na Ukraine," *Otechestvennye Zapiski* 1, no. 34 (2007): 84–96; Lowell W. Barrington and Erik S. Herron, "One Ukraine or Many? Regionalism in Ukraine and Its Political Consequences," *Nationalities Papers* 32, no. 1 (2004): 53–86; John-Paul Himka, "The Basic Historical Identity Formations in Ukraine: A Typology," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 28, no. 1–4 (2011): 483–500; Yaroslav Hrytsak, "National Identities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: The Case of Lviv and Donetsk," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 22 (1998): 263–81; Karina V. Korostelina, "Mapping National Identity Narratives in Ukraine," *Nationalities Papers* 41, no. 2 (2013): 293–315; Volodymyr Ishchenko, "Class or Regional Cleavage? The Russian Invasion and Ukraine's 'East/West' Divide," *European Societies* 26, no. 2 (2023): 1–26.

⁷⁷ Andrzej Jakubowski, "Ethnic Structure of Contemporary Ukraine," *Confrontation and Cooperation: 1000 Years of Polish-German-Russian Relations* 2, no. 2 (2015): 4–15; Volodymyr Kulyk, "Is Ukraine a Multiethnic State?," *Slavic Review* 81, no. 2 (2022): 299–323.

⁷⁸ Ivan Katchanovski, "Regional Political Divisions in Ukraine in 1991–2006," *Nationalities Papers* 34, no. 5 (2006): 507–32; Vyacheslav Nikulin and Nataliya Selyutina, "Geopolitical Orientations of Ukrainian Political Elites and the Electoral Campaign of 2006," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 8, no. 4 (2007): 544–58; Paul S. Pirie, "National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 48, no. 7 (1996): 1079–1104; Nataliia Pohorila, "Political and National Identity in Ukraine's Regions: Where Does the Center Fit?," *Polish Political Science Review* 4, no. 1 (2016): 18–32; Stephen White, Ian McAllister, and Valentina Feklyunina, "Belarus, Ukraine and Russia: East or West?," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 12, no. 3 (2010): 344–67; Osipian and Osipian, "Regional Diversity and Divided Memories in Ukraine," 616–42; Lilia V. Tomaichuk, "Regionalism y Regionalnaya Identichnost v Sovremennoi Ukraine," *Polytycheskaya Ekspertiza: POLYTEKS* 9, no. 1 (2013): 252–63; Bohdan V. Maksymets, "Uplyv Natsionalnoyi Identichnosti na Rezultaty Mistsevykh Vyboriv Pochatku XXI st. v Ukrayini," *VISNYK NTUU "KPI". Politologiya. Sotsiologiya. Pravo*. 3, no. 19 (2013): 26–30; Ishchenko, "Class or Regional Cleavage?," 1–26.

⁷⁹ Gwendolyn Sasse and Alice Lackner, "War and Identity: The Case of the Donbas in Ukraine," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 34, no. 2–3 (2018): 139–57; Mykola Riabchuk, "Two Ukraines' Reconsidered: The End of Ukrainian Ambivalence?," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 15, no. 1 (2015): 138–56; Anna Matveeva, *Through Times of Trouble. Conflict in Southeastern Ukraine Explained from Within* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2017); Oksana Malanchuk, Nataliya J. Chernysh, and Viktor I. Susak, "Forsovany Vybiry: Identichnosti ta Postavy do i pisly Evromaidanu," *Ukrayinskyi Sotsium* 4, no. 59 (2016): 8–20; Olena Kryvytska, "Identichnist Ukrayinskogo Pogranychcha: Donbas," *Naukovi Zapysky Instytutu Politychnykh i Etnonatsionalnykh Doslidzhen im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrayiny* 1 (2017): 293–313; Lowell Barrington, "A New Look at Region, Language, Ethnicity and Civic National Identity in Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 74, no. 3 (2022): 360–81.

⁸⁰ Stylianos A. Sotiriou, "The Irreversibility of History: The Case of the Ukrainian Crisis (2013–2015)," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 16, no. 1 (2016): 51–70; Lodewijk Smoor, "Understanding the Narratives Explaining the Ukrainian Crisis: Identity Divisions and Complex Diversity in Ukraine," *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies* 11, no. 1 (2017): 63–96.

⁸¹ Olga Onuch and Henry E. Hale, "Capturing Ethnicity: The Case of Ukraine," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 34, no. 2–3 (2018): 84–106; Elise Giuliano, "Who Supported Separatism in Donbas? Ethnicity and Popular Opinion at the Start of the Ukraine Crisis," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 34, no. 2–3 (2018): 158–78; Timothy Frye, "What Do Voters in Ukraine Want?: A Survey Experiment on Candidate Ethnicity, Language, and Policy Orientation," *Problems of Post-Communism* 62, no. 5 (2015): 247–57; Barrington, "A New Look at Region, Language, Ethnicity and Civic National Identity in Ukraine," 360–81.

impact of language policies on national identity,⁸² and the new regional divisions.⁸³ However, a body of research based on the classic civic/ethnic dichotomy does not provide clear and more nuanced insight into the transformation of Ukrainian identity. On the one hand, there is evidence that there is an inclination towards ethnic-based national identity and, therefore, Ukraine has become more Ukrainian.⁸⁴ Another body of research concluded that the Ukrainian identity is developing civic features.⁸⁵ On the other hand, in an experimental study, it was established that ethnicity was not a significant category for political choices among the populace.⁸⁶ That is why a subtler approach that would go beyond civic/ethnic divisions is necessary, especially when analysing identity change over a longer time framework.

In the post-Soviet period, national identities of newly independent states were influenced by the process of Europeanisation.⁸⁷ This process was analysed from various perspectives: the institutionalist approach,⁸⁸ which explained the process of EU and NATO enlargement as a result of rational choice and consensus, and the constructivist approach, which emphasised the rhetorical nature of

⁸² Kulyk, "Language and Identity in Ukraine after Euromaidan," 90–106; Elizabeth A. Peacock, "National Identity and Language: Class Differences among Youth in Western Ukraine," *Global Studies of Childhood* 5, no. 1 (2015): 59–73; Volodymyr Kulyk, "Mova i Identychnist v Ukrayini Pislya Yevromaidanu," *Naukovi Zapysky Instytutu Politychnykh i Etnonacionalnykh Doslidzhen im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrayiny* 2, no. 82 (2016): 90–103; Lev N. Krasnov, "Radikalnaya Ukrainizatsiya: Proekty Novoi Yazykovoi Politiki," *Voprosy Natsionalnykh i Federativnykh Otnosheniy* 1, no. 36 (2017): 74–79.

⁸³ Maria Lewicka and Bartłomiej Iwańczak, "Regional Differentiation of Identities in Ukraine: How Many Regions?," in *Reconceptualizing Ukraine: Identities, Legacies, Confessions, Languages, Mediascapes and Economic Attitudes*, eds. Ulrich Schmid and Oksana Myshlovska (Central European University, 2019), 25–66; Petro Kuzyk, "Ukraine's National Integration before and after 2014. Shifting 'East – West' Polarization Line and Strengthening Political Community," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 60, no. 6 (2019): 709–35; Lowell Barrington, "Is the Regional Divide in Ukraine an Identity Divide?," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 00, no. 00 (2021): 1–26.

⁸⁴ Arel, "How Ukraine Has Become More Ukrainian," 1–4.; Kulyk, "National Identity in Ukraine," 588–608; Aleksandr K. Degtiarev, "Natsionalnaya Identichnost i Perspektivy Ukrainskoi Gosudarstvennosti," *Nauchnye vedomosti Belgorodskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya: Filosofiya. Sotsiologiya. Pravo* 38, no. 24 (245) (2016): 71–76; Kulyk, "National Identity in Time of War," 296–308.

⁸⁵ Sasse and Lackner, "War and State-Making in Ukraine," 75–98; Barrington, "Citizenship as a Cornerstone of Civic National Identity in Ukraine," 155–73; Barrington, "A New Look at Region, Language, Ethnicity and Civic National Identity in Ukraine," 360–81.

⁸⁶ Frye, "What Do Voters in Ukraine Want?," 247–57.

⁸⁷ As a relatively new and contested notion, in academic literature, the term of Europeanisation has several usages and definitions: a) as the process of creation of new institutions of governance at the European level; b) as an attraction to form of organisation and government, which has been exported outside European territorial boundaries; c) signifies a political unification of Europe; d) as a process, where European policy-making increasingly influences the domestic politics; f) as a situation where aspects of domestic politics are transformed by distinct modes of European governance. See Jim Buller and Andrew Gamble, "Conceptualising Europeanisation," *Public policy and administration* 17, no. 2 (2002): 4–24.

⁸⁸ Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998).

Europeanisation⁸⁹ and the role of identity in this process.⁹⁰ Being involved in mechanisms of socialisation with the European Union, Central and Eastern-European (CEE) countries incorporated the notion of “Europeanness” into their national identity discourses,⁹¹ and were involved in the process of institutionalisation of their relations with the EU and NATO.

In contrast with the CEE countries, Ukraine has not been formally offered membership, neither in the EU⁹² nor NATO. However, Ukrainian society and the state have been actively involved in the process of Europeanisation,⁹³ which raised researchers’ interest in a place Europe occupied in the Ukrainian imaginary. As research results show, Europe has become a normative model for Ukraine and mass media fully embraced Europeaness⁹⁴ and European values have been accepted by Ukrainians.⁹⁵ However, the researchers noted that there were also different ways to understand Ukraine as a part of Europe.⁹⁶ Therefore, the meanings and importance of Europeanisation in Ukrainian society can be contested. The events that took place in 2013-2014 were largely interpreted as a result of European aspirations⁹⁷ and a clash of regional and political identities.⁹⁸ According to research, the European

⁸⁹ Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

⁹⁰ Hansen and Wæver, *European Integration and National Identity*.

⁹¹ Egle Rindzeviciute, “‘Nation’ and ‘Europe’: Re-Approaching the Debates about Lithuanian National Identity,” *Journal of Baltic Studies* 34, no. 1 (2003): 74–91; Toomas Riim, “Estonia and NATO: A Constructivist View on a National Interest and Alliance Behaviour,” *Baltic Security and Defence Review* 8, no. 1997 (2006): 34–52; Kornely Kakachia and Salome Minesashvili, “Identity Politics: Exploring Georgian Foreign Policy Behavior,” *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 6, no. 2 (2015): 171–80; Kornely Kakachia and Alexander Markarov, *Values and Identity as Sources of Foreign Policy in Armenia and Georgia*, eds. Kornely Kakachia and Alexander Markarov (Tbilisi: Publishing House “Universal,” 2016).

⁹² Ukraine was granted the status of a candidate for accession to the EU by the European Council on 23 June, 2022, which happened years later after time period included into this research.

⁹³ About Europeanisation of non-EU countries see Frank Schimmelfennig, “Europeanisation beyond the member states,” *Zeitschrift für Staats-und Europawissenschaften (ZSE)/Journal for Comparative Government and European Policy* (2010): 319-339.

⁹⁴ Orlova, “‘Europe’ as a Normative Model in the Mediatized Discourse of Ukrainian Political Elites,” 222–241; Minesashvili, “Before and after 2014: Russo-Ukrainian Conflict and Its Impact on European Discourses in Ukraine,” 416–87; Minesashvili, *European Identities During Wars and Revolutions*, 268-269.

⁹⁵ Tsyrya, “The Formation of the European Identity of Ukraine,” 59.

⁹⁶ White and Feklyunina. *Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*, 135-161.

⁹⁷ Boris Barkanov, “Crisis in Ukraine Clash of Civilizations or Geopolitics,” in *Power, Politics and Confrontation in Eurasia*, eds. Roger E. Kanet and Matthew Sussex (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 210–39.

⁹⁸ Andrii Portnov, “Post-Maidan Europe and the New Ukrainian Studies,” *Slavic Review* 74, no. 4 (2015): 723–31; Olga Baysha, “Ukrainian Euromaidan: The Exclusion of Otherness in the Name of Progress,” *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 18, no. 1 (2015): 3–18.

model became widely accepted as the opposing strategy to the Russian vector.⁹⁹ However, due to the differences in understanding Ukraine's future in Europe, the meanings of Europeanisation need unpacking, especially in the process of contestation of meanings of national identity at the collective level.

Since 2014, Ukrainian foreign policy has undergone significant transformation. Ukraine abandoned its "multi-vector" foreign policy and its neutral status, claiming its rights to full-fledged NATO membership in addition to aspirations of integration into the European Union. However, throughout the post-Soviet period, the issue of Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine was subject to oscillation that puzzled foreign policy analysts.¹⁰⁰ The issue of Ukraine's accession to NATO was also a matter of concern in international politics, as Russia was constantly reminding about the lack of security guarantees from NATO. Being a process of bilateral and multilateral relations between the state and members of the military alliance, Euro-Atlantic integration goes beyond the institutionalisation of Ukraine-NATO relations. It is also a process of discursive articulation of foreign policy, construction of national contributions to the Alliance, and legitimisation of the accession policy. As a contested issue, the investigation of discourses on NATO integration may illuminate the patterns of identity change and identity contestation by the ruling political elites in Ukraine, as well as reveal the constitutive role of identity in the decision-making process for NATO membership.

The literature review leads to a number of conclusions. As identity is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, the philosophical worldview forms the basis of methodological approaches in identity studies. First, in order to study national identity as a complex collective imaginary, it is necessary to go beyond methodological and paradigmatic debates. Second, even though the civic/ethnic dichotomy is a widespread analytical tool used to assess national identity change, its usage is limited in contexts where identity is highly contested, such as in the case of

⁹⁹ Cristian Nitoiu, "The European Union's 'Ideal Self' in the Post-Soviet Space," *Europe-Asia Studies* 70, no. 5 (2018): 692–710.

¹⁰⁰ Karina Shyrokykh, "The Evolution of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine: External Actors and Domestic Factors," *Europe-Asia Studies* 70, no. 5 (2018): 832–50; Ekman, "Painful Moments and Realignments," 232–244.

Ukraine. Analysis of national identity as a discursive phenomenon, which consists of constructed meanings,¹⁰¹ may be revealing. Rarely are quantitative studies able to address such complex issues. Instead, a qualitative analysis of meanings is more suitable for unpacking the nuances of discursive national identity change. Paradigmatic debates may impose limitations on research design, therefore, it is necessary to approach identity research using an adopted for the case analytical framework and methods. Finally, post-Soviet countries are relatively recent entities. As a result, the longitudinal studies of national identity meanings are rare. The debate on Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration has been historically divisive for Ukrainian society and lacks analysis from an identity perspective. Therefore, longitudinal research on the way identity is being constructed and changed in these debates may make a case for further development of the identity research agenda. Studying the process of identity change as a change of meanings is one of the ways to reveal the constitutive role of national identity in the policy of accession. Understanding the role of national identity transformation in a political debate may yield valuable insights into how the national is intrinsically linked with the international in a regionally and linguistically diverse society.

Research question

The research question of this dissertation is as follows: *How was Ukrainian national identity represented and contested in the discourses of the Ukrainian ruling political elites on the issue of Euro-Atlantic integration over time?*

Focusing on the narrow issue of identity continuity/change and contestation, the dissertation aims to analyse the implication of these for formulation of foreign policy on Ukraine's accession to NATO in a long-term period.

¹⁰¹ Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott, *Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists*, eds. Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 90-92.

Theoretical framework

This study aligns with a social-constructivist understanding of national identity which is considered a mental construct or “imagined political community.”¹⁰² As a collective identity, national identity is not a real or objectively existing phenomenon, but exists through articulation of meanings attached to the notion of a nation. Even though national identity is not limited to its discursive representation, in this work, the research on national identity is defined as a discursive construction, i.e. national identity is “*produced, reproduced, transformed*” discursively.¹⁰³ If construed as a social category, identity is attributed meanings that may be contested in discursive practice. The meaning making of a nation is an object of power struggle for dominance and homogenisation through continuous (re)production in discursive practice. In this dissertation, national identity is analysed as a combination of discursive representations in texts that are subject to contestation by the actors who (re)produce distinct meanings of identity.

National identity is an understanding of the collective identity of a community that considers itself a nation. It is expressed through a system of meanings constructed through a combination (a set) of discursive representations of Self, expressed through articulation of sameness, otherness, and boundary construction through discursive articulation of security, danger, and threat.

The notion of “representation” is associated with the following meanings: “standing for” / “speak for” as political representation and “depiction”, as a linguistic embodiment of ideas. Both meanings are useful in this research. First, the ruling political elites, whose discourses are being analysed here, are representing the people, therefore, they assume a collective identity through political representation¹⁰⁴ of their nation. The second meaning is associated with the construction of national identity through discursive practice. Therefore, identity

¹⁰² Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 15.

¹⁰³ Rudolf De Cellia, Martin Reisigl, and Ruth Wodak, “The Discursive Construction of National Identities,” *Discourse and Society* 10, no. 2 (1999): 153.

¹⁰⁴ David Runciman, “Hobbes’s Theory of Representation: Anti-Democratic or Proto-Democratic?,” In *Political Representation*, ed. by Ian Shapiro, Susan C. Stokes, Elisabeth Jean Wood, and Alexander S. Kirshner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 15–34.

representations are imaginaries expressed through linguistic means¹⁰⁵ that may have political implications for actions and decisions.

The terminology of an (*identity*) *representation* is preferred to connote a greater fluidity and not a fixed nature of identity.¹⁰⁶ Through discursive practice, identity entrepreneurs (re)produce national identity representations that constitute the meanings of national identity. Together with representations of threat and security, national identity representations are used for the formulation and legitimation of policies by the ruling political elites.¹⁰⁷

The *elites* are defined as “individuals and small, relatively cohesive, and stable groups with disproportionate power to shape national and supranational political outcomes on a continuing basis.”¹⁰⁸ This research is focused on the study of *ruling political elites*, who are (groups of) individuals either elected or appointed to governmental service. The object of the study is the discourses of the ruling political elites who participated in a public discussion and decision making about the policy of Ukraine’s accession to NATO.

The ideas about social reality, social order and social objects, including identities, are manifested in discourse.¹⁰⁹ *Discourses*¹¹⁰ are conceived of as systems of meanings that express relations of power.¹¹¹ However, in academic literature the notion of discourse may have other usages, such as public discourse, political discourse, when it may either refer to a system of meanings or to speeches and texts. The notion of *discursive practice* is preferred, meaning the process of national identity construction. As national identity consists of meanings, the struggle for power is exercised through the redefinition of these meanings through contestation.

¹⁰⁵ Kevin C. Dunn, “Historical Representations,” In *Qualitative Methods in International Relations*, ed. by Audie Clotz and Deepa Prakash (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 80.

¹⁰⁶ See Audie Clotz, A. and Cecelia M. Lynch. *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations* (New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), 13.

¹⁰⁷ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 211.

¹⁰⁸ Heinrich Best and John Higley, introduction to *The Palgrave Handbook of Political Elites*, ed. by Heinrich Best and John Higley (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 3.

¹⁰⁹ Roy Bhaskar, *Reclaiming Reality. A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy* (London: Verso, 1989), quoted in Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power*, 3rd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), (125) 235–236.

¹¹⁰ There are multiple definitions of ‘disourse’ adopted by social science researchers.

¹¹¹ Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

Discursive epistemology adopted in this research bears the following implications for the study of identity. A discourse-analytical approach adopted in this dissertation takes a bearing from the tradition of poststructuralist writings of Foucault, Kristeva and Derrida with points of convergence with Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).¹¹² A basic theoretical assumption is that identity does not exist prior to discourse. Therefore, it refutes a direct cause-effect relation between identity and foreign policy decision making. Yet, representations of identity in discourse bear constitutive significance for debates of foreign policy.¹¹³ The literature on identity politics suggests that policies implemented by political actors, particularly, by the elites in power, aim to construct and promote a certain “project” of national identity¹¹⁴. The underlying idea is that the values, priorities and the worldview promoted by identity entrepreneurs may have an impact on the outcomes of political decisions and actions. As it is challenging to empirically demonstrate causality between identity and other social phenomena, it leads to the adoption of a constitutive and not a causal role of identity in social processes¹¹⁵ in this study. Accordingly, identity is one of the “causes for action”¹¹⁶ and serves as a ground for legitimization of political decisions.¹¹⁷ Constitutive causality can be demonstrated through empirical analysis of narratives of identity, metaphors and other rhetorical devices, which are identifiable elements that may serve as mechanisms to support policies, justify political behaviour or actions.¹¹⁸ Drawing on particular representations of states and institutions, politicians are able to argue for specific policies, justify and legitimize them.

In discourse-analytical approach, identity is relational, which means that it is constituted along two dimensions through the discursive processes of linking and

¹¹² Hansen, *Security as Practice*, xv-xvi.

¹¹³ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 4.

¹¹⁴ Lane, “Identity Formation and Political Elites in the Post-Socialist States,” 1-10.

¹¹⁵ Richard Ned Lebow, “Constitutive Causality: Imagined Spaces and Political Practices,” *Millennium* 38, no. 2 (2009): 211–39.

¹¹⁶ Bernd Bucher and Ursula Jasper, “Revisiting ‘Identity’ in International Relations from Identity as Substance to Identifications in Action,” *European Journal of International Relations* 23, no. 2 (2017): 391–415.

¹¹⁷ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 187.

¹¹⁸ Lebow, “Constitutive Causality,” 211-239.

differentiation.¹¹⁹ The meanings of identity are constituted through discursive juxtaposition between devalued and privileged signs.¹²⁰ Linking and differentiation demonstrate the possibility of destabilisation of these signs: some of them may be negatively valued in one discourse and positively constructed in another.¹²¹ The evaluation of meanings attached to identities in discourses opens up possibility to identify changes in identity articulation.

Research design, methodology and methods

This section describes research design for studying national identity change based on the intertextual model of a foreign policy debate within a discourse-analytical approach elaborated by Lene Hansen.¹²² A discourse-analytical approach has been chosen due to its flexibility in studying foreign policy debates that can be adjusted for different research questions. It provides a sound and logical selection of texts for discourse analysis and justification of time framework. Being used as a general analytical framework, in order compare identity representations in terms of continuity and contestation, discourse-analytical approach has been complemented by method of a predicate analysis¹²³ and analytical framework of identity paradoxes.¹²⁴ Compared to other approaches studying national identity change in IR and Political Science, discourse-analytical approach, as applied in this dissertation, allows to delve into nuances of co-constitutiveness of identity and foreign policy and explore the ideational power of domestic sources of foreign policy.

The analytical framework elaborated in this dissertation is anchored in the *second intertextual model (II)*¹²⁵ which focuses on a wider political debate on foreign policy. According to Hansen's definition, "*intertextual models* identify the locations of different discourses in relations to official discourse and other sites of opinion and

¹¹⁹ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 46; Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London and New York: Verso Trade, 1985).

¹²⁰ Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*.

¹²¹ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 18-19.

¹²² Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 64.

¹²³ Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations," 225–54.

¹²⁴ Rumelili and Todd, "Paradoxes of Identity Change," 3–18.

¹²⁵ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 54.

debate.”¹²⁶ The second intertextual model provides “intertextual links to consider the major actors and arenas within a wider foreign policy debate”, i.e. analysis goes beyond discourses of the policy makers and takes into account discourses produced by political actors who oppose the policy. Intertextuality is the way in which texts and discourses are linked to or embedded into larger discourses.¹²⁷ Therefore, all selected texts refer to the same topic and main actors or refer to the same events.¹²⁸ In this research, *intertextuality* is understood as a reference to the same foreign policy debate, i.e. the issue of Ukraine’s accession to NATO.

In the second intertextual model, parliamentary debates are particularly useful for analysis,¹²⁹ as they encompass both supporters and opponents to the policy. Following this line of thought, this model allows to include the views of opponents to NATO membership among the ruling political elites, as well it considers alternative views on Ukraine’s role in relations with the Alliance. Figure 1 depicts the comparative research framework of a wider political debate on a foreign policy applied to debates of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

Figure 1. Analytical framework for the study of Ukrainian national identity change



¹²⁶ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 58.

¹²⁷ Fairclough, *Language and Power*, 37.

¹²⁸ Ruth Wodak, Afterword: ‘What Now?’ – Some Reflections on the European Convention and Its Implications to (Un)Doing Europe: Discourses and Practices of Negotiating the EU Constitution, ed. by Michał Krzyzanowski and Florian Oberhuber (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2007), 206.

¹²⁹ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 55.

Through the discourse analytical approach, it is demonstrated how foreign policy debates are structured by a smaller number of basic discourses. According to Hansen, *basic discourses* are analytical frameworks that “are of a debate structure” aligned across political divisions.¹³⁰ They facilitate structural analysis of discourse formation within foreign policy debate.¹³¹ Basic discourses construct different Others with different degrees of radical difference, articulate radically diverging forms of spatial, temporal, and ethical identity and construct competing links between identity and foreign policy.”¹³² Identifying competing basic discourses allows to illuminate the structure the projects of identity constructed in these discourses and analyse in what ways national identity meanings are contested and changed over time.

The distinction of basic discourses in the texts is based on differences expressed on foreign policy issues and on different representations of Others, which consequently discursively construct different identities. Identification of basic discourses is done through a close reading of texts and elaboration of a coding system based on the key representations of identity (Self, Others), which can be geographical identities, historical analogies, metaphors, security referents, among others¹³³ articulated in documents and parliament discussion. It is noteworthy that “basic discourse” is an “analytical distinction of an ideal-type kind”¹³⁴ that should be established empirically and may prove to have a more nuanced structure than the ideal type.

The definition of basic discourse is not conterminous with the definition of discourse provided in the theoretical framework, however it does not contradict it. Rather, the basic discourse is a narrow understanding of discourse as a system of meanings, which is based on the position on foreign policy, relation to Others and articulation of security. Basic discourses provide structures for constructed identity projects that consist of identity representations identified empirically. Identity

¹³⁰ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 65.

¹³¹ Ibid., 95.

¹³² Ibid., 46.

¹³³ Ibid., 47.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 46.

representations may undergo the following transformations: they may extend to larger audiences who articulate them, they may be adopted by a competing discourse and may acquire new meanings.¹³⁵

Methodological technique applied to a selection of foreign policy debates is mapping debates around “*key events*.” These events are situations that are manifested on the media or political agenda which have the power to influence the official policy-identity construction.¹³⁶ In order for identity to be discursively constructed, there should be social and/or political events that would trigger and generate debates among the ruling political elites. Therefore, discourses are not present in public space *per se*. Articulation of discourses depends on the political agenda and inclusion or exclusion of identity entrepreneurs who may participate in discussions. Besides, debates on foreign policy are not always accessible to the public. Availability and accessibility of public discussion impose certain limitations on the empirical study of policy-related discourses, as well as on the time framework established for analysis.

Furthermore, the timeline of key events between Ukraine and NATO was elaborated.¹³⁷ Drawing upon the Ukraine-NATO events timeline, I identified the main identity entrepreneurs in articulation of discourses on Euro-Atlantic integration in Ukraine: government officials, who represent Ukraine in Ukraine-NATO institutions and events, the President of Ukraine, and members of parliament. The Verhovna Rada (the Parliament) and the President of Ukraine play a major role in foreign policy formulation on NATO. While during the official events of Ukraine and NATO, official policy was clearly articulated, the debates on the issue of accession between the ruling elites sparked off during the parliamentary sessions.

The identity entrepreneurs, whose speeches are being analysed in this research, fall under the definition of *ruling political elites*. The representatives of the ruling political elites were either elected through elections or appointed to office by

¹³⁵ Iryna V. Zhyrun, “Dinamika Natsionalnoi Identichnosti Ukrainy v Discussii po Voprosu Evroatlanticheskoi Integratsii,” *Vestnik Permskogo Universiteta. Politologia* 15, no. 2 (2021): 59–70.

¹³⁶ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 32.

¹³⁷ See Appendix 1 for a timeline of events between Ukraine and NATO.

the elected officials. Multiple identity entrepreneurs are capable of constructing the collective imaginary about Ukraine in relations with NATO. Among them, there are political analysts, journalists, or civil society activists, and institutions, such as think-tanks and sociological research facilities. However, most of the time, these actors lack explicit and transparent decision-making power on foreign policy issues. As foreign policy debates imply a certain process of decision making, in this case, creation of an alliance with a military bloc, it is more important to analyse the structures of meaning articulated by the political actors in power. Therefore, the research did not take into account the texts produced by the actors outside of politicians who hold office.

It is important to note the nature of the parliamentary sessions in the Ukrainian Parliament, which are *public* debates. These debates can be accessed by the citizens via the radio, Rada TV channel and (since 2012) via Youtube channel, either in recordings, live transmissions, or official transcripts from the Parliament website. Rada also has a group of accredited journalists who may attend the parliamentary sessions. While some of the discussions in specialised committees may not be accessible to the general public, the representatives of the committees make statements on current affairs in Rada. The President of Ukraine and representatives of the executive branch are routinely invited to report on foreign and domestic issues to the Parliament. Therefore, the parliamentary sessions in Ukraine go beyond a specialised legislative process. Rather, they serve as a platform for communication among ruling political elites. The impact of political speeches on the imaginary of the Ukrainian population lies beyond the scope of this research. A more important issue for this dissertation is in what ways the articulation, contestation and change of national identity meanings constructed in debates between the ruling elites may shed important light on the consequent outcomes on the policy of NATO accession.

Debates on any policy imply that a group of policy-makers promotes a certain direction, while others may oppose, reject or offer an alternative policy. In the context of NATO-Ukraine relations, it was previously known that the issue of

accession to NATO had been historically divisive for Ukraine.¹³⁸ The political groups from the right-wing ideological spectrum were more inclined to support NATO integration, while the politicians who hold leftist ideologies opposed it. Therefore, there was an expectation to identify at least two opposing discourses on cooperation with NATO and the policy of Euro-Atlantic integration within the debates between the ruling political elites.

In order to confirm the expectations, I conducted a pilot study based on a set of materials from 2008 and 2018. The coded texts on the NATO debate were taken from the official NATO website, Verhovna Rada website, and the website of the Presidential Administration. The preliminary expectations about pro- and anti-NATO positions were confirmed. However, the pilot study revealed a third basic discourse that was situated in an intermediary position. The groups of actors who articulated this basic discourse were accepting cooperation with NATO, but rejecting NATO membership. The basic discourses identified in a pilot study were based on a different approach to foreign policy with NATO: Ukraine as a NATO member, Ukraine as a neutral country, and Ukraine as a NATO partner.

Predicate analysis is used as the principal method of discourse analysis.¹³⁹ This method focuses on meanings attached to nominations and the *unit of analysis* may vary from one word to a phrase depending on the context. Predicate analysis is suitable for the study of language practices, constitution of subjects, social construction of space and geopolitical reasoning in texts.¹⁴⁰ It is based on the analysis of the parts of speech attached to a noun: adjectives, verbs and adverbs.¹⁴¹ This method allows to establish overlapping meanings constructed by different discourse, as systems of signification.¹⁴² The predicates were coded using the qualitative software QDA Miner Light.

¹³⁸ Stephen White, Julia Korosteleva, and Roy Allison, "NATO: The View from the East," *European Security* 15, no. 2 (2006): 165–90; White and Feklyunina, *Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*; Sergey Khrychikov, *The Effect of NATO Partnership with Ukraine on Inter-Ethnic Relations within the Country*, NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship, 2000: 63.

¹³⁹ Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations," 225–54.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 231–232.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 225–54.

¹⁴² Appendix 2 lists nomination markers identified as representation markers of the Ukrainian Self and the Others.

The analysis of identity change is based on the notion of national identity as a system/net of (multiple) discursive representations. It considers the multiplicity of identity representations in basic discourses that construct Ukraine within the debate on a policy of NATO accession. For instance, pieces of text that contain “state, country, Ukraine, Ukrainian public”. Additionally, in order to capture collective identity formation, coding was extended to the predicates attached to pronouns, such as “we, they, our + noun”. Pronouns can be used to conceptualise collective identities and group identities either as insiders or as outsiders.¹⁴³ The analysis, interpretation and comparison of *meanings* attached to these nominations is the first stage to pinpoint the identity change.

The materials of analysis allow the researcher to identify the actors who (re)produce national identity representations and construct a particular project of identity in discourse.¹⁴⁴ The meanings attached to the “Ukrainian government” and its characteristics will probably differ depending on the agency of speakers and the type of text,¹⁴⁵ which was considered during coding and analysis. Depending on the genre of the text and the speaker,¹⁴⁶ different rules of coding may apply. Texts that cover the events of the Euro-Atlantic cooperation (e.g. official statements of the Ukrainian government) were coded entirely. In joint statements, only parts of the text expressed by a Ukrainian representative were coded. In media sources, only direct speech by a Ukrainian speaker was coded. Lastly, in parliamentary debates and presidential speeches, only pieces of texts that refer to NATO were coded.

National identity is constructed in discourse through the mechanisms of articulation of difference (or similarity) between Self and the Other. Therefore, analysis of identity construction is conducted through identification of in-group and out-of-group attributions that are expressed in reference to “us” and “them”. These in- and out-of- groups have different composition, depending on the foreign policy

¹⁴³ Paul Chilton and Christina Schäffner, Introduction: Themes and Principles in the Analysis of Political Discourse to *Politics as Text and Talk: Analytic Approaches to Political Discourse. Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture*, ed. by Paul Chilton and Christina Schäffner (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2002), 1–41.

¹⁴⁴ See Appendix 4 for a complete list of actors who participated in debates on Euro-Atlantic integration.

¹⁴⁵ See Appendix 2 for a complete list of nominations in empirical data.


¹⁴⁶ Appendix 4 lists the names of all identity entrepreneurs among the ruling elites included in the analysis.

direction advocated by the speakers. Not only does the construction of “them” include an explicit mention of a particular “Other”, but it attaches a different meaning to this Other, as well as a different level of threat that this Other represents to the in-group. Some meanings depend on the context. For instance, who are “we” and “them” depends on the particular rhetorical situation. Linguists call it the rhetoric of pointing deixis. In order to understand the utterance, one should interpret it from the position of the speaker. In political and public speeches, “we” may refer to a nation.

Analysis of how threats are constructed in debates on the issue of Euro-Atlantic integration may demonstrate a wider spectrum of threats against which a nation needs to stay united. The change in articulation of security in discourse may be interpreted as re-articulation of identity boundaries. Security referents of who/what represents the threat in discourses and who/what is being threatened may demonstrate how national identity changes over time.

In order to identify national identity projects constructed in foreign policy debates, I elaborated the algorithm for coding the empirical materials (Figure 2). The position of the speaker on the issue of NATO accession (pro-NATO, anti-NATO or other) is crucial for assignment of a code to a specific basic discourse. The code is assigned to every nomination of the Self, Other and security representation found in the text. For example, a representation of Ukraine articulated as a member of NATO is coded as a part of pro-NATO basic discourse. The predicate attached to a nomination is coded into a category depending on the meaning (e.g. international cooperation). Categories may consist of one or several codes, depending on their articulation in the text.

Figure 2. Coding algorithm of identity representations.



Key words guide the process of meaning interpretation. The interpretation is situated in meanings of pieces of text (predicate) that refer to nominations¹⁴⁷ (Self, Other, security). Sometimes, the category is defined by semantics. For instance, the word “democracy” is almost a unique way to describe the country as democratic. However, other codes require an in-depth interpretation and a higher level of abstraction, especially considering that the selected texts are written in three languages: Russian, Ukrainian and English.

Analysis of security representations consists of two steps. The first step is coding pieces of texts with reference to security/danger/threat in three basic discourses. The second is the analysis of codes on security, asking four questions: 1) What is mentioned as security in discourse? 2) What is articulated as danger or threat? 3) What/who has to be protected? 4) What/who can guarantee security?¹⁴⁸ The security articulated in basic discourses is assessed in terms of its role in demonstration of identity contestation and change.

Time framework

The time framework of the research covers 21 years of official relations between NATO and Ukraine from 1997 to 2018. The chosen time lapse is crucial because it encompasses the articulation of radically different foreign policies – from neutrality to the proclamation of accession to NATO, and includes a debate on constitutional amendments in regard to the Euro-Atlantic integration proposed in 2018.¹⁴⁹

Aiming to analyse identity change in a historical perspective, the starting point of research is the formalisation of Ukraine-NATO relations with the signature of the Charter of Cooperation in 1997. The final point of analysis is 2018, when Constitutional amendments to Ukraine’s aspiration of Euro-Atlantic integration were proposed. Since the Constitutional amendments on aspiration to NATO integration were implemented in 2019, the position on anti-NATO policy may be

¹⁴⁷ See a complete list of coded representations in Appendix 5 (Ukraine) and Appendix 6 (Others).

¹⁴⁸ See Appendix 7 for complete findings in security articulation from 1997 to 2018.

¹⁴⁹ Appendix 1 includes a timeline of the major events between Ukraine and NATO since 1991, which was constructed as a guideline for periodisation and selection of comparative moments.

considered anti-constitutional. Therefore, the opposing discourse is likely to disappear from public debates of the ruling elites after 2018. As this dissertation is focused on analysis of contestation of identity projects, the potential elimination of anti-NATO discourse from the political sphere and a lack of an open to public contestation is the main reason why the study is limited by 2018.

The timeline of research is divided into *four comparative moments* which are established in accordance with the change of the official foreign policy on accession to NATO: 1997-2003 – multi-vector policy (period 1); 2006-2009 – NATO-oriented foreign policy (period 2); 2010-2013 – policy of neutrality (period 3); 2016-2018 – the return of NATO-oriented foreign policy (period 4).

In the Ukrainian context, foreign policy change has been associated with a change of executive power, when a new President promotes a certain foreign policy, which, at times, may take the opposite direction to the policy promoted by the previous Presidential Administration. It is particularly evident in foreign policy on Ukraine's accession to NATO, which has fluctuated from neutrality to aspirations of a fully-fledged membership.

Period 1 (1997-2003) is characterised by the official “multi-vector” foreign policy during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma. This period begins with a milestone event between NATO and Ukraine – a signature of the Charter on Special Partnership in 1997 and ends with an adoption of laws on national security that proclaimed integration of Ukraine in NATO as the final goal in 2003.

Period 2 (2006-2009) is associated with the foreign policy of a “forced” Euro-Atlantic integration implemented by President Viktor Yushchenko. This period reflects the divisions of the national ruling elites in the aftermath of the civil protests during the presidential elections in 2003-2004, known as the Orange Revolution. International events that took place in that period also had an impact on debates about Euro-Atlantic policy at the domestic level. Among the most significant international events of the period were the proclamation of Kosovo independence and the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008.

Period 3 (2010-2013) is characterised by an implementation of neutrality policy introduced by President Viktor Yanukovich in 2010. Having adopted a neutral status in the national legislation, Ukraine suspended its aspirations for NATO membership. However, the cooperation between NATO and Ukraine continued.

Period 4 (2016-2018) is marked by a transformation of the legal framework of Ukraine under President Petro Poroshenko and a resumed policy of NATO accession. The major events that had an impact on the debate about NATO were the start of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution that explicitly established Euro-Atlantic integration as a strategic objective in the future.

The years 2004-2005 and 2014-2015 were purposefully omitted from analysis, as during those years foreign policy on NATO accession was not significantly altered. In both periods the domestic issues overshadowed the international agenda. As a result, there was a relative scarcity of materials for analysis on the issue of the policy of accession in the selected sources. It is noteworthy that during the excluded periods, there was no change of ruling political elites at the national level because the materials included into analysis cover all elected and acting elites at the time. The analysis included all cohorts of elites elected during the time despite the elimination of some periods from the study. Therefore, all elites in power were analysed within previously defined periods.

Table 1. Periodisation of electoral cycles in Ukraine and periodisation of research time framework.

Parliament elections	1994	1998	2002	2006	2007	2012	2014
Presidential elections	1994	1999		2004		2010	2014
Periodisation of research		Period 1 1997-2003	Gap 1	Period 2 2006-2009	Period 3 2010-2013	Gap 2	Period 4 2016-2018

The chosen time framework covers periods for four presidential elections and seven parliamentary elections. In the selected body of texts, there are speeches of 363 representatives of the ruling elites whose opinion had a record in public speeches on the issue of Ukraine's accession to NATO from 1997 to 2018. The chosen time framework encompasses a sufficiently long period for a comparative study of

national identity. It is based on comparative moments of foreign policy on NATO, aligned with the change of ruling elites through the electoral cycle.

Empirical data

The empirical data represents the intertextually linked texts on Ukraine's accession to NATO. These texts were extracted with the help of a search system and key words on the official web-sites of the institutions involved in the discussion of Euro-Atlantic integration. The key search words used were "NATO" and "Euro-Atlantic" in Ukrainian sources and "Ukraine" on the NATO web-site. Only speeches of the Ukrainian officials were analysed in all sources. Taking into consideration the long-term time-framework and the comparative research design, continuity and accessibility of the main sources through the entire time framework of analysis was important.

In terms of criteria of continuity and accessibility, the official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament could be qualified as the best source for longitudinal studies of political debates in Ukraine. It contains the transcripts of the sessions since the first parliamentary elections of independent Ukraine and all transcripts are easily accessible online. As the Ukrainian Rada serves as a public sphere for political communication of the ruling political elites, the transcripts of sessions also contain all annual addresses of the President to the Parliament, including the presidential speeches on foreign policy issues.

The official NATO web-site contains most of the information. However, some of the earlier data could be missing or incomplete. The transcripts of some speeches could be accessible through the search of the archival data and a pointed search of a specific Ukraine-NATO event. Some speeches are available in the original language without translation into English and/or are saved in the form of audio recordings. I transcribed the recordings of the speeches before coding.

The website of the President's Administration is problematic in terms of continuity, because it contains only materials in reference to the incumbent President. Therefore, at the time when this research started in 2018, it was possible

to extract the speeches of President Poroshenko applying the search with the keyword “NATO” for period 4. However, when searching for presidential speeches from previous periods, it was necessary to use a guide regarding key events in NATO and Ukraine relations, which led to the inclusion of reprinted speeches in the media sources. Because of this discontinuity and limited access to presidential speeches, the reprinted versions of the original speeches were used. Several texts (an interview, a commentary on a meeting, and presidential speeches) were taken from the media, where they were reprinted, as these documents were not available from the original sources. Presidential speeches may be available at the Parliament library, but they are not easily accessible. Therefore, the analysed empirical materials mainly come from the following sources:

- Ukrainian Parliament (Rada)¹⁵⁰
- Official NATO website¹⁵¹
- Official website of the President’s Administration of Ukraine¹⁵²

The distribution of texts from the sources is the following: Transcripts of plenary session in Rada - 316 documents, NATO-Ukraine Commission statements – 8 documents, NATO-Ukraine statements – 11 documents, Presidential Administration (speeches) outside of parliamentary sessions - 12 texts, speeches published in the media – 6 texts. All texts identified within the established time framework in the main sources were considered for analysis.¹⁵³

The transcripts of the parliamentary sessions at the Parliament contain speeches of committee members, ministers, representatives of bilateral and multilateral delegations of Ukraine and NATO, as well as the President’s speeches to Parliament on foreign policy from 1997 to 2018. Materials cover the speeches by the representatives of the following administrative units: State Committee of Communication and Information of Ukraine, Committee of Foreign Affairs, Committee on National Security and Defence, Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine,

¹⁵⁰ Official Rada website <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/ru> (Accessed June 2018)

¹⁵¹ Official NATO website <https://www.nato.int/> (Accessed June 2018)

¹⁵² Official site of the Presidential Administration https://www.president.gov.ua/en_ (Accessed June 2018)

¹⁵³ Appendix 3 includes detailed data on text distribution per periods of analysis.

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, National Institute of Strategic Research, and Security Service of Ukraine.

To conclude, the analysed texts are speeches given by the ruling political elites, who engage in public discussion of the issues of Ukraine-NATO relations. These and other important public pronouncements clearly articulate Ukraine's foreign policy position and its relations with the Others. They are produced by the ruling political elites who have the power to represent the people and speak on their behalf and therefore, in their addresses, political actors (re)articulate collective national identity meanings. Moreover, these individuals have a certain monopoly on public dissemination of information or access to insiders' views on foreign policy.

Research flow

The research process consists of several stages. First, I identify the basic discourses of the ruling political elites on Ukrainian national identity in the debates on Euro-Atlantic integration. The basic discourses are (re)produced by the political actors, who take sides in political debates and argue for the adoption of a particular direction in foreign policy. Because political discourses often tend to be determined by the changing political context, methodologically, identification of basic discourses derives from the content of each text and does not rely on the personality or political affiliation of the speaker.

The second stage of research consists of identification and analysis of contestation, change and continuity of national identity representations in the basic discourses. In the third stage, I analyse the construction of Others in basic discourses and draw conclusions on how the national identity of Ukraine is being constructed in relation to these Others. At the last stage, I analyse articulations of security, danger and threat and their role in national identity construction. Finally, I summarise the observations on how changes in articulation of the Ukrainian identity enhance/inhibit the policy on NATO accession.

The research boundaries and limitations

According to the adopted definition of national identity, this research focuses on investigation of the discursive change of national identity in debates between Ukrainian ruling political elites. The qualitative research is complemented with the overview of statistical data on national identity dynamics provided by the social research institute “Razumkov Centre”.

Only the discourses of the political elites who were elected/appointed to the national institutions are considered, which is justified by the definition of ruling elites. This research does not include political elites of the uncontrolled territories of Donetsk, Lugansk and Crimea. Although the comparative analysis of national identity construction of these regions could be an interesting perspective on the issue, it lies beyond the scope of this research.

This research does not analyse the Foreign Policy of Euro-Atlantic integration as such, neither does it focus on the military cooperation between Ukraine and NATO. Discursive articulation of foreign policy does not imply that all what has been said could have policy implications. Even though limited in explanatory power of foreign policy, analysis of foreign policy discourses does not contradict other explanations but complements it. Therefore, research literature on NATO-Ukraine relations is consulted at all times that allows to draw conclusions on the alternative views on the nature of process of Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine.

Contribution to the scientific field

The dissertation contributes to the research problem of national identity change and contestation by providing empirical evidence of how various projects of national identity are constructed by different groups of ruling political elites who advocate different foreign policy agendas. Therefore, the results of this research demonstrate the contestability of national identity meanings through discourse and expand the body of knowledge about the foreign policy debates at the level of the ruling political elites.

This research provides a longitudinal study of national identity change in the post-Soviet context. It demonstrates how identity continuity is possible because of the adoption and transformation of identity representations by competing basic discourses.

In this research, it is demonstrated how the Ukrainian ruling political elites legitimise and promote the Euro-Atlantic integration policy through discursive construction of national identity despite the lack of a formal offer of membership in the Alliance.

The work draws on domestic sources of foreign policy formulation and intends to establish a dialogue between literatures on identity in Political Science and International Relations and contribute to understanding of how national identity may be built on articulations of both cultural/civilisational belonging, which is traditionally categorised as an ethnic identity by political scientists, and foreign policy preferences, which are studied by International Relations scholars.

1. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF NATIONAL IDENTITY TRANSFORMATION

In order to analyse the longitudinal change of the Ukrainian national identity, I will tackle the following theoretical and methodological issues. First, I address the variety of conceptualisation of national identity in section 1.1. Construction of national identity in the post-Soviet states took place in a particular historical context, while identity politics became instrumental in the nation- and state-building processes. Therefore, the issue of identity politics and the role of the ruling political elites in national identity change are discussed in section 1.2. In section 1.3, I analyse approaches to studying national identity change. Finally, I provide a detailed description of the analytical framework adopted in this research in section 1.4.

1.1 Conceptualisation of national identity: levels of analysis, constructed meanings and their discursive contestation

The objective of this section is to analyse the conceptualisations of national identity in the academic literature, to outline the main theoretical juxtapositions in studies of national identity, and to present an argument for studying identity as a discursive construction.

There are a number of characteristics ascribed to identity that most researchers tend to agree on: it is complex, depends on relations with Others, and is socially constructed through multiple practices, including discursive practice. Yet, it is difficult to provide a single definition of identity because the phenomenon of identity is complex and ambiguous.¹⁵⁴ In order to understand the notion of identity, it is vital to distinguish between its two meanings: identity-as-sameness and identity-as-self.¹⁵⁵ The first meaning underlines a similarity with someone, while the second emphasises its uniqueness. Therefore, identity is expressed through “I/Self”, which is thought to be unique, but similar to the members of the group to which “I/Self” belongs, being at the same time different from “Other(s)”. A failure to distinguish

¹⁵⁴ Ricoeur, “Narrative Identity.”, 73–81.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

between these two usages of an identity concept creates confusion, especially when dealing with issues of identity change.

The process of how Self-awareness and categorisation of “us” and “them” happen is obscure. First of all, it is due to the fact that the process of identification is a mental process of an individual, which may be a life-long experience. Second, identity as the outcome of the process of identification is formed through practices. Having said that, the way someone talks, relates, communicates and behaves are signs of both a formed identification and identification being formed in the process. Identity manifestations acquire cultural and individual forms through the contacts people have with each other.¹⁵⁶ Their identities are constructed in a system of social relations with the need of mutual recognition by Others.¹⁵⁷ Therefore, in the study of identity and analysis of identity change, it should be acknowledged that it is impossible to get insight of complexity of these mental processes of an individual.

Given the origins of the term “identity”, which stems from the studies of the psyche of an individual, there are a number of contradictions in regard to identity conceptualisation. The major problem is that the notion of individual identity is extrapolated on larger groups and communities, which places identity analysis at the collective level. The researchers distinguish multiple social identities, such as ethnic, religious, national, transnational, civilisational identities, among many others, all of which may be both individual and collective identities. On the one hand, collective identities are more complex than individual ones, on the other, they are more reductionist bringing an array of individual identifications to a few identity markers that subdue the individual choices and preferences. Collective identity or identifications are the collectives/communities bound by distinct communication patterns, emotions, normative discourses, perspectives, aspirations and pooling of resources. Therefore, in order to understand the dynamics of a collective identity, one should go beyond a mere aggregation of individual identities. Instead of being a sum of individual identities, the collective identities are based on the imaginary of

¹⁵⁶ Elena A. Orlova, “Kontseptsii Identichnosti / Identifikatsii v Socialno-Nauchnom Znanii,” *Voprosy Sotsialnoi Teorii* 4, no. 1 (2010): 87–111.

¹⁵⁷ Alberto Melucci, *L'invenzione Del Presente: Movimenti, Identida, Bisogni, Inividuali* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1982).

a group about its members. Benedict Anderson highlighted this particularity of a collective identity when he described the nation as an “imagined community,”¹⁵⁸ i.e. people do not have the possibility to know all its members, but can just imagine what common characteristics make them a nation and what differentiates them from other nations. Having said that, the individual and collective identities should be analysed in different ways.

Analysing a group members’ subjective identities and taking the aggregate data of individual identities as a sign of collective identity inhibits the understanding of how collective identities are formed. Instead, it is necessary to account for the intersubjective meanings agreed upon by the members of the group. Going beyond individual identities, intersubjective meanings stand for the shared interpretations of groups’ attributes.¹⁵⁹ Therefore, the understanding of the collective identity should be formed through the study of practices and analysis of meanings attributed to a particular community. The level of agreement on who belongs to “in-” or “out-of-group” may prove to be crucial for the assessment of a cohesion of a group and acceptance of a collective identity by its alleged members. I argue that two levels of identity – individual and collective – should be treated as distinct, as the imaginary about Self and Others is formed and functions at these levels in a different manner. Even though most of the “individual” identities are based on collective frameworks,¹⁶⁰ individual identity¹⁶¹ tends to be based on first-hand experiences. The collective identity is a part of the imaginary constructed in often indirect engagement with a community through narratives, discourses or material, visual and other representations.

Both levels of identity, individual and collective, are engaged in identity politics, which is an umbrella term encompassing the processes and policies that shape social identities. There are two ways in which identity politics is understood.

¹⁵⁸ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 5.

¹⁵⁹ Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable.”, 695–711.

¹⁶⁰ I own this remark to Prof. Dr. Andreas Heinemann-Grüder.

¹⁶¹ Psychologist David Kahneman (Kahneman D. (2011). *Thinking, fast and slow*. Macmillan.) analytically separated individual cognition into two-level system, naming it System 1 and System 2. The System 1 generates emotions, while System 2 performs complex calculations and intentional actions. Most of the “individual” identities are based on collective frameworks

The first one is *politics* that promotes the interests of a certain social (ethnic, religious, etc.) group, while the second stands for a *policy* that aims at the creation of new identities.¹⁶² Here, *identity politics* is defined as activities of actors of the political process that shape and construct national and other forms of identity. The latter interpretation emphasises the role of the elites and government in the development of political communities. Identity politics contributes to individual and collective experiences, as well as to the creation of the collective imaginary.

Through identity politics, the actors promote the meanings and common practices of a nation at the state level. Antony Smith expressed the idea that ideologies, symbolism and commemorative practices, which in our understanding make a part of identity politics, have a component of conscious manipulation.¹⁶³ Therefore, identity politics is often purposeful and instrumental, exercising power over the formation of the imaginary of a nation and about the nation at personal and collective levels.

What distinguishes national identity from other social identities is that it is inextricably intertwined with the idea of a nation. National identity is a complex phenomenon which is a part of macropolitical identity,¹⁶⁴ i.e. the identity of the community that constitutes a particular state. The constructivists emphasise the nature of social construction of national identity even when it is linked to seemingly essential national characteristics such as language or ethnicity.¹⁶⁵ The definition of a nation is far from universal and highly contested. The criteria established for a nation may have serious political implications as they legitimise what communities may be recognized as “nations”, which could grant them the right to claim political

¹⁶² Elena Yu. Tsumarova, “Politika Identichnosti: Politics ili Policy?,” *Vestnik Permskogo Universiteta. Seriya: Politologiya* 2 (2012): 5–16.

¹⁶³ Anthony Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 3.

¹⁶⁴ Olga Yu. Malinova, “Makropoliticheskaya Identichnost,” in *Politicheskaya Identichnost i Politika Identichnosti. Tom 1: Identichnost kak Kategoriya Politicheskoi Nauki: Slovar Terminov i Ponjatiy*, ed. by I. S. Semenenko (Moskva: ROSSPEN, 2012), 76.

¹⁶⁵ See Lindsay Paterson, “Universities and Nations in Britain in the Twentieth Century,” in *National Identity, Nationalism and Constitutional Change*, ed. by Frank Bechhofer and David McCrone (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 163–88; Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism*; Eric Hobsbawm, introduction: *Inventing Tradition to The Invention of Tradition*, ed. by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1–14; Jon E. Fox and Cynthia Miller-Idriss, “Everyday Nationhood,” *Ethnicities* 8, no. 4 (2008): 536–63.

autonomy and participation in international politics. Therefore, the meanings promoted through identity politics may bear serious political and social consequences for national politics and the decision making in national and international arenas.

As soon as the notion of identity is regarded as the result of social construction, it may be difficult to empirically establish the origins of individual identities, nor to prove the primary causality between identity and practice, as these are being formed simultaneously through interaction. This problem is partially solved though the implicit explanation of ontological grounds adopted by a researcher.

Philosophical ontologies are situated on the continuum of different understandings of cause-effect relations between identity and political processes which range from positivist to post-structuralist accounts. The cause-effect relation and the possibility to establish mechanisms between national identity construction and other social processes is situated in positivist ontology. From a positivist standpoint, national identity represents a project of political actions in identity politics. Following this line of argument, it is accepted that national identity has an impact on political decisions, as well as that it can be purposefully constructed and used instrumentally. On the opposite, researchers who adopt the post-structuralist ontologies reject the possibility to draw causal links between identity and other political or social phenomena.¹⁶⁶ Yet, the negation of a causality in poststructuralist argument does not make the study of identity futile. The poststructuralists' view on identity is presented as a way to understand how certain political actions become possible and how linking and differentiation help legitimise political actions.¹⁶⁷ This recognition brings post-structuralists closer to the constitutive ontology. The constitutive and not a causal role of identity in social processes occupies the middle ground on the nature of identity,¹⁶⁸ which is adopted in this study.

¹⁶⁶ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 25-27.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 25-27.

¹⁶⁸ Lebow, "Constitutive Causality," 211-239.

Both causal and non-causal ontologies are used for studying identity. However, when it comes to empirically supported data, hardly is it possible to establish direct causal links between national identity, individual identities and the decision-making process.¹⁶⁹ Demonstrating causal links may be challenging, if not impossible, when adopting a positivist ontology. Taking the middle ground on ontological premises on identity, empirically identifiable elements, such as narratives of identity, metaphors, framing of identity and other rhetorical devices may serve as mechanisms to support policies, justify political behaviour or actions.¹⁷⁰ Doing so, there is an implicit acknowledgement of the impact of identity on the “real” world, making the study of identity change indispensable for understanding political processes. Yet, identity should not be seen as a single factor in political outcomes or political processes. It is just one of many aspects that may facilitate the decision-making, justify and legitimise actions.

One could argue that a nation is how people identify and how they are identified. In academic literature, the understanding of national identity, which is linked to the idea of a nation, has evolved from a narrowly defined ethnic identity to a broader understanding of a nation as a political community. The classical definition of a nation coined by Anthony Smith depicts it as a community that possesses geographical and political borders. The nation is a culturally-similar group, whose unity is based on a common ethnic, linguistic and/or religious origin.¹⁷¹ The ethnocentric understanding of a nation in Nationalism studies has established two main criteria for a community that may call itself a nation. First, such a community should be located in a “definite social space”¹⁷² and possess a territory. Yet, a narrow tribal-like definition seems to contravene the realities of the multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multilingual populations of modern nation-states. Second criterion is that its members should have a feeling that they belong to the territory and to the community. The feeling has to do with the psychological and emotional attachment,

¹⁶⁹ William Bloom argued for a psychological explanation in “*Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*.”

¹⁷⁰ Lebow, “Constitutive Causality,” 211-239.

¹⁷¹ Smith, *National Identity*, 14.

¹⁷² Kuzio, “National Identity in Independent Ukraine,” 582–608.

which William Bloom elaborated on in his work explaining this feeling as a basic need for security.¹⁷³ Ernest Gellner argued for other conditions of a nation, among which there should be the “will” of the people to be a nation and political and historical circumstances, when the nations are accepted,¹⁷⁴ to name a few. Despite a large literature on national identity, many researchers seem to evade providing a definition of a nation, rather they explain the phenomenon of a nation indirectly analysing circumstances, historical and political processes, which give rise to nationalism. Because national identity depends on a definition of a nation, it becomes equally difficult to define.

In this work, a social-constructivist view on identity is adopted. National identity is considered an abstract phenomenon brought into existence through the discursive practice, which can be evidenced through identification and analysis of discursive representations articulated by the actors involved in identity politics. Agreement on representations and meanings attached to the nation may serve as an indication of the collective understanding of a nation. However, these representations and meanings may become a matter of contestation from different publics, especially in historical moments of change.

This discursive *contestation* of identity, in fact, represents a struggle for power over meaning. In this research, *discourse* is understood as systems of meanings that express relations of power.¹⁷⁵ These systems of meanings may go unnoticed in the everyday life. However, they may shape the boundaries of what is acceptable and unacceptable or what is “correct” and “incorrect” when talking about the actions of the imaginary national community. Among many conceptualisations of discourse, there is a narrow understanding of discourse as limited to a text, and a wider interpretation of discourse as not reduced to the language. Neither national identity nor discourse are reduced to the language. Rather, the text is a “specific and unique

¹⁷³ Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*.

¹⁷⁴ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 52-56.

¹⁷⁵ Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*.

realization of discourse.”¹⁷⁶ More importantly, through a discourse in the form of text, the patterns of structures and meanings become more evident.

It is important to clarify that national identity and identity politics are not limited to a discursive articulation. First of all, individual psychological and emotional attachment to a nation may be expressed in various forms. Definitions of national identity found in the academic literature reflect the psychological origins of identity conceptualisation. However, they apply it to groups interpreting it as collective identification. For instance, Justin Gibbins defined national identity as a “psychological we-feeling”¹⁷⁷ that unites a nation. William Bloom characterised national identity as a “condition in which a mass of people have made the same identification with national symbols”, which unites them into one psychological group.¹⁷⁸ Bloom highlighted the role of national symbols in the formation of national unity “from within”. For Michael Billig, it is a kind of collective “consciousness” that includes the awareness of the group. Bechhofer and McCrone’s definitions refer to identity as “a piece of psychological machinery”¹⁷⁹ and a “frame of reference”¹⁸⁰ through which people interpret the events around them, and “construct, modify and apply to themselves in particular contexts.”¹⁸¹ In this way, the unity of a national community is understood as a kind of collective psyche. However, hardly could this collective attachment be traced through analysis of individual identities. Rather, the evidence of collective identity may be explicitly established through a distinction of “us” from “them”, which can be found through the study of collective practices, especially discursive practice.

What constitutes the core of national identity is a matter of debate. The aforementioned essentialist view on national identity, which places ethnic identity

¹⁷⁶ Wodak, Afterword: ‘What Now?’ – Some Reflections on the European Convention and Its Implications,” 203–215.

¹⁷⁷ Justin Edward Gibbins, *Britain, Europe and National Identity: Self and Other in International Relations* (Chennai: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

¹⁷⁸ Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*, 52.

¹⁷⁹ Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 6th ed (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 7.

¹⁸⁰ Frank Bechhofer and David McCrone, “Conclusion: The Politics of Identity,” in *National Identity, Nationalism and Constitutional Change*, ed. by Frank Bechhofer and David McCrone (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 189–205.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 189–205.

at the centre of identity formation, pretends to provide a “natural continuity” to an ancient tribal group. However, such a definition does not make a distinction between an ethnic group, a nation and a nation-state. In order to fill the gap between the theorised ethnic core of a nation and the actual heterogeneity of societies, another aspect of national identity was highlighted, which is a sense of belonging to a “political community” with common institutions, rights and duties.¹⁸² Therefore, national identity encompasses political and socio-cultural (ethnic) dimensions. This understanding of national identity as ethnic and political led to a widely used acceptance of a dichotomous nature of national identity as either ethnic or civic. An assumption of what should constitute a nation – a common culture or political loyalty to central powers – lies at the core of analysis of national identity. The “civic” national identity is based on political loyalty, while the “ethnic” one is situated in common cultural background and practices. The researchers maintain that the political dimension of identity is as important as an ethnocultural one,¹⁸³ however, analysis of national identity as either ethnic or civic implies making a choice between a more exclusionary ethnic identity or a more inclusive civic one, which constrains the analysis of national identity in heterogeneous societies.

National identity is more complex than the civic versus ethnic dichotomy holds. The multidimensional nature of national identity can be observed in the overlapping of national identity with other identities, such as sub-national (regional) and supranational identities, e.g. civilisational or imperial. For some national polities, civilisational identity may be a part of national identity and be used in support of integration policies.¹⁸⁴ However, national-civilisational identities may possess distinctive socio-cultural values and behaviour,¹⁸⁵ which implies conflict and contestation of identities within a given society. Given the complexity of

¹⁸² Smith, *National Identity*, 14.

¹⁸³ Montserrat Guibernau, “Anthony D. Smith on Nations and National Identity: A Critical Assessment,” *Nations and Nationalism* 10, no. 1–2 (2004): 125–41; Valery Tishkov, “Rossiiskiy Narod i Natsionalnaya Identichnost,” *Rossiia v Globalnoi Politike* 6, no. 4 (2008): 135–42; Antonina V. Shvetsova, “Natsionalnaya Identichnost kak Sotsiokulturnyi Fenomen,” *Observatoriya kultury* 14, no. 6 (2017): 653–61.

¹⁸⁴ Vladimir I. Pantin, “Natsionalno-Tsivilizatsionnaya Identichnost,” in *Politicheskaya Identichnost i Politika Identichnosti. Tom 1: Identichnost kak Kategoriya Politicheskoy Nauki: Slovar Terminov i Ponjatiy*, ed. by Irina S. Semenenko (Moskva: ROSSPJeN, 2012), 116–19; Ekman, “Painful Moments and Realignments,” 232–244.

¹⁸⁵ Pantin, “Nataionalno-Tsivilizatsionnaya Identichnost,” 116–19.

contemporary politics, the relationship of national identity with other identities is subject to an assessment through empirical research, as these depend on multiple factors, especially on a historical context.

In a number of constructivists' works on national identity, it was demonstrated how identities can be moulded by long-term policies, which result in acceptance of omnipresent ideas about the nation. A prominent example is the implementation of language practices in a community, which are a subject to continuous construction by the powerful majority and institutions.¹⁸⁶ Associations with a nation, its name, a territory and the government, become so tightly linked that the absence of a nation becomes unimaginable or using Billig's words – nation is omnipresent or "banal."¹⁸⁷ On the other hand, this seemed banality can be challenged when the borders of the state are contested or when new identity politics is undertaken.

Among social practices that constitute national identity, discursive practice takes a central place in the construction of the collective intersubjective meanings of national identity. The idea of national identity as a discursive construction has been accepted by scholars across social science disciplines since the 1990s.¹⁸⁸ The reason for the popularity of the discursive approach to identity studies lies in the possibility to capture the representations of the nation articulated in the public sphere, to elicit articulations about Self and Others, and to compare the different meanings in terms of their agreement and contestation.

The importance of studying a national identity as a discursive construction lies in the fact that much of what a national community represents in the collective imaginary has been expressed through discourse. Summarizing the ideas of previous

¹⁸⁶ See Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

¹⁸⁷ Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 77.

¹⁸⁸ See Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe*; De Cellia et al., "The Discursive Construction of National Identities," 149–73; Wodak et al., *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*; Olga Fillippova, "Politics of Identity through School Primers: Discursive Construction of Legitimate Image of State, Nation and Society in Soviet and Independent Ukraine," *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 27, no. 1 (2009): 29–36; Kristine Barseghyan, "Rethinking Nationhood: Post-Independence Discourse on National Identity in Armenia," *Polish Sociological Review* 144 (2003): 399–416; Korostelina, "Mapping National Identity Narratives in Ukraine," 293–315; Merje Kuus, "European Integration in Identity Narratives in Estonia: A Quest for Security," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 1 (2002): 91–108; Ted Hopf, "'Crimea Is Ours': A Discursive History," *International Relations* 30, no. 2 (2016): 227–55; Irina A. Bubnova, "Diskurs Natsionalnoi Identichnosti na Postsovetском Prostranstve," *Yazyk, Literatura i Kultura kak Grani Mezhekulturnogo Obshcheniya*, 2015, 69–83.

researchers, Billig stated that identity is not a “thing, but it is a shorthand description for ways of talking about the self and community.”¹⁸⁹ Therefore, having a national identity means that one possesses certain ways of talking about nationhood,¹⁹⁰ the way people learn and are reminded about the nation through the language. Besides discursive marking of in- and out-of-groups, which Billig called the “syntax of hegemony”, national identity is shaped through “microscopic” linguistic references, such as “the people” and “society”. Declarations of a particular identity and the categorisation of others are expressed in discourses and carry “their own extra packets of meaning.”¹⁹¹ For the empirical study, it means that national identity is overwhelmingly constructed even when it is not mentioned as “national identity”. The conceptualisation of national identity as a discursive construct challenges the idea of a pre-given collective identity based on a common ethnic origin.

As discourses are produced by multiple actors and across multiple contexts, there can be articulations of different Selves in relation to Others, which may construct different identities. Acknowledgement of multiple Others articulated in discourses opens a discussion about a range of Otherness, construction of multiple and, at times, conflicting, identities in regard to different (or the same) Others. Discursive approaches recognize multiple identities created in interaction with different Others. Besides, when being analysed in terms of ethnic belonging,¹⁹² Otherness may be expressed in terms of non-ethnic or political terms. Otherness could be embodied in organisations, alliances, or any other type of collective identity. As Hopf stated, identity may change depending on who the state is interacting with,¹⁹³ Therefore, it can be concluded that it is important not to assume that national identity is the same in relation with all external actors, who are constructed as Others, but to verify it through empirical analysis.

¹⁸⁹ Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 61.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 8.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 67.

¹⁹² Jan Germen Janmaat, “The Ethnic ‘Other’ in Ukrainian History Textbooks: The Case of Russia and the Russians,” *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education* 37, no. 3 (2007): 307 — 324; Lowell W. Barrington, “Views of the ‘Ethnic Other’ in Ukraine,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 8, no. 2 (2002): 83–96; Anna Triandafyllidou, “National Identity and the ‘Other’,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21, no. 4 (1998): 593–612.

¹⁹³ Hopf, “Making Identity Count,” 3–19.

The dynamic of national identity construction is similar to other social identities as it evolved around both Self-awareness of the internal “us” and external Others. This dialectic relationship between the “inside” and “outside” can be described as “a double-edged relationship.”¹⁹⁴ Even though it could be difficult to establish a clear line dividing the internal and the external in a national polity, national identity may exist only because there are other identities. Therefore, ideas and meanings about national identity are constructed in relation with other actors, either other nation-states or international organisations.

Foreign policy is the realm where national identity is most evidently (re)constructed in relation with external Others. While the borders of the state are defined by geography, the boundaries of national identity are defined through discursive practice. The discursive demarcation between “Self” and “Other” and a “domestic” from “foreign” is how an identity constitution is achieved.¹⁹⁵ As a result, the articulated ideas about a nation constitute who “we” are and who constitute “the Others”. This categorisation sets criteria and consequent engagement in foreign policy directions. In foreign policy discourses, identity is constructed through mechanisms of linking to those considered ‘in-group’ and differentiation from Others.¹⁹⁶ Although these mechanisms can be analytically separated, they belong to the same twofold process of identity construction.

The discursive construction of security (danger and threat) is linked with the notion of the significant Other and boundary demarcation of national identity. Billig paid attention to the idea of “insularity”¹⁹⁷ of national identity: it should be unique and distinct from other nations. The nation’s uniqueness and difference should be protected from the outside influences which are constructed as threats. Failing to mark a boundary between Self and Others may result in the loss of uniqueness of a nation as “we” may eventually become “them”. On the other hand, the preservation of the internal unity and “universality” of the nation is crucial. In this way, the

¹⁹⁴ Anna Triandafyllidou, *National Identity Reconsidered. Images of Self and Other in a ‘United’ Europe* (Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002).

¹⁹⁵ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 8-12.

¹⁹⁶ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 19-21.

¹⁹⁷ Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 72.

discursive articulation of security is a part of differentiation between in- and out-of-groups, and therefore, a part of national identity construction. Reference to “national identity” in discourse is rare. Likewise, “security” or “threat” may not be pronounced in discourse.¹⁹⁸ Instead, for in-group construction, articulation of unity against a potential threat or reference to past events¹⁹⁹ may be used. Therefore, the formation of national identity could involve various practices of imaginary community construction, including the discursive articulation of threats and history, that creates an imaginary and collective “us”.

Differences between individual and collective identities have opened a cross-disciplinary discussion about what identity is and what role it plays in social processes. The study of national identity in the discipline of Political Science is more concerned with the “internal” source of national identity articulation, factors, actors, and mechanisms that affect it at the domestic level. For instance, the areas of interest include (but are not limited to) issues related to differences between political preferences and regional identity types,²⁰⁰ the effect of national identity on behaviour and norms of its society;²⁰¹ the role of history;²⁰² and historical memory;²⁰³ energy

¹⁹⁸ Jarrod Hayes, “Identity, Authority, and the British War in Iraq,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12, no. 3 (2016): 334–53.

¹⁹⁹ Sandra Obradović and Caroline Howarth, “The Power of Politics: How Political Leaders in Serbia Discursively Manage Identity Continuity and Political Change to Shape the Future of the Nation,” *European Journal of Social Psychology* 48, no. 1 (2018): O25–35.

²⁰⁰ Pohorila, “Political and National Identity in Ukraine’s Regions,” 18–32; Barrington and Herron, “One Ukraine or Many?,” 53–86; Korostelina, “Mapping National Identity Narratives in Ukraine,” 293–315; Riabchuk, “‘Two Ukraines’ Reconsidered,” 138–156; Tomaichuk, “Regionalizm i Regionalnaya Identichnost v Sovremennoi Ukraine,” 252–63.

²⁰¹ David Miller and Sundas Ali, “Testing the National Identity Argument,” *European Political Science Review* 6, no. 2 (2014): 237–59; Andrew Mason, “Integration, Cohesion and National Identity: Theoretical Reflections on Recent British Policy,” *British Journal of Political Science* 40, no. 4 (2010): 857–74; K.S. Grechanyi, “Natsionalna Identichnist v Ukrayini: Politychnyi Aspekt,” *Sotsiologiya i Politychni Nauky* 13, no. 5 (2008): 901–6.

²⁰² Peter W. Rodgers, “(Re)Inventing the Past: The Politics of ‘National’ History in the Ukrainian Classroom,” *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 6, no. 2 (2008): 40–55.

²⁰³ Alexandra Wangler, *Rethinking History, Reframing Identity: Memory, Generations, and the Dynamics of National Identity in Poland* (Wiesbaden: Springer Science & Business Media, 2012); Efemishch, “Proshloe v Konstruirovani Natsionalnoi Identichnosti,” 77–90.

resources;²⁰⁴ civil conflicts;²⁰⁵ language;²⁰⁶ ethnic²⁰⁷ and external Others²⁰⁸ in national identity formation. In Nationalism studies, identity is provided with a functionalist explanation. It serves as a mechanism of personal belonging to an imaginary collective nation without which an individual would suffer alienation.²⁰⁹ Nationalism studies pay special attention to the formation of the nation itself and attribute a leading role to the culture, language and ethnicity in national identity construction.²¹⁰ At the domestic level, identity provides a foundation for a state's existence and is used for legitimation of the state's institutions and policies.

In International Relations, identity studies belong to three broad theoretical traditions: sociological institutionalism, psychoanalysis and social psychology, and poststructuralism/discourse studies. Each of these approaches developed a different conceptualisation of identity. As a result, the concept of identity has extended to various IR research areas and serves both as an explanation and a way to understand the state's foreign policy behaviour.²¹¹ Identity has been interlinked with other key IR concepts such as norms, security community,²¹² ontological security,²¹³ national

²⁰⁴ Peter Rutland, "Petronation? Oil, Gas, and National Identity in Russia," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 31, no. 1 (2015): 66–89; Trine Villumsen Berling, Izabela Surwillo, and Sandra Sørensen, "Norwegian and Ukrainian Energy Futures: Exploring the Role of National Identity in Sociotechnical Imaginaries of Energy Security," *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 2021, 1–30.

²⁰⁵ Kulyk, "National Identity in Ukraine," 588–608; Pop-Eleches and Robertson, "Identity and Political Preferences in Ukraine—before and after the Euromaidan," 107–18.

²⁰⁶ Dominique Arel, "Interpreting Nationality and Language in the 2001," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 18, no. 3 (2002): 213–49; Ksenia Maksimovtsova, "Language Policy in Education in Contemporary Ukraine: A Continuous Discussion of Contested National Identity," *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 16, no. 3 (2017): 1–25.

²⁰⁷ Barrington, "Views of the 'Ethnic Other' in Ukraine," 83–96.

²⁰⁸ Kuzio, "Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine," 343–65.

²⁰⁹ McCrone, Frank, and David Bechhofer, *Understanding National Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 10.

²¹⁰ See Smith, *National Identity*; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Vladimir V. Kochetkov, "Natsionalnaya i Etnicheskaya Identichnost v Sovremennom Mire," *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta. Seria 18. Sotsiologia i Politologia* 2 (2012): 144–62.

²¹¹ See Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics*; Andrey P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016); Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy*, 12–37.

²¹² Katzenstein, "Introduction," 1–27; Linus Hagström, "The 'Abnormal' State: Identity, Norm/Exception and Japan," *European Journal of International Relations* 21, no. 1 (2015): 122–45; Michael C. Williams and Iver B. Neumann, "From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (2000): 357–87.

²¹³ Christopher S. Browning and Pertti Joenniemi, "Ontological Security, Self-Articulation and the Securitization of Identity," *Cooperation and Conflict* 52, no. 1 (2017): 31–47; Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*.

interest,²¹⁴ and integration processes in Europe.²¹⁵ The significance of the constitutive Other in identity construction has become an inherent part of IR identity-based research, particularly within the constructivist and poststructuralist approaches.²¹⁶ Along with the proliferation of identity studies, there has been a considerable change in the approach to Otherness. Firstly, the researchers focused on radically different Others²¹⁷ and later non-radical and amicable representations of the Other.²¹⁸ In International Relations, the Other is usually a culturally alien entity, normally, a foreign state. The articulation of differences takes place through basic discourses, visions of the past and shared historical narratives.²¹⁹ However, the significance of constructed meanings in relation to the Other rather than the intensity of relations makes the Other important.²²⁰ The concept of identity has become widely applied across the aforementioned IR approaches, however, “national identity” or just “identity”, may be used in IR literature interchangeably.

National identity, therefore, is both a psychological individual feeling associated with the national political community and a set of ideas and intersubjective meanings about the nation and the collective unifying characteristics. Both individual and collective identities are a product of identity politics formed through social practices, particularly, discursive practice. However, individual and collective identities should be treated differently. National identity at the collective level is a matter of agreement on intersubjective meanings attached to a nation, rather than an aggregate of individual self-assessments. While foreign policy is a realm

²¹⁴ See McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*; Suh, *Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliances*.

²¹⁵ Kuus, “European Integration in Identity Narratives in Estonia,” 91–108; Thomas Diez, “Speaking ‘Europe’: The Politics of Integration Discourse,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 6, no. 4 (1999): 598–613; Hansen and Wæver, *European Integration and National Identity*; Simeon Mitropolitski, “EU Integration: An Enforcement of or an Impediment to National Identity in Bulgaria and Macedonia,” *Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia* 3, no. 2 (2014): 309–326.

²¹⁶ Iver B. Neumann, “Self and Other in International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 2 (1996): 139–174; Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” 384–96; Esparza, “National Identity and the Other,” 413–36; Malinova, “Russian Identity and the ‘Pivot to the East,’” 227–39; Elena V. Morozova, “Obraz Drugogo/Chuzhogo v Formirovanii Vneshnepoliticheskoi Identichnosti (Obzor Literaturny),” *Istoricheskaya i Sotsialno-Obrazovatel'naya Mysl* 8, no. 6/2 (2016): 183–86.

²¹⁷ See Campbell, *Writing Security*; Hansen, *Security as Practice*.

²¹⁸ Gibbins, *Britain, Europe and National Identity*; Siddi, “An Evolving Other,” 35–50.

²¹⁹ White and Feklyunina, *Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*, 22.

²²⁰ Olga Y. Malinova, “Kontsept ‘Drugogo’ v Issledovaniyakh Identichnosti: Analiz Sovremennykh Diskussii,” *Politicheskaya Nauka* 4 (2016): 154–69, 161.

where the distinction between the national Self and foreign Others is most eloquently expressed, the foreign policy debates take place at the domestic level among the national political elites. Therefore, despite a distinction between the conceptualisation and the role of national identity in Political Science and International Relations, the differences between the “inside” and “outside” are not clear cut in discursive practices.

1.2 The role of the ruling political elites in identity politics and national identity change in the post-Soviet space

For the post-Soviet states, which were composed of diverse ethnic and linguistic groups, the idea of a unified nation was thought to have become a source of national cohesion and legitimization of state independence. As a result, the construction of a national identity has morphed into a particular political project supported by implementation of new governmental policies, invention of new practices, and articulation of new representations of national identity in discourses that aimed to shape the post-Soviet national imaginary. In this section, I discuss the role of the ruling political elites in identity politics and the relationship between identity politics and national identity change.

In academic literature, identity politics is associated with a broad range of practices and processes that may shape people’s social identities. The umbrella term *identity entrepreneurs* defines the most influential actors of identity politics: individuals, groups and institutions that have the authority and power to shape both the individual and collective imaginary about national identity. The identity entrepreneurs possess a large number of instruments and mechanisms that may alter national identity and potentially have an impact on a perception of national identity among the population. The media,²²¹ institutions,²²² such as schools and the army,

²²¹ Orlova, “‘Europe’ as a Normative Model in the Mediatized Discourse of Ukrainian Political Elites,” 222–41.

²²² Miller, “Politika Stroitelstva Natsii - Gosudarstva na Ukraine,” 76–99; Anssi Paasi, “Nationalizing Everyday Life: Individual and Collective Identities as Practice and Discourse,” *Geography Research Forum* 19, (1999): 4–21; Tatiana Zhurzhenko, “Everyday Europeanization and Bottom-Up Geopolitics at the Ukrainian-Polish Border,” *Geopolitics*, January (2024): 1–43.

political parties,²²³ groups of elites,²²⁴ national and international organisations²²⁵ may become powerful actors in complex processes of identity politics. However, the leading role in national identity construction and identity politics belongs to the state and those who have access to control the state policies. It is the government that promulgates language laws, establishes programs of education, authorises books, shapes the symbolic and memory politics which articulate ideas about the nation. Policy makers also impose meanings, create reality through discourses²²⁶ and adopt particular identity narratives in accordance with their policy agendas.²²⁷ Therefore, government officials and the ruling political elites possess significant power to shape the processes of identity politics.

The role of the ruling political elites in national identity change is particularly salient in the context of the post-Soviet transformations. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the newly-formed states had to define an array of trajectories of societal and political development that would justify independence and serve a unifying force for societies. Such trajectories include but are not limited to the adoption of laws on a national language, the re-assessment of Soviet history, the creation of new commemorative practices and symbols. Therefore, identity construction and change in the post-Soviet period were particularly influenced by the ruling political elites whose role was decisive in making the new rules and institutions in order to shape the identities and the imaginaries of the population.²²⁸ The evaluation of changes in the population's perception of national identity and the impact of the new politics on national cohesion have become a large field of research in post-Soviet studies.

²²³ Inna Melnykovska, Rainer Schweickert, and Tetiana Kostiuhenko, "Balancing National Uncertainty and Foreign Orientation: Identity Building and the Role of Political Parties in Post-Orange Ukraine," *Europe - Asia Studies* 63, no. 6 (2011): 1055–72.

²²⁴ Barseghyan, "Rethinking Nationhood," 399–416.

²²⁵ Alexandra Gheciu, "Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the 'New Europe,'" *International Organization* 59, no. 4 (2005): 973–1012.

²²⁶ Michael J. Shapiro, *The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 100, 116.

²²⁷ Siddi, "An Evolving Other: German National Identity and Constructions of Russia," 35–50.

²²⁸ Lane, "Identity Formation and Political Elites in the Post-Socialist States," 1–10.

From the perspective of identity politics, an idea of a nation may turn into a strategic project of the elites. The nation may be perceived as a result of purposeful efforts of the political and intellectual elites who promote certain ideas about the nation, common values, symbols and endeavours.²²⁹ As Checkel and Katzenstein noted, “the construction of identity suggests an engineering view of politics”²³⁰ which entails purposeful actors and their political choices. Through the formation of political and social identities, the elites pursue their own interests, including legitimization of integration into international alliances and establishing connections²³¹ with other states. Therefore, the construction of a national identity can be analysed as a set of ideas, actions and outcomes that aim to promote the elites’ interest.

However, it would be erroneous to assume that the construction of national identity is exclusively a top-down process. First, the ruling political elites and government are not entirely independent or separated from the population, as they fulfil the function of popular representation and assume a collective identity when speaking on behalf of the state.²³² Therefore, by promoting a particular project of identity, the elites represent certain groups of people and their ideas should resonate in the population attitudes, which present a clear limitation for the elites. Secondly, the ruling political elites are not homogeneous. They may represent different groups with opposing interests, supporting different policies and constructing different identity projects. As a result, identity politics and national identity projects may become a matter of contestation, struggle and negotiation among the political actors.

Assigning a leading role to the ruling political elites does not entail diminishing the role of society in national identity construction. People may contest and reinterpret the identity policies which do not match their worldview or come into conflict with their value system.²³³ People may also perform and construct a

²²⁹ Tishkov, “Rossiiskiy Narod i Natsionalnaya Identichnost,” 135–42.

²³⁰ Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, “The Politicization of European Identities,” in *European Identity*, ed. by Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3.

²³¹ Lane, “Identity Formation and Political Elites in the Post-Socialist States,” 1–10.

²³² Runciman, “Hobbes’s Theory of Representation,” 15–34.

²³³ Rico Isaacs and Abel Polese, “Between ‘Imagined’ and ‘Real’ Nation-Building: Identities and Nationhood in Post-Soviet Central Asia,” *Nationalities Papers* 43, no.3 (2015): 371–382; Abel Polese, Rustamjon Urinboyev, Tanel

national identity through everyday practices,²³⁴ which do not necessarily follow the patterns of elite-driven identity politics. Finally, the positive response to the new symbols of identity is key in collective identity formation.²³⁵ Therefore, the ruling elites are limited in the extent of the policies and identities they promote, as alien practices or unacceptable symbols will have a destabilising effect on a national polity. This is the reason why the impact of identity politics and national identity construction should not be interpreted as a uniquely top-down process. Rather, it is a complex process of identity contestation and negotiation between diverse groups involved in the process of national identity construction.

In the post-Soviet nations, identity politics evolved into a re-articulation of national identity and Otherness. On the one hand, there was a need to construct a new national project from “within”. For this reason, new policies were adopted by ruling elites, among which there were language policies, creation of new symbols and practices, which contributed to the process of de-Sovietisation²³⁶. On the other hand, there was a need to re-position national identity in relation to external Others which manifested in the transformation of national identity discourses.²³⁷ Both Russia and Europe are known to be constitutive, but opposing and exclusionary Others in new national identities projects of the post-Soviet states.²³⁸

Kerikmae, and Sarah Murru, “Negotiating Spaces and the Public–Private Boundary: Language Policies Versus Language Use Practices in Odessa,” *Space and Culture* 22, no. 3 (2019): 263–79; Abel Polese, “Building a Ukrainian Identity in Odessa: Negotiation of Markers and Informal Nationalism,” *Otoritas: Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan* 8, no. 1 (2018): 1–16.

²³⁴ See Edensor, *National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life*; Emilia Pawłusz and Oleksandra Seliverstova, “Everyday Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Space. Methodological Reflections,” *Studies of Transition States and Societies* 8, no. 1 (2016): 69–86; Abel Polese, Oleksandra Seliverstova, Tanel Kerikmae, and Ammon Cheskin, “National Identity for Breakfast: Food Consumption and the Everyday Construction of National Narratives in Estonia,” *Nationalities Papers* 48, no. 6 (2020): 1015–35.

²³⁵ Graeme Gill, *Symbols and Legitimacy in Soviet Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 5.

²³⁶ Dmitry V. Berezniakov and Sergey V. Kozlov, “Politika Identichnosti Postsovetskoi Ukrainy: Kak “Ukrainskoe” Pobezhdalo “Sovetskoe,” *Simvolicheskaya Politika* 5, (2017):198–222; Rogers Brubaker, “National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe,” *Daedalus* 124, no. 2 (1995): 107–32.

²³⁷ Eduard G. Soloviev, “Tendentsii Transformatsii Ukrainskoi Identichnosti: Vyzovy dlia Rossii,” *Rossiia i Novye Gosudarstva Evrazii* 3 (2018): 9–22; Olga I. Vendina, Vladimir A. Kolosov, Fiodor A. Popov, and Aleksandr B. Sebensov, “Ukraina v Politicheskom Krizise: Obraz Rossii kak Katalizator Protivorechii,” *Polis. Politicheskie issledovaniya*, no. 5 (2014): 50–67; Olena Morozova, “Ukraine’s Journey to Europe: Strategic Macronarrative and Conceptual Metaphors,” *European Security* 28, no. 3 (2019): 323–40.

²³⁸ Rindzeviciute, “‘Nation’ and ‘Europe’,” 74–91; Mikhail A. Molchanov, “Choosing Europe over Russia: What Has Ukraine Gained?,” *European Politics and Society* 17, no. 4 (2016): 522–37; Kuus, “European Integration in Identity Narratives in Estonia,” 91–108; Kornely Kakachia, “Georgia’s Identity-Driven Foreign Policy and the Struggle for Its European Destiny,” *Caucasus Analytical Digest* 37, no. March 29 (2012): 4–7; Kuzio, “Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine,” 343–65.

The internal homogenising policies may have different effects on national cohesion in ethnically diverse societies. Labelling identity politics “nationalising,”²³⁹ Roger Brubaker argued that policies supporting the promotion of cultural and political hegemony would have explosive effects on societies. These predictions have some true to a certain extent, as the post-Soviet states vary in ethnic and linguistic demographic, consequently, nationalising policies had various effects on national cohesion.²⁴⁰ For instance, in Kazakhstan these policies served to strengthen the major ethnic group, as the ethnonational boundaries were strong, while in Ukraine the nationalising policies reshaped loyalties and identities, as the ethnonational and linguistic boundaries were blurred.²⁴¹

The construction of national identity in relation to external Others is another issue which could threaten a national cohesion and, in some cases, endanger territorial integrity. Were the new national identity perceived in conflict with the loyalties of the ethnic minorities, this could mobilise the minority group and lead to material and moral support from the “external homeland”, and in the worst-case scenario result in a territorial succession.²⁴² Therefore, foreign policy and rhetoric about external Others could shape the national and international dynamics of societies and post-Soviet national identities.²⁴³ To a certain degree, it had a bearing on national interethnic relations and reshaped national loyalties. A link between foreign policy and national identity remains an important part of nation-building rhetoric²⁴⁴. The relation to external Others and geopolitical vision matters for foreign policy directions, as they are inherently connected with a notion of state security.²⁴⁵

²³⁹ Brubaker, “National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe,” 107–32.

²⁴⁰ Rogers Brubaker, “Nationalizing States Revisited: Projects and Processes of Nationalization in Post-Soviet States,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34, no. 11 (2011): 1785–1814.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 1785–1814.

²⁴² Brubaker, “National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe.”

²⁴³ Stephen Shulman, “National Integration and Foreign Policy in Multiethnic States,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 4, no. 4 (1998): 110–32; Stephen Shulman, “The Internal-External Nexus in the Formation of Ukrainian National Identity: The Case for Slavic Integration,” in *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine*, edited by Taras Kuzio and Paul D’Anieri (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 103–29.

²⁴⁴ David J. Smith, “Framing the National Question in Central and Eastern Europe: A Quadratic Nexus?,” *Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 2, no. 1 (2002): 3–16; Jennie L. Schulze, *Strategic Frames: Europe, Russia, and Minority Inclusion in Estonia and Latvia* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2018).

²⁴⁵ Vladimir A. Kolosov, “Geopoliticheskoe Videnie Mira i Identichnost,” v *Identichnost: Lichnost, Obshchestvo, Politika*, ed. by Irina S. Semenenko (Moskva: Ves' Mir, 2017), 469–75.

Assumption of the split loyalties of national minorities may result in social tension, contribute to the construction of the “internal enemy” and “fifth column” within the national borders, as happened in the case of Ukraine.²⁴⁶

Foreign policy direction is subject to contestation by multiple actors of identity politics. However, the degree to which different groups may impose the desired outcome differs. While the general public may express their choices during the electoral period or support of the political campaigns, the ruling political elites have a continuous impact on a formulation of foreign policy and articulation of foreign policy discourses. This continuity is situated in the elites’ role in political representation, their direct involvement in decision-making, authority and power to contest foreign policy choices. Language is an important way of symbolic representation and is the principal form through which the ideas are projected into the public realm. It is through the language that ideas about the nation and national identity are being negotiated explicitly or implicitly in debates over policy.²⁴⁷

Every nation is situated in a specific historical context which is in high degree defines the ways how national identity will be shaped. Therefore, national identity change should be analysed as a part of historical and political developments. The contestation of national identity meanings does not lead to a conflict itself, yet identity may be a source of group mobilisation.²⁴⁸ Conflicts do not arise merely because of identity conflict, but the identity can be intertwined with other contextual situations that are shaped by government decisions²⁴⁹ or geopolitical interests of third parties.²⁵⁰ Therefore, identity politics is an inherently complex and multifaceted process that is intertwined with parties’ interests, promulgated policies and a

²⁴⁶ See: Vendina et al., “Ukraina v Politicheskoy Krizise,” 50–67; Degtiarev, “Natsionalnaya Identichnost i Perspektivy Ukrainskoy Gosudarstvennosti,” 71–76.

²⁴⁷ Gill, *Symbols and Legitimacy in Soviet Politics*, 6.

²⁴⁸ Kulyk, “National Identity in Ukraine,” 588–608; Karina V. Korostelina, “Conflict of National Narratives of Ukraine Euromaidan and Beyond,” *Die Friedens-Warte* 89, no. 1/2 (2014): 269–90.

²⁴⁹ Adam Charles Lenton, “Why Didn’t Ukraine Fight for Crimea? Evidence from Declassified National Security and Defense Council Proceedings,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 00, no. 00 (2021): 1–10.

²⁵⁰ Iain Ferguson, “Between New Spheres of Influence: Ukraine’s Geopolitical Misfortune,” *Geopolitics* 23, no. 2 (2018): 285–306; Jacobus Delwaide, “Identity and Geopolitics: Ukraine’s Grappling with Imperial Legacies,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 32–33 (2014): 179–207; Kuzyk, “Ukraine’s National Integration before and after 2014,” 709–35; Natalia Y. Matveeva, “Konflikt na Ukraine: Sotsialno-Politicheskie Smysly Uchastnikov,” *Istoriya i Sovremennost* 1, no. 25 (2017): 158–76.

historical conjunction. It is important to empirically confirm the contestation and change of national identity meanings. In terms of capacity to shape identity politics and alter national identity, the ruling political elites remain powerful actors who may alter discourses on national identity and potentially have an impact on the general population's perception of national identity. It is the reason why the "elites" approach is and will be dominant in national identity scholarship.

1.3 Sociological and discursive approaches to studying national identity change

This section discusses the existing approaches to studying national identity change, addressing the issues of national identity identification and measurement. I categorise sociological and discursive approaches within the studies of national identity and provide arguments for studying national identity change through discursive approaches.

The recent discussion of methodological approaches to studying national identity concluded that there is no single method to capture identity change, neither quantitative or qualitative methods are perfectly suited to measure identity complexity.²⁵¹ Instead of adhering to a particular method, researchers of national identity may use a combination of methods and analytical frameworks. The reason for methodological flexibility is that the methodological issues of identity change are not problematised in terms of application of the methods, but in terms of scientific logic and their suitability to answer the research question in mind.

Sociological approaches are situated in methodological individualism. They identify and operationalise measurable components (categories) of national identity, such as language, religion and ethnicity, among others. These components serve as a foundation for surveys through quantitative methods. Being a complex phenomenon, identity is divided into measurable and comparable categories:

²⁵¹ Daniel Bochsler, Elliott Green, Erin Jenne, Harris Mylonas, and Andreas Wimmer, "Exchange on the Quantitative Measurement of Ethnic and National Identity*," *Nations and Nationalism* 27, no. 1 (2021): 22–40; Iryna V. Zhyrun, "Izmenenie, Sdvig ili Transformatsiya: Analiz Metodologicheskikh Podkhodov k Issledovaniyu Natsionalnoi Identichnosti," *Vestnik Permskogo Universiteta. Seriya: Politologiya* 13, no. 3 (2019): 68-77.

political, ethnic and cultural ones.²⁵² As the studies show, these components have a different propensity for change. Ethnocultural components of national identity are more stable and lasting, whereas the political components are prone to transformation.²⁵³

Sociological approaches are especially valuable for comparing the feeling of the national belonging across generations, which were subject to different processes and mechanisms of identity socialisation.²⁵⁴ However, the largest pitfall in the sociological approaches to national identity is the underlying assumption that aggregate individual identities constitute the national whole. Yet, national identity, as a collective identity, is not equal to a sum of individual social identities. Rather, it is based on the level of agreement or disagreement on the meanings attached to the notion of a nation.

Another disadvantage of sociological research lies in the difficulty for individual researchers to capture and assess longitudinal changes. In order to measure the shifts of identity cross-temporally, the collection of representative data and its analysis needs to be repeated periodically using the analogous methodology in longitudinal projects. Such projects are possible in large research projects or under the auspices of research institutes, but are quite tedious for individual researchers and, consequently, rare.

One more pitfall is that sociological approaches do not account for so-called “situational identity.”²⁵⁵ There is a possibility that respondents may accentuate one or another social identity out of their multiple identities, depending on the context. Therefore, under the conditions of social unrest or armed conflict, measurement of

²⁵² See Fabrykant, “National Identity in the Contemporary Baltics,” 305–31; Gal Ariely, “Measuring Dimensions of National Identity across Countries: Theoretical and Methodological Reflections,” *National Identities* 22, no. 3 (2020): 265–82.

²⁵³ Liudmila V. Russkikh, “Identichnost: Kulturnaya, Etnicheskaya, Natsionalnaya,” *Vestnik Juzhno-Uralskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta. Seriya: Socialno-Gumanitarnye Nauki* 13, no. 2 (2013): 178–80; Mohammed Torki Bani Salameh and Khalid Issa El-Edwan, “The Identity Crisis in Jordan: Historical Pathways and Contemporary Debates,” *Nationalities Papers* 44, no. 6 (2016): 985–1002; Yang Zhong, “Explaining National Identity Shift in Taiwan,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 25, no. 99 (2016): 336–52.

²⁵⁴ See Shawn T. Thelen and Earl D. Honeycutt, “Assessing National Identity in Russia Between Generations Using the National Identity Scale,” *Journal of International Marketing* 12, no. 2 (2004): 58–81; Steinhardt et al., “The identity shift in Hong Kong since 1997,” 261–276.

²⁵⁵ Pirie, “National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine,” 1085.

national identity by previously identified categories is problematic. In order to overcome this limitation, discursive approaches²⁵⁶ could be applied to capture the situational shifts.

Measurement of national identity by categories does not reveal the complexity of national identity change. The interconnections between national identity categories could be more complex than was initially expected. Lack of historical background and the phenomenon of situational identity may lead to opposing conclusions. For example, Kulyk argued that the role of the Ukrainian language has increased, as it was perceived as a foundation of the independence of Ukraine.²⁵⁷ On the contrary, in another study it was concluded that the role of language in Ukraine decreased, as the language was not a significant marker of Ukrainian identity and did not define belonging to the Ukrainian state.²⁵⁸ These contradictory conclusions illustrate the need for a nuanced approach to identity studies, as the research results may heavily rely on the context, meaning the Ukrainian language may be significant under some circumstances, while insignificant under others. Therefore, contextualisation and historicity are crucial for understanding national identity change.

Discursive approaches are more suitable for unpacking the complexity of national identity. However, terms used in discursive approaches manifest previously discussed differences in philosophical understanding of the relationship between identity and discourse. The researchers use a variety of word combinations to explain the relationship between national identity and discourse. In their works, one may find the following: a “basic discourse,”²⁵⁹ (of identity), (national) “identity

²⁵⁶ See Kulyk, “National Identity in Ukraine,” 588–608.

²⁵⁷ Kulyk, “Language and identity in Ukraine after Euromaidan,” 90–106.

²⁵⁸ Nadiia Bureiko and Teodor Lucian Moga, “The Ukrainian – Russian Linguistic Dyad and Its Impact on National Identity in Ukraine,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 71, no. 1 (2019): 137–55.

²⁵⁹ See Hansen, *Security as Practice*; White and Feklyunina, *Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*.

discourse,”²⁶⁰ “discourse of the country’s identity,”²⁶¹ “discourse of identity,”²⁶² “discourse on identity,”²⁶³ and “discourses about identity.”²⁶⁴ Some of these terms are used synonymously and interchangeably by researchers, which may cause confusion. These word combinations reflect a different ontological relationship between identity and discourse. For example, “basic discourses” and “identity discourse”, and “discourse of identity” imply identity and discourse as inseparable from one another, whereas “discourse on identity” and “discourses about identity” construct identity as a separate from discourse phenomena.

In academic literature, discourse is a contested phenomenon and is defined in terms of its relationship with reality. Torfing identified three generations of discourse theories: linguistic theories, critical discourse analysis, and genealogical approaches.²⁶⁵ The last group has also become known as critical constructivists. Such classification is useful for understanding the overall developments in discourse analysis, but contemporary research in social sciences is often a combination of theories of discourse and other disciplinary theories. Besides a narrowly defined understanding of discourse, it can be used in the meanings of speech or text, produced by the individual or institution. Particularly, it may refer to different levels of analysis or genres of discourse. For instance, public, official discourse, or media

²⁶⁰ White and Feklyunina, *Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*; Kuus, “European Integration in Identity Narratives in Estonia,” 91–108; Gregory Feldman, “Shifting the Perspective on Identity Discourse in Estonia,” *Journal of Baltic Studies* 31, no. 4 (2000): 406–28; Stavroula Philippou and Eleftherios Eleftherios, “On Continuity and Change in National Identity Construction: An Initial Note on Greek-Cypriot Education, 1960 – 2010,” *The Cyprus Review* 22, no. 2 (2010): 219–33; Alexander Bukh, “Identity, Foreign Policy and The Other’: Japan’s Russia’,” *European Journal of International Relations* 15, no. 2 (2009): 319–345; Bubnova, “Discurs Natsionalnoy Identichnosty na Postsovetском Prostranstve,” 69–83; Hagström, “The ‘Abnormal’ State,” 122–45; Bucher and Jasper, “Revisiting ‘Identity’ in International Relations,” 391–415; Aydın-Düzgit, “Foreign Policy and Identity Change,” 19–34; Obradović and Howarth, “The Power of Politics,” 025–35; Siddi, “An Evolving Other,” 35–50.

²⁶¹ Feldman, “Shifting the Perspective on Identity Discourse in Estonia,” 406–28; Siddi, “An Evolving Other,” 35–50.

²⁶² Kuus, “European Integration in Identity Narratives in Estonia,” 91–108; Feldman, “Shifting the Perspective on Identity Discourse in Estonia,” 406–28; Rindzeviciute, “‘Nation’ and ‘Europe’,” 74–91; Philippou and Eleftherios, “On Continuity and Change in National Identity Construction,” 219–33; Aydın-Düzgit, “Foreign Policy and Identity Change,” 19–34.

²⁶³ Rindzeviciute, “‘Nation’ and ‘Europe’,” 74–91; Barseghyan, “Rethinking Nationhood,” 399–416; Aydın-Düzgit, “Foreign Policy and Identity Change,” 19–34; Obradović and Howarth, “The Power of Politics,” 025–35.

²⁶⁴ Wodak et al., *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*; De Cellia et al., “The Discursive Construction of National Identities,” 149–73; Malinova, “Russian Identity and the ‘Pivot to the East,’” 227–39.

²⁶⁵ Jacob Torfing, “Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments, and Challenges,” in *Discourse Theory in European Politics*, ed. by David Howarth and Jacob Torfing (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 1–32.

discourse. Therefore, the term “discourse” may acquire different meanings throughout the same text.

Collective identity and the meanings of national identity can be captured through discursive approaches. Through discourse analysis, the researchers exercise a “qualitative and interpretative recovery of meanings from the language the actors use to describe and understand social phenomena.”²⁶⁶ In some works, discourse analysis is qualified as a method,²⁶⁷ although different methods have been elaborated within the discursive approaches. In terms of comparative analysis of national identity change, discursive approaches may offer more possibilities for a longitudinal study of collective identity. Understanding discourse as structures of meaning expressed in oral or written texts, the researchers have more access to the empirical materials, which may provide alternative explanations to identity change than the identical sets of statistical data.

With the aim to capture the change of meanings of national identity in multiple social spheres, Hopf elaborated a system of coding national identity meanings collected from multiple sources, which can be compared with articulated meanings of other national identities. Hopf combines interpretative ontology and epistemology with positivist methods. As such, the study of change of identity *per se* is not relevant if it does not relate to broader social phenomena and does not specify the role the researcher attributes to national identity and its transformation. For Hopf, identity is “an alternative explanation for war, peace, cooperation, and conflict.”²⁶⁸ This premise connects the meanings of national identity with expectations to predict the actions of the state at international level. Even though, Hopf’s inductive extraction of identity meanings brings interesting insights into the articulation of national identities in society, it naturally falls short on prediction of foreign policy and state behaviour. The reason being is that the population has only a limited power to indirectly influence foreign policy decision-making of the elites. Therefore, the change in national identity meanings among the population does not necessarily

²⁶⁶ Abdelal et al., *Measuring Identity*, 6.

²⁶⁷ See *ibid.*, 4.

²⁶⁸ Hopf, “Making Identity Count,” 3–19.

result in a change of state behaviour in the international arena. However, Hopf's approach is suitable for comparing changes in national identity meanings between the population and the elites. The analysis of meanings may reveal the level of agreement or disagreement on the notion of a nation. In other words, it may identify the meanings of national identity articulated at the collective level and highlight the level of contestation of these meanings, suggesting either cohesion or division across the national polity.

National identity change has also been studied through the instruments elaborated by researchers within Critical Discourse Analysis. CDA is not a unified school, rather it is a number of approaches (or schools) that emphasise the role of power exercised through discursive practice and linguistic construction of social reality. The definition of national identity in CDA is situated in the notions of a collectively "imagined community" introduced by Anderson and "habitus" elaborated by Bourdieu.²⁶⁹ National identity is understood as produced through the processes of discursive practice and the process of socialisation in society.²⁷⁰ In CDA, researchers seek to establish the causal links between discursive construction of identity and societal processes through application of rigorous linguistic, pragmatic and argumentative analysis, among others.²⁷¹

Researchers in political science and international relations use CDA as a toolkit. The notion of power and discourse as a power struggle bridges CDA methodological developments with the purposes of the study of political processes. For example, applying CDA methods, Aydın-Düzgit concludes that representations of identity by a governing elite may interact with public perceptions, which would provoke change or continuity in public identifications.²⁷² According to the author, there is an interplay between the changed elites' discourses and public discourses. Change in governmental discourse is also possible as a result of contestation of

²⁶⁹ Paul Bourdieu, "Structures, Habitus, Practices," in *The Logic of Practice* (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), 52–65.

²⁷⁰ Wodak et al., *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*, 4; De Cella et al., "The Discursive Construction of National Identities," 149–73.

²⁷¹ See Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, eds. *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies*, 3rd edition (London: Sage, 2016).

²⁷² Aydın-Düzgit, "Foreign Policy and Identity Change," 32.

discourse by opposition groups in society. Therefore, discourse may serve as a mechanism of discursive identity change.

In CDA, discursively constructed identity is understood as a phenomenon that has an impact on societal processes; the structure of discourse is regarded as having causal power on political outcomes. In a volume on comparative analysis of the process of NATO accession, the researchers concluded that discursive national identity was the reason why Hungary joined NATO, while Austria did not.²⁷³ Kovács and Wodak specify that national identity may be analysed in terms of categorised thematic blocks about shared national history, present and future, culture and territory, which they call “content discourses.”²⁷⁴ In CDA, both qualitative and quantitative methods are used, as well as different methods of data collection situated in ethnography.

What distinguishes CDA from other discourse analysis approaches is its focus on identification and analysis of linguistic macro-strategies, which imply the purposeful nature of discourse. National identity is understood as a relatively *established* phenomenon. Therefore, constructive strategy is used to develop and construct identity; preservation and justification strategies are used to protect the established, but threatened national identity; transformation strategies are needed to move from one established national identity to another.²⁷⁵ To sum up, while focusing on national identity change, in CDA the researcher needs to focus on identification of transformation strategies.

The weakness of CDA approach is that the process of identity change is presented as a deliberate and natural process, which does not account for contestation of identity meanings and their change in the process of contestation. Therefore, as a national identity is understood as a more or less static phenomenon, it implies that identity change is purposeful and voluntary, which occurs without

²⁷³ Karin Liebbart, “Austrian Neutrality: Historical Development and Semantic Change,” in *NATO, Neutrality and National Identity: The Case of Austria and Hungary*, ed. by András Kovács and Ruth Wodak (Wien and Koln: Böhlau, 2003), 23-50.

²⁷⁴ András Kovács and Ruth Wodak, preface to *NATO, Neutrality and National Identity: The Case of Austria and Hungary*, ed. by András Kovács and Ruth Wodak (Wien and Koln: Böhlau, 2003), 13.

²⁷⁵ Kovács and Wodak, “Preface,” 15.

contestation of identity meanings and without processes of identity politics. Such an approach to identity change leaves out the process of discursive power struggle over meaning making. However, the strong aspect of CDA approaches is that the study of discourse is placed in the historical context, which balances its pitfall providing a deeper understanding to identity change.

Another line of research into the discursive study of identity is presented within the genealogical approaches of poststructuralists.²⁷⁶ In poststructuralist understanding, identity is either changeable, but can be fixed at some point, or fluid to the point of impossibility of fixing. Identity is constructed through discursive practices and cannot be separated from discourse because they are constitutive of each other. One strand of poststructuralist literature is built on the discursive theory of hegemony proposed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouff and a theory of discourse as power elaborated by Michel Foucault. Another strand is more disciplinary focused, as it analyses identity in the context of foreign policy. The theoretical premises of poststructuralist works are influenced by Jacques Derrida's theory of deconstruction and securitisation theory elaborated by the Copenhagen School, as well as international relations theories. Because of theoretical particularities, these two poststructuralist approaches have gained prominence among different disciplinary realms, with few exceptions. While the first strand occupies an important place in the study of Political Science, the second is more prominent in International Relations.

This part of the section will focus on a discussion of a discourse-analytical approach elaborated by Lene Hansen, whose work is ascribed to the second strand of poststructuralist literature. So far, the discourse-analytical approach has been applied to research questions situated in the International Relations discipline. However, the flexibility of the methodological framework offered by Hansen may be used for the study of identity construction within the national context, too, bridging the interdisciplinary gap. Hansen's discourse-analytical approach is

²⁷⁶ See Viacheslav Morozov, *Rossia i Drugie* (Moskva: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2009); Campbell, *Writing Security*; Hansen, *Security as Practice*.

suitable for research questions centred on the “constitutive significance of representations of identity for formulating and debating foreign policies,”²⁷⁷ which is exercised at the national level. The research framework is built on assumptions of the constitutive relation between identity, foreign policy and discourse. IR poststructuralists consider identity and policy linked through discourse because both are produced through discourse, therefore, identity and foreign policy are ontologically interlinked. As a result, in poststructuralists’ view, identity cannot be a cause of foreign policy. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily make poststructuralist identity research futile and lacking practical application. Knowledge of how Self and Others are constructed in discourse may contribute to an understanding of *how* certain actions in policy were made possible. Recognition of the constitutive role of identity in political processes is the middle ground between the causal and post-structuralist assumptions. Even though it is difficult to establish the causal explanation of identity, the way identity is articulated matters for policy outcomes, justification or mobilisation of support for the actor’s goals.²⁷⁸

The discourse-analytical framework allows to identify multiple projects of national identity constructed by actors of identity politics. According to Hansen, these multiple identities are constructed around a position in foreign policy directions, different representations of Self and Others, and a different understanding of a particular foreign policy issue. The way Self and Others are constructed in discourses sheds light on why certain policies became possible or impossible at a certain point in time.

Drawing upon the theory of securitisation of the Copenhagen School and works of poststructuralist researcher David Campbell,²⁷⁹ Hansen highlights the role of security in identity articulation, especially in foreign policy debates. In poststructuralist literature on identity, security is not objective and material, but a discursively constructed phenomenon. For Campbell, danger, threats and security set the boundaries of identity and are an integral part of foreign policy, contributing

²⁷⁷ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 5.

²⁷⁸ Lebow, “Constitutive Causality,” 211-239.

²⁷⁹ See Campbell, *Writing Security*.

to identity existence.²⁸⁰ Articulating a menace is also a way to connote the Otherness, as threats cannot be separated from their referents. In other words, discourses on the issue of foreign policy construct the “foreign” and “international” in order to constitute the “domestic,”²⁸¹ setting an identity boundary between “us”, the nation, and the rest. Construction of something or someone as a threat makes the threatened object a political and rhetorical urgency, which grants priority and legitimacy to the policies.²⁸² When something is constructed as an existential threat to the object, it is *securitised*²⁸³ through discourse, meaning it is argued if the problem is not addressed, the consequences will be fatal. The authors of the securitisation theory argue for certain conditions under which the process of securitisation takes place. For securitisation, it is important that the situation should resonate among the public, providing the platform for legitimization of extraordinary actions. However, when talking about identity securitisation, the articulation of security through reference to danger and threat is enough for securitisation of identity. In discourses on foreign policy, the state is often presented as a referent object that is threatened, meaning construction of threat to its collective identity and the existence of society as such²⁸⁴. Discursive security articulation contributes to redefinition of boundaries between “us” and “them” and legitimization of certain actions in the name of communal security. Treating security construction as a discursive phenomenon enables us to evidence a change in national identity by tracing security construction in discourses on the issues of foreign policy.

The research design elaborated by Hansen is situated in the *intertextual* connection between the texts. The concept of intertextuality was developed in Bakhtin’s and Kristeva’s works and was applied within a range of discursive approaches.²⁸⁵ Intertextuality is the way in which texts and discourses are linked to

²⁸⁰ Ibid., 12-13.

²⁸¹ Ibid., 60-75.

²⁸² Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 34-35.

²⁸³ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

²⁸⁴ Morozov, *Rossia i Drugie*, 218-219.

²⁸⁵ See Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction,” 297–320; James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro, eds. *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989); Anna De Fina, Deborah Schiffrin, and Michael Bamberg, introduction to *Discourse and Identity*, ed. by Anna De

or embedded into larger discourses.²⁸⁶ The meaning of a certain phenomenon in discourse depends on the relationship of the text with other texts, not just on the text itself. In some way, all texts are shaped by prior texts. Furthermore, these texts may draw explicitly or implicitly from other texts “through continued reference to a topic or main actors; through reference to the same events; or by the transfer of the main arguments from one text into the next.”²⁸⁷ In poststructuralist discourse analysis, the researchers maintain that the foreign policy decision-makers are situated within a larger political and public sphere, therefore, the representation of identity draws upon and is formed by the representations articulated by a larger group of media outlets, individuals, and institutions.²⁸⁸ For identity researchers, it signifies that individuals who (re)produce identity discursively, rely on a plethora of previous texts and knowledge. Therefore, the articulated identities these individuals (re)produce in their discourses are not individual, but rather make a part of larger societal knowledge produced through discourse when these discourses (or texts that constitute them) are connected by context, topic, arguments or other intertextual references. The notion of intertextuality implies that much of the knowledge expressed by identity entrepreneurs may be coming from other sources. It creates a link between the notion of common social knowledge and collectively shared meanings of national identity.

The critics of discursive approaches to identity argue that one can read too much into the language, overemphasising its role and impact.²⁸⁹ Scant attention to the methodological problems in IR discourse studies has been criticised for the lack of a method.²⁹⁰ This criticism may be pertinent for poststructuralist works based on deconstructive and genealogical theories, which are subject to individual

Fina, Deborah Schiffrin, and Michael Bamberg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Abdelal et al., *Measuring Identity*; Senem Aydın-Düzgit and Bahar Rumelili, “Discourse Analysis: Strengths and Shortcomings,” *All Azimuth* 8, no. 2 (2019): 285–305; Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, “The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA),” in *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies*, ed. by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (Los Angeles and London: Sage, 2016), 23–61; Norman Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003).

²⁸⁶ Fairclough, *Language and Power*, 37.

²⁸⁷ Wodak, Afterword: ‘What Now?’ – Some Reflections on the European Convention and Its Implications,” 206.

²⁸⁸ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 7.

²⁸⁹ Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 11-12.

²⁹⁰ Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations,” 225–54.

interpretation and somehow lack transparency, some may even claim, rigor. However, more specific linguistically-driven methods are being developed, such as metaphor analysis, predicate analysis and a toolkit of critical discourse analysis.²⁹¹ In order to overcome some of the discourse analysis constraints, the principle of triangulation is applied. It includes various methods of data collection, as well as inclusion of diverse sets of data (political speeches, newspaper articles, etc.)²⁹² In addition, discursive approaches could be criticised for their subjectivity during the interpretation of data, as the results of discursive studies could be hard to replicate. Yet self-reflection of a researcher coupled with an exhaustive and transparent description of all stages of data collection, analysis and interpretation may improve the validity of discursive studies.

Despite the flaws of discursive approaches, it can be argued that the study of discursive change may contribute to understanding of national identity change. Generally, discourse refers to taken-for-granted structures of meaning²⁹³. It is conceptualised as “patterns and commonalities of knowledge and structures” in which a text is a “specific and unique realization of discourse.”²⁹⁴ National identity consists of meanings expressed in discourse, therefore, the study of changes in the meanings in discourse may demonstrate identity change.

Meanings of national identity are contested by multiple identity entrepreneurs who compete and struggle over (re)interpretation of these meanings, especially when these identity representations have an impact on issues with tangible policy outcomes. Ruling some meanings in and others out, discourses serve as sources of power, especially if dominant discourses become common sense.²⁹⁵ Alternative discourses may contest dominant representations²⁹⁶ of identity, therefore, challenging the power and influencing the process of decision-making. When

²⁹¹ Aydin-Düzgit and Rumelili, “Discourse Analysis,” 285–305.

²⁹² Wodak et al., *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*, 9.

²⁹³ Aydin-Düzgit and Rumelili, “Discourse Analysis,” 285–305.

²⁹⁴ Wodak, Afterword: ‘What Now?’ – Some Reflections on the European Convention and Its Implications,” 203–215.

²⁹⁵ Jutta Weldes, “High Politics and Low Data. Globalisation Discourses and Popular Culture,” in *Interpretation and Method. Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*, ed. by Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea (Armonk, New York: M.E Sharpe, 2006), 176–186.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., 179.

opponents propose oppositional policies, not only do they involve into criticism of the existing directions, but also rearticulate the construction of identity, challenging the key representations that underpin the policy in question.²⁹⁷ This makes discourses and representations of identity in them paramount in the struggle for power.

Changes in identity discourse are not mere rhetorical shifts. Shifts in discourse may be observed through changes in key terms and their interpretation, as well as the introduction of new terms that had been rarely used before.²⁹⁸ Analysis of changes in identity discourses should take into consideration the context; cultural factors, for instance, acceptance or rejection by the significant Other, or the instrumental usage of identity construction in an attempt to achieve political objectives.²⁹⁹ Furthermore, changes in articulation of discourses can be regarded as a change of collective identity.

These changes are observed in discourse in three accounts: social change is mirrored in discourse change; changes in social reality are driven by changes in discourse; and social changes are represented in narratives, explanations, and arguments for or against the debate.³⁰⁰ For a researcher, both absences and abnormalities are considered as important as the features present in the discourse.³⁰¹ Attention to the features that are not represented in the data differentiates discourse analysis as a method from content analysis.

Discursive shifts may be accompanied by the rhetoric of continuity, thus making the transformation in discourse blurred. Central elements may remain, giving continuity to discourses. Consistency of representations of identity in discourses may have an impact on the way discourses change, as articulation of identities is inconsistent, discourses will be less stable and more prone to change.³⁰²

²⁹⁷ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 28.

²⁹⁸ Rainer Baumann, "The Transformation of German Multilateralism: Changes in Foreign Policy Discourse since Unification," *German Politics and Society* 20, no. 4 (2002): 1–26.

²⁹⁹ White and Feklyunina, *Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*, 27.

³⁰⁰ Fairclough, *Language and Power*, 37.

³⁰¹ Ted Hopf, "Discourse and Content Analysis: Some Fundamental Incompatibilities," *Qualitative Methods Spring* (2004): 31–33.

³⁰² Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 26.

Another factor that influences discourse change is a stable relationship between identity and policy, as well as the existence of either support or criticism from other discourses³⁰³. As discourses are structural in nature, it takes a lot of time to change the structure of discourse. It has considerable inertia and resilience, especially when there are other discourses, articulated by the individuals and institutions, and routines that present challenges to the dominant representation.³⁰⁴ Therefore, the study of national identity change should consider both change and continuity in discourses.

In conclusion, identity change could be evidenced through both quantitative studies situated in sociological approaches and through changes of meanings in discourses in the application of discursive approaches. Given the various approaches to the study of national identity, their differences lie in the philosophical grounds, while methodology and methods are used to complement these theoretical assumptions with empirical findings. Inductive extraction of national identity meanings from discourses may reveal unexpected connections and articulations. Even though discursive approaches are being criticised for limitations in producing generalisable conclusions, they serve a valuable instrument for understanding national identity transformation. In order to overcome the limitations of discursive approaches, researchers of national identity may adjust an analytical framework or combine approaches in order to find the balance between theoretical underpinnings and methods that suit best to answer a research question.

Main conclusions of Chapter 1

1. National identity is a contested notion the study of which may be based on diverse philosophical premises and studied across social (sub)disciplines. It is a complex phenomenon intertwined with other social identities which relies on the definition of a nation. Its transformation can be identified through a change of meanings in discourses that articulate collective identity.

³⁰³ Ibid., 26.

³⁰⁴ Øystein Haga Skånland, “‘Norway Is a Peace Nation’: A Discourse Analytic Reading of the Norwegian Peace Engagement,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 45, no. 1 (2010): 34–54.

2. Identity politics is twofold. It can be understood as politics that promotes the interests of a certain social group and as policies that aim at the creation of new identities through activities of identity entrepreneurs. Identity politics contributes to individual and collective experiences, as well as to the creation of the collective imaginary of the nation.
3. Ruling political elites play a major role in identity politics in the context of post-Soviet societies, where the idea of a nation turned into a strategic project of nation- and state-building. In the post-Soviet states, identity politics involved the re-articulation of national identity and Otherness in multiple areas, especially in debates on foreign policy.
4. Discursive approaches are preferable in the studies of longitudinal national identity change. National identity should not be regarded as an aggregate of individual subjective identities that are measured in sociological approaches.

2. CONTEXTUALISATION OF NATO-UKRAINE ACCESSION POLICY

Chapter 2 provides the historical background to Ukraine's policy on Euro-Atlantic integration. Section 2.1 presents analysis of NATO enlargement and Ukraine's prospects of accession. Situating analysis of national identity in historical and political contexts in section 2.2, I overview the changes in foreign policy directions and outline different views on NATO-Ukraine relations among the political elites and changing perceptions of the foreign policy among the Ukrainian population. In addition, I provide possible reasons of why the foreign policy on NATO accession become salient for Ukraine. Section 2.3 presents a concise contextualisation of the role of Euro-Atlantic integration in national identity change in the post-Soviet period.

2.1 NATO enlargement: The question of Ukraine's accession

This section analyses the issue of Ukraine's accession to NATO in the context of NATO's overall enlargement policy while assessing in particular its potential impact on European security. First, I will discuss the theoretical underpinnings of NATO's enlargement after 1991, addressing the dilemma of NATO expansion of whether it was a cause or a consequence of the current security challenges in Europe. Then I address the nature of the Alliance and the prospects of Ukrainian membership in the context of the ongoing conflict with Russia.

A plethora of theoretical perspectives were applied to understand the reasons and consequences of NATO enlargement. "Realism" writ large explains alliances as a strategy to protect national and common interests against a threatening state in the international system. However, the realist theories, such as balance-of-power,³⁰⁵ a balance-of-threat,³⁰⁶ and a balance-of-interest,³⁰⁷ could not provide a satisfactory explanation for NATO expansion in the 1990s. By the time the USSR and Warsaw Pact already disappeared and the United States became the global super power. New

³⁰⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York and Toronto: Alfred A. K., 1973).

³⁰⁶ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990).

³⁰⁷ Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (1994): 72–107.

threats for the U.S.'s European allies had not been clearly defined. As the primary goal of NATO was containment of the USSR, following the realist logic, one could have expected the Alliance to disintegrate. Various reasons for NATO's durability were proposed: the absence of an alternative for NATO in the European security architecture, the maintenance of the U.S. presence in Europe, NATO's bureaucratic self-interest, the shift towards "out-of-area" operations ("out-of-area or out of business") or the transformative agenda of NATO vis-à-vis partner countries ("Partnership for Peace").³⁰⁸ Glaser supported the idea of NATO's lasting relevance after 1991, as the Alliance would still protect European and American interests in the region.³⁰⁹ Rynning posited that NATO survived because it could provide "burden-shifting" required for an alliance.³¹⁰ Overall, NATO's success seemed to be ensured by the "promise of a unified response, the maintenance of sufficient military force coupled with the willingness to use it, and the ability to win."³¹¹ Not only did NATO endure, but also it accepted new members of the former Warsaw pact. Why? Offensive realists would argue that NATO expanded because it could, maximizing gains and using a window of opportunity. Defensive realists would argue that the applicant countries were seeking security against an unpredictable Russia, to ensure the U.S.'s lasting commitment, and to keep Germany under control, reflecting thus the validity of NATO's original purpose (to keep the Soviets out, the Americans in and the Germans down).³¹²

Constructivists provided different explanatory grounds for NATO expansion arguing that it was NATO's ability to adjust to a new international context and to the emerging security challenges, accompanied by the creation of a common identity for its members that kept the Alliance united throughout the 1990s. Constructivist

³⁰⁸ Dušica Lazarević, "NATO Enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia: Old Wine in New Bottles?," *Connections* 9, no. 1 (2009): 37-38.

³⁰⁹ Charles L. Glaser, "Why NATO Is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe," *International Security* 18, no. 1 (1993): 5-50.

³¹⁰ Sten Rynning, *NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 6.

³¹¹ Ginta T. Palubinskas, "NATO at 70 Piece in a Changing Security Environment," *Æther: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower* 1, no. 2 (2022), 16.

³¹² These words are attributed to Hastings Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO.

approaches underlined the importance of values and common identity³¹³ in NATO enlargement, arguing that NATO turned into a “security community.”³¹⁴ However, some countries, such as Portugal, Greece and Turkey, had not complied with the liberal-democratic norms when they entered the alliance; they were admitted to NATO despite the lack of democratic values at the time of joining. Yet, considering the geostrategical importance of these countries, their membership in the Alliance was perceived as a course of action that would help these countries to become more democratic.³¹⁵ Conversely, realists maintained that values were not seen as one of NATO’s important characteristics due to the fact that the interest-based features of NATO members were considered more important.³¹⁶ With the concomitant process of democratisation in the post-Soviet space, NATO enlargement was expected to support the democratic transformations in CEE countries. Therefore, NATO presence was perceived as a sign of democratic changes in the region.

Security and economic interests of both new and old NATO members proved to be a significant factor in NATO expansion. Particularly, it was the U.S. domestic policy and the EU members interests that were crucial in this process.³¹⁷ After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a lasting control over European security affairs, in which NATO enlargement was pivotal, turned of primary concern for the U.S. One of the U.S.’s fears was a loss of its influence in Europe, had Europe created its

³¹³ Frank Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation,” *Security Studies* 8, no. 2-3 (1998): 198-234; Falk Ostermann, “Cohesion through identity,” in *Research Handbook on NATO*, ed. by Sebastian Mayer (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2023), 400-414.

³¹⁴ Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO,” in *Inside Domestic Politics and Norm Diffusion in International Relations: Ideas do not float freely*, ed. by Thomas Risse (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 78-114; Williams and Neumann, “From alliance to security community,” 357-387; Deutsch et.al. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*; Emanuel Adler, “The spread of security communities: communities of practice, self-restraint, and NATO’s Post—Cold War Transformation,” *European journal of international relations* 14, no. 2 (2008): 195-230; Gabi, Schlag, “Re-Constituting NATO: Foundational Narratives of Transatlantic Security Cooperation in the 1950s and 1990s,” in *Uses of “the West”: Security and the Politics of Order*, ed. by Gunther Hellmann and Benjamin Herborth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 156–78.

³¹⁵ Alexandra Gheciu, “NATO, Liberal Internationalism, and the Politics of Imagining the Western security Community,” *International Journal* 74, no. 1 (2019): 32-46.

³¹⁶ Thierry Tardy, ed. *The Nations of NATO: Shaping the Alliance’s Relevance and Cohesion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022).

³¹⁷ Charles A. Kupchan, “The Origins and Future of NATO Enlargement,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 21, no. 2 (2000): 127-148; Ronald J. Bee, “Boarding the NATO Train: Enlargement and National Interests,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 21, no. 2 (2000): 149-169; Robert W. Rauchhaus, “Marching NATO Eastward: Can International Relations Theory Keep Pace?,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 21, no. 2 (2000): 3-20; Kimberly Marten, “Reconsidering NATO Expansion: A Counterfactual Analysis of Russia and the West in the 1990s,” *European Journal of International Security* 3, no. 2 (2018): 135–61.

own security structures.³¹⁸ In the 1990s, European security architecture could count on the establishment of Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and a *de jure* existing, embryonic Western European Union (WEU), both of which could at least theoretically transform into pan-European security organisations, that consequently could undermine the dominance of NATO in Europe. Another preoccupation was a surge of ethnic violence in Eastern Europe, which NATO enlargement could hopefully prevent.³¹⁹ The U.S. government involved the newly-independent states into cooperation with NATO supporting the creation of programs, such as the Rose-Roth program of cooperation,³²⁰ the Partnership for Peace program (PfP) and Membership Action Plans (MAP) for aspiring members. Additional factor supporting the NATO enlargement was a perception of NATO as a gateway for European membership by the CEE countries, which entailed them with economic benefits.³²¹ As new NATO members perceived that meeting membership criteria in the Alliance could bring them to the EU membership, they were willing to join NATO.

The reasons for the enlargement and the decision-making dynamic can be understood by taking the heterogeneity of NATO members into account, which has been assessed on a range of variables. NATO members have a different perception of NATO's relevance, which has an impact on its cohesion, decision-making and its future. Analysing NATO's relevance, Tardy concluded that as far as NATO answered the security concerns of its members, it remained relevant.³²² As for its cohesion, it all depended on differences across various dimensions. Tardy posited that the presence of the United States in NATO and its commitment were more significant for its members, than the existence of the alliance itself. Even though

³¹⁸ Timothy Andrews Sayle, *Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2019).

³¹⁹ Kimberly Marten, "NATO Enlargement: Evaluating its Consequences in Russia," *International politics* 57, no. 3 (2020): 401-426.

³²⁰ NATO Parliamentary Assembly. "Rose-Roth Seminars & Parliamentary Training Programmes." NATO Parliamentary Assembly, n.d. <https://www.nato-pa.int/content/rose-roth-seminars-parliamentary-training-programmes>.

³²¹ Marten, "NATO Enlargement: Evaluating its Consequences in Russia," 401-426.

³²² Thierry Tardy, introduction to *The Nations of NATO: Shaping the Alliance' Relevance and Cohesion*, ed. by Thierry Tardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 3.

the U.S. does not totally control NATO, it does dominate the alliance in the area of nuclear strategy, which puts Europe in indirect dependence.³²³ Therefore, withdrawal of the U.S. from NATO would have been fatal for organisation's existence.³²⁴ As such, NATO reinforces bilateral relations between NATO members and the U.S.,³²⁵ which affects NATO's internal cohesion. The later Ukrainian crisis gave NATO a sense of purpose and lasting existence, however, the NATO members failed to show similar a level of commitment similar to the U.S., which resumed the problem of burden-sharing within the Alliance.³²⁶ The wars in former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, had demonstrated that the European Union and the OSCE were unwilling and unable to end the violence in its immediate neighbourhood. It took military intervention by the U.S. in August 1995 against Serb positions to prepare the ground for the Dayton Agreement.

The first range of variables in regard of NATO cohesion concerns the correlation between foreign and defence policies of the member states to the extend they were aligned with NATO's or the United States' policies and interests. The second correlation refers to the diversity of threat assessments, particularly pertaining to Russia and the broader security agenda of the member states. West and East Germany, for example, had been at the "frontline" of the Cold War. Unified Germany was thus keen to shift the future frontline towards the East, i.e., to have a buffer zone of NATO countries between itself and Russia. With NATO expansion, Germany would no longer be a potential battle ground. At the institutional level, there was a variance in perception of NATO as being an exclusive defence institution or just one option among several. Tardy distinguished three groups of NATO members: "non-NATO-aligned with a broad security agenda" (the United States, France, Turkey), the "NATO-aligned with a Russian-centric security agenda" (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania), and "NATO-aligned with a

³²³ Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealism First Cut," *Journal of International Affairs* 44, no. 1 (1990): 103–23.

³²⁴ Thierry Tardy, "NATO's Members Relevance and Cohesion," in *The Nations of NATO: Shaping the Alliance' Relevance and Cohesion*, ed. by Thierry Tardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 36.

³²⁵ Ibid., 23–24.

³²⁶ Yanan Song, "Ironclad US Commitment to NATO? From NATO Expansion to the Ukraine Crisis," *Cogent Social Sciences* 10, no. 1 (2023).

non-Russian security agenda” (United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Canada, Denmark).³²⁷ Tardy’s work analyses only half of current NATO members, therefore, it is possible that there could be other policies around which the NATO members may align. With the recent expansion of NATO on Sweden and Finland, the group of “Russian-centred security agenda” might gain more weight within the Alliance.

When evaluating alliance cohesion, two dimensions need to be considered. The first dimension is the extent to which there is an agreement on central political principles, such as individual liberties, democracy, civilian control of the military, and the rule of law among the alliance members. Cohesion of the alliances may be altered by different views on these issues. The second dimension of values is rooted in the nature of domestic debates among political parties and leaders. If there is a strong anti-NATO sentiment in the country, it could have an impact on cohesion of the organisation.³²⁸ According to Tardy, the cohesion and relevance of NATO depended on such factors as the strategic culture of the country, threat perception and institutional preferences, interests and values, domestic issues, a level of commitment, and future challenges. Additionally, the cohesion of the Alliance can be affected by the level of agreement its members have on threats and an appropriate response to these threats. However, Tardy argued that it was still open to debate whether “shared interest” or “shared values” were central to the cohesion of the alliances. With the enlargement, NATO encompassed members with different interests, which could also affect the decision-making process. Threat assessments, policy orientations and task prioritisation³²⁹ may differ among the Allies. The perception of risks and threats is informed by location – Portugal and Poland definitely diverge in their perceptions of Russia. As a result, NATO cohesion could be altered when new challenges arise, as well as new members join the organisation.

³²⁷ Tardy, “NATO’s Members Relevance and Cohesion,” 23-24.

³²⁸ Ibid., 4.

³²⁹ Tardy, *The Nations of NATO: Shaping the Alliance’s Relevance and Cohesion*.

NATO's leadership itself argued that NATO expanded in order to become stronger and be able to respond collectively to any present and future threats.³³⁰ However, a number of scholars maintained that NATO was weakened by the enlargement. In the early 2000s, NATO demonstrated a lack of unity in the critical moments, in particular, it was affected by the U.S. superiority in military affairs and American assertion to direct the allies' actions, while Europe was trying to reconfigure a new and pluralist NATO.³³¹ In more recent analysis, Kimberly posited that new members did not reinforce NATO, but weakened it, particularly, in terms of communication, force integration and effectiveness.³³² Some of the new members, for example Hungary, soon proved to be unreliable. The internal coherence was furthermore strained by the U.S.-dominated military interventions in Afghanistan (2001 onwards) and Iraq (2003 onwards). In addition, it became more difficult to reach consensus on political issues. The rise of conservative, far-right and populist movements in NATO countries may also hinder NATO functioning, as these movements have the power to (re)articulate narratives about the "community" as representing Christian civilization, which presents a new challenge to NATO unity.³³³

There has not been a straightforward answer in the debates on whether NATO enlargement contributed to European security or eroded it. Some scholars argued that NATO persistence after 1991 was vital for maintaining Europe's security. Brzezinski contended that institutionalisation brought peace to "civil war" in the West.³³⁴ In his view, Article 5 of NATO bid the United States to Europe, the presence

³³⁰ Shea, Jamie, "NATO at 75: An Undoubted Historical Success Story but What Will the Centenary Look Like?," Friends of Europe, 2024. Accessed June 02, 2024 <https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/critical-thinking-nato-at-75-an-undoubted-historical-success-story-but-what-will-the-centenary-look-like/>; NATO, "NATO Military Committee: Allied Air Command Leads Forward Deployed, Agile Air Power in Multi-Domain Operations," NATO, 2023. Accessed June 02, 2024 https://ac.nato.int/archive/2023/NATO_MC_at_AIRCOM; Nancy Bikoff Pettit, "NATO's Strength Is in Its Unity," U.S. Embassy Latvia, 2019. Accessed June 02, 2024 <https://lv.usembassy.gov/nato-70/>; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Estonia, "NATO Foreign Ministers: NATO Enlargement Has Strengthened the Security of Europe," Republic of Estonia, 2014. Accessed June 02, 2024 <https://vm.ee/en/news/nato-foreign-ministers-nato-enlargement-has-strengthened-security-europe>.

³³¹ Rynning, *NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation*, 180.

³³² Marten, "NATO Enlargement: Evaluating its Consequences in Russia," 401-426.

³³³ Gheciu, "NATO, Liberal Internationalism, and the Politics of Imagining the Western Security Community," 32-46.

³³⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "An Agenda for NATO: Toward a Global Security Web," *Foreign Affairs* (2009): 2-20.

of which alongside with NATO, prevented conflict in Europe after the Second World War. As a result, after 1991, the role of NATO changed, turning it into a stabilising framework in Central and Eastern Europe, which filled the void of security that the EU could not meet.³³⁵ The Balkan wars in the 1990s contributed to maintenance of NATO troops in Europe considering their potential to be used in peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations. Overall, this line of argument maintained that NATO expansion contributed to European security as it provided a barrier against uncertainty about Russia's possible expansionism, while it did not cause Russia's authoritarianism and nor inhibited cooperation.³³⁶

Another line of thought maintained that NATO as an alliance outlived itself and its expansion was an error.³³⁷ The reason being was that NATO expansion revived the security dilemma in NATO-Russia relations and drew new dividing lines in Europe. In his famous essay, George F. Kennan argued that there was no necessity to expand NATO in the 1990s as it would have dire consequences on a relationship with Russia. Kennan warned that it was "to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions,"³³⁸ neither of which the U.S. would like. Diesen supported this view, contending that NATO was established as an instrument of the U.S. to maintain its influence in Europe and balance the USSR.³³⁹ According to Diesen, NATO outlived its purpose and could intend to pursue a collective hegemony thus challenging international stability.³⁴⁰ Diesen contends that while stability is preserved by creating pragmatic alliances, permanent alliances may skew the balance of power and incentivise the creation of

³³⁵ Ibid., 2-20.

³³⁶ Alexander Lanoszka, "Thank Goodness for NATO Endangerment," in *Evaluating NATO Enlargement: From Cold War Victory to the Russia-Ukraine War*, ed. by James Goldgeier and Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shiffrin (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023), 307-339.

³³⁷ See George F. Kennan, "A Fateful Error," *New York Times* Feb.05, (1997); Robert J. Art, "Creating a Disaster: NATO's Open-Door Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 113, no. 3 (1998): 383-403; Michael McGwire, "NATO Expansion: A Policy Error of Historic Importance," *Review of International Studies* 24, no. 1 (1998): 23-42.

³³⁸ Kennan, "A Fateful Error."

³³⁹ Glenn Diesen, *The Ukraine War & the Eurasian World Order* (Atlanta: SCB Distributors, 2024).

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

counter-alliances.³⁴¹ When NATO declared its “open-door” policy and used an incremental tactic for expansion in order to establish its hegemony in the post-Cold War world, it dismissed Russia’s complains as disproportionate and caused new lines of tension, which in turn served as a justification of NATO’s existence³⁴² — a self-fulfilling prophecy. Therefore, according to this line of thought, NATO enlargement did not respond to the emerging insecurities, but exacerbated them. Hunter cast doubts on whether NATO’s open-door policy was purposeful. On the contrary, he argued that NATO did not have any intention to accept new members and found itself in a trap.³⁴³ Whether NATO expansion was purposeful or not, a resurgent Russia was identified as a future threat to NATO,³⁴⁴ while NATO expansion in turn was perceived as a threat to Russia’s national interests by its anti-Western political establishment.³⁴⁵

The opponents to NATO enlargement asserted that the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 and the ongoing conflict with Russia were the consequences of NATO enlargement to the former Soviet countries. As NATO was established as a defensive military alliance, there was a disagreement on whether expansion of NATO was the cause of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict or, on the opposite, the consequence of a lack of NATO expansion. As some scholars anticipated, NATO expansion left Ukraine excluded from the European security system and created new boundaries in Europe.³⁴⁶ Mearsheimer posited that the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 was the fault of the West, as the U.S. and European powers promoted policies, namely NATO enlargement, EU expansion and democracy promotion, that “added fuel to fire” in political situation in Ukraine.³⁴⁷ Sauer considered that Ukrainian conflict was a symptom of great powers competition, which demonstrated the flaws of post-Cold

³⁴¹ Diesen, G. *The Ukraine War & the Eurasian World Order*.

³⁴² Ibid., 125.

³⁴³ Robert Hunter, “The Ukraine Crisis: Why and What Now?,” *Survival* 64, no. 1 (2022): 6–28.

³⁴⁴ Glaser, “Why NATO Is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe,” 5-50.

³⁴⁵ L Jonathan P. Chase, *East of Eden: Addressing Russian Interests during NATO Enlargement* (Pennsylvania: Carlisle Barracks, 1996); Andrew T. Wolff, “The Future of NATO Enlargement after the Ukraine Crisis,” *International Affairs* 91, no. 5 (2015): 1103–21.

³⁴⁶ Michael Mandelbaum, “Preserving the New Peace-The Case against NATO Expansion,” *Foreign Affairs* 74 (1995): 9-13; Jonathan Clarke, “Replacing NATO,” *Foreign Policy* 93 (1993): 29.

³⁴⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin,” *Foreign Affairs* 93 (2014): 80.

War European security architecture.³⁴⁸ He concluded that the conflict was caused by a clash of the (failed) strategies of the U.S. and Russia.³⁴⁹ Overall, the line of reasoning against NATO expansion maintains that the conflict could have been avoided had the West listened to the Moscow's objections.³⁵⁰ Conversely, the supporters of enlargement claimed that Ukrainian crisis became possible because NATO had been slow to take Ukraine under its collective security umbrella. McFaul and Sestanovich argued that Ukrainian crisis was the result of internal political processes in Russia and overreaction to NATO expansion.³⁵¹ Other conditions, such as Russia's form of personalist autocracy, Putin (and Putinism as ideology),³⁵² and the changing balance of power are considered sufficient to explain the Russian invasion of Ukraine, whereas NATO expansion and Russian imperialism are regarded simplistic explanations.³⁵³ The assessments of NATO expansion and its role in European security architecture, therefore, differ depending on whose security is at stake. Goldgeier and Itzkowitz Shiffrinson came to a similar conclusion arguing that NATO enlargement was both beneficial and detrimental, depending on the actors involved and the level of analysis.³⁵⁴

Another issue of contention is whether NATO enlargement in general and a potential Ukrainian membership in particular posed a threat to Russia provoking the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Some scholars see the cause of Russia's military actions in a Western unwillingness to include Russia into the new world order. On the one hand, these scholars argue that NATO expansion served as a trigger for Russian

³⁴⁸ Tom Sauer, "The Origins of the Ukraine Crisis and the Need for Collective Security between Russia and the West," *Global policy* 8, no. 1 (2017): 82-91.

³⁴⁹ Alan Cafruny, Vassilis K. Fouskas, William D.E. Mallinson, Andrey Voynitsky, "Ukraine, Multipolarity and the Crisis of Grand Strategies," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 25, no. 1 (2023): 1-21.

³⁵⁰ Ted Galen Carpenter, "Many Predicted NATO Expansion Would Lead to War. Those Warnings Were Ignored," *Guardian*, February 28, 2022; Ted Galen Carpenter, "The US and NATO Helped Trigger the Ukraine War," CATO Institute, March, 2022; Song, "Ironclad US commitment to NATO?"

³⁵¹ Michael McFaul, Stephen Sestanovich, and John J. Mearsheimer, "Faulty Powers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis?," *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 6 (2014): 167-178.

³⁵² Alex Hughes, "Plan Z: Reassessing Security-Based Accounts of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine," *Journal of Advanced Military Studies* 14, no. 2 (2023): 174-208.

³⁵³ Michael McFaul and Robert Person, "Why Putin Invaded Ukraine," in *War in Ukraine: Conflict, Strategy, and the Return of a Fractured World*, ed. by Hal Brands (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2024), 34-54

³⁵⁴ James Goldgeier and Joshua R. Itzkowitz, "Evaluating NATO Enlargement: Scholarly Debates, Policy Implications, and Roads Not Taken," *International Politics* 57, no. 3 (2020): 291-321.

actions, making the West thus responsible for the Ukrainian crisis,³⁵⁵ as the evolution of the post-Cold War order did not seem to meet Russia's expectations. First, Russia realized that the West's security goals did not match its own, therefore, NATO existence was perceived as a threat to Russia's national security interests.³⁵⁶ Second, while Russia allegedly counted on a mutual transformation of the post-Cold War security order in Europe, this was supposedly contrary to the West's perspective, that accordingly previewed a unilateral adoption of liberal ideals by Russia.³⁵⁷ NATO limited Russia's ability to shape developments of European security and the U.S. used NATO as a cardinal point of its policy in Europe.³⁵⁸ Russia's perception of NATO transformed from a view of a potential partner to a renewed military threat to its national security due to the West seeking to spread its economic, political and cultural influence in Eurasia.³⁵⁹ Therefore, from a perspective of the transformation of the post-Cold War order, NATO represented an important component of liberal and Western order, which alienated Russia making it seek systemic incentives to create a post-Western world order.³⁶⁰ According to Diesen, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict is nothing but a proxy war of the West and NATO representing the clash between competing world orders: The West's liberal order against a multipolar Eurasian-Westphalian world order, where Russia replaced the idea of a Greater Europe by a Greater Eurasia.³⁶¹ Van Hooft posited that NATO enlargement would have been more effective in terms of collective defence and engagement with Russia, had it not been used as the U.S. instrument policy.³⁶² All these propositions start from the underlying assumption that Russia perceived itself as a non-Western country with a self-image as rival of the U.S. and Russia's enmity towards NATO

³⁵⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, "The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine Crisis," *The National Interest*, June 23, 2022; Dunford, "Causes of the Crisis in Ukraine," 89-125.

³⁵⁶ Mikhail Polianskii, "Russia's Dissociation from the Paris Charter-Based Order. Implications and Pitfalls," *Russia in Global Affairs* 76, no. 4 (2021): 45.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 45.

³⁵⁸ Andrey A. Sushentsov and William C. Wohlforth, "The Tragedy of US-Russian Relations: NATO Centrality and the Revisionists' Spiral," *International Politics* 57, no.3 (2020): 427-450.

³⁵⁹ Andrei P. Tsygankov, "The Sources of Russia's Fear of NATO," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 51, no. 2 (2018): 101-111.

³⁶⁰ Diesen, *The Ukraine War & the Eurasian World Order*, 138.

³⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 138.

³⁶² Paul Van Hooft, "Land Rush: American Grand Strategy, NATO Enlargement, and European Fragmentation," *International Politics* 57, no. 3 (2020): 530-553.

was, however, not a matter of principle after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, President Yeltsin had mused about Russia's NATO membership,³⁶³ a deliberation later repeated by Putin in a conversation with U.S. president Clinton in 2000.³⁶⁴ In 2008, president Medvedev proposed a draft of treaty on new European security framework, which could potentially provide Russia a say in NATO decision-making and halt NATO expansion to the East, which however was not political feasible³⁶⁵ and therefore ignored.

On the other hand, some researchers provide evidence that NATO did not present a threat and there were other reasons for Russia to act against Ukraine. The decrease in military spending of Russia during NATO enlargement in 1990s and 2000s suggested that Russia did not see NATO expansion as a military threat.³⁶⁶ However, the decrease of military spending could also be connected to the general downfall in economic capabilities of Russia after the Soviet Union collapse. Another argument maintains that Russia had not objected to earlier waves of NATO expansion prior to the Bucharest summit in 2008, when NATO considered providing MAP to Ukraine and Georgia.³⁶⁷ While NATO was essential to understanding Russian position, it was not the real cause of invasion in 2022, Baud posited.³⁶⁸ A separate point of contention is whether Russia was promised that NATO would not expend to the East that may explain Russia's lack of a strong opposition to early waves of NATO enlargement. While it is true that there was no formal agreement that would bound NATO to its Cold War borders,³⁶⁹ there is archival evidence that such promises, although not in a legally binding form, have taken place, which is

³⁶³ Thomas L. Friedman, "Soviet Disarray; Yeltsin Says Russia Seeks to Join NATO," *New York Times*, 1991. <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/21/world/soviet-disarray-yeltsin-says-russia-seeks-to-join-nato.html>; Matt Kennard, "Revealed: Boris Yeltsin Privately Supported NATO Expansion in 1990's," *Declassifieduk*, 2023. <https://www.declassifieduk.org/revealed-boris-yeltsin-privately-supported-nato-expansion-in-1990s/>.

³⁶⁴ David Hoffman, "Putin Says 'Why Not?' to Russia Joining NATO," *The Washington Post*, March 05, 2000. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/03/06/putin-says-why-not-to-russia-joining-nato/c1973032-c10f-4bff-9174-8cae673790cd/>.

³⁶⁵ Ulrich Kühn, "Medvedev's Proposals for a New European Security Order: A Starting Point or the End of the Story?," *Connections* 9, no. 2 (2010): 1-16.

³⁶⁶ Marten, "NATO Enlargement," 401-426.

³⁶⁷ Lazarević, "NATO Enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia," 29-66.

³⁶⁸ Jacques Baud, *Operation Z-English version: The Hidden Truth of the War in Ukraine Revealed-Essais-documents* (Paris: Max Milo Editions, 2023).

³⁶⁹ Mary Elise Sarotte, "A Broken Promise: What the West Really Told Moscow about NATO Expansion," *Foreign Affairs* 93 (2014): 90-97.

considered a standard diplomatic practice.³⁷⁰ Sarotte provided evidence that NATO enlargement happened for multiple reasons,³⁷¹ among which there were strategic choices of the American and Soviet leaders, the inability of Russian leadership to prevent expansion, and misunderstandings of the promises being made. As such, in the first decades of post-Soviet time, Russia may have counted on promises made by the Western leaders, planned a cooperation with NATO and did not possess a real power to intervene into the process of enlargement, even if it did perceive it threatening.

There is a number of explanations to Russia's opposition to NATO enlargement. One line of argument maintained that NATO expansion was about the Russia's fear of democratisation in the region that could follow NATO enlargement. In other words, NATO enlargement was rather about spreading democracy, than about Russia.³⁷² Kimberly argued that the real cause of Russia's worries was a perception of threat to its political regime and establishment of liberal democracy in neighbouring countries, which could have a spill-over effect on Russia. However, the fact that some NATO countries have backslid to more autocratic regimes, which could be a threat to NATO's cohesion,³⁷³ provides evidence that NATO did not produce a long-standing democratic institutionalisation.³⁷⁴ EU membership rather than NATO membership is considered to have a positive impact on democratisation processes.³⁷⁵ Another explanation of negative reaction of Russia to NATO enlargement was a need to bolster domestic nationalistic support and change declining position of Russia in the world.³⁷⁶ NATO's unilateral actions in the

³⁷⁰ Diesen, *The Ukraine War & the Eurasian World Order*; Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shiffrin, "Deal or no deal? The End of the Cold War and the US Offer to Limit NATO Expansion," *International Security* 40, no. 4 (2016): 10-11.

³⁷¹ Mary Elise Sarotte, *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021).

³⁷² Marten, "NATO Enlargement," 401-426.

³⁷³ Celeste A. Wallander, "NATO's Enemies Within: How Democratic Decline Could Destroy the Alliance," *Foreign Affairs* 97, no. 4 (2018): 70-81.

³⁷⁴ Mandelbaum, "Preserving the New Peace," 9; Dan Reiter, "Why NATO Enlargement Does not Spread Democracy," *International Security* 25, no. 4 (2001): 41-67; Paul Poast and Johannes Urpelainen, *Organizing Democracy: How International Organizations Assist New Democracies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018).

³⁷⁵ Christos Kollias and Panayiotis Tzeremes, "My Trip to Europe is about America Rallying the World's Democracies and the Elephant in NATO's Room," *European Security* 32, no. 2 (2023): 190-209.

³⁷⁶ Marten, "NATO Enlargement," 401-426.

Balkans and U.S. foreign policy actions served another explanation of Russia's discontent. During NATO intervention in Kosovo, Russian interests and security concerns were ignored, which caused a deterioration in relationships.³⁷⁷ As such, the root of the conflict between NATO and Russia lies according to this reasoning in the relationship between the U.S. and Russia. As Russia lost parity with the U.S. and did not follow the new rules of the European security architecture imposed by NATO, the U.S. stopped treating it as a strategic partner and global power, therefore, Russia was denied a recognition of its interests in the post-Soviet "near abroad."³⁷⁸ As such, NATO enlargement had been irritating for Russia, even though it did not represent a real military threat,³⁷⁹ as Marten argued. Rather the fear of democratic transformation that NATO enlargement would entail was coupled with a symbolic loss of status that Russia suffered at international arena. All these explanations, however, do not include analysis of change in military capabilities due to NATO enlargement, which may contribute to the understanding of the increase of threat perception in Russian leadership.

Ukraine's geopolitical position was crucial in its role in NATO-Russia relations. Brzezinski argued that "Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire,"³⁸⁰ as Ukraine provided access to the Black Sea. Ukraine was considered a part of geopolitical rivalry between the West and Russia,³⁸¹ where NATO served the U.S. instrument to extend its influence on Ukraine. Russia also explored Ukraine's divisions insisting on the status of neutrality.³⁸² In 2008, Lazarević concluded that the prospects of Ukraine of joining NATO depended on a "transatlantic bargain" between the U.S. and Russia.³⁸³ The offensive realists argued that transformation of

³⁷⁷ Ibid., 401-426.

³⁷⁸ Ibid., 401-426

³⁷⁹ Ibid., 401-426

³⁸⁰ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 46.

³⁸¹ Łukasz Jureńczyk, "The United States and Ukraine's Aspirations for NATO Membership," *Przegląd Strategiczny* 13, no. 16 (2023): 49-62; Doboš, "The tale of two empires," 77-96.

³⁸² Diesen, *The Ukraine War & the Eurasian World Order*, 140.

³⁸³ Lazarević, "NATO Enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia," 29.

geopolitical balance in Europe due to NATO expansion was one of the causes that triggered Russia's actions in Ukraine in 2014.³⁸⁴

The U.S. did not decisively support a rapid inclusion of Ukraine in NATO because of fear that Russia could respond. Yet, the “door” of NATO remained open. Another reason was of hesitancy to provide a MAP to Ukraine was that Ukraine did not fully meet NATO requirements in terms of political and military preparation.³⁸⁵ These requirements were outlined in a Study on NATO Enlargement in 1995, which established the main criteria for future NATO applicants, namely: “a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy; the fair treatment of minority populations; a commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts; the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations; and a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures.”³⁸⁶ As for NATO cohesion, it is crucial to accept politically stable countries. Therefore, any assessment of the future prospects of Ukraine's access to NATO should consider the level of readiness of an applicant to comply with these demands.

When at the Bucharest summit in 2008 the Ukrainian prospects of being offered MAP were discussed, NATO members were divided on the issue. Great Britain and Central European states supported the initiative of MAP,³⁸⁷ while France and Germany objected. The reason being was the inability of Ukraine to meet membership requirements and the two countries intention to improve relations with Russia.³⁸⁸ Back in 2008, the main constraint for Ukrainian membership in NATO was low public support of the accession policy,³⁸⁹ whereas broad public support would have been required for accession to the Alliance.³⁹⁰ As such, prior to the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, the divisiveness of NATO accession for the Ukrainian population was a significant hindrance to offering NATO membership. When the

³⁸⁴ Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault,” 77–84.

³⁸⁵ Jureńczyk, “The United States and Ukraine's Aspirations for NATO Membership,” 49-62.

³⁸⁶ “Enlargement and Article 10,” NATO, last modified October 03, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm

³⁸⁷ Steven Pifer, “Ukraine's Geopolitical Choice, 2009,” *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 50, no. 4 (2009): 387-401.

³⁸⁸ Lazarević, “NATO Enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia,” 37-38.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 48.

³⁹⁰ Pifer, “Ukraine's Geopolitical Choice, 2009,” 387-401.

Ukrainian crisis broke out in 2014, different ways to settle it were proposed, but membership in NATO was dismissed.³⁹¹ Nevertheless, Ukraine intensified its cooperation with NATO, which led some to argue that Ukraine has turned in a *de-facto* NATO member state.³⁹² As a result, its inability to meet the basic criteria, the opposition by Russia and the respect of Russian spheres of influence by two vital NATO members as well as the divisions inside NATO coupled with the divide inside Ukraine over accession prevented the country from being offered concrete steps for membership.

Assessing the prospects of Ukraine's accession to NATO, it can be stated that the protracted conflict of Ukraine with Russia hampers the possibility of membership in the foreseeable future. It is possible that the U.S. may agree to support Ukraine joining NATO after the end of the conflict with Russia. However, that also depends on multiple factors, such as the future peace arrangements, attitudes of regional and global powers as for structure of the future European and global security,³⁹³ as well as economic, social and political conditions of Ukraine. While Ukraine may be waived the MAP stage in the process of accession,³⁹⁴ as Finland has been, it still needs to comply with the requirements for a NATO country. Having said that, when the conflict ends, Ukraine should be re-evaluated in terms of its economic stability, democratic processes and institutions, minority policies, its ability to resolve the conflicts, as well as other criteria of membership in the Alliance.

³⁹¹ Henry A. Kissinger, "How the Ukraine Crisis Ends," *The Washington Post*, March 05, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "What Is to Be Done? Putin's Aggression in Ukraine Needs a Response," *The Washington Post*, March 3, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/zbigniew-brzezinski-after-putins-aggression-in-ukraine-the-west-must-be-ready-to-respond/2014/03/03/25b3f928-a2f5-11e3-84d4-e59b1709222c_story.html.

³⁹² Scott Ritter, "Reaping the Whirlwind," *Scheerpost*, September 23, 2022, <https://scheerpost.com/2022/09/23/scott-ritter-reaping-the-whirlwind/>; Biljana Vankovska, "NATO 2022: A Search for Friends and Foes," *Political Science Issues* 12, no. 7 (83) (2022): 2318; Daniel Gaido, "An Alternative View of the Ukrainian Conflict: Stephen F. Cohen on the Origins of the New Cold War," *International Critical Thought* 13, no. 1 (2023): 138-154; Biljana Vankovska, "The Future of NATO After the Ukraine War: The Emperor's New Clothes," in *Eurasian Security after NATO*, ed. by Dušan Proroković and Ekaterina Entina (Belgrad and Moscow: Institute of International Politics and Economics and Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Science, 2023), 9-28.

³⁹³ Jureńczyk, "The United States and Ukraine's Aspirations for NATO Membership," 49-62; Larsen Henrik, *Prospects for Ukraine's NATO Membership*, International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), 2023.

³⁹⁴ Alex Ward and Paul McLeary, "Biden 'Open' to Plan that Eases Ukraine's Path to NATO Membership," *Politico*, June 15, 2023, <https://www.politico.com/news/2023/06/15/biden-ukraine-nato-membership-00102331>.

So far, the conflict exacerbated the old social, economic and political problems. The active phase of Russo-Ukrainian conflict exposed a great level of corruption in Ukraine,³⁹⁵ as well as evidenced a failure of Ukraine to establish the rule of law and limit the power of the oligarchs.³⁹⁶ The conflict with Russia coupled with a combination of domestic and foreign policies created tensions and distrust between the government of Ukraine, national minorities and their respective kin-states,³⁹⁷ which may hinder the process of negotiation of accession. Any disagreement with neighbouring countries, most of which are NATO members, should be settled before the membership application. The U.S., Germany³⁹⁸ and recently Slovakia³⁹⁹ have been cautious about offering membership to Ukraine. Besides an ongoing armed conflict, which is an objective barrier to NATO membership, a shift in priorities of NATO members may hinder Ukraine's accession. NATO's policy of enlargement requires unanimous agreement of all its members. Due to NATO's enlargement up to 32 countries, the number members with conflicting interest may entangle the approval of Ukraine's membership. Hunter describes a pessimistic scenario in which non-European countries, including Ukraine and Georgia, have no possibility to join NATO, as no such right to join NATO exists.⁴⁰⁰

It is possible that Ukraine's accession could contribute to the delegitimation of Russia's political regime, its national identity narrative and the legitimacy of its leadership. According to Klein and Major, Ukraine joining NATO would cause a blow to Russia's narrative of great power, and, if coupled with the military regime,

³⁹⁵ Javier Cifuentes-Faura, "Corruption in Ukraine during the Ukrainian-Russian War: A Decalogue of Policies to Combat It," *Journal of Public Affairs*, 24, no. 1 (2024): e2905.

³⁹⁶ Henrik Larsen, "Thinking about Post-War Ukraine," *Texas National Security Review* 6, no. 3 (2023): 99–110.

³⁹⁷ Iryna Zhyrun, "The 'Quadratic Nexus' of National Minority Politics in Ukraine: The Assessment of National Cohesion," *Nazioni e Regioni*, no.21-22 (2023): 75-95.

³⁹⁸ Larsen, "Prospects for Ukraine's NATO Membership."

³⁹⁹ Mathieu Pollet, "Slovak PM: Ukraine Must Give Up Territory to End Russian Invasion," *Politico*, January 21, 2024, <https://www.politico.eu/article/slovakia-prime-minister-robert-fico-ukraine-cede-territory-russia-moscow-invasion-nato-entry/>.

⁴⁰⁰ Hunter, "The Ukraine Crisis: Why and What Now?," 6–28.

could cause regime destabilisation.⁴⁰¹ Both NATO and Ukraine are fighting to weaken Russia, as it has been proclaimed a common foe.⁴⁰²

In case the Ukrainian membership is instrumental against the fight of the West against Russia, conditions of NATO accession for Ukraine may differ from those imposed on other members. As Robinson posits, the process of NATO accession has become guided by political considerations rather than by a requirement of meeting the criteria of democratic conditionality,⁴⁰³ resulting in a gradual process of erosion of this policy. Therefore, acting in extraordinary circumstances, NATO may lay down more flexible requirements for political process of Ukraine. There are risks, however, that accepting the country that does not meet the fundamental requirements in terms of social and political stability could jeopardise the functioning of the organisation and add to the NATO's challenges "from within". It may affect the decision-making process of the organisation impacting its cohesion, shifting priorities and to a certain extent putting in question its credibility.

A number of scholars have expressed the view that, at the moment, Ukraine cannot join NATO⁴⁰⁴ and the best solution is to adopt the status of neutrality. Since 2014, Mearsheimer has argued that Ukraine should not join either pro-Western or pro-Russian camps, but to become a sovereign and neutral country.⁴⁰⁵ Implementing internationally recognized neutrality of Austrian model could have proved a stabilising factor for Ukraine and the region.⁴⁰⁶ More recently, Walt has presented a variety of reasons starting from the objective assessment of Ukraine as not meeting membership criteria and pointed at the lack of guarantees that NATO would be able

⁴⁰¹ Margarete Klein and Claudia Major, *Ensuring Ukraine's Security: From ad hoc Support to Long-Term Security Guarantees as NATO Member*, No. 46/2023, SWP Comment, 2023.

⁴⁰² Eado Hetch, "NATO Aid to Ukraine," in *The War in Ukraine: 16 Perspectives, 9 Key Insights*, ed. by Eado Hecht and Shay Shabtai (Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2023), 81–93.

⁴⁰³ Eyal Robinson, "Flexible Democratic Conditionality? The Role of Democracy and Human Rights Adherence in NATO Enlargement Decisions," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 24, no. 3 (2021): 696–725.

⁴⁰⁴ Kissinger, "How the Ukraine crisis ends,"; Roy Allison, "Russia, Ukraine and State Survival through Neutrality," *International affairs* 98, no. 6 (2022): 1849–1872; Stephen M. Walt, "NATO Should Not Accept Ukraine—for Ukraine's Sake," *Foreign Policy*, March 5, 2024; Larsen, "Prospects for Ukraine's NATO Membership."

⁴⁰⁵ Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault," 77.

⁴⁰⁶ Heinz Gärtner and Maya Janik, "Overcoming Geopolitical Insecurity. Making the Case for a Neutral Ukraine according to the Austrian Model," in *Ukraine in the Crosshairs of Geopolitical Power Play*, ed. by Peter W. Schulze and Winfried Veit (Frankfurt-on-Main: Campus Verlag GmbH, 2020), 129–159.

to extend to Ukraine.⁴⁰⁷ By the same token, he argued that NATO membership would only prolong the conflict and seeking neutrality would be a more viable option. Allison also supported a status of neutrality, as the West ruled out the possibility to guarantee Ukraine protection under Article 5 of NATO.⁴⁰⁸

One of the main problems for Ukraine's membership could be that it does not represent sufficient "strategic value" for the West nor adds to the U.S.'s security, which makes the U.S. and other allies unwilling to get involved into a direct confrontation with Russia.⁴⁰⁹ Friedman contends that the main reason why accession to NATO is not viable for Ukraine is because Ukraine does not contribute to the U.S. security, therefore the U.S. will avoid any direct conflict with Russia. Consequently, the armed neutrality for Ukraine would have to be a credible solution to the conflict.⁴¹⁰ Another aspect that may contribute to the understanding of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict is the analysis in a broader context as a clash between imperialisms of the West and Russia. As such, the settlement of the current conflict would be based on a deconstruction of the U.S. military influence in Europe and dismantling of NATO.⁴¹¹ The problem of a prolonged the Russo-Ukrainian conflict was that both Russia and Ukraine had the capacity for endurance and did not come to the negotiation table.⁴¹² Moreover, Ukraine was constrained by the Zelensky's decree signed in 2022 which stipulated that there could be no negotiation with Russia, while Putin was the president. While Putin was re-elected in March 2024 for a new six-year term and Ukraine has not held presidential elections by May 2024 in accordance with the term limit, the negotiations seemed to be blocked from both sides as either would be able argue that the leadership was lacking legitimacy.

In November 2022, President Zelensky presented a unilaterally defined "Ukraine's Peace Formula Philosophy" that consisted of 10 points that would lay

⁴⁰⁷ Walt, "NATO Should Not Accept Ukraine—for Ukraine's Sake."

⁴⁰⁸ Allison, "Russia, Ukraine and State Survival through Neutrality," 1849-1872.

⁴⁰⁹ Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault," 88; Benjamin H. Friedman, "Neutrality Not NATO: Assessing Security Options for Ukraine," *Defense Priorities*, July 12, 2023; Larsen, "*Prospects for Ukraine's NATO Membership*."

⁴¹⁰ Friedman, "Neutrality Not NATO."

⁴¹¹ Gaido, "An Alternative View of the Ukrainian Conflict," 138-154.

⁴¹² Gerard Delanty, "Introduction to the Special Issue on the Russo-Ukrainian War: A new European war? Considerations on the Russo-Ukrainian War," *European Journal of Social Theory* 26, no. 4 (2023): 431-449.

grounds for the peace in Ukraine,⁴¹³ and which Russia disapproved. Switzerland hold a conference on Ukraine after the Group of Seven (G7) Summit in June 2024. Russia rejected the possibility to participate in the event in Switzerland and it was not invited to the negotiation table. Several countries expressed their wiliness to mediate the negotiation process including China that put forward its own plan on regulation of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict,⁴¹⁴ which Russia called “the most reasonable one.”⁴¹⁵ Even though there was an intent of a peace settlement, excluding Russia made the whole peace process futile. It is inconclusive whether negotiation rounds that started in early 2025 with the arrival of Donald Trump to presidency in the U.S. will produce tangibile results. They seem to bring some progress to the process; however, Ukraine and Europe have been initially excluded from the negotiation process. In any case, at the end, the peace deal should be signed between Russia and Ukraine.

Before the start of the peace talks, the Ukrainian government has been trying to elaborate alternative arrangements of security based on bilateral agreements. Due to the fact that demilitarisation and denuclearisation of Russia or nuclearisation of Ukraine, which could ensure Ukraine’s security, are considered as either unrealistic or leading to further escalation of the conflict,⁴¹⁶ Ukraine has been working on long-term security guarantees, emphasising its right to become a full-fledged NATO member. In September 2022, more than 6 months into Russian invasion, Ukraine presented its recommendations for defence in the Kyiv Security Compact. The document states that the guarantees for Ukraine by a coalition of Western countries have to be legally and politically binding to secure the self-defence of Ukraine. Some of these guarantees should be permanent and continuous. According to the Compact,

⁴¹³ These include the following: 1) Radiation and nuclear safety; 2) Food security; 3) Energy security; 4) Release of prisoners and deportees; 5) Implementation of the UN Charter; 6) Withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities; 7) Justice; 8) Ecocide and the protection of the environment 9) Prevention of escalation 10) Confirmation of the end of the war.

⁴¹⁴ “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China*, February 24, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367485.html.

⁴¹⁵ “Russia’s Lavrov Says Chinese Peace Plan on Ukraine Is Most Reasonable so Far,” *Reuters*, April 4, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-lavrov-says-chinese-peace-plan-ukraine-is-most-reasonable-so-far-2024-04-04/>.

⁴¹⁶ Klein and Major, “*Ensuring Ukraine’s security*.”

in case of a new aggression on Ukraine, the guarantors should try to ensure the approval of a response from the General Assembly of the UN, gather for collective consultations and then make decision on how to answer to the aggression. Arrangement of an alternative to NATO protection means that Ukraine does not count on collective security guarantees from NATO in the nearest future.

In the continuation of Kyiv Security Compact, Ukraine elaborated and signed an array of bilateral security agreements. In July 2023, during the meeting in Japan, Ukraine and G7 countries announced the signature of a framework agreement, which outlined long-term commitments of G7 and European countries⁴¹⁷ to support Ukraine. The Joint Declaration to support Ukraine at G7 meeting was followed by a number of bilateral Agreements on Security Cooperation between Ukraine and NATO countries.⁴¹⁸ It is expected that a number of guarantors of Ukraine signing similar security agreements may grow in the following year. Ukraine also intends to involve and gain support from the countries of the Global South, preparing a Global Peace Summit.

The bilateral security agreements are signed for period of 10 years or until the time when Ukraine joins NATO. The main goal of the agreements is to formalise and specify economic, military and other support that the guarantors have provided since 2022 and pledge to provide in the future. The spheres of application of agreements encompass support of Ukraine in provision of security and military aid, cooperation in intelligence, economic and humanitarian programs. Some countries have undertaken financial responsibilities. For instance, the agreement with the Netherlands fixed the size of the military support to Ukraine for 2 billion euros in 2024,⁴¹⁹ Canada will provide financial and military help of 3 billion Canadian

⁴¹⁷ Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.

⁴¹⁸ At the time of writing in June 2024, bilateral agreements were signed with the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Denmark, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Finland, Latvia, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, and Sweden. Negotiations were hold with the U.S., Estonia, Poland, and other countries.

⁴¹⁹ “Ukraina ta Niderlandy Razom Zakhyschayut Nashykh Ludei i Nashi Tsinnosti, i Razom My Maemo Peremogty v Tsiomu Zakhysti – Volodymyr Zelensky Pislia Zuztrichi z Markom Riutte v Kharkovi,” *Office of the President of Ukraine*, 2024. <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/ukrayina-ta-niderlandi-razom-zahishayut-nashih-lyudej-i-nash-89489>.

dollars,⁴²⁰ and Denmark states that military support to Ukraine will be at least 1,8 billion euros in 2024.⁴²¹ While being unable to reach consensus on defence and military support from NATO members at the collective level, Ukraine tries to insure its security establishing the mechanism of specific guarantees on bilateral basis. Such mechanism allows more flexibility in decision-making for NATO countries and provides a framework within which they may act as sovereign states eliminating the risk to activation of Art.5 of NATO against Russia. As such these agreements minimise the risks of direct confrontation between Russia and NATO.

Another goal that Ukraine has been trying to achieve through the signature of bilateral agreements is to ensure the political support for its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Ukraine signed a Common Declaration with North Macedonia as for support of its NATO membership, and its invitation to NATO when corresponding conditions are met.⁴²² Many of the signed agreements contain a clause on recognition and support of aspirations of NATO membership. As for the membership prospects, Ukraine was expecting the invitation to talks on accession to NATO at Summit in Washington in 2024.⁴²³ However, these expectations of fast-track accession were not met neither at the Vilnius Summit in 2023 nor in 2024, even though the Ukrainian government was vocal about them.⁴²⁴ Zelensky stated that Ukraine would become a part of NATO as soon as “the war ends.”⁴²⁵ Therefore, Ukraine posited that these were NATO members who had to make the decision, as the Ukrainian government had already made its choice. After the start of direct negotiations

⁴²⁰ “Volodymyr Zelensky i Dzhashtin Triudo u Kyevi Pidpysaly Ugodu pro Spivrobitnytstvo u Sferi Bezpeky mizh Ukrainoyu ta Kanadoyu,” *Office of the President of Ukraine*, 2024, <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/volodimir-zelenskij-i-dzhastin-tryudo-u-kyevi-pidpisali-ugo-89237>.

⁴²¹ “U Lvovi Volodymyr Zelenskiy i Mette Frederiksen Pidpysaly Ugodu pro Spivrobitnytstvo u Sferi Bezpeky ta Dovgostrokovu Pidtrimku,” *Office of the President of Ukraine*, 2024, <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/u-lvovi-volodimir-zelenskij-i-mette-frederiksen-pidpisali-ug-89189>.

⁴²² “U Tirani Glava Derzhavy ta Prem’yer-Ministr Pivnichnoi Makedonii Pidpysaly Spilnu Deklaratsiyu shchodo Yevroatlantichnoi Integratsii Ukrainy,” *Office of the President of Ukraine*, 2024, <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/u-tirani-glava-derzhavi-ta-premyer-ministr-pivnichnoyi-maked-89429>.

⁴²³ “Andrii Yermak Zustrivsyia z Dyrektorom Finskogo Instytutu Mizhnarodnikh Vidnosin Mikoyu Aaltola,” *Office of the President of Ukraine*, 2024, <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/andrij-yermak-zustrivsyia-z-direktorom-finskogo-institutu-miz-89821>.

⁴²⁴ “Andriy Yermak na Drifingu dlya Nimetskikh ZMI: Ukraina Ochikue Otrymaty na Samiti u Vilnyusi Chitke Zaproshennya do Sproshchenogo Priyednannya do Alyansu,” *Office of the President of Ukraine*, 2024, <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/andrij-yermak-na-briingu-dlya-nimeckikh-zmi-ukrayina-ochikuy-83809>.

⁴²⁵ “Ye Odnoznachnist u Tomu, shcho Ukraina Bude v NATO – Volodymyr Zelenskiy,” *Office of the President of Ukraine*, 2023, <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/ye-odnoznachnist-u-tomu-sho-ukrayina-bude-v-nato-volodimir-z-84297>.

between the U.S. and Russia, the Secretary General of NATO admitted that Ukrainian membership in NATO was “removed from the negotiation table” in March 2025.⁴²⁶

The question of Ukraine’s accession to NATO depends on conditions of the future peace settlement of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and on NATO’s role in European security. Talking about NATO future, Wolff suggested that there were three possible directions of policy that NATO could pursue: discard, maintain or recast its enlargement.⁴²⁷ Enlargement policy, he argued, was lacking purpose and would eventually aggravate relations with Russia. However, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has given impetus to enlargement, providing NATO with a purpose of existence. Recent evidence suggests that NATO has continued the policy of enlargement, accepting Finland and Sweden in 2023 and 2024. Should NATO review its policy “injecting geopolitical thinking into the process of enlargement,”⁴²⁸ the potential members will be assessed against criteria of their strategic importance, eliminating unimportant candidate countries from the list of potential members. Assuming a possible shift in the U.S. foreign policy and security priorities, there is a risk that Ukraine may be unofficially eliminated from a list of candidates. The rise of populism represents a threat to NATO’s future, as populist leaders have questioned the NATO usefulness,⁴²⁹ which makes the fate of Ukraine dependent on internal politics of NATO countries, particularly the U.S. Menon and Ruger argued that NATO enlargement has been detrimental to the U.S. and eliminated alternative options for European security architecture.⁴³⁰ If U.S. shifts its priorities to other regions, i.e. containing China, European members of NATO will have to take a

⁴²⁶ “Rutte: Issue of Ukraine’s Accession to NATO Removed from Negotiating Table,” *Interfax Ukraine*, March 14, 2025, <https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/1055716.html>.

⁴²⁷ Wolff, “The Future of NATO Enlargement after the Ukraine Crisis,” 1103–21.

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*, 1103–21.

⁴²⁹ Phillip Gary Schrank, “The Rise of Populism and the Future of NATO,” *Global Politics Review* 3, no. 2 (2017): 53–62.

⁴³⁰ Rajan Menon and William Ruger, “NATO Enlargement and US Grand Strategy: A Net Assessment,” *International Politics* 57, no. 3 (2020): 371–400.

larger share in support provided to Ukraine and be forced to develop an alternative security structure in Europe.⁴³¹

The scholars have been pondering on NATO's future which has been outlined within three ideal-type scenarios: "NATO classic plus", which will focus on collective defence and issues, such as hybrid warfare, cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns; "NATO with Global Outlook", expanding its geographical and functional scope; and a "NATO Generation Z", which would expand a definition of security and tackle non-traditional threats.⁴³² While NATO's interests may shift, Ukraine largely depends on the collective decision-making of the alliance, as well as on the position of every member-state on question of Ukraine's accession. The major problem for Ukraine is that a close-knit partnership with NATO did not yield security guarantees for Ukraine, while Ukraine provided its infrastructure and supplied manpower to fight the conflict it cannot win on its own. So far, bilateral security agreements have equipped NATO countries with unprecedented level of access to security structures, information and control over Ukraine. The place Ukraine will occupy in European security architecture will be decided by the principal actors of European security, such as Russia and the U.S., in a new changing global environment.

2.2 NATO-Ukraine relations and political divide on foreign policy of Euro-Atlantic integration

This section briefly overviews the major stages in the Ukrainian foreign policy on NATO and discusses the factors that could have contributed to the adoption of NATO-accession policy by the government of Ukraine. It highlights the domestic shifts in foreign policy on NATO together with the changing attitudes towards Euro-Atlantic integration.

Formal relations of Ukraine with NATO could be traced back to 1991 when Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Ukraine was the first among

⁴³¹ This part of the dissertation was written in June 2024 before the informal admission of NATO Secretary General that Ukraine's NATO membership was not under discussion between Russia and the U.S.

⁴³² Matthias Dembinski and Caroline Fehl, *Three Visions for NATO. Mapping National Debates on the Future of the Atlantic Alliance* (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2021).

the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to engage with NATO through the Partnership for Peace program (PfP) in 1994. Participation of Ukraine in PfP rested on assumptions that it would raise international prestige, provide additional security guarantees, contribute to building European security system, and allow to balance Ukraine's foreign policy vis-à-vis CIS.⁴³³ Within the PfP framework, Ukraine participated in NATO peacekeeping operations, held military exercises and hosted multinational military training on its territory. According to Bukkvoll, partnership with NATO was supported by the major political forces, while membership of Ukraine was a controversial issue.⁴³⁴ Furthermore, while practical (military) cooperation was a non-interrupted practice and was not a subject of much public debate, the policy of NATO membership was marked with inconsistencies and was a divisive and polarising topic. Therefore, the aspirations of Euro-Atlantic integration need to be analysed apart from military cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, as they constitute two different dimensions of the Ukraine-NATO relations. This analysis specifically focuses on the political aspect of Ukraine - NATO relations.

The diplomatic relations established between Ukraine and NATO were outlined in the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership. When signed in 1997, this document gave impetus to further institutionalisation of Ukraine-NATO relations. The major problem, that had a long-term implication for the Ukrainian politics and Ukraine-NATO relations, was that this milestone document was a political non-binding agreement which was not subject to the formal process of ratification in Parliament. According to the architecture of bureaucratic appointments, the President of Ukraine submitted the candidatures of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence for parliamentary approval, which gave the President overwhelming control over the formulation of foreign policy. Thus, since the very start, the relations of Ukraine with NATO were under the command of the executive

⁴³³ Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine and NATO: The Evolving Strategic Partnership," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 21, no. 2 (1998): 1-30.

⁴³⁴ Tor Bukkvoll, "Political and Military Utility of NATO for Ukraine," in *NATO: The Power of Partnerships. New Security Challenges Series*, ed. by Håkan Edström, Janne Haaland Matlary, and Magnus Petersson (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2011), 83-111.

power, which may explain the shifts in foreign policy after each presidential election. All these make the President of Ukraine a powerful figure in definition in the policy of accession to NATO. Historically, a lack of agreement on foreign policy between the legislative and executive powers resulted in a political stalemate.

The aspirations to join NATO were first pronounced by the second President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, during his second term in office in May 2002 at the NATO-Ukraine Commission meeting in Reykjavik. At the time, the statement did not draw much public attention. Back then, Ukrainian foreign policy officially followed a “multi-vector” policy that aimed to keep a balance between the European and Russian vectors of foreign policy. In 2003, the Parliament adopted a new law on national security that stated the intention of NATO membership for the first time.⁴³⁵ Interestingly, in his first term in the early 1990s, Kuchma was opposed to the idea of NATO enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe. However, according to Bukkvoll’s assessment, the political leadership of Ukraine realised that orientation towards Europe would provide Ukraine with “identity, security, and money.”⁴³⁶ Besides, Russia established partnership with NATO and at the time did not object to Ukrainian partnership.⁴³⁷ As a result, by the end of the second presidential term, not only did Kuchma support the wave of NATO enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe, but also laid the ground for the future Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine.

The change of government in 2004 after the Orange Revolution and the third round of presidential elections served as a catalyst to openly pro-Western policies and an initiation of a more public discussion of Ukraine’s membership in NATO. In February 2005, President Viktor Yushchenko signed an application to for a NATO Membership Action Plan at the Brussels Summit along with a NATO-approved package of reform program titled the “Intensified Dialogue on Membership”. However, the political elites were polarised on the Euro-Atlantic issue.⁴³⁸ The

⁴³⁵ See Bukkvoll, “Political and Military Utility of NATO for Ukraine,” 83-111.

⁴³⁶ Tor Bukkvoll, “Ukraine and NATO: The Politics of Soft Cooperation,” *Security dialogue* 28, no. 3 (1997): 369; See Bukkvoll “Political and Military Utility of NATO for Ukraine,” 83-111.

⁴³⁷ See Bukkvoll “Political and Military Utility of NATO for Ukraine,” 83-111.

⁴³⁸ Nikulin and Selyutina, “Geopolitical Orientations of Ukrainian Political Elites and the Electoral Campaign of 2006,” 544-58.

internal divisions and a standoff between the executive and legislative branches resulted in a political stalemate in 2006. In order to put an end to political confrontations, Yushchenko and the main political parties in Parliament signed the “Declaration of National Unity.”⁴³⁹ This document defined that Ukraine’s membership in NATO would be decided in a national referendum.⁴⁴⁰ On the eve of the Bucharest Summit in 2008, the Ukrainian public learned that President Viktor Yushchenko, Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko and Parliamentary Chairman Arseniy Yatsenyuk sent a petition to the NATO General Secretary for Ukraine to join the NATO Membership Action Plan. This document became known as “the letter of the three”. The exact content of the letter has never been publicly disclosed. Nevertheless, the information about its existence resulted in a stalemate in the political system for months. Despite the divisiveness of the Euro-Atlantic integration issue, Yushchenko signed a Declaration to Complement the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership confirming the Euro-Atlantic vector and deepening cooperation with NATO⁴⁴¹ closer to the end of his term in August 2009.

The victory of Viktor Yanukovych in the presidential elections started a period of neutrality. In January 2010, Yanukovych announced that “Ukraine was and will be a non-aligned state.”⁴⁴² The Parliament of Ukraine voted for the laws on national security and “On the foundations of internal and foreign policies”, which officially proclaimed the neutral status in June of the same year. However, Ukraine did not pursue the status internationally recognised neutrality.

The events of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 and a compromised security contributed to the return of the NATO issue high on the political agenda. After voting in the Ukrainian parliament in December 2014, President Poroshenko signed

⁴³⁹ Signatory parties of the Universal were: President Viktor Yushchenko, Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov, Chairman of the Parliament Oleksandr Moroz, Leader of “Our Ukraine” party Roman Bezsmertny, the leader of the fraction of the Socialist Party Vasily Tsushko, the leader of the “Party of Regions” Viktor Yanukovich. Petr Simonenko, the leader of the “Communist Party” signed the Universal with a number of provisions. Yulia Timoshenko, the leader of “Blok of Yulia Timoshenko” did not sign the document.

⁴⁴⁰ Declaration of National Unity, 2006, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0010100-06>.

⁴⁴¹ Declaration to Complement the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, last updated August 26, 2009, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_57045.htm?.

⁴⁴² “Yanukovych: Ukraine Will Remain a Neutral State,” *Kyiv Post*, January 7, 2010, <https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/yanukovych-ukraine-will-remain-a-neutral-state-56539.html?cn-reloaded=1>.

the law which revoked the non-aligned status of Ukraine. During the first year of the armed conflict in Donbass region, Ukraine and NATO intensified their cooperation. Since 2018, the Ukrainian Parliament has adopted legislation that confirmed membership in NATO as a strategic foreign and security policy objective and NATO recognized Ukraine as an aspiring member. The adoption of the constitutional amendments that proclaimed the irreversibility of Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations was a watershed in Ukrainian politics, as it factually put an end to the political debates on accession to NATO.

In 2019, Vladimir Zelensky was elected as the President of Ukraine. First, he emphasized that the population of Ukraine was to be consulted on NATO membership at the referendum. In 2020, he approved a new National Security Strategy which stated the aim of membership in NATO.⁴⁴³ The same year Ukraine received the status of NATO's Enhanced Opportunity Partner,⁴⁴⁴ which suggested both political and military cooperation with the Alliance, and was the highest status granted to non-members.⁴⁴⁵ Later in 2021, Zelensky's administration declared a MAP with NATO to be an "immediate goal" and urged to speed up the process of the Ukraine's accession. Among political forces after 2014 only the Opposition Bloc/Platform promoted the narrative of neutrality and close ties to Russia, but it became a minority after 2014.⁴⁴⁶ After the start of fully-fledged conflict with Russia in 2022, Zelensky was initially willing to accept neutrality of Ukraine in March, but later announced that he signed an application for acceleration of accession to NATO in September 2022.

The lack of national consensus is one of the reasons why the policy of Euro-Atlantic integration has been contested in Ukraine before 2014. During the Soviet times, NATO had the role of a symbolic Other. However, after independence there was no unity among the political elites who the Other was: Russia or the West.⁴⁴⁷ Ukraine turned out to be a regionally diverse country where the preferences for

⁴⁴³ "Relations with Ukraine," NATO, last updated March 11, 2025, nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm.

⁴⁴⁴ In 2014, Georgia, Finland, Sweden, Australia and Jordan were invited to join Enhanced Opportunity Partnership.

⁴⁴⁵ Allison, "Russia, Ukraine and State Survival through Neutrality," 1849-1872.

⁴⁴⁶ Ekman, "Painful Moments and Realignments," 232-244.

⁴⁴⁷ Kuzio, "Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine," 343-65.

foreign policy direction radically differed among the regions.⁴⁴⁸ Table 2 represents data on differences on the issue of NATO among the population of different regions of Ukraine.

Traditionally, the Western regions of Ukraine would support Euro-Atlantic integration, whereas the population of the South and East of the country were against NATO membership. Despite the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the gap in attitudes towards NATO membership between the Ukrainian regions remained. By 2016, the majority of the population in the East and South would vote against NATO membership. The report in 2021 indicated that the North and Central regions support NATO integration at 83% (9% against) and 65% (22% against) respectively, while in the Southern and Eastern regions support reaches 49% and 44% with 37% and 41% against it.⁴⁴⁹ These data show that in the case of a referendum on NATO, it would probably split the population in the Eastern and Southern regions.

Table 2. Aggregate data on public opinion from different regions of Ukraine from 2002 to 2016. Answer to the question: *If next week there were a referendum on Ukraine's accession to NATO, how would you vote?*⁴⁵⁰ (source: Razumkov Centre).

	West			Centre			South			East		
	2002 ⁴⁵¹	2008 ⁴⁵²	2016 ⁴⁵³	2002	2008	2016	2002	2008	2016	2002	2008	2016
Support	45,4	47,8	70,0	28,6	22,4	49,1	27,9	10,9	30,1	29,8	8,4	30,8
Against	20,4	20,6	7,0	27,9	51,2	20,1	37,9	59,9	33,6	40,6	70,4	43,9
Not vote	10,4	6,3	5,2	16,2	8,8	11,0	12	15,2	19,7	13,9	9,2	13,1
Difficult to say	23,8	25,3	17,8	27,3	17,6	19,8	22,2	14,0	16,1	15,7	12,0	12,1

The opinion of political parties was also divided on the issue of NATO accession, even though rarely did the parties address this foreign policy direction during the electoral campaign. The right-wing parties constructed the identity of Ukraine as a country that had to follow the European vector, while the left-wing

⁴⁴⁸ White et al., "Belarus, Ukraine and Russia," 362; White and Feklyunina, *Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*, 248.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid., 11.

⁴⁵⁰ In the methodology used in the 2016 poll, the Donbass is treated as a separate region. Previously, it was included in the data of the Eastern region.

⁴⁵¹ Mikhaïlo Pashkov and Valeriy Chalyi, "Vidnosyny Ukraina-NATO u Fokusi Gromadskoi Dumki," *Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona* 8, no. 32 (2002): 50–60.

⁴⁵² Tsentrazumkova, "Informatsiyna Skladova Yevropeiskoyi ta Yevroatlantychnoyi Integratsiyi: Gromadska Dumka," *Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona* 1, no. 95 (2008): 42–60.

⁴⁵³ Tsentrazumkova, "Identychnist Gromadian Ukrayiny v Novykh Umovakh: Stan, Tendentsiyi, Regionalni Osoblyvosti," *Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona* 3–4, no. 161–162 (2016): 3–14.

parties insisted on the creation of a bilingual and bi-cultural country and a federative system.⁴⁵⁴ This contestation of foreign policy among the political parties prior to 2014 presented a dilemma which was intertwined with identity contestation.

The conflict in the Donbass and the loss of control of Ukraine over Crimea seemed to put an end to the controversy over Euro-Atlantic integration. The dynamic of public attitudes towards foreign policy measured via polls evidence transformation of popular preferences towards the acceptance of NATO membership (table 3).

Between 2000 and 2003, the population perceived the EU and Russia as priorities in foreign policy, while from 2005 to 2009 the priority of engagement with Russia increased twofold. Starting from 2015, the EU has become the priority in foreign policy while support for engagement with Russia dropped from 48,6% in 2009 to 6,8 in 2016. Interestingly, the United States has never occupied an important role in the perception of foreign policy priorities among the population and its support oscillates between 1,6-4,9%.

Table 3. Aggregate data on public opinion of foreign policy priorities from 2000 to 2016. Answer to the question: *What should be the (priority) direction of foreign policy of Ukraine?*⁴⁵⁵ (source: Razumkov Centre).

	2000 ⁴⁵⁶	2002 ⁴⁵⁷	2003 ⁴⁵⁸	2005 ⁴⁵⁹	2006 ⁴⁶⁰	2009 ⁴⁶¹	2015 ⁴⁶²	2016 ⁴⁶³
EU countries	33,0	31,2	31,7	27,1	25,4	27,6	51,1	45,8
Russia	20,9	29,6	29,0	43,1	42,2	48,6	10,8	12,6
CIS countries	29,1	24,3	23,1	11,7	12,0	8,9	5,7	6,8
The U.S.	4,9	4,9	1,9	2,0	1,6	1,9	3,4	4,8

⁴⁵⁴ Melnykovska et al., “Balancing National Uncertainty and Foreign Orientation,” 1055–72.

⁴⁵⁵ The source of the data is the journal “*National Security and Defense*” published by Razumkov Centre <https://razumkov.org.ua/vydannia/zhurnal-natsionalna-bezpeka-i-oborona>.

⁴⁵⁶ Mikhailo Pashkov and Valeriy Chalyi, “Ukrayinsko-Rosyiske Spivrobitnytstvo v Otsinkakh Naseleण्या Ukrayiny,” *Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona* 1, no. 37 (2003): 44–56.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid., 44–56.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid., 44–56.

⁴⁵⁹ Tsentrazumkova, “Yevropeyska Integratsiya Ukrayiny: Pozytsiyi ta Otsinky Gromadyan,” *Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona* 7, no. 67 (2005): 44–56.

⁴⁶⁰ Yuriy Yakymenko and Olga Lytvynenko, “Regionalni Osoblyvosti Ideino-Politychnykh Oriyentatsiy Ukrayiny v Konteksti Vyborchoyi Kampaniyi – 2006,” *Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona* 1, no. 73 (2006): 2–18.

⁴⁶¹ Tsentrazumkova, “Ukrayinsko-Rosyyskye Otnosheniya v Otsenkakh Grazhdan Ukrainy,” *Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona* 4, no. 108 (2009): 72–84.

⁴⁶² Tsentrazumkova, “Identychnist Gromadyan Ukrayiny: Zminy, Tendentsiyi, Regionalni Identychnosti,” *Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona* 3–4, no. 161–162 (2016): 2–57.

⁴⁶³ Andriy Bychenko, “Rezultaty Sotsiologichnogo Doslidzhennya Tsentru Razumkova: ‘Zovnishniopolitychni Oriyentatsii Gromadyan Ukrayiny’,” *Tsentrazumkova*, 2016, <https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/rezultaty-sotsiologichnoho-doslidzhennia-tsentru-razumkova-zovnishniopolitychni-orientatsii-hromadian-ukrainy>.

Other countries	-	1,7	-	-	5,2	-	6,1	7,0
Difficult to say	-	8,3	-	-	13,6	-	22,5	22,9

According to the data, there was a considerable change in the public perception of the national security model after 2014 (table 4). There is evidence of a drop in the support for unity with Russia and the CIS (from 38,2% to 7,7%) and significant growth in support of NATO membership (from 13% to 52%). However, the share of the population that supported neutrality remained at around 30%. Since 2014, the sociological data had not included Crimea and uncontrolled areas in Donetsk and Lugansk regions, which expressed the most negative attitudes towards Euro-Atlantic integration in previous periods.

Table 4. Aggregate data on public opinion of national security from 2006 to 2021. Answer to the question: *What model of national security in Ukraine do you support?* (source: Razumkov Centre).

	2006 ⁴⁶⁴	2009 ⁴⁶⁵	2012 ⁴⁶⁶	2021 ⁴⁶⁷
Ukraine must join bloc with Russia and CIS countries / Join Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)	30,0	38,2	19,3	7,7
Ukraine must enter NATO	16,2	13,0	12,8	51,4
Ukraine must remain neutral / non-aligned status	41,7	32,6	37,1	29,3
Difficult to answer	12,1	16,2	30,8	11,6

The pattern of voting on a hypothetical referendum on NATO membership has changed dramatically (table 5). While in the years prior to 2014 the majority of the population would vote against NATO membership, since 2015 the trend for support has been on the rise. It skyrocketed from 18,1% in 2009 to 69,1% in 2018.

Table 5. Aggregate data on public opinion on NATO membership of Ukraine from 2000 to 2018. Answer to the question: *If next week there was a referendum on Ukraine joining NATO, how would you vote?* (source: Razumkov Centre).

	2002 ⁴⁶⁸	2003 ⁴⁶⁹	2006 ⁴⁷⁰	2009 ⁴⁷¹	2015 ⁴⁷²	2017 ⁴⁷³	2018 ⁴⁷⁴
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⁴⁶⁴ Andriy Bychenko, "Gromadska Dumka pro NATO i Pryiednannya do Niogo Ukrayiny," *Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona* 9, no. 81 (2006): 20–38.

⁴⁶⁵ Tsentrazumkova, "Zovnishnya Polityka ta Polityka Bezpeky Ukrayiny: Gromadska Dumka," *Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona* 2–3, no. 131–132 (2012): 72–76.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid., 72–76.

⁴⁶⁷ Tsentrazumkova, *Suspilna Pidtrymka Yevroatlantychnogo Kursu Ukrayiny: Otsinky ta Rekomendatsiyi* (Kyiv: Tsentrazumkova, 2021), 11.

⁴⁶⁸ Pashkov and Chalyi, "Ukrayinsko-Rosiyske Spivrobitnytstvo v Otsinkakh Naseleennya Ukrayiny," 44–56.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid., 44–56.

⁴⁷⁰ Yakymenko and Lytvynenko, "Regionalni Osoblyvosti Ideino-Politychnykh Orientatsiy Ukrainy v Konteksti Vyborchoyi Kampaniyi – 2006," 2–18.

⁴⁷¹ Tsentrazumkova, "Zovnishnya Polityka Ukrayiny Ochyma Gromadyan," *Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona* 2, no. 113 (2010): 72.

⁴⁷² Tsentrazumkova, "Identychnist Gromadyan Ukrayiny: Zminy, Tendentsiyi, Regionalni Identychnosti," 2–57.

⁴⁷³ Tsentrazumkova, *Suspilna Pidtrymka Yevroatlantychnoho Kursu Ukrayiny*, 11.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid., 11.

For joining NATO	32	23	16,0	18,1	43,6	64,5	69,1
Against joining NATO	32,2	39,9	61,3	61,1	25,9	21,4	18,9
Would not vote	13,7	13	17,8	8,4	12,8	-	-
Difficult to say	22,1	24,1	4,9	12,3	17,7	14,1	12,0

Significant changes may also be observed in public perception of NATO across the years (table 6). While most people perceived it as an aggressive military bloc prior to 2014, in 2021 NATO stood for a defence union for the majority of the respondents.

Table 6. Aggregate data on changes in perception of NATO in public opinion. Answer to the question: “What is NATO?” (source: Razumkov Centre).

	2000 ⁴⁷⁵	2002 ⁴⁷⁶	2003 ⁴⁷⁷	2006 ⁴⁷⁸	2008 ⁴⁷⁹	2009 ⁴⁸⁰	2021 ⁴⁸¹
Aggressive military bloc	46,2	34,8	37,5	53,5	43,1	50,7	22,4
Defense union	21,5	24,8	22,0	16,4	21,1	23,9	47,8
Peacekeeping organisation	16,5	17,7	17,8	13,3	15,0	11,3	16,5
Difficult to say	15,8	22,7	22,7	16,8	20,8	14,1	13,4

The divide on the Euro-Atlantic integration issue in Ukraine used to be explained by cultural, ethnic and historical differences existing across the Ukrainian regions. It is true that foreign policy preferences between the regions partially reflected the historical baggage linking the Western regions to Poland and Austro-Hungarian Empire, while the East and South of Ukraine were bound to Russia. It could be argued that, to a certain extent, these differences represented the civilisational divide in Ukraine. Yet, in order to acquire significant political force, different identities had to be mobilised and historical past had to be actualised by identity politics.

The engagement between NATO and Ukraine goes beyond bilateral relations, as it turned into a matter of geopolitical importance. After several waves of NATO enlargement, Ukraine became a territory of conflicting interests, a buffer zone

⁴⁷⁵ Andriy Bychenko and Leonid Polyakov, “Skilky NATO Potribno Ukrayintsiyam?,” *Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona* 8 (2000): 13–22.

⁴⁷⁶ Pashkov and Chalyi, “Vidnosyny Ukrayina-NATO u Fokusi Gromadskoi Dumky,” 50–60.

⁴⁷⁷ Pashkov and Chalyi, “Ukrayinsko-Rosiyske Spivrobitnytstvo v Otsinkakh Naseleennya Ukrayiny,” 44–56.

⁴⁷⁸ Bychenko, “Gromadska Dumka pro NATO i Pryyednannya do Niogo Ukrayiny,” 20–38.

⁴⁷⁹ Tsentr Razumkova, “Informatsiyna Skladova Yevropeiskoyi ta Yevroatlantychnoyi Integratsiyi: Gromadska Dumka,” 42–60.

⁴⁸⁰ Tsentr Razumkova, “Zovnishnya Polityka Ukrayiny Ochyma Gromadyan,” 72.

⁴⁸¹ Tsentr Razumkova, *Suspilna Pidtrymka Yevroatlantychnoho Kursu Ukrayiny: Otsinky ta Rekomendatsiyi*.

between Russia and the West.⁴⁸² Therefore, relations between Ukraine and NATO are situated in a complex geopolitical conjuncture and depend on the reaction of other states, including Russia.

The choice of foreign policy orientation in Ukraine has been a multilayered and complex problem which posed difficulties for analysis of its change. The start of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict draw attention to Euro-Atlantic foreign policy direction of Ukraine; however, the academic analysis was framed more within the causes of the conflict. As a result, the explanation of Ukraine's aspirations to seek NATO membership before the conflict was out of focus. I structure a discussion around several theoretical and analytical points that could shed light on the choice of foreign policy of NATO accession by Ukraine analysing it within theoretical approaches and academic literature on Foreign Policy Analysis of Ukraine.

The starting point of discussion is that the primary function of foreign policy of the state is to ensue its national security and interests. Adopting the view of defensive realists, given the uncertainty of international environment, states must be suspicious of other states' increase in power and can never feel secure.⁴⁸³ In terms of security seeking, there is a number of realist theories that would be suitable to explain Ukraine's policy on NATO, yet not all of them have the same explanatory force. Developing the alliance theory, Walt argued that states sought for alliance in order to balance against threats, particularly when the threat was in geographic proximity.⁴⁸⁴ However, this explanation of Ukraine's foreign policy choice on NATO could be satisfactory if applied to the period after Russo-Georgian conflict in 2008. Before that period the only incident that could have provoked Ukraine seeking security in alliance, was a territorial dispute with Russia over Tuzla island in Kerch Strait between Russia and Crimea in September of 2003.⁴⁸⁵ However, the

⁴⁸² Dmitriy D. Danilov, "Krizis Evropeiskoi Sistemy Bezopasnosti: Ukraina na Puti v NATO," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* 3 (2015): 87-104; Wolff, "The Future of NATO Enlargement after the Ukraine Crisis," 285-306.

⁴⁸³ William C. Wohlforth, "Realism," in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 131-49.

⁴⁸⁴ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 23-24.

⁴⁸⁵ In September 2003, the Russians started building a causeway towards island Tuzla located between Russia and Ukraine in the Kerch Strait. In 1925, the Tuzla Island was separated from the Russian Kuban region by a storm and in 1941 was transferred to the Crimean Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic. The status of the Tuzla Island was unsettled until 2014, when Russia took over Crimea. The geographic location of the island within Ukrainian

policy on NATO accession was officially adopted much earlier, in the period when Russia itself considered a closer engagement and cooperation with NATO. As indicated above, the first public pronouncement of NATO accession policy was made in May 2002 in Reykjavik at the NATO-Ukraine Commission meeting⁴⁸⁶ and new laws on “Basis of National Security of Ukraine” allowing NATO membership were adopted in June of 2003. In addition, the alliance theory explains alliance formation, not its behaviour. Therefore, it falls short on providing explanation to the adoption of NATO accession policy in the early 2000s.

Security dilemma theory could provide an explanation to Ukraine’s foreign policy choice of NATO. While being situated between Russia and NATO, Ukraine was seeking to increase its security in order to guard its independence, especially after it gave up nuclear weapons and the guarantors of the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances failed to protect its territorial integrity in 2014. In fact, both Russia and Ukraine could have been⁴⁸⁷ caught in a trap of security dilemma that resulted in a conflict: While Ukraine was seeking NATO membership, Russia perceived this move as hostile to its own security. However, this explanation could also be applied to the events following after the Russo-Georgian conflict, but security dilemma cannot not explain earlier shifts of foreign policy. After the conflict in Georgia, it would be logical for Ukraine to seek NATO membership, instead, Ukraine adopted a neutral policy in 2010. What could explain that move? Moreover, a perception of insecurity would result in amassing weapons and be ready for a conflict. Contrary to such expectations, Ukraine was one of the major exporters in the market of weapons. In 2012, just two years before the armed conflict in Donbass, Ukraine occupied the 9th place on the list of world exporters with a share of 2% of world’s total, equal to Israel and Italy.⁴⁸⁸ Since the 2000s, Ukraine also participated in the NATO PfP Trust Fund project that ensured demilitarisation of Ukraine within

jurisdiction made the Russian fleet in the Azov Sea vulnerable to a unilateral halt of the transpass through the Kerch Strait by Ukraine.

⁴⁸⁶ See Bukkvoll, “Political and Military Utility of NATO for Ukraine,” 83-111.

⁴⁸⁷ James Sperling and Mark Webber, “NATO and the Ukraine Crisis: Collective Securitization,” *European journal of international security* 2, no. 1 (2017): 19-46.

⁴⁸⁸ “SIPRI Year Book 2013. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), <https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2013/>.

the defence reform.⁴⁸⁹ To sum up, up to 2014 there is no indication that Ukraine perceived real security threats from Russia, otherwise, it would neither demilitarise nor sell its military products abroad.

It is important to note that Ukrainian production of weapons made a part of a former Soviet military-industrial complex and Ukraine inherited both factories and a large stockpile of Soviet weapons. After independence, Ukrainian military production was still tightly connected with Russia. Therefore, even though Ukraine was an arms producer not all military products were made through a closed cycle of production on its territory. The same could be said about Russia. When the conflict in 2014 erupted, it turned out that Ukrainian export and entire military industries were at risk, as they produced jet engines, uranium fuel and electronics for the nuclear arsenal of Russia and over 70% of Ukrainian exports were going to Russia.⁴⁹⁰ In the media it was estimated that in 2003, 51,9% of military industrial complex exports of Ukraine went to Russia⁴⁹¹ and 80% percent of the components needed by Ukrainian defense industry were provided by Russia.⁴⁹² In the period of neutrality in 2011, Ukraine peaked its economic cooperation with Russia with up to \$19,8⁴⁹³ billion of exports and over \$29 billion of imports. As military production is sensitive data, it could be quite strenuous to assess the losses from the break-up of cooperation in military-industrial complex between Russia and Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian estimates in 2014, the cut-off of defence contracts would produce a loss of at least \$1,5 billion a year.⁴⁹⁴ A brief analysis of the downfall of economic cooperation since the start of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine suggests that the conflict has caused a dramatic loss to both economies. Compared to previous

⁴⁸⁹ "NATO Project to Destroy Surplus Weapons and Ammunition in Ukraine," *NATO*, last updated November 4, 2008, https://www.nato.int/cps/ru/natohq/news_21617.htm?selectedLocale=en.

⁴⁹⁰ Carol J. Williams, "Ukraine's Freeze on Military Exports to Russia Carries Risks," *Los Angeles Times*, November 15, 2014, <https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-ukraine-arms-russia-20141125-story.html>.

⁴⁹¹ Valentin Badrak, Sergey Zgurets and Sergey Maksimov, *Kult: Oruzheinyi Biznes po-Ukrainski* (Kiev: Defense-Express, 2004), 288.

⁴⁹² As cited in Victor Yasmann, "Russia/Ukraine: Could Gas Spat Impact Military Cooperation?," *Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty*, 16 December 2005.

⁴⁹³ Ukraine Product Exports to Russian Federation in US\$ Thousand 2011-2012, *World Integrated Trade Solution*, <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/UKR/StartYear/1996/EndYear/2022/TradeFlow/Export/Indicator/XPRT-TRD-VL/Partner/RUS/Product/all-groups>.

⁴⁹⁴ Williams, "Ukraine's Freeze on Military Exports to Russia Carries Risks."

periods, in economic terms, a neutrality period was beneficiary to economic development of Ukraine more than any other period.

Membership in NATO has economic implications. NATO is viewed as providing a public good – a collective defence.⁴⁹⁵ NATO members seek to save military expenditures relying on collective defence, which it comes with a higher cost of maintaining independent weapons industries. For Ukraine, as an arms producer, it would pose a serious dilemma. Economically, NATO free trade area of weapons between the members is potentially attractive to taxpayers and voters. However, there is a list of obstacles that resulted in a failure of NATO weapon standardisation policies. First and foremost, these were government interference and nationalism.⁴⁹⁶ For Ukraine, as one of the main arms exporters, membership in NATO meant either competing with the NATO military industrial complex or converting from exporter to the importer of NATO weapons. The analysts who advocated for Ukraine's accession to NATO categorised the concerns about the negative impact of NATO membership on the military-industrial complex of Ukraine as a “misconception” and “urban legend.”⁴⁹⁷ However, the conflict with Russia demonstrated that there was a grain of truth in it. Particularly, because the Ukrainian defence industry was concentrated in the most hostile to NATO regions – Eastern Ukraine.⁴⁹⁸

After 2014 the Ukrainian military complex was drained of its technological power and Western countries had to provide weapons for Ukraine to fight in the conflict with Russia.⁴⁹⁹ Foreign military industries also expressed their readiness to build their own arms production in Ukraine,⁵⁰⁰ which could partly substitute losses from Russia. That however would not be the original Ukrainian production. In

⁴⁹⁵ Keith Hartley, *NATO Arms Co-Operation: A study in Economics and Politics* (London: Routledge, 2021).

⁴⁹⁶ Hartley, *NATO Arms Co-Operation: A study in Economics and Politics*.

⁴⁹⁷ Kriendler, “Ukrainian Membership in NATO: Benefits, Costs and Challenges.”

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁹ Vesa Kanninen and Juha-Matti Lehtonen, “Supporting Ukraine Militarily: Why Is the West Divided?,” *CESifo Working Paper* No. 11609, January 01, 2025), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5130880.

⁵⁰⁰ Ben Aris, “Ukraine's Defence Sector Development Goes into High Gear,” *Intellinews*, October 15, 2024, <https://www.intellinews.com/ukraine-s-defence-sector-development-goes-into-high-gear-348288/>; Jan Buchar, “Opportunity for Czech Industry: Confident Ukrainian Arms Factories are Going All Out and Looking for Partners for Cooperation,” *CZDefence*, October 15, 2024, <https://www.czdefence.com/article/opportunity-for-czech-industry-confident-ukrainian-arms-factories-are-going-all-out-and-looking-for-partners-for-cooperation>.

addition, a base line of spending for NATO membership was set around 2% of GDP. Within the period from 1991 to 2013, Ukrainian spending on defence fluctuated between 0,35% of GDP (in 1993) to 1,58% in 2013, with the peak of 2,8% in 1997 during disarmament of a nuclear stockpile. Therefore, NATO membership would be costlier for Ukraine than maintaining neutrality, at least in a short-term period. Since 2014, the defence spending had been growing and could have reached a staggering 21% of GDP in 2024.⁵⁰¹ The conflict with Russia skyrocketed Ukraine's defence spending and, being unable to pursue security of nuclear weapons, Ukraine prioritised integration into NATO after 2014.⁵⁰² Therefore, seeking NATO membership in order to cut costs on defence seems logical while facing real military threat from Russia. However, the period of neutrality can be explained by a different type of logic: a pragmatism of economic cooperation with appeasing strategy of putting on hold NATO membership. Preference of neutral status was advantageous considering the intertwined and inter-dependent nature of Russian and Ukrainian military industrial complexes.

Another line of analysis is based on exogenous factors, such as geopolitics and foreign policies of neighbouring states. On the one hand, Ukrainian foreign policy had to balance against great powers interests. Primarily, it was Russia, as it considered Ukraine a part of its sphere of influence⁵⁰³ and used its power tools in order to constrain Ukraine's autonomy in foreign policy.⁵⁰⁴ Realists hold responsible a geopolitical factor of NATO expansion for Russia's take over of Crimea.⁵⁰⁵ Others argue that Ukraine was trapped in a contestation between the West and Russia.⁵⁰⁶

⁵⁰¹ "Ukraine to Largely Increase Defence Spending in Draft Budget 2024," *Global Defence News*, September 18, 2023, <https://armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/conflicts-in-the-world/russia-ukraine-war-2022/ukraine-to-largely-increase-defence-spending-in-draft-budget-2024>.

⁵⁰² Polina Sinovets and Adérito Vicente, "The Day after: The Impact of Russia's Invasion on Ukrainian Political Elites' and Public Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons," *The Nonproliferation Review* 30, no. 4–6 (2023): 197–219.

⁵⁰³ Ferguson, "Between New Spheres of Influence," 285–306.

⁵⁰⁴ Elias Götz, "Neorealism and Russia's Ukraine Policy, 1991–Present," in *Russia, the West, and the Ukraine Crisis*, ed. by Elias Götz (London: Routledge, 2018), 53–75.

⁵⁰⁵ Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault," 77–84.

⁵⁰⁶ Velina Tchakarova, "Competing Geopolitical Approaches towards Eastern Europe," *Austria Institut für Europa und Sicherheit spolitik (AIES)*, Focus 4 (2017), 1–5.

Oriented towards one side, Ukraine was unable to progress between the standoff between two camps.⁵⁰⁷

It seems that idea of Ukraine's central role in regional politics was as important as the material factors. Ukraine was symbolically important for Russia due to the imperial and Soviet past being a key constituent in national narratives of modern Russia.⁵⁰⁸ It is worthy to note that the role of Ukraine in geopolitics cannot be just be attributed to the exogenous factors. As a kind of identity, geopolitical place of Ukraine also had to be recognised by Ukraine itself. Therefore, if Ukraine recognised its centrality for continuity of Russian national identity and its foreign policies, it had to act accordingly protecting its future with separation from Russia in ideational realm. If the idea of Ukraine as a central part of Russia's past (and present) empire was undermining ontological security of Ukraine, it could influence its foreign policy choices leading it to establish a distinct from Russia foreign policy, identity, and therefore destiny. For Ukraine, NATO embodied not only material, but symbolic power, possessing a common set of values and norms and a separate from Russia future.

Constructivists argued that identity and values in NATO accession policy were central in Ukraine. Alongside with cost-benefit calculations, norms and values of NATO as a democratic community could define foreign policy preferences in Ukraine that was in demand for domestic democratic changes.⁵⁰⁹ Accession to NATO could also be attractive due to NATO influence through soft power, financial assistance, positive conditionality and capacity building.⁵¹⁰ For Ukraine, NATO meant identity, financial support and security.⁵¹¹ However, the analysts indicated that positive changes could be reached only after building an appropriate coordination policy for Euro-Atlantic policies in the government of Ukraine.⁵¹²

⁵⁰⁷ Gärtner and Janik, "Overcoming Geopolitical Insecurity," 30.

⁵⁰⁸ Andrei P. Tsygankov, "Vladimir Putin's Last Stand: The Sources of Russia's Ukraine Policy," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 31, no. 4 (2015): 279-303.

⁵⁰⁹ Shyrokykh, "The Evolution of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine," 832-50.

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 832-50.

⁵¹¹ Bukkvoll, "Ukraine and NATO."

⁵¹² Steven Pifer, Steven Larrabee, Jan Neutze, and Jeffrey Simon, "Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic Ambitions: Building an Effective Policy Coordination Process," *Atlantic Council of the United States. Bulletin* Vol. XVII, No. 1 February 2006.

Constructivists approach implied that domestic factors and ideas have been decisive in shaping foreign policy on accession.

Explanations that relied on domestic sources of foreign policy in Ukraine have been most convincing in explaining NATO accession policy. Ukraine's foreign policy direction and its alignment with NATO was reformulated by the changed in the domestic landscape in Ukraine. The events after the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 shifted domestic power structure resulting in a fragmentation of the political support of anti-NATO party. As such, it contributed to national identity change which served a driver for a new foreign policy direction.⁵¹³ Overall, shifts in foreign policy of NATO accession have been associated with changing leadership in Ukraine.

It is possible that in early period of Ukraine's consideration of NATO membership, the role of ideas was particularly strong. From early 1990s, Ukraine was striving to get more visibility and recognition through international associations and NATO was one of them. In the 90s, European security architecture was not yet settled and NATO was one of possible platforms to ensure peaceful European future. Even Russia was first considering NATO membership. However, by the time security context changed and Ukraine and Russia were both left outside of NATO, no other security framework emerged. Adopting the neighbouring countries in the West as a role model, for the Ukrainian elites NATO membership became an idea that was difficult to substitute, which contributed to the polarisation of the issue on NATO accession after the Orange Revolution. Still, there is a lack of empirical research on foreign policy decision making in Ukraine and understanding of Ukraine's place in NATO policy. Particularly, research on perception and misperception in foreign policy decision making would bring new aspects of explanations of Ukraine's foreign policy on NATO membership.

At the national level, still there are a number of unresolved issues remaining in terms of practical implementation of the announced Euro-Atlantic integration policy. Besides security concerns, one may identify legal inconsistencies between the new and old proclamation, the standing issue of a national referendum, the

⁵¹³ Ekman, "Painful Moments and Realignment," 232-244.

conflict in Ukraine that escalated into the military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine in 2022. Overall, the agenda of the Euro-Atlantic integration in Ukraine demonstrates its dependence on the political will of the ruling elites, as well as on the interests of international actors.

2.3 The role of Euro-Atlantic integration in national identity change

Enhanced cooperation with NATO and the enlargement process in the post-Soviet period increased the significance of the Alliance as Other in the post-Soviet space. This section presents the evaluation of a body of research on the role of NATO in national identity change from the perspective of identity politics.

In the broader context of European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes, NATO turned into an agent of international socialisation which was able to shape the norms and national identities of the new states that were striving to integrate into the alliance⁵¹⁴. Moreover, along with other international organisations, such as OSCE and the EU, NATO played a key role to socially constructing political identities defined by liberal democratic norms and values, which would lay the foundation for a benign inter-democratic security community.⁵¹⁵ NATO assumed a role in the socialisation process, which implied subject-object or a “teacher-student” relationship in which the former transfer its values to the latter, which was pinpointed by a body of constructivist literature.⁵¹⁶ Therefore, the Euro-Atlantic integration was considered a “process of international socialisation”⁵¹⁷ in which institutions, such as NATO and the European Union became “constitutive institutions that contribute to shaping actors’ identities, values and interests by imposing definitions of member characteristics and purposes upon the governments of member states.”⁵¹⁸ The process of state socialisation assumes that the state, i.e. its

⁵¹⁴ Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement,” 198-234; Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization?,” 973–1012.

⁵¹⁵ Glenn Diesen, *EU and NATO Relations with Russia: After the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (London: Routledge, 2016).

⁵¹⁶ Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement,” 198; Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization?,” 973–1012.

⁵¹⁷ Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement,” 198.

⁵¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 211.

ruling elites, political elites and bureaucracy must undergo the process of teaching and learning⁵¹⁹ in order to make the desired norms become a part of the domestic decision-making process, legislative documents, political and public discourse. In this regard, the aspiring members were to engaged in the process of socialisation in order to “learn” and internalise the NATO norms.⁵²⁰ As an agent of socialisation, NATO possessed considerable power to influence reinterpretation of the world and ideas of socialised groups. It was grounded in efforts to promote new liberal and democratic norms in the mechanisms of teaching and persuasion.⁵²¹ Additionally, the cooperative behaviour among actors made them identify with each other, constructing themselves as “we”, who were connected by certain common norms.⁵²² Therefore, engagement with NATO may result in a substantial change of state’s norms, behaviour and transformation of discursive articulation of identity. Socialisation literature has been criticised for embracing a simplified approach to analyse socialisation process in international relations and for overlooking agency of the Eastern European countries in this process.⁵²³ Hlatky and Fortmann argued that socialisation efforts have been effective to a certain extent, as security identity could be altered under conditions of low security threats to transatlantic community, whereas cooperative security identity model could be displaced by a more traditional conception of identity when security threat is high.⁵²⁴

NATO enlargement opened up new possibilities for close engagement with post-Soviet societies. In order to incorporate new members, novel mechanisms of socialisation of societies into the Euro-Atlantic community were elaborated. Kuus argued that for Central European countries, NATO turned into a cultural and

⁵¹⁹ Ibid., 211.

⁵²⁰ Raimo Väyrynen, “The Security of the Baltic Countries: Cooperation and Defection,” in *Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region: Russian, Nordic and European Aspects*, ed. by Olav F. Knudsen (Ilford: Frank Cass, 1999). 204–22.

⁵²¹ Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization?,” 973–1012.

⁵²² Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” 384–396.

⁵²³ Marko Lovec, Kateřina Kočí, and Zlatko Šabič, “The Stigmatisation of Central Europe via (Failed) Socialisation Narrative,” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 24 (2021): 890-909; Maria Krasnodebska, “Socialization as a Power Discourse: Conceptualizing the Eastern Enlargement of Western International Institutions,” *Economics and Business Review* 14, no. 3 (2014): 7–22.

⁵²⁴ Stéfanie Von Hlatky and Michel Fortmann, “NATO Enlargement and the Failure of the Cooperative Security Mindset,” *International Politics* 57 (2020): 554–72.

identity-based project which “simultaneously banalised and glorified the alliance.”⁵²⁵ The author labelled this process a “geopolitical imperial subject making”⁵²⁶ in which NATO became a part of the daily experiences of the population. Without a formal enemy in the early years of the post-Soviet transformation, NATO expanded the areas of cooperation beyond the military sphere and became involved in the shaping the individual and collective identities of post-Soviet societies.

As the body of previous research shows, engagement with NATO may alter articulations of Self-representations and Otherness in identity discourses. In Central European countries, NATO accession was articulated as a requirement for the state and individual to be recognized as a “mature western subject.”⁵²⁷ Both NATO and European accession discourses constructed the boundaries between Self and Others. For instance, intellectuals of Central-European countries used rhetorical strategies to discursively locate their countries in Europe, while constructing Eastern European countries, particularly, Russia, as the Others.⁵²⁸ There is evidence that in Ukraine such discursive change on the Europeanness of the country was rationally justified and carefully weighed. In 1996, the American-Ukrainian committee made a recommendation to identify Ukraine as a Central European country.⁵²⁹

A change in foreign policy, such as a move towards a military alliance, demands justification and legitimisation in order to gain the necessary political support from both the elites and the population. Identity politics occupies an important place in foreign and security policies, which are being an “instrumental-rational calculation of current threats.”⁵³⁰ Besides the rearticulation of identity in terms of “us” and “them”, the elites may engage in the construction of new historical narratives in order to mobilize the collective memory.⁵³¹ Therefore, justification of

⁵²⁵ Merje Kuus, “‘Love, Peace and Nato’: Imperial Subject-Making in Central Europe,” *Antipode* 39, no. 2 (2007): 270.

⁵²⁶ Kuus, “‘Love, Peace and Nato,’” 269–90.

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*, 269–90.

⁵²⁸ Merje Kuus, “Europe’s Eastern Expansion and the Reinscription of Otherness in East-Central Europe,” *Progress in Human Geography* 4 (2004): 472–89.

⁵²⁹ Bukkvoll, “Ukraine and NATO,” 370.

⁵³⁰ Riim, “Estonia and NATO,” 36.

⁵³¹ Kovác and Wodak, ‘Preface’, 9–21.

the foreign policy direction may require modification of ways of talking about the past, as well as discursive change of collective identity construction.

Legitimation of Euro-Atlantic integration in Central European countries took unusual forms. Kuus noted that in discourses, the representation of Alliance transformed into a “peace movement” and military force was associated with moral good articulating NATO as drained of “its military content and elevated to the sphere of fundamental human values.”⁵³² Only positive categories were used in relation to NATO enlargement, such as values, democracy and openness. The trend of uniquely positive representation was observed in different discursive fields: governmental rhetoric, academic research and mainstream media, which was a signal of a militarisation of social life.⁵³³ Likewise, in Estonia, the cooperation with NATO underlined the common values, rather than military guarantees.⁵³⁴ Studying the most recent case of Montenegro’s accession, Bešić and Spasojević⁵³⁵ reiterated the argument that Euro-Atlantic integration was not the issue of military security, but rather of social and political transformation. Such discursive homogeneity may indicate that the ruling elites in those countries may have had a high level of agreement on the issue of NATO accession.

The Euro-Atlantic integration may have negative effects on the formation of issue-based social cleavages, especially when these are connected to existing cleavages, such as ethnic or religious ones. As NATO is associated with the western identity, its representations may clash with the alternative eastern-collective identity-based projects, the way it happened in Montenegro, where both Eastern-Russian and Western-European national identities are present. When ethnic identity becomes a political identity, new social and political circumstances provoke a shift in identification. After 1997, the Serbian-identified population has increased in Montenegro, as almost 20% of Montenegrins altered their political identity, starting to identify as Serbs. As a result, NATO membership turned into a highly contested

⁵³² Kuus, “Love, Peace and Nato,” 269–290.

⁵³³ Ibid., 269–290.

⁵³⁴ Riim, “Estonia and NATO,” 34–52.

⁵³⁵ Miloš Bešić and Dušan Spasojević, “Montenegro, NATO and the Divided Society,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 51 (2018): 139–50, 269.

issue which aligned with the ethnic divisions.⁵³⁶ The issue of NATO accession split Montenegrin society into almost equal halves: Serbs were on the one side and the rest of the ethnic groups were on the other. In this way, the issue of Euro-Atlantic integration deepened a long-lasting cleavage in Montenegrin society, which has the potential to undermine the stability of Montenegro and put under question the legitimacy of NATO itself.⁵³⁷ A similar trend was observed in the Baltic states where NATO and EU integration were marked by the East vs. West discursive opposition.⁵³⁸ Therefore, the accession to NATO may break the delicate balance between minorities within the country, as NATO represents the “West”. However, when the construction of Otherness in identity projects coincides, it may enhance the cooperation between the state and the Alliance, as in case of Estonia where the acceptance of Russia as common with the West “Other” enabled cooperation between the government and NATO.⁵³⁹ The process of accession may also have a positive effect on democratic and military transformation of the country.⁵⁴⁰

Overall, in the post-Soviet countries, Euro-Atlantic integration was driven by the process much associated with the process of European integration. In Georgia, NATO aspirations were supported by the notion of “Europeanness.”⁵⁴¹ In Ukraine and Belarus, NATO membership was promulgated by the pro-European discourses in which an integration process was constructed as a preservation of sovereignty against Russian influence.⁵⁴² The Euro-Atlantic policy introduced in Ukraine by President Kuchma particularly pointed at the component of European identity in relations with NATO.⁵⁴³

⁵³⁶ Bešić and Spasojević, “Montenegro, NATO and the Divided Society,” 139–50.

⁵³⁷ Ibid., 139–50.

⁵³⁸ Grazina Miniotaite, “Convergent Geography and Divergent Identities: A Decade of Transformation in the Baltic States,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 16, no. 1 (2003): 209–22.

⁵³⁹ Riim, “Estonia and NATO,” 34–52.

⁵⁴⁰ Vladimir Vuckovic, Boro Vucinic, and Vladimir Dordevic, “Partnership for a Secure Future: Montenegrin Road to NATO from 2006 to 2015,” *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 29, no. 4 (2016): 602–25.

⁵⁴¹ Tracey German, “Heading West? Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic Path,” *International Affairs* 19, no. 3 (2015): 601–14.

⁵⁴² White and Feklyunina, *Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*, 236.

⁵⁴³ Ukaz Prezidenta Ukrayiny pro Derzhavnu Programu Spivrobitnytstva Ukrayiny z Orhanizatsiyeyu Pivnichno-Atlantychnoho Dohovoru (NATO) na period do 2001 roku vid 4 lystopada 1998, *Official Bulletin of Ukraine* 45, Art. 1662, 1998.

The impact of NATO's engagement with Ukrainian society is yet to be analysed. However, due to the negative image of NATO in the post-Soviet Ukraine, the necessity of socialisation of Ukrainian society with NATO was fixed in the first State program (1998-2001) which outlined the NATO-Ukraine plan of cooperation,⁵⁴⁴ that could be qualified as the start of NATO-Ukraine state identity politics. The objective to change the public's opinion was pronounced to be one of the primary goals in information policy in NATO-Ukraine relations. The youth have been actively involved in the process of information dissemination about NATO. According to the established information policy, there were multiple events in order to socialise the citizens of Ukrainians with NATO. Among them, one may find educational interactive games among university students, national Ukrainian forums "Ukraine-NATO", a plethora of games, and contests. The program adopted in 2018 specified that the information about NATO was disseminated in events with the aim to increase "the level of readiness of the youth to fulfil their duty to defend the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine"⁵⁴⁵ which meant it was aimed to prepare the youth be ready to participate in military actions. The Ukrainian youth's exposure to NATO could be traced in education: history books of Ukraine provided students with information on the program of Ukraine to join NATO and construct a positive role of NATO in the contemporary world.⁵⁴⁶ In addition, regional libraries hosted information Centres in which they held constant exhibitions on NATO's activities. In 2020, a publication of the first manual of "NATO Studies" was announced, which was to NATO activities "not only as a security bloc, but also as an organisation that adopts international law, democratic values and human rights as a basis of its activity."⁵⁴⁷ All these indicate that socialisation with NATO has become a part of state identity politics in Ukraine. Assessment and impact of these policies on society and change of national identity need to be a subject of research in the

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁵ Ukaz Prezidenta Ukrainy pro Zatverdzhennya Richnoyi Natsionalnoyi Programy pid Egidoyu Komisiyi Ukrainy-NATO na 2018, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2018, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/89/2018#Text>.

⁵⁴⁶ Vendina et al., "Ukraina v Politicheskoy Krizise," 50–67.

⁵⁴⁷ "V Ukraini Prezentuvali Pershiy Pidruchnik z NATOznavstva," *Ukrinform*, 2020, <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/2862441-v-ukraini-prezentuvali-persij-pidruchnik-z-natoznavstva.html>.

future. Yet, it is important to note that the conflict with Russia could have a great impact on shifts in foreign policy preferences and identities. Therefore, finding empirical evidence of the impact of NATO identity politics on the general population before 2022 would be difficult.

To conclude, socialisation with NATO may influence construction of national identity in a socialised state. At the post-Soviet space, the process of socialisation involved both the elites and the general population. This process of socialisation with NATO is not a one-way process and the aspiring state should also be recognized as agents, who were willing to transform national polities.

Main conclusions of Chapter 2

1. NATO is not a homogeneous organisation and its members may promote different policies. The question of Ukraine's integration into NATO has not achieved a full support from NATO members. Therefore, Ukraine prospects on accession to NATO depend on a number of factors, such as the conditions under which the Russo-Ukrainian conflict ends, the interests of the NATO members, particularly, the U.S., and the context of European security. Meanwhile, Ukraine has been working on ensuring guarantees of its defence as an alternative to NATO membership.
2. The Euro-Atlantic integration issue was divisive for Ukrainian society, as both the elites and the general population were split along regional and ideological lines before 2014. After 2014, there were significant changes in the perception of NATO and policy of Euro-Atlantic integration that manifested a broader acceptance of membership. The population of the Eastern and Southern regions were still divided on the issue of NATO integration. The change of the Euro-Atlantic foreign policy largely depended on the ruling political elites, particularly the President of Ukraine and the executive branch.
3. NATO enlargement in the post-Soviet period has had an impact on the national identities of the newly accepted member states. Political elites may construct new historical narratives in order to mobilize support for the Alliance. Membership

may shape the formation of issue-based social cleavages in the domestic context. Societies that are involved in socialisation with the NATO process may experience change in national identity articulation. In the case of Ukraine, the process and the impact of NATO-driven identity politics is still to be assessed in future research.

3. NATIONAL IDENTITY TRANSFORMATION IN UKRAINE

Chapter 3 provides the contextual and historical background to changes in the national identity of Ukraine in the post-Soviet period. Section 3.1 presents the analysis of empirical studies on the Ukrainian national identity in academic literature. In section 3.2 using sociological research data I points out several trends of Ukrainian national identity change before 2022.

3.1 Studies of the Ukrainian national identity: The state of the field

In this section I discuss various dimensions of the Ukrainian national identity which derive from analysis of predominantly empirically-based studies. The major themes cover analysis of identity politics in Ukraine, literature on the development of Ukraine's national identity in the post-Soviet period, and an overview of emerging approaches to analysing Ukrainian national identity.

As an object of identity politics, national identity can be shaped through a change of policies, societal practices, transformation of public spaces and discourses. After 2014, identity politics became particularly salient when the Ukrainian government established a new set of practices that contribute to victimisation of Ukraine and exclusion of the Soviet legacy⁵⁴⁸ from the public sphere. A plethora of studies on the Ukrainian identity presents several puzzles that lie at the intersection of language practices, ethnic self-identification and regionalism. Interconnection between regional differences, ethnic groups and political preferences is one of the problems that the researchers tackle within area studies of the Ukrainian national identity. The main reason behind the interest in regional variations of identities is the difference between voting patterns of the administrative regions that correlated with the major ethnic and linguistic groups living in the territories.

⁵⁴⁸ Plekhanov, "Formirovanie Kalendaria Gosudarstvennykh Prazdnikov i Pamiatnykh Dat v Postsovetskoi Ukraine," 116–32; Berezhniakov and Kozlov, "Politika Identichnosti Postsovetskoi Ukrainy," 198–222; Valentina P. Kharkhun, "Khronologiya i Tipologiya Ukrainskoi Retseptsii Kommunizma (Muzeinyi Aspekt)," in *Simvolicheskaja Politika* 5, ed. by Olga Y. Malinova (Moskva: UNION RAN, 2017), 175–97; Klymenko, "Choosing Mazepa Over Lenin," 815–36; Kovalov, "When Lenin Becomes Lennon," 709–33.

Regionalism and political divisions in Ukraine are explained by historical developments of two basic identities⁵⁴⁹ – Western and Eastern, that were formed in the 19th century. The striking difference between the West and the East of the country often serves as a starting point for analysis of identity in comparative studies,⁵⁵⁰ as these regions are associated with conflicting and antagonistic identities.⁵⁵¹ Regardless of what criteria are chosen for the definition of a region, there is a big difference between the western region and the rest.⁵⁵² In the post-Soviet period, national identity in Lvov became more ethnically rooted, while in Donetsk it remained more civic.⁵⁵³ Researchers established that these variations of national identities were mirrored in different views of the population in regard to historical memory and geopolitical preferences, among others.

In the post-Soviet period, due to regional differences, Ukrainian society has become known as “atomised”⁵⁵⁴ and divided⁵⁵⁵ into different types of identities. These types can be situated within the continuum between the so-called “Western” and “pro-Soviet” identities.⁵⁵⁶ In literature on the Ukrainian identity it is possible to find a variety of categorisations of identity types: “Central European” and “post-Soviet”;⁵⁵⁷ “three Ukraines”;⁵⁵⁸ national-patriotic, pro-European and pro-Russian.⁵⁵⁹

⁵⁴⁹ Shulman, “National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine,” 58–87; Riabchuk, “‘Two Ukraines’ Reconsidered,” 138–156; Miller, “Dualizm Identichnostei na Ukraine,” 84–9; Aleskey I. Miller, “Proshloe i Istoricheskaya Pamiat kak Faktory Formirovaniya Dualizma Identichnostei v Sovremennoi Ukraine,” *Politicheskaja Nauka* 1 (2008): 83–100.

⁵⁵⁰ Barrington and Herron, “One Ukraine or Many?,” 53–86; Zhurzenko, “A Divided Nation?,” 249–267; Pohorila, “Political and National Identity in Ukraine’s Regions,” 18–32; Viktor Susak and Iryna Vashchynska, “Loyalnisna Komponenta Identychnosti ‘Ukrayinets/ka’: Regionalni Vymiry na Prykladi Mist Lvova ta Donetska (1994–2010–2015 rr.),” *Ukrainskiy Sotsium* 27, no. 64 (2018): 9–18; Miller, “Dualizm Identichnostei na Ukraine.”

⁵⁵¹ Zhurzenko, “A Divided Nation?,” 249–267; Matveeva, “Konflikt na Ukraine,” 158–76.

⁵⁵² Barrington and Herron, “One Ukraine or Many?,” 53–86.

⁵⁵³ Susak and Vashchynska, “Loyalnisna Komponenta Identychnosti ‘Ukrayinets/ka’,” 9–18.

⁵⁵⁴ Hansen et al., “National Identity,” 1–28; Victor Cebotari, “Civic, Ethnic, Hybrid and Atomised Identities in Central and Eastern Europe,” *Identities* 23, no. 6 (2016): 648–66; Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy*, 8–9.

⁵⁵⁵ Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine and Nation-Building*, 2nd ed. (New York: Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002), 43–47.

⁵⁵⁶ Osipian and Osipian, “Regional Diversity and Divided Memories in Ukraine,” 616–42; Barrington and Herron, “One Ukraine or Many?,” 53–86; Barrington, “Is the Regional Divide in Ukraine an Identity Divide?,” 1–26; Riabchuk, “‘Two Ukraines’ Reconsidered,” 138–156; Popovych, “Ukrayinska Identychnist mizh Zakhodom ta Skhodom u Politychnomu Dyskursi Vykonavchoyi Vlady (1994–1999),” 334–41; Olena V. Kryvytska, “Spilna Identychnist v Umovakh Dezintegratsii Ukrayinskogo Suspilstva: Osoblivosti i Shliakhy Formuvannia,” *Naukovi Zapysky Instytutu Politychnykh I Etnonatsionalnykh Doslidzhen im. I.F. Kerasa NAN Ukrainy* 3–4, no. 95–96 (2018): 124–41; Lewicka and Iwańczak, “Regional Differentiation of Identities in Ukraine,” 25–66; Miller, “Dualizm Identichnostei na Ukraine,” 84–9.

⁵⁵⁷ Himka, “The Basic Historical Identity Formations in Ukraine,” 483–500.

⁵⁵⁸ Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015).

⁵⁵⁹ Pavlo Hai-Nyzhnyk and Leonid V. Chuprii, “Formuvannya Zagalnonatsionalnoyi Identychnosti Ukrayintsiv v Konteksti Suchasnykh Vykykiv,” *Hileya: Naukovyy Visnyk*, no. 101 (2015): 474–81.

A Ukrainian historian said that there are not two Ukraines, but “twenty-two”, as linguistic and ethnic identities overlap and cannot be brought to a politicised simplification of two Ukraines.⁵⁶⁰ Regional and local identities still occupy an important place in the hierarchy of individual identities, providing some people with a social identity of who they are. However, the problem is that the notion of a “region” is in flux as it does not have an established criterion to define. As Barrington and Herron show,⁵⁶¹ the criteria for the definition of a region may significantly change the research conclusions. A variety of different identities singled out by the researchers demonstrate how identity is not a static and objective phenomenon, but a multifaceted and constructed notion that depends on the criteria established for its identification. The connection between the region and other identity variables remains blurred,⁵⁶² which makes it difficult to establish the links between identity, region and electoral behaviour. Even though a variety of national identity types are found in academic literature, it is impossible to come up with a single identity classification or a unique explanatory model.

Russian and Ukrainian identities have often been represented as conflicting, however, the difference between these two identities is not dramatic.⁵⁶³ Boundaries of these identities were flexible⁵⁶⁴ and there were several points of contact prior to 2022. The closeness of these identities demanded a historically-driven approaches which would recognize and accept the existing and fluid identities of the East and abandon a simplistic division on two Ukraines.⁵⁶⁵ Moreover, ethnic identification in Ukraine have been a matter of self-identification which may be heavily dependent on context and other social identities.

The recent research on the relationship between Russian and Ukrainian identities suggest that there has been a shift in perceptions of these identities among

⁵⁶⁰ Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Dvadtsiat Dvi Ukrainy,” *Krytyka* 54 (2002): 3–6.

⁵⁶¹ Barrington and Herron, “One Ukraine or Many?,” 53–86.

⁵⁶² Barrington, “Is the Regional Divide in Ukraine an Identity Divide?,” 1–26; Mihaylov and Sala, “Subnational Identities in the Context of the Changing Internal Geopolitics,” 79–96.

⁵⁶³ At least, before February 2022.

⁵⁶⁴ Seliverstova, “‘Consuming’ National Identity in Western Ukraine,” 61–79.

⁵⁶⁵ Zaharchenko, “Polyphonic Dichotomies,” 241–70.

the populace. All in all, Ukraine became more Ukrainian.⁵⁶⁶ Even though the conflicts that started 2014 and escalated in 2022 served as catalysers for these changes, transformation of ethnic identification should also be analysed in a broader context of identity politics pursued by the Ukrainian political elites.

Differences in language preference and national identity variations present another puzzle in academic discussion. Despite the extensive body of research, there is no agreement on the place of the Ukrainian language in national identity. Some researchers contended that language was the main issue of contestation between the regions and was a source of inter-ethnic conflict in the East of Ukraine.⁵⁶⁷ Others conclude that the language did not play a significant role and was not the main marker of identity and a nation.⁵⁶⁸ Due to the fact that the language differences were practically resolved and negotiated on the ground,⁵⁶⁹ language policy in Ukraine could be a matter of manipulation of the elites and a part of an ideology.⁵⁷⁰ However, other research results demonstrate that the Ukrainian language has become more important in the formation of the Ukrainian national identity, especially after events in 2014.⁵⁷¹ After 2022, Ukrainian language became more widespread in the public sphere.⁵⁷² Nevertheless, the Russian language is used as a language of international communication for Ukrainians in the Western regions,⁵⁷³ that have been known for an everyday use of Ukrainian and also used as a language of communication at home

⁵⁶⁶ Volodymyr Kulyk, "Shedding Russianness, Recasting Ukrainianness: The Post-Euromaidan Dynamics of Ethnonational Identifications in Ukraine," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 34, no. 2–3 (2018): 119–38; Onuch and Halem, "Studying Identity in Ukraine," 79–83; Arel, "How Ukraine Has Become More Ukrainian," 1–4; Kulyk, "What Have We Learned about Ethnonational Identities in Ukraine?," 975–90; Kulyk and Hale, "Imperfect Measures of Dynamic Identities," 841–60; Kulyk, "National Identity in Time of War," 296–308.

⁵⁶⁷ Abel Polese, "Language and Identity in Ukraine: Was It Really Nation-Building?," *Studies of Transition States and Societies* 3, no. 3 (2011): 36–50; Csilla Fedinec and István Csernicsko, "Language Policy and National Feeling in Context Ukraine's Euromaidan, 2014–2016," *Central European Papers* V, no. 1 (2017): 81–100.

⁵⁶⁸ Pirie, "National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine," 1079–1104; Kuzio, "National Identity in Independent Ukraine," 582–608; Volha Charnysh, "Analysis of Current Events: Identity Mobilization in Hybrid Regimes: Language in Ukrainian Politics," *Nationalities Papers* 41, no. 1 (2013): 1–14; Bureiko and Moga, "The Ukrainian–Russian Linguistic Dyad and Its Impact on National Identity in Ukraine," 137–55; Tomaichuk, "Regionalizm i Regionalnaya Identichnost v Sovremennoi Ukraine," 252–63.

⁵⁶⁹ Polese, "Language and Identity in Ukraine," 36–50; Polese et al., "Negotiating Spaces and the Public–Private Boundary," 263–79.

⁵⁷⁰ Charnysh, "Analysis of Current Events," 1–14; Bureiko and Moga, "The Ukrainian–Russian Linguistic Dyad and Its Impact on National Identity in Ukraine," 137–55.

⁵⁷¹ Kulyk, "Language and Identity in Ukraine after Euromaidan," 90–106; Kulyk, "Mova i Identychnist v Ukrayini pislya Yevromaidanu," 90–103.

⁵⁷² Volodymyr Kulyk, "Language Shift in Time of War: The Abandonment of Russian in Ukraine," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 40, no. 3 (2024): 159–174.

⁵⁷³ Charnysh, "Analysis of Current Events," 1–14.

for Russian speakers.⁵⁷⁴ Another observation is that the young people of the working and the middle classes have different attitudes towards the Russian and Ukrainian languages.⁵⁷⁵ Additionally, the usage and interpretation of the language differs across generations.⁵⁷⁶ Therefore, in the Ukrainian context, linguistic preference is intertwined with other social identities, which makes it challenging to establish the role of language in national identity change, as well as impossible to separate it from other factors and social and political context.

Despite the criticism of the civic/ethnic dichotomy,⁵⁷⁷ this dichotomy serves as a starting point for research on changes in the Ukrainian national identity. The problem with this approach is that if the civic/ethnic dichotomy of national identity is understood as an exclusionary binary model, it is problematic in terms of understanding identity change in Ukraine. Conclusions of some researchers may seem paradoxical: civic identity is the dominant identity among the Ukrainian population, but the “*real*” Ukrainian identity is ethnocentric.⁵⁷⁸ This effect is ascribed to a multi-levelled nature of identity, as different populations of Ukraine possess different identities. According to Bevz,⁵⁷⁹ civic identity consolidated in 2012 and the Ukrainian language evolved into the principal marker of national identity, which contains a logical contradiction to the definition of civic identity because the language is a primary characteristic of ethnic identity. The results of the most recent studies demonstrate that since 2014, civic identity has become more widespread in Ukraine, however, it coexists with a more consolidated ethnic Ukrainian-focused

⁵⁷⁴ Kulyk, “Language Shift in Time of War,” 159-174.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid., 159-174; Peacock, “National Identity and Language,” 59-73.

⁵⁷⁶ Kuzio, “National Identity in Independent Ukraine,” 582-608.; Charnysh, “Analysis of Current Events,” 1-14; Peacock, “National Identity and Language,” 59-73.

⁵⁷⁷ Taras Kuzio, “Nationalism in Ukraine: Towards a New Theoretical and Comparative Framework,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 7, no. 2 (2002): 133-61; Matthew Blackburn, “The Persistence of the Civic – Ethnic Binary: Competing Visions of the Nation and Civilization in Western, Central and Eastern Europe,” *National Identities* 0, no. 0 (2021): 1-20.

⁵⁷⁸ Konstantyn V. Kyslyuk, “Ukrayinska Identychnist v Istoryko-Kulturniy Retrospektyvi,” *Mizhnarodnyi Visnyk: Kulturologiya, Filologiya, Muzykoznavstvo II*, no. 9 (2017): 3-8; Kulyk, “National Identity in Time of War,” 296-308.

⁵⁷⁹ Tetiana Bevz, “Osoblyvosti Formuvannya Gromadyanskoyi Identychnosti v Suchasniy Ukraini,” *Naukovi Zapysky Instytutu Politychnykh i Etnonatsionalnykh Doslidzhen im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrayiny* 3, no. 71 (2014): 236-46.

view of national identity.⁵⁸⁰ According to Kravchenko's research, Ukrainians are proud to be from Ukraine and consider themselves as Ukrainian citizens and Europeans,⁵⁸¹ which may suggest the formation of a civic identity. The development of active civil society is also ascribed to the prevalence of civic identity. According to these criteria, prior to 2014 civic identity prevailed in the majority of regions because the public became actively involved in the political life of a country. Nevertheless, the importance of ethnic identity has been increasing,⁵⁸² and after 2022 national identity seemed to acquire a more radical meanings caring a civic attachment to homeland together with exclusive ethnocultural content.⁵⁸³ Therefore, in the case of Ukraine, both civic and ethnic components of national identity are present. It is difficult to conclude whether the Ukrainian identity has become more civic or ethnic, as the idea about the Ukrainian nation and national identity tend to be interlinked with the ethnicity, language and political views, which makes the Ukrainian national identity seem to have evolved toward both its extremes.

It may be a tedious task to establish a clear division between civic and ethnic components in national identity of Ukraine. Even though Ukrainian identity is claimed to be a political civic identity, in accordance with its core historical and cultural features, it is in fact ethnic.⁵⁸⁴ Ukrainian scholars use “natsia/nation” (нація in Ukr.) in reference to both civic and ethnic identity,⁵⁸⁵ while a definition of the “nation” is situated in ethnocultural identification: “the Ukrainian nation is an ethnic and demographic basis of Ukrainian society – the main criteria of state-building.”⁵⁸⁶ The definition of national identity as civic but founded on ethnic principles makes the analysis of its change in terms of a civic/ethnic dichotomy problematic.

⁵⁸⁰ Barrington, “Citizenship as a Cornerstone of Civic National Identity in Ukraine,” 155–73; Sasse and Lackner, “War and State-Making in Ukraine,” 75–98; Kryvytska, “Identychnist Ukrayinskogo Pogranychcha: Donbas,” 293–313; Susak and Vashchynska, “Loyalnisna Komponenta Identychnosti ‘Ukrayinets/ka’,” 9–18; Pavlo P. Hornostai, “Gromadyanska identychnist Ukrayintsiv ta yiyi Evolyutsiya,” *Problemy Politychnoyi Psykhologiyi* 2, no. 16 (2015): 98–111.

⁵⁸¹ Dmytro Kravchenko, “Natsionalna Identychnist Ukrayintsiv: Sotsiokulturnyi Vymir,” *Versus* 1, no. 5 (2015): 99–105.

⁵⁸² Hornostai, “Gromadyanska Identychnist Ukrayintsiv ta yiyi Evolyutsiya,” 98–111.

⁵⁸³ Kulyk, “National Identity in Time of War,” 296–308.

⁵⁸⁴ Degtiarev, “Natsionalnaya Identichnost i Perspektivy Ukrainskoi Gosudarstvennosti,” 71–76.

⁵⁸⁵ See Galyna Lutsyshyn, “Chynnyky Konsolidatsii Ukrayinskoyi Natsii,” *Ukrayinska Natsionalna Ideya: Realii ta Perspektivy Rozvytku* 23 (2011): 165–69.

⁵⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 165–69.

In the post-Soviet period, education has been used instrumentally in identity politics. In Ukraine, school books have become an instrument in education and the formation of norms and values,⁵⁸⁷ among the young generation. Researchers have concluded that the Ukrainian identity constructed in the school books is an ethnic one.⁵⁸⁸ Negative representations of Others,⁵⁸⁹ particularly Russia, in school books provoke a construction of the national narrative of victimisation and create stereotypes about Others.⁵⁹⁰ Even though historical narratives in the books do not start a conflict *per se*, they may become a powerful instrument for social mobilisation.⁵⁹¹ These narratives and discourses may shape the identification of the students creating a different from the previous generation's worldview. However, in Ukraine, national identity is also reinterpreted by both students⁵⁹² and teachers,⁵⁹³ who may provide their own narratives about identity. Therefore, "top-down" identity politics cannot entirely impose a certain identity on the community, there is always a process of interpretation involved.

An analysis of national identity as a narrative allows the researchers to take a distance from the civic/ethnic dichotomy. Narratives have a double structure – they define "us" and "them", and therefore shape national identity meanings. The analysis of results in Korostelina's research demonstrates a variety of narratives about

⁵⁸⁷ Popson, "The Ukrainian History Textbook," 325–50; Janmaat, "The Ethnic 'Other' in Ukrainian History Textbooks," 307 — 324; Fillippova, "Politics of Identity through School Primers," 29–36; Rodgers, "(Re)Inventing the Past," 40–55; Peter W. Rodgers, "Contestation and Negotiation: Regionalism and the Politics of School Textbooks in Ukraine's Eastern Borderlands," *Nations and Nationalism* 12, no. 4 (2006): 681–97; Tetyana Koshmanova, "National Identity and Cultural Coherence in Educational Reform for Democratic Citizenship. The Case of Ukraine," *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice* 1, no. 1 (2006): 105–18; Karina Korostelina, "Constructing Nation: National Narratives of History Teachers in Ukraine," *National Identities* 15, no. 4 (2013): 401–16; Karina V. Korostelina, "Shaping Unpredictable Past: National Identity and History Education in Ukraine," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 42, no. 2 (2010): 129–37; Debra A. Friedman, "Our Language: (Re)Imagining Communities in Ukrainian Language Classrooms," *Journal of Language, Identity and Education* 15, no. 3 (2016): 165–79; Miller, "Politika Stroitelstva Natsii - Gosudarstva na Ukraine," 76–99; Pryshchepa, "Nation-Building and School History Lessons in Ukraine after 2014," 120–35.

⁵⁸⁸ See Popson, "The Ukrainian History Textbook," 325–50; Rodgers, "Contestation and Negotiation," 681–97.

⁵⁸⁹ Poleshchuk, "Obraz Rosii na Storinkakh Shkilnikh Pidruchnykiv z Istorii Ukrainy," 97–106; Zhurukhina, "Politizatsiya Istorii na Postsovet'skom Prostranstve (na Primere Ukrain'skikh Uchebnikov Istorii)," 180–92.

⁵⁹⁰ See Janmaat, "The Ethnic 'Other' in Ukrainian History Textbooks," 307–324; Korostelina, "Shaping Unpredictable Past," 129–37.

⁵⁹¹ Korostelina, "Shaping Unpredictable Past," 129–37.

⁵⁹² Friedman, "Our Language," 165–79.

⁵⁹³ Korostelina, "Constructing Nation," 401–16.

Ukrainian national identity.⁵⁹⁴ After change of power in 2014, the temporary government excluded some narratives from public discourse, which led to the discontent of the South-East region.⁵⁹⁵ In this way, the absence of a widely accepted national identity and the government's preference for a particular identity became a source for identity mobilisation in conflict.

Foreign policy choices and relationships with foreign Others to great degree contributed to national identity construction in the post-Soviet Ukraine. Both became an arena for contestation by groups with different visions⁵⁹⁶ of the Ukrainian identity, that was constituted as either in closer relations with Russia or Europe. There is evidence that before 2014, the political elites did not agree whether Russia had to be perceived as the "Other", which split the political forces in Ukraine.⁵⁹⁷ In the election period, Russia and NATO were the two most common external Others appearing in the materials on geopolitical issues, while those with the Ukraine and EU were in third place.⁵⁹⁸ The orientation towards Europe gained widespread acceptance in Ukraine, which led to European integration being uncontested among political actors.⁵⁹⁹ The protests in support of the Association Agreement with the EU in November 2013 were framed as a "civilisational" choice of Europe, a "revolution of dignity", and a "revolution of values."⁶⁰⁰ There is evidence of a positive dynamic of a pro-European civilisational identification of Ukrainians since 1991,⁶⁰¹ in contrast to attitudes towards Russia that have been routinely constructed as a

⁵⁹⁴ Karina V. Korostelina, "Ukraine Twenty Years after Independence: Concept Models of the Society," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 46, no. 1 (2013): 53–64; Korostelina, "Mapping National Identity Narratives in Ukraine," 293–315.

⁵⁹⁵ Korostelina, "Mapping National Identity Narratives in Ukraine," 293–315.

⁵⁹⁶ Shulman, "National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine," 58–87.

⁵⁹⁷ Kuzio, "Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine," 343–65; Nikulin and Selyutina, "Geopolitical Orientations of Ukrainian Political Elites and the Electoral Campaign of 2006," 544–58.

⁵⁹⁸ Nikulin and Selyutina, "Geopolitical Orientations of Ukrainian Political Elites and the Electoral Campaign of 2006," 544–58.

⁵⁹⁹ Orlova, "'Europe' as a Normative Model in the Mediatized Discourse of Ukrainian Political Elites," 222–41.

⁶⁰⁰ Igor Torbakov, "'This Is a Strife of Slavs among Themselves': Understanding Russian–Ukrainian Relations as the Conflict of Contested Identities," in *The Maidan Uprising, Separatism and Foreign Intervention*, ed. by Klaus Bachmann and Igor Lyubachenko (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2014), 183–205; Prymachenko, "Antykolonialnyi Dyskurs OUN/UPA v Suchasnomu Ukrainkomu Konteksti Borotby za Yevropeisku Identychnist," 328–38; Khimyak, "Tsyvilizatsiyna Identyfikatsiya Ukrayiny," 156–63.

⁶⁰¹ Voropayeva, "Yevropeiska Tsyvilizatsiyna Identychnist yak Chynnyk Konsolidatsiyi Gromadyan Ukrayiny u Postkolonialnu Dobu (1991–2018 rr.)," 139–46.

negative Other.⁶⁰² Relations with NATO had an impact through positive conditionality, financial assistance, soft power, and through encouragement of the new norms and values.⁶⁰³ Some researchers challenged the assumptions of language and ethnicity as decisive in foreign policy preferences: the electoral support was better predicted by foreign policy preferences of the candidates, rather than by their native language or ethnicity.⁶⁰⁴ As foreign policy remains an important issue for national identity construction, however, more research is needed to assess the recent changes.

The Ukrainian elites started to construct Ukraine as European in the early 1990s. First, there was an intent to forge a Central European identity, presenting the argument of belonging which was based on a shared history and geography.⁶⁰⁵ However, it lacked recognition by the Others, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, who did not admit Ukraine to the Visegrád group. Considering the prospects of integration into European institutions, the Ukrainian elites continued to construct the Ukrainian identity as Central-Eastern European⁶⁰⁶ and later as just European.⁶⁰⁷ In addition, in the first decades of independence Ukraine actively participated in peacekeeping operations, which it used as a strategy for shaping a new national identity and gain recognition as a state with foreign policy attained to the Western interests.⁶⁰⁸ Prior to 2014, there was no single view on Ukraine as a part of Europe and different interpretations were available among the public. In the perception of the elites and the general population, Ukraine was European to different degrees.⁶⁰⁹ It was understood as either fundamentally different from Russia,

⁶⁰² Degtiarev, “Natsionalnaya Identichnost i Perspektivy Ukrainskoi Gosudarstvennosti,” 71–76; Vendina et al., “Ukraina v Politicheskoi Krizise,” 50–67.

⁶⁰³ Shyrokykh, “The Evolution of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine,” 832–50.

⁶⁰⁴ Frye, “What Do Voters in Ukraine Want?,” 247–57; Kulyk, “Language Identity, Linguistic Diversity, and Political Cleavages,” 627–48.

⁶⁰⁵ Stephen R. Burant, “Foreign Policy and National Identity: A Comparison of Ukraine and Belarus,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 47, no. 7 (1995): 1125–44.

⁶⁰⁶ Kuzio, “Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine,” 343–65.

⁶⁰⁷ White et al., “Belarus, Ukraine and Russia,” 344–67; Tsyrfa, “The Formation of the European Identity of Ukraine,” 43–63; Orlova, “‘Europe’ as a Normative Model in the Mediatized Discourse of Ukrainian Political Elites,” 222–41; Oleksii Polegkyi, “Framing of European Integration in Ukrainian Media Discourse,” *European Journal of Communication* 17 (2016): 180–96.

⁶⁰⁸ Madalina Dobrescu, “Status Seeking through Peacekeeping: Ukraine’s Quest for a Positive Social Identity,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 19, no. 2 (2023): 2–20.

⁶⁰⁹ White and Feklyunina, *Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*, 135–161.

or culturally close to Russia and an Eastern Orthodox/East Slavic civilization, or was articulated as the one that did not belong to any in-group of “European” states, not even to Russia.

There is a growing body of research in which Ukraine is being analysed as a post-colonial country. This literature has not yet shaped into a specific focus area and requires a serious scientific discussion. The notion of post-colonialism appears in early works on Ukrainian identity in the post-Soviet period. Kuzio⁶¹⁰ noted the impact of the past on the regions of Ukraine, which were historically composed within different empires. Therefore, Ukraine turned from being a subject of an empire into an independent state. Kuzio’s research was based on theoretical assumptions of those authors who compared de-sovietisation with decolonisation in the West⁶¹¹ in which Russia and the Soviet Union’s policies were compared to English policies of “internal colonisation.”⁶¹² The post-colonial past explains language use, historiography, religious, social and economic policies, as well as justifies nation-building policies used for elimination of some (or all) colonial heritage.⁶¹³ Riabchuk draws an analogy between the situation of the Ukrainian population after 2014 and the “creole” population of Latin America.⁶¹⁴ Analysing Ukrainian history as the history of empires, this author frames Ukrainian identity as post-colonial, which has shown itself after events in 2014. On the contrary, in the Russian academic literature, the politics of identity implemented in independent Ukraine was interpreted as colonial policies undertaken by the Ukrainian government that aimed at the cultural subjugation of the Russophone population of Eastern Ukraine.⁶¹⁵ Therefore, any analysis of identity politics from a post-colonial perspective largely depends on a researchers’ point of view and is not based on objective scientific criteria.

⁶¹⁰ Kuzio, “National Identity in Independent Ukraine,” 582–608.

⁶¹¹ Ibid. 582–608; Kuzio, “Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine,” 343–65; Taras Kuzio, “History and Memory in Post-Soviet Colonial Space,” *Nationalities Papers* 30, no. 2 (2002a): 241–64.

⁶¹² Kuzio, *Ukraine and Nation-Building*.

⁶¹³ Kuzio, “History and Memory in Post-Soviet Colonial Space,” 241–64.

⁶¹⁴ Riabchuk, ““Two Ukraines’ Reconsidered,” 138–156.

⁶¹⁵ Degtiarev, “Natsionalnaya Identichnost i Perspektivy Ukrainskoi Gosudarstvennosti,” 71–76.

Depictions of Ukraine as a colonised country are present in the collective social imaginary and can be traced by empirical research. In narratives of history teachers, Russia was articulated as an empire,⁶¹⁶ in elites' narratives, the post-Soviet Ukraine stood for the colony of the oligarchs,⁶¹⁷ while the Russian language was argued to be a "former imperial language"⁶¹⁸ that dominated and marginalised the Ukrainian language. Ukrainian literature and historical memory have also been analysed as post-colonial developments.⁶¹⁹ Overall, Ukrainian national identity construction has been shaped by post-colonial and post-imperial discourses. However, this post-colonial rhetoric is being used in domestic and foreign policy without a proper academic understanding of imperial and colonial politics.⁶²⁰ Therefore, the approach to studying Ukrainian post-Soviet identity as post-colonial needs to be reassessed.

The themes of securitisation of the language and national identity have been salient in discussions within the academic literature published in Ukrainian language. Some theoretical articles on Ukrainian identity express the view that the Ukrainian language lies at the heart of the culture, ethnic identification and "national consciousness", and its nation-building function is connected with national security.⁶²¹ Other works emphasize the role of education as a source of identity security.⁶²² However, empirical studies of how security makes a part of national identity are not yet available in the case of Ukraine.

After 2014, there was evidence of new schisms that emerged among the Ukrainian population, such as differences between the identity of the population in

⁶¹⁶ Korostelina, "Constructing Nation," 401–16.

⁶¹⁷ Korostelina, "Ukraine Twenty Years after Independence," 53–64.

⁶¹⁸ Kulyk, "Language and Identity in Ukraine after Euromaidan," 90–106.

⁶¹⁹ Vitaly Chernetsky, "Sofia Andrukhovych's Felix Austria: The Postcolonial Neo-Gothic and Ukraine's Search for Itself," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 61, no. 4 (2019): 386–98; Prymachenko, "Antykolonialnyi Dyskurs OUN/UPA v Suchasnomu Ukrainskom Konteksti Borotby za Yevropeisku Identychnist," 328–38.

⁶²⁰ Efemishch, "Proshloe v Konstruirovani Natsionalnoi Identichnosti," 77–90.

⁶²¹ Bielovetska, "Problema Zberezhennya Natsionalnoi Identychnosti yak Skladovoyi Duxovnoyi Bezpeky Ukrayinskoho Suspilstva," 6–14; Evgen M. Manuilov and Yuriy Y. Kolynovskyy, "Dukhovna Bezpeka Ukrayinskoho Suspilstva u Derzhavotvorchkykh Protsesakh Suchasnosti," *Visnyk Nacionalnoho Yurydychnoho Universytetu imeni Yaroslava Mudrogo* 1, no. 40 (2019): 21–38.

⁶²² Vitaly V. Baranivskyy, "Vyshcha Osvita u Vyrishenni Problem Dukhovnoyi Bezpeky Ukrayinskoho Suspilstva." *Visnyk Kharkivskoho Natsionalnogo Pedagogichnogo Universytetu imeni H.S. Skovorody. Filosofiya* 41, no. 1 (2013): 206–21; Milena V. Bezuglaya, "Dukhovno-Kulturni Tsinnosti Osvity i Dukhovna Bezpeka Osobystosti," *Dukhovnist Osobystosti: Metodolohiya, Teoriya i Praktyka* 41 (2017): 34–45.

the territories controlled and uncontrolled by the central Ukrainian government⁶²³ and between two Russian-speaking regions in Eastern Ukraine⁶²⁴ and the rest of Ukraine. However, in recent research on identity and conflict in Ukraine, results have been indecisive, as they may discuss different populations. For instance, Matveeva⁶²⁵ pointed at the emergence of new identities formed by warfare in the Donbass region. On the contrary, research conducted by Sasse and Lackner⁶²⁶ led to inconclusive results on the impact of war on identities. Keeping in mind the conflict between Russia and Ukraine that started in 2022, the Ukrainian studies will continue further tackling the issues of the recent identity transformations.

The answer to the question of how Ukrainian national identity changes involves several dimensions. A number of general trends are visible, such as a shift of regional divide towards the East, the existence of a multiplicity and contestation of national identity types, “Europeanisation” and de-Sovietisation of Ukrainian identity, as well as the rising importance of foreign policy direction for national identity construction. However, measuring identity change as the civic or ethnic does not provide a clear picture if assessed as shifting towards one or another end of a dichotomy. Rather, the Ukrainian national identity is developing both civic and ethnic features. Lastly, most studies capture the meanings of the Ukrainian national identity in a particular time and setting, but do not show how identity meanings evolve over time or how these meanings are contested and/or reach consensus.

3.2 Revealing national identity change in Ukraine through sociological research

Quantitative sociological methods have become dominant for measuring long-term trends in identity change of the population, as they provide numerical and relatively easy to compare sets of data. Sociological methods, however, are limited in scope

⁶²³ See Malanchuk et al., “Forsovanyi Vybir,” 8–20; Kulyk, “National Identity in Ukraine,” 588–608; Sasse and Lackner, “War and Identity,” 139–57; Kuzyk, “Ukraine’s National Integration before and after 2014,” 709–35; Stanyslav L. Katayev, “Prymushennya do Identychnosti yak Tekhnolohiya Hibrydnoyi Viyny (Vypadok Donbasu),” *Visnyk Kharkivskogo Natsionalnogo Universytetu imeni V.N. Karazina*, no. 41 (2018): 29–34.

⁶²⁴ Mykhailo F. Stepyko, “Vykylyky Ukrayinskiy Identychnosti v Umovakh Zovnishnoyi Agresiyi,” *Hileya: Naukovyj Visnyk*, no. 96 (2015): 423–27; Anrey V. Baranov, “Sovremennyyi Konflikt Identichnostei na Ukraine: Vliyanie na Dezintegratsiyu Obshchestva,” *Natsionalnaya Bezopasnost i Strategicheskoe Planirovanie*, 4, no. 12 (2015): 18–24.

⁶²⁵ See Matveeva, *Through Times of Trouble*.

⁶²⁶ Sasse and Lackner, “War and Identity,” 139–57.

when applied to the longitudinal studies conducted by individual researchers. That is why in this section I summarise the results of the sociological data collected by one of the leading analytical centres in Ukraine, the Razumkov Centre.⁶²⁷ I compare and contrast the trends in identification of the populace at large with observations that originated from qualitative analysis undertaken in this dissertation. Even though there are some methodological challenges when comparing different sets of data, the results of sociological research from the Razumkov Centre may highlight the general trends in national identity change of the Ukrainian population over the last two decades.

The selected data reflect the most relevant aspects of national identity, such as attitudes towards citizenship of Ukraine, linguistic practices, ethnic and cultural identification, and a feeling of being “European”. Based on results of the sociological polls, it is also possible to outline the dynamic in change of personal identification with the national territory and other entities, such as a local or regional community. These stand out as important markers of national identity change in experts’ evaluations.

Given the nature of the data, it is crucial to highlight the features that distinguish the experts’ assessment of national identity from the previously outlined approaches identified in the academic literature. First, in an expert-driven analysis by the Razumkov Centre, national identity is understood as an emotional attitude of individuals towards the national entity, which can be traced through “awareness and feeling of belonging to a community.”⁶²⁸ This definition is situated in a psychological understanding of identity. Second, there is a difference between the conceptualisations of national identity provided by the experts and academics. What is defined as “national identity” in academia is referred to as a “common identity of the citizens”⁶²⁹ or “civic identity”⁶³⁰ in experts’ reports. This points to the different

⁶²⁷ The Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies named after Olexander Razumkov (the “Razumkov Centre” - Tsentr Razumkova in *Ukr.*), last accessed 05 Jan 2022 <https://razumkov.org.ua/en/>.

⁶²⁸ Tsentr Razumkova, “Spilna Identychnist Gromadyan Ukrayiny: Osoblyvosti y Problemy Stanovlennya,” *Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona* 7, no. 79 (2006): 3–35.

⁶²⁹ *Ibid.*, 3–35.

⁶³⁰ Tsentr Razumkova, “Identychnist Gromadyan Ukrayiny: Zminy, Tendentsiyi, Regionalni Identychnosti,” 2–57.

terminology in the expert and academic literatures. Third, in sociological polls there is a wide range of categories that measure identity through self-reported attitudes. The first group of categories (questions) refers to the attitudes to Ukrainian citizenship, identification of Ukraine as a motherland, level of patriotism, i.e. measures what the academics call the civic national identity. The second group of questions refers to socio-cultural aspects of identity which include language use, ethnic groups, and self-identification with a particular cultural tradition, among others, i.e. what is known as ethnic national identity. The experts follow the Soviet tradition to label ethnic identification as “*natsionalnost*”, i.e. “nationality”. Fourth, the experts’ conclusions are situated in a number of underlying assumptions about the nature of national identity. The most important observation is that national identity is considered a final *result* of a nation-building process which aims to create a national unity. This process should not be spontaneous, but controlled and guided by the state, elites and civil society, i.e. national identity is the result of identity politics. The reason behind it is that national identity is regarded as a precondition for state stability and development. Lastly, there is a change in perception of the role of regional identity in national cohesion that can be inferred from the experts’ reports. A report in 2006⁶³¹ recognised multiple identities and regional differences in Ukraine that did not inhibit national cohesion. However, in 2016, the lack of a feeling of national belonging presents the risk of “integration of some subnational identities of some communities with foreign identities”⁶³². It means that experts admit that a lack of personal loyalty to Ukraine and the prevalence of local or regional identity over a national one is perceived as a threat to the state and assumes a potential disloyalty from such populations.

The data presented below overviews sociological research before Russo-Ukrainian conflict in 2022. Overall, there was a growing trend of a positive attitude to being a Ukrainian citizen (table 7). The lowest point was recorded in the year 2003 with a total sum of 51,9% of answers “being very proud” and “rather proud”.

⁶³¹ Tsentr Razumkova, “Spilna Identychnist Gromadyan Ukrayiny,” 3–35.

⁶³² Tsentr Razumkova, “Identychnist Gromadyan Ukrayiny,” 2–57.

After 2015, the level of pride of being a Ukrainian citizen remained at the level of 68,4%. However, from 2015 the number of those who were not proud of being a Ukrainian citizen grew by 7,7% (a sum of “not very proud” and “not proud”).

Table 7. Aggregate data of sociological research from 2000 to 2017. Answer to the question: “Are you proud to be a citizen of Ukraine?” (source: Razumkov Centre).

	2000 ⁶³³	2003 ⁶³⁴	2005 ⁶³⁵	2015 ⁶³⁶	2017 ⁶³⁷
Very proud	22,6	21,8	20,3	28,7	21,9
Rather proud	39,8	30,1	36,0	39,7	46,5
Not very proud	25,2	24,9	26,5	17,2	23,4
Not proud	8	16,2	7,9	5,8	7,3
Difficult to say	4,4	7,0	9,3	8,6	0,8

Change in language practices is assessed through a measurement of language used at home and self-reported native language (table 8). According to the data, the Ukrainian language gained popularity and was more frequently used as a language of private communication after 2014. According to the respondents, the usage of Ukrainian at home increased from 39,7% in 2002 to 55% in 2017, while the usage of Russian declined twofold from 40,4% to 23,2%. However, there was a significant and relatively stable number of people who used both Ukrainian and Russian languages (20,5%).

Table 8. Aggregate data from sociological research from 2002 to 2017. Answer to the question: “What language do you speak at home?” (source: Razumkov Centre).

	2002 ⁶³⁸	2006 ⁶³⁹	2015 ⁶⁴⁰	2017 ⁶⁴¹
Ukrainian	39,7	39,3	49,8	55,5
Russian	40,4	28,1	23,7	23,2
Ukrainian and Russian	19,5	30,9	24,7	20,5
Another	0,4	0,1	1,4	0,4

⁶³³ Pashkov and Chalyi, “Ukrayinsko-Rosiyske Spivrobitnytstvo v Otsinkakh Naseleण्या Ukrayiny,” 44–56.

⁶³⁴ Ibid., 44–56.

⁶³⁵ Yakymenko and Lytvynenko, “Regionalni Osoblyvosti Ideino-Politychnykh Oriyentatsiy Ukrayiny v Konteksti Vyborschoyi Kampaniyi – 2006,” 2–18.

⁶³⁶ Tsentrazumkova, “Identychnist Gromadyan Ukrayiny,” 2–57.

⁶³⁷ Ibid., 2–57.

⁶³⁸ Pashkov and Chalyi, “Ukrayinsko-Rosiyske Spivrobitnytstvo v Otsinkakh Naseleण्या Ukrayiny,” 44–56.

⁶³⁹ Tsentrazumkova, “Spilna Identychnist Gromadyan Ukrayiny,” 3–35.

⁶⁴⁰ Tsentrazumkova, “Identychnist Gromadyan Ukrayiny,” Note: The set of questions in 2015 and 2017 slightly differs from previous polls and includes the answers as “mainly Ukrainian”, “mainly Russian”, “difficult to say” (0,5% in both years). For the purposes of unification of data, “mainly Ukrainian and Russian” answers are unified with “Ukrainian” and “Russian” in these years.

⁶⁴¹ Tsentrazumkova, “Identychnist Gromadyan Ukrayiny: Tsinnisno-Oriyentatsiynyi Aspekt,” *Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona* 1–2, no. 169–170 (2017): 3–61.

More people reported Ukrainian as a native language in 2017 compared to 2006 data (table 4). Recognition of the Ukrainian as a native language grew by 15,7% in a decade. On the contrary, Russian as a native language declined by 16,9%, from 30,7% in 2006 to just 13,8% in 2017. Interestingly, the percentage of the people who spoke only Russian at home did not significantly changed (from 28,1% to 23,2%) but there was over 50% fall in recognition of Russian as a native language. Therefore, there were individuals who spoke Russian at home but did not report it as a native language, which is puzzling. It contradicts the basic definition of the native language as the one used as a language of communication in the family, i.e. the first language the child learns.

Table 9. Aggregate data from sociological research from 2006 to 2017. Answer to the question: “What is your native language?” (source: Razumkov Centre).

	2006	2007	2008	2015 ⁶⁴²	2017 ⁶⁴³
Ukrainian	52%	51,4	42,7	59,9	67,7
Russian	30,7	25,7	28,7	22,1	13,8
Ukrainian and Russian	15,6	21,5	26,0	15,1	17,4
Other language	1,1	0,9	0,9	2,1	0,7
Difficult to say	0,6	0,5	0,7	0,7	0,4

There was a trend to identify more as an ethnic Ukrainian (+14,8%) and less as an ethnic Russian (-12,3) (table 10). As ethnic identity in Ukraine was not being institutionalised, therefore, the change in ethnic identification could be attributed to a change in self-identification. The data from sociological research 2017⁶⁴⁴ evidenced elaboration of a more nuanced approach to ethnic identity adding the category of bi-ethnic association: 12% identified with both ethnic groups, while 6% did not identify with neither. Comparing this data with the language practices, it is worth noting that there is a significant number of Russian-speaking ethnic Ukrainians.

Table 10. Aggregate data from sociological research from 2006 to 2017. Answer to the question: “What is your ethnic identity (‘natsionalnost’)?” (source: Razumkov Centre).

	2006	2015 ⁶⁴⁵	2017 ⁶⁴⁶
Ukrainian	77,2	86,3	92,0

⁶⁴² Tsentr Razumkova, “Identychnist Gromadyan Ukrayiny: Tsinnisno-Oriyentatsiynyi Aspekt,” 3-61.

⁶⁴³ Ibid., 3-61.

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid., 3-61.

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid., 3-61.

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid., 3-61.

Russian	18,3	8,9	6,0
Other	3,2	2,8	1,5
Difficult to say	1,3	2,0	0,6

From data presented in table 11 we may observe a significant shift in cultural tradition. Between 2006 and 2015 there was an increase by 13,7% in identification with the Ukrainian cultural tradition and a decrease in Soviet and Russian identifications, 6,1% and 8,1% respectively (table 11). However, there was an insignificant growth of 0,5% in association with the general European tradition.

Table 11. Aggregate data from sociological research from 2006 to 2015. Answer to the question: “What cultural tradition do you associate with?” (source: Razumkov Centre).

	2006	2007	2015 ⁶⁴⁷
Ukrainian	56,3	57,9	70,0
Soviet	16,4	19,4	10,3
General European	6,6	6,4	7,1
Russian	11,3	10,1	3,2
Other	1,5	1,0	1,7
Difficult to say	7,9	5,2	7,7

The European dimension of identity is measured in two respects: as a feeling of being a European and the place Europeanness occupies in the hierarchy of territorial identities. According to sociological research, the majority of Ukrainians neither felt European nor associated themselves with the culture and history of the European Union (table 12). Despite the promotion of European ideas in the media and governmental policies, the level of identification with European identity among the common Ukrainians remained around 30-40%, while the majority (around 50%) did not feel European. However, after 2017, the data indicated substantial growth in association with the European identity and a decrease in the number of respondents who did not have association with the European identity.

Regional differences between the South/East and Centre/West are salient in all respects. Respondents considered that the differences between the regions of Ukraine were greater than between a region and a particular neighbouring country⁶⁴⁸. Among the factors that split the country, Ukrainians named differences in their attitudes to the war in the East (41%), attitudes towards Russia (40%), and attitudes

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid., 3-61.

⁶⁴⁸ Tsentrazumkova, “Identychnist Gromadyan Ukrayiny v Novykh Umovakh,” 3–14.

towards Europe and the U.S. (28%).⁶⁴⁹ Residents of the Donbass region were more inclined to consider these issues controversial for society than respondents from other regions.

Table 12. Aggregate data of sociological research. Answer to the question: “Do you feel being a European, feel a belonging to the culture and history of the European Community?” (source: Razumkov Centre).

	2005 ⁶⁵⁰	2006 ⁶⁵¹	2007 ⁶⁵²	2009 ⁶⁵³	2012	2015 ⁶⁵⁴	2017 ⁶⁵⁵	2021 ⁶⁵⁶
Yes	10,4	11,1	11,9	10,8	12,3	13,2	40,3 ⁶⁵⁷	41,2
Rather yes	22,9	20,1	21,9	20,6	21,5	15,8	-	-
Rather no	26,0	24,8	27,0	30,2	28,6	29,9	-	-
No	34,3	37,1	33,7	33,2	32,2	32,6	50,4	49,4
Difficult to say	6,4	6,9	5,5	5,2	6,3	8,6	9,3	9,5

When compared to other territorial identities, in 2015⁶⁵⁸ only 1,5% of Ukrainians associated themselves primarily with European territorial identity, while 0,6% primarily with Russia, 2,1% with the Soviet Union, and the majority declared the primary association with Ukraine or a city/village where they live, 40,1% and 39,6% respectively. Ukraine was considered a European country because of its geographical position (77,1%) and common history (51,4%). However, it was perceived less European in terms of culture (43,7%), political (32,5%), social (21,7%) and economic (16,0%)⁶⁵⁹ aspects.

Experts noted some changes in association of identities with Ukraine (+8% since 2005) and observed a decline of local territorial identity (-4,8% since 2005). However, the local city/village identity still prevailed in the hierarchy of personal identities in the Southern and Donbass regions. In these regions, the local identity

⁶⁴⁹ Tsentr Razumkova, “Konsolidatsiya Ukrayinskogo Suspilstva: Vyklyky, Mozhlyvosti i Shlyakhy,” *Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona* 7–8, no. 165–166 (2016): 2–97.

⁶⁵⁰ Tsentr Razumkova, “Yevropeiska Integratsiya Ukrayiny: Pozytsii ta Otsinky Gromadyan,” *Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona* 7, no. 67 (2005): 44–56.

⁶⁵¹ Tsentr Razumkova, “Gromadyany Ukrayiny pro Yevropeysku Integratsiyu,” *Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona* 2, no. 86 (2007): 32–48.

⁶⁵² Tsentr Razumkova, “Formuvannya Spilnoyi Identychnosti Gromadyan Ukrayiny: Perspektyvy i Vyklyky,” *Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona* 53, no. 9 (2008): 2–31.

⁶⁵³ Tsentr Razumkova, “Zovnishnya Polityka Ukrayiny Ochyma Gromadyan,” 72.

⁶⁵⁴ Tsentr Razumkova, “Identychnist gromadyan Ukrayiny,” 2–57.

⁶⁵⁵ Tsentr Razumkova, *Ukrayina: 30 Rokiv na Yevropeiskomu Shlyakhu*, ed. by Yuriy Yakymenko (Kyev: Zapovit, 2021).

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid., 357.

⁶⁵⁷ In this source the data of “yes” and “rather yes” are unified.

⁶⁵⁸ Tsentr Razumkova, “Identychnist” Gromadyan Ukrayiny,” 2–57.

⁶⁵⁹ Tsentr Razumkova, *Ukrayina: 30 Rokiv na Yevropeiskomu Shlyakhu*, 365.

was a primary identity for 50,2% and 44,3% of respondents respectively, while the association with the Ukrainian identity constituted 31,1% in the South and 22,6% in Donbass, according to data gathered in 2015.

The interpretation of data, however, has certain limitations. First, the sociological research did not compare the same populations. After 2014, it excluded the respondents in Crimea and uncontrolled areas of Donesk and Lugansk regions. Therefore, some of the data, particularly in language and ethnic identification, may have been skewed because the Russian speaking population was not included in the sample. In addition, there was a change in the methodology of a region definition in this data set. After 2014, the data from the Donbass region was separated from the Eastern region. Therefore, clusters of the administrative regions included in “eastern” regions differ, which casts some doubt on the validity of results from a comparative perspective.

To conclude, despite certain limitations of the sample and changes in research design of experts’ research of national identity, there were several trends that could be identified among the Ukrainian population. Adopting a positivist cause-effect relation of national identity and social processes in research, the experts’ research design was based on the fundamental assumption of a possibility to have a more or less unified and homogeneous nation. The statement about a necessity to have a “commonly-shared national idea” was supported by 80% of respondents. However, according to the experts, the formation of a “common nation-wide identity of Ukraine” had not yet been accomplished⁶⁶⁰ before 2022.

A significant change was the growing recognition of Ukrainian and a decline of Russian identities, which could be traced through changes in the language use, ethnic self-identification, and association with cultural traditions. In short, according to sociological data, Ukraine was becoming more “Ukrainian”. However, experts argue that this was a sign of “civic”⁶⁶¹ identity, as Ukrainian populations felt more identified as the citizens of Ukraine. These conclusions demonstrate the

⁶⁶⁰ Tsentr Razumkova, “Identychnist Gromadyan Ukrayiny,” 2–57.

⁶⁶¹ Tsentr Razumkova, “Identychnist Gromadyan Ukrayiny: Tsinnistno-Oriyentatsiynyi Aspekt,” 3-61.

contradiction between identification of national identity as either civic or ethnic, if treated as mutually exclusive for the purpose of assessing identity change. In addition, they create confusion and logical contradiction, because if Ukraine becomes more ethnic, then it cannot be civic, as civic identity by definition is the opposite to the ethnic. Therefore, Ukrainian identity is formed around the idea of “Ukrainianess”, which is an ethnic identification. As a result, the population may feel that they correspond to this idea of Ukrainianess to different degrees.

There is a clear discrepancy between the declaration of a native language and the use of the language in the family, which points to differences in meanings attached to the native language among respondents. The sociological data do not account for the political and social contexts, neither do they reflect on governmental identity politics or social expectations of certain answers. Interpretation of data on language use needs to consider the long-term impact of identity politics on individual identities. For example, in the educational programs, the Ukrainian language is assigned a “state-building”⁶⁶² function without which it is impossible to be identified as Ukrainian patriot. In identity politics and nation-building strategies, the Ukrainian language stood for one of the pillars of the visions of an independent state. It is worth noting that the study of the Ukrainian language in schools is complemented by a discipline titled “Native language”, which is in essence an additional course in Ukrainian with a socio-cultural component designed for 5th to 7th graders. It is possible that the fact that the Ukrainian language is placed at the centre of the idea of a nation and state, makes the answer about Russian as a native language much less socially acceptable. Despite the growing importance of Europe in the social and political process of Ukraine, the association with Europe as a cultural tradition or territory is insignificant and has not drastically changed through the years at the level of personal identity. At the same time, attitudes towards Russia among the population were polarising according to the data collected prior to 2022.

⁶⁶² S.I. Demianenko, *Robocha Programa “Ukrainska mova (za profesiynym spriamuvanniam)” dla studentiv galuzi znan 0303 Zhurnalistika ta informatsia* (Kyiv, 2017), 9-10; Ministerstvo Osvity i Nauky Ukrainy, *Ukrainska Mova 5-9 klasy. Programa dla Zagalnoosvitnikh Navchalnykh Zakladiv z Rosiyskoyu Movoyu Navchanna*, 2017, 3, 59.

Main conclusions of Chapter 3

1. Analysis of the academic literature provides evidence of several patterns of change in the Ukrainian national identity. Among them, there is a shift of regional differences that lie between the Eastern regions and the rest of Ukraine, the “Europeanisation” and “de-Sovietisation” of identity, as well as the growing importance of foreign policy for national identification.
2. If civic/ethnic dichotomy understood as exclusionary model, it is not suitable for measuring identity change in Ukraine due to the fact that ethnic and civic components distinguished in research are intertwined with other identities. Moreover, the use of this dichotomy leads to oversimplification of national identity and creates a contradiction in the logic of claims about changes to the Ukrainian national identity.
3. Having analysed the longitudinal sociological data, it can be inferred that more Ukrainians identify as ethnic Ukrainians, and fewer as Russians. The same pattern of a shift to a more ethnic identification with the Ukrainian identity is observed in the use of languages, which evidences that Ukraine has become more “Ukrainian.” However, the Ukrainian population does not have a strong identification with European cultural tradition, neither does it consider the U.S. or NATO as important Others in the foreign policy of Ukraine.

4. UKRAINIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY TRANSFORMATION IN DISCOURSE ON EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION FROM 1997 TO 2018

This section presents the results of empirical research on the transformation of the Ukrainian national identity in the discourses of the ruling political elites on NATO accession. In section 4.1, I discuss the three basic discourses on the issue of Euro-Atlantic integration through which the national identity of Ukraine is constructed. Representations of the Self, contestation of the meanings of these representations by the ruling political elites, and subsequent changes in identity articulation are examined in section 4.2. The differences in the construction of Otherness and security in basic discourses are analysed in sections 4.3 and 4.4.

4.1 Transformation of basic discourses on Euro-Atlantic integration

This section includes a comparative analysis of changes in basic discourses articulated by the ruling political elites across four periods of comparison from 1997 to 2018. Basic discourses are analytical constructions that facilitate structural analysis of identity formation within a foreign policy debate.⁶⁶³ The methodological identification of basic discourses is based on key representations of identity that articulate radically different Others and that argue for the adoption of different policies.

In Ukraine, the debate on foreign policy concerns two major aspects of the relationship with NATO: military (and other) cooperation and the issue of NATO membership, often referred to as Euro-Atlantic integration. The analytical distinction between these two dimensions of NATO-related policy in Ukraine help reveal a number of crucial differences between the groups of political actors. Focusing on debates of NATO accession highlights the nuances of the foreign policy promulgated by the groups of ruling political elites, and helps distinguish the basic discourses and representations of identities that these ruling political elites (re)produce.

⁶⁶³ Hansen, *Security as practice*, 95.

Through empirical analysis, I distinguish three basic discourses in debates on Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. I labelled them as pro-NATO, anti-NATO, and In-Between basic discourses. These labels are associated with a direction of foreign policy expressed in the speeches of political actors. Consequently, in the pro-NATO (basic) discourse, the political actors support the policy of NATO accession, in the anti-NATO (basic) discourse they promote the policy of neutrality (or non-bloc status), and in the In-Between (basic) discourse the speakers prioritise domestic policies over foreign policy of NATO integration.

Articulation of different foreign policy directions in basic discourses is supported by a construction of the main juxtaposed Others: Russia, the U.S. and NATO (table 13).

Table 13. Comparison of change in basic discourses articulated in 1997 and 2018.

Basic discourse	Foreign policy on NATO		Others	
	1997	2018	Positive	Negative
Pro-NATO	Neutrality/Possible membership	Euro-Atlantic integration	the U.S. NATO	Russia
In-Between	Neutrality	Possible integration/ NATO Ally	Russia and U.S. (changing)/Multiple Others	NATO (changing)
Anti-NATO	Neutrality	N/A	Russia	NATO the U.S.

In pro-NATO basic discourse, Russia occupies a place of a negative Other, while the United States and NATO are constructed as positive and friendly Others. On the contrary, the speakers of anti-NATO discourse construct Russia as a positive Other, and NATO and the U.S. are presented as enemies. In-Between discourse differs from anti-NATO and pro-NATO discourses in the aspect of Othering. Its actors do not construct a Ukrainian national identity in terms of radical Otherness and their level of support of the policy is based on a balanced assessment of the positive and negative effects of NATO membership on the Ukrainian people and Ukrainian statehood. Another difference is that pro-NATO and anti-NATO discourses remain relatively stable throughout the years in terms of their internal structures, while In-Between discourse changed over time. The In-Between discourse transforms in terms of its fading support of the policy of neutrality. While

in 1997 this group of political actors vigorously rejected the policy of Euro-Atlantic integration, in 2018 they accepted accession to NATO as a long-term goal.

Articulation of security in discourses redefines the boundaries of identity through construction of threats and danger. These articulations fundamentally differ in pro-, anti- and In-Between basic discourses. Details on differences in security construction will be discussed in detail later in this text in section 3.4. Identification of different foreign policy options on NATO accession, articulation of different and juxtaposed Others, together with a corresponding articulation of security in discourses provide support for the argument that basic discourses on NATO accession construct distinct national identity projects.

The contribution of political actors in debates on NATO-related policies turned to be quite significant in adherence to one or another basic discourse. Political leaders who articulated the pro-NATO discourse were members of the parties that belonged to the central left, central right, right and ultra-right political spectrum. Among them, at different periods, there were members of parliament from the Social Democratic Party (United), The Ukrainian's People Party, "Our Ukraine", People's Movement of Ukraine, Fraction "Svoboda", Udar Vitaliy Klitschko, "Fatherland" Party, etc. The representatives of the executive branch, among them the Presidents of Ukraine and members of the Ministries and different committees, were among the actors who constructed the pro-NATO discourse. Representatives of the executive power were among the ruling elites who would most of the time support the policy of accession to NATO.

The anti-NATO basic discourse was articulated by the party members who adhered to the centre-left and ultra-left political ideologies. These were mostly the members of Parliament (MPs) from the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Progressive Socialist party, Peasant Party of Ukraine, the Social-Democratic Party, the Party of Regions, and the Opposition Bloc, among others.

The In-Between discourse was articulated by the centrist parties, such as the Lytvyn Bloc, and other MPs who belonged to a variety of parties that could be placed on centre-right and -left of political spectrum. These actors represented the following

parties and coalition blocs: Ukrainian People's Party, Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, the Revival Party, the People's Party, etc. In addition to party members, the discourses were articulated by MPs who were elected to Parliament as independent politicians. These group of identity entrepreneurs of In-Between discourse can be described as the least numerous, but the most eclectic in terms of political ideologies of the speakers.

The trend in support of Euro-Atlantic integration has not changed much with the time. The same conclusion is reached in regard to the left-wing political actors who rejected the policy of NATO integration. What affected the shift in discourses most was a transformation of the political landscape of Ukraine after the events in 2014, when the Communist Party was banned from the elections and representation of the Party of Regions in Parliament was weakened. As a result, it affected the possibility of actors to express their views on NATO in public debates, as well as closed doors for political participation.

Due to the research time framework that covers over twenty years of political process, a full list of the political actors who participated in debates on NATO accession is quite extensive. Details about the actors with their political affiliation (where available) whose speeches were codified as pro-NATO, anti-NATO and In-Between discourses can be found in Appendix 4. This part of the section proceeds with the analysis of change and contestation of basic identity discourses, providing a short description of major historical events that were important for their articulation in every period under study.

Basic identity discourses in 1997-2003 (period 1). The first period is associated with a time when Ukraine was actively cultivating its relations with the international community. The Ukrainian government had to meet the challenges of formulating a coherent and legitimate foreign policy and at the same time to address issues that were posing threats to the unity of the country internally. The policy of Euro-Atlantic integration was officially formulated by the government in 2002-2003. Therefore, from 1997 to 2002 the topic of cooperation with NATO was a more

publicly contested issue than the policy of NATO accession, which had not been well articulated in a public discussion.

In period 1, the pro-NATO basic discourse oscillated between the position of neutrality and a possibility of NATO membership. The promotion of NATO integration as the final goal of Ukraine-NATO relations constructed Ukraine as a part of a large system of European security. However, the speakers included other organisations besides NATO in this system, such as the WEU, OSCE, the European Union, and the Council of Europe. Therefore, in the first phase of comparison, integration into the European system of security was constructed as a complex and multidimensional process. It is worth noting, that at the time Russia was not yet articulated as a radically different and threatening Other, neither was NATO an important Other in the first period from 1997 to 2003 in the pro-NATO basic discourse: “*NATO is not against Russia and Russia is together with NATO.*”⁶⁶⁴

Table 14. Basic discourses on Euro-Atlantic integration in 1997-2003 (period 1).

Discourses on identity	Pro-NATO membership	In-Between position on NATO	Against-NATO membership
Positive Other	N/A	N/A	Slavic countries
Negative Other	N/A	N/A	NATO
Neutral Policy	U.S., Russia Neutrality/NATO membership	NATO Cooperation with both Russia and NATO	The U.S. Russia Non-aligned neutral

Rather, NATO was articulated through representations of other countries, either current or future members. Interestingly, in the pro-NATO discourse, the construction of the U.S. as a significant Other precedes a construction of NATO as Other, which points to the importance of the United States in NATO-related issues. The discussions of Russia contained both negative and positive representations, which described it as a country that was moving closer to Europe and was to become a part of NATO. In addition, there was a discussion on Ukraine-Russia relations that reflected the unresolved issues of the Russian military Fleet based in Crimea, and

⁶⁶⁴ In Ukr.: “*HATO не проти Росії, а Росія з HATO.*” Transcript of the 100th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the second convocation 12 June 1997, 4 pm, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/4139.html>.

Russia's internal conflict in the Chechen Republic. This articulation reflected historical developments of the 1990s, when Russia also strived for establishing relationships with NATO.

In anti-NATO discourse, the speakers supported the policy of non-aligned/neutral status of Ukraine. The main foreign policy goal of Ukraine was articulated as an integration into international and European structures. However, some speakers argued that the European direction excluded the possibility of NATO membership for Ukraine, which sparked off intense debate among the identity entrepreneurs. In the anti-NATO discourse, Ukraine was portrayed as a Slavic nation, that by nature was opposed to the radically different Others were NATO and the United States: *"It supposes, that we are going to take the West's side and will take a great sin of historical national and Slavic treachery on our sole."*⁶⁶⁵ Russia was articulated neither as an amicable nor threatening Other. The reason being is that Russia was not a good example to follow, primarily, because it was perceived as a future NATO partner.

The In-Between discourse occupied an intermediary position on foreign policy, accepting neutrality promoted by the anti-NATO discourse. However, it prioritised the domestic politics in Ukraine in which NATO was not a part of the political agenda. In the In-Between discourse, international cooperation was acceptable and desirable to develop with both Russia and NATO. In this basic discourse, the Alliance was constructed as European. In period 1, the political actors of In-Between discourse were describing NATO as a peace-making structure under transformation: *"We support peacemaking initiatives of our government and further program of partnership exclusively for peace."*⁶⁶⁶ Because those actors did not consider Euro-Atlantic integration as a viable foreign policy option, the

⁶⁶⁵ In Rus.: *"Предполагается, что мы будем на стороне Запада и возьмем на свою душу тяжкий исторический грех национального и славянского предательства."* Transcript of the 100th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the second convocation 12 June 1997, 4 pm, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/4139.html>.

⁶⁶⁶ In Ukr.: *"Ми підтримуємо миротворчі ініціативи нашого уряду та подальшу програму партнерства виключно заради миру."* Transcript of the 40th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 20 April 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2264.html>.

representations of NATO accession were not available in the In-Between discourse in period 1.

Policy of cooperation with NATO proved to be a contested issue among the speakers. On the one hand, in the pro-NATO discourse, cooperation was articulated as a strategy for Ukraine to become a European country. On the other hand, the political forces formulating the anti-NATO discourse, considered cooperation with NATO unconstitutional due to Ukraine's nature as a non-aligned country that was fixed in the Declaration of Independence in 1991.

In period 1, articulation of discourses mirrored the key historical events that generated debates on the Euro-Atlantic issue among the ruling political elites. Among them, there were the signature of the Charter on Distinctive Partnership in July 1997, the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in March 1999, and the adoption of foreign policy laws of Ukraine in 2003. Because of the high level of uncertainty of these policies, the basic discourses were not coherent and presented a number of internal contradictions. The politicians lamented the loss of nuclear military capabilities that reduced the influence of Ukraine on the world stage. The actors who articulated the pro-NATO discourse were not unified in their vision of cooperation with NATO in the first period. At some moments, cooperation with NATO was argued as not leading to NATO accession, but as an instrument to be used in order to guarantee the territorial integrity of Ukraine. On other occasions, cooperation with NATO was constructed as instrumental to Euro-Atlantic integration, which was claimed to be the final objective.

Basic identity discourses in 2006-2009 (period 2). In period 2, Euro-Atlantic integration became a particularly divisive issue for the political elites. That period encompassed a number of important events that affected the discussion of the relevance of NATO accession. Among them, there were the independence of Kosovo, a conflict between Russia and Georgia, the death of Ukrainian military personnel in operations abroad, as well as the intension to apply for a Membership Action Plan on the eve of the Bucharest Summit in 2008. Considering a variety of distinct positions on NATO membership, the analysis of basic discourses uncovered

a coherent discursive articulation of Selves, with articulation of internal and external Others.

In period 2, Ukraine was constructed as a NATO member in the nearest future in pro-NATO discourse. This period was associated with the pro-Western policies of Viktor Yushchenko in period that followed the Orange Revolution in 2003-2004. The Membership Application Plan of NATO was presented as an important turning point for Ukraine that would mark the initial stage in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. In this way, the speakers of pro-NATO discourse argued, Ukraine would become an indispensable element of the European security system architecture: *“Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity are key factors for ensuring stability in Europe.”*⁶⁶⁷ In the pro-NATO discourse of period 1 a variety of Others can be found. Russia was still perceived as a part of the European security system and a strategic partner, but it was also constituted as an aggressive state that violated international laws, referring to its war with Georgia. NATO was constituted as an important Other, presented as a democratic community of countries and a guarantor of security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Europe and Eastern Europe were constructed as distinct Others.

Table 15. Basic discourses on Euro-Atlantic integration in 2006-2008.

Discourses on identity	Pro-NATO membership	In-between position on NATO	Against-NATO membership
Positive External Other	NATO Europe The U.S.	N/A	Russia
Negative External Other	Russia	N/A	NATO The U.S.
Policy	NATO Member	Neutral	Non-aligned neutral

The policy of NATO accession promoted by the government was met with strong opposition from a number of political forces who articulated the anti-NATO discourse. The most radically different representations of the Self were elaborated by the Communist Party and members of the “Party of Regions”, which held the majority of seats in Rada at the time. First, these political forces argued for the

⁶⁶⁷ Joint Statement Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the level of Heads of State and Government, 04 Apr. 2008, accessed March 12, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8964.htm.

adoption of the non-aligned neutral status. As an option, Ukraine could turn into a central component of the European security system, that could potentially include Russia. In anti-NATO discourse, the membership in the Alliance was articulated as not meeting the demands of national security interests. On the contrary, it presented a loss and threat.

The politicians who contributed to the articulation of In-Between discourse in period 2 did not support the policy of Euro-Atlantic integration, as relations with NATO were divisive. Therefore, they argued there was no need for NATO integration. Moreover, Ukraine had plenty of domestic problems. Under the circumstances of social divisions and economic hardship, Ukraine had to take care of itself, as no one could help it. The motto of this group was: *“Ukraine has to concentrate on itself.”*⁶⁶⁸ Instead of being employed as a tool in the geopolitical configuration of military alliances, non-aligned status was the most preferable option for Ukraine. The ruling political elites who articulated In-Between discourse promoted the adoption of the internationally recognised status of neutrality. They argued that such a status would ensure Ukraine with all necessary guarantees of international security.

The way NATO membership was constructed in three basic discourses presented several points of contention which were built on different argumentation of its necessity and consequences. In pro-NATO basic discourse, Euro-Atlantic integration was constructed as instrumental to European integration: *“Our way to Europe lies through the doors of NATO.”*⁶⁶⁹ Besides the enhanced military capabilities, the actors of pro-NATO discourse enumerated diverse social, political and economic benefits that would result from Ukraine’s accession. Among them, there were the democratisation of society, the formation of a middle class, the development of stronger economy, improvement of records on human rights, and

⁶⁶⁸ In Ukr.: “Україна повинна зосередитися на собі.” Transcript of the Session 13, Verhovna Rada of Ukraine, the 8th of April, 2008. 10am. Presided by the Head of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine Yatseniuk A.P. Accessed <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/385.htm>.

⁶⁶⁹ In Ukr.: “Наш шлях в Європу через двері НАТО.” Opening remarks by the Ukrainian Defence Minister (Informal meeting of NATO Defence Ministers (IDM 1-2008) Vilnius, Lithuania, 7-8 February 2008), <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2008/0802-vilnius/0802-mod.htm>.

the achievement of overall social well-being. All these were presented as entirely and uniquely beneficial outcomes of the Euro-Atlantic integration process in which the MAP was the first step.

Table 16. Representations of NATO membership impact in basic discourses in 2006-2008.

Discourses on identity	Pro-NATO membership	In-between position on NATO	Against-NATO membership
Impact of Euro-Atlantic integration	A way to European integration Progress	Unpopular direction Forced	Catastrophe Regression

Conversely, the anti-NATO discourse constructed the possibility of Euro-Atlantic integration as a catastrophic event which was built on the premises of political irresponsibility, Russophobia, and divisiveness:

“...engage our state in this or other military bloc, as for example, NATO [...] may turn out to be catastrophic for our people of Ukraine and for all Europe.”⁶⁷⁰

Moreover, according to the speakers, accession to NATO would endanger the policy of integration into the European Union. It would have a negative impact on the military and high-tech industrial complexes, weaken economic development, affecting small and middle-sized businesses and energy systems. In addition, it was argued the NATO accession would generate a split in society which could aggravate the political and social situation. Overall, it was argued that the fact of Euro-Atlantic integration would cause a deepening political crisis, regression in development and loss of social and economic well-being. Most importantly, NATO membership could have geopolitical consequences and risks for Ukraine, as it would make Ukraine choose sides between the West and Russia. As a result, NATO membership would even damage the relationship with the Alliance itself. Therefore, in anti-NATO discourse in the period 2, NATO membership was constructed as a threat and a loss

⁶⁷⁰ In Ukr.: “...залучити нашу державу у той чи інший військовий блок, як, наприклад, НАТО, [...] може обернутися катастрофою для народу України і всієї Європи.” Transcript Session 1, Verhovna Rada of Ukraine, the 2nd of September, 2008, 10am. Presided by the Head of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine Yatseniuk A.P. Accessed <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/541.html>.

that served the argument why Ukraine was not ready to join the MAP – it would immediately have an impact on its strategic relations with Russia and other countries. It was defined as “an act of political irresponsibility”. In the In-Between basic discourse, membership in NATO was constructed as forced upon Ukraine and as an unpopular and divisive issue which had to be abandoned.

Decision making representation on NATO accession was one of the contested articulations that appeared in period 2. Even though, in all three discourses there was a consensus on the necessity of the referendum on the issue of NATO, the pro-NATO position attributed all responsibility for accession on the Alliance members, while in the anti-NATO discourse they argued for the necessity of the national referendum and prioritise the popular will.

Table 17. Representations of Decision making on Euro-Atlantic integration in 2006-2008.

Discourses on identity	Pro-NATO membership	In-between position on NATO	Against-NATO membership
Decision making on NATO membership	Allies /Referendum	Referendum	People/Referendum

The time when the referendum should be held, as well as the meanings of MAP in Euro-Atlantic integration, were among contested representations. Was the Memberships Action Plan the beginning of accession, as it was argued in the anti-NATO discourse? Was it just a chance to join the developed democracies, according to the articulation of the pro-NATO discourse? In the elites’ speeches and statements, the time framework when the referendum should be held would change depending on the meanings attached to the MAP. If Ukraine starts Euro-Atlantic integration with MAP implementation, then a referendum has to be conducted before applying for the Membership Action Plan. If it is not so, the referendum has to be conducted after Ukraine accomplishes the MAP stages. Despite a widespread agreement on the referendum as an instrument of foreign policy legitimation, it remained a contested and unresolved issue in case of Ukraine-NATO relations.

Basic identity discourses in 2010-2013 (period 3). The period of neutrality started with the official voting of the Ukrainian Parliament in June 2010. Previously, the policy of neutrality was announced by the newly elected President Viktor

Yanukovych in February 2010. Under conditions of the policy of neutrality, the articulation of basic discourses differed from discourses in other periods. During period 3, practical cooperation with NATO was the only dimension of engagement. Concomitantly, the elimination of Euro-Atlantic integration as a practical policy option, transformed the discourses. Representation of *Decision making* on NATO integration disappeared from all discourses. Contested representations of Euro-Atlantic integration were still present in pro-NATO and anti-NATO basic discourses, but disappeared from the In-Between discourse. In this period, the status of a neutral state and its effects turned into a matter of contestation among the speakers. Discussion about NATO shifted from the debates on Euro-Atlantic integration to the discussion of the status of neutrality of Ukraine and the acceptable level of engagement with NATO in the domain of practical cooperation.

Table 18. Basic discourses on Euro-Atlantic integration in 2010-2013.

Discourses on identity	Pro-NATO membership	In-between position on NATO	Against-NATO membership
Positive Other Negative Other	NATO/Multiple Russia	N/A N/A	Russia NATO The U.S.
Policy	Euro-Atlantic integration	Military training	Non-aligned neutral

In pro-NATO basic discourse, cooperation with NATO was constructed as central and necessary for Ukraine. More specifically, it was argued that cooperation with the Alliance was to support the status of Ukraine as an international actor and was also favourable for military and economic areas. The effects of neutrality were perceived as ultimately negative for both international and domestic issues, would “isolate it from a democratic world” and “ruin the Ukrainian state.”⁶⁷¹ Neutrality was constructed as not sustainable and divisive for society, and as a return to Russia that isolated Ukraine from the world and dismantled its “European choice”.

In the anti-NATO discourse, the discussion of cooperation with NATO split into two camps. One part of the actors constructed cooperation with NATO as

⁶⁷¹ In Ukr.: “ізолювати її від демократичного світу” and “руйнує українську державу.” Transcript of the 50th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the sixth convocation 03 June 2010, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/938.html>.

beneficial for Ukraine, another one considered it too large in scope and harmful. While in the pro-NATO discourse, neutrality was constructed as a policy that would put an end to the European integration of Ukraine, in the anti-NATO rhetoric, on the contrary, the effects of neutrality were articulated as a factor that would speed up European integration. Neutrality was filled with positive meanings by the speakers who was against NATO accession policy. It was presented as ensuring development and progress in all spheres of social life, which would bring economic benefits, guarantee defence of state sovereignty and protect national interests, as well as would strengthen the role of Ukraine in the international arena. Neutral status was claimed to “...bring economic dividends, empowering of the country, truly fortify sovereignty of Ukraine.”⁶⁷² The political actors enumerated the positive effects of consolidation for society that neutrality would entail and argued that this was a historical moment for Ukraine. Within articulations of neutrality status, the representations of European integration appeared, which was an unusual trend for the structure of the basic discourses on Euro-Atlantic integration.

In period 3, in the In-Between discourse, neutrality was constructed as a favourable decision. It was articulated as a choice made by the people of Ukraine in 1991, when independence was proclaimed. Military exercises were not considered harmful. Even though the competing discourses contested the meaning of Russia as the Other, this period seemed to be the least contested among all periods of comparison.

Basic identity discourses in 2016-2018 (period 4). The year 2014 marked a new era in Ukrainian history. Ukraine lost control over the territory of Crimea and parts of the Lugansk and Donetsk regions, its army started engagement into military operation in the Eastern Ukraine, which the Ukrainian government proclaimed an “Anti-Terrorist Operation” (ATO). Therefore, it was expected to identify a change in basic discourses would be a result of transformation of the political context,

⁶⁷² In Rus.: “экономические дивиденды, укрепляющие мощь страны, по-настоящему укрепляет суверенитет Украины.” Transcript of the 46th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the sixth convocation 21 May 2010, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/934.html>.

territorial losses, rising insecurity and civil unrest. Throughout the post-2014 period, Ukraine adopted a number of laws on foreign policy and national security, including a constitutional amendment which included the clause on Euro-Atlantic integration. The newly elected government of President Petro Poroshenko resumed the policy of Euro-Atlantic integration.

Despite the political transformations that took place in Ukraine, the basic discourses demonstrated resilience in terms of foreign policy articulation. In 2018, it was still possible to identify some contestation of Euro-Atlantic policies in political debates of the ruling elites, even though it was articulated by a handful of people. The transformation of basic discourses can be also partially explained by dramatic changes to the political landscape, as the Communist Party of Ukraine was banned from political life and the electoral process, and the Party of Regions lost majority of its representation in Parliament in 2014. However, some of its members formed the Opposition Bloc and remained in Parliament after the change of power in 2014.

Table 19. Basic discourses on Euro-Atlantic integration in 2016-2018.

Discourses on identity	Pro-NATO membership	In-between position on NATO	Against-NATO membership
Positive Other	NATO Europe The U.S.	NATO	N/A
Negative Other Policy	Russia Member of EU and NATO	N/A NATO membership as long-term and uncertain	N/A Non-aligned status

In the pro-NATO discourse in period 4, Ukraine had come to be constituted as an inseparable part of the Euro-Atlantic area that had been transformed into the Eastern flank of NATO. NATO was not represented instrumentally as a way to join the European Union. Rather, the European and Euro-Atlantic integrations conflated into discursively inseparable from one another policies. Both were pronounced to be strategic directions and achieved simultaneously. The benefits of the Euro-Atlantic integration were articulated in terms of security and social benefits. According to the political actors, being a part of the Euro-Atlantic alliance would help to overcome poverty, achieve peace, security, democratisation, and reach a proper development

of Ukraine, as well as to achieve high living standards for the Ukrainian population. Amendments to the Constitution were articulated as “historic” and “civilisational” which would “change mentality of the nation” and establish it as a part of the West. The pro-NATO discourse rearticulated NATO as a guarantor of Ukraine’s independence and a guarantor of its security, which were present during periods 1 and 2, but gradually vanished during the period of neutrality.

Table 20. Representation of the impact of NATO membership in basic discourses in 2016-2018.

Discourses on identity	Pro-NATO membership	In-between position on NATO	Against-NATO membership
Impact of Euro-Atlantic integration	Security and independence Progress	Political speculation Distractive	Loss of independence and sovereignty N/A

In the anti-NATO basic discourse in the period 4, cooperation with NATO was constructed as anti-European. According to the speakers, NATO was not keen to accept Ukraine. Articulation of internal Others contributed to the anti-American sentiment expressed by this group of the ruling political elites: “...*grant-eaters, who execute the orders of the State Department and more so in the places, where they hear sounds of NATO*”.⁶⁷³ In addition, constitutional amendments and accession to the Alliance were opposed by the political actors. The representation of Euro-Atlantic integration was constructed as a loss of Ukrainian independence and sovereignty. The speakers argued that only non-aligned status could make Ukraine strong and independent. Therefore, the mere existence of the Ukrainian state was constructed as dependent on the preservation of foreign policy of neutrality, i.e. constructed in existential terms. The adherents of this position belonged to the Opposition Bloc that consisted of the former members of the Party of Regions.

The In-Between discourse preserved its internal consistency after 2014. The domestic, social and economic problems were prioritised. By 2018, the possibility of NATO integration was not completely rejected, but it was presented as a long-term and uncertain prospect: “*Ukraine will not join NATO in a short-term or*

⁶⁷³ In Ukr.: “грантоїдів, які виконують доручення Госдепу і тим більше там, де йдуть звуки з НАТО.” Transcript of the 58th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 21 June 2018, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6843.html>.

medium-term perspective.”⁶⁷⁴ In addition, the issue of a referendum and the necessity of a national agreement on foreign policy arose within this discourse. Therefore, Ukraine’s membership in NATO was constructed as a political speculation which was a part of the electoral campaign in the upcoming presidential elections. As a result, NATO membership had come to be constituted as harmful to the area of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO. Politicians from various political parties contributed to the articulation of In-Between basic discourse, including the populists.

A major distinction between these basic discourses in period 4 were differences in construction of Otherness. While anti-NATO basic discourse articulated NATO and the U.S. as hostile to Ukraine, in In-Between discourse, NATO was perceived as a strategic partner. In the In-Between discourse, the political actors also articulated multiple Others who were constructed as examples of consensus around the issue of Euro-Atlantic integration: Croatia, Georgia, Switzerland. The discussion of the status of neutrality, which was articulated in In-Between discourse prior to 2014, transformed into scepticism about practical implementation of NATO-related policies. Representation of Ukraine as a neutral country was still present in the speeches of the ruling political elites. The U.S. was constructed as a partner in bilateral cooperation, but Russia was not constructed as a radical Other. It turned into a country that “intervened” in Crimea.

All these demonstrate that the ruling political elites continued constructing three basic discourses after 2014. Both anti-NATO and In-Between basic discourses significantly transformed, but did not vanish from the public discussions. Therefore, the dichotomy of views on Euro-Atlantic integration was preserved, even though the anti-NATO discourse had been marginalised.

To sum up, basic discourses on identity in debates on Euro-Atlantic foreign policy presented internal consistency and continuity from 1997 to 2018 despite the

⁶⁷⁴ In Rus.: “Украина не вступит в НАТО в кратко- или среднесрочной перспективе.” Victor Pinchuk, “Op-ED: Ukraine Must Make Painful Compromises for Peace With Russia,” *112.UA*, December 29 2016, accessed Nov 28 2019, <https://112.ua/mnenie/otkaz-ot-vstupleniya-v-nato-i-es-v-obmen-na-mir-na-donbasse-polnyy-tekst-nashumevshey-stati-pinchuka-362623.html>.

disruptive events of 2013-2014 and the beginning of the armed conflict in Ukraine. These basic discourses supported different foreign policy directions in regard to Euro-Atlantic policies and articulated different degrees of Otherness of the United States, Russia and NATO. The most contested periods were period 1 (1997-2003) and period 2 (2006-2009), while the least contested period was period 3, when Ukraine proclaimed the status of neutrality. In period 4, the pro-NATO discourse had come to dominate the political discussion of NATO accession. It contained the biggest number of representations, which elaborated in detail on the policy of Euro-Atlantic cooperation and integration. Due to the transformation of the political landscape of Ukraine and political exclusion of a part of the ruling and other political elites from participation in the electoral process, pro-NATO basic discourse was articulated by the largest number of members of the political elites who stayed in power after 2014. In this way, the representatives of ruling political elites, who constructed the anti-NATO discourse, were marginalised in the public political debates. However, it is possible that anti-NATO discourse was still articulated in spheres that lay beyond the scope of this research.

4.2 Representations and meanings of Self: Contestation, change and continuity

Using sets of representations articulated by the basic discourses, I elaborated a model of Self-representation of the Ukrainian identity in debates on the issue of Euro-Atlantic integration. The codes of representations were placed in four thematic categories depending on dimensions of Self-representation in relations with NATO: cooperation with NATO, Euro-Atlantic integration, representations of Ukraine at the domestic level and representations of Ukraine as an international actor (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Model of Self-representation in Euro-Atlantic discourses.



The representations of the Ukrainian identity are compared in terms of consensus/contestation in the same period and continuity/change from 1997 to 2018 in three basic discourses. Comparative analysis of representations of Ukraine presents evidence of how the meanings of Ukraine are contested by the actors who articulate competing basic discourses and advocate different foreign policy directions. Longitudinal analysis of discursive transformation of national identity reveals that these representations present both change and continuity. Some of these representations acquire a wider variety of meanings, while some of them disappear. The changing historical context in which these representations are constructed inevitably affects the transformation of meanings and articulation of certain identity representations. However, the discursive representations do not always reflect factual changes, as will be noted in the discussion below.

The actors, who articulate competing basic discourses, attach different meanings to the representations of identity and, as a result, they construct different identity projects through articulation and contestation of these meanings. The projects of identity articulated in the basic discourses differ in terms of content of representations, which refer to different themes and issues in relation to NATO accession. For instance, in the first period, the issue of military training with NATO was articulated in the anti-NATO discourse, but ignored in the pro-NATO discourse.

Over time, some representations may become more significant and extensive, and acquire a larger number of meanings and connotations. For example, in the pro-NATO discourse, Ukraine as Europe was first articulated through a metaphorical reference to Europe as home. By 2018, besides this metaphorical representation, Ukrainian Europeanness was constructed through articulation of the European democratic essence of Ukraine, European values that Ukraine hold, which were

linked to European integration in the future. Appendix 5 provides a complete set of tables with the Self-representations across the four thematic groups in all periods. Table 21 demonstrates the representations of national identity articulated in the first period by the pro-NATO discourse. Among the many representations in basic discourses, I will discuss in more detail the contested representations in periods 1-4, representations that gained consensus among the actors, and outline representations that underwent transformation from 1997 to 2018.

Table 21. Representations articulated in the pro-NATO basic discourse in period 1 (1997-2003).

Representations: Cooperation with NATO		Representations: Euro-Atlantic integration	
Cooperation with NATO	and Russia as a way to Europe as evolution of society as foreign policy became more acceptable ecology and NATO has impact on economy in peacekeeping missions military sphere national security interests politicized issue Rada takes part in wide range of issues	Effects of NATO integration	consultation democratic control fight with international terrorism high technology common operations (peacekeeping) be wealthy not expensive protection of population support of national ecological and economic security programs
Relations with NATO	unique status of Ukraine as European security is important to be considered	NATO integration	as European choice in foreign policy as part of European integration is not certain decided by referendum guarantor of independence
NATO enlargement	in national interest	Ukraine	will join NATO needs NATO does not enter NATO yet starts integration into NATO
Representations: International dimension		Representations: National dimension	
Ukraine	as a peacekeeper as a regional actor as Central-Eastern European country as in sphere of Russian influence as part of European system of security	Ukraine	act independently, national interest as Europe as a colony/occupied as undecided solved border problems needs to be united need to be strong as vulnerable

	as subject of geopolitics has been following Russia is not a member of CIS lost nuclear status deserves to be in Europe has responsibilities with the IO making historical choice international actor as a neutral country solved border problems	Ukrainian society	is not ready for NATO integration
		Ukrainian people	politicised considerer NATO political, democratic bloc support regular contacts with NATO
Foreign Policy	change in 2002 integration into European and world structures priority of international integration	Army	is underfinanced needs modernisation
Evaluations of foreign policy	advances unprecedented success		
Multi-vector	harmful	Geography matters	Alliance's neighbour between Europe and Russia
Neutrality and non-aligned status	lost sense created mechanisms of European security preserved		

Contested representations of Self in 1997-2003 (period 1). The Self-representations in the first period of comparison are marked by a contestation between the anti- and pro-NATO discourses. In period 1, the prospects of Euro-Atlantic integration were vague, therefore, articulation of some representations in the same basic discourse was inconsistent. For example, Ukraine was constructed both as a country that was not joining NATO and as a country that started its path towards Euro-Atlantic integration. The articulation of Ukraine as a NATO member became possible after the laws on foreign policy and decisions on national security that had been adopted in 2002-2003. These laws were labelled by the speakers as the beginning of European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine and the end of the “harmful” multi-vector foreign policy in pro-NATO discourse. Consequently, this change was contested by the speakers of anti-NATO discourse, who argued that Ukraine was following the course imposed on it by the West.

Contestation of meanings of national identity representations can be observed through the entire time-framework included in the analysis, but change in degree of contestation. Some representations and issues tend to be more contested than others,

while some may be either ignored in a discussion or achieve a certain level of agreement. Such alteration in contestation can be explained by multiple factors, such as the change of international context, political agenda and political forces who make decisions. Table 22 presents examples of contested representations of the national identity of Ukraine on the issue of cooperation with NATO in period 1, when the policy of NATO accession was formulated. While the NATO supporters constructed cooperation in terms of national security and national interest of Ukraine, the opponents of NATO integration argued that cooperation had to be stopped. The understanding of cooperation articulated in the In-Between discourse in the first period was closer to the meanings presented in the anti-NATO discourse. In In-Between discourse, the Charter signed with NATO in 1997 was constructed as a limiting factor for Ukraine's foreign policy. Therefore, cooperation with NATO was articulated as incompatible with the national interest and as an unimportant issue.

Table 22. Contestation of cooperation with NATO 1997-2003.

Pro-NATO discourse	Anti-NATO discourse
Wide range of issues	Need to be stopped
National security/interest	No need for wider cooperation
Important relationship	Unconstitutional
Acceptability	Divisive
Politicised issue	Against national interest
Unique status of Ukraine	Against military training
NATO enlargement/national interest	Training as integration
Evolution	Degradation
Opportunities in military sphere	Military training costs
Impact on the economy	Obligations

It is through the articulation of popular representation that the ruling political elites may legitimise the proposed foreign policy. That is why the representations of the *Ukrainian people and Ukrainian society* have been contested and continued representations in discourses on Euro-Atlantic issue. In period 1, the representations of Ukrainian society and people were articulated by all basic discourses. In the pro-NATO discourse, actors often cited the data of sociological polls in order to construct an agreement of society on the policy of cooperation with NATO:

*“Almost half of citizens of Ukraine see NATO as a defence organisation and democratic organisation, and only 17% perceive it as a hostile aggressive bloc.”*⁶⁷⁵

However, according to some speakers, society was considerably divided on the issue of NATO, which was explained by the lack of information and a long history of disinformation about NATO. In the anti-NATO discourse, the representation of people was contested by articulation of disagreement on the NATO accession. According to the politicians, the people of Ukraine had to be asked about NATO, as the government acted against their will and the trust of people was betrayed. In anti-NATO discourse, Ukrainian society was constituted as the one that knows the “true” nature of NATO and was unaware of the treacherous governmental policies to join the Alliance. Besides, the speakers argued that the policy of Euro-Atlantic integration violated the will of the people expressed at the referendum on independence held on December 1, 1991. Therefore, cooperation with NATO tended to create social tensions and provoked mass demonstrations. In the In-Between discourse, society was also constructed as being uninformed on the issue of NATO accession.

Contested representations of Self in 2006-2009 (period 2). One of the contested representations of Ukraine between the pro-and anti-NATO discourses was the *equality or inequality of Ukraine* in relations with NATO. Pro-NATO discourse constructed Ukraine and NATO as equal. Ukraine and NATO were represented as a community with common goals and threats. They shared the burden and responsibilities of regional security and they mutually benefited from the outcomes of cooperation. The argument that Ukraine needed NATO was supported in a number of ways, among which there were the claims that engagement with NATO would result in growth of social equality, democratisation of society, NATO’s support for domestic reforms and assistance in their implementation.

⁶⁷⁵ In Ukr.: “...майже половина громадян України вбачає в НАТО оборонну організацію, демократичну організацію і лише 17 відсотків громадян розглядають НАТО як ворожий агресивний блок.” Transcript of the 100th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the second convocation 12 June 1997, 4 pm, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/4139.html>.

According to the speakers who articulated the pro-NATO discourse, domestic success would have a spill-over effect on the international dimension. As the supporters of Euro-Atlantic integration claimed, Ukrainian democratisation was beneficial for Europe. NATO was also interested in the accession of Ukraine because it would be “*able to ensure its ideals in a larger area*”⁶⁷⁶. Therefore, NATO was constructed in ideational terms as an institution that promoted certain values and democracy. Besides the political and social ramifications, domestic transformation was articulated as a geostrategic and civilisational choice. In addition, there were claims that Euro-Atlantic integration did not have any alternative. The actors of pro-NATO discourse constructed Euro-Atlantic integration as a transformative external force that had uniquely positive outcomes for the Ukrainian social, political, and military spheres.

On the opposite, anti-NATO discourse articulated the representations of Ukraine as instrumental to NATO. First, the speakers claimed that Ukraine served as a buffer zone against Russia. Second, Ukraine was argued to be a source of military personnel in conflicts abroad who were used as “cannon fodder”. In case of NATO accession, Ukrainian soldiers would “*substitute American soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan*.”⁶⁷⁷ In this way, Ukraine would provide military personnel for defending the foreign interests abroad, the speakers posited. Ukraine would also be used as a territory for hosting NATO military bases and anti-missile defence systems. Therefore, the roots of the contestation were based on terms of equality and necessity of the relationship between Ukraine and NATO. The anti-NATO discourse challenged overwhelmingly positive representations in pro-NATO discourse with the construction of NATO membership as an imminent threat. According to the speakers, Ukraine’s involvement in any bloc would be catastrophic for both Ukraine and Europe. A lack of national consensus deepened social divisions, resulting in a

⁶⁷⁶ Transcript, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko spoke at a luncheon hosted by the Atlantic Council in New York on September 24, 2008, *Atlantic Council*, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/transcript/transcript-ukraine-president-viktor-yushchenko/>.

⁶⁷⁷ In Rus.: “*заменяют американских солдат в Ираке и Афганистане*.” Transcript session 21, Verhovna Rada of Ukraine, the 18th of January, 2008. 10am. Presided by the Head of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine Yatseniuk A.P. Accessed <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/34.html>.

political crisis and a course of regression in social and economic development, they asserted.

A sharp contrast between the anti-NATO and pro-NATO discourses could also be found in the international dimension. Ukraine was not protected, but threatened by cooperation with NATO. Moreover, it was dragged into conflicts beyond its borders. Therefore, support of NATO policies abroad was presented as a danger for the national policy.

This “need versus threat” line of contestation was intertwined with national interest and sovereignty, which are important notions for foreign policy and identity. What policy best corresponds to the national interest? In pro-NATO discourse, the national interest of Ukraine was to join NATO. Through the process of accession, Ukraine would be able to defend its national interest at the international level and peace in Ukraine would be defended by a collective system of security. Therefore, relations with NATO were situated in the articulation of national interests, which stood for the existential necessity to preserve the nation: “...*only accession of Ukraine to NATO may safeguard and guarantee territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine.*”⁶⁷⁸ Contrary to such claims, in anti-NATO discourse, Ukraine was constructed as being used in defence of foreign interests abroad, particularly the interests of the United States and NATO. The articulation of the national interest in In-Between discourse was closer to the articulations of anti-NATO discourse. According to the speakers, NATO’s policy of recognising Kosovo’s independence created a dangerous precedent for Ukraine: “*Considering the interests of Ukraine, and national interests, [we have] to condemn what has just happened in Kosovo.*”⁶⁷⁹ It was Crimean opposition to NATO that made Euro-Atlantic integration impossible for Ukraine. NATO’s actions in Kosovo were perceived as a threat to the national interest of Ukraine because they endangered its territorial integrity.

⁶⁷⁸ In Ukr.: “...тільки вступ України в НАТО зможе забезпечити і дати гарантію територіальної цілісності і суверенітету України.” Transcript of the 19th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 15 April 2008, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/392.html>.

⁶⁷⁹ In Rus.: “... исходя из интересов Украины, национальных интересов, сразу осудить то, что произошло в Косово.” Transcript of the 11th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 21 March 2008, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/383.html>.

The same dynamic of contestation can be found in the articulation of representations of sovereignty. Was Euro-Atlantic integration a gain of sovereignty or a loss of sovereignty? Ukraine was a sovereign country, that is why it had all the power to decide on NATO membership without interference from the outside. In pro-NATO discourse, Euro-Atlantic integration was the only way to guarantee national sovereignty and territorial integrity. For its opponents, it was a loss of sovereignty. In the In-Between discourse, sovereignty was not explicitly mentioned. However, it could be inferred that sovereignty was articulated through the notions of independence and security: a recognized neutral status with real guarantees from the international community would secure the independence of Ukraine as a state. These examples of contestation demonstrate how articulation of identity can be a part of discursive practice that is supported by discursive construction of security through construction of danger to sovereignty, i.e. when the existence of the state is articulated as being threatened.

Contestation of Ukraine's role and status in the international arena has been present in articulations of discourses on Euro-Atlantic issue since 1997 (Table 23). In basic discourses, Ukraine was either constructed as a non-bloc neutral state or as a part of the European system of security, which could include or exclude Russia and NATO. The place of Ukraine in the international system of security was a watershed representation in basic discourses. The conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008 made the security issue for Ukraine a particularly sensitive issue. In period 2, pro-NATO discourse constructed NATO accession as a factor that could protect Ukraine from the expansionist politics of Russia. Therefore, the actors argued that Ukraine could minimise its losses by securing its position under NATO's umbrella, like the Baltic states had done. In this way, Ukraine could avoid Georgia's scenario.

Table 23. Representation of Ukraine in security systems from 1997 to 2018.

	Period 1	Period 2	Period 3	Period 4
Pro-NATO	Neutrality/NATO as European and historical choice	NATO as civilisational choice	NATO as European and civilisational choice	NATO as European and civilisational choice
Anti-NATO	Non-aligned neutral	Non-aligned neutral	Non-aligned	N/A
In-Between	Non-aligned	Non-aligned independent	Neutrality	Neutral/ Membership as long-term

However, the actors, who articulated In-Between discourse, argued that NATO was not ready to accept Ukraine. They claimed that neutral status was what Ukraine really needed. In anti-NATO discourse, there was a perception of tension with Russia and other countries that posed a threat to Ukraine. Besides opposition to the policy of NATO accession, anti-NATO discourse offered an alternative approach to collective security that would include Russia. In the speakers' view, such a pan-European system would truly make it a collective system and would ease the tensions along the dividing lines in Europe. Neutral status was presented as anticipated and much desired. The policy of neutrality was understood as "active neutrality" that would ensure cooperation with other actors of the international system. The non-aligned status was another desirable option articulated by anti-NATO discourse actors. After 2014, argumentation of neutrality status became rare, but yet it was present in the speeches of the ruling political elites who did not support the policy of NATO accession.

Consensus on representations of Self from 1997 to 2018. In period 1, it is observed that among the ruling political elites there was an agreement on representations of the *Ukrainian army*. The representations of the Ukrainian army as underfinanced and needing modernisation were articulated in periods 1 and 2. However, in the first period, even in the pro-NATO discourse, the politicians admitted that the modernization of the army could be ensured without NATO. The representation of the army was linked with the representation of Ukraine as a poor country in periods 1 and 2. According to the speakers, the lack of money in the

country created the situation when the army could not defend the country: “...today the defenders of our homeland themselves need protection and support from society.”⁶⁸⁰ In the period of neutrality, the representation of the army disappeared from all discourses and were rearticulated in the last period. After 2014, the Ukrainian army started to be constructed in pro-NATO discourse as one of the most efficient and powerful armies on the European continent. It is remarkable how political actors may use the statistical numbers as an argument to support their position. While in period 2, the politicians complained that Ukraine could not afford 3% of its GDP to be invested in the army, in period 4, they claimed that Ukraine spent 6% on defence, more than NATO countries themselves. In discourses, the army was constructed as a source of pride for the Ukrainian people, as well as an institution that met the requirements of NATO membership.

Representation of Ukraine as a *European country* was shared by all political actors who articulated basic discourses from 1997 to 2018 (table 24). However, there are nuances that distinguish the understanding of Ukrainian Europeanness among actors who support different policies. In pro-NATO discourse in period 1, Europe was articulated in metaphorical reference to a “European house”, which was a home to Ukraine. In the anti-NATO discourse, being European meant to conduct active European and international politics, to cooperate with multiple institutions, both European and beyond. In addition, being European stood for preservation of the industry, otherwise it was not Europeanisation. Therefore, in anti-NATO discourse, Europeanness was formulated with as a pragmatic action, not just a symbolic “return” to the European home.

⁶⁸⁰ In Rus.: “...сегодня защитники нашего отечества сами нуждаются в защите и поддержке со стороны общества.” Transcript of the 13th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the forth convocation 24 February 2006, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2037.html>.

Table 24. Representation of Ukraine as European 1997-2018.

	Period 1	Period 2	Period 3	Period 4
Pro-NATO	European	European	N/A	Europe
Anti-NATO	Slavic/European	European	Eastern European/European	N/A
In-between	European	N/A	N/A	N/A

In period 2, when Ukraine turned to an openly Euro-Atlantic policy, Europeanness in pro-NATO discourse was articulated in terms of the geographical location of Ukraine and its shared history with the European nations. Ukraine and Europe were framed through the lenses of teacher-student relations, where Ukraine was a student that “passed the exam” to be a European country. The political actors used historical references to Bohdan Khmelnytsky, whose troops fought as a part of French troops in the 17th century to underline Ukraine’s connection to Europe. Geography was used as justification of Ukraine’s belonging to common European space. The Atlantic area was constructed as a large geographical space: “*both the Black sea and the Baltic sea belong to the basin of the Atlantic Ocean.*”⁶⁸¹ In this way, geographic proximity and references to common history contributed to the constitution of Ukrainian Europeanness, which had to be accepted as an undeniable fact. Events of the civil protests during the Orange revolution in 2003-2004 were presented as a demonstration of a democratic, peaceful and “European” way of the people to defend their choice to elect the President. The implemented policies were argued to support Ukraine in achieving “*European standard of life*”⁶⁸² and “*European standards of economic, social and democratic development.*”⁶⁸³

In anti-NATO discourse, Europeanness was not a salient representation in period 2. However, there were references to European values and policies on

⁶⁸¹ In Ukr.: “...басейн Атлантичного океану належить і Чорне море, і Балтійське в тому числі.” Transcript Session 16, Verhovna Rada of Ukraine, the 10th of April, 2008, 10:00 am. Presided by the Head of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine Yatseniuk A.P. Accessed <https://iportal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/389.html>

⁶⁸² In Ukr.: “європейського рівня життя.” Transcript Session 1, Verhovna Rada of Ukraine, the 2nd of September, 2008, 10am. Presided by the Head of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine Yatseniuk A.P. Accessed <https://iportal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/541.html>.

⁶⁸³ In Ukr.: “європейських стандартів економічного, соціального, демократичного розвитку.” Transcript Session 1, Verhovna Rada of Ukraine, the 2nd of September, 2008, 10am. Presided by the Head of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine Yatseniuk A.P. Accessed <https://iportal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/541.html>.

national minorities, which were ascribed to the Europeanness of Ukraine and connected to the context of Ukrainian legislation.

In period 3, a period of official neutrality, European integration became one of the important representations within the discussion of neutrality status. Being European was constructed as the process of achieving economic growth and implementing European policies. In anti-NATO discourse, the Europeanness of Ukraine was understood in terms of non-aligned status and adherence to the policies of European integration. Neutrality did not seem to contradict the notion of Europeanness:

*“...desire to achieve better examples and development of economy, find solution to social problems, functioning of democratic institutions – what is usually called European choice.”*⁶⁸⁴

The Europeanness of Ukraine was much more elaborated in period 4 in pro-NATO discourse. Furthermore, Europeanness was articulated in metaphorical reference of a “road to Europe” and the construction of Europe as a family to which Ukraine belonged. Besides, the representation of being European was linked to ideational and material prosperity, in terms of having values, being a democracy, having a right to a decent and prosperous life. Ukrainians were constructed as people first and foremost guided by values, not as interested in material gains. Constitutional amendments that fixed the Euro- and Euro-Atlantic integration, were articulated as a confirmation of the Ukrainian European identity. Representation of Europe for Ukraine was expressed in biblical reference to the promised land of Ukraine: *“...united Europe is our promised land.”*⁶⁸⁵ The European future was “normal”, which implies that any other future would be “abnormal”.

In anti-NATO discourse, Europeanness was associated with the meanings attached to expectations of high standards and quality. The major difference between

⁶⁸⁴ In Ukr.: “прагненню досягти кращих європейських зразків у розвитку економіки, вирішенні соціальних проблем, функціонування демократичних інститутів - того, що прийнято називати європейським вибором.” Transcript of the 6th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 18 March 2008, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/378.html>.

⁶⁸⁵ In Ukr.: “...єдина Європа – то є наша земля обітована.” Transcript of the 35th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eight-convocation 22 November 2018, 16:00 pm, accessed February 11, 2019, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6960.html>.

the competing discourses was that in anti-NATO discourse Europeanness was linked to implementation of particular policies, while in the pro-NATO discourse it was constructed through metaphors and democratic ideals.

An important nuance in the representation of Ukraine as European was the contestation of the *civilisational* roots of Ukraine, as Europe, and the transformation of this civilisational narrative. The contestation was constructed around the Slavic identity and re-articulation of Ukraine from Eastern European to Western European. In period 1, pro-NATO discourse constructed Ukraine as a “cradle” of Eastern European civilization. However, there also was the articulation of Central-European identity which situated Ukraine among Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland. In the anti-NATO discourse, Ukraine was constituted as the one that belonged to a Slavic ethnicity, as the one becoming a platform against Russia and the Slavic world, and as attacked by the West and the U.S. as its leader.

In period 2, there was articulation of the civilisational narrative in pro-NATO discourse where Ukraine was constructed as both the East and the West. In anti-NATO discourse, Ukraine was articulated as a tool against Slavs and the Orthodox in the Balkans. In period 3, in the pro-NATO discourse, the ruling political elites were presenting the “civilisational choice” of Ukraine as a choice between Europe and Asia. Besides, “civilisation” acquired the meanings of development, implying its fundamental opposition to “uncivilised” and “barbarian”. Therefore, in pro-NATO discourse, the Ukrainian choice of neutrality was constructed as going back to uncivilised Asia. Conversely, in the anti-NATO discourse, the European choice included the normalisation of relations with Russia. Supporters of the anti-NATO policy constructed Ukraine as “a bridge between the East and the West”, and as a regional leader in Eastern Europe. However, there was also a continuing construction of Ukraine as an object of manipulation and a tool against the “Slavic unity” and civilisation in the anti-NATO discourse.

In period 4, the pro-NATO discourse, which started to dominate the political debates on NATO, Euro-Atlantic integration was re-constructed as a choice of civilization. Ukraine became a “fort of European civilisation” in Eastern Europe, a

“civilised” European country that was opposed to “Ural”, which lay beyond the boundaries of contemporary European civilization. The civilisational European choice was discursively intertwined with the representation of people’s choice, which was also connected with an amendment of the Ukrainian Constitution. In this way, Ukraine was constituted in discourse as an integral part of Western civilisation in which the Euro-Atlantic integration was not simply a change of the Constitution, but a “change of nation’s mentality”. According to the speakers, the Ukrainian cultural space was meant to serve as a protection against the “Russian world” better than any nuclear weapons. The Western region of Ukraine was presented as an exemplary region of Ukrainian culture. Therefore, national identity representations highlighted the importance of ethnic and cultural components.

The representation of Ukraine as a *Peacekeeper* is one of the continuous representations from 1997 to 2013 (table 25). The Ukrainian identity of a peacekeeper was two dimensional: Ukraine sent troops to both NATO and the UN peacekeeping forces. Even though the representation of Ukraine as a peacekeeper was an uncontested representation among the ruling political elites, there was a contestation of some meanings of Ukraine as a peacekeeping nation between pro-NATO and anti-NATO basic discourses.

Table 25. Representation of Ukraine as a peacekeeper from 1997 to 2018.

	Period 1	Period 2	Period 3	Period 4
Pro-NATO	Peacekeeper	NATO peacekeeping	Peacekeeper	N/A
Anti-NATO	(against) NATO peacekeeping Peacemaker in UN	Peacekeeper	Peacekeeper	N/A
In-between	N/A	Peacekeeper	Peacekeeper	N/A

In period 1, the representation of Ukraine as a peacekeeper contributed to the construction of Ukraine as a part of the international community and a country that contributed to world peace. In the pro-NATO discourse, it was emphasised that Ukraine was acting along with the Polish peacekeepers. However, in the anti-NATO discourse, peacekeeping under the auspices of NATO was contested. According to

the speakers, Ukrainian peacekeepers did what NATO wanted them to do. Besides, the NATO peacekeeping operations bore financial costs for Ukraine, while peacekeeping in the UN forces brought financial benefits. Through peacekeeping within NATO structures, Ukraine contributed to NATO actions, which were assessed negatively in anti-NATO discourse.

In period 2, in the pro-NATO discourse, Ukraine was constructed as a contributor to security in Afghanistan and Kosovo, which made Ukraine an important actor in European security. As the speakers posited, Ukraine took part in “... *common European and regional systems of collective defence*.”⁶⁸⁶ In the anti-NATO discourse, this representation was contested due to Ukraine’s participation in NATO peacekeeping operations. Rather, Ukraine was seen as defending foreign interests and being dragged into military conflicts abroad. In the In-Between discourse, the political actors argued for a rejection of this instrumental use of Ukraine in international organisations: “[Ukraine has to] ... *refuse to consumerist attitude to Ukraine’s participation in international organisations*.”⁶⁸⁷

In period 3, the representation of Ukraine as a peacekeeper became one of the main representations with contested meanings across all basic discourses. In the pro-NATO discourse, Ukraine was constructed as an important player in the international arena, and as one of the most active contributors to the peacekeeping forces in various international organisations. However, it was argued that the peacekeeping was bringing financial benefits neither to the peacekeeping forces nor to the Ukrainian budget.

In anti-NATO discourse in period 3, representation of Ukraine as a peacekeeper at the international level was expanded by articulation of Ukraine as equal partner to other countries, which contributed to its image of a peacekeeping state. Moreover, the speakers argued that it set an example for other countries. While

⁶⁸⁶ In Ukr.: “...в загальноєвропейській та регіональних системах колективної безпеки.” Transcript of the 15th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 09 April 2008, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/388.html>.

⁶⁸⁷ In Ukr.: “...відмовитися від споживацького ставлення до участі України в міжнародних організаціях.” Transcript of the 13th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 08 April 2008, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <http://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/385.html>.

being a neutral country, peacekeeping provided Ukraine with the necessary experience of military training. Besides the speakers contended that it was bringing economic benefits to the Ukrainian army while serving the purpose of supporting foreign policy priorities, as well as protecting national interests abroad:

*we demonstrate, that we are an independent state, that participates in peacekeeping operations and that we are that state, that takes part taking into account its national interests, not at someone's behest*⁶⁸⁸

In addition, Ukraine was constructed as a country devoted to universal human values supporting people in harsh life-threatening situations. In anti-NATO discourse, even NATO peacekeeping activities were considered a positive contribution of Ukraine during this period.

In period 3, In-Between discourse also elaborated the representation of Ukraine as a peacekeeper. According to the speakers, participation in the UN peacekeeping forces was particularly beneficial for Ukraine as it brought both financial gains and professional training to the Ukrainian army. However, while the UN provided the money to the budget and economy of the country, participation in the missions of the European Union and NATO was presented as a financial burden for Ukraine. Moreover, the actors considered that national and economic interests abroad were not sufficiently defended in the hotspots of peacekeeping operations and Ukraine had lost its leadership in peacekeeping. Therefore, the speakers, who articulated In-Between discourse, demonstrated the most critical attitude towards the peacekeeping operations under the auspices of NATO in this period.

Discursive articulation of Ukraine as a peacekeeper stopped after 2014. However, the discontinuation of the representation was not connected to the Ukraine's lack of participation in peacekeeping operations. According to the UN data⁶⁸⁹, Ukraine was still an active participant of the UN peacekeeping missions.

⁶⁸⁸ In Rus.: "...мы показываем, что мы государство независимое, которое участвует в миротворческих операциях и то государство, которое принимает участие с учетом своих национальных интересов, не по указке кого-то." Transcript of the 40th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the seventh convocation 24 May 2012, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1282.html>.

⁶⁸⁹ UN Peacekeeping: Troop and Police Contributors, accessed February 04, 2022, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>.

From 2000 to 2004, Ukraine's peacekeeping contingent ranged between 1061 to 1536 people. In 2002, Ukraine was ranked as the #9 contributor to the UN peacekeeping. Since 2007, Ukrainian personnel working in the UN peacekeeping mission ranged between 306 to 760 people. Even though Ukraine did reduce the number of peacekeeping forces compared to the first period, the articulation of peacekeeping identity in discourse did not reflect the actual change at the level of involvement into peacekeeping missions.

Explanation of why Ukraine was not treated as a peacekeeper in discussion on Euro-Atlantic integration may lie in its incompatibility with other representations articulated in period 4. First, the armed conflict in the Donbass contributed to the representation of Ukraine as a possible place for the UN peacekeeping mission. In pro-NATO discourse, peacekeeping operations were mentioned as one of the possible ways to settle the conflict. There was also a mention of Ukraine's experience in peacekeeping missions. Second, representation of Ukraine as a peacekeeper was at odds with the representation of Ukraine as a victim of aggression that was asking international society for help. In this way, discursive articulation of peacekeeping contradicted the articulation of external aggression and a country in need. Therefore, it was discontinued in the discussion of Euro-Atlantic integration, despite the fact the Ukraine remained one of the key participants in peacekeeping missions.

Change of the representations of Self in basic discourses. The most important pattern of identity change was observed through identification of reliance of identity articulation on a perception of the adopted foreign policy by the ruling political elites. When the actors who contributed to competing discourses argued for diametrically opposed policy directions, the representations of national identity in basic discourses were mostly constructed as positive representations when foreign policy direction adopted by the government met the group's expectations. In case when the adopted or discussed foreign policy did not meet the expectations, the representations of national identity were constructed through negative representations of Self.

In period 1, the official “multi-vector” foreign policy changed to Euro-Atlantic integration by 2003. While this period encompassed the speeches during both multi-vector and more Euro-Atlantic oriented policies, the representations of Ukraine articulated in this period were mixed within the pro-NATO discourse. The negative representations were linked to Ukraine that was presented as following Russia and as being a part of the Russian sphere of influence. The status of neutrality was blamed for the deplorable state of the Ukrainian army and nuclear disarmament. At the same time, more favourable representations of Ukraine were articulated in connection with a policy of Euro-Atlantic cooperation and integration, whereas a multi-vector policy was presented as oriented towards Russia. In pro-NATO discourse, Euro-Atlantic integration and cooperation were constructed as a part of the Ukrainian national interest, independence and participation in the international arena. Meanwhile, in anti-NATO discourse, representations of Ukraine in regard to cooperation and integration into NATO were negative. Ukraine was constructed as serving foreign interests, losing its independence, being used as a tool against Russia, being corrupt, backward and defenceless, etc.: “... *we mistakenly create the legislative framework with the goal to introduce a military regime and NATO troops.*”⁶⁹⁰ The same pattern of negative representation can be observed in In-Between basic discourse.

In period 2, Euro-Atlantic integration was the main issue in foreign policy that was promoted by the executive power after the events of the Orange Revolution during the presidential elections in 2003-2004. The representations of Ukraine were negative in the In-Between and anti-NATO discourses, but positive in pro-NATO discourse. The positive representations of Ukraine in anti-NATO discourse were constructed in regard to the neutral status, which was the preferable foreign policy direction of this group of political elites.

⁶⁹⁰ In Rus.: “...мы ошибочно создаем законодательную базу с целью, чтобы у нас был введен военный режим и были введены войска НАТО.” Transcript of the 33rd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 05 November 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2352.html>.

In period 3, the pattern of national identity representations was preserved. The negative representations were constructed in pro-NATO discourse (table 26), and mostly positive representations could be found in anti-NATO and In-Between discourses.

Table 26. Representations of Ukrainian identity in pro-NATO basic discourse in 2010-2013.

Representations: Cooperation with NATO		Representations: Euro-Atlantic integration	
Cooperation	as military training as peacekeeping in NATO Deepening C Defence depends on Need for wider C	Euro-Atlantic integration	Renewal of as continuity as the only option as European choice
Ukraine	needs NATO to defend its citizens Worsened relationships with NATO Need new laws allow dialogue with NATO As European system of security		
Representations: International dimension		Representations: National dimension	
Effects of neutrality (negative)	is not able to sustain defence costs Turn to Russia Limits international participation Isolates Ukraine European choice is dismantled Endangers Ukraine Damages international image and agency	Effects of neutrality (negative)	Divisive for Ukrainian society
Change of foreign policy	Weakness of foreign policy Threat to national security Getting closer relations with Russia Document on neutrality is superficial Balanced approach in military exercise Anti-NATO foreign and domestic policy	Neutrality / non-aligned(negative)	Contradictory - military bases is harmful is outdated Non-aligned is not a legal term has to end military base in Crimea Sevastopol base is unconstitutional Ukraine is de facto non-aligned Indecisiveness of civilisational choice

Cooperation	as international actor as UN member	Ukrainian society	does not agree with coalition
Ukraine	as a peacekeeper does not protect its peacekeepers Peacekeeping as international image No financial benefits from peacekeeping in the UN	Ukraine	Undemocratic Undecisive / civilisational choice not successful loses opportunities looking up to Russia has to defend its citizens is located between Atlantic and Pacific has identity not successful
Ukrainians (victim)	are victims of Russian border control sailors in international fleet as a victim of pirates		
Ukraine (colonial)	is dependent was occupied by Russia will be a colony and satellite state		

In period 4, the political forces that supported the policy of NATO accession dominated the discussion. After 2014, Ukraine objectively had to face multiple challenges starting from territorial losses, armed conflict, economic, political, and social losses. These events constituted a turning point in the regional context and Euro-Atlantic security⁶⁹¹. Despite the dramatic events that took place in Lugansk and Donetsk regions after the Ukrainian government started ATO, the representation of Ukrainian identity in pro-NATO discourse was constructed as mostly positive, with a few exceptions. The ruling political elites started to construct Ukraine as a special partner of NATO, a security provider in Europe, who was to become a future NATO member: “*Ukraine goes into NATO and the EU, nothing else is discussed.*”⁶⁹² In addition, Ukraine was articulated as a progressive country that had started ambitious reforms, became stronger, renovated the army, was committed to democracy and the rule of law. Some negative representations were articulated in regard to the lost opportunities with NATO in previous years.

⁶⁹¹ Panagiota Manoli, “Global and Regional Repercussions of the Ukrainian Crisis: An Introduction,” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 15, no. 2 (2015): 121–27.

⁶⁹² In Ukr.: “...Україна їде в НАТО і ЄС, інше не обговорюється.” Transcript of the 41st session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 02 December 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2360.html>.

In period 4, in anti-NATO discourse, Ukraine was constructed as a country that lost sovereignty, because exercising full sovereignty was possible only under the condition of neutrality (non-alignment): “*Our country has to be strong and non-aligned.*”⁶⁹³ In the In-Between discourse both negative and positive representations were found (table 27). As the actors accepted a possibility of Euro-Atlantic integration in the future, Ukraine was articulated as a part of the civilised and European world. However, the decision on NATO accession had to be taken at the national referendum. Therefore, more negative representations of Ukraine were found in the In-Between discourse. In-Between discourse had been singled out because of priority given to domestic politics over foreign policy, and the representations of Ukraine in period 4 highlighted this assumption. In the In-Between discourse, economic issues and domestic reforms were articulated as more important than the policy of Euro-Atlantic integration. According to the politicians, Ukraine needed to build a stronger economy, as it was weak and had to protect its national interests. There was a continuing emphasis on the Ukraine’s inferiority in regard to NATO’s criteria, which was emphasised by the articulations of divisiveness of the NATO accession issue in Ukrainian society. The actors emphasised a lack of governmental efficiency and consensus on the issue, giving priority to NATO being treated as a politically-motivated decision: “*You do not move to Europe like that.*”⁶⁹⁴ This negative construction of the Self demonstrates that In-Between discourse did not disappear from the political debates after 2014.

Table 27. Representations of Ukrainian identity in the In-Between basic discourse in 2016-2018.

Representations: Cooperation with NATO		Representations: Euro-Atlantic integration	
Cooperation	is limited	Euro-Atlantic integration	(no) NATO membership long-term Divisive for society without referendum Matter of crisis as obsession Part of political campaign

⁶⁹³ In Ukr.: “Наша країна повинна бути сильною, позаблоковою.” Transcript of the 35th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 22 November 2018, 16:00 pm, accessed February 11, 2019, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6960.html>.

⁶⁹⁴ In Ukr.: “Так не йдуть в Європу.” Transcript Session 36, Verhovna Rada of Ukraine, the 23th of November, 2018, 10 am. Presided by the Head of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine Parubiy A.V. Accessed <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6962.html>.

			Political declaration has no practical value
		Ukraine (a future NATO member)	Membership or participation in NATO Constitutional change as unnecessary does not meet NATO standards as NATO Ally
Representations: International dimension		Representations:	National dimension
Ukraine	as neutral deserves more support gave up nuclear weapons need relationships with other countries to become stronger should be a part of the civilised world	Ukraine	Economic issues are more important for the country Issue of land is more important should be strong, defend people's rights Culture, language, church, army - independence of Ukraine Divisive politics Need of strong economy Need to protect itself / National interest as problem solver as weak need to focus on internal problems need to be realistic parliament is not as good as European Need to think about interests of Ukrainians Not interested to ordinary people
		Decision-making	at referendum

Changing, but lasting and shared representations across discourses from 1997 to 2018. There are several shared and continuing representations of Ukraine that need to be analysed as a part of identity change and continuity: a representation of Ukraine as a *Victim*, as an *Occupied/Colonised* country and representation of the *Ukrainian people and society*.

Representations of Ukraine as a *Victim* were found in both pro- and anti-NATO discourses (table 28). Throughout time, Ukraine has been articulated as a victim in various contexts. In pro-NATO discourse, Ukraine was a victim of history: it was deprived of its independence multiple times, suffered from misinformation

and lost millions of lives in the political processes of the last century (period 2). In anti-NATO discourse, Ukraine was articulated as a victim of the economic crisis and U.S. and NATO interests: “*More and more Ukraine is being sacrificed to the interests of the United States of America and NATO.*”⁶⁹⁵ By 2018, this representation of the Self as a victim continued within pro-NATO discourse as Ukraine being a victim of military aggression. Therefore, the representation of a victim was shared by basic discourses, however, they constructed a different victimiser. The representation of Ukraine as a Victim was a continuous representation, which became particularly salient in period 4.

Table 28. Representation of Ukraine as a victim in basic discourses from 1997 to 2018.

	Period 1	Period 2	Period 3	Period 4
Pro-NATO	N/A	Victim of historical events	Victim of pirates, Russian border control	Victim of Russia
Anti-NATO	Victim of conflict	Victim of IO, U.S., NATO politics	Victim of internal divisive politics	N/A
In-between	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

In the academic literature, occupation and colonisation are treated as distinct historical phenomena. However, in basic discourses on Euro-Atlantic integration, occupation and colonisation are constructed as almost equal and interchangeable processes (table 29). The representation of Ukraine as *Occupied or Colonised* is a continuing in time representation. However, the occupier has been contested in the competing discourses, as it changes depending on the discourse and the period under study.

In period 1, Ukraine was constructed as occupied in pro-NATO discourse because Russia had a military base in Crimea. Therefore, Ukraine was articulated as a big “colony” of the Soviet empire. Both the Russian empire and the Soviet Union were constructed as occupiers of Ukraine. At the same time, these representations were contested in the anti-NATO discourse that referred to occupation in the context

⁶⁹⁵ In Rus.: “Україна все більше приноситься в жертву інтересів Соединенных Штатов Америки и НАТО.” Transcript of the 65th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the forth convocation 13 January 2006, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2017.html>.

of the Second World War. Ukraine was also constructed as a colony, similar to the Asian, African and Latin American colonies, that were used as a source of natural resources. In anti-NATO discourse, Euro-Atlantic integration was equalled to the policy of colonisation in which Ukraine becomes a colony of the West: “...*in foreign policy course does not even hint at Ukraine’s policy as a sovereign and independent state.*”⁶⁹⁶

Table 29. Representation of Ukraine as a colonized/occupied country: the construction of a coloniser/occupant in basic discourses from 1997 to 2018.

	Period 1	Period 2	Period 3	Period 4
Pro-NATO	Soviet Union/Russia	N/A	Russia	Russia (post-colonial)
Anti-NATO	The West	The U.S.	N/A	N/A
In-Between	N/A	Dependent/ Needs a master	N/A	N/A

In period 2, Ukraine was constructed as occupied by the U.S. in the anti-NATO discourse. The speakers articulated Ukraine as a defender of American and pro-NATO interests and depicted it as an American protectorate. President Yushchenko and the governing coalition were articulated as supported by the U.S.: “*Yushchenko ran to the White House for support.*”⁶⁹⁷ The political actors discursively constituted Ukraine as a defenceless state caught in the middle of geostrategic interests, particularly, American, which could make it an “American, pro-Western colony” and “neo-colony of NATO”. In period 2, In-Between basic discourse was implicitly aligned with the occupation discourse. Ukraine was articulated as incapable of functioning without a “master”, incapable of taking responsibility, and acting independently.

In period 3, in pro-NATO discourse, Russia was constructed as an occupier. Ukraine was presented as a country that economically depended on the Russian Federation, which tried to turn Ukraine into a colony and a satellite: “*In this way,*

⁶⁹⁶ In Rus.: “... во внешнеполитическом курсе нет даже намека на политику Украины как суверенного, независимого государства.” Transcript of the 26th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 26 March 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2256.html>.

⁶⁹⁷ In Rus.: “*Ющенко побежал в Белый Дом за поддержкой.*” Transcript Session 17, Verhovna Rada of Ukraine, the 30th of September 2008, 10 am, Presided by the Head of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine Yatseniuk A.P. Accessed <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/557.html>.

they are trying to turn the country in the colony and a satellite of the neighbouring state.”⁶⁹⁸ In period 4, Ukraine was constructed as a (post-) colonial country. Euro-Atlantic integration was perceived as a way to leave the “sphere of Russian influence”, the “imperial orbit of the Kremlin”, and a way to decolonise Ukraine. Supporters of NATO accession constructed Russia as an empire in opposition to the West.

Therefore, the representations of Ukraine as a colonized, occupied and dependent Self were articulated in all discourses at different points in time. Colonisation, occupation and liberation from the “imperial past” were used as a legitimisation of Euro-Atlantic policies or as an argument against it. The agent of colonisation was changing depending on the basic discourse. In anti-NATO discourse, the coloniser was the United States, while in pro-NATO discourse, it was Russia. However, there was no distinction between a colonisation and occupation in political speeches.

Representation of the *Ukrainian people and Ukrainian society* were continuous representations in basic discourses and were intertwined with representations of *Decision-making* on Euro-Atlantic integration.

In period 1, pro-NATO discourse constructed the Ukrainian society as the one that supported long-term relations with NATO and had a favourable view of NATO as a defence organisation. On the opposite, the political actors who contributed to anti-NATO discourse, contested this representation, referring to the Ukrainian people as being cheated, because the people were against NATO enlargement to the East. The contestation of what the Ukrainian people wanted and what policy they supported remained the issue in the first period. The numbers and statistics played a special role in articulation of the popular support or disagreement of Euro-Atlantic policies. Political opponents provided the statistical data that suited their argumentation, emphasising the unity and overwhelming majority that support either neutrality or Euro-Atlantic integration. The transformation in the representation of

⁶⁹⁸ In Ukr.: “Цим самим країну намагаються перетворити у колонію і сателіта сусідньої держави.” Transcript of the 50th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the sixth convocation 03 June 2010, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/938.html>.

Ukrainian society was observed in period 4, when the pro-NATO discourse articulated the national consensus on Euro-Atlantic integration. Little was left from representations of internal divisions on the issue observed in other periods of comparison. By 2018, “*the majority of Ukrainian society*⁶⁹⁹”, “*over 60 percent*”,⁷⁰⁰ and “*70 percent of the population*⁷⁰¹” supported NATO membership, as it was argued by NATO supporters. In other words, the ruling political elites argued that this just confirmed the aspirations of the nation by voting for Euro-Atlantic laws on accession. Even though In-Between discourse articulated the decision-making as a matter to be decided at the national referendum, there were no representations of the Ukrainian people and society that would be articulated as opposed to Euro-Atlantic integration.

Representations of Ukraine articulated in basic discourses are strategically utilised by the ruling political elites in support of the foreign policies they promote. Some representations reflect historical and political contexts, while others gain salience due to their appropriateness in a debate on foreign policy direction. Contestation of identity representations is possible with a different degree of disagreement on their meanings.

4.3 Patterns in construction of Others in basic discourses on Euro-Atlantic integration

Pro-NATO, anti-NATO and In-Between basic discourses encompassed a series of opposing Others, constructing different degrees of Otherness which ranged from a construction of a radically different Other or an amicable Other. The Self-Other constellations within the basic discourses are telling. Russia has been constructed as an enemy in pro-NATO discourse and constituted as an aggressor and a threat to the territorial integrity of Ukraine, whereas it has been articulated as a friendly Other in anti-NATO articulations. The same pattern is observed in the representations of the

⁶⁹⁹ Transcript Session 10, Verhovna Rada of Ukraine, the 20th of September, 2018, 10 am. Presided by the Head of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine Parubiy A.V. Accessed <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6900.html>

⁷⁰⁰ Transcript Session 35, Verhovna Rada of Ukraine, the 22nd of 2018, 4 pm, Presided by the Head of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine Parubiy A.V. Accessed <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6960.html>

⁷⁰¹ Ibid.

United States and NATO – while they are constructed as positive Others in pro-NATO discourse, representations in anti-NATO discourse are associated with threat, danger and animosity. In this section, the discussion on NATO accession is mostly structured only around constitutive Others in the basic discourses: NATO, Russia, and the U.S. However, the change in representations of non-constitutive Others is outlined in general terms where they contribute to delineation of boundaries between “us” and “them”. Appendix 6 provides all representations of Others identified through empirical research, categorised as external and internal.

It is worth mentioning that in the first period from 1997 to 2003, NATO was not constructed as an important Other in the pro-NATO discourse (see table 30). Instead, NATO was represented in discourse implicitly through a reference to the NATO-member countries. Particularly, the new members of the Alliance: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, that were constituted as Slavic neighbours, and the Baltic countries, that were constructed as part of the civilised West. Therefore, there was a positive representation of NATO members, which allowed to imply a positive representation of NATO as a part of “our” group in pro-NATO discourse.

Table 30. Salient representations of NATO from 1997 to 2018 in basic discourses.

	Period 1	Period 2	Period 3	Period 4
Pro-NATO	N/A	Guarantor of security Wise Democratic	Guarantor	Supports reforms in Ukraine Solidary with Ukraine Collective security system Ensures security and peace Military ally Wealthy
Anti-NATO	Aggressive Criminal Creates insecurity Subjugates Ukrainian policy Violates international law	Aggressor Propagandist American instrument of influence Threat	Aggressive Platform for bilateral meetings	Ideology Does not accept Anti-European

	Coloniser/occupant Anti-Slavic Threat			
In-Between	Peace-making force Enlarging Aggressive European	N/A	Divisive Not profitable peacekeeping Drug traffickers	Strategic partner

Representations of NATO in anti-NATO discourse in period 1 contrast with the absence of explicit NATO representations in pro-NATO discourse. In anti-NATO discourse, NATO is the main constitutive Other in period 1. The most salient representations constructed NATO as an aggressive bloc, a criminal that violated the international law, and an anti-Slavic coloniser/occupant that was a source of national, regional, and global insecurity. The aggressiveness of NATO was constructed mainly in the context of the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia and Iraq in the 1990s-2000s and in the context of military exercises with Ukraine conducted in Crimea: “*In reality, NATO is destroying Slavic Orthodox civilisation, including our historical memory.*”⁷⁰² References to historical events are also used to support the claim that NATO is *naturally* aggressive. Particularly, NATO is blamed for “200 aggressive wars” from the 1950s to 1970s that caused millions of deaths and the war in Vietnam. It is worth noting the historical inaccuracy of such statements, as the war in Vietnam was not a NATO operation. Therefore, through discursive articulations in anti-NATO discourse, NATO was constituted as the embodiment of American power and, in this way, this articulation denies difference between the U.S. and NATO. The actors of anti-NATO discourse often referred to NATO and the U.S. as a source of evil. NATO was constructed as a historically anti-Russian and anti-Slavic organisation, which was a threat to the historical memory of the “Slavic Orthodox civilisation”. The military Ukraine-NATO training was constructed as a process of colonisation and territorial appropriation expressed as “boots of NATO” that tramped the Ukrainian land. In this way, NATO was

⁷⁰² In Ukr.: “НАТО фактично нищить слов'янську православну цивілізацію, у тому числі нашу історичну пам'ять...” Transcript of the 26th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 26 March 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2256.html>.

metaphorically representing an enemy soldier that came to conquer Ukraine. In addition, the speakers expressed fears of U.S. and NATO hegemony through articulation of the radical Otherness of NATO that was constituted as barbarous and satanic, that carried a legacy of fascism.

In contrast with the representations found in anti-NATO discourse, in the In-Between discourse, NATO was not constructed as American, but a European structure. The representations of NATO had both negative and positive assessment of its actions, referring to NATO as an aggressive bloc at some point in time and as a peace-making force in another.

In period 2 from 2006 to 2009, when the Ukrainian government first publicly proclaimed aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration, representations of NATO appeared in the pro-NATO discourse as positive Other. However, NATO was not as important as the negative representations of Russia in that period. NATO was articulated as the guarantor of security in the Euro-Atlantic area, as a peacemaker in the Georgian conflict, as a defence bloc, and a space of wellbeing and democracy. On the opposite, in anti-NATO discourse, NATO was constructed as an aggressor and an instrument of American influence in Ukraine. In period 2, the ruling elites discursively constructed NATO as a military and police force that was trying to establish control over natural resources of the world. The politicians claimed that NATO promoted militarisation and was supportive of nationalism in both Ukraine and Georgia. Besides, NATO was constructed as an aggressor and an instrument of American influence. Moreover, the U.S. and NATO were articulated as presenting a threat to European security: “...the United States and NATO destroyed the after-war agreements on peace and security in Europe encoded in Helsinki.”⁷⁰³ There were other negative representations that contributed to the articulation of NATO membership as a threat.

With the implementation of a policy of neutrality in period 3, the articulation of Otherness transformed in basic discourses. In pro-NATO discourse, the

⁷⁰³In Ukr.: “Сполученні Штати і НАТО знищили післявоєнні угоди, закріпленні у Гельсінкі про мир та безпеку в Європі.” Transcript, Verhovna Rada, 2008b. Session one, 02 September 2008, accessed October 26, 2020, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/541.html>.

representations of the U.S. almost disappeared, while Russia, NATO and several NATO countries continued to be articulated in discussions about the Ukraine-NATO cooperation. In pro-NATO discourse, NATO started being associated with the European security space that guaranteed the national security of Ukraine: “*On Euro-Atlantic space there is one system of collective security – that is NATO.*”⁷⁰⁴ In anti-NATO discourse, the articulation of the main Others, the U.S., NATO and Russia, continued. However, in the period of neutrality, the importance of NATO diminished, while the U.S. and Russia remained important constitutive Others for the political elites who opposed the policy of Euro-Atlantic integration in this period. In the In-Between discourse, NATO was constituted through a disapproval of NATO’s peacekeeping operations which did not bring money to the budget. The political leaders claimed that the politics of NATO integration was divisive for the country.

After the transformation of the political and security contexts in Ukraine in 2014, the articulation of NATO in the pro-NATO discourse underwent considerable modifications. First and foremost, NATO started being associated with domestic reforms in Ukraine. Since 2014, NATO has provided financial support and consultations to Ukraine. This fact was mirrored in the articulation of NATO representations in the speeches of the ruling political elites. Articulation of representations of NATO constituted NATO as a positive Other in period 4 where the Alliance was constituted as a powerful global entity that ensured peace and security. The biggest transformation in articulation of NATO was observed in representations that constructed NATO as a community with the European Union, which made it a part of civilization with values and an “instrument against despotism”. In pro-NATO discourse, NATO was articulated as an institution with its own philosophy based on human rights values, and defence of people’s freedoms and democracy: “*...to protect liberty, common heritage and civilization of its peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, freedom, individuality and law.*”

⁷⁰⁴ In Ukr.: “На євроатлантичному просторі є одна система колективної безпеки – це НАТО.” Transcript of the 50th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the sixth convocation 03 June 2010, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/938.html>.

This is the basic philosophy of NATO bloc.”⁷⁰⁵ It was presented as the most efficient system of collective European security in which not a single country had suffered from aggression.

Another change was that the Euro-Atlantic area evolved into “Other” and gained salience in pro-NATO discourse after 2014. According to the ruling elites’ speeches, the NATO members were the “sworn brothers” and partners of Ukraine, that at the time was constituted as an inseparable part of this Alliance. In anti-NATO discourse, NATO was constructed as an ideological union that had no plans to accept Ukraine. On the contrary, in the In-Between discourse, articulation of NATO changed into a representation of NATO as a strategic partner. As such, NATO members were mentioned in their exemplary role of reaching a consensus on NATO issues in society that was settled in referendums on Euro-Atlantic integration.

Throughout all the periods under study, there was not much change in the way Russia was being constructed in pro-NATO discourse. In contrast to positive NATO representations, Russia was depicted as authoritarian and threatening. In the first period, the most salient representation of Russia was as the country that was moving towards NATO membership: “*NATO is not against Russia, but Russia is with NATO.*”⁷⁰⁶ However, it was also portrayed as aggressive, (post)imperial, anti-Ukrainian, and as a military power that was threatening the territorial integrity of Ukraine in Crimea. The construction of Russia as an aggressor was one of the continuing representations throughout the entire time framework under study.

Table 31. Salient representations of Russia from 1997 to 2018 in basic discourses.

	Period 1	Period 2	Period 3	Period 4
Pro-NATO	Aggressor Anti-Ukrainian (post) imperial Part of NATO Military power	Aggressor Anti-Ukrainian Guarantor of Ukraine’s independence	Imperial Seeks NATO membership Danger	Aggressive Empire Authoritarian Occupant Destabiliser

⁷⁰⁵ In Ukr.: “...захистити свободу, загальну спадщину і цивілізацію своїх народів, засновані на принципах демократії, свободи, особи і законності. Це основна філософія блоку НАТО.” Transcript of the 51st session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 08 June 2017, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6535.html>.

⁷⁰⁶ In Ukr.: “НАТО не проти Росії, а Росія з НАТО.” Transcript of the 100th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the second convocation 12 June 1997, 4 pm, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/4139.html>.

	Takes over Crimea	Influences NATO Violates international laws Threat to sovereignty and territorial integrity		Threat Violates international laws Under sanctions Caused loss of life
Anti-NATO	Not example to follow Neighbour Brotherly nation Causes problems	Strategic partner Has common historical roots	Main strategic partner Renewed cooperation Common interest As need for Ukraine's economy	N/A
In-Between	N/A	N/A	Strategic partner	Intervened in Crimea

In period 2, in pro-NATO discourse, the political elites continued to construct Russia as an aggressive imperial state with ambitions for expansion. The speakers argued that Russia violated international law and many UN resolutions. Russia was blamed for the anti-Ukrainian posture and misrecognition of Ukrainian statehood. Relations between Ukraine and Russia were assessed as detrimental, as there was continuous pressure on economic relations and propaganda attacks. According to the political actors, Russia meddled in Ukraine's internal affairs, trying to alter policies in historical memory and to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO:

“to renounce our own history, to deny to honour the victims of Holodomor and [deny to] restore historical justice in regards of the UPA heroes [Ukrainian Insurgent Army].”⁷⁰⁷

Therefore, Russia was constructed as a source of insecurity for Ukraine. It was depicted as a state that could harm Ukraine's national interests, misrecognised Ukrainian sovereignty, consequently, it presented as an existential threat to Ukrainian independence. When Ukraine announced a policy of neutrality in 2010,

⁷⁰⁷ In Ukr.: “...зречтись власної історії, відмовитись від вшанування жертв голодомору та відновити відновлення історичної справедливості щодо героїв УПА.” Transcript of the 19th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 15 April 2008, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/392.html>.

Russia was still constructed as threatening to Ukraine, as an empire, and as a country that benefited from cooperation with NATO.

In period 4, the ruling political elites that supported the course of NATO accession constituted Russia as a radically different Other. The most salient representations were those that articulated Russia as an aggressive Asian state, and a threat to the region and the world, particularly to the EU and NATO. Russia was even blamed for the migration crisis in Europe because of its involvement in the military campaign in Syria. A number of representations underlined the Russian influence on the domestic affairs of Ukraine. Among these there were a status of the Russian language that was constructed as an intent to annex the Ukrainian territories. In addition, Russia was hold responsible for controlling the militias in the East of Ukraine and the media space in Ukraine. According to the speakers, Russia was the enemy of the state and Ukrainian people, a country that killed thousands of civilians in the Eastern Ukraine and previously in Georgia. It was the Kremlin's actions blamed for numerous deaths during the events in 2013-2014 in Ukraine. Furthermore, Russia was constructed as a part of the conflict in Ukraine, and as responsible for implementation of the Minks agreements that defined a special status of the Donbass region. Moreover, Russia was argued to be not willing to end the war in Eastern Ukraine. It was also blamed for using other instruments against Ukraine, such as control and blackmailing over the gas and electricity networks, and control over economic Ukraine's development, etc. The speakers in the pro-NATO discourse constructed Russia as an empire and an occupier of Crimea and Donbass. According to the supporters of NATO accession, the imperial ambitions of Russia kept Ukraine in poverty and dependence in many respects, including culture. Ukraine was articulated as an indispensable part of the empire. Besides, it was argued that Russian despotism threatened the Ukrainian people and their values. Russia was *"a life-long enemy and tyrant, who has been destroying the Ukrainian people, Ukrainian values."*⁷⁰⁸ What differed in representations of Russia was that its

⁷⁰⁸ In Ukr.: "... віковичним ворогом-деспотом, який сотні років знищує українську людину, українські цінності." Transcript of the 51st session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 08 June 2017, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6535.html>.

behaviour was assessed as erratic, irrational, obsessive, maniacal, and without legitimate power even within its borders. Analysis of representations of Russia lead to a conclusion that in pro-NATO discourse Russia was constituted as a powerful agent in Ukrainian affairs and, therefore, these representations contributed to the construction of Ukraine as lacking agency in these events, which also assumes lack of responsibility for their consequences.

In anti-NATO discourse, on the other hand, Russia was attributed the qualities of a “brotherly” nation and the main strategic partner. Russia was articulated as “not a threat”, but as a matter of national interest. However, the representations in the anti-NATO discourse were not uniquely positive. Starting from period 1, Russia was discursively constituted as a separate and different country, which was not always an example to follow because of its cooperation with NATO. Nevertheless, the politicians pinpointed the common characteristics that could lay the ground for including Russia in “our” group. The people of Ukraine and Russia were constructed as having a shared history, having fought the same wars, which were the reasons why these people would remain united. The most positive representations of Russia in period 3 were produced when the policy of neutrality was adopted. In this period, Russia was depicted as the main strategic and equal partner. Moreover, relations with Russia were described as a way to Europe, because of the economic benefits that economic cooperation could bring. In period 4, the representations of Russia disappeared from anti-NATO discourse. Yet, it is noteworthy that there were no negative representations of Russia in anti-NATO discourse after 2014.

In the In-Between discourse, Russia was constructed as an unproblematic strategic partner. Even after 2014, the articulation of Russia did not alter to radical Otherness.

In anti-NATO and pro-NATO discourses, representations of the United States were contested (Table 32). In contrast to a lack of NATO as Other in the period 1, the United States has been a part of discourses on the issue of Euro-Atlantic policies since the very beginning of Ukraine-NATO relations.

Table 32. Salient representations of the U.S. from 1997 to 2018 in basic discourses.

	Period 1	Period 2	Period 3	Period 4
Pro-NATO	Supporter of Ukraine Guarantor of peace Democratic	Supports Ukraine Guarantor	N/A	Bilateral relations Efficient relationship Assists Ukraine Part of Budapest memorandum Strategic partner
Anti-NATO	Aggressive Empire Threat Criminal Terrorist state Controls power in Ukraine Anti-Slavic Is NATO	Aggressor Drags Ukraine into NATO Makes decisions for Ukraine May kill Ukrainians	Aggressive Strategic partner	N/A
In-between	N/A	N/A	Strategic partner	Bilateral cooperation

In pro-NATO discourse, the most salient representations constituted the U.S. as a country that supported Ukraine in international politics and as a leader of democracy in the world. In period 3, which was the period of neutrality, there were no representations of the U.S. in pro-NATO discourse. This finding may indicate that the U.S. as Other was more important for the policy of NATO accession, than for a policy of cooperation with NATO. After 2014, the representations of the U.S. reflected the intensified bilateral relations between Ukraine and the United States. The speakers discursively constructed the U.S. as a democratic country that assisted Ukraine by providing it with military equipment and guarantees stemming of the Budapest memorandum.

The United States as Other seems to be much more important for articulation of anti-NATO discourse than other discourses. The representation of the United States in anti-NATO discourse followed a similar pattern of articulation of radical otherness similar to representations of Russia in pro-NATO discourse. In period 1, in anti-NATO discourse, the United States was articulated as a country that pursued an aggressive politics and committed acts of aggression against Yugoslavia and Iraq.

In the speeches of the opponents of NATO accession, the U.S. was constituted as an imperialist and police state that was aiming to dominate and control the world: “*the chief gendarme Uncle Sam will define who violates the human rights, who will be bombed, who will be pardoned.*”⁷⁰⁹ According to politicians, the United States controlled power in Ukraine and plotted a coup d’état, as well as financed the non-governmental organisations and presented a threat to Ukraine and the world.

In period 2, in anti-NATO discourse, the United States was constructed as an aggressor, who violated international law and dragged Ukraine into NATO. A representation of the U.S. as a coloniser who bribed the Ukrainian elites completed the overall negative depiction of the U.S. in anti-NATO discourse. Nevertheless, the U.S. was recognized as a democratic country.

In period 3, in anti-NATO discourse the articulation of the United States was negative. The U.S. was constructed as an aggressive state because of its politics in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, Afghanistan and Libya. The speakers argued that the U.S. was an imperial entity that sought to colonise Syria. However, there was a recognition of the U.S. as a strategic partner who respected the neutrality of Ukraine.

Due to marginalisation of anti-NATO discourse, the articulation of the U.S. representations discontinued in period 4. In the In-Between discourse in period 4, the U.S. was articulated in positive terms as a strategic partner and a partner in bilateral cooperation.

Europe has been an important constitutive Other for the Ukrainian national identity in the post-Soviet period. However, the empirical analysis of debates on the Euro-Atlantic issue demonstrates that Europe seems to play a minor role for construction of the Ukrainian national identity in this context (table 33).

⁷⁰⁹ In Rus.: “...главный жандарм дядя Сэм будет определять, кто нарушает права человека, кого бомбить, кого миловать.” Transcript of the 34th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 07 April 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2258.html>.

Table 33. Salient representations of Europe from 1997 to 2018 in basic discourses.

	Period 1	Period 2	Period 3	Period 4
Pro-NATO	Does not recognise Ukraine	Beneficial for cooperation Forgetful	N/A	Democratic Needs Ukraine
Anti-NATO	As a guide/example Defenceless against NATO	N/A	Cooperation with EU	N/A
In-Between	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

In pro-NATO discourse in period 1, Europe was perceived as an agency that did not recognise Ukraine as a democratic partner and did not allow it to enter European markets. In period 2, Europe was constructed as forgetful of Ukraine's contribution to European development in the past. The speakers blamed Europe for the conflict between Russia and Georgia: it was Europe's permissive policies towards Russia that allowed this conflict to happen. In the period of neutrality, representations of Europe were not articulated in pro-NATO discourse. In period 4, there were no considerable changes in the articulation of representations of Europe. It was constructed as a democratic entity, yet incomplete without Ukraine.

In anti-NATO discourse, Europe was articulated as a successful community of countries, however, it was not as powerful as NATO. Europe was mentioned as the one that refused to send its troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. Another mention was attributed to the context of practical cooperation with the EU.

Representations of internal Others articulated in basic discourses provide another piece of evidence in support of the political divisions and different projects of identity constructed in these discourses. In pro-NATO discourse, the Communists and "pro-Russian" politicians in Rada opposition forces were labelled the "fifth column", anti-Ukrainian and anti-democratic hypocrites. In contrast, in anti-NATO discourse, those who promoted the idea of accession to NATO were constructed as the American fifth column and anti-patriotic nationalists. It is noteworthy that all discourses employed a very similar strategy of representation of internal Others. Patriotism and loyalty to the country were the main argument that served a legitimisation for competing foreign policies.

A general observation concerning the articulation of internal Otherness is that the internal Others are constructed in relation to external Others: they are either constituted as pro-Russian or pro-American. There is also a personalisation of foreign policy orientation in discourses: the executive power and the elected president are usually accused of wrong doings. In the last period of comparison, Eastern Ukraine appeared as a new representation of internal Others that was constructed as a territory of the Russia-backed militants.

Over time, the articulation of historical representations of Others gained importance in pro-NATO discourse. In period 1, the Others in discourse were a part of the Soviet history and the Cold War: the Warsaw Pact was presented as aggressive, and there were mentions of Stalin and Hitler. In period 4, the historical references belonged mostly to the post-Soviet period and relations between NATO and Ukraine. Yet, the Soviet Union as the historical Other was still constructed as the “empire of evil”.

In conclusion, analysis of the representation of Others in basic discourses demonstrates how the Ukrainian identity is constructed in relation to the antagonistic Others. Russia, the U.S. and NATO are constituted as radically different for Ukraine Others, that are diametrically opposed in anti- and pro-NATO discourses. In contrast, the actors who articulated In-Between discourse did not construct the identity of Ukraine in relation to radical Others. The main change was that the articulation of NATO that first appeared in anti-NATO discourse in period 1 transformed from being constituted as an aggressive and dangerous Other to a representation of a supporter of domestic reforms and a wealthy guarantor of security for Ukraine in pro-NATO discourse in period 4. Russia remained a constant constitutive Other in discourses on NATO accession, while NATO and the U.S. were not articulated in some periods. Finally, Europe was not one of the constitutive Others, as the construction of Ukrainian identity in discourses on the Euro-Atlantic issue was built around different degrees of Otherness of the United States and Russia.

4.4 Constructing national identity through articulation of security, danger and threat

Delineation of boundaries is a way to construct identity which can be done through a discursive articulation of security, danger and threat. Articulation of security representations is a nuanced way in which national identity is constructed through referents marked as danger. However, security is an elusive and abstract concept that is subject to contestation among identity entrepreneurs. In this part of the dissertation, I outline the milestones in charting the evolution of security articulation in discourses on Euro-Atlantic integration.

The first observation that derives from empirical research is that security is rarely defined in the ruling political elites' debates. It seems that the notion of security in political speeches is a matter of a commonly shared knowledge, therefore, there is no need to explain or define it explicitly. In period 1, pro-NATO discourse contained just a few mentions of security which defined it as a fundamental national interest, the essence of existence, and a broad field with many players. In period 2, articulation of security acquired a broader definition in the ruling political elites' discourses. Not only was security used in its conventional understanding as military security, but also was constructed in terms of economic, international, and ecological security. However, these definitions were more exceptions than the rule. Politicians do not usually define security in their speeches, rather they articulate it through the references to threats/dangers and mention what/who has to be protected, as well as what/who can provide security. As the data indicates, these components of articulation of security do not necessarily form a complete logical sequence in politicians' utterances. The presence of just one security component is enough to constitute the discursive articulation of security.

The second finding is that basic discourses construct a different understanding of threats in the same period of time. For instance, in pro-NATO discourse, NATO was constructed as the agency that could guarantee security, whereas, in anti-NATO discourse, NATO was constituted as a source of threat. In this way, different identity projects were constructed. In one identity project NATO was included in "in-group",

while in another it was “out-of-group” that threatened the national community. Tables 34 and 35 present a list of internal and external threats identified in pro- and anti-NATO discourses.

Table 34. Construction of security in pro-NATO basic discourse 1997-2003.

What is security?	What presents danger and threat?	What has to be protected?	Who/what can guarantee security?
		National security	Army
	New security threats: terrorism, migration		
		European continent	Relations between NATO and Russia
	Anti-NATO sentiment	Ukraine	Cooperation
	Dominant position of the U.S. and Russia	Europe	
	International conflict Russia	Ukraine	
		European security	Collective actions
	Loss of nuclear status		
		Ukraine	NATO membership
	Migrants from Asia	Ukraine	
	Buffer zone	Ukraine	
		Territorial integrity	NATO, OSCE, nuclear powers
	Civilisational choice	Ukraine as Europe	Collective security
	Division on zone of influence	Ukraine	

The principal difference between the competing basic discourses was that there was an emphasis on construction of external threats in pro-NATO discourse, while anti-NATO discourse focused on domestic threats. For national identity, it means that these discourses delineate different boundaries of national identity. While pro-NATO discourse constructed exogenous menaces such as a threat from Russia, anti-NATO discourse turned to endogenous threats: a weakness of the army, nationalistic movements, and intents to join the MAP. All these contributed to the contestation of the national identity project, due to a disagreement on a common danger against which the nation would need to unite.

Table 35. Articulation of security in pro-NATO discourse from 1997 to 2018: What/who represents a threat.

	1997-2003	2008	2010-2013	2018
Domestic threats	Loss of nuclear status Civilizational choice	Double citizenship Internal enemies Status of the	Non-nuclear status Nuclear disarmament	Security in the Eastern Ukraine Neutrality

	Anti-NATO sentiment	Black Sea Fleet Domestic political divisions	Lack of finance Pacifism of Ukraine Reduction of the military Politicians	Poverty and emigration Ukraine as exporter of goods and human resources Revision of policy
External threats	Russia Division on zone of influence Dominant position of the U.S. and Russia New security threats: terrorism, migration Buffer zone International conflict Migrants from Asia	Russia Military aggression of Russia Neighbor countries External enemy New energy transportation routs A similar to Georgia-Russia conflict Being involved into foreign conflict	Moscow empire Imperial ambitions Neighbors Romania's missile defense Nuclear weapons New threats: cyberattack, uncontrolled migration, radical religious movements, narcotrafficking Global threats	Russia Kremlin "Russian World" Return to imperial sphere Occupation Northern Flow-2 Left- and right-wing populism, Euro-skepticism, undemocratic trends in neighbor countries

The construction of Russia as a security threat in pro-NATO discourse presents evidence of identity continuity from 1997. By 2018, the representation of Russia as a threat encompassed several close security articulations: The Kremlin, the "Russian world" and a threat of return to imperial influence.

Even though this work focused on patterns of change and continuity, one should not detract from the importance of the historical context. There are some similarities between all basic discourses which reflect reconfigurations in the international environment. First of all, NATO and Ukraine formalised their relations through the Charter immediately after the process of denuclearisation of Ukraine. It was understandable why in 1997-2003 the loss of nuclear status was among the security concerns among all three groups of speakers who participated in the debates on NATO accession. In the period of neutrality from 2010 to 2013, the articulation of nuclear status reappeared in security articulation in both pro- and anti-NATO discourses: *"for peanuts was sold and surrendered our nuclear... nuclear shield of*

our Ukraine.”⁷¹⁰ It seems that in the moments when Ukraine was not particularly focused on Euro-Atlantic integration, its identity was constructed as vulnerable to external nuclear threats.

Another way in which the security representations mirrored historical events was that cooperation between Ukraine and NATO in period 1 was marked by the articulation of collective security, cooperation, and collective action as guarantees of Ukrainian security. Post-Soviet Ukraine was actively involved in the construction of its network of cooperation with many international organisations, including NATO.

Table 36. Articulation of security in anti-NATO discourse from 1997 to 2018: What/who represents a threat.

	1997-2003	2006-2009	2010-2013	2018-2018
Domestic threats	Denuclearisation Loss of nuclear weapons Lack of control over NATO cooperation Danger of military training	Yushchenko political course No threat Nationalist dictatorship Ukrainian fascism MAP Signing MAP Joining NATO Puppet government/politics Nationalists Rejection to cooperation with Russia	Weak Ukrainian army Lack of actions from the State Conflict in Crimea Parliament Lack of nuclear arms Pro-NATO coalition Lack of Ukrainian-only military drill Military exercise	N/A
External threats	Danger of war NATO NATO membership Imperial states	Joining NATO Unamicable relations with Russia and Bielorrussia International terrorism Conflict with Russia International terrorism	International terrorism, ecological and man-made events	N/A

⁷¹⁰ In Rus.: “...за копейки была продана и сдана ядерная... ядерный щит нашей Украины.” Transcript of the 15th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the seventh convocation 18 April 2013, 16:00 pm, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/4963.html>.

External insecurities of the time would also affect the security articulation in discourse. Ukraine had a number of disputes with its neighbours, including tensions with Russia over the island Tuzla in the Kerch Strait, which was considered a threat to territorial integrity. Additionally, among the contextual historical threats were Romania's missile defence system, the Georgia-Russia military conflict and the Albanian militia. Coherent and continuous security articulation contributes to identity continuity. Political actors who constructed the identity project in pro-NATO discourse secured it through an uninterrupted articulation of mostly external threats.

It is possible to analytically distribute all entities constructed as threatened into five categories: territories, state, nation/civilization, society, and international relations. The analysis of the data demonstrated that security articulation in debates on Euro-Atlantic integration evolved from a conventional understanding of security, which consisted of providing military defence of the territory to a constitution of security that rested on national culture, economy and international relations. By 2018, the range of issues that needed protection expanded from a representation of national territory to other spheres. Among them, there were the information space and informational security, the economy, independence, the Ukrainian language and the global and regional systems of security. Articulation of threats was also modified throughout the twenty-year period. Shifting away from international dangers, the threats became more localised. Even though it was more common to articulate security as coming from an external international environment, in Ukraine threats were constructed as originating domestically. For instance, a puppet government was depicted as a threat in the anti-NATO discourse in 2008.

Table 37. Articulation of security in pro-NATO discourse from 1997 to 2018: Who/what needs protection.

	1997-2003	2006-2009	2010-2013	2016-2018
Territory	Ukraine Territorial integrity European continent Europe	Ukraine National territory, integrity Island Tuzla Black Sea Fleet	Ukraine	Ukraine Eastern Ukraine

		Crimea Black Sea area		
State	Sovereignty European security	National security National interest Democracy	Sovereignty Security of Ukraine National defence Independence Guarantees of national security Ukrainian state	National security National defence Independence Information security
Nation/civilization	N/A	National values Ukraine's honour	Ukrainian language Fundamental national values: language, independent church	Ukrainian language
Society	N/A	Citizens Disunity among patriots	Ukraine's citizens	Investments Information space Economy and other spheres
International relations	N/A	N/A	Status of Ukraine as European player Euro-Atlantic integration Status of Black Sea Fleet Euro-Atlantic choice Cooperation with NATO Share of gas transportation system	European security Global and regional systems of security Nuclear security in Europe Euro-Atlantic security

What all articulations of security have in common is that most of them mention Ukraine, which needs protection from dangers. However, what should be protected could be less tangible, such as the Slavic ethos, sovereignty, honour, and national values. The first period from 1997 till 2003 presents evidence of a relative consensus that it was Ukraine and its territory/citizens that needed protection. Over time, the variety of threatened referents in discourse has grown.

Table 38. Articulation of security in anti-NATO discourse from 1997 to 2018: Who/what needs protection.

	1997-2003	2006-2009	2010-2013	2016-2018
Territory	Ukraine	Ukraine Territorial integrity	Ukrainian land	N/A
State	National security State survival	National security Sovereignty	National security System of security National interest Statehood Independence Defensive capacity of the army	N/A
Nation/civilization	Slavic ethos	N/A	N/A	N/A
Society	Civilians Ukrainian people	Economic growth	Citizens Economy of Sevastopol	-
International relations	N/A	Energy supplies Relations with Russia and Belorussia Prolongation of bilateral treaty Revision of trade relations Industrial cooperation	World community Income from gas	N/A

Interestingly, a range of referents constructed as threatened increased during the period of official neutrality from 2010 to 2013 in pro-NATO discourse. It implies that articulation of security in debates on NATO integration was important *before* the real territorial insecurity in 2014 when Ukraine lost control over Crimea and the Eastern regions. As such, articulation of security served for a purpose of national identity construction rather than was a response to real security threats.

In comparison to pro-NATO discourse, the articulation of security in anti-NATO discourse was less important. The political actors articulated the endangered civilisational dimension of the Slavic nations in the first period. However, this aspect did not develop further in anti-NATO discourse. On the contrary, pro-NATO basic discourse included national and ethnic features under the umbrella of the Euro-Atlantic issues. National values, the Ukrainian language and the independent church became security referents that the Euro-Atlantic integration was deemed to protect.

As a result, the core components of national identity were articulated as threatened, consequently, it is possible to argue that after 2014 national identity was being discursively securitised.

Table 39. Pro-NATO discourse: Who/what guarantees security.

	1997 -2003	2006-2009	2010 - 2013	2016-2018
National	Army	N/A	Army Strong Ukraine Every citizen Common efforts of the majority and the opposition Civilizational choice	Reform of Security Service Military and security agencies Counterespionage activities Changes in laws and management Ukrainian culture Language laws
International	NATO, OSCE, nuclear powers Relations between NATO and Russia Cooperation Collective security Collective actions NATO membership	Many players beyond Ukraine	Mechanisms to prevent threats International and national military training Euro-Atlantic integration	Budapest Memorandum Support of the whole world European strategy

The articulation of who/what may uphold security is the last stage of analysis. In debates on Euro-Atlantic integration, security could be assured by a number of national and international actors, as well as actions. From 1997 to 2018, articulation of guarantors of security shifted from mostly external dependence to domestic decision-making in pro-NATO discourse. According to politicians, Ukraine could maintain its security by implementation of domestic reforms in the security sphere and by enhancement of the Ukrainian culture and language. It is remarkable how ideas of reforms and ethnic culture have substituted the traditional pillars of security: the army and military might.

In contrast, anti-NATO discourse followed a different path. First and foremost, it managed to maintain a more conventional understanding of security providers, such as the army and collective actions in the security domain.

Additionally, international cooperation and amicable relationships with neighbours were articulated as crucial for the guarantees of Ukraine's security. Therefore, the national identity of Ukraine was constructed as a cooperative country, open to international collective action. However, the partners of cooperation articulated in discourse are a matter of contestation. NATO was constructed as the most important partner in the pro-NATO discourse, whereas the CIS and Russia are significant partners in the anti-NATO discourse. Nevertheless, such contestation was a characteristic of the first period. Russia and the CIS were not explicitly articulated as security providers from 2008 to 2018.

Table 40. Anti-NATO discourse: Who/what guarantees security.

	1997 - 2003	2006-2008	2010 - 2013	2016-2018
National	Neutrality	N/A	Political will Decision on the Fleet Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol Statehood and the state	Strong Army
International	CIS military bloc Treaty between Russia and Ukraine Peace with neighbours	Wide cooperation between neighbours	Cooperation with neighbours European collective security Agreement on the Fleet Military training	N/A

There was evidence that In-Between basic discourse transformed after 2014. It was the least elaborated position in the debates on NATO accession that emphasized the importance of domestic issues over international ones. However, one of significant changes was that the articulation of security became prominent by 2018. Security providers were articulated in conventional terms, referring to conventional security in the form of military security. As stated in In-Between discourse, military cooperation with neighbouring NATO countries and NATO bases in Ukrainian territory was what could assure the security of Ukraine.

In conclusion, the articulation of security in discourses contributes to national identity construction through constitution of danger, threat and boundaries construction between the national state and Others. Even though the meanings of security are not explicitly spelled out, the articulation of multiple dangers and threats aims to provoke the feeling of unity among the nation. The meanings of dangers and

threats are subject to contestation by the speakers who have different positions on a formulation of foreign policy. Changes in identity are reflected in the articulation of security in basic discourses that could be expressed in terms of threatened Self and a number of threatening events or Others. In debates on NATO accession, the security articulation was particularly salient in the moments when the government did not explicitly pursue the Euro-Atlantic integration policy in 1997-2003 (period 1) and 2010-2013 (period 3). Therefore, articulation of security was not a response to real and imminent threats. Rather, it contributed to discursive construction of identity when arguing for a particular foreign policy direction.

Table 41. Articulation of security in the In-Between discourse: Who/what guarantees security.

	1997 - 2003	2006-2008	2010 - 2013	2016-2018
National	N/A	Army	N/A	Military bases Changes to the constitution to allow military bases of the Alliance
International	Security mechanisms	N/A	N/A	Cooperation with NATO Direct cooperation between the U.S. and Ukraine Military alliance with Eastern-European states, Poland, Baltic States, Hungary

In the period under study, the articulation of security has evolved from being expressed in conventional understanding of security, such as a military power, to being constructed as a matter of ethnic and national identity. National values, the national church and the Ukrainian language became a part of security concerns for the speakers of pro-NATO discourse. Therefore, by 2018, there was evidence of discursive identity securitisation in basic discourses. Another shift in security articulation is concerned with acceptable ways to safeguard security. While in 1997, security providers belonged to the international environment, in 2018 they were mostly national. Therefore, the Ukrainian identity was constructed as driven by domestic decision making that could maintain it protected.

Main conclusions of Chapter 4

1. Three basic discourses of Ukrainian identity among the ruling political elites present internal consistency and continuity from 1997 to 2018. They are situated in the articulation of different foreign policies in regard to relations of Ukraine

with NATO, construct juxtaposing positive and negative Others, and vary in discursive articulation of security.

2. For construction of identity and argumentation of NATO accession foreign policy, Russia, the U.S. and NATO turn out to be constitutive Others, while Europe plays a minor role. A comparison between four comparative periods of foreign policy change evidences a transformation of basic discourses after 2014.
3. Representations in a model of the Ukrainian national identity can be analytically assigned into four thematic groups: cooperation with NATO, Euro-Atlantic integration, representations of Ukraine at the domestic level and representations of Ukraine as an international actor.
4. Representations of identity demonstrate evidence of change/continuity, consensus/contestation. There are several continuous representations of Ukraine as a colonial/occupied country, victim and a European country from 1997 to 2018. The agents who are represented as committing acts of colonisation and aggression have been changing, depending on the basic discourse and time framework. Representations of the U.S., NATO and Russia as occupants and/or colonisers are symbolic and do not mirror the historical facts.
5. The articulation of security is considered in this context as a mechanism of boundary construction for national identity. Security changed from being expressed in conventional terms of military power to being constructed as an issue of national identity protection. In the ruling political elites' discourses, the Ukrainian language, values and national identity have become a part of security concerns.

CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation presents a longitudinal study of national identity transformation in the debates of the ruling political elites on a foreign policy issue, situated in the case of Ukraine's policy of NATO accession from 1997 to 2018. The research question addresses the discursive change of national identity, which is subject to contestation by groups of ruling political elites who promote different foreign policies. Looking into co-constitutiveness of foreign policy and national identity, this dissertation aimed to reveal the implications of national identity change for articulation of policy of Ukraine's accession to NATO. It situated research on Ukrainian national identity in a historical context of identity politics and domestic and international debates on NATO enlargement.

The research design is based on the intertextual comparative model of discourse analytical methodology. It permits the detection of changes in discursive representations of identity and their meanings, as well as allows to reach theoretical conclusion on a discursive identity change and its constitutive role in political processes. A comparative framework is divided into four periods that correspond to the foreign policy change of Ukraine in regard to relations with NATO: multi-polar policy (period 1 – 1997-2003), declaration of aspirations for NATO membership (period 2 – 2006-2009), policy of neutrality (2010-2013) and return to Euro-Atlantic policy agenda (2016-2018).

The groups of the political elites included in the study were either elected or appointed to governmental service, which fall under the definition of ruling political elites. The role of political representation empowers these individuals with authority to speak on behalf of the nation. These individuals have a right to speak on the national issues when they justify and legitimise political decisions. Besides, the ruling elites have a monopoly on certain information which is accessible to participants of the political process. In this way, the representations of the national Self in discourses of the ruling elites constitute collective representations of national identity. The assumption of a constitutive link between identity and foreign policy provides grounds for a more nuanced understanding of national identity change in

discourses. That is why analysing the discourses of ruling political elites in Ukraine produces an insight into the nuances of identity politics within a contestable issue of Euro-Atlantic integration.

Discussion of the NATO issue in the Ukrainian Parliament goes beyond parliamentary debates and serves a platform for a wider political debate on foreign policy direction. Besides the party members, the Ukrainian Rada encompasses a varied number of independent members of parliament, who may align with a political fraction and speak on its behalf. Debates in the Parliament on NATO membership involved representatives of the executive branch, such as the Presidents of Ukraine, ministers, and committee representatives.

In debates on Euro-Atlantic integration, the Ukrainian identity is constructed in three basic discourses that were singled out through empirical analysis. In these discourses, the ruling political elites construct different national identity projects, articulate juxtaposed Others and argue for different directions in Euro-Atlantic foreign policy. The main Others in discourses were Russia, the U.S. and NATO. Basic identity discourses, labelled as pro-NATO, anti-NATO and In-Between, differ in articulated representations of the political, social and geopolitical consequences that the Alliance membership entails.

The pro-NATO position was adopted by the groups of the ruling political elites who hold from centre-right to ultra-right ideologies. Representatives of the executive power also supported the pro-NATO membership, except during the period of neutrality from 2010-2013. The actors, who hold membership of the centre-left to ultra-left parties, constructed the anti-NATO discourse. The politicians who articulated In-Between discourse belonged to the centrist parties. However, representatives from either the left or right-wing spectrum of political ideologies would also argue for a policy based on the economic and geopolitical interests of the state. It can be concluded that the position of constructing In-Between basic discourse was not embedded in their political ideology, but in unvarnished, middle-ground pragmatic considerations.

The integration policies usually include a “yes” or “no” option. In the case of Ukraine, however, there is an intermediary position that has been largely left unnoticed. The politicians who articulated In-Between discourse routinely deprioritised the issue of Euro-Atlantic integration and proposed to focus on domestic problems. Literature on the Euro-Atlantic integration provides little account of alternative positions on NATO accession. Therefore, identification of In-Between discourse on Euro-Atlantic integration that articulated a distinctive Self is a valuable contribution to discussion of the NATO accession process in Ukraine.

The contestation of meanings attached to national identity in basic discourses is centred around Ukraine’s relations with NATO, their impact on society, and Ukraine’s relations with external Others, which is particularly salient when comparing periods 2 (2006-2009) and 4 (2016-2018). In period 2 (2006-2009), in pro-NATO discourse, the actors articulated Ukraine as equal to NATO and as a member of the European security community; in the In-Between discourse, Ukraine was presented as inferior to NATO, i.e. NATO would not accept a weak Ukraine; and in the anti-NATO discourse, it was argued that Ukraine was superior to NATO, therefore, it could create its own security system.

Despite the transformation of social, political and security contexts in Ukraine, the basic discourses demonstrated resilience to contextual change. Discursive contestation of identity did not completely disappear from political debates, but it did become much weaker by 2018. Pro-NATO discourse on Euro-Atlantic integration preserved the main representations and structures from 1997 till 2018, as well as contained the most numerous groups of political actors who articulated it. In the In-Between discourse, the political actors supported the status of neutrality, yet by 2018, they came to an acceptance of the possibility of NATO membership in the long run. Meanwhile, anti-NATO discourse was marginalised due to the exclusion of its supporters from participation in the political sphere. Because of the events of 2014, that are known as the Ukrainian crisis, particularly, the loss of control of Ukraine over Crimea, anti-NATO discourse lost its structure in terms of the possibility to articulate previously constructed external Others. After

2014, Russia could no longer be used as an amicable Other for articulation of anti-NATO project of national identity. As a result, the neutrality claims in the anti-NATO discourse appealed to the arguments of sovereignty loss. As a result, pro-NATO discourse on Euro-Atlantic integration could be recognised as a dominant discourse among the ruling political elites in power in 2018, even though it was slightly contested by the opponents of the policy on NATO accession.

What makes the discussion of Euro-Atlantic integration particular is that it was constructed in terms of the social, political, and economic well-being of the national Self. The debates about the military alliance are expected to set forth arguments based on the security rationale. Indeed, the articulation of security, danger and threat were the contested representations among competing discourses. However, Euro-Atlantic integration was articulated most fully in terms of civilisational values and domestic transformation that would change the national Self for so much desired European ideal. This conclusion is similar to the conclusions on the effects of NATO enlargement in Central and Eastern European countries where “accession discourse produces NATO membership as a state’s precondition for being—as a requirement for being recognized as a modern, mature western subject.”⁷¹¹ The process of the Euro-Atlantic integration and NATO were articulated as an external agent that would generate positive changes in Ukrainian society.

This dissertation provides a more nuanced understanding of the articulation of identity in foreign policy debates. It underlines the importance of self-articulation and positive representations of Self and Others in a discussion of foreign policy. The representations of Ukraine were positive and replete with the meanings that expressed optimism when the adopted foreign policy met the expectations of a certain group of the ruling political elites. On the opposite, the representations of national identity were filled with negative meanings and constructed in terms of existential threats, when the adopted foreign policy was against the preferred foreign policy direction. This observation provides an understanding to the constitutive role

⁷¹¹ Kuus, “Love, Peace and Nato,” 294.

of national identity change and foreign policy in the ruling political elite's discourses. During the first period, the opponents to NATO accession articulated negative representations of Ukraine in anti-NATO discourse when there was a movement towards closer cooperation with NATO and a possibility of Euro-Atlantic integration arose. Meanwhile, the representations of Ukraine were positive in anti-NATO discourse, when there was an adoption of neutral status.

The changes to the articulation of Others in discourses coincided with the changes in foreign policy priorities announced by the executive branch of Ukrainian government. The representation of the U.S. seemed to be more important for Euro-Atlantic integration, while cooperation with NATO was possible without the articulation of the U.S. in the discourse. As such, the contestation of NATO representations lies between its articulation as an "American" organisation in anti-NATO discourse and the construction of NATO as "European" in the discourses of the ruling political elites who supported accession to NATO.

It is noteworthy that representations of Europe did not dominate the debates on NATO-related policies. Europe was one of the Others in pro-NATO basic discourse, however, it was not the main or contested Other in the competing basic discourses. In Ukraine, the representations of the U.S. seemed to be essential in a discussion of the policy of NATO accession. Therefore, in foreign policy debate on NATO membership, the dichotomy between the construction of radical Others in basic discourses lies between the United States and Russia, not between Russia and Europe, as has been assumed. There is evidence that the change of the political context may result in a disappearance of discursive articulation of the U.S., Europe or NATO as Others, while the representations of Russia are constant representations articulated throughout the time framework under study. It serves the indication that Russia is the main Other for change and continuation of the Ukrainian national identity. As such, this role in national identity of Ukraine makes Russia the main point of reference in foreign policy debates.

One of the significant changes in basic discourses was the articulation of a similarity between two different policies of European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

While NATO membership was constructed as instrumental for European Union integration in period 2 (2006-2009), the political elites conflated these two different integration policies into a single foreign policy direction in period 4 (2016-2018). Consequently, a more acceptable among the population policy of European Union integration was discursively intertwined with a less popular and divisive policy of NATO accession. Interestingly, the same happened in the discourses on Euro-Atlantic integration in Georgia.⁷¹²

The construction of radical Otherness plays a crucial role in the legitimization and the promotion of the Euro-Atlantic integration policy. The radical Otherness of NATO, the U.S. and Russia is constituted through articulation of existential threats to the national Self. The external Others are articulated not only as an exogenous threat to the territorial integrity, but are also constructed in terms of their capacity to interfere in the domestic affairs of Ukraine. The more power the Other seems to have to influence Ukraine, the more threatening a representation of the Other is constructed in the discourses. In pro-NATO basic discourse, the threat to Ukraine and the radical Otherness of Russia were constituted long before the territorial losses that happened in 2014. These constructions of Otherness were used in support of policies that were articulated as an urgency for the protection of the nation. They also delineated the boundaries of the national polity, constructing threatening Others, which contributed to the transformation of national identity in discourse.

However, the articulation of radically different Other may have negative effects on policies as it denies agency to Self and contributes to the constitution of victimhood. Articulation of Ukraine as a victim discursively empowers a radically different construction of Russia, implying its agency and power to influence Ukraine-NATO relations, meanwhile Ukraine is constructed as a passive “non-agent”. As such, constructing Ukraine as a victim, the ruling political elites exonerate Ukraine from responsibility for political decisions and outcomes of NATO accession policy.

⁷¹² Frederik Coene, *Euro-Atlantic Discourse in Georgia: The Making of Georgian Foreign and Domestic Policy after the Rose Revolution* (London: Routledge, 2016).

The articulation of radical Otherness and threats also contributed to a discursive securitisation of identity. Particularly, the radically constructed representations of Russia and securitisation of Ukrainian identity were achieved concurrently in the discourses. Language policy has become a highly politicised issue on the Ukrainian political agenda, having constituted one of the main tracks of identity politics in post-Soviet Ukraine⁷¹³. Since period 2 (2006-2009), the Ukrainian language has been articulated as threatened in the debates on a foreign policy issue. Furthermore, starting from 2014, the discursive securitisation of identity intensified when the representations of ethnic and cultural identity became security referents in the ruling elites' speeches. By 2018, security articulations already encompassed national identity as a security referent that required protection. Paradoxically, the pattern of discursive identity securitisation started in the period of neutrality, which was the most peaceful period for the Ukrainian state. In a broader sense of policy implementation, the securitisation of the language issue in Ukraine can be traced through the adopted policies on language use in the public sphere, which limited the use of the Russian language in Ukrainian society.⁷¹⁴ There is evidence that a construction of security in the discussion of NATO accession policy has been used for delineating identity boundaries, rather than being a response to real-life threats. Since 2014, national identity has been securitised, as the ideas of reforms and ethnic culture have become as important as the conventional understanding of security expressed in representations of the army and military power.

The use of representations of colonialism and occupation demonstrates how the elites can utilise symbolic power through a reference to past events and temporal (historical) Others. Ukraine as a territory colonised by Russia has been articulated in history books⁷¹⁵ and in both domestic politics and foreign policy debates.⁷¹⁶

⁷¹³ Elena A. Markova, "Politika Ukrainy v Yazykovoi Sfere: Osnovnye Itogi," *Problemy Postsovetskogo Prostranstva* 7, no. 1 (2020):73-83; Arel, "Language Politics in Independent Ukraine," 597-622.

⁷¹⁴ See Markova, "Politika Ukrainy v Yazykovoi Sfere: Osnovnye Itogi," 73-83.

⁷¹⁵ Vendina et al., "Ukraina v Politicheskoi Krizise," 50-67; Janmaat, "The Ethnic 'Other' in Ukrainian History Textbooks," 307-324.

⁷¹⁶ Efemishch, "Proshloe v Konstruirovani Natsionalnoi Identichnosti," 77-90; Kuzio, "History and Memory in Post-Soviet Colonial Space," 241-264; Oleksii Polegkyi, "Identity-Building in Post-Communist Ukraine: Post-Imperial vs Post-Colonial," in *Beyond Transition? Memory and Identity Narratives in Eastern and Central Europe. CFE Conference Papers Series No. 7* (Lund: The Centre for European Studies (CFE), 2015), 169-90; Iryna V.

Overall, the theme of occupation⁷¹⁷ has been salient in the recent academic literature on Ukrainian identity. In a discussion on NATO accession, there was no distinction between the notions of colonialism and occupation in the discourses. The ruling political elites seemed to articulate the representations of the colonised and occupied Ukraine as interchangeable. Russia, the U.S., NATO and the West, in general, were constructed as colonisers and occupants. It is noteworthy that the representations of the colonisers/occupants in discourses did not reflect the historicity of events. For instance, Poland or Austria-Hungary, which included Ukrainian lands before the Soviet Union, were never mentioned as colonial powers or empires. This selectiveness of historical facts can be explained by the strategic choices that the ruling political elites make when it comes to the actualisation of historical representations, which can be used in support of political argumentation. The importance of articulation of historical (temporal) Others has grown over time in the articulation of pro-NATO discourse. As NATO and Ukraine strengthened cooperation, the most common historical reference in basic discourses has become the representation of the shared historical past of Ukraine and NATO by 2018.

In prior scholarship, the discussion about the (post)colonial nature of the Ukrainian identity has not yet shaped into a separate track of scientific analysis. Nevertheless, there is a necessity to evaluate these intents to reformulate the post-Soviet national Ukrainian identity as post-colonial.⁷¹⁸ Representations of a colonised and occupied Self strengthen the articulation of Ukraine as a victim, having an effect of denying agency to Ukraine for the outcomes of NATO accession policy. Therefore, Ukraine is constituted as bearing little responsibility for its actions. This construction of a victim is coupled with the construction of Russia as an inherently aggressive and irrational, which strives to re-establish its “imperial” control over Ukraine. The constitution of the radical Otherness of Russia denies rationality in its

Zhirun, “Formirovanie Ukrainskoi Identichnosti: Grazhdanskaya, Etnicheskaya ili Postkolonialnaya?” *Rossiia i Sovremennyi Mir* 3, no. 112 (2021): 145–64.

⁷¹⁷ Chernetsky, “Sofiia Andrukhovych’s Felix Austria,” 386–98; Prymachenko, “Antykolonialnyi Dyskurs OUN/UPA v Suchasnomu Ukrainskom Konteksti Borotbi za Yevropeisku Identychnist,” 328–38.

⁷¹⁸ Zhirun, “Formirovanie Ukrainskoi Identichnosti,” 145–64.

actions and, consequently, constructs Russia as incapable of participating in rational negotiations or talks.

The analysis of identity as a combination of representations in discourse enhances our understanding of how articulation of collective identity changes. It was expected that some representations were contested, some achieved relative consensus among the ruling political elites, and that some representations continued and others discontinued. As the political context changes, the change in articulation of national identity representations seems to be predictable. However, along with the changes of the political context, some representations may become incompatible with a set of representations articulated at specific time. That explains why these incomparable with the context representations may disappear from discourses even if the reality did not change. This is true for the representation of Ukraine as a peacekeeper, which gained salience and consensus in the period of neutrality. In post-2014 period, it became incompatible with the representation of Ukraine as suffering from the internal conflict and disappeared from basic discourses despite the fact that Ukraine continued to contribute to the peacekeeping missions. This evidences how discursive representations are strategically mobilised in debates on foreign policy, and how their articulation in discourse does not reflect the actual participation of Ukraine in the UN and NATO peacekeeping missions, which has not significantly changed since 2014.

The Europeanness of Ukrainian identity is a constant and uncontested identity representation among all basic discourses, even in the speeches of the ruling political elites who opposed the policy of NATO membership. Understanding Ukraine as a part of Europe has been subject to different interpretations among the Ukrainian political elites, who were divided over identification of Ukraine with either being a part of Europe or Russia, characterised as “Other” Europe.⁷¹⁹ The researchers underlined the importance of Europeanness in the Ukrainian identity construction, as Europe became a normative model for Ukraine,⁷²⁰ and emphasized the national

⁷¹⁹ White and Feklyunina, *Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*, 135-161.

⁷²⁰ Orlova, “‘Europe’ as a Normative Model in the Mediatized Discourse of Ukrainian Political Elites,” 222–41.

identity transformation since 2014 as a result of consequent territorial losses in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea.⁷²¹ Nevertheless, the present study argues that there is also a lot of continuity in the representations of the Ukrainian Self. Identity continuity is achieved through the process of re-articulation of identity representations in discourses. Representations of Ukraine as European have evolved from an articulation of Ukraine as having a special European identity, i.e. special in terms of a geographically located (Eastern) European country, to being constituted in ideational terms as a part of Western European civilisation and a holder of European values.

The data on Ukrainian identity extracted from the sociological research of the Razumkov Centre (provided in section 3.2) contrast with the qualitative findings of this study. While I argue that Europeanness was a shared and continuous representation in the discourses of the ruling political elites, the common Ukrainians did not feel a strong association with the European cultural tradition and less than half of the respondents declared their identification with the European Community by 2018. This leads to a conclusion that the ruling political elites articulated Europeanness strategically in order to justify and legitimise a preferable foreign policy. The meanings attached to Europeanness may lie at the core of the differences between understanding of Europe by the elites and identification with Europe by the population. Taking into account the escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict after 2022, these data may have changed.

Even though Europeanness is omnipresent in Ukrainian identity representations, Europe remains the Other and not “us” for Ukraine. The articulations of Europe in the ruling elites’ discourses evidence some resentment, as Ukraine lacked recognition from Europe as being European.

An in-depth analysis of the meanings of Europeanness unpacks the important differences in civilisational narrative linked to the European choice. Within a twenty-year period, the articulation of Ukraine changed from a Slavic and Central

⁷²¹ See Alexei V. Popov, “What Has Happened to Ukraine Inertial Scenario for Ukraine’s National and Political Identity,” *Russia in Global Affairs* 16, no. 2 (2018): 8–35; Shevel, “The Politics of Memory in a Divided Society,” 137–64.

(and Eastern) European identity to a Western European identity. This change was possible due to re-articulation of boundaries between Ukraine and Russia, where Russia was constructed as an alien to Europe entity that threatened Ukraine and the entire European civilisation. This civilisational articulation demarcates the difference between the “civilised” Europe and Ukraine and the “uncivilised and barbaric” Asia-like Russia. Civilisational representations also point out to the schism between the Slavic/Orthodox and Western/European, which over time evolved into a demarcation between the European and Asian civilisations. These articulations demonstrate how the political elites essentialise the notion of a civilisation and actualise radical differences through discourse.

A constitutive link between identity and the foreign policy debate may shed light on the importance of representations of Ukrainian society and people in the discourses on Euro-Atlantic integration. A shift in the representation of decision making clarifies how it became possible (or necessary) to amend the Constitution of Ukraine in order to “fix” aspirations of Euro-Atlantic integration in the basic law of the country without an official offer of membership from the Alliance and without conducting a referendum on NATO accession.

The results of this dissertation demonstrate that the discussion of foreign policy on NATO accession in Ukraine is interwoven with discursive national identity construction, the articulation of Otherness and re-definition of boundaries through discursive security articulation. Despite the proclamation of Ukraine’s firm commitment to the track of Euro-Atlantic integration, there was a continuous contestation of the meanings attached to the representations of NATO accession. Even though the ruling political elites presented a certain level of consensus on the Euro-Atlantic integration policy, there were voices of dissent and the overwhelming consensus at the level of the elites was not accomplished. Partly, the domination of pro-NATO discourse was achieved due to the exclusion from the political sphere the political forces. Those who opposed NATO integration, including the members of the Communist party, were legally banned from the process of fair and free political competition, as well as restricted by implementation of constitutional amendments

fixing European and Euro-Atlantic integration as foreign policy priority. All these have significantly limited the opportunities for a public discussion of the Euro-Atlantic accession issue in Ukraine in the post-2018 period. Implementation of a constitutional norm on NATO meant that arguing for a policy against NATO could be considered an unconstitutional act. As such, denying the future of Ukraine in NATO could entail a possible legal persecution or even criminal charges. However, it could be possible that the anti-NATO discourse was articulated in areas that lay beyond the scope of this study.

Focusing on a narrow issue of a constitutive link between identity change and foreign policy in discourses, this dissertation is limited in the answer to the urgent questions on Ukraine's accession to NATO. Particularly, it is limited to providing the explanation of whether NATO enlargement was one of the causes for the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. However, the results of the dissertation do allow to reach understanding on a complexity of domestic debates and plurality of views on Ukraine's role in NATO. It is necessary to acknowledge that the Ukrainian membership in NATO is situated in a broader context of European security architecture, great power politics and geopolitical bargains. The deficiency of a method applied in this work was mediated by addressing the scholarly debates on perspectives of Ukrainian membership in NATO and literature on identity politics. However, even at the domestic level of Foreign Policy Analysis, it leaves certain issues out of discussion. For instance, discourse-material connection in NATO-Ukraine relations, the impact of perceptions and misperceptions in foreign policy decision making, and the role of individuals in Ukrainian engagement with NATO, among others.

In 2022, the start of a Russo-Ukrainian conflict became a critical juncture in Ukrainian history where NATO enlargement was claimed to be central. Analysis of debates on NATO accession in Ukraine demonstrates how the articulation of ideas about the future of Ukraine in NATO among the ruling political elites was constructed in ideational terms with a distorted perception of threats, illusionary idea of Europeanness and idealised image of NATO membership. Since 2014, there has

been a constant escalation in both military actions and discursive battles. Without providing excuse to the warfare, the conclusions of this dissertation draw attention to the power of discursive constructions. In the midst of complexities that presented geopolitical configurations of power, the policies that Ukraine's ruling elites promoted were concomitant with the radical construction of Russia's otherness. All together that could have inhibited engagement in a fruitful dialogue on NATO accession with the involved parties and could have contributed to the diplomatic and political deadlock that lead to the intensification of the conflict. The policy of balancing between the interests of the West and Russia failed, and by being unable to resolve domestic power struggles, the Ukrainian elites that supported NATO membership silenced and ostracised their political opponents, at the same time, turning the choice of national identity and culture within Ukraine into national security issue.⁷²² The construction of the victimhood of Ukraine and a constitution of Russia as a radical, irrational, and imperial Other also to a certain extent added to the promotion of NATO accession foreign policy, as well as played a negative role in Russo-Ukrainian relations.

⁷²² Zhyrun, "Ukrainian Discourses on NATO," 165–80.

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<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1163.html>
95. Transcript of the 1st session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 04 September 2018, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6879.html>
96. Transcript of the 1st session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 02 February 2016, 4:06 pm, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6111.html>
97. Transcript of the 1st session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 07 February 2017, 10:05 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6414.html>
98. Transcript of the 1st session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 5 September 2017, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6575.html>
99. Transcript of the 1th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the second convocation 02 September 1997, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/4179.html>
100. Transcript of the 20th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the second convocation 25 September 1997, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/4198.html>
101. Transcript of the 20th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 22 March 2007, 10:05 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1400.html>
102. Transcript of the 21st session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 01 October 1998, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2145.html>

103. Transcript of the 21st session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 16 April 2008, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/395.html>
104. Transcript of the 21st session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 18 January 2008, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/34.html>
105. Transcript of the 21st session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 07 October 2008, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/561.html>
106. Transcript of the 21st session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the sixth convocation 02 November 2010, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/999.html>
107. Transcript of the 21st session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 22 February 2017, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6462.html>
108. Transcript of the 22nd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fourth convocation 22 October 2002, 4pm, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1542.html>
109. Transcript of the 22nd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 02 June 1998, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2067.html>
110. Transcript of the 22nd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 15 March 2000, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2474.html>
111. Transcript of the 22nd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 23 March 2007, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1402.html>
112. Transcript of the 22nd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 20 October 2016, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6338.html>
113. Transcript of the 23rd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 15 March 2000, 4 pm, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2475.html>
114. Transcript of the 23rd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 03 April 2007, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1403.html>
115. Transcript of the 23th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 01 April 2016, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6164.html>
116. Transcript of the 24th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 03 June 1998, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2070.html>
117. Transcript of the 24th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the second convocation 04 March 1997, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/4021.html>
118. Transcript of the 24th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 24 February 2017, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6469.html>
119. Transcript of the 25th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fourth convocation 18 June 2002, 10:00am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1487.html>
120. Transcript of the 25th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 04 April 2007, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1405.html>
121. Transcript of the 25th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the sixth convocation 07 April 2011, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1127.html>

122. Transcript of the 25th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 04 April 2017, 10:03 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6472.html>
123. Transcript of the 26th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fourth convocation 19 June 2002, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1488.html>
124. Transcript of the 26th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fourth convocation 01 April 2003, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1608.html>
125. Transcript of the 26th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 19 March 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2250.html>
126. Transcript of the 26th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 26 March 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2256.html>
127. Transcript of the 26th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 06 November 2018, 16:00 pm, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6938.html>
128. Transcript of the 27st session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 21 October 2008, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/566.html>
129. Transcript of the 27th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fourth convocation 12 November 2002, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1547.html>
130. Transcript of the 27th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 23 March 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2251.html>
131. Transcript of the 27th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the sixth convocation 08 April 2011, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1129.html>
132. Transcript of the 27th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 09 November 2017, 16:00 pm, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6641.html>
133. Transcript of the 27th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 14 April 2016, 10:10 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6174.html>
134. Transcript of the 27th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 05 April 2017, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6478.html>
135. Transcript of the 28th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fourth convocation 02 April 2003, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1610.html>
136. Transcript of the 28th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 24 March 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2252.html>
137. Transcript of the 28th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 21 October 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2346.html>
138. Transcript of the 28th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 26 April 2007, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1419.html>
139. Transcript of the 28th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 28 July 2006, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1322.html>
140. Transcript of the 29th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fourth convocation 03 April 2003, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1611.html>

141. Transcript of the 29th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 24 March 1999, 4 pm, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2253.html>
142. Transcript of the 29th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 10 April 2007, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1410.html>
143. Transcript of the 29th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 14 November 2017, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6648.html>
144. Transcript of the 2nd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 02 September 2008, 4pm, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/542.html>
145. Transcript of the 2nd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 20 September 2007, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1464.html>
146. Transcript of the 2nd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the sixth convocation 07 September 2011, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1164.html>
147. Transcript of the 2nd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 03 February 2016, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6114.html>
148. Transcript of the 2nd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 07 February 2017, 4pm, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6415.html>
149. Transcript of the 30th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 15 October 1998, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2154.html>
150. Transcript of the 30th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 25 March 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2254.html>
151. Transcript of the 30th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 01 August 2006, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1504.html>
152. Transcript of the 30th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the sixth convocation 20 April 2011, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1132.html>
153. Transcript of the 30th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 09 November 2018, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6947.html>
154. Transcript of the 30th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 07 April 2017, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6484.html>
155. Transcript of the 33rd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 06 April 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2257.html>
156. Transcript of the 33rd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 05 November 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2352.html>
157. Transcript of the 33rd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 02 August 2006, 17:53 pm, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1506.html>
158. Transcript of the 33rd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the seventh convocation 16 May 2012, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1275.html>
159. Transcript of the 33rd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 12 April 2017, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6492.html>

160. Transcript of the 33th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fourth convocation 02 July 2002, 10:00am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1492.html>
161. Transcript of the 33th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 17 November 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2353.html>
162. Transcript of the 34th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fourth convocation 15 April 2003, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1615.html>
163. Transcript of the 34th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 07 April 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2258.html>
164. Transcript of the 34th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 03 June 2008, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/416.html>
165. Transcript of the 35th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 06 April 2000, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2487.html>
166. Transcript of the 35th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the sixth convocation 27 April 2010, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/923.html>
167. Transcript of the 35th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 22 November 2018, 16:00 pm, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6960.html>
168. Transcript of the 35th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 05 December 2017, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6662.html>
169. Transcript of the 36th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 04 June 2008, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/420.html>
170. Transcript of the 36th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 30 October 2008, 4:30 pm, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/575.html>
171. Transcript of the 36th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the sixth convocation 12 May 2011, 4 pm, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1138.html>
172. Transcript of the 36th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 23 November 2018, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6962.html>
173. Transcript of the 37th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 17 June 1998, 4 pm, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2083.html>
174. Transcript of the 37th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 07 April 2000, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2489.html>
175. Transcript of the 37th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 06 December 2017, 10:03 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6667.html>
176. Transcript of the 37th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 16 April 2017, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6501.html>
177. Transcript of the 38th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fourth convocation 10 July 2002, 10:00am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1511.html>
178. Transcript of the 38th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 23 October 1998, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2162.html>

179. Transcript of the 38th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 09 April 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2262.html>
180. Transcript of the 38th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 29 November 2000, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2582.html>
181. Transcript of the 38th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the second convocation 19 March 1997, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/4036.html>
182. Transcript of the 38th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 11 November 2008, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/577.html>
183. Transcript of the 38th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 04 December 2018, 16:00 pm, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6971.html>
184. Transcript of the 38th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 07 December 2017, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6670.html>
185. Transcript of the 39th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fourth convocation 25 November 2003, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1685.html>
186. Transcript of the 39th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 19 April 2000, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2491.html>
187. Transcript of the 39th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the sixth convocation 15 December 2010, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1017.html>
188. Transcript of the 39th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the seventh convocation 23 May 2012, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1281.html>
189. Transcript of the 3rd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 09 February 2000, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2455.html>
190. Transcript of the 3rd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 12 February 2008, 5 pm, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/370.html>
191. Transcript of the 3rd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 06 March 2008, 2:15 pm, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/375.html>
192. Transcript of the 3rd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 05 September 2018, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6884.html>
193. Transcript of the 3rd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 7 September 2017, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6580.html>
194. Transcript of the 40th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 20 April 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2264.html>
195. Transcript of the 40th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 17 June 2008, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/427.html>
196. Transcript of the 40th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 12 November 2008, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/580.html>
197. Transcript of the 40th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 27 April 2007, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1421.html>

198. Transcript of the 40th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the seventh convocation 24 May 2012, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1282.html>
199. Transcript of the 40th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the sixth convocation 14 March 2010, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/928.html>
200. Transcript of the 41st session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 02 December 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2360.html>
201. Transcript of the 41st session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 30 April 2007, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1422.html>
202. Transcript of the 42nd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 20 April 2000, 4 pm, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2494.html>
203. Transcript of the 42nd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 18 June 2008, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/430.html>
204. Transcript of the 42nd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 03 May 2007, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2644.html>
205. Transcript of the 42nd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the sixth convocation 18 May 2010, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/930.html>
206. Transcript of the 43rd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 12 December 2006, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1363.html>
207. Transcript of the 43rd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 04 May 2007, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1423.html>
208. Transcript of the 43rd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the sixth convocation 19 May 2010, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/931.html>
209. Transcript of the 43rd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 23 May 2017, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6515.html>
210. Transcript of the 44th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 23 April 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2268.html>
211. Transcript of the 45th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 23 April 1999, 4 pm, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2269.html>
212. Transcript of the 45th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 08 July 2008, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/433.html>
213. Transcript of the 45th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 13 December 2006, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/1365.html>
214. Transcript of the 45th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 22 December 2016, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6391.html>
215. Transcript of the 45th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 23 May 2017, 10:00 am, accessed February 11, 2019,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6520.html>
216. Transcript of the 46th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 17 November 1998, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2171.html>

217. Transcript of the 46th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 15 December 1999, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2365.html>
218. Transcript of the 46th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 09 July 2008, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/434.html>
219. Transcript of the 46th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the sixth convocation 01 June 2011, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
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<https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6850.html>
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303. Transcript of the 6th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 18 March 2008, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
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304. Transcript of the 6th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 20 June 2006, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
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312. Transcript of the 73rd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the second convocation 07 May 1997, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018,
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313. Transcript of the 74th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 11 July 2001, 10:00am, accessed October 1, 2018,
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334. Transcript of the 92nd session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the second convocation 04 June 1997, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/4131.html>
335. Transcript of the 94th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the second convocation 05 June 1997, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/4133.html>
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338. Transcript of the 97th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the second convocation 11 June 1997, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/4136.html>
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341. Transcript of the 9th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the third convocation 19 May 1998, 4 pm, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2054.html>
342. Transcript of the 9th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 20 March 2008, 10 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/381.html>
343. Transcript of the 9th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the sixth convocation 23 September 2010, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/986.html>
344. Transcript of the 9th session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the seventh convocation 19 September 2013, 10:00 am, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/5060.html>
345. Transcript of the Extraordinary session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the fifth convocation 09 April 2007, 12:00 pm, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/2630.html>
346. Transcript of the Extraordinary session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 26 November 2018, 16:00 pm, accessed February 11, 2019, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6966.html>
347. Transcript of the Honorary session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 28 June 2016, 12:00 pm, accessed February 11, 2019, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6253.html>
348. Transcript of the Honorary session of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation 03 July 2017, 3:06 pm, accessed February 11, 2019, <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6554.html>
349. Transcript of the Session 1, Verhovna Rada of Ukraine, the 2nd of September, 2008, 10am. Presided by the Head of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine Yatseniuk A.P. Accessed <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/541.html>

350. Transcript of the Session 13, Verhovna Rada of Ukraine, the 8th of April, 2008. 10am. Presided by the Head of Verhovna Rada of Ukraine Yatseniuk A.P. Accessed <https://portal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/385.htm>
351. Transcript, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko spoke at a luncheon hosted by the Atlantic Council in New York on September 24, 2008. Source: Atlantic Council <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/transcript/transcript-ukraine-president-victor-yushchenko/>
352. Tyshden, Klimkin and Stoltenberg discussed further steps in Ukraine and NATO relations, 19 March 2018, accessed 10 February 2019, <https://tyzhden.ua/News/211029>.
353. Ukrainska Pravda. Yuchenko: NATO took the obligation to admit Ukraine. 04 April 2008, accessed 10 February 2019, <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2008/04/4/3409481/>.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1. The timeline of NATO-Ukraine relations⁷²³

Date	NATO-Ukraine relations and events
19 Jan, 1990	Ukraine takes part in Rose-Roth program ⁷²⁴
1 Dec, 1991	Ukraine joins the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)
6 Jan 1992	Mission of Ukraine to NATO
22-23 Feb. 1992	Visit of NATO Secretary General Wörner to Ukraine
10 March, 1992	Ukraine joins the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council
May 1992	(the Permanent Delegation from Ukrainian Parliament – ?)
8 Jun. 1992	President Kravchuk visits NATO Headquarters in Brussels
8 Feb, 1994	Ukraine signs Partnership for Peace (PfP) program
13 March 1995	Ukraine-NATO Security Agreement (information)
1997 – 2003 (Period 1)	
1 Jan, 1997	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is established, replaced NACC Institution
1997	The NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) is established
1 May, 1997	NATO Information and Documentation Center (NIDC) is open in Kiev
9 July, 1997	Charter on a Distinctive Partnership
23 April, 1999	NATO Liaison Office opens in Kyiv.
4 November, 1998	President Leonid Kuchma signed an order “About State Program on Cooperation between Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) for the period of 2001
1 Nov, 2000	Joint Monitoring Group (JMG) of the Ukrainian Parliament and NATO Parliament Assembly (PA)
19 Dec, 2001	the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Defence Ministers' Session
2002	JMG is transformed into Ukraine-NATO Inter-Parliamentary Council (UNIC)
15 May, 2002	the NATO-Ukraine Commission ministerial meeting
7 June, 2002	the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Defence Ministers' Session
9 Jul, 2002	the Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission
21 Nov, 2002	Ukrainian Parliament expressed support for NATO membership
22 Nov, 2002	NATO-Ukraine Action Plan
22 Nov, 2003	Meeting of the NATO Ukraine Council at the level of Foreign Ministers
3 June, 2003	The NATO-Ukraine Commission at Foreign Ministers
5 Dec, 2003	The Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at Foreign Ministers' level
29 June, 2004	The NATO-Ukraine Commission
22 Feb., 2005	Brussels Summit, Yushchenko accepts Membership Action Plan (MAP)
20-21 April, 2005	Informal meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Vilnius, Lithuania Intensified Dialogue of Ukraine and NATO
9 June, 2005	The meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the level of Ministers of Defence at NATO Headquarters
19 Oct, 2005	The meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission
8 Dec, 2005	The meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission
2006-2009 (period 2)	
26 April, 2006	The informal meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Sofia, Bulgaria

⁷²³ The timeline is designed with a focus on bilateral, multilateral and institutional cooperation. It does not cover events in the area of military cooperation.

⁷²⁴ The programme has evolved to include parliamentarians from an increasing number of non-NATO countries. Today it aims to enhance parliamentary awareness and to build contacts and provide experience and expertise. Particular attention is paid to promoting the principle of the democratic control of armed forces and to the development of effective parliamentary oversight of defence and the military. <https://www.nato-pa.int/content/rose-roth-programme?readmore=true>

08 June, 2006	The meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Defence Ministers' session
3 August, 2006	National coalition signs "Universal of national unity" on referendum on NATO issue
28-29 Nov, 2006	NATO Summit, Riga
7 Dec, 2007	The meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the level of Foreign Ministers
14-15 June, 2007	The Meetings of NATO Defence Ministers
08 Jan, 2008	Petition to join NATO
7-8 February 2008	Informal meeting of NATO Defence Ministers (IDM 1-2008) Vilnius, Lithuania
2-4 April, 2008	NATO Bucharest summit
3 April, 2008	Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest
4 April, 2008	The meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission
13 June, 2008	The meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission
3 Dec, 2008	Foreign Ministers meeting at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, development of an Annual National Programme (ANP) for Ukraine
17 Dec, 2008	Allied Foreign Ministers' meeting
5 March, 2009	Consultations with Ukraine (NAC, NUC)
9 Jul, 2009	Declaration to Complement the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership (signed 21 August, 2009 in Brussels)
2010 – 2013 (Period 3)	
February, 2010	NATO membership is off agenda.
01 March, 2010	Yanukovich visits Brussels
10, June 2010	Ukrainian parliament declares Ukraine as assuming "non-aligned" status
10 June, 2010	The meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Defence Ministers session
15 April, 2011	The meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at Foreign Ministers level, Berlin
22 Feb, 2013	The meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Defence Ministers session
March, 2013	JMG is reorganized into the NATO-Ukraine Inter-Parliamentary Council
2014	
April, 4-5, 2014	Ukrainian Parliament delegation meets with the Standing Committee of NATO PA, Riga
May 30-June 2	NATO PA Committees meeting, Vilnius "Declaration on Supporting Ukraine"
3 June	The meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the level of NATO Defence Ministers
25 June	Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the level of Foreign Ministers
24 July	NATO PA delegation visits Ukraine
29 August	The extraordinary meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission
September	NATO Summit held in Newport, Wales
Nov 22-24	NATO PA Committees meeting, Hague
2 Dec	Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the level of Foreign Affairs Ministers
Dec, 15-16	President of NATO PA (M. Turner) visits Ukraine
2015	
26 Jan	An extraordinary meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission
March 12-13	A group of Ukrainian MPs led by the Head of the Permanent Delegation of Ukrainian Parliament in NATO PA I. Klymush-Tsintsadze visited the NATO and NATO PA headquarters
May 16-18	Permanent Delegation of Ukrainian Parliament in NATO PA took part in the spring session of the NATO PA (Budapest). Declaration "On the expansion of the Alliance"

26 May	Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission
8 June	Meeting of the NATO – Ukraine Inter-Parliamentary Council took place in Kyiv
1 Sept	The NATO-Ukraine Strategic Communications Partnership Roadmap
2 Dec	The NATO-Ukraine Commission meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers
2016-2018 (period 4)	
15 Jun	Meeting of the NATO – Ukraine Commission at the level of Defence Ministers
8-9 July	NATO Summit in Warsaw
July 2016	The Commission for Coordination of Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine is established
9 July	Meeting of the NATO – Ukraine Commission
2017	
9 Feb	The Prime Minister of Ukraine visits NATO
25 June	The Ukrainian Parliament adopted legislation reinstating membership in NATO as a strategic foreign and security policy objective.
10 July	The meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Kyiv
7 Dec	The NATO-Ukraine Commission at the level of Foreign Ministers
14 Dec	The meeting of the NATO – Ukraine Commission at the ambassadorial level
2018 – 2024	
26 April 2018	The meetings of NATO Foreign Ministers
11-12 July 2018	NATO Summit, Brussels
26 Nov 2018	The meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission
21 June 2018	Verhovna Rada adopts Bill “On National Security of Ukraine” (No 8068)
20 Sept, 2018	Verhovna Rada votes for amendments to the Constitution
13 Dec, 2018	NATO Secretary General and President Poroshenko discuss developments in and around the Sea of Azov
4 Feb. 2021	The new Regulations on the development of Annual National Programs under the auspices of the NATO-Ukraine Commission are approved
12 June 2020	NATO recognizes Ukraine as an Enhanced Opportunities Partner
22 July 2020	The North Atlantic Council approved Ukraine's accession to NATO's Sea Guardian Operation as a Potential Operational Partner
18 March 2021	Ukraine joins the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence
April 2021	Establishment of the Crimea Platform Support Group in the NATO PA
Jan.2022	Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission
22 Feb.2022	An extraordinary meeting of NATO-Ukraine Commission
Sept.2022	Ukraine submits an application for fast-track accession to NATO
June 2023	NATO-Ukraine Commission meets with Ukrainian Foreign Minister
July 2023	The NATO-Ukraine Council substitutes Ukraine-NATO Commission
Jan. 2024	Creation of International Working Group on Security and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine

Appendix 2. Nominations of national identity in basic discourses

Representations	Nominations		
	Ukrainian	English	Russian
Ukraine	державна Київом країна Людей народного нації наших співвітчизників наші хлопці суспільства Україна українського народу українську громаду Українці	nation nation's national Our nations our population Ukraine Ukraine's	в стране государства граждан национального наше общество нашего народа наши сыновья наших сограждан общественности Украины украинского народа украинское общество Украину
Russia	агресор Азіопи Кремль Москві наші сусіди Путіним Росії Російського + noun Російської Федерації російською Російську імперію	Moscow Russia Russian Russian Federation	России
Europe	європейці Європи Євросоюз ЄС країн-членів Євросоюзу	European European Union	
NATO	альянсу військо-поліцейський блок державами-членами Альянсу Євроатлантика євроатлантичної спільноти Євро-Атлантичному Західного альянсу країнам-учасникам НАТО країн-членів та НАТО НАТО натовські оборонному блоку Організації Північноатлантичного договору союзники	Alliance Alliance's Allied forces Euro-Atlantic NATO North Atlantic Treaty Alliance Partner nations	блок НАТО НАТО Североатлантическим альянсом Североатлантического блока членам Североатлантического союза
The United States	Білого дому Капітолію. Вашингтоном американським Сполученні Штати США	the U.S the United States the United States of America	Американских + noun Америке Соединенных Штатов Америки

Appendix 3. Distribution of materials, sources and actors across periods 1-4

Period 1 (1997-2003)				
Sources		Number of actors and their position in discourse		
	No	For NATO	Against NATO	In-between
Verhovna Rada of Ukraine Stenographs of plenary session in Rada	110	42	58	12
Total	110	112		
Period 2 (2006-2009)				
Verhovna Rada of Ukraine Stenographs of plenary session in Rada	84	52	53	14
NATO-Ukraine Commission: (Joint) statements, press-statements	5			
NATO official web-site: (Joint) press-conference, opening remarks, informal meeting,	8			
Media and internet elite speeches	4			
Presidential Administration: Presidential speech	1			
Total	102	119		
Period 3 (2010-2013)				
Verhovna Rada of Ukraine Stenographs of plenary session in Rada	39	32	30	8
Total	39	70		
Period 4 (2016-2018)				
Verhovna Rada of Ukraine Stenographs of plenary session in Rada	83	50	2	10
NATO-Ukraine Commission: (Joint) statements, press-statements	3			
NATO-Ukraine Commission: (Joint) statements, press-statements	3			
Media and internet elite speeches	2			
Presidential Administration: Presidential speech	11			
Total	102	62		
Total materials	353	Total individuals 363		

Appendix 4. Actors who generate discourses on Euro-Atlantic integration 1997-2018

PRO-NATO POSITION	ANTI-NATO POSITION	IN-BETWEEN POSIION
PERIOD 1 (1997 – 2003) (112 individuals)		
Shkidenko, V.P. Baranov O.A. First Deputy Head of State Committee of Communication and information of Ukraine Kuchma L.D, President of Ukraine Kruchkov G.K. Kendzior Y.M. Our Ukraine Yavorivsky V.O. Our Ukraine Udoenko G.I. Shkodchenko V.P. Manchulenko G.M. People's Movement of Ukraine Shkil A.V. Block Tymoshenko Gluhivsky L.I. Ulynets V.G. Chornousenko O.I. Volkovetsky S.V. Shevchenko V.F. Ratushny M.Y. Zerebetsky E.P. Kyiak T.P. Democratic party of Ukraine Zaiets I.O. Ratushny M. Y. Nilous V.O. Udoenko G.I. Tovt M.M Orobets Y.M. Gluphivskyi L.I. Vitrenko N.M. Filento V.P. Chornovil V.M. Kuzmuk O.I. Minister of Defense Kozhyn V.V. People's Movement of Ukraine Pavlovsky M.A. Chaliy O.O. Zarubinskyi O.O. People's Democratic Party Sakhno Y.P. People's Democratic Party Kirilenko V.A. People's Movement of Ukraine Zayets I. O. People's Movement of Ukraine Gutsol M.V. Andresyuk B.P. Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United) Chikal A.V.	Tyshennko P.V. Communist Party of Ukraine Mazur O.A. Yabloko Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine Simonenko P.M. Communist Party of Ukraine Kruchkov G.K. Communist Party of Ukraine Yatsenko V.M. Melnikov O.B. Green Party Vitrenko N.M. Progressive Socialist Party Ivanov V.G. Rodionov M.K. Communist Party of Ukraine Ginzburg O.P. Communist Party of Ukraine Puzakov V.T. Communist Party of Ukraine Donchenko Y.G. Communist Party of Ukraine Aleksandrovska A.O. Zatynaiko O.I. Bulba S.S. Socialist Party of Ukraine Marchenko V.R. Progressive Socialist Party Pilipenko M.V. Communist Party of Ukraine Chopahin O.M. Olyinyk B.I. Krasniakov Y.V. Kogen Y.B. Moiseenko V.M. Communist Party of Ukraine Taran M.V. Zvonarzh A.Y. Communist Party of Ukraine Boldyrev Y.O. Syzenko Y.P. Communist Party of Ukraine Nikolaenko S.M. Socialist Party Markovska N.S. Socialist Party Marmazov Y.V. Skrabak P.A. Bobriniov O.V. Yurkovsky A.V. Tishchenko O.V. Communist party of Ukraine Kuzev V.A. Moroz O.O.	Tabachnik D. V. Moroz O.O. Rada Speaker Osadchuk P.I. Yurkovsky A.V. Communist Party of Ukraine Rzhavsky O.M. Ostash I.I. Kononov V.M. Bilas I.G. Group Reforms-Center Syrota M.D. Labour Ukraine Party Bondarchuk O.V. All-Ukrainian Union of workers Faction Communist Party of Ukraine Demidenko A.F. Shevchuk S.V. (12)

Ukrainian Labour Party Zvarych R. M. People's Movement of Ukraine Shuliak P.I. Deputy Minister of Defense (41)	Baulin P.B. Samofalov G.F. Anishchuk V.V. Communist party of Ukraine Matveev V. Y. Faction of Communists Buiko G.B. Pkhidenko S.S. Domansky A.I. Communist Party of Ukraine Eshchenko V.M. Strogov A.N. Bilorus O.G. Batkivshina Grachev O.O. " Dovhan S.V. Committee member on issues of finance and banking, faction of Peasant Party of Ukraine Kononov V.M. Faction of the Green Party Smirnov E.L. Zhezhuk N.S. Communist Party of Ukraine Gavrysh S.B. Group Revival the Regions Tropin V.I. Communist Party of Ukraine Royenko V.G. Communist Party of Ukraine Oliynyk B.I. Communist Party of Ukraine Kruk Y. B. Rakhanskyi A.V. Strizhko L.P. Faction of Communists Abramov F.M. Faction of Communists (59)	
	PERIOD 2 (2006- 2009)	
Poroshenko P. Minister of Foreign Affairs Defence Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov Yatsenyuk A.P. Head of Ukrainian Parliament President Viktor Yushchenko Deputy Foreign Minister Konstyantyn Yeliseyev Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Konstantyn Yeliseyev, Presidential Special Envoy to Georgia Ogryzko V. Foreign Affairs Minister NATO-Ukraine commission Kendzior Y. M. Our Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc Kozhara L.O. Party of Regions Grytsenko, A. S. The Our Ukraine–People's Self- Defense Bloc Minister of Defense Kupchyshyn O.M. Foreign Minister Deputy	Petr Simonenko, Communist Party of Ukraine Kiseliov V.O. Party of Regions Bloc Gordienko S.V. Communist Party of Ukraine Shufrich N.I. Party of Regions Bloc Sukhy Y.M. Party of Regions Aleksandrovska A.O. Communist Party of Ukraine Konovalyuk V.O. Party of Regions Kravchenko M.V. Communist Party of Ukraine Alekseev I.V. Communist Party of Ukraine Chechetov M.V. Party of Regions Stetskiv I.S. The Our Ukraine–People's Self- Defense Bloc Akimova I.M. Party of Regions Bloc	Litvin V.M. The Lytvyn Bloc Kiseliov V.O. Party of Regions Bloc Grinevetsky S.P. The Lytvyn Bloc Yanukovich V.F. Party of Regions Sukhy Y.M. Party of Regions Konovalyuk V.O. Party of Regions Bilorus O.G. Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc Kravchenko M.V. Communist Party of Ukraine Moroz O. O. Shurma I.M. Social – Democratic Party United Shevchuk S.V. Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc Kalashnikov O.I. Party of Regions Chubarov R. A.

Shkil A.V. Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc Kyrylenko I.G. Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc Parubiy A. Our Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc Zayets I. Ukrainian National Party, Our Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc Tsytyskiy N. First deputy General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Tarasyuk B. I. People's Movement of Ukraine Party Our Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc Bilorus O. G. Member of Committee of Foreign Affaires Filenko V. P. Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc Stoiko I.M. People's Movement of Ukraine Sobolev, S. V. Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc Pisarenko V.V. Non-party Yavorivsky V.O. Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc Kostenko Y. I. Our Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc Dzhorzhyk Y. I. The Ukrainian's People Party Kyrylenko V. A. Our Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc Kyrychenko S.O. Chief of the General Staff Commander-in-Chief Prokopovych N.V. “Our Ukraine” Grygorovych L.S. “Our Ukraine” Kinakh A.K. Head of Committee on national security and defense Sukhy Y.M. Party of Regions Kniazhevich R.P. “Our Ukraine” Bokyi I.S. Lukianenko L.G. Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc Chornovil T.V. Tymoshenko Y. V. Poliakov L.I. Antipov O.M. Secretary of Committee on Security and Defense Gnatenko L.M.	German G. M. Party of Regions Bogoslovskaya I. Party of Regions Grynevetsky S. P. Bloc of Litvin Chervonopyskyi S.V. Socialist Party of Ukraine Yanukovich V.F. Party of Regions Tsybenko P.S. Communist Party of Ukraine Popescu I.V. Party of Regions Yevremov O. S. Party of Regions Lukash O.L. Party of Regions Matveev V.G. Faction of Communists Boldyrev Y.O. Party of Regions Samofalov G.F. Kushnariov Y. P. Bulba S.S. Socialist Party of Ukraine Bondarchuk I. M. Matvienkov S.A. Socialist Party of Ukraine Kolishnichenko V.V. Miroshnichenko Y.R. Marmazov Y.V. Communist Party of Ukraine Ponomarenko G.G. Gorbenko N.A. Party of Regions Golovatyi S.P. Bugaets A.O. Masenko O.M. Zarubinsky O.O. Bondarchuk O.V. Communist Party Chichkanov S.V. Solomatin Y.P. Mironenko V.A. Communist Party of Ukraine Gerasimov I.O. Communist Party of Ukraine Stoyan O.M. Party of Regions Shurma I.M. Social – Democratic Party United Komar M.C. Party of Regions Mishura V.D. Buiko G.B. Faction of Communist Anti-fascist committee Shepetin V.L. Zaiets V.V. Azarov M.Y. Oplachko V.M. Faction of Communist Party	Sadovyi M. I. Socialist Party of Ukraine
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Yadukha V.S. Taran V.V. Party “Batkivshchina” (Fatherland) Manchulenko G.M. People’s Movement of Ukraine Zaets I.O. The Ukrainian’s People Party Bandurka O.M. Zhyzhko S. A. Our Ukraine Chernovetsky L. M. “Our Ukraine” Pavlychko D.V. The Ukrainian’s People Party Girnyk E.O. “Our Ukraine” Lyashko O.V. Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc Nemyria G.M. Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc Yakovyna M. M.	Boiko B.S Social – Democratic Party United Peklushenko O.M. Party of Regions	
	PERIOD 3 (2010-2013)	
Bondarenko V.D. Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc Chornovil T.V. First deputy head Committee of International Affaires Chornovil T.V. Chornovolenko O.V. Chumak V.V. Udar Vitaliy Klitchko Dzhorzhyk Y.I Ukrainian People’s Party Grytsenko A.S. Head of Committee on National Security and Defense Karmazin Y.A. Our Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc, The Motherland Defenders Party Karpuk V.G. Kendzior Y.M. Our Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc, Party For Ukraine! Kirilenko V.A. Deputy group “For Ukraine” Kniazhevich R.P. Fraction "Fatherland Kurennoy V.K. Kurpil S.V. Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, All- Ukrainian Union "Fatherland" Lyashko O.V. Martynenko M.V. Our Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc ”. Martynenko M.V. Our Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc Movchan P.M. Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc Parubiy A.V. Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, All- Ukrainian Union "Fatherland	Naidionov A.M. Faction of Communists Lelyuk O.V. Faction of Party of Regions Gorbatuyk A.O. Grishchenko .K.I. Kovalevska Y.O. Zarubinskiy O.O Azarov M.Y. Mozharovsky V.M. Vecherko V.M. Faction of Party of Regions Smituykh G. E. Faction of Party of Regions Volynets E. V. Chechetov M.V. Demchenko R.M. Miroshnichenko Y.R. Faction of Party of Regions Kolotsey Y.O. Faction of Party of Regions Komar M.C. Yanukovich V. President of Ukraine Popesku I.V. Faction of Party of Regions Aleksandrovska A.O. Faction of Communists Kozhara L.O. Faction of Party of Regions Kuzmuk O.I. Faction of Party of Regions Grach L.I. Faction of Communists Simonenko P.M. Communist Party Alekseev I.V. Communist Party Tsarkov E.I. Matveev V.G. Faction of Communists	Kiseliov V.O. Party of Regions Bloc Kaplin S.M. Faction “Udar” Grinevetsky S.P. The Lytvyn Bloc Dzhorzhyk Y.I Ukrainian People’s Party Litvin V.M. The Lytvyn Bloc Shevchhuk S.V. Zarubinsky O.O. Klympush O.D.

Plushch I.S. Shevchenko O.O. Fraction "Svoboda" Shkil A. V. Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc Zarubinskiy O.O. The People's Party Shkutyak Z.V. Our Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc Stoyko I.M. Fraction "Fatherland, Party For Ukraine! Syrotyuk Y.M. All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" Taran V.V. Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc Tarasyuk B.I. People's Movement of Ukraine, Our Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc ” Tomenko M.V. Fraction "Fatherland Yavorivskiy V.O. Zaets I.O. Our Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc” Zaiets I.O. Our Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc, Ukrainian People's Party	Skarbobiychuk R.V. Faction of Communists Kinakh A.K. Kolesnichenko V.V. Faction of Party of Regions Tsybenko P.S. Faction of Communists	
	PERIOD 4 2016-2018	
President Petro Poroshenko Members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Volodymyr Groysman Prime Minister of Ukraine, NATO-Ukraine Commission Gerasimov A.V. European Solidarity party Patukh T.T: Faction “Samopomich Union” Fris I.V. Faction Bloc of Petro Poroshenko Head of Permanent Parliamentary Assembly NATO Burbak M.Y. National front Bereziuk O.R. Faction “Samopomich Union” Tymoshenko Y. V. “Fatherland” Party Yurinets O.V. Member of NATO Assembly Faction Bloc of Petro Poroshenko Tarasyuk B.I. “Fatherland” Party Deputy Head of Foreign Affairs Committee Syroid O. Head of Verhovna Rada Deputy Krulko I.I. “Fatherland” Party Parubiy A.V. Head of Verhovna Rada	Vilkul O.Y. Opposition Bloc (former Party of Regions) Nimchenko V.I. Opposition Bloc (former Party of Regions)	Lyashko O.V. Radical party of Oleg Lyashko Boiko Y.A. Opposition Bloc (former Party of Regions) Bondar V.V. Revivial Party Litvin V. M. People's Party Chumak V.V. Bereziuk O.R. Self-Reliance Party Pisarenko V.V. Revivial Party Melnichuk S.P. Pinchuk V. Businessman Boiko Y.A.

Groisman V.B. Prime Minister of Ukraine Lyashko O.V. Radical party of Oleg Lyashko Burbak M.Y. Head of Faction National Front Gerashchenko I.V. Faction Bloc of Petro Poroshenko Kryvenko V. M. The People's Movement of Ukraine Vysotsky S.V. Gopko G.M. Ionova M. M. European Solidarity Lutsenko I.S. Faction Bloc of Petro Poroshenko Sobolev S.V. "Fatherland" Party Vivk V.I. Radical party of Oleg Lyashko Vinnik I.Y. Faction Bloc of Petro Poroshenko Klimkin P. A. Foreign Minister of Ukraine Zayats A.I. State secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affaires Basiuk S.M. Deputy Head Security Service of Ukraine Pastukh T.T. Lozovoy A.S. Vlasenko S.V. "Fatherland" Party Klympush-Tsyntsadze I.O. First deputy of the head of Committee in Foreign Affaires Yatsenyuk A.P. Prime Minister Prystaiko V.V. Ministry of Foreign Affaires Rusnak I.S. Ministry of Defense Illienko A.O. Svoboda Teteruk A.A. National front Kyshkar P.M. Zalshchuk S.V. Lyashko O.V. Radical party of Oleg Lyashko Katser-Buchkovska N.V. Vovk V.I. Radical party of Oleg Lyashko Poyarkov V.O. Rychkova T.B. Faction Bloc of Petro Poroshenko Sotnyk O.S. Union "Self-Reliance" Bereza Y.M. Faction "Samopomich Union" Derevianko Y.B. Party "Volia"		
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Gorbulin V.P. Director of National Institute of Strategical Research Goncharenko O.O. Faction Bloc of Petro Poroshenko		
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Appendix 5. Projects of national identity: Self representation of Ukraine in basic discourses

Period 1 (1997-2003) Pro-NATO project of Ukrainian identity.

Representations: Cooperation with NATO		Representations: Euro-Atlantic integration	
Cooperation with NATO	and Russia as a way to Europe as evolution of society as foreign policy became more acceptable Ecology and NATO has impact on economy in peacekeeping missions military sphere National security interests Politicized issue Rada takes part in Wide range of issues	Effects of NATO integration	Consultation Democratic control Fight with international terrorism Hight technology Common operations (peacekeeping) Be wealthy Not expensive Protection of population Support of national ecological and economic security programs
Relations with NATO	Unique status of Ukraine as European security is important to be considered	NATO integration	as European choice in foreign policy as part of European integration is not certain decided by referendum guarantor of independence
NATO enlargement	in national interest	Ukraine	will join NATO needs NATO does not enter NATO yet starts integration into NATO
Representations: International dimension		Representations: National dimension	
Ukraine	as a peacekeeper as a regional actor as Central-Eastern European country as in sphere of Russian influence as part of European system of security as subject of geopolitics has been following Russia is not a member of CIS lost nuclear status deserves to be in Europe has responsibilities with the IO making historical choice International actor as a neutral country solved border problems	Ukraine	act independently, national interest as Europe as a colony/occupied as undecisive solved border problems needs to be united need to be strong as vulnerable
		Ukrainian society	is not ready for NATO integration
		Ukrainian people	Politicised Considerer NATO political, democratic bloc Support regular contacts with NATO
Foreign Policy	change in 2002 Integration into European and world structures Priority of international integration	Army	is underfinanced needs modernisation

Evaluations of foreign policy	Advances Unprecedented success		
Multi-vector	Harmful	Geography matters	Alliance's neighbour Between Europe and Russia
Neutrality and non-bloc status	Lost sense Created mechanisms of European security preserved		

Period 1 (1997-2003) Anti-NATO project of Ukrainian identity.

Representations: Cooperation with NATO		Representations: Euro-Atlantic integration	
Cooperation	as degradation as intervention divides society Illegal Information and education programs is copied from others is not controlled by Rada is not in national interest should be stopped Obligations for Ukraine Peacekeeping costs Wider cooperation is not needed	Effects of Euro-Atlantic integration	Financial cost of NATO Industrial decline Instrumental usage of territory is against national interests as instrument of power is harmful No benefits splits Slavic states Will result in problems with Russia
Ukraine	an accomplice as a buffer zone is dragged into NATO peacekeeping forces gives preference to NATO	Euro-Atlantic integration	Secretive nature Negotiation on NATO integration to be stopped
Military training	Against military training as anti-Russian as occupation as NATO integration costs Sovereignty is violated military as cannon fodder	Ukraine	will serve foreign interests will lose independence will defend foreign interests is dragged into NATO as a victim of conflict between NATO and Russia
Ukraine and NATO	have different interests Formation of European collective system of security and Russia as one issue		
Partnership	as anticonstitutional Need to be validated with NATO is needed Rada did not ratify the Charter		
Representations: International dimension		Representations: National dimension	
Ukraine	a neutral and non-bloc state a subject of geopolitics as a colony as a tool against Russia as non-nuclear state as peaceful / peacemaker as responsible for victims as Slavic cannot develop without Russia gave up nuclear weapons	Ukraine	loses industries as unlawful state as poor as independent as governed from the outside as dependent on others as democratic as defenceless and vulnerable as corrupt

	integration into larger European structures international actor participates in US military campaigns		as European (country)
Non-bloc status	prevented Ukraine from Tashkent Treaty	Army	is reforming as needed modernisation
Relations with Romania	Ukraine supported Romania on NATO Ukraine is successful in bilateral relations	Foreign policy with NATO	Inconsistent Collaboration with the occupant
Peacekeeping forces	Are commanded by NATO	Referendum	on integration with Russia and Belorussia Unite in prosperity
		Ukrainian people	against NATO Need for referendum Destiny at risk Peaceful unity with Slavic nations as cheated should decide on NATO
		Neutrality	issue to be solved as in constitution as part of referendum on independence to be secured was in Declaration

Period 1 (1997-2003) In-Between-NATO project of Ukrainian identity.

Representations: Cooperation with NATO		Representations: Euro-Atlantic integration	
Cooperation	is impossible/incompatible with national interest is not on agenda Ecology Leave PfP program	*****	
Charter with NATO	constrains Ukraine		
Representations: International dimension		Representations: National dimension	
Ukraine	s associated member as an international actor as non-bloc and neutral	Ukraine	as peaceful as a European country need to concentrate on internal issues lacks independence
Foreign policy law 2002	Need for balanced policies Euro-Atlantic orientation	Ukrainian people	didn't decide on NATO
		Ukrainian society	is not aware of NATO issue

Period 2 (2006-2009) Pro-NATO project of Ukrainian identity.

Representations: Cooperation with NATO		Representations: Euro-Atlantic integration	
Cooperation	and other bilateral relations as army support as development as economic advantage as progress Deeper cooperation Effective cooperation Enhanced cooperation Fruitful and beneficial cooperation Implementation of Ukraine-NATO plans Importance of cooperation Ongoing progress on cooperation	Euro-Atlantic integration	Profitable for Ukraine and Europe Decided through referendum No other alternative to European vector Commitment to Consistency on Contributes to Ukraine's international role as protection against Russia is correct is protection of sovereignty Geostrategic and civilizational choice is defined by laws as EU integration as economic and social development Guarantees security and stability Government promotes Improves possibility to defend national interests Has little support
Ukraine	as Strategic NATO Partner Attitudes towards NATO	Ukraine	does not join NATO needs NATO joins developed democracies Committed to continuity in political decisions
Military training	as not a threat	Non-bloc status	is not justified by current situation
		Ukraine and Allies	as a future NATO member Support of Ukraine MAP application Positive evaluation of Ukraine's military participation Allies positive on Ukraine's membership Allies help in reforms
National interest Ukraine	Army should defend Foreign troops in Ukraine Friendly relations with Russia Join MAP and NATO Need to be taken into account	NATO's enlargement	ensures security
NATO & Ukraine as community	Committed to collective security Common security threats Mutually beneficial relationship Promotion of regional cooperation Wide range of cooperation issues	EU integration	No guarantees
Partnership	contribution to peace in Euro-Atlantic		
Peacekeeping forces	under NATO command		

Representations: International dimension		Representations: National dimension	
Ukraine	a part of UN mission Refused nuclear weapons as a buffer zone as a member of regional European security system as a transit country as both East and West as European as involved into military abroad Contributes to regional peace settlement Contributor to regional security enhances security is different from Georgia NATO contributor to security should behave like Baltic states Takes part in humanitarian mission Transparent in security issues	Ukraine	Sovereign state solving its problems independently State problems as a Victim will be more egalitarian as divided strives for peace and stability as united can defend itself
		Ukraine as democratic	Faithful to democratic principles Freedoms guaranteed Ready for democratic changes Respectful for international norms Respects constitution
Ukraine as a member of international community	Active in Council of Europe Integration into EU Member of World Trade Organisation Seeking enhanced cooperation with EU Seeking free trade with EU as cooperating with all civilized world integration is geopolitical issue refused nuclear weapons	Ukraine as progressive country	Committed to continue reforms Development of international program Ongoing consolidation of the elites views on NATO Peacefully managed conflicts Progress in reforms Technologically advanced
Relations with Russia	Ukraine is open for discussion of NATO integration	Ukraine as Struggling	Army is not financed Coping with challenges Late with deadline to join NATO More reforms to align with NATO standards Need to continue reforms Needs to make a choice in foreign policy Reforms are slow
		Decision-making on NATO membership	Alliance decides on Ukraine membership Allies decide on MAP Decision will be taken by referendum Referendum as distraction Third parties should not decide Ukraine is in disadvantage people should decide

		NATO's role	is a divisive issue Humanitarian aid MAP as a consolidation factor for society assists Ukraine leads Ukraine to Europe supports information to the public supports Ukraine's reforms Social benefits for Ukrainian society
		Ukrainian people	are not interested in NATO issue Necessity to inform the public Promoting information on NATO among the public Resources for improved NATO image do not support NATO membership Unknowlegable about NATO
		Ukrainian society	Internally divided Dialogue to convince the nation Internal divisions in the coalition

Period 2 (2006-2009) Anti-NATO project of Ukrainian identity.

Representations: Cooperation with NATO		Representations: Euro-Atlantic integration	
Cooperation	as costly different from integration in non-peacekeeping is possible against terrorism leads to death of Ukrainian military is absurd with aggressive armies	Euro-Atlantic integration (as regression)	Commitment of state crime Divisive for society as religion acceptable with good relations with Russia endangers cooperation with other countries Financial costs as regression is not EU integration Rada should control Political irresponsibility is catastrophic Political irresponsibility Issue of sovereignty
Ukraine as a NATO partner	NATO's puppet as a buffer is used in conflicts	Ukraine	will not join NATO will not join MAP not expected takes a side in Russia-West relations
		NATO integration as forced	Ukraine is dragged into NATO Voting on NATO is being forced
		MAP	means membership Initiative to join is a shame leads to referendum Demand to withdraw the letter to join MAP

			Ukraine learnt about MAP from American senator
Representations: International dimension		Representations: National dimension	
Ukraine as international actor	Creation of unified economic zone with Russia Pan-European security system alternative to NATO Ukraine's participation in international organisations Ukraine in external conflicts has geopolitical value Ukraine hasn't used the opportunity at Summit need to prepare for system of collective security	Decision-making	controlled by the US Against referendum (finance) be taken at referendum Government-driven process MAP after referendum Yushchenko ignores the referendum issue Referendum and Russian language Referendum as democratic Referendum law does not exist Referendum results Ukrainian people should decide
Ukraine in external conflicts	Ostrich politics in Kosovo Ukraine helps Serbia dragged into conflict outside its borders Defend foreign interests	Society	Common European values Divided society Escalation of political situation has negative attitude towards NATO integration
National interest	EU and Russia NATO integration is against is sold by the capitalists are not protected by the government are touched by Kosovo independence	Ukrainian people	Wise as pro-Soviet needs more information are against being passive observers Majority is against are being fooled
Ukraine as a victim	as a victim of NATO and US is a victim of economic crisis in the zone of confrontation between Russia and US is used as political currency in geopolitics	Ukraine as a victim	as a victim of Yushchenko politics Genocidal politics in Ukraine
Ukraine as non-bloc neutral	Active neutrality - including cooperation with NATO Neutrality is not against European choice Neutrality is not isolation Realisation of neutrality and non-bloc status of Ukraine	Ukraine (positive)	as non-bloc neutral as becoming democratic is Lacks of democratic process as former Soviet empire as independent
Ukraine's occupied	as a Western colony as American geopolitical space defends US interests is the US protectorate	Ukraine as occupied	Foreigners in government Majority in the Parliament is controlled by NATO National treason is taking place Pro-American and anti-Russian forces in the coalition favourable for the US decisions Yushchenko as loyal to the US as colonial economy is colonised
		Ukraine (negative)	Need to solve domestic social and economic problems Lacks common idea

			Looking for enemies as excuse as ruined need to support the army is in deplorable state does not learn from history
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Period 2 (2006-2009) In-Between-NATO project of Ukrainian identity.

Representations: Cooperation with NATO		Representations: Euro-Atlantic integration	
Cooperation	is not membership Relations are divisive	Euro-Atlantic integration	Refusal from forcing No need for is not popular in Parliament a distraction from internal problems Reforms as preparation for NATO vector is pushed
		Ukraine	is in NATO as NATO member: is not expected in NATO hasn't used the opportunity at Summit
Representations: International dimension		Representations: National dimension	
Ukraine	need to prepare for system of collective security as non-bloc independent is used as political currency in geopolitics participation in international organisations Need for higher international level	Ukraine	Politicians endanger existence as highly developed country is in deplorable state has geopolitical value Lack of democratic process is striving to become democratic
		Ukraine (dependent on others)	Lack of state self-fulfillment always needs a master has to be independent state statehood is vulnerable has to fix the country by itself need to get a guaranteed neutral status need to solve domestic social and economic problems Looking for enemies as excuse
		Decision-making	Referendum
		Ukrainian society	Divided Ukrainians are "defeated"

Period 3 (2010-2013) Pro-NATO project of Ukrainian identity.

Representations: Cooperation with NATO		Representations: Euro-Atlantic integration	
Cooperation	as military training as peacekeeping in NATO Deepening C Defence depends on Need for wider C	Euro-Atlantic integration	Renewal of as continuity as the only option as European choice

Ukraine	needs NATO to defend its citizens Worsened relationships with NATO Need new laws allow dialogue with NATO As European system of security		
Representations: International dimension		Representations: National dimension	
Effects of neutrality (negative)	is not able to sustain defence costs Turn to Russia Limits international participation Isolates Ukraine European choice is dismantled Endangers Ukraine Damages international image and agency	Effects of neutrality (negative)	Divisive for Ukrainian society
Change of foreign policy	Weakness of foreign policy Threat to national security Getting closer relations with Russia Document on neutrality is superficial Balanced approach in military exercise Anti-NATO foreign and domestic policy	Neutrality / non-bloc (negative)	Contradictory - military bases is harmful is outdated Non-bloc is not a legal term has to end military base in Crimea Sevastopol base is unconstitutional Ukraine is de facto non-bloc Indecisiveness of civilizational choice
Cooperation	as international actor as UN member	Ukrainian society	does not agree with coalition
Ukraine	as a peacekeeper does not protect its peacekeepers Peacekeeping as international image No financial benefits from peacekeeping in the UN	Ukraine	Undemocratic Undecisive / civilizational choice not successful loses opportunities looking up to Russia has to defend its citizens is located between Atlantic and Pacific has identity not successful
Ukrainians (victim)	are victims of Russian bordercontrol sailors in international fleet as a victim of pirates		
Ukraine (colonial)	is dependent was occupied by Russia Will be a coloni and satellite state		

Period 3 (2010-2013) Anti-NATO project of Ukrainian identity.

Representations: Cooperation with NATO		Representations: Euro-Atlantic integration	
Cooperation	is beneficial for Ukraine		

	is too large with NATO is illegal Focused on economic benefits continues	Euro-Atlantic integration	Creates tension between Ukraine and others Sovereignty loss Divisive for society Creates tension between Ukraine and others is not national interest
Military training	with NATO is unacceptable		
Participation in NATO operations	meets foreign interest of Ukraine		
Representations: International dimension		Representations: National dimension	
Ukraine	must be recognized as neutral country Ukraine is a non-bloc country is a factual non-bloc country has choices in security does not take part in military blocs follows pro-Ukrainian policy Need to define mechanisms of implementation as a bridge between the East and the West Strong, independent, reliable partner Self-isolated from the world Open to cooperation with others New period, international image Must become regional leader in Eastern Europe	Ukraine	needs it own independent politics lacks finances as regional as corrupt Politically stable country Oriented by national interest Oriented by economic benefits Need to be unified around national idea Effective cooperation of power Democratic and competitive with high potential A victim of internal divisive politics
Effects of neutrality (positive)	Will fasten European integration International actor/Ukraine as a full member of world Strengthened international image of Ukraine Pragmatic foreign policy	Effects of neutrality (positive)	Insures development Progress in all spheres of life Economic benefits strengthen sovereignty Depoliticized the NATO issue Defense of state sovereignty Defense of national interest Consolidates Ukrainian political forces Brings economic benefits
Neutrality	or collective security as opposites is not implemented sufficiently is not archaic neutrality will fasten European integration Main element of foreign policy	Neutrality	Non-bloc status is in the Declaration of Independence Historical moment Geopolitical choice FP is based on Ukrainian basic laws Adopted by the people of Ukraine
European integration	Continuity of Euro- integration policy Cooperation with the EU	European integration	Systemic social transformation

	Does not hamper relations with Russia As priority Fundamental part of pragmatism Ongoing negotiation process		
National interest	Non-bloc status is national interest Need to be defended is endangered Have international agreements Cooperation with collective security structures FP as national interest	Foreign policy change	A need of update Makes Ukrainian politics open
Ukraine as member of collective European security system	Active participant of collective system Alternative security membership Contributor to world peace and stability Military training not efficient or united	Ukrainian society	Unified society is priority people lack money was waiting for neutrality does not support NATO reject nationalistic agenda do not trust politicians
Cooperation	as international actor in the military sphere		

Period 3 (2010-2013) In-Between-NATO project of Ukrainian identity.

Representations: Cooperation with NATO		Representations: Euro-Atlantic integration	
++++		++++	
Representations: International dimension		Representations: National dimension	
Neutrality	Allows coalition formation Choice made by people in 1991 allows military exercises State does not impose ideology	Ukraine (vulnerable)	does not have money for the army Conflicts inside
Ukraine as peacekeeper	Peacekeeping is beneficial Peacekeeping does not benefit Ukraine is losing place among peacekeepers military participate in peacekeeping		

Period 4 (2016-2018) Pro-NATO project of Ukrainian identity.

Representations: Cooperation with NATO		Representations: Euro-Atlantic integration	
Cooperation	Billateral relations Committed partner Completed projects Cooperation against Russia as progress	Euro-Atlantic integration	As a way to European integration Civilizational choice Constitution change is needed is key Guarantees independence

	strengthens national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity Engagement with NATO Enhanced cooperation with Enhances reforms and ability to defend Funds to help Ukraine financially Improves security in Black Sea and Azov Sea Increased participation in missions facilitates participation of Ukrainian military Participation in military training		Guarantees peace and security High standard of living to the Ukrainian people MAP was the right thing in 2008 Membership as distancing from Russia Mobilizes Ukrainian society and reforms NATO and EU membership help to gain victory over Russia NATO is to defend Ukraine from Russian aggression Subject to political speculation
Ukraine	Significant contributor to NATO operations Special partner/Ally of NATO hosts a NATO Assembly meeting is interested in opportunities energy infrastructure is more resilient objective to achieve NATO standards	Ukrainian military	defend Euro-Atlantic choice
Ukraine and NATO as a community	Common finances Joint military exercise as efficient for both NATO and Ukraine are fighting hybrid attacks NATO and Ukraine have common things Principle of reciprocity	National interest	Change of Constitution for NATO membership Euro-Atlantic integration is to be defended
Partnership as security and stability	alone isn't enough contributes to peace of Europe provides security to Euro-Atlantic area	Ukraine as a future NATO member	will be NATO member is an Ally and eastern flank of NATO is adopting Euro-Atlantic standards contributed to NATO Strategic direction of Ukraine Restated aspiration for NATO Open door of membership Neutrality representations NATO membership as a final goal NATO membership as security Membership is supported by population as care as independence is a fight Laws for Ukraine to join NATO Irreversibility of the NATO and EU membership Integration as reforms

			Historical decisions on internal policies Discussion on NATO membership
Representations: International dimension		Representations: National dimension	
Armed conflict in Donbass	A humanitarian catastrophe Conflict to be solved by diplomatic means NATO membership could have prevented the conflict Necessity of Minsk implementation Occupied territory Peace representations Peacekeeping UN mission in Donbass Peacekeeping operation	Armed conflict in Donbass	President aims to settle it peacefully Minsk agreement is unconstitutional
		(pro) Ukrainian as post-colonial	Need to get rid of Moscow influence Rejection of colonisation Ukraine as part of empire
Ukraine as international actor	European and NATO integration International image is improved Needs support and solidarity New foreign policy approaches/representation Part of free world Peacekeeping and intern training Refused nuclear weapons in the centre of world processes is being supported right to be independent in foreign policy	Ukraine as Europe	European values in Ukraine Future EU member as European civilisation as a European democracy has European identity is a part of Europe is part of the West
Ukraine as a security provider	Commitment to Euro-Atlantic security European security Key to Euro-Atlantic security defends itself and Europe defend NATO and European countries	Ukraine as More progress needed/coping	Implementation of ambitious reforms Importance of reforms for peace and prosperity is willing to implement recommendations need to implement more laws
Ukraine as a Victim	could not defend itself defends itself is a victim of aggression	(pro) Ukraine as progressive country	Important laws on security adopted Progress in implementing reforms agrees on its laws with NATO, US and others became stronger fights corruption gained independence is not through into chaos made progress renovated army Committed to democracy and rule of law Independent can defend Peaceful as united

	Ukraine as a struggling country	Agricultural country Challenges of Ukraine - Russia aggression and defence of statehood Corrupt country Divided, loses opportunity with NATO Lack of innovative technologies Lack of nuclear weapons Late with NATO membership Need for strategy in FP Need to become more resilient Poverty to be overcome Remaining challenges has war with Russia needs financial help and lethal weapons
	Decision making on NATO	NATO should support Referendum on NATO Referendum on the Constitution Ukrainian parliament took the decision Ukrainian people made the choice
	Ukrainian state	Language and history as the basis for statehood army is strong
	NATO for Ukraine	engaged into political dialogue supports reforms in security and military area
	Ukrainian Society	does not support Russia was divided on NATO people defend Ukraine support/is united on NATO Want to see Ukraine among European democracies

Period 4 (2016-2018) Anti-NATO project of Ukrainian identity.

Representations: Cooperation with NATO	Representations: Euro-Atlantic integration	
*****	*****	
Representations: International dimension	Representations: National dimension	
*****	Sovereignty of Ukraine	Constitutional change as loss of sovereignty Non-bloc status as
	Ukraine	gained sovereignty People-oriented future European standards

Period 4 (2016-2018) In-Between-NATO project of Ukrainian identity.

Representations: Cooperation with NATO	Representations: Euro-Atlantic integration
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Cooperation	is limited	Euro-Atlantic integration	(no) NATO membership long-term Divisive for society without referendum Matter of crisis as obsession Part of political campaign Political declaration has no practical value
		Ukraine (a future NATO member)	Membership or participation in NATO Constitutional change as unnecessary does not meet NATO standards as NATO Ally
Representations: International dimension		Representations: National dimension	
Ukraine	as neutral deserves more support gave up nuclear weapons need relationships with other countries to become stronger should be a part of the civilized world	Ukraine	Economic issues are more important for the country Issue of land is more important should be strong, defend people's rights Culture, language, church, army - independence of Ukraine Divisive politics Need of strong economy Need to protect itself / National interest as problem solver as weak need to focus on internal problems need to be realistic parliament is not as good as European Need to think about interests of Ukrainians Not interested to ordinary people
		Decision-making	at referendum

Appendix 6. Representations of Others in basic discourses

Period 1 (1997-2003). Representations of Others in pro-NATO project of national identity.

External Others		No mentions	In No of documents
Russia	Anti-constitutional Russian Fleet	3	2
	Partnership with Russia is needed	5	2
	Russia accepts NATO enlargement	1	1
	Russia and Byelorussia as UN founders	1	1
	Russia as aggressor	7	4
	Russia as anti-Ukrainian	4	2
	Russia as decisive	1	1
	Russia as (post) imperial	5	3
	Russia as moving to Europe	2	2
	Russia as not a threat to Ukraine	1	1
	Russia as nuclear	2	2
	Russia as occupant	1	1
	Russia as part of NATO	15	5
	Russia as poor	1	1
	Russia as strategic partner	1	1
	Russia blocks relationship with Europe	2	2
	Russia cooperates with NATO	3	3
	Russia does not recognize Ukraine	1	1
	Russia has disarmed Ukraine	3	2
	Russia has military training with Ukraine	2	2
	Russia has military training with the US	1	1
	Russia has territorial claims	2	2
	Russia includes military infrastructure	5	2
	Russia involved into Yugoslavian conflict	2	1
	Russia is unstable	1	1
	Russia takes over Crimea	4	3
	Russian disinformation	2	1
	Russian ships causing harm	2	1
	Treaties with Russia to be reviewed	1	1
	Russian politicians (chauvinists)	3	1
	Putin as taking care of Russia	1	1
Total		85	54
The United States	US national interests	1	1
	US finances Ukrainian military training	1	1
	US controls NATO enlargement	1	1
	US as supporter of Ukraine	3	1
	US as guarantor of peace	2	1
	US as democratic	2	1
	US as aggressor	1	1
	Cooperation Ukraine-US	2	2
	Clinton made concessions to Russia	1	1
	President of the US mediator	2	1
	Kissinger as wise	1	1
Total		17	12
Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Slavic Bulgaria	Western countries/civilized	1	1
	West does not take into consideration Ukraine	1	1
Germany	Partner	1	1
Byelorussia	not in NATO	1	1
The world	changing	1	1
Serbia	European	1	1
Romania	National interest	2	1
Poland	New level of relations	2	1

China	interested in multipolarity and dominance	1	1
Europe	doesn't recognize Ukraine	1	1
	restrain Ukraine	1	1
The Balkans	Threat to peace	3	1
Central European countries	will be in NATO and EU	1	1
OSCE and NATO	security structures	1	1
CIS	Cooperation	3	1
New NATO members (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic)	Slavic, brothers, neighbours	4	4
	Budget of NATO countries	1	1
Neutral countries	Civilization, rich, high developed, democratic	3	3
Historical Others			
Warsaw Pact (and Soviet Union)	Aggressive	3	2
Stalin	wanted the USSR in NATO	1	1
	Finish geography	1	1
Hitler	Enemy	2	1

Internal Others		No mentions	In No of documents
Communists	militaristic	2	1
	surrendered nuclear weapons	2	1
Left parties	anti-NATO anti Europe	23	7
	dependent	1	1
	pro-Russian	10	3
	uneducated	1	1
Anti-Ukrainian group in Rada		2	1
Deputies	use NATO as threat	3	2
Executive branch	influenced by the left	4	2
	influenced by Russia	1	1
Government	not ready for EU and NATO	2	1
	government illegal actions	1	1
Soviet	stereotypes	4	2

Period 1 (1997-2003). Representations of Others in anti-NATO project of national identity

External Others		No mentions	In No of documents
Russia	will respond to NATO enlargement	1	1
	is not example to follow	4	2
	is not a threat	1	1
	is a different country	1	1
	has ceded to NATO	1	1
	as nuclear power	1	1
	as brotherly nation	1	1
	as a way for development	1	1
	as a neighbour	2	1
	causes problems	2	2
Total		15	12
The United States	Agreement on US-Ukraine relations	3	3
	Clinton as lacking support	4	1
	Cooperation with the US should be stopped	1	1
	NATO and US as responsible for Yugoslavia crimes	12	10
	NATO and US as responsible for Iraq	3	2
	finances military training	1	1

	as a threat	12	7
	aggressive politics	20	10
	behind NATO in Ukraine	2	2
	as criminals	1	1
	as empire	6	4
	as police state	3	3
	as terrorist state	4	3
	as undermining the UN	2	2
	controls Ukraine's information	2	1
	controls power in Ukraine	7	4
	plots of coup d'état in Ukraine	1	1
	influences Ukrainian culture	2	2
	double standard in IR	1	1
	is NATO	4	3
	violates international law	2	2
Total		93	64
NATO	Enlargement as a threat to Russia	3	2
	Enlargement prevents reintegration of post-Soviet countries	1	1
	Membership is not in sight	3	2
	Military and political bloc	2	2
	NATO and nuclear weapons	3	2
	NATO and the US as anti-Slavic	7	4
	as a coloniser/occupant	16	6
	as a policeman	5	4
	as a threat	12	4
	as aggressive	75	28
	as criminals	28	13
	as existential issue	2	2
	as historical enemy	2	2
	as legacy of the fascists	5	3
	as military power	8	5
	as outdated	3	2
	as part of Europe	3	2
	as satanic	1	1
	as selective	4	1
	benefits from professional army	2	1
	challenges the UN	9	4
	creates insecurity	18	14
	develops plans for Crimean conflict	1	1
	does not contribute to wealth	6	6
	excluded from collective security	1	1
	expands to the East	5	3
	serves to the US	9	6
	spreading fake information	9	3
	subjugates Ukrainian policy	12	7
	supports Eastern Europe regimes	1	1
	Violation of International Law	15	7
Total		271	140
Europe	as aging	1	1
	as aggressive	1	1
	as defenceless against NATO	2	2
	as a guide/example	2	2
Total		6	6
Yugoslavia	as brotherly nation	3	3
	as NATO victim	18	13
	Slobodan Milosevic patriot	4	1
	Peoples of Yugoslavia defend independence	2	2
	Kosovo military as terrorists	1	1
The Balkans	Fascism in the Balkans	3	1

	as American interest	2	2
Western countries	as unethical (intervention, genocidal politics, ethnic cleansing)	3	3
	interferes	2	1
	does not need Ukraine	1	1
	dictates Ukraine	3	2
European countries	take markets	4	2
Iraq	as a victim	3	1
	England and US as responsible for Iraq	1	1
Germany	as former enemy	4	3
China	as progressive	1	1
UN	as powerless	2	2
	UN Secretary General subjugated to the US	1	1
Turkey	as NATO and threat	3	2
Poland	military in Iraq	1	1
	good neighbour and NATO	3	1
France	as aggressor	1	1
Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic	New NATO countries	1	1
NATO countries	are not threatened	1	
Antanta	as historical threat	2	1
Neutral countries	peaceful	2	2
OSCE	does not fulfil the function	1	1
International institutions	Controlling	2	2
IMF representations	Controlling and interfering	5	5
CIS countries	as interest	2	2
Yugoslavia, Russia, Byelorussia	brotherly nations	18	12

Internal Others		No mentions	In No of documents
Ukrainian officials	Unknown steps	3	3
Deputies	drag Ukraine into Iraq war	1	1
Soviet Union	as historical Other	2	2
Rukh	as interested in NATO	4	3
President Kuchma	as destabilizer	4	4
	as a criminal	13	14
	Kuchma government seeks NATO membership	11	6
	as unreliable	2	1
	as anti-Russian	2	2
Government of Ukraine	as pro-US	1	1
	as anti-Slavic	1	1
	as anti-Communist	1	1
	as pro-NATO-biased	20	10
Executive power	as anti-constitutional	9	4
Kravchuk	lost nuclear status of Ukraine	3	2
Political forces	collaborate in foreign policy	14	9
Political elites	as destructive	2	1
	as corrupt	6	6
Non-bloc and Russian factor	as manipulation	2	1
Military forces	as victims of government	1	1
Ethnic minorities	as supporting NATO	1	1
Crimean Tatar	challenges	2	1

Period 1 (1997-2003). Representations of Others in In-Between-NATO project of national identity.

External Others		No mentions	In No of documents
NATO	is under transformation	1	1
	is satisfied with special partnership	1	1
	enlargement as real	2	2

	brining economic loss	1	1
	as real and European structure	1	1
	as potentially dangerous	1	1
	as peace-making force	3	2
	as aggressive	2	2
	as European	2	1
European countries	democratic neighbours	2	1
International organisations	helpless	4	3
Russia	reacts to NATO	1	1
Slavic Union	as imperial	1	1
Yugoslavia	ethnic cleansing	2	2

Internal Others		No mentions	In No of documents
Communists	Imperial, getting Ukraine into trouble alliances	5	2
	s as occupants	1	1
Executive power	cannot represent Ukraine	1	1
NATO integration	Internal support	3	2
	Split on NATO in Rada	7	4

Period 2 (2006-2009). Representations of Others in pro-NATO project of national identity.

External Others		No mentions	In No of documents
Russia	Aggressive	9	3
	Anti-Ukrainian position	5	3
	Condemnation of Russian actions	1	1
	Cooperation in technology	1	1
	Detrimental effect on bilateral relations	4	2
	Guarantor of Ukraine's independence	4	4
	Information attack on Ukraine	2	1
	Perceives threat from Ukraine's integration	3	2
	as interested in NATO cooperation	2	2
	as not democratic	1	1
	as part of European security	1	1
	as strategic partner	4	1
	as threat to Ukraine-US relations	1	1
	supports Ukraine	1	1
	tries to influence Ukrainian internal policies	1	1
	tries to influence the NATO expansion	7	4
	violates international law	8	3
	Russian military forces in Ukraine	4	4
	Threat to national interest of Ukraine	1	1
	Threatens Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity	18	5
	Total	78	42
The United States	Importance of the US for Ukraine	1	1
	Technologically developed	1	1
	complies with obligations of a guarantor	2	2
	relations with Russia	2	1
	supports Ukraine	10	3
	Total	16	8
NATO	Guarantor of security in Euro-Atlantic	4	3
	as a peacemaker in Georgian conflict	2	1
	as defence bloc	2	2
	as democratic community	2	1
	ensures security of Ukraine	5	5
	is not responsible for Ukrainian losses	2	1
	is wise	2	2
	Ostrich politics in Georgian conflict 2008	1	1
	Stable and reliable partner	1	1
	Territory of well-being and democracy	2	1

	Total	23	18
NATO countries	are safe from attacks	2	2
	Croatia as Slavic NATO country	1	1
Georgia	Preoccupation of external conflict	1	1
	Not in NATO	2	2
Europe	Beneficial cooperation between EU and Ukraine	3	2
	Effective cooperation with Europe	2	1
	as incomplete	1	1
	has provoked Russian aggression in Georgia	2	1
	supports Ukrainian aspiration	2	1
	region is in crisis	1	1
	Forgetful	2	1
	Necessity of soft power to promote Ukraine in Europe	1	1
	Number one trade partner	2	1
Eastern-Europe	Baltic states as example of Russian aggression and NATO choice	2	1
	Belarus as partner	5	1
	Eastern Europe joined NATO due to national agreement	2	1
	Economic competitors	1	1
	Moldova border settled	1	1
	Other countries also were divided on NATO	3	2
	Other countries suffered from communist regime less	1	1
Poland and Lithuania	Friends, successful	2	2
Romania	Economically successful	1	1
Albania	es example	3	1
China	Partner/security provider	7	1
Neutral countries	provide troops for NATO peacekeeping operations	1	1
Turkey	as NATO member	2	1
UN, OSCE, EU, NATO	Reliable peacekeeping organisations	1	1
Historical Others			
Soviet Union	sent consultants to Afghanistan provoking tragedy	1	1
Taras Shevchenko	anti-Russian	1	1

Internal Others		No mentions	In No of documents
Anti-NATO position	hypocrite	15	6
Communist	as anti-NATO	1	1
	as alien ideology	1	1
	as controlled by Russia	3	1
	as hysterical, ignorant	1	1
	as pro-Slavic	1	1
	as pro-Soviet	3	1
Politicians	divisive politics	4	3
	Pro-Moscow position	12	6
	The fifth column in the Parliament	6	4
Donbass politicians	as anti-NATO and pro-Russian	1	1
Government of Kuchma and Yanukovych	as unreliable	4	3
New coalition	not democratic	5	4
	acting against national interest	3	2
Post-soviet people	as anti-NATO	1	1
Prime-Minister	as non-democratic	5	2
SDPUo	as inconsistent	3	1
Yushchenko	as anti-NATO	2	1

Period 2 (2006-2009). Representations of Others in anti-NATO project of national identity.

External Others		No mentions	In No of documents
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Russia	is not a threat	2	2
	a strategic partner, brotherly nation	7	3
	cooperates with NATO more than Ukraine	1	1
	have common historical roots	4	2
	relations are getting worse	1	1
	Total	15	9
The United States	started aggression in the Balkans	1	1
	support nationalism	1	1
	Supports Ukraine in confrontation with Russia	1	1
	as aggressor	8	6
	as example of democratic governance	2	1
	as making decisions about Ukraine	3	3
	as world coloniser	2	1
	did not contribute finance	1	1
	drags Ukraine into NATO	8	5
	may kill Ukrainian citizens	3	2
	violated international law	1	1
	Total	31	23
NATO	Foreign policy is strategic development (or decay)	1	1
	Informational campaign about NATO is propaganda	9	5
	as a product of the Cold war	1	1
	as a spy	2	1
	cannot guarantee security	1	1
	destroys countries	1	1
	interferes into Ukrainian state	4	2
	is American instrument of influence	7	7
	is a tool of transnational corporations	1	1
	is an aggressor	17	12
	is not welcome on Ukrainian territory	1	1
	membership is a threat	4	4
	responsible for Ukrainian deaths	3	1
	supports militarisation and nationalism	2	1
	violated international law	1	1
	Total	55	40
NATO Allies	Misinformed	1	1
	Cooperation with NATO members is dangerous	2	1
Turkey	as not stable	2	2
	as NATO country, close to Caucasus	1	1
Georgia	as criminal regime supported by NATO	2	1
	as pro-American regime	1	1
	Georgian conflict as inter-ethnic	1	1
CIS countries	priority	4	3
Eastern European countries	Neighbours, brothers	2	2
Europe	refuses to provide soldiers to NATO	1	1
IMF	destroys the gold reserve	1	1
WTO	Negative effects	3	3
Neutral countries	as example of success	1	1
The UN	Re-evaluation of cooperation	1	1
Romania	as threat to territorial integrity	6	2
The world	is misinformed	1	1
	is united against terrorism	1	1

Internal Others		No mentions	In No of documents
Crimea	will never accept NATO	1	1
	Yushchenko's government violates the law of Crimea	3	1
Government as nation's enemy	Blocks information about discontent about NATO	1	1
	as anti-Russian	1	1

	damages the economy	5	2
	does serves foreign interests	7	6
	involves Ukraine into Georgian conflict	1	1
	is acting against people's will	18	11
	provides false information	14	6
	Illegal actions	32	13
	revise history	2	2
	commit state treason	4	1
	abused power	14	8
	unconstitutional actions	7	3
Political leaders	do not take care of people	6	4
	worsen the political crisis	1	1
Oligarchs	divisive politics	8	1
Yushchenko	as pro-NATO Russophobe	15	10
	(Yushchenko) as pro-American	10	6
	splits the country (civil war)	13	3
	policies as loss of sovereignty	5	3
	anti-Constitutional	3	2
Opponents	anti-Economic zone with Russia	2	1
Internal enemy	American fifth column	4	3
	Destroy sovereignty and independence	2	2
	Not patriots serve foreign interests	12	8
Nationalists	as a threat to territorial integrity and independence	3	2
Grant-holders	as pro-NATO	6	2
Military	loyal to Ukraine	1	1
Russian language	is restricted	1	1
Historical Others			
Ukrainian Republic	Collapsed	1	1
Soviet Union	Pride in past	1	1

Period 2 (2006-2009). Representations of Others in In-Between-NATO project of national identity.

External Others		No mentions	In No of documents
Russia	no problem in relations	1	1

Internal Others		No mentions	In No of documents
Parliament members	exaggerate importance of NATO issue	2	2
	fulfil political tasks	5	3
	take care of their own interests	1	1

Period 3 (2010-2013). Representations of Others in pro-NATO project of national identity.

External Others		No mentions	In No of documents
Russia	Misrecognition of Ukraine	3	1
	Necessity to involve Russia into foreign policy with EU and NATO	1	1
	as danger	4	3
	as imperial	2	2
	as independent	2	1
	benefits from cooperation with NATO	1	1
	cooperates/seeks to join NATO	3	3
	blocks Ukrainian relationships with NATO	1	1
	violates the Budapest memorandum	1	1
	does not allow Ukraine into NATO	2	1
	does not represent Ukrainian interests	2	1
	wanted non-nuclear Ukraine	2	1
	border control as danger	4	1
	Searching for other alternatives than Russia in security	1	1
	Total	29	19
NATO	The only guarantee of national security	2	2

	Security space	1	1
	welcomes Ukraine	1	1
	as peacekeeping operation	1	1
	the only system of collective security in Europe	1	1
	Total	6	6
Baltic states	as future NATO	1	1
Western countries	as examples of NATO integration	2	1
Eastern European countries	as successful NATO countries	2	1
	Ukraine has to follow	2	1
Byelorussia	as possible Shanghai Coop.Org. member	1	1
	as losing language	1	1
China	as a way to EU integration	1	1
China and France	No guarantees	1	1
Military exercise	as routine of Others	1	1
Neighbouring countries	as potential threat	1	1
Neutral countries	finance their defence	2	2
Other countries	as NATO members before EU	1	1
Poland	as example for Ukraine	1	1
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation	as alternative to Russia	4	1
US	as a partner	1	1
World	is rough	2	1

Internal Others		No mentions	In No of documents
Anti-NATO sentiment	created by Yanukovich	4	1
Coalition	is anti-Ukrainian	2	1
Communists	are oligarchs	1	1
	as dishonest entrepreneurs	1	1
Government of Yanukovich	as pro-Russian	7	4
	puts under threat national interest	3	3
	The regime destroys the army and defence	3	1
	has to defend Ukraine	2	2
	as pro-Soviet	1	1
	does not meet expectations	9	3
	is biased	1	1
President Yanukovich	threatens people	3	2
Language	as a marker of patriotism	2	1
Enemies	The fifth column in Ukraine	1	1

Period 3 (2010-2013). Representations of Others in anti-NATO project of national identity.

External Others		No mentions	In No of documents
Russia	Relations based on national interest	2	2
	Cooperation does not deepen	1	1
	Great Russian people	1	1
	main strategic partner	9	5
	Regional unity of Russia	1	1
	Relations with Russia is a way to Europe	2	2
	Renewed cooperation	6	4
	as having different internal structure	1	1
	as partners with common interest	4	1
	as enemy has economic costs	3	2
	as heterogeneous society	1	1
	rents the base in Sevastopol	1	1
	supports Ukraine	2	2
	supports collective security	2	2
	Ukraine needs Russia in economic development	4	2
	Total	40	28
The United States	as interested in disarmament	2	2

	Respect Ukraine's neutrality	1	1
	Strategic cooperation	5	2
	as aggressive	15	3
	as imperial	1	1
	as partner	2	2
US and Russia	as strategic partners	1	1
NATO	as a platform of bilateral meetings	2	1
	as aggressive	2	2
	as fighter with pirates	1	1
	Acts with impunity	2	1
	as international criminals	1	1
	favours Ukraine's approach	1	1
	is not against Sevastopol issue	2	2
Al Qaeda	as US and NATO creation	1	1
Europe	Set of regulative norms	1	1
	doesn't manage security system	2	1
	Cooperation with EU	2	2
Customs Union	Cooperation	2	1
	as a bridge between Europe and Asia	1	1
World	will be relieved by neutrality	1	1
	changes fast	3	2
West	looks positively on rapprochement with Russia	2	2
UN and NATO countries	in Libia	1	1
Turkey	as NATO cooperating with Russia	1	1
Syria	as a victim of the US aggression	3	1
Neutral countries	as non-NATO	2	1
EU	supports Sevastopol issue	1	1
China	lack of relations	6	1
China, India, others	Activation of relations	5	3

Internal Others		No mentions	In No of documents
Yanukovich and Medvedev	Collective security	1	1
Crimea	does not support military training	1	1
Government	acting as pleased	3	2
	as cooperating with Russia	1	1
	as unwilling to integrate into Eurasian Union	2	1
	is destroying the country	2	2
	is loyal to the US	3	1
	government does not abide anti-NATO	7	3
Opposition	as not democratic	1	1
	is against Sevastopol decision	1	1
	supported non-bloc status	2	1
Parliament	as not representing popular will	1	1
Parties	as pro-Western	1	1
Previous government	did not pay	1	1
	supported by the US	1	1
USSR	did not take part in peacekeeping	1	1
Yushchenko	as providing weapons to Georgia	1	1
pro-NATO MPs	as nationalists	2	1

Period 3 (2010-2013). Representations of Others in In-Between-NATO project of national identity.

External Others		No mentions	In No of documents
NATO	is divisive	1	1
	peacekeeping does not bring money	2	1
	as drug traffickers	1	1
Russia and US	as strategic partners	1	1

Peacekeeping of other countries	as a source of income	2	1
Iran and North Korea	as nuclear	1	1
International organisations	Need to join them	2	1
All countries	participate in military exercise	1	1

Internal Others		No mentions	In No of documents
Oligarchs	have to support peacekeepers	1	1

Period 4 (2016-2018). Representations of Others in pro-NATO project of national identity.

External Others		No mentions	In No of documents
Russia	Authoritarian	5	4
	Conflict price on Ukraine - economic and humanitarian	1	1
	Fights for language so could annex Ukraine	1	1
	Occupier	8	6
	Putin as a irrational	3	2
	as empire	9	5
	As enemy	5	2
	as influencer of Ukrainian militants	2	2
	as providing supplies to Eastern Ukraine	2	2
	as responsible for compliance with Minsk Agreements	3	2
	as threat to existence of the EU and NATO	3	2
	caused loss of life	6	4
	compared to Hitler Germany	2	1
	conducts war against Ukraine	2	2
	controls Ukraine	8	3
	controls media space in Ukraine	7	5
	destabilize Ukraine	9	7
	does not grant access to territories	2	2
	does not want to end the armed conflict	2	2
	has its military in Ukraine	3	2
	Russia is a threat to Ukraine and region	18	13
	is a threat to the world	5	5
	hybrid threats to the US, EU and Ukraine	5	2
	is afraid of NATO	2	1
	is aggressive	53	31
	Acting with impunity in Ukraine	1	1
	keeps prisoners	5	2
	makes an information war abroad	3	3
	obstructs NATO membership	6	2
	perceives the West as weak	1	1
	under sanctions	7	6
	undermines nuclear non-proliferation	2	1
	violates international laws	12	7
	actions in Crimea as illegal and illegitimate	3	3
	construction is a violation of Ukraine's sovereignty	2	2
	militarization of Crimea	1	1
	Russian ships attack Ukrainian ships	1	1
Russia and communist	as demons	1	1
Total		211	140
The United States	Bilateral relations	9	5
	Efficient relationship	5	4
	assists Ukraine	7	5
	supports Eastern Europe and NATO	3	2
	Trump as democratic	2	1
	US and officials as friends	3	2
	a just/democratic	2	2

	as example of NATO country	2	1
	as part of Budapest memorandum	9	4
	is strategic partner	4	4
	provides lethal weapons	3	3
	should promote alliance with NATO	4	3
	Total	53	36
NATO	Allies are ready to help with the military in Ukraine	2	1
	Allies demonstrate solidarity with Ukraine	5	5
	Committed to cooperation with Ukraine	1	1
	Defence and political bloc	3	3
	Instrument against despotism in Europe	1	1
	Military allies	5	2
	NATO General Secretary as a friend of Ukraine	1	1
	as civilisation and values	1	1
	as collective security system	8	3
	as gender equal	1	1
	as human rights defender	2	1
	as international organisation	4	3
	as perplexed	1	1
	as wealthy	1	1
	ensures security	6	6
	guarantees peace and security	8	5
	helps on its terms	1	1
	is high standard of living	3	3
	is powerful	4	4
	prevents escalation in the Black Sea	1	1
	supports reforms	15	11
	Successful international union	1	1
	Total	75	57
Euro-Atlantic area	Euro-integration has to be protected	1	1
	Expansion of NATO	4	1
	Free peoples of NATO	2	2
	Influenced by Russia	1	1
	NATO countries friends	2	2
	Partners	1	1
	are stronger and wealthier	1	1
NATO and EU	are interconnected, similar	2	2
Croatia	as NATO success	5	1
Montenegro	as NATO member	3	2
Poland	has military bases of the US	1	1
	lost its independence without defence (history)	1	1
	understands threat from Russia	1	1
Europe	Democratic	2	2
	incomplete without Ukraine	1	1
	as protected by NATO	1	1
	needs Ukraine	2	2
	Strategical security NATO	1	1
European institutions	support Ukraine against Russia	2	2
Eastern Europe	joined NATO and then the EU	1	1
Lithuania and Poland	as partners	1	1
Lithuanian colleagues	help in financial investment	1	1
Balkan	mercenaries in Ukraine	1	1
	as example of pro-NATO choice	1	1
	defend themselves from Russian aggression	1	1
Georgia	as close country	6	2
Hungary	meddling	1	1
International partners	as democratic defenders	1	1
OSCE	in Donbass	3	2
West	as example of freedom of speech	1	1

	fights against Russia	2	2
	is not united in support	3	2
The world	supports Ukraine	1	1
Representations of historical Self/Others	European symbols of integration	2	1
	Georgia independent	1	1
	Historical relationship with NATO	25	2
	Multivector foreign policy as a labyrinth	2	2
	NATO creation	1	1
	Soviet Union	3	3
	Ukraine before USSR	2	2
	XX century	1	1
	Yushchenko as supporting NATO	1	1

Internal Others		No mentions	In No of documents
Crimea	as occupied	3	3
	is Ukrainian	1	1
	Russian Crimea as threat	1	1
Eastern Ukraine	Conflict as international	1	1
	is controlled by Russia-backed militants	2	1
	Militants are backed by Russia	1	1
	Militants in Eastern Ukraine as terrorists	1	1
	Militants violate ceasefire	1	1
Anti-NATO politicians	are Ukraine's enemies	9	6
Communists	Anti-NATO, gave up nuclear weapons	4	2
Illegal groups	Need to disarm	1	1
Neutrality course in	2010 as anti-Ukrainian	4	3
Peace settlement ideas	are pro-Russian	2	1
Poroshenko	as influenced by Russia	4	1
	as providing untrue information about NATO	2	1
Pro-Russian media in Ukraine	Control, propaganda	7	2
Russian agents in Ukraine	Widespread	10	4
The pro-Russian fifth column	in parliament	11	4
Traitors	in government	2	2
Ukrainian politicians	sabotaged NATO	11	3
Military	Unreliable	3	2
Yanukovich	as pro-Russian anti-NATO	7	3

Period 4 (2016-2018). Representations of Others in anti-NATO project of national identity.

External Others		No mentions	In No of documents
NATO	National programs NATO-Ukraine as anti-European	1	1
	will not accept Ukraine	2	1
	as ideology	2	2

Internal Others		No mentions	In No of documents
Grant-holders	promote US interests	1	1
Political elite	formed unreal expectations	1	1
Presidential campaign	is built on divisive issues	2	1

Period 4 (2016-2018). Representations of Others in In-Between-NATO project of national identity.

External Others		No mentions	In No of documents
Russia	as intervening Crimea	1	1
NATO	Strategic partner	1	1
Croatia	as example of referendum on EU membership	1	1
Georgia	as example on NATO referendum	1	1

Switzerland	as an example of decision making at referenda	1	1
Brexit	as example of referendum on foreign policy	2	2
Budapest memorandum	guarantees	6	4
US	bilateral cooperation	5	2
	has bilateral alliances	1	1

Internal Others		No mentions	In No of documents
Government	is corrupt	5	1
	Traitors	4	1
Parliament	as lacking support from population	1	1
Political elite	is not efficient	2	1
President Poroshenko's	actions are contradictory	4	2

Appendix 7. Security construction in basic discourses on Euro-Atlantic integration

1997-2003 pro-NATO discourse

What is security?	What presents danger and threat?	What has to be protected?	Who/what can guarantee security?
		National security	Army
	New security threats: terrorism, migration		
		European continent	Relations between NATO and Russia
	Anti-NATO sentiment	Ukraine	Cooperation
	Dominant position of the US and Russia	Europe	
	International conflict Russia	Ukraine	
		European security	Collective actions
	Loss of nuclear status		
		Ukraine	NATO membership
	Migrants from Asia	Ukraine	
	Buffer zone	Ukraine	
		Territorial integrity	NATO, OSCE, nuclear powers
	Civilizational choice	Ukraine as Europe	Collective security
	Division on zone of influence	Ukraine	

1997-2003 anti-NATO discourse

What is security?	What/who presents danger and threat?	What has to be protected?	Who/what can guarantee security?
	Danger of war NATO Imperial states	Ukrainian people	
	Lack of control over NATO cooperation		
	Danger of military training	Ukraine Civilians	
	NATO membership		Treaty between Russia and Ukraine
	NATO	National security	
			Neutrality
			CIS military bloc
	Loss of nuclear weapons	Ukrainian people	
	Denuclearization	Slavic ethos	
			Peace with neighbors
		State survival	

1997-2003 in-between discourse

What is security?	What presents danger and threat?	What has to be protected?	Who/what can guarantee security?
			Security mechanisms
	Nuclear confrontation, war		

2006-2009 pro-NATO discourse

What is security?	What presents danger and threat?	What has to be protected?	Who/what can guarantee security?
Fundamental national interest		National values	
Essence of existence		Sovereignty	
Goes beyond Ukrainian-Russian relations		National territory, integrity	
A broad field with many players		Ukraine	
	Neighbour countries	Democracy	
	Russia	Island Tusla	
	New energy transportation routs		
	A similar to Georgia-Russia conflict	Citizens	
	Status of the Black Sea Fleet	Black Sea Fleet, Crimea	
	Being involved into foreign conflict		
	Military aggression of Russia	Ukraine	
		Ukraine's honour	
	External enemy	Disunity among patriots	
	Domestic political divisions	National interest	
		Black Sea area	
	Internal enemies		
	Double citizenship		

2006-2009 in-between discourse

What is security?	What presents danger and threat?	What has to be protected?	Who/what can guarantee security?
		Ukraine	Army
	Lack of demarcation of the borders	Military	
	Albanian militia	Peacekeepers	
		Ukrainian citizens	

2006-2009 anti-NATO discourse

What is security?	What presents danger and threat?	What has to be protected?	Who/what can guarantee security?
	Yushchenko, political course	Energy supplies Relations with Russia and Bielorrussia	
	No threat		
	Rejection to cooperation with Russia	National security	Wide cooperation between neighbours
	Unamicable relations with Russia and Bielorrussia		
	Reduction of the military	Prolongation of bilateral treaty	
		Revision of trade relations	

		Industrial cooperation	
	Conflict with Russia	Economic growth	
	Nationalist dictatorship		
	Ukrainian fascism		
	MAP	Security of Ukraine	
	Signing MAP	Ukraine as a military target	
	Joining NATO	Sovereignty	
	Nationalists	Territorial integrity	
	Puppet government/politics	Territorial integrity	
	International terrorism		
	Joining NATO/international terrorism	Ukraine	

2010-2013 pro-NATO discourse

What is security?	What presents danger and threat?	What has to be protected?	Who/what can guarantee security?
Wide understanding of security: not only military, but also economic, international, ecological – indivisible security	Non-nuclear status	Status of Ukraine as European player	
	Lack of finance	Security of Ukraine	Army
	Romania's missile defence	Sovereignty	
	Pacifism of Ukraine	Security	
	Nuclear weapons	Ukraine	
	Nuclear disarmament	Ukraine's citizens	
	Politicians	Ukrainian state, Ukrainian language, Euro-Atlantic integration	
	Imperial ambitions	Fundamental national values: language, independent church, temporal status of Black Sea Fleet, share of gas transportation system, Euro-Atlantic choice	
	New threats: cyberattack, uncontrolled migration, radical religious movements, narcotrafficking		
	Moscow empire	Independence	Civilizational choice; Euro-Atlantic integration
	Global threats		Mechanisms to prevent threats
	Neighbors	Security	Strong Ukraine

		Security	Common efforts of the majority and the opposition
		Guarantees of national security	
		Security and cooperation with NATO	
		National defence	International and national military training
		Ukraine's independence	Every citizen

2010-2013 in-between discourse

Security representations are not available

2010-2013 anti-NATO discourse

What is security?	What presents danger and threat?	What has to be protected?	Who/what can guarantee security?
	Weak Ukrainian army	World community	
		System of security	Cooperation with neighbours
	Conflict in Crimea		Decision on the Fleet
	Parliament	Statehood and independence	
	International terrorism, ecological and man-made events	Citizens	European collective security
	Military exercise	Ukrainian land	
	Pro-NATO coalition		
	Lack of Ukrainian-only military drill		
		Economy of Sevastopol	Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol
		Income from gas	Agreement on the Fleet
	Lack of actions from the State	Defensive capacity of the army	Statehood and the state
		National interest	Military training
		National security	Political will
	Weak army		
	Lack of nuclear arms		

2016-2018 pro-NATO discourse

What is security?	What presents danger and threat?	What has to be protected?	Who/what can guarantee security?
		Investments	Reform of Security Service
		Ukrainian language	Language laws
		Ukraine	Support of the whole world
	Security in the Eastern Ukraine		
		National security and defence	

	Northern Flow-2	European security Ukraine	
	Kremlin	Ukraine	
	Neutrality	National security	
	Poverty and emigration	Ukraine	
	Ukraine as exporter of goods and human resources		
	“Russian World”		Ukrainian culture
		Information space	Changes in laws and management
	Occupation	Information security	
	Return to imperial sphere		European strategy
	Revision of policy		
	Left- and right-wing populism, Euro-scepticism, undemocratic trends in neighbour countries		
		Global and regional systems of security	
		Nuclear security in Europe	Budapest Memorandum
		Economy and other spheres	Counterespionage activities
		Independence of Ukraine	Military and security agencies
	Russia	Eastern Ukraine Euro-Atlantic security	

2016-2018 in-between discourse

What is security?	What presents danger and threat?	What has to be protected?	Who/what can guarantee security?
		Ukrainian territory	Military bases
			Changes to the constitution to allow military bases of the Alliance
			Cooperation with NATO
			Direct cooperation between the US and Ukraine
			Military alliance with Eastern-European states: Poland, Baltic States, Hungary

2016-2018 anti-NATO discourse

What is security?	What presents danger and threat?	What has to be protected?	Who/what can guarantee security?
			Strong Army