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**The Southern African
Development Community
and its Relations to the
European Union**
Deepening Integration
in Southern Africa?

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Deepening Integration in Southern Africa?

Introduction

Looking at the African continent it is indeed striking that the idea of regional integration is widespread. A total of 14 Inter-Governmental Organizations have developed in Africa to deal with regional integration issues.¹ The multitude of Regional Integration Initiatives² (RIIs) however has resulted in a prevalence of overlapping memberships. Only six African states

1 Cf. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa: *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II. Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities*, Ethiopia 2006, p. xiii.

2 The prevalent term “Regional Economic Community” (REC) is linked to the idea of the African Economic Community and therefore refers first and foremost to economic integration. Although in the current literature the term REC does not exclusively refer to the economic dimension of integration, the term is not used in this article. Rather, the term “Regional Integration Initiative”, which can also be found in the relevant literature (e.g. Philippe de Lombaerde: *Supporting Regional Integration – the Roadmap of Indicators and Tools*, UNU-Cris Occasional Papers 0-2003/3, p. 3), better fits the definition of Regional Integration as a process, and it can be applied to organizations regardless of their organization’s scope and depth of integration. The term Regional Organization is used synonymously in this paper.

belong to one RII exclusively.³ Accordingly it is no surprise that Southern Africa is covered by at least three partly intersecting RIIs:

- The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA);
- The Southern African Development Community (SADC);
- The Southern African Customs Union (SACU).

Table 1 Overlapping Memberships in RIIs of Southern African States

Country	COMESA*	SADC	SACU	Other
Angola	X	X		
Botswana		X	X	
DR Congo	X	X		CEMAC
Lesotho		X	X	
Madagascar	X	X		IOC
Malawi	X	X		
Mauritius	X	X		IOC
Mozambique		X		
Namibia	X	X	X	
South Africa		X	X	
Swaziland	X	X	X	
Tanzania		X		EAC
Zambia	X	X		
Zimbabwe	X	X		

*The other member states are: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan and Uganda.

3 Cf. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa: *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa I*, Ethiopia 2004, p. 40.

Taking all SADC member states into consideration and thus applying an extended definition of Southern Africa, the number of overlapping memberships in that region actually is even larger due to the membership of Mauritius and Madagascar in the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), the Democratic Republic of Congo belonging also to the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Central, CEMAC) and Tanzania's affiliation with the East African Community (EAC). The particular levels of cooperation of the different RIIs vary substantially and none of them "has been able to produce genuine integration".⁴ However, SADC, COMESA, CEMAC and EAC are recognized as building blocks by the African Union. Taking into account prospect of success and potential for development SADC is considered the most important regional organization in Southern Africa.⁵

While the aim of deepening integration in Southern Africa seems quite evident, the question remains what challenges SADC will face on its way. After introducing the organization SADC, this paper addresses the current challenges of regional integration in Southern Africa. However, in a globalizing world, regionalization is never just an internal affair of one world region. The interrelations with other regions and countries are and have always been an influential factor. Therefore this paper also analyses the role of SADC's biggest International Cooperating Partner (ICP), the European Union, in the integration process. Finally, part three explores EU-SADC relations with a view to its contribution to the objective of deepening integration.

4 Cf. Heinonen Hannu: Economic Integration in Southern Africa, Helsinki 2005, p. 1, in: <http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/kmi/english/HannunWP.pdf> (29.01.06).

5 Cf. *ibid.*; Cf. <http://www.afrol.com/articles/16829> (29.01.07). Cf. Stefan Mair: Die regionale Integration und Kooperation in Afrika südliche der Sahara, in: http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/NATCA7,0,0,Die_regionale_Integration_und_Kooperation_in_Afrika_s%FCdlich_der_Sahara.html (29.01.07). Cf. Michael Neumann: Afrikanische Regionalisierung. Rahmenbedingungen und Perspektiven, Arbeitspapier Nr. 86/03 des Fachbereichs Wirtschaft der FH-Hannover, November 2003, p. 28.

The Southern African Development Community – An Overview

SADC currently has 14 member states representing a population of nearly 240 million people.⁶ The member states differ significantly in their geographical situations, their economic power and their development status.

Table 2 Comparative Data SADC countries⁷

Member States	Population Size (July 2006 est.)	Area (square km)	HDI Rank (out of 177)	GDP (per capita USD)	LDC status
Angola	12,127,071	1,246,700	161	2,180	X
Botswana	1,639,833	600,370	131	9,945	
DR Congo	62,660,551	2,345,410	167	705	X
Lesotho	2,022,331	30,355	149	2,619	X
Madagascar	18,595,469	587,040	143	857	X
Malawi	13,013,926	118,480	166	646	X
Mauritius	1,240,827	2,040	63	12,027	
Mozambique	19,686,505	801,590	168	1,237	X

6 The population figure is calculated on the accumulated data of the estimated population of each SADC member state for July 2006, by the CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook> (29.01.06). Seychelles withdrew their membership in 2004 because "...there was little justification for the money Seychelles was expected to contribute to the regional organization annually, especially at a time it was undergoing difficulties with the shortage of foreign exchange." But Seychelles applied to rejoin in 2006 since its economy has improved and the country has increased its activity in international relations. Cf. SADC today, Vol. 8, No. 6, February 2006, p. 9.

7 Figures for Population size and Area from <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> (4.1.2007), HDI rank and GDP data from <http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/pdfs/report/HDR06-complete.pdf> (04.01.07), LDC status from <http://www.un.org/ohrlls/> (04.01.07).

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Namibia	2,044,147	825,418	125	7,418	
South Africa	44,187,637	1,219,912	121	11,192	
Swaziland	1,136,334	17,363	146	5,638	
Tanzania	37,445,392	945,087	162	674	X
Zambia	11,502,010	752,614	165	943	X
Zimbabwe	12,236,805	390,580	151	2,065	
Total	237,718,740	7,634,705	-	-	8

While the Democratic Republic of Congo covers 62,660,551 square km, more than six times the size of Germany, Swaziland and Mauritius only comprise 17,363 square km and 2,040 square km, roughly the size of Slovenia and Luxembourg respectively. In the Human Development Index 2006 the SADC member states are ranked between 63/177 (Mauritius) and 168/177 (Mozambique).⁸ Despite being ranked behind Mauritius, South Africa is the dominant power in the region economically and politically with a GDP per capita of 11,192 USD. According to the latest data on per capita income, additional nine countries of the region (Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Angola, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique and Zambia) can be qualified as middle income countries. However, the latter five countries are still classified in the category Least Developed Country (LDC).⁹ That means, together with the DR Congo, Malawi and Tanzania, eight SADC members are LDCs.¹⁰

8 UNDP: Human Development Report 2006. Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty and the global water crisis, New York 2006, p. 284ff.

9 All countries in the Human Development Report are grouped by income using World Bank classifications: high income (gross national income per capita of \$10,066 or more in 2004), middle income (\$826–\$10,065) and low income (\$825 or less). UNDP: Human Development Report 2006. Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty and the global water crisis, New York 2006, p. 275. GDP data: p. 284ff. The Committee for Development Policy "bases its identification of least developed countries on criteria designed to measure three dimensions of a country's state of development: (a) its income level, measured by gross national income per capita; (b) its stock of human assets, measured by a human assets index; and (c) its economic vul-

Heterogeneity is thus the first impression of the SADC region. But most of the SADC member countries are unified by a common history of British colonial rule, which has also led to compatible philosophies of economy, traditions of administration¹¹ and English as the prevailing official language. Another unifying element has been the coalition against apartheid South Africa, which was the foundation of SADC's predecessor, SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference). Since then, the SADC member states have been tied up by the perception that economic growth and welfare are only possible through integration in the world market, increasing international competitiveness achieved through regional integration¹² and by a common vision anchored in historical and cultural roots.

Vision, Principles and Common Agenda

The vision of the Southern African Development Community

“is one of a common future, a future in a regional community that will ensure economic well-being, improvement of the standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social justice and peace and security for the peoples of Southern Africa. This shared vision is anchored on the common values and principles and the historical and cultural affinities that exist between the peoples of Southern Africa.”¹³

nerability, measured by an economic vulnerability index [...] to become eligible for graduation a country must meet the threshold for two of the three criteria; to qualify for graduation, it must do so in two consecutive triennial reviews.” Committee for Development Policy: Report on the sixth session (29 March – 2 April 2004), Economic and Social Council, Official Records, 2004, Supplement No. 13, New York 2004, p. 15, in: <http://www.un.org/ohrlls/> (29.01.07).

- 10 Cf. List of Least Developed Countries, in: <http://www.un.org/ohrlls/> (29.01.06).
- 11 Cf. Danko Knothe; Daniel Müller: Ritter von der traurigen Gestalt. Ursachen der Governance-Probleme multilateraler Institutionen in Afrika, Hallenser IB-Papier 2/2006, Halle-Wittenberg 2006, p. 22, in: <http://www2.politik.uni-halle.de/rode//IBFor2-06.pdf> (29.01.07).
- 12 Cf. Wolfgang Köhler: Regionalismus neuen Typs, p. 9, in: Akzente, Vol 2, 2004, pp. 8-13.
- 13 SADC Secretariat: Major Achievements and Challenges. 25-years of Regional Cooperation and Integration, Gaborone 2005, p. 19. Cf. www.sadc.int/english/about/vision/index.php (29.01.07).

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The common principles laid down in article four of the SADC Treaty are the following:

- sovereign equality of all member states;
- solidarity, peace and security;
- human rights, democracy and the rule of law;
- equity, balance and mutual benefit;
- peaceful settlement of disputes.¹⁴

SADC and the member states are supposed to act according to these principles while pursuing the Common Agenda expressed in article five of the Treaty. The agenda which aims at turning the vision into reality is very comprehensive in scope. According to this article, SADC aims to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development. Regional integration is envisaged as a means to enhance the standard and quality of life of the population and to support the socially disadvantaged. Collective self-reliance and the interdependence of member states are the basis for the evolution of common political values, systems and institutions as well as the promotion of peace, security and self-sustained development. National and regional strategies shall be harmonized, productive employment and programs shall be promoted and maximized, natural resources shall be utilized sustainably and the environment shall be protected effectively. Further objectives included in article five are the crosscutting themes of poverty alleviation (with the ultimate objective of eradicating it), the fight against HIV/AIDS, and promotion of gender mainstreaming¹⁵ as well as the strengthening and consolidation of the social, cultural and historical affinities and links among the people of the region.

14 Cf. Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, Ch. 3, Art. 4 Principles.

15 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, Ch. 3, Art. 5 Objectives.

History

In 1980, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was founded by the so-called Frontline States¹⁶ together with Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to reduce their dependency on apartheid South Africa, to achieve collective self-reliance and to secure support of the International Community. However, the real achievements were moderate.¹⁷ In 1992, the organization transformed from a development conference into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) before the end of Apartheid in South Africa, which then became a SADC-member in 1994.

The beginning of the development community marked a particularly important change in SADC's orientation: from functional cooperation to development integration. This concept differed from regional integration in the classical sense of market integration. It rather implied a very close political cooperation that developed common programs for different economic areas and coordinated economic policies for production, infrastructure and trade.¹⁸ Development integration also implied fair distribution of benefits and costs of integration¹⁹ as well as cooperation in political and security issues. But besides the then established Summit of Heads of State and Government (as the main policy-making institution), the Council of Ministers and the permanent Secretariat, the decentralized structure of SADCC lived on in sectoral coordinating units and commissions.²⁰ It was mainly this decentralized structure comprising 21 sector coordinating units that proved inefficient in the long run because it weakened the SADC Secretariat's

16 Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia.

17 Cf. Martin Adelman: SADC vor dem Umbruch: Wird die politische und wirtschaftliche Integration im südlichen Afrika gelingen?, Bonn 2005, p. 1, in: library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/02807.pdf (29.01.07).

18 Cf. Gottfried Wellmer: Studie über die zukünftigen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen der EU und den Staaten der Entwicklungsgemeinschaft des Südlichen Afrikas (SADC), p. 8, in: Dritte Welt Haus Bielefeld; Koordination Südliches Afrika (Eds.): SADC zwischen regionaler Integration und reziprokem Freihandel mit der Europäischen Union, Bonn 2000.

19 Cf. *ibid.*

20 Cf. Heinonen Hannu: Economic Integration in Southern Africa, p. 8. The scheduled tribunal for dispute settlement was not established until 2006.

power, authority and resources required to facilitate regional integration. In addition, the sector coordinating units contributed to a lack of regional focus of the SADC's Programme of Action. Also their ability to pursue and implement policies differed to a great extent.

Another problem was the ambiguous effects caused by the membership of South Africa. On the one hand, the accession of the regional economic superpower was conducive to SADC's pursuit of genuine regional integration in terms of the adoption of legally binding protocols, including the Protocol on Trade and Infrastructure.²¹ On the other hand, the rivalry between South Africa and Zimbabwe turned out to be a hindrance to instead of a facilitator of integration.²² Furthermore, the economic disparities between South Africa and the other member states created fears of South African hegemony, slowing down the integration process. Eventually in the late 1990s, even the achievements in infrastructural development and in fostering a sense of regional belonging could no longer hide the severe problems that obstructed substantial successes in regional cooperation and integration. Growing divisions within SADC were revealed for example in the failure to reach an agreement on the role of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security (established in 1996).²³ Nonetheless, SADC did not break down but instead in 1999 the Summit directed the Council to initiate a comprehensive review of the operations of SADC institutions, which finally resulted in an ambitious restructuring program. It aimed at enabling the SADC secretariat to provide adequate leadership, at ensuring a clearly focused work program linked to the overall objectives and at tackling the implementation deficit.²⁴

21 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 9.

22 Cf. Martin Adelman: SADC vor dem Umbruch, p. 2.

23 Cf. Jan Isaksen; Elling N. Tjønneland: Assessing the Restructuring of SADC – Positions, Policies and Progress, Bergen 2001, p. 4.

24 Cf. Elling N. Tjønneland; Jan Isaksen; Garth le Pere: SADC's Restructuring and Emerging Policies. Options for Norwegian Support, Bergen 2005, pp. V, 3.

The New Institutional Structure

Since the institutional structure of SADC was a primary source of the organization's lack of effectiveness and efficiency, its reorganization lay at the heart of the reform process. While the Summit of Heads of State and Government remained the supreme policy-making institution, other institutions were completely restructured or replaced by newly created ones. In contrast to the country-based coordination of sectoral activities and programs, the new structure, which after more than three years delay is now in place, is more centralized. However, the institutional reform still has not arranged for any decision-making power on the supranational level: all decisions are taken by consensus between the member states.

The key element of the reform, the political and practical strengthening of the Secretariat, comprises two elements: first, the fusion of the 21 sector responsibilities in four directorates (Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment; Infrastructure and Services; Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources; and Social and Human Development and Special Programs) of an expanded secretariat. The second main element is the focus of the Secretariat's activities on economic integration and the mobilization of financial resources and a concentration on policy development, harmonization and assistance to member states.²⁵ The core organizational structure now consists of the Executive Secretary's Office and the Department of Strategic Planning, Gender and Development and Policy Harmonization, under which the four directorates fall. New in this context is also that the directors are now chosen by the Secretariat and not by their governments. This means that one can expect their first loyalty to be to the Secretariat and then to their state of origin.²⁶ Furthermore, National Committees have been established in each Member State for more efficient national coordination and implementation of SADC policies. These Committees, composed of key stakeholders from the government, private sector and civil society in

25 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 3.

26 Cf. Wolfgang Köhler: *Regionalismus neuen Typs*, p. 10.

member states and chaired by the SADC National Contact Points, shall thereby support that the regional integration process is inclusive.²⁷

As previously mentioned, the Summit has remained the supreme decision-making institution. A new element within the governance structure is the Troika, which is built from the current, the incoming and the outgoing chairperson. The chair is elected annually. A Troika exists for all bodies of governance. It has the responsibility of acting as a Steering Committee to ensure fast decision-making and to facilitate timely implementation of decisions as well as to provide policy direction to SADC institutions between regular meetings. The Council of Ministers has the authority over two newly created institutions: the Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM), which shall provide directions to programs and activities as well as monitor and control the implementation of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the Standing Committee of Officials, a technical advisory committee to the Council.²⁸

In the course of the restructuring process SADC has also been granted control over the formerly semi-independent SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation. However the actual form of that control is not yet clear. Initially there was a small administrative unit at the SADC Secretariat. The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (SIPO), decided upon in 2004, originally envisioned a Department for Politics, Defense and Security within the Secretariat,

27 Gaolathe to launch National Committee tomorrow, Daily News online, 13 September 2002, <http://www.gov.bw/cgi-bin/news.cgi?d=20020913> (29.01.06). „SADC National Contact Points are located in the Ministry responsible for all SADC matters. Their responsibility include regular consultation with and briefings of relevant government institutions, the enterprise community and media on matters relating to SADC.“ The Southern African Development Community (SADC), p. 2f. in: www.ictsd.org/dlogue/1999-02-01/overviewSADC.pdf#search=%22national%20contact%20points%20sadc%22 (29.01.07). Cf. Martin Adelman, SADC vor dem Umbruch, p. 2.

28 Cf. Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, Ch. 5, Art. 12 Integrated Committee of Ministers; Cf. www.sadc.int/english/about/brochure/index.php (29.01.07); Cf. Munetsi Madakufamba: Council to approve regional programme for 2006, in: SADC Today, Vol. 8 (2006) No. 6, p. 8; Cf. Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, Ch. 5, Art. 13 Standing Committee of Officials; Cf. www.sadc.int/english/about/brochure/index.php (29.01.07).

headed by a Chief Director directly responsible to the Executive Secretary.²⁹ However, in 2005 it was decided to install a fifth directorate within the secretariat instead.³⁰ The directorate, which is headed by a director, reports to the Organ directly through the Executive Secretary,³¹ while the other directorates are subordinated to one Chief Director as interface to the Executive Secretary.³² The Organ is led by a Troika, which is not equal to the Troika of the Summit but annually elected by the Summit. The Ministerial Committee is responsible for the coordination of the work of the Organ and its structures. On the working level the Inter-State Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC), where the defense and security ministers meet, and the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), where the foreign ministers meet, report to the Ministerial Committee and the Organ Troika.

Since 2006 SADC has also established a tribunal based on article 16 of the SADC Treaty.³³ Like the members of the European Court of Justice the ten members of the tribunal are selected “from nationals of States who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective states or who are jurists of recognized competence”.³⁴ Their main responsibility is the arbitration among member states but also the adherence to and the proper interpretation of the SADC Treaty, SADC protocols and all binding instruments adopted within the SADC framework.³⁵

29 Cf. SADC Secretariat: Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation, Lesotho 2004, p. 48.

30 Cf. Elling N. Tjønneland; Jan Isaksen; Garth le Pere: SADC's Restructuring, p. 6.

31 Cf. Elling N. Tjønneland: SADC and Donors – Ideals and Practices. From Gaborone to Paris and back, Gaborone 2006, p. 14.

32 SADC Secretariat: New Secretariat SADC Organisational Structure as approved by Council on 25th February 2005, Grand Baie, Republic of Mauritius, in: www.sadc.int/english/about/secretariat/sadc%20Structure%205022005.pdf (29.01.07).

33 Cf. SADC establishes Tribunal, in: SADC Today, Vol. 8 (2006) No. 6, p. 4.


34 Protocol on Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure Thereof, Part II Organisation, Art. 3 Constitution and Composition, in: www.sadc.int/english/documents/legal/protocols/tribunal.php (29.01.07). For the European Court of Justice cf. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Art. 223.

35 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, Ch. 5, Art. 16 The Tribunal.

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Similar to the rules of procedure before the judicial bodies of the European Community, organs and institutions of SADC, its member states as well as natural and legal persons are allowed to bring actions against a SADC Member State or the Community under the provisions of Part III of the Protocol on Tribunal.³⁶

Overview: SADC's new institutional structure



Another pillar of the reform is the new method of calculating the membership fees. The fee is no longer the same for every single member state. Instead each state, depending on its population size and economic power, pays at least 5% but maximal 20% of the cumulative membership contribu-

36 Cf. Protocol on Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure Thereof, Part III Jurisdiction, Article 17ff. For the Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Bodies of the European Community see Treaty Establishing the European Community, Article 225ff.

tion share of the SADC budget. This is the first step towards a regional compensation between South Africa and its poorer neighbours³⁷ as South Africa is the only state contributing 20%.

The restructuring of the SADC institutions has been the most important and labour-intensive activity of the last five years. But not only have the institutions been reformed. Another important and resource consuming element of the reform was the development of the RISDP and the SIPO, which “identify the main interventions in all areas of regional cooperation and integration which SADC intends to pursue in the next 15 years.”³⁸

RISDP and SIPO – the new policies

In order to achieve as much consensus as possible on RISDP and SIPO the member states undertook national consultations with governmental departments, the private sector, NGOs, academic and research institutions during its development process.³⁹ The private sector was also involved in the consultations at regional level. The purpose of the consultations was to realign priorities, policies and strategies on a regional level.

SIPO focuses on the sectors of politics, defense, state security and public security and identifies objectives for each sector. For those objectives general strategies and activities are named. Further policy documents like the Mutual Defense Pact and the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections supplement SIPO. But still the Organ has to operationalize, prioritize and develop implementation mechanisms and business plans.⁴⁰ Despite those challenges, the work program and priorities are de facto shaped by some of the SADC institutions.⁴¹ Also, the SADC Organ

37 Cf. Hein Möllers: Regionale Entwicklungsgemeinschaft des Südlichen Afrika, n. p., in: www.issa-bonn.org/laender/sadc.htm (19.01.07).

38 SADC Executive Secretary, Dr. Tómas Salomão, Priorities during my office tenure, n.p., in: www.sadcreview.com/special_features06/frfeatures.htm (29.01.07).

39 SADC Executive Secretary DR. Prega Ramsamy Media Briefing, 9 July 2003, Gaborone, in: http://www.sadc.int/news/news_details.php?news_id=52 (29.1.07).

40 Cf. Elling N. Tjønneland; Jan Isaksen; Garth le Pere. SADC's restructuring, p. 14.

41 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 15. “The work on public security (policing) is strongly shaped by the existence of SARPCCO, which is active in facilitating technical co-operation between police agencies in the region. The Organ's work is also shaped by the gener-

has made progress in developing the plans for a peacekeeping brigade as part of the African Union (AU) standby force. Further, regional approaches in combating small arms proliferation, and in the field of election monitoring are moving ahead. There will be, among other things, the need of more financial support from donors to increase SADC's technical capacities to assist member states in this regard.⁴²

Compared to SIPO, the RISDP is already more advanced.⁴³ The final adopted version of the RISDP identifies challenges and priorities, including the twelve priority intervention areas. They are of both cross-sectoral and sectoral nature and identified as decisive for the realization of SADC'S objectives, in particular in promoting deeper regional integration, integrating SADC into the world economy, promoting balanced and equitable development, eradicating poverty, and promoting gender equality.⁴⁴ For each of these intervention areas the plan lists general and comprehensive strategies and activities. But it fails to provide clear regional and operational priorities.⁴⁵ Therefore some more, unpublished and restricted documents were worked out: the 2004 RISDP Implementation Framework, which provides rather detailed 15-year, five-year and one-year (2005-2006) implementation plans for each of the four directorates, business plans for the directorates and a list of priorities and a ranking of existing and potential RISDP projects.⁴⁶

By February 2005, 46 projects were listed corresponding to these priorities, including 31 projects that have to be implemented by the Secretariat and 15

ally good technical co-operation between the defense forces in the region through the working groups of the Inter-State Defense and Security Committee. Importantly, the Organ Troika (and in particular its current Chair, South Africa) is active in its attempts to push the Organ to the centre stage and in turning the Organ Secretariat and SIPO into effective instruments.”

42 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 16. The membership fees make up 39% of the whole SADC budget for 2007/08.

43 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 14.

44 SADC Secretariat: Regional Indicative Strategic Plan (RISDP). Executive Summary, point no. 6, in: <http://www.sadc.int/english/documents/risdps/summary.php?media=print> (29.01.07).

45 Cf. Elling N. Tjønneland; Jan Isaksen; Garth le Pere: SADC's Restructuring, p. 11.

46 Cf. *ibid.*

that lie in the responsibility of the member states. According to Tjønneland, Isaksen and le Pere, “[t]hese documents and emerging priorities show that the SADC Secretariat is making serious efforts and progress in giving the organization’s social and economic work a sharper regional focus.”⁴⁷

The RISDP and SIPO are thus designed to pursue the overall objective of deepening integration, but there is still the question as to what challenges and constraints remain concerning deeper integration in Southern Africa.

Challenges and constraints to regional integration in SADC

The southern African region faces severe challenges that threaten socio-economic development. About 90 million people or 40% of the SADC region’s population live in extreme poverty.⁴⁸ Eight of the last 25 ranks of the Human Poverty index are SADC member countries.⁴⁹ The region has the highest proportion of people subsisting on one USD a day in the world.⁵⁰ The main deficiencies are low access to safe drinking water and child malnutrition. Almost half of the member states’ indicators on these two components of human poverty are below the regional average.⁵¹ To reduce poverty by half by the year 2015 the region requires a GDP growth of 6.2%, but even in member states like Botswana and South Africa with high GDP growth rates and high per capita rates respectively, the record of pov-

47 Cf. *ibid*, p. 12.

48 Cf. SADC Secretariat: *Achievements and Challenges*, p. 76. On the basis of Indicators such as high levels of malnutrition, illiteracy, unemployment, underemployment, declining life expectancy, and unsatisfactory access to basic services and infrastructures needed to sustain basic human capacities.

49 UNDP: *Human Development Report 2006*, p. 294.

50 Cf. SADC Secretariat, *Achievements and Challenges*, p. 76. An own calculation on the basis of the data of the Human Development Index for the percentages of people living with less than one Dollar per day and the CIA World Factbook for the population figures for the SADC countries (Angola, Congo, Mauritius and Swaziland excluded) revealed a population number of almost 70 million people living with less than one Dollar per day.

51 SADC Secretariat: *RISDP*, Ch. 2 *Socio-economic situation in SADC*, 2.4.2 *poverty situation*, in: http://www.iss.co.za/af/regorg/unity_to_union/pdfs/sadc/risdp/c2.pdf (29.01.07).

erty prevalence remains high.⁵² In addition, the division of labour, as well as training and education facilities tend to favour men over women.⁵³ This makes females especially vulnerable to poverty and dependent on men. Nine of the last 25 ranks of the Gender-related Development Index are held by SADC countries.⁵⁴ Thirteen of the fourteen SADC countries rank among the last 45 out of 136 countries in this index. Poverty in the SADC region is also coupled with food insecurity. Food production has increased marginally related to the growth of the population.⁵⁵ Although food imports almost doubled over the last two years,⁵⁶ the situation remains unstable because of floods and droughts necessitating humanitarian assistance for many people. In 2004 5.4 million people required food assistance. The number of households running out of food continues to increase.⁵⁷ On the whole, food insecurity, the lack of employment and low productivity in the SADC region are main obstacles to poverty eradication.⁵⁸ In addition, increasing levels of illiteracy in some SADC countries,⁵⁹ and especially the HIV and AIDS epidemic contribute to the low human development in the SADC region as the

52 Cf. SADC Secretariat: Achievements and Challenges, p. 77.

53 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 77. Cf. UNDP: Human Development Report 2006, p. 363 ff., 371 ff.

54 Cf. UNDP: Human Development Report 2006, p. 366. The Gender-related Development Index considers the same indicators as the Human Development index but with view to the gender equity. The bigger the gap in quality of life of between men and women, the lower the ranking.

55 Cf. SADC Secretariat: Achievements and Challenges, p. 77.

56 Cf. SADC Secretariat: SADC food security update, January 2006, Gaborone 2006, in: http://www.sadc.int/english/fanr/food_security/Documents/fs_update/Food%20Security%20Update%20-%20Jan%202006-%20fnl.pdf (29.01.07). SADC Secretariat: SADC food security update, July 2004, Gaborone 2004, in: http://www.sadc.int/english/fanr/food_security/food_update_july_2004.php (29.01.07).

57 Cf. *ibid.*

58 Cf. SADC Secretariat: RISDP, 2.4.3 selected health, education and labour indicators, in: http://www.iss.co.za/af/regorg/unity_to_union/pdfs/sadc/risdp/c2.pdf (29.01.07). The Human Development Report did not give any data for unemployment rates in the SADC countries therefore exact numbers were not available.

59 Lesotho, Mauritius, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. One explanation could be high respectively increasing school fees. At least in South Africa sinking enrolment rates indicate a correlation. In Mauritius enrolment rates have also decreased, but no school fees are raised. However, rising unemployment rates could indicate the need for children to work instead of going to school to support their families. Increasing enrolment rates in the other three countries do not allow for substantial explanations.

epidemic undermines economic development and exacerbates poverty. According to the latest estimates of UNAIDS, more than 13 million people are HIV positive in the SADC region.⁶⁰ This makes up to nearly 40 percent of all people infected with HIV in the world.

Apart from those economic, human and social problems, to which regional integration hopefully is one answer, there are some major constraints to the process of regional integration itself.

One of the most striking constraints is the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe. The restrictive policy of head of state Robert Mugabe, whose leadership is characterized by a repressive constitutional, legislative and electoral tactics, has lured the country into a socio-economic disaster and created an enormous refugee problem for neighbouring countries. Also the crisis has caused the delay of key infrastructural and economic development projects like the construction of a new bridge across the Zambezi River.⁶¹ In the field of agriculture, Zimbabwe's regular livestock epidemics pose a long-term threat to the region. Concerning the fiscal policy, the vision of a common currency remains a chimera as long as high inflation rates persist in Zimbabwe.⁶²

It is a constraint in general, that although threats to the region's security are mainly internal (concerning governance, human rights and political legitimacy), SADC policies in this area still concentrate on traditional military security.⁶³ Therein lies one of the reasons for the often cited lack of political will of the member states particularly in deepening political integration. The SADC principles and guidelines governing democratic elections are an

60 Calculated on the figures of UNAIDS: Report on the global AIDS epidemic 2006. A UNAIDS 10th Anniversary Special Edition, Geneva 2006, p. 506.

61 Cf. Southern Africa: Zimbabwe not on SADC heads of state agenda, IRINnews.org, 17.08.06, in: http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=55165&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=SOUTHERN_AFRICA (29.01.07).

62 Cf. Ibid. The figures for the inflations rates in SADC countries for the years 2003/2004 already show the bad performance of Zimbabwe with 285% followed by Angola with 44% and Madagascar with 27%. The latest data (inflation rate 1281,1%) clearly points to the disastrous situation that Zimbabwe is facing.

important exception to this observation. Although they “[...] add little value to the technical management and observation of the elections”, these principles and guidelines are a first step in the formulation of a policy that is based on the before mentioned principles: “[...] for the first time, they publicly commit SADC heads of state/government to proper elections.”⁶⁴ However, the Zimbabwean elections in March 2005 revealed a problem in the implementation of these principles. They cannot be enforced as SADC lacks the power to impose sanctions against an offending member state.

South African dominance is another factor that forms an obstacle to regional integration at the moment. On the one hand South Africa is economically dominant in the region to such an extent that it is “[...] vital for the region to be able to include RSA [Republic of South Africa] in the economic integration process.”⁶⁵ On the other hand “[o]ne of the conditions that increases the likelihood of successful economic integration is that the regional partners are more or less on the same level of economic development [...]”.⁶⁶ Given South Africa’s leading position in intra-regional trade, economic integration in SADC could possibly thwart trade creation and instead lead to polarization.⁶⁷ In that case, economic benefits would be concentrated on South Africa, while other members would even suffer economic losses. Here one reason for the ambivalent relationship between South Africa and its neighbours becomes apparent. The other members are deeply suspicious that South Africa will take advantage of the reduction of tariff barriers⁶⁸ because its companies would obtain easy market access in other member states while at the same time high non-tariff barriers would

63 Cf. Christian von Soest; Julia Scheller: Regionale Integration im südlichen Afrika: Wohin steuert die SADC?, p.6, in GIGA Focus, No. 10, 2006, in http://www.giga-hamburg.de/content/publikationen/pdf/gf_afrika_0610.pdf (29.01.07).

64 Khabele Matlosa: Democratisation at the Crossroads. Challenges for the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, ISS Paper 118 (2005), p.17, in: <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/papers/118/Paper118.pdf> (29.01.07).

65 Cf. Heinonen Hannu: Economic Integration in Southern Africa, p. 14.

66 Cf. Heinonen Hannu: Economic Integration in Southern Africa, p. 14-15.

67 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 17.

68 Cf. Gottfried Wellmer: Tragen wirtschaftliche Partnerschaftsabkommen (EPAs) zur Beseitigung der Armut bei? Die Handelspolitik der Europäischen Union mit den

protect South African industries from more cost efficient products originating from other SADC countries.⁶⁹ Examples are the textile and the sugar industry, which are protected through complicated rules of origin that increase the costs of production and prices of consumption. This raises doubts concerning South Africa's commitment to not pursue its own national interests to the detriment of its neighbours, and it reduces the willingness of those neighbours to deepen economic integration. Yet there are factors that could diminish the likelihood of the polarization effect. Several studies have pointed to the possibility that South Africa could instead act as a locomotive for the whole region.⁷⁰ Instead of the polarization effect or after a short period of polarization, the flying geese model is expected to prevail. "In this model, the leading country [South Africa] constantly develops new industries and when it loses competitive advantage in a particular product, it is relocated to its less developed neighbours."⁷¹ If the flying geese model works for SADC, this will also attract more foreign investment to the region and intraregional investment, fostered by the creation of a free trade area, because investors could profit from lower labour costs and larger markets.⁷² However, this is dependent on many factors, such as the given infrastructure and skilled labour capacity.⁷³

According to the South Africa's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad, "the key driver for development and deeper integration within the SADC over the next 15 years is market integration".⁷⁴ If so, one of the most urgent constraints is the already mentioned problem of overlapping memberships. SADC and COMESA are both striving for the implementation of a customs union in the near future. SACU is already a customs union. As states cannot be members in two different customs unions, overlapping

AKP-Staaten am Beispiel der Entwicklungsgemeinschaft des Südlichen Afrika (SADC), Bielefeld 2005, p. 37 ff.

69 Cf. Gottfried Wellmer: wirtschaftliche Partnerschaftsabkommen, p. 38 f.

70 Cf. Heinonen Hannu: Economic Integration in Southern Africa, p. 18 f.

71 Ibid., p. 18.

72 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 20.

73 Cf. *ibid.*

74 SADC leaders to talk regional integration, in: Mail and Guardian online, 17 August 2006, in: http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=280977&area=/breaking_news/breaking_news__business/ (29.01.2007).

memberships are obstacles to the realization of deeper market integration.⁷⁵ SACU could be a motor for the SADC customs union as starting point that would be enlarged by and by.⁷⁶ In contrast, COMESA obstructs the implementation of a SADC customs union because there are still evident tendencies that COMESA wants to pocket SADC and South Africa.

Having identified the major challenges and constraints to integration in SADC integration within in SADC, it is likewise important to examine the external relations of SADC as a factor of deeper integration, in particular, its relationship to its most significant partner, the European Union.

The EU-SADC relations – remedying constraints?

SADC's pursuit of deeper integration is in line with the EU's own positive experiences with regional integration and the general assumption that regional integration will substantially contribute to welfare in ACP countries.⁷⁷ Consequently, the encouragement of (sub-)regional integration is again a key element in the Euro-African partnership for achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals and promoting sustainable development, security, political reform, economic modernization and good governance in Africa.⁷⁸ It is this context that the following shall address the actual design of the EU-SADC relations and its supportive character.

The EU-SADC relations can be clustered in three fields of interaction: development cooperation, political cooperation and economic cooperation.

75 WTO regulations forbid countries from belonging to more than one customs union.

76 Cf. Christian von Soest; Julia Scheller: SADC, p. 4.

77 For the general assumption cf. Philippe de Lombaerde: Supporting Regional Integration – the Roadmap of Indicators and Tools, UNU-CRIS Occasional Papers 0-2003/3, p. 3. ACP means the group of African Caribbean and Pacific States.

78 Commission of the European Communities: Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and The European Economic and Social Committee. EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development, Brussels 2005, p. 3. Council of the European Union: The EU and Africa: Towards a strategic partnership, Brussels 2005, p. 2.

Development Cooperation

The support of the European Union in the field of development cooperation aims at creating sustainable development and thus at reducing poverty. Consequently all of the aforementioned socio-economic challenges are subject to EU-SADC development cooperation.

The financial framework for development cooperation with SADC is the European Development Fund (EDF). The funds allocated under the current 9th EDF to the SADC region for the period 2002-2007 are 101 million Euros plus 60 million Euros in unspent funds from the previous EDFs. In addition, the individual member countries of SADC receive bilateral assistance from the EU member states. If those funds are taken together, the European Union proves to be the biggest single donor to the SADC region.⁷⁹ However, the individual EU member states still have their own development programmes with SADC and its member countries. Additionally, for the period 2008-2013 the European Union has planned for the allocation of 135 million Euros under the 10th EDF for development cooperation with SADC.

The strategy of the EU-SADC development cooperation is laid down in a Regional Strategy Paper and the Regional Indicative Plan (RIP) by the EU. Those plans cover the same period as the 9th EDF. The RIP was developed before the RISDP was adopted but is nevertheless compatible to it in most of its development objectives, especially the economic integration timeframe.⁸⁰ The two focus areas of the current RIP are regional integration and trade as well as transport and communication. Both sectors receive 35-45% of total funds. While support in these sectors aims at improving the economic situation, there are also several interventions designed to directly address social areas in which SADC faces major development challenges. There are several projects in the food, agriculture and natural resources sector, for example the “SADC Land and Water Management Resource Programme”, which started in March 2003 and a project on regional

79 Cf. Southern African Marketing Co. (Pty) Ltd.; SADC Secretariat (Eds.): Official SADC trade, industry and investment review 2005, Gaborone 2005, p. 30.

80 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 30.

integration in the SADC livestock sector, which also started in 2003. Both projects have the goal to increase crop or livestock production. Other programmes like the “Southern African Animal Disease Control Programme” or the “Implementation and Coordination of Agricultural Research and Training in the SADC Region” also contribute to the overall objective of poverty alleviation.⁸¹ Another non-focal area of the RIP is the intra-regional development of human skills and education and training institutions. The RIP also supports a programme to increase awareness for HIV/AIDS, HIV/AIDS education and prevention. The Project “Regional Support for Multi-Sectoral Response to HIV/AIDS” that started already under the 8th EDF is continued. While the overall objective is a reduced number of HIV/AIDS infected and affected persons and the remedying of HIV/AIDS, also a constraint to socio-economic development, the concrete project purpose is to increase the secretariat’s capacity in identifying and supporting measures against HIV/AIDS and in promoting appropriate policies and practices on the epidemic.⁸²

Besides those measures, EU-SADC development cooperation also comprises support to capacity building of the SADC secretariat. One of the projects under the 9th EDF has entailed the recruitment of seven long-term experts and the provision of financial support to strengthen the secretariat’s abilities in implementing and monitoring SADC protocols and in making effective use of information technology. Another project assists the secretariat and policy-makers from the region to participate more effectively in the WTO negotiations on services and to liberalise and increase intra-regional trade in services. Thus, development cooperation between SADC and the EU helps deepen integration through assistance in addressing the socio-economic problems that SADC has to face. But it also deepens integration directly through the support of the regional organization’s capacities.

81 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 32.

82 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 33.

Political Cooperation

On the political level the dialogue between SADC and the EU has been institutionalized through a Declaration, commonly called Berlin Initiative, which was the result of the first EU-SADC ministerial meeting in 1994 in Berlin. The objectives of the dialogue were to contribute to peace, democracy and sustainable development. Regular meetings on the level of senior officials in preparation of a ministerial conference every two years were considered necessary. As a result of the first meeting it was agreed upon to cooperate in several fields, such as regional integration, trade and economy, private investment and development, including infrastructure, health, combating international crime and others. Since then, six ministerial conferences have taken place: in Windhoek 1996, in Vienna 1998, in Gaborone 2000, in Maputo 2002, in The Hague 2004 and in Maseru 2006.

In 2002 at the Maputo Conference its structure was revised in order to make the Conference and the EU-SADC partnership more efficient.⁸³ One consequence was that the meeting in The Hague took place in the EU-SADC Double Troika format. The meeting was attended only by the ministers and representatives of the SADC Troika and the Troika of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security plus the SADC secretariat and the EU Troika.⁸⁴ But the format of the conferences has been subject to further discussions since, and no formal agreement on this issue has been reached yet. The EU-SADC meetings have always been an instrument of information exchange on the latest developments in the regions in all areas of interest and to criticize stagnating progress or certain policies. Prevailing subjects of the last meeting were the fight against HIV/AIDS, the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as the issues of sustainable peace and security, good governance and democracy, trade and economic liberalization, including EPA negotiations, infrastructure support and the outline

83 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 27.

84 The EU Troika that attends the ministerial meeting always consists of the current and the following chair of the European Union and the European Commission plus the Council Secretariat.

for the 10th EDF Regional Indicative Program.⁸⁵ Also, during the last meeting in Maseru, the EU and SADC discussed possibilities for strengthening democratic institutions in the region and in particular the capacity of the SADC Secretariat to observe and strengthen the electoral processes in member states. The potential for collaboration between similar institutions in the EU and SADC with a view to sharing information on best practices in the management of electoral processes was also debated. This can be interpreted as a sign that the political dialogue between the EU and SADC helps to set and to keep domestic affairs on the SADC agenda. Accordingly, several conferences, workshops, seminars and programs on matters of regional concern, like HIV/AIDS or drugs and the funding for a number of special political projects like SADC's work on small arms have been the output of the Berlin initiative.

Another field of political cooperation is security and peace. In this area the EU has undertaken a horizontal initiative, the financial support of an African Peace Facility set up by the African Union. The AU or a sub-regional organization like SADC with the political approval of the AU can initiate a request for financing from this facility. Indirectly though, the political cooperation of the EU is extended to the support of a SADC Standby Force which is currently under preparation.

One effect of the institutionalization of the political cooperation between SADC and the EU is certainly the improvement of reciprocal understanding,⁸⁶ although the dispute over the Zimbabwean case may provide a different picture.

As Robert Mugabe turned despotic over the last years, expelling white farmers from their farms and suppressing democracy for the Zimbabwean people on the whole, the EU states called upon SADC to strongly condemn such policies and to take sanction measures. But the SADC states, where many leaders were traditional allies of Mugabe in the anti-colonialism

85 Communiqué for the SADC-EU Double Troika Ministerial Meeting 17 November 2006 Maseru, the Kingdom of Lesotho, 17 November 2006, in: http://www.eu2006.fi/news_and_documents/other_documents/vko46/en_GB/1163780592389/ (29.01.07).

86 Cf. Official SADC trade, industry and investment review 2005, p. 27.

struggle, neglected to react in such a harsh way. Instead, SADC leaders, especially Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, have engaged in quiet diplomacy, trying to positively influence Mugabe behind closed doors. This approach has been widely questioned.⁸⁷ But now that it has become obvious that Mugabe's strategy has led to a catastrophic reversal in economic development, most heads of state and government are more willing to take a stricter stance on Zimbabwe. A sign for this development seems to be the early departure of Mugabe from the SADC Summit in Lesotho in 2006. At the summit the other SADC leaders criticized Mugabe's policies in the context of economic development, and said investors had been scared away from the region.⁸⁸ Still, it is unclear to which extent the session on Zimbabwe during the Lesotho Summit put pressure on Mugabe, especially in light of his latest announcements to extend his presidential term for two more years. That would mean that the next presidential elections would take place in 2010 together with the next elections of the parliament. However, in contrast to the EU, SADC is very unlikely to undertake any sanctions.⁸⁹ After all, this would require unanimity, and of course Zimbabwe will not impose sanctions on itself.

Economic Cooperation

Economic cooperation is an important pillar of EU-SADC relations since the EU is the most important trading partner of the SADC region. The EU receives 42% of SADC exports and is the region of origin of 39% of SADC imports.⁹⁰ The trade relations with SADC are based on the Cotonou Partnership Agreement of 2000. This successor to the Lomé Agreements defines the fostering of smooth and gradual integration of the ACP states into the global economy as the objective of economic and trade coopera-

87 Moyiga Nduru: "We want to show all is not well in Zimbabwe" – SADC protestors, Inter Press Service News Agency, 17 August 2006, in: <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=34381> (29.01.07).

88 Mugabe leaves SADC summit in a huff, Zim Online, 21 August 2006, in: http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/aug21_2006.html (29.01.07).

89 The SADC Treaty provides for different possibilities of sanctions in Art. 33, from the suspension of the right to speak up to the suspension of cooperation, between SADC and the Member State.

tion. Since regional integration is seen as a key instrument for the integration of ACP countries into the world economy, the Cotonou Agreement considers cooperation with RIIs an important element for the enhancement of the production, supply and trading capacity of the ACP countries as well as their capacity to attract investment.⁹¹ Since the arrangements under the Lomé Agreements did not increase the competitiveness of the ACP countries substantially, the Cotonou Agreement provides for a new type of regional trading arrangements known as Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). These EPAs are WTO-compatible and envisage the creation of larger economic areas “with stable, predictable and transparent regulatory frameworks”.⁹² They are the dominant issue in EU-SADC trade relations at the moment. The negotiations on an EPA with SADC started in July 2004. The target date for the entry into force of the EPA is January 2008. However, EPA negotiations have struggled with two of the aforementioned constraints to regional integration in SADC: namely, the dominance of South Africa and the overlapping memberships in different RIIs. Both problems become clearly visible in the composition of the SADC-EPA group which negotiates the EPA with the EU. Instead of all SADC member states, only the SACU-members Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland plus Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania belong to the SADC-EPA group. South Africa has observer status. The remaining SADC members negotiate in the Eastern and Southern Africa-EPA group (ESA), which was initiated by COMESA. The ESA negotiations already started in February 2004.

It is difficult to assess which impact the EU-SADC trade relations have on deeper integration in SADC. On the one hand EPAs are seen as capable of fostering regional integration because an internal SADC free trade area is needed for the implementation of a common free trade agreement with the EU.⁹³ After all, the objective that the EPAs enter into force in 2008 coin-

90 Cf. http://www.delbwa.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_and_sadc/introduction.htm (23.11.06).

91 Sanoussi Bilal; Francesco Rampa: *Alternative (to) EPAs. Possible Scenarios for the future ACP relations with the EU*, Maastricht 2006, p. 14.

92 Cf. SADC Secretariat, *Major Achievements and Challenges*, p. 81.

93 Cf. What is an EPA? in: Southern African Marketing Co. (Pty) Ltd.; SADC Secretariat (Eds.): *The Official SADC Trade, Industry and Investment Review 2005*, p. 28.

cides with SADC's genuine time frame for deepening economic integration, i.e., with the envisaged implementation of a SADC free trade area. In addition, the EPA negotiations necessitate a fast-track implementation of the trade protocol in order to prepare the member states' economic, social and institutional infrastructures to adequately cushion the expected adjustment impacts associated with the EPAs.⁹⁴ For that reason, the EPAs give a strong incentive to realize the next steps (free trade area and customs union) in economic integration without delay. On the other hand, the EU is pushing for the realization of a SADC customs union by 2008.⁹⁵ This pressure from EPA negotiations could lead to excessive demands on SADC capacities and thus to the failure of the attempt to fast-track the Trade Protocol implementation. This, in turn, could result in the exact opposite of the EPA reasoning, namely socio-economic hardships that make economic convergence, and thus integration, even more difficult.

In addition, the split of member states into two EPA groups, as well as South Africa's absence, are viewed as impediments to integration of SADC. South Africa is a special case because it already negotiated a reciprocal trade agreement (Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement, TDCA) with the EU bilaterally. Moreover, the EPA negotiations would lead to the existence of three different free trade agreements of SADC countries with the EU if there is no change in the composition of the negotiating parties. The SADC-EPA group faces the difficulty that, because of membership in SACU, some countries are already affected by the TDCA. In order to secure the functioning of the EPA, this would imply that either all conditions of the TDCA would have to be taken over or the SADC-EPA countries would have to protect their borders against the crossing of all products which were imported under the TDCA rules into the region.⁹⁶ The first option is nearly impossible because of the difficult time frame. The TDCA conditions must be met in 2012 while the EPAs shall enter into force in 2008 so that only four years are left for the other countries to re-

94 Cf. SADC Secretariat: *Achievements and Challenges*, p. 81.

95 ECDPM: *Update on regional EPA negotiations*. ESA - EU Economic Partnership Agreement (ECDPM InBrief 15F), Maastricht 2006.

96 Cf. *ibid.*

duce all import duties to zero.⁹⁷ Also, it seems less of a good deal for the less advanced economies of the SADC-EPA to take over the conditions of a free trade agreement between South Africa and the EU. The latter option could thwart deeper integration in the SADC region. In this context the EU-South Africa trade relations have rather exacerbated the difficulties between SADC and South Africa instead of contributing to a solution.

The splitting of SADC member states to the SADC and the ESA groups leads to three future scenarios. The first is that COMESA and SADC would build *one* free trade area and agree on the same external tariffs;⁹⁸ this implies difficult negotiations.⁹⁹ Alternatively, complicated rules of intraregional trade would need to be implemented if the countries remained members in both organizations and in two different EPA arrangements.¹⁰⁰ This would split SADC economically and would hinder deeper economic integration. However, in March 2006, a tripartite meeting of COMESA, SADC and EAC countries took place. On this occasion, the present ministers recommended the harmonization of their EPA negotiating positions, the coordination of their positions on tariffs, including their phase-down and their stance on sensitive products. The last scenario would be a change of mind of the double members according to their historical and political links towards the SADC customs union and the SADC-EPA.¹⁰¹ Then COMESA and the ESA-EPA would only comprise the East African states and thus essentially equate to the termination of double memberships. However, the advantage would be a clear division between Eastern and Southern African States. While the last option seemed to be very difficult to realize in the past, there has been some movement recently regarding the question of overlapping memberships. At the last Summit in Maseru, Lesotho, a Task Force was established to propose measures for fast-tracking the implementation of the SADC integration agenda (free trade area in 2008 and customs union in 2010). The task force was to report to the Extra Ordi-

97 Cf. Gottfried Wellmer: *wirtschaftliche Partnerschaftsabkommen*, p. 42.

98 SACU and EAC would also need to agree to that one free trade agreement.

99 Cf. Martin Adelman: *SADC vor dem Umbruch*, p. 7.

100 Cf. *ibid.*

101 Cf. *ibid.*

nary Summit held in October 2006, which was planned for scaling up the implementation of the SADC integration agenda (although the Task Force had not progressed as much as had been envisioned).

Another complication to the EPA negotiations comes from the “Everything but Arms-Initiative” (EBA), which provides for full duty and quota-free access to the European markets for products from LDCs, but with no time-limit to do so. The SADC-EPA group has requested that its LDCs, Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania, remain in a permanent EBA status under a future EPA. However, the EU has voiced concerns on this in the light of the phase-out of the WTO-waiver for the EBA provisions starting the first January 2008.

Conclusions

Deepening integration in the SADC region means to realize the objectives of the RISDP and SIPO. With a reorganized institutional structure in place, SADC is hopefully in a better position to address its challenges and to tackle the constraints to regional integration. If it succeeds in building capacity in management, planning and monitoring, the foundation for a more efficient and effective cooperation between the member states can be established.¹⁰² Especially the establishment of the Tribunal could prove an important driving force of integration because for the first time a mechanism for the settlement of disputes is in place. The lack of which was seen as a hindrance to deeper integration because the fear of arbitrary arrangements between the more powerful states would result in tentative reforms.¹⁰³

While EU-SADC relations are undoubtedly helpful if socio-economic challenges are concerned, key problems like the South African dominance have been rather worsened. The pursuit of the EU’s own trade interests, which have led to the accomplishment of the TDCA, have complicated the situation in Southern Africa and reveal the incoherence of the EU’s policy towards Southern Africa. Despite these shortcomings of the EU-SADC

102 Cf. Wolfgang Köhler: Regionalismus neuen Typs, p.10.

103 Cf. Danko Knothe; Daniel Müller: Ritter von der traurigen Gestalt, p. 22.

relationship one cannot conclude that the road towards deeper integration is inaccessible. Dieter and Melber found in 2000, that regional integration in SADC, contrary to the then prevalent impression, could “well be qualified less negatively as ‘regional integration in ferment’”.¹⁰⁴ This remains true in 2006: the Community is in motion. Besides the adoption of the Protocol on Finance and Investment in October 2006, which is an important step in the realization of economic integration,¹⁰⁵ the fact that the Zimbabwean crisis was indeed debated at the last Summit is a sign that SADC leaders no longer accept Mugabe’s policies. After the cruel treatment of Zimbabwean opposition leader Tsvangirai South Africa even moved beyond quite diplomacy by urging Harare to respect the rights of all Zimbabweans and (party) leaders. In addition, the implementation of a task force, the convening of the extraordinary Summit and the tripartite meeting prove that the political will exists to reach deeper market integration and to eventually think about the abolishing of overlapping memberships. The contribution of EU-SADC relations here has certainly fostered a continuous dialogue and provided new incentives. So it seems that deeper integration in SADC needs impulses from the outside that include further support of the international donor community, especially of the EU. However, it is also important that SADC members take a stronger common stand towards the EU and that they align their bilateral policies with the multilateral SADC policies. This is necessary to oppose incoherent cooperation approaches of the EU from the very beginning as well as to propose and enforce mechanisms for resolution, whether popular or not, i.e. the annulment of the TDCA. SADC member states also need to ensure that SADC’s capacities are not exhausted and that a genuine time frame can be followed. After all, the process of regional integration in the European Union has shown that deepening integration is also a matter of time.

104 Heribert Dieter; Henning Melber: Not Future For SADC? Perspectives for Regional Integration in Southern Africa after the Mauritius Summit, INEF Report, 43 (2000), p. 27.

105 It pursues harmonization of policies on taxation, investment, development finance, stock exchanges, insurance, exchange control payments and clearing systems and macroeconomic convergence.

Abbreviations

ACP	Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Countries
AU	African Union
CEMAC	Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Central
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
EAC	East African Community
EBA	Everything but Arms initiative
EDF	European Development Fund
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
ESA	Eastern and Southern Africa
ICM	Integrated Committee of Ministers
IOC	Indian Ocean Commission
ISDSC	Inter-State Defense and Security Committee
ISPDC	Inter-State Politics and Diplomatic Committee
LDC	Least Developed Country
RII	Regional Integration Initiative
RIP	Regional Indicative Plan
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation
TDCA	Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement

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