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Structures, possibilities and
limits of European crisis
reaction forces for conflict
prevention and resolution

Conditions for a successful EU
security and defence policy, based
on the decisions by the EU at Nice
9th December 2000

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Introduction

The following paper is based on the author's "Conditions and options for an autonomous 'Common European Policy on Security and Defence' in and by the European Union in the post-Amsterdam perspective opened at Cologne in June 1999", written after the decisions by the European Council in June 1999 and published by the Center for European Integration Studies in Bonn.¹ In addition, it is supplemented by a new analysis of the problems raised by the later agreements in the context of the EU summit decisions at Helsinki and Nice on European security and defence policy, the European crisis reaction forces and the "Headline Goal" for their strength and composition.

The question is asked, whether these decisions and guidelines as well as the Headline Goal for the forces meet the conditions posed by the European security situation, the requirements of the European military contribution to Nato as well as those for an independent European military crisis response. This paper discusses the main aspects of the planned security, defence and crisis response policies in the limited European context against the background of crisis and conflict realities on the European periph-

1 See ZEI Discussion Paper C 54/1999.

ery and beyond. It deals in particular with six central issues and problems of a general nature:

- the issue of political-military structures and intergovernmental decision-making in the EU,
- the problem of force structuring between participants for military operations outside Nato,
- the issue of standardisation, interoperability and readiness of crisis response forces,
- the problem of “European options“ for independent use of EU forces in crisis and conflict,
- the issue of “European Armed Forces“ and European military integration in the EU - the problem of harmony in the Atlantic alliance for an enlarged “European role”.

These six subjects are interrelated and must be seen in the general context. They are being dealt with in this discussion paper in three parts:

I. The necessary political-military structures and political decision-making in the EU on security and defence policy for crisis response, including the requirements for flexibility in exercise of international missions and mandates under changing conditions.

II. The requirements for force structuring, including interoperability and standardisation, readiness of forces and sustainability of deployments in crisis contingencies as conditions for “European“ options of crisis response.

III. The problems of harmony within the alliance, compatibility with US forces and of the creation of “European Armed Forces“ for a “European defence“ within the alliance as the hidden agenda behind the EC programme of 1999/2000.

I. Political-military structures and political decision-making in the EU on security and defense policy for crisis response

1. The decisions of the European Council on the planned common European security and defence policy at the end of the armed hostilities with Serbia over Kosovo in June 1999 have made obvious the need for going beyond the original concept of the “Petersberg Tasks“ for the WEU, decided in 1992 in a different situation and later worked into the Amsterdam treaty, as well as further than the limited vision of the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties on common European security policies. This is, however, not

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the purpose of the Helsinki and Nice decisions in the year 2000 by the EC nor the issue addressed by the further decisions of the Foreign and Defence ministers of the EU partner states on force goals and general military missions for the European crisis reaction corps, to be created by 2003. The official European agenda is narrower than the tasks, which could, at least by the Balkan experience, confront the EU in case of American insistence on "European action" for conflict prevention (one of the explicit missions in the "Petersberg Tasks" and in the EU documents) and an ensuing escalation of the crisis without US and Nato participation - a contingency, which cannot be systematically excluded, certainly not in view of the ongoing American debate on the use of US forces in European crisis situations, i.e. in former Yugoslavia. Since the US ally is neither interested in a European "Nato light" substitute for a robust "European Pillar" within Nato nor in a separate European military organisation with its own force, duplicating Nato functions, but unable to replace Nato with US participation and dependent on Nato assets, while detracting resources and capabilities from Nato, a wider European responsibility with a larger military growth potential has to be envisaged for the future. The problem has been clearly posed by the Clinton and - recently at Munich in the International Security Conference February 2001 - by the Bush II Administration in the statement made by Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (3.2.01). Washington has held a continuous "red line" not to be crossed by the "European Security and Defence Identity" in delimiting itself by its own military forces from Nato or even within Nato from the integrated "Allied Command Europe": No duplication, no detraction from Nato capabilities. Priority for Nato missions and for allied military capabilities.

The European Nato allies do not question this priority nor the necessity for meaningful consultation with the US within Nato on possible separate European crisis management operations outside Nato. They adhere to the principle "Nato first", which also means, that Nato in a crisis in Europe would, as a matter of fact, have "the first choice" for intervening in the situation with its allied forces, and this with active participation of the European allies as in the Balkan contingencies, with "the collective Nato missions" there, cited as examples, as did Nato Secretary General George Robertson at Munich in his statement on 3rd February 2001, mentioning, that "the US maintains only 15 percent of the total peacekeeping force committed in the Balkans - a far cry from the preponderance one might expect". while French Defence Minister Alain Richard promised (on the same occasion and date) that "the European capacity...will enrich the range of tools available to the transatlantic community for crisis management".

If this is really to be the case, the EU needs for joint military action in support of international peace and security not only autonomous military structures and capabilities for the use of European forces as well as procedures for independent decision-making

in time of crisis, but foremost the political commitment to build up and maintain the necessary military forces at the required level of operational capabilities and professional quality, including the technical assets and stocks of arms, munitions and equipment. This requirement can only be met by a responsible and coherent political authority at the highest level, independent from the North Atlantic Council. Otherwise, “strategic autonomy“, as the political goal is sometimes called, could not be achieved vis-à-vis Nato and the United States, which means that the EU could only become a true “global player“ in international politics and security on this essential condition: Central political (intergovernmental) authority on security and defence with the ultimate responsibility for the decisions on crisis response and the commitment of forces, made available by the member states after agreement in Nato with the non-EU allies. Common commitment for joint action under European command and control, if there is no joint Nato/EU operation under Nato command and control (to be exercised in this case by the European Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, as envisaged in the official documents).

For the sake of argument, it is supposed that the European Council of Chiefs of State and Government can provide this authority. It is, however, not certain that this authority can be discharged in a timely and effective way in a sudden crisis. But such decisions are always subject to circumstances and the political constellations including the domestic situation of each national government. There may be political constraints to acting early in a crisis or to commit the necessary forces for fear of risks to them and for fear of losses in action. These are legitimate concerns for any government and parliament, but they may jeopardise precisely the timely action and frustrate the political goals set by European security policy. For this reason, the Heads of State and Government must be personally involved in the political assessment of a crisis, in the risk-taking and the decision-making from the beginning. This means that the European Council of the EU must be able and willing to deal with a crisis at an early stage and must be sufficiently informed, assisted and advised to do so. This political priority has consequences for the procedures and organisms the EU needs, to be effective for crisis management. This has not been so in the past, the most recent past of the Kosovo conflict included. The international examples, the Gulf War, the Somalia Crisis, the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict have clearly shown that not only international organisations such as the UN or the OSCE are hard put to react both timely and forcefully to meet the challenge, but that the member states themselves find it difficult to respond by action in good time to prevent the crisis from escalating or to limit the conflict by appropriate measures, if and when sanctions and demonstrations of force remain ineffective. Vis-à-vis the Yugoslav conflict from 1991 to 1995 and again in 1998-99 in the Kosovo crisis EU policies for a negotiated settlement by compromise were ineffective, EU responses were weak, belated and inappropriate for the solution of the problem, that had to be addressed. The reasons for this continued failure are

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known: There was no agreement between the European governments on either the nature of the conflict and the gravity of the crisis situation in each case or on the necessary and available means to employ, let alone on the political objective to be pursued and hence on the preferred outcome of any concerted European effort towards conflict resolution. There was no strategy and not even a concept shared by all the EU members on how to deal with the situation. Therefore, no European action beyond communiqué rhetoric, procedural proposals for a diplomatic moderation to reduce the tension between adversaries or for compromise solutions by mediation with a political impact on the crises and a chance of success, came under way. This was particularly obvious in the approach to and the dealings with the Bosnian crisis in late 1991 and later in 1992-95 with the Bosnian War. Outstanding examples were the failed Carrington initiative with a conference between the parties to the Yugoslav war of secession and the beginning Bosnian civil war without agreed results and the Western plan for the division of Bosnia, put forward by the Anglo-American mediators.

The reasons were many, above all the refusal on the part of the warring parties to come to terms for a territorial compromise. But the obvious reluctance of the Western governments, to commit forces for an eventual intervention to block escalation of the armed violence and military confrontations on the ground in over four long years, convinced the adversaries in Yugoslavia that no outside actor would step in to separate them and end the armed conflicts. Thus, the lack of deterrence power, which is as much of a psychological as of a physical nature, left the Western governments without a credible alternative to diplomacy - and as Henry Kissinger had remarked when trying to mediate between Israel and the Arab enemies of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, "diplomacy without the sword is without an alternative", hence powerless and without influence on determined opponents. In terms of strategy: If there is no capability for appropriate military sanction in case of refusal to come to negotiated terms, there is no deterrence. Policy is deprived of the option for punitive action, hence diplomacy of the ultimate means of persuasion. This applied fully to Yugoslavia and in particular to Bosnia. As to the EC partners with their long-standing "European Political Cooperation" (EPC) for concerted action in international affairs, they were unable to agree on more than principles and procedures or to forever demand cease-fires, although in the end of the day 123 of those concluded were broken again or simply disregarded by the local combatants. Their institutional weakness was lack of unity and lack of resolve.

During the French referendum campaign over the Maastricht treaty in the midst of the Bosnian catastrophe, with French, British, Dutch and Italian troops prominently engaged in Bosnia for the failing UN peace-keeping mission, the then French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, ventured the argument (in a debate on French TV), that if the Maastricht treaty with its clause on the European foreign and security policy had been in effect in 1992, the Bosnian War might have been prevented or ended by a joint

European initiative. At that time, the European governments, with Paris as leading example, tried to temporise in order not to commit armed forces for decisive action, which would have meant offensive operations in Bosnia, and were even divided over the dropping of relief goods by parachute to the besieged enclaves of Srebrenica and Tuzla, cut off on land by the Serbs. French general Morrillon, in command in the region for the UN “protection force“, publicly advised against such relief from the air for fear of provoking the Serbs to shoot at the transport aircraft and escalating the situation on the ground. “Escalation“ was the sum of all fears to the European partners, and this to the extreme that at the moment of the Croat and Muslim offensives in Western Bosnia in the summer of 1995, which turned the tide of the war against the Serbs and offered a new opportunity for ending the conflict by resolute armed intervention on the ground and from the air, the German Defence Minister Volker Rühle declared that “the worst“ that could happen and must therefore be avoided, was “escalation“ of the war. This political opinion on the state of the Bosnian conflict and the issue of military escalation from the outside, flew in the face of the evidence on the ground, which strongly suggested only military power, brought to bear by the allies against the Serbs, could finally end this devastating war, which had escalated since 1992 after almost four years and 300.000 dead victims with up to three million displaced persons. On this crucial point of policy and strategy in conflict, all the European governments agreed with the German defence minister, who had stated the conventional wisdom of Europe on war, conflict limitation and risk-taking in crisis. This misunderstanding of both the situation and the strategy of controlled escalation by military intervention to end the war (which was done a few weeks later by Nato under American leadership with allied air attacks from Italy and the deployment of an allied rapid reaction force, composed of British, French and Dutch combat troops, close to Sarajevo) shows the real problem of policy-making and reaching common decisions on how to act in a difficult and dangerous situation:

Policy-making in crisis always means acting under the pressure of events, which may be beyond control or may be used to advantage, with time for measured responses running out fast.

For this reason, governments find themselves close to the cutting edge of power to be used in order to make an impact on the situation and confronted with considerable risks to the success of their crisis response, to their forces engaged in conflict and even to their own political situation at home. This applied to the allied governments in 1993-95 and again over the Kosovo in 1998-99 as it applied to the UN and the EU from the beginning of the wider Balkans crisis in 1991 with Yugoslavia dissolving in four wars of secession against the central Serb authority in Belgrade. It has to be recalled that at the beginning, in early 1991, the Luxemburg foreign minister Poos, then in the chair of the intergovernmental EC “troika“ presidency, addressed the developing

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crisis as an occasion for European political initiatives to settle a conflict in Europe, and called out “the hour of Europe“ to act. His assessment was quite right, but the EC partners could neither act individually as European Powers, as France and Britain might have done, at least initially, nor as a group of states or a “community“ , for lack of agreement and of ready forces to be used in a joint military intervention to prevent a war from spreading to Bosnia. Europe as a whole was unable to enforce either UN resolutions or the rules of the CSCE. Russia was threatening to block any vote in the UN World Security Council which would authorise the use of force against Yugoslavia or the Bosnian Serbs, the CSCE (later OSCE) was dependent on unanimity; it had no mandate before the end of 1994 and no means or organisation before 1996 to act as provider of security in a crisis situation and still has no right to intervene in member countries or any foreign territory. The West European Union (WEU), while present with a flotilla in the Adriatic to observe compliance with the UN embargo on arms, military equipments and oil to Yugoslavia, did not have the military means to do more, and its members did not want to engage further. The EU, at that time still the old EC with its intergovernmental political cooperation in international affairs and an elaborate, well-organised consultation mechanism, lacked a political objective, a strategy for success, the means to carry it out and the coherence to act effectively.

2. This inability, prolonged beyond 1995 to 1999 with the Kosovo affair, shows that the main problem of policy-making and decision-taking lies with the national governments and legislatures, not with the EU as such, since there is no European supra-national political authority with competence and responsibility for security and defence, let alone with jurisdiction over armed forces and “European“ military operations. This basic problem of political authority and responsibility for international action cannot be solved by organisation and procedures, by diplomatic consultations and by committees, since it is first and above all not a management problem but one of political vision, unity and resolve. The other side of this case also proves the point: When the resolve was there in late summer of 1995, three or four governments agreed to send troops together to fight and all the allies agreed in Nato to commit the air power assembled in Italy to end the war. This led to the armed mediation by the US at Dayton and to the Paris Peace for Bosnia. The EU was indirectly represented in the Dayton negotiations by three of its members, but it was no actor itself. For Dayton no set-up of committees and consultation procedures was necessary nor was there time to do it in. Understandings between “the able and willing“ on the ad hoc tasks and the appropriate means at their disposal was all, what was needed. The interallied ad hoc-coalition organised itself in a practical manner without relying on either EU or Nato procedures or committee machinery. Russia was engaged for the negotiation by the US, without which nothing would have been accomplished. To end the Kosovo war in June 1999 the EU was useful, but again it was represented by the governments, and the European Council acted more as an international Notary Public to enregister the

provisional solutions negotiated by others, i.e. the US and Russia, endorsed by the G-8 Summit and presented to Europe without an alternative as they had been presented to Belgrade by a “take it or leave it“ challenge in the form of an “ultimate proposal“ under the threat of continued air attacks on a widening scale and with an increasing intensity of bombing. It is true that the Finnish President represented the EU as partner to the mediation in Belgrade, which was based on an international position, hammered out mainly by the US in negotiations with a recalcitrant Russia, itself outmanoeuvred and isolated, even by China, at the UN and marginalized in Europe by the dual track advance of Nato towards the East with the extension of the treaty area and towards the South East on the Balkans with the engagement of allied forces, establishing Nato military structures, offering security and defence guarantees to neighbours of Serbia and creating a political-military prefiguration of a Nato sphere of interest wide beyond the former Yugoslavia, englobing virtually all of South Eastern Europe.

3. It stands to reason, that Nato’s part in the ending of the acute Kosovo crisis and in stabilising both Macedonia and Montenegro, controlling Albania and the Kosovo itself, was more important to the provisional conflict resolution than that of the EU. It is equally obvious that the European governments at that time had a common political interest in acting together for peace in Europe by helping to end the conflict and to demonstrate European initiative, which was done at Cologne with the “Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe“. The decision on the common security and defence policy, which had been prepared since 1998, i.e. by the Franco-British initiative of St. Malo in December, was timely to put the EU on the political map of Europe and on the European security agenda after the participation of most of its members in the Nato operation “Allied Force“. The Cologne Summit decision on security and defence policy for the EU was a logical, even a compelling conclusion to the chain of events on the Balkans and in the “transatlantic partnership“ since the beginning of the Balkan conflict in 1991/92. It was the consequence of the Kosovo experience with Nato in action under US leadership and control, if the EU was to come into existence as a “global player“ at all.

But the entire experience concerned mostly the allied governments in Nato, which were related to each other in ever wider circles of active participation in decision-making before and during the conflict: The first or “inner“ circle consisting only of the US and Britain as in the Gulf War, a second one with France as the third partner, a third with Italy and Germany as deployment countries for the US and Nato aircraft in Europe, active participants in the “air campaign“ with valuable assets and as “Dayton partners“ of the “International Contact Group“ (its membership extended to Italy and its scope beyond Bosnia onto the entire Balkans) for the diplomatic operation as additional associates in auxiliary roles, finally the “outer“ circle of all Nato partners, represented by the permanent Nato council in Brussels under the chairmanship of the Secre-

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tary General, who was directly connected to Washington and to the US Commander-in-Chief in Europe as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), who commanded operation "Allied Force" in his H.Q. at Mons. The heads of the national delegations acted on their instructions from home (and several of the Heads of State or Government used their direct contacts to the President in Washington). The rest of the Nato political-administrative machinery in the political H.Q. in Brussels was only involved at the consultative level and had to present the operation to the public. The entire set-up offered a fair example of classic coalition warfare, as the "solidarity between allies" and the "cohesion of the alliance" were constantly invoked by the Nato authorities as the overriding concern. In the end, general Wesley Clark resumed the success of the military strategy and operational tactics, imposed by his political masters on operation „Allied Force“, with the sober assessment, that it worked and that it had "maintained alliance cohesion", one of the four objectives of the "air campaign"².

4. The Balkan example is no argument against proper procedures of consultation and decision-taking nor against the organisation, without which no common policy-making is possible in the long run between a dozen let alone two or three dozen governments. But it shows that organisation and procedure cannot replace political union and authority, policy and strategy. It also shows that coalitions between partner states and at least an internal "balance of power" still exist within the Western institutions, both in Nato and in the EU as they exist at the UN and in the OSCE. Intra-alliance and intra-community policies may act on a pattern of strategies of limited conflict of national interests on major policy issues such as going to war together or simply applying pressure on other countries or intervening in a hostile environment. Finally it shows that the declared political solidarities and hence the formal structures and boundaries of treaty areas between partner states in the EU as in Nato can be stretched, over-extended and over-ridden by understandings of some of the members with each other and with states outside, accepted as external partners in ad hoc coalitions for special or dominant purposes in a given situation, as was the case with Russia both in 1995 over Bosnia and in 1999 over the Kosovo. This pattern is apt to re-emerge in international crisis management and conflict resolution in the future, whenever the stakes are high and the odds ominous, and, of course, when it would be necessary "to engage Russia" in the common security interest, one day possibly China outside Europe and certainly, for the EU in operations outside Nato on the European periphery, Turkey - which means that the entire European discussion on the "European Security and Defence Identity" with the proclaimed "Common European Policy on Security and Defence" is in reality subject to the American connection and to Turkey as it is on Norway for con-

2 See Politische Studien, Hanns Seidel Stiftung, München, 4/2000, Die USA und Europa, S. 96.

tingencies in Northern Europe. Cross-influences will play across the outer borders of the EU as they will across the Nato boundaries, wherever these boundaries will be.

EU structures will, therefore, have to be flexible, if they are to hold the still loose but widening union together in international action and if they are to withstand the pressures of crisis from the outside and of dissent from the inside. They must provide for active participation of European Nato allies, which are not members of the EU, but are in a geo-strategic position, which could not be circumvented for a crisis response operation by EU forces. This is a critical point in relation with Turkey and a possible cause for intra-alliance controversy also with the US. A conflict on this point could paralyse any military response by the EU on the Southern periphery of Europe or in the Black Sea region. It could block Nato consent to the use of Nato force and command structures, Nato bases and other Nato assets by the EU for outside purposes.

5. The common foreign, security and defence policy, especially all crisis management and conflict control policies with the use of force or even only of certain military means such as transport aircraft, relief convoys on the ground or teams for water drilling, road/bridge and power-line reparation, mine-clearing, distribution of food and medical assistance in theatres of armed hostilities (such as in Somalia or Bosnia and Kosovo), will remain concerted operations between national contingencies and services, each one under the ultimate authority and the national jurisdiction of their respective governments. Hence the first and last word on such commitments, deployments and employments will be reserved for the national authorities as will be the military missions and the "rules of engagement" to be agreed upon beforehand by the participating countries. On this capital point there will be political and ideological differences from member to member, which becomes obvious when one considers the neutrality policies of some EU states such as Sweden and Austria outside Nato or the different constitutional regimes with the German one, even since 1994, still a particular case.

From the Nato experience the general lesson can be drawn, that by and large arising differences of opinion and even of national interests in crisis management can be overcome or at least limited by mutual moderation. However, Nato is a military-political alliance, based on intergovernmental cooperation alone with the alliance organisation no independent entity but the prolongation of an alliance of sovereign states. This has established the pre-existing political hierarchy between the allies at the creation as the underlying reality of the transatlantic partnership including the "special relationship" between the US and Britain (even if the latter has changed due to the loss of power and international influence of Britain in relation to the US) and the Anglo-American predominance in Nato as a fact of life: The US as the protective power of Europe during the Cold War has remained the political leader and the moderator of the alliance. American strategic supremacy and technological-economic superiority as

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materialised in the US forces and global military organisation above and beyond the transatlantic connection englobing Europe with the complete strategic control of Nato border on a benign hegemony, which is all but formally complete, determines alliance policies and strategy, even if the US could not rule Nato against the will of its European allies. The US-German relationship, grown out of West Germany's dependence on American power and commitment for the defence of the FRG after 1945 and until the end of the East-West confrontation, on America's good will and political support for the national reunification of 1998/90, reinforces both the existing political hierarchy in Nato and the internal coalition politics within an inner circle around the US as the central power of the alliance, consisting of Britain, Germany and France (as far as the latter participates in Nato affairs) and, to a somewhat lesser degree, also of Italy as the other important basing-country for US forces in Europe and the central power in the Mediterranean.

6. The Nato members in the international "Dayton group" on South-Eastern Europe reflects this post-1990 situation in the alliance. Spain aspires to a similar position in the inner circle as that of Italy since 1996. Turkey however on the political margin in a geopolitical-strategic key position as one of the most important "strategic allies" (Holbrooke in 1994) of the US for the control of Europe from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea and Caucasus in the North to the Gulf in the South. This set-up inside Nato is the hard core of the alliance as an international player. The formal equality of its sovereign members in treaty terms under international law is not operational in political-strategic terms under crisis and conflict conditions. The nuclear side of reality again changes this set-up by privileging Britain and France among all European allies. But since nuclear arms are "weapons of last resort" and with Soviet power gone, Russia geographically removed from the center of Europe and no forward defence necessary against an immediate military threat on the continent, Nato strategy does no longer address confrontation risks in Europe proper nor rely on ready nuclear forces for regional deterrence, the "nuclear status privilege" is no longer of the same importance in favour of Britain and France. It is, however, still a political status symbol and offers the advantages of a privileged legal position in the NPT as a support of national veto power in the WSC of the UN. For the EU it has not been an obstacle to a common security policy so far. But as the EU develops into an inter-national unity of action, based on arrangements between its member states and lately on the union treaties, the nuclear issues of politics and strategy will come under consideration.

Britain and France, already in a special position as secondary nuclear powers and privileged permanent members of the UN security council with veto power, used to military intervention policies outside Europe, reflecting their past as centers of overseas colonial empires with still active clientele politics and interests in Africa and in the Middle East, can always rely on their special international status in reserving spe-

cial rights in the security and defence domain as well as for their relations with the US, Russia, China or India.

In Nato these special situations are controlled by the dominant US interest in Europe and in control of alliance forces by US dominated Nato authorities, by US economic interests in the armaments markets and the Nato programmes on “standardisation“ of equipments for “inter-operability“ and improvement of allied forces (as has become clear again in the conclusions of the review “Lessons learnt“ from the operation “Allied Force“ 1999 and the ensuing defence improvement initiative of Nato, to which all European allies have agreed in principle and have made commitments for force goals). The French restrictions on participation in the military cooperation in Nato diminish France’s position in Nato and limit French influence, thus indirectly upgrading the German position in the alliance. But outside Nato and in particular outside Europe France and Britain hold their post-Great Power positions above all other European allies and hence, their EU partners. What will this situation mean for EU structures and policy-making on crisis reaction and conflict prevention by the use of military forces? As far as the structures and procedures are concerned, the Nato example has been followed by the architects of the EU common security and defence policy. The Military Committee (MC) of Nato, composed on the highest level by the National Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces or Chiefs of the Defence Staff, with a working level in Brussels of Permanent Representatives of these chiefs, and a permanent International Military Staff, military counterpart of the political Council in Permanent Session, which is composed by the heads of the national delegations to Nato (the so-called “Nato ambassadors“, representatives of their governments) has been copied. This had already been done for the reactivation of the WEU, where a military committee of permanent delegates (for some partners as in the German case the same general officers in double function) had been created. This pattern has been transferred to the EU, which now had its own MC and international Military Staff. The Political and Security Policy Committee of civil representatives of the governments has been set up according to the Nato example of the permanent council. The Secretary General and High Representative for the Security and Defence policy of the EU may sit in the chair of the committee. A situation center for crisis management as a political-military response and coordination cell has been added, in order to give the EU an operational crisis reaction capability. A strategic reconnaissance satellite center is to follow, in order to create the desired “independent“ European capability for the acquisition, exploitation and evaluation of strategic intelligence by space-based satellite systems in the common possession of the EU partners.

All in all, this rudimentary and possibly provisional structure for the EU security and defence policy with the planning, coordination and control functions for a European crisis reaction force at the higher political-military level and down to the operational

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headquarters for the planning and command and control of force components deployed for and employed in non-Nato military missions in the service of the EU or by the EU for the UN or the OSCE appears to be adequate for the stated purpose of covering the entire spectrum of the 1992 "Petersberg Tasks" for WEU, which have been assumed by the EU, reaching from humanitarian relief action with military and civil means via peace-keeping missions with interposing troops to separate adversaries, deploy troops to secure open roads and free traffic under international control, police contested or unsafe areas, disarm opponents, neutralise threats to security, to peace enforcement with the use of military force including combat operations to achieve the missions objective.

This objective would be in general to extend protection and project stability in crisis situations to the advantage of the populations or the threatened legal authorities, protect or restore the internal peace of countries, to which EU forces would be deployed on request by the legal government with a mandate, possibly by the UN or the OSCE. Cases of intervention by offensive use of armed force may arise, but such cases were not expressly included in the 1992 Petersberg missions for WEU forces. They may, however, emerge as the consequence of a peace-keeping operation or even, as in Somalia, of a humanitarian relief mission, which would have to be protected or conducted by a military force of the EU, running into armed resistance or being attacked for booty. The objective of the mission could, therefore, require not only defensive but counter-offensive use of force including of heavy arms, i.e. to overcome road blocks, to cross a river under fire, to break a siege or an encirclement by a hostile armed opposition, in order to go on with a relief convoy. Missions may change by themselves under the influence of unforeseen events.

Therefore, the political and the military structures of the EU security and defence group from the European Council (EC) to the Foreign Ministers Council, eventually completed by the Defence Ministers, down to the Political and Security Committee and the Military Committee with its Military Staff must be prepared, organised and staffed to be capable of swift decisions for a timely and effective crisis response - this is the whole reason for the entire operation and the ambitious EU programme for a common security and defence policy outside Nato in non-Nato contingencies. Obviously, here lies the critical point, on which everything would turn in an acute crisis and during an ongoing, protracted conflict with EU forces or force components engaged in their missions. In this point the procedures are important for speedy decisions on action after fixing the objectives, which can be achieved with the available means in time for a successful outcome, evaluating the risks and defining which would be acceptable, the same for costs and eventual losses, elaborating an exit-strategy which would not confound the purpose of an operation and frustrate the political aims.

7. One essential consideration is when the heads of governments should be involved, since ministers cannot decide for themselves on military force, sanctions or other means of pressure. In the EU foreign policy domain, the political directors of the ministries of foreign affairs are the key figures for consultations on important matters and for submitting decisions to their ministers. Any safe procedure must include, not bypass them. The participation of the defence ministers will be necessary on any decision to commit military forces or assets, to deploy troops abroad and to use foreign bases, whether inside Nato or outside. Without the defence ministers no meaningful agreement on allied forces and joint force structures is possible, and without the defence ministers the defence budget cannot be loaded with additional costs for deployments and operations added for international security or foreign policy reasons. The defence part of the new policy cannot be managed or decided upon by the foreign ministers. Since military or “hard“ security is always linked to the use of force and to defence considerations, it is a capital error not to associate the defence ministers on a permanent basis with the foreign ministers in the ministerial council on security policy. In this respect, the EC has failed in his self-given task of setting up an appropriate structure for political decisions on security and defence. As long as the foreign ministers may decide on their own, when to consult with the defence ministers and call them in for a common session of the council, their deliberations on the military aspects of crisis management and conflict prevention or termination will be too far off from practical military and technical considerations and tend to make “incremental employment“ decisions of the kind that commits forces piecemeal, with light arms be preference, in small units, with narrowly limited missions and rules of engagement, forcing them to allow themselves to be fired upon first if not attacked outright with deadly use of arms and bound to unrealistic perceptions of danger and threat in the theatre of crisis as well as to an interpretation of international law to the disadvantage of regular forces exposed to guerrilla fighters or street fighting and sniping, road-blocking and harassing military posts and camps.

Too restrictive mandates or interpretations of rules of engagement and rules of international law by the lawyers of the foreign services and diplomatic representatives have led to the self-inflicted debacle of UNPROFOR in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995. “Incremental“ engagement of forces with the mission to control a crisis situation always carries a non-calculable risk against unknown, often hidden odds and in situations, which may change rapidly and hence confront the deployed international troops with a violent runaway crisis, with which they later cannot catch up, so that the one-sided escalation of the conflict escapes their grasp, piles up serious risks to their operations at little cost to the authors of organised violence, inflicts losses without any real chance of eliminating the source of danger let alone of establishing control. The British and French contingents of UNPROFOR together lost more than 70 men dead without any decisive action. This is why the international “protection“ force in Bosnia

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could not even effectively protect itself, let alone the populations and localities under their responsibility for security.

8. The defence ministers and chiefs of the armed forces bear the responsibility (in Germany the constitutional responsibility of the minister as commander-in-chief) for the forces and their soldiers vis-à-vis the government and the parliament, but ultimately before the people. No foreign minister can replace them in this and the foreign ministries do not have the competence and expertise to analyse a situation from an operational point of view, evaluate the risks, the requirements and the cost of an operation, least at all of a belated or weak response in a developing crisis, where the odds are against the insertion of forces without the necessary strength, support and supplies over a longer stretch of time. There are no safe “preventive deployments“ of forces in a theatre of crisis, where an armed conflict may erupt and the “prevention“ force has the task of suppressing the forces of violence in time before they can act. It follows from there, that the foreign ministers cannot make an assessment alone, whether a given potential crisis situation warrants only a small and light force for “preventive deployment“ or whether a stronger and heavier armed force should be deployed as a matter of caution to be able to keep the causes for an eruption of conflict under control. This is, anyway, one of the most difficult and most risky decisions to make at the beginning of an involvement. “Policy“ decisions cannot be safely dissociated from military “strategy“ decisions and from operational-tactical considerations of implementation, since the execution of policy determines success or failure and the “mission impossible“ for armed forces often results from a constraining mandate for the incremental use of light forces in situations, that have been ill observed or perceived by the political authorities and their diplomatic advisers, where the risks have been underestimated by the policy-makers. After Bosnia for the UN, the Kosovo has offered lessons to Nato and to the allied governments, advised and represented by their Nato ambassadors and the secretary general of Nato in the permanent council: Their assessments and evaluations before the implementation of the exclusive air strategy of “Allied Force“ in March 1999 were proven inaccurate and on the time axis wide off the mark. Their predictions of how Milosevic would react to the “phased“ air campaign and what it would take to bend or break him were wrong, and their interpretations of the Serb reasoning during the conflict was not better. It is true, that they had ample military advise in Brussels and in their capitals, which they listened too, once the armed hostilities were opened. But before that, during the political phase of crisis management by diplomacy and with the OSCE observers in Kosovo, while preventive force deployments were made in Macedonia across the border and the “Extraction Force“ was assembled there to evacuate the observers in case of a threat to their security, the allied governments via the EU “troika“, did not persuade Milosevic to change his policy nor did they bring him to honour the various agreements they had made

with him. All missions failed, finally the Holbrooke mission in the fall of 1998 and ultimatums were not followed up with the threatened military action.

The former chairman of the Nato Military Committee, German general Klaus Naumann, who with general Wesley Clark negotiated in October 1998 in Belgrade with Milosevic the withdrawal of the bulk of Serbian forces from Kosovo and tried during the ultimate last mission to Belgrade in January 1999 to persuade Milosevic to comply with the Western five demands for a settlement of the Kosovo, has criticised the Western "crisis management" in 1998-99 before the break-down of the Rambouillet negotiation. He has argued that the spring of 1998, when the escalation of violence started in the Kosovo, would probably have been "the right point in time to show resolve", but at that time, "many Nato countries looked upon the situation as an internal affair" (and the US was bound into a severe internal constitutional crisis over President Clinton). Therefore, the crisis management missed the proper opportunity, when escalation into war with Serbia over Kosovo might still have been avoided.³ General Naumann has drawn as lesson from the failed Kosovo diplomacy before March 1999 that "crisis management can achieve its primary objective to avoid war only by winning the initiative early and if possible by preventive action"⁴.

"Winning the initiative" is more than taking an initiative. It is a strategic term which means that the object of the initiative is to deny the opponent to set the conditions of the conflict, to reduce his freedom of action until he is blocked from reaching his goals and secure freedom of action for oneself in order to determine the evolution of the conflict and finally its outcome. "Winning the initiative" is about winning control of the situation by bringing superiority over the adversary to bear. For any coalition or alliance, hence for the EU as a community of states, the lesson for its crisis management policies is to bring in sufficient military force early, at least on stand-by, ready to be deployed and engaged, capable of a sustained effort to exercise physical and technical control of the crisis situation and impose the conditions of conflict prevention, conflict limitation or conflict termination, in sum: establish strategic dominance of the theatre. This basic requirement limits the time for "incrementalism" and sets the stage for a timely deployment of a military force or para-military police force (or both together).

8. EU security structures and forces for crisis response must be tailored to this requirement. This asks for a standing combination of political-diplomatic and military expertise for the early recognition of danger, proper use of the available warning time for analysis and assessment of the situation, the correlation of forces and risks of a-

3 See Klaus Naumann, Kosovo - Modell für die Zukunft?, In: Erich Reiter, Der Krieg um das Kosovo 1998/99, Mainz 2000, p. 24.

4 Ibid., p. 25.

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tion before the crisis erupts into open violence and escalates into armed conflict. The examples of Bosnia and Kosovo, discussed above under this aspect, are cases in point ????. The EU authorities and associate governments should mind these examples and use the experience for the architecture of their security and defence policy: A closely knit fabric of cooperation between foreign affairs and defence with the intelligence and security services across administrative departments and political domains as well as across the national frontiers between the participating countries. This consideration clearly pleads for both a common council for the foreign and defence ministers and a standing committee with representatives from both as well as for a permanent interchange between the PSC and the MC with the Military Staff under the authority of the Secretary General/High Representative for Security and Defence Policy of the EU. In this political-military context the crisis response cell and the situation center would give optimal service to the process of assessment and policy-making for eventually necessary preventive deployments in support of preventive diplomacy and the introduction of military force into the equation of the means for action. The Military Staff could coordinate its „strategic planning“ with the policy planning, based on the same intelligence and on a joint assessment by exploitation of the results of „early warning“. This is necessary on any account, since the MS figures in the EC document Annex to the Conclusions of the Presidency on the Nice EC session 7/9-11-2000⁵) as “linkage“ between the EUMC (the military committee and the military forces, made available to the EU, and as advisory organism of the competent authorities of the EU, i.e. the Political and Security Committee, the Secretary General, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and ultimately the EC of the Heads of State and Government.

9. Any architecture or assemblage of structures for political decision-making, military planning and coordination of forces , elaboration of crisis response options both political and economic as well as military must provide for the participation of non-EU allies and of willing candidates for EU membership, once these are recognized and associated to EU political consultations or even in a formal partnership with the EU. It must at the same time secure the integrity and autonomy of EU planning, decision-making and the implementation of political decisions and strategic plans by the EU organisation for security and defence, i.e. for crisis response. This subject is an old theme of the relations between Nato and Russia since 1994 with Moscow always demanding more access than Brussels can give, if Nato is to continue as an efficient military-political alliance, capable of international action by itself and not hindered by others. This principle of self-determination in crisis and crisis response even in cooperation with external security partners should be valid for the EU as well. Otherwise the EU Security and Defence Policy organisation would risk to degenerate into a second OSCE without impact on hard security problems. For all candidates to EU mem-

5 See SN 400/00 ADD 1 Rev 1, p. 77 (German version).

bership, which would not yet be Nato members in case of a crisis contingency, the same criteria for autonomy and integrity of the EU as an international player in security matters must apply. Otherwise the EU would acquire a loose fringe of associated and participating partners, not really bound by solidarity and discipline on the basis of contractual obligations and an “*acquis commun*“ of common practice in the exercise of policies in the international field.

II. The force structuring and the options for European crisis response with military means

1. The adopted “*Headline Goal*“ for EU crisis reaction forces, based on the “*Petersberg Tasks*“ for the WEU in 1992, sets a requirement for some 115.000 soldiers in ground forces, of which not more than 60.000 in one contingency force, 300 combat aircraft and 75 naval vessels plus a airlift/sealift capability of 188 transport airplanes and 61 transport ships for longer range deployments in the contingency of use of force with possible combat missions. Such a contingency could materialize in a situation, where the mission would be “*separation of parties by force*“, in other words: deployment of an interposition force to separate two adversaries, opposing each other on the terrain. This is supposed to be the most demanding of the “*Petersberg Tasks*“ for EU forces, the others being “*conflict prevention*“ i.e. preventive deployment of troops in a crisis area and “*humanitarian assistance*“, which has two parts: “*humanitarian aid*“ (as in Southern Turkey to Kurdish refugees from Northern Iraq in the spring of 1991, in Eastern Bosnia or in Somalia) and “*evacuation operation*“ (as in Northern Iraq in 1991 or from flooded or devastated areas). The national contingents announced by the participating countries in 2000 for the “*Helsinki Force Catalogue*“ (HFC) added up to more than 100.000 soldiers for ground forces, 400 combat aircraft und 100 naval vessels. Non-EU states, which are members of Nato, and therefore admitted to participate in EU “*Petersberg Task*“ operations, announced additional force contributions in November 2000 at Helsinki. This means that on the quantitative scale the force requirements are already fulfilled on paper. As to military quality, which is recognized as the essential criterion, the well known deficiencies in European Nato forces subsist and limit the operational value of the commitments made by the concerned EU partners at Helsinki: Strategic transport, strategic reconnaissance, command and control capabilities, logistical support over larger distances, readiness of units, combat search and rescue (CSAR) assets, precision-guided munitions (PGM) and other high accuracy weapons such as air-to-ground, ground-to-ground, sea-to-surface missiles, orientation and target acquisition equipment etc. In Nato, the military authorities and the US defence minister have identified additional deficiencies in Allied Forces Europe after the Kosovo operation: In general terms standardisation and interoperability of the various national components of allied forces, i.e. in telecommunications, communications secu-

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city, intelligence assets and analysis, electronical surveillance and air-space control, friend/foe-identification of flying aircraft and night combat capabilities in the air and on the ground. The “Defence Capabilities Initiative“ (DCI) adopted in Nato by all allies has identified the deficiencies in detail and spelled out the remedies. It has also been adopted by the EU partners as the yard-stick for measuring military requirements for the EU force. On November 20, 2000 the participating EU governments accepted a list of initiatives for upgrading EU crisis response force components and the European organisation to be set up. The system of division of labour by sharing roles was adopted, in order to avoid duplications and optimise European options by joint capabilities. The results need to be verified for eventual correction or completion. Judging by past experience with European efforts in the defence domain, perfection is not to be expected but adequate results could be achieved.

2. The weak point in the political-administrative architecture lies in the absence of the Finance Ministers or at least the budget directors of the finance ministries and in the failure to create a Committee on Technology, Arms and Equipment, composed of the armaments directors in the national defence ministries. But these errors could be corrected, since cooperation in the armaments domain with the harmonisation of planning and procurement of military equipments is an explicit objective of the new European Security and Defence Policy and a measure of practical cooperation does exist. If the political will prevailed to build up a solid European crisis response capability with military force, which could indeed “enrich“ (in the words of the French Defence Minister) the collection of tools for crisis reaction and conflict prevention/ termination and, at the same time, address the tasks of the Nato DCI with results, that could satisfy the military authorities of Nato and above all the US, the structural deficiencies in the concept of Helsinki and Nice could well be eliminated.

The synergetic effects of European force structuring and Nato force goals in the new allied forces structure, to be organised in Europe, could materialise by the build-up of the multilateral “Eurocorps“, to which France contributes forces together with Germany, Spain, Belgium and other allies, however some of them only with token forces of dubious availability let alone operational readiness, to a full-fledged Nato “crisis reaction corps“, in this case the 3rd one of high readiness, with the “Franco-German Brigade“ (at this time the only immediately available one in the corps) as the “spear-head“ of a rapid crisis reaction force. This will be effective only, if and when both France and Germany make one operational division with three brigades each and the necessary complementary troops for support and supply available, ready for operational employment with mobile command and control, long range air transportation, mobile air defence assets and logistics packages for air transport, all in interoperability modes and with considerable standardisation at least for the use of ammunition and fuel, electric aggregates and communications equipments. The troops would have to

be trained in compatible skills and tactics (one of the major deficiencies the US forces observed in their European Nato allies in Bosnia since 1995 was the inability to use US-compatible equipments in communications and American transmission formats, language, ciphers, etc as generals Joulwan and Clark noted).

A European Air Transport Command, Reconnaissance, Strategic Intelligence and Assessment Command and Control of EU forces as common functions with common organisations - all force goals already envisaged by the WEU before 1995 - are to contribute to the upgrading of real "European options" for crisis response. The general rule is a "single set of forces" for Nato and EU, as 14 of the 15 EU partners participating in the planned joint crisis response capability are bound in the Nato military cooperation with its long-existing force goal planning process. However, a separate force planning subject is evacuation of people in emergency situations beyond the operational search and rescue, since Nato does not plan for emergency evacuation of civilians on a large scale as a military function (it has, however, accomplished this task by improvising in March/April 1991 between Northern Iraq and Southern Turkey in the Kurdish contingency).

3. Force structuring for crisis response is by nature provisional and must be as flexible as possible to adapt to changing contingencies and situations on the ground. The EU and Nato have identified 149 different operational capabilities to meet the various challenges posed by the three main generic tasks of humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention and interposition of troops for forceful separation of opponents in a crisis situation with armed violence threatening or having already occurred. The 115.000 soldiers of the land or ground forces will have to be divided into various operational components, in "packages" for the various identifiable contingencies. Since never more than one expeditionary force of up to 60.000 soldiers shall be deployed on the ground in one contingency and this for up to 12 months, on call for readiness within 60 days, the 115.000 force level offers several options for rotation in deployment: on average either three times 35-40.000 for four months or up to 55.000 in two periods of six months each. The force packages could be smaller, i.e. 15-20.000, which would leave an operational ready reserve with three contingencies covered at the same time. These figures show that the force structure should be extremely flexible, in order to lend itself to rapid adaptation of "packages tailored" to given situations with limited tasks in each case. If, however, one large operation were to become necessary, such as Bosnia in 1995-96 or Macedonia-Kosovo in 1999, the authorised expeditionary force of up to 60.000 strong would have to be used. In this case it would have to be deployed to the theatre for the time necessary up to 12 months without relief or rotation, unless ready reserves stood by. The 115.000 overall level for land forces in the EU crisis reaction corps would probably allow such a stretched-out deployment, if the logistical support and the money to pay were on hand. But Bosnia and Kosovo with

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Macedonia show that the required time for peace-keeping or even more for peace-making may well last longer than the allotted 12 months. This is even likely in such cases, where international forces would be inserted into an crisis area with the mission of either to keep the adversaries apart or to enforce the peace by offensive deployments for control, which is implicit in the "Petersberg Tasks".

4. In such cases, the development of the situation can change both the mission and the required forces or quality, equipment, operational capabilities of the forces. This happened in Somalia and in Bosnia between 1992 and 1994: In Somalia from protection of the humanitarian assistance via transport and distribution of relief goods and other aid (which had become objects of competition between rivals in the ethnic civil war for the control of the territory by control of hungry populations and at the same time prizes of looting by banditism) to the need to suppression of banditism and finally enforcement of UN decisions with the attempt of disarming warring factions, hunting "war lords" and securing control of the territory by force and occupation. In Bosnia with a similar development from simple watching over demarcation lines, to protecting relief convoys and individuals, opening blocked roads, guarding abandoned villages or towns, creating UN proclaimed "safe havens" for refugees and defending (or rather not really defending) such areas as Srebrenica or Tuzla (abandoned with the people to the Serbs). In the end in 1995, the UN "Protection Force" did not discharge its responsibilities and could not even help itself, not even with Nato air cover, because of the lack of heavy arms, armoured transport helicopters for mobility over longer distances and a UN mandate with appropriate rules of engagement to open fire not only when under attack but also to protect villages or traffic on the road and generally to carry out their missions with the use of force. The result was general helplessness and disorientation, loss of time and effort, high cost for no return in security. The Canadian soldiers of UNPROFOR chained to bridges or gates of military installations of the Bosnian Serbs as living shields to deter Nato air attacks and artillery fire before the late summer of 1995 were the sorry symbol ??? of international incapacity to cope with the problems and master the crisis. The Dutch battalion handing over Srebrenica, one of the "safe havens" held open for Bosnian refugees, with several thousands of civilians to the Serb military of general Mladovic, since wanted as a "war criminal", was the more dramatic symbol of this incapacity.

In the end, the UN soldiers stood in the way for Nato air attacks and Nato ground deployments such as the insertion of the allied rapid reaction force close to Sarajevo to counter the Serb artillery fire barrages. The conversion of such troops to a fighting force is possible, but not always and everywhere under all circumstances. In the Bosnian case, part of the UNPROFOR elements were upgraded in arms and equipment for enlarged missions including readiness for combat, in other cases they were replaced by fresh Nato forces from Europe. In general terms Nato first stood in for the UN, where

it was allowed to do this, then replaced the UN forces for the occupation and control of Bosnia. The change-over meant the end of the UN military presence in Bosnia and marked the beginning of a cooperation between Nato and the UN under the operational and physical control of Nato with first about 50-60.000 allied soldiers in the Ifor/Sfor. By the year 2001 the level of Sfor has been reduced to about 33 % of the original one. Bosnia has been, at least on the surface and for the most, been pacified without further bloodshed or armed violence on a recognisable scale. Is the replacement of the UN force by Nato the model on which the EU bases is provisional crisis respond for peace-enforcement with the use of strong and active military force?

5. The official German interpretation of the Helsinki and Nice EU documents mentions that “only possible developments of a crisis will tell, whether the EU or Nato will act militarily“ and that therefore „consultation and cooperation“ between the two organisations constitute “a key function“, i.e. “in times of crisis“, in order “to involve the alliance comprehensively in the decision-making process, which can lead to an EU operation“. The American partners did ask during the last years, whether this could mean that US forces might be called in belatedly to finish off the business started by the Europeans? This is, of course, one of the key questions, that the US Congress would ask in the course of events, leading to a request by the EU or European Nato allies for US forces in a European contingency. Here lies one of the reasons for the obvious American scepticism vis-à-vis European crisis control operations, although the US has for a long time demanded such European capabilities to deal with European contingencies without calling in US forces until they would be really needed. The ambivalence of the American debate and official policy on this matter reflects the ambiguity of such crisis situations and their incalculable evolution, for which the situation in Southern Serbia bordering on Kosovo and on Macedonia gave an example in the spring of the year 2001 with the Albanian violence breaking out in that region.

6. Such possibilities point to the critical nature of force structuring and armaments for crisis response, conflict prevention and termination as well as to the inherent and mostly hidden risks of “incrementalism“ in deploying and engaging forces in order not to intervene too soon too heavy-handed and to keep all the options open for controlled escalation and de-escalation. The old French adage “qui peut le plus peut le moins“, meaning that he who can do more, can also do less - but not vice versa. In other words: Larger and better armed forces can be used successfully in different ways than smaller and lighter ones, when the tide changes and new challenges arise. Force structuring for crisis response must therefore create adaptable force components for various combinations, which allow different options, above all a spectrum of options by changes in the composition of rapidly available elements, without having to exchange whole force structures or field formations such as brigades and divisions (in Bosnia Ifor was composed in 1996 of three allied divisions with several brigades each, under the command

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of the then British-led ARRC from ACE). The “Head Quarters“ structure adopted by Nato offers the advantage of various elements to be inserted into one frame and interchanged in the course of the operation without a general change-over and loss of continuity. The EU structure has adopted this system, which also makes it easier to cooperate with Nato and change operational responsibilities in the theatre.

The latest example of the reality on the ground changing rapidly and by surprise was the rebellion of Macedonian Albanians on the border of Kosovo around the town of Tetovo, where on March 14, 2001 a group of the newly organised Macedonian-Albanian UCK opened fire on the positions of the Macedonian army and border police, collocated with 1200 German soldiers of the former international “Extraction Force“ for an emergency evacuation of the OSCE observers from Kosovo still under Serb control in 1998 before the outbreak of the Kosovo war. This German contingent and other international elements were held in reserve for the logistical supply and possible reinforcement of the German sector in the South Kosovo since the Kfor deployment in June 1999. They had not seen any action or been under hostile fire until mid-March 2001: All of a sudden they found themselves on the front of a beginning fire fight across the border with mortar impacts close to their barracks. 200 of them were immediately withdrawn back to security and German Leopard tanks were deployed from Kosovo to the Tetovo garrison in Macedonia as a back-up by heavy armour and as deterrence of aggression by what the German defence minister Rudolf Scharping called “Albanian terrorists“⁶. His troops in Tetovo were garrisoned in a Macedonian border town with an Albanian majority population and situated between three different “UCK“ guerrilla forces: The one in Kosovo, a second one in the Presovo region of South Serbia and a new one near the border in Macedonia - quite an unforeseen situation two years earlier, when the international force had been deployed to Northern Macedonia, a country with one quarter to one third of its population being Albanian-Muslim.

A few days earlier, US troops had to open fire in the South Serbian Presovo valley border sector to Kosovo on UCK partisans in order to restore security. A cease-fire was negotiated with the UCK groups in Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovic under the monitoring surveillance by a Joint Security Force Headquarters at Bujanovic. Later the Yugoslav army was allowed back in regimental strength into this border region, a 5 km wider buffer zone, to maintain order. With the returning troops came general Nebojsa Pavkovic, former commander of the Yugoslav army corps in Kosovo during the conflict of 1999 - a 180 degree change in the political situation on the terrain as well as between Nato and Belgrade, due to the UCK activities in South Serbia and to the change of power in Yugoslavia (general Pavkovic, however, was one of the leading supporters of Milosevic in the Yugoslav army).

Both new contingencies demonstrated the need for international insertion forces to always be prepared for a sudden deterioration of conditions and crises concerning their missions, which might then be changed from one day to the other, with even the opponent changing: The assumption, widely made since 1991, that forces for crisis management and peace-keeping, in particular for „preventive deployments“ like the original one to Macedonia, do not need heavy arms such as artillery and even less offensive means such as armour and armoured combat helicopters, let alone fighter-bombers to accomplish their missions, but should be lightly armed as to be inoffensive and highly mobile for policing their sector and inspiring confidence in the populations, reducing tensions between adversaries, has again been proved wrong by these events. Heavy arms, especially armour, artillery and combat helicopters are essential to military security even in a stationary defensive posture of international “stabilisation forces“ such as Sfor in Bosnia, Kfor in the Kosovo or the international back-up force in Macedonia.

7. This requirement limits the necessary structural changes of security forces compared to de-fence forces in Europe. The answer to the problem posed does not lie in an alternative “light“ instead of “heavy“ or in the dubious distinction between “offensive“ and “defensive“ but in striking a proper balance between both types of equipment, capabilities, hence force structures and force levels. It stands to reason that more infantry is needed, but so are airborne and heliported combat units with engineers, signal and medical components and light highly mobile armoured units to accompany the infantry, which itself must also be mounted on light armoured and wheeled combat vehicles and battle-field transportation. The heavy armour must still be available at short distances as back-up and fire support in case of need. The training and mental preparation of the soldiers has to take into account the various contingencies which may arise during a mission and prepare the troops for more than one kind of service in the field. But the idea, that an entire “new type“ of “light“ military force, bordering on the para-military police could replace the existing force structures, at least below the division level, is an illusion. Brigades may be composed of a mix of light and heavy battalions with artillery. Or each battalion may have two light companies and one heavier company with some field artillery support and light armour, but in addition the heavier armoured and armed fighting vehicles of the mechanised infantry and armoured battalions with their medium or heavy main battle tanks must be deployed with the lighter units as an insurance against a bad day. The combination can be optimal at brigade or combat group level. Several variants are possible and flexible force structures with flexible command and control permit changes in the composition of the battalions for special purposes and for the adaptation to changing contingencies and missions of the same units.

6 See Mathias Rüb, Report from Tetovo, In: FAZ 17.03.2001, pp. 1, 3.

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8. The programme of the German army for a new, brigade-oriented structure of the land forces with two mobile divisional headquarters for command and control of functional force elements or “tailored packages“ in specific deployments for specific missions, each capable of commanding and supporting three to four brigades or brigade-size combat groups in international security contingencies, the whole laid out for up to 150.000 soldiers, in Nato roles and for non-Nato roles with an EU force, an OSCE force or an UN force, shows the way to go beyond the narrow limits of the 1992 “Petersberg Tasks“, if the need to do so, were to arise.

The pledged German contingent to the EU crisis reaction corps of 115.000 soldiers in land forces for the crisis deployment of up to 60.000 in one contingency mission and one year at 60 days notice on call, would be composed of a total of some 18.000 soldiers:

- one “nucleus“ operational joint headquarters for army, navy and air force components in joint command and control,
- land forces component:
 - around 14.000 soldiers land forces
 - available within 5 to 30 days,
 - one “nucleus“ land component command or headquarters for the ground forces in the deployment area/area of operations (the German-Dutch corps is earmarked as a future “crisis reaction corps“ in Allied Forces Europe of Nato),
 - a division headquarters with supply and support troops for one division,
 - a brigade headquarters with 6 combat battalions plus supply and support units for the brigade,
- air force component:
 - “nucleus“ air component command or headquarters to command the air force units in the area of operations
 - around 6.000 soldiers,
 - available in 5 to 10 days,
 - 6 combat squadrons with 79 aircraft,
 - 8 squadrons (companies) of ground-to-air defence systems,
 - air transport and general support units,

• naval component:

- “nucleus“ maritime component command or headquarters to command the naval forces in the area of operations and control other maritime movements,
- around 4.000 soldiers,
- available in 2 to 20 days,
- 15 combat vessels,
- 1 naval combat air squadron with 12 aircraft,
- maritime surveillance assets and units,
- support forces,
- central medical service:
 - around 2.800 soldiers,
 - available in 20 to 30 days,
 - 2 field hospitals,
 - 6 medical rescue centers,
 - 1 sea-based medical installation (hospital ship),
- joint forces base service:
 - around 3.500 soldiers,
 - available in 20 to 30 days,
- national logistic support elements,
- reconnaissance and military intelligence elements.

The German example shows that with less than 20.000 military personnel, one European country could fill a third of the bill for the 60.000 strong European crisis reaction force component in one contingency mission. This means that if conditions and availability as well as sustainability were equal in all three countries, Britain, France and Germany with about 20.000 soldiers each in “tailored packages“ on the German model, could field the 60.000 soldiers in operational units with their organic support and above with the necessary general support and headquarters organisation for mobile command and control, ground-to air defence, communications and transport, air cover, air transport, sea-lift and general logistics including the home base installations and assets within 30 days. This consideration leads to the conclusion, that there would be at least a second possible multinational force package of another 60.000 soldiers within in 30 days for a period of up to 12 months, if all the other participating EU

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partners would field their national contributions on this model, of course of varying personnel and equipment strength. Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Portugal could certainly do that, Poland, Czechia and Hungary as EU candidates and associates could contribute, as they all do in Bosnia to Sfor and in Kosovo to Kfor under Nato command and control. Turkey offers to contribute as it does with two battalions to Sfor under Nato authority in Bosnia.

What Austria and the two Nordic EU members Sweden and Finland would do in a serious crisis with regard to the deployment of a EU force with an offensive or at least active military mission is not certain and would depend on the circumstances and the domestic political constellation. But all three countries have participated in UN peace-keeping operations with military elements, Sweden with Norway, Denmark and Finland has integrated small Baltic units in a "Nordic battalion" in Sfor after having contributed to UN forces for several decades as the other Scandinavian countries and Finland. Denmark is not part of the ESDI and does not participate in the common security and defence policy. Norway, still not a member of EU, is free as a Nato ally to contribute or abstain. The decisions of all of these countries probably will be taken case by case on the merits of each case in their respective national perception.

Therefore the strength and composition of the European crisis reaction corps and its deployable force components should not pose any real problem within 6 to 12 months and within a limited European-Mediterranean dimension. However, six months periods of service in a crisis situation, as currently in the Balkans, may pose problems of sustainability and require rotation of personnel and equipment, if not of entire units. Volunteers may not always be in abundance. Professional soldiers of high quality may sometimes be in short supply. The equipment has to be maintained and repaired, which means exchanged according to its having been used on rough terrain or in combat. Whatever the plans and rules, the real-time utility depends on the way, soldiers and equipment are being employed and cared for. If the EU were to assume the entire responsibility for the stability of the Balkans with its own means, including the military security function, the 60.000 limit for personnel at one time in one single deployment would have to be raised by at least half, probably doubled to 120.000. Since 115.000 soldiers in land forces are the total agreed upon, even this force goal could be met for one year; afterwards rotation of units and personnel in headquarters and services in the operational area would definitely have to begin. But with this maximum, which would allow for either two successive deployments of 60.000 each for two times six months or of three at 40.000 for a rotation over one year, the human resources would be stretched to the extreme sustainable. The Chief of the German Defence Staff (Inspector General of the Bundeswehr), general Harald Kujat, is on record since March 2001 with the public warning that the limits of the personnel reserves for crisis deployment of German units have been reached with what is now in the Balkans.

The European crisis response possibilities are therefore not as grand as it may appear by mere counting of the numbers of military personnel in service in all EU member states. The cost of such deployments is such that two billion D-Mark have been set aside annually in the defence budget to cover such operations. The amount may just be adequate, as long as there is no large and continuous expenditure of ordnance and fuel and no mounting repair requirements are to be expected by wear and tear in the field. But already, the ministry of finance in Berlin has sent an inspection to the Balkans in order to find out, whether it is „necessary“ to offer 180 D-Mark a day to every soldier serving there. Pay is directly linked to motivation and hence to volunteers to go into a crisis zone. This is treacherous ground for bureaucrats with only the budget in mind and inexperienced in looking at risks, hardship and hazards associated with service outside the office. This example shows again, how necessary it is, to engage the budget directors of the ministries of finance directly, systematically and personally in the planning for and the funding of crisis reaction policies in the service of international security.

9. In the general view, autonomous EU operations without reliance on Nato would rather be the exception, EU operations relying on Nato assets (bases, force structures, capabilities) and procedures, the general rule. This is the basic concept adopted at Helsinki and elaborated at Nice by the EU partners. However, the Balkan experience since 1991 shows that such assumptions, while reasonable and practical, may have given way in meeting the realities of a theatre of conflict. The main problem does lie with the air cover, surveillance from the air and air-space control, air transport, armed and armoured helicopters, strategic-operational reconnaissance and intelligence, real-time operational information, navigation and identification of locations, all satellite-based, finally with night-fighting capabilities of aircraft and armour on the ground. Nato can offer assets, the EU has few. In Bosnia in 1995-96 most of the communications, navigation and information assets were US (above 90 %). It is in this critical and costly domain, that the EU partners will have to prove their abilities to carry out their intentions and sustain their efforts over time.

III. Harmony within the alliance, compatibility with US forces and the issue of a “European Army“ in the future

The quarrel with Ankara over Turkish participation in EU peace support and crisis response operations is but one aspect of the problem posed: How can the European Security and Defence Identity and the exercise of a European security and defence policy by EU crisis response with military force be made compatible with Nato requirements in a crisis? How can the EU and the US with the rest of the European allies

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make satisfactory agreements of practical value and be efficient both outside and inside Nato? How can “the single set of forces“ for EU and Nato of the European allies be used to mutual satisfaction in the perception of the best interest of both Europe and the alliance?

All US forces in and earmarked for Europe have out-of-area contingency priorities. All operational European forces in Nato will have at least some non-Nato missions envisaged for them in international security contingencies. Ten years after the end of the East-West confrontation in Europe and of the Soviet Union, this new priority-setting is normal and indeed unavoidable. The creation of the European crisis reaction corps within the limits set by the EU governments seems to be a reasonable response to the new needs and challenges, but also to the long-standing American demand for more European efforts in the field of security and defence.

“Collective defence“ behind the border-lines of the Nato parameter with a firm posture of forces in Europe has given way to “collective security“ as the immediate concern and the first priority as long as there occurs no new appearance of a direct military threat in Europe against Nato. Turkey lies on the border between European defence and international security in an area of unrest and potential threats around the European periphery, including against Europe itself from the South. Hence the Nato area is unevenly exposed to security hazards from its environment running from the Caucasus and the Black Sea via Central Asia and the Middle East along the Southern coast of the Mediterranean to the Maghreb in North Africa. But this wide “Southern arc of tensions“ , which englobes Europe and the entire Mediterranean, also marks the larger strategic-geopolitical unity of this valuable, unevenly populated and developed world region, spanning three continents and bordering on two oceans in the South and in the West: The Indian Ocean and the North Atlantic. As Nato and the EU expand to the East on the European continent and come closer to Russia, the European security agenda changes and with it the scope, scale and strategic significance of “collective defence“ by Nato in Europe. Will the Baltic and the Black Sea become - in strategic-political terms - “Nato lakes“ as the Mediterranean has become over time in the last fifty years inspite of the fact, probably strange in the classical perception of Admiral Mahan, that Nato does not control the opposite coast in North Africa, at least not with naval and air bases and certainly not politically? Will the environment around Europe remain stable or will the volatile situation escalate into permanent danger? The answer to this question lies in the possible understandings with Russia, in Russia’s position in the Caucasus, in Georgia’s relations with Nato and in Turkey’s relations with Russia, with Syria, Israel and Egypt, ultimately with America’s position in the Middle East between Israel, its client, and the Arab world, hostile to the existence of the Jewish State as the dominant regional power with still colonial features on Arab land. Half a dozen countries in the region have missiles of ranges reaching Southern Europe, mis-

sile technology and possibly the nuclear weapons option plus a part in the spread of other dangerous means of mass destruction.

In this situation the defence of the European Nato perimeter changes its strategic meaning: Defence in the strategic sense must be forward defence beyond the perimeter of the Nato area by the means and strategy of denial of aggressive options against Europe and the American presence in the region. The requirements for such a strategy, both political-economic and military, are stabilising forces on the periphery and organizing mutual political support based on common security and interests. What role could a separate “autonomous“ European crisis reaction force play under such conditions in this specific peripheral environment and what role, that Nato with US leadership could not play? What will be the strategic objectives of the autonomous European security policy and could they be achieved in “strategic autonomy“. How will the EU governments define their common long-term and immediate security interests for example vis-à-vis Turkey, a “strategic partner“ both for the US and Europe, and how vis-à-vis Israel? In order to use crisis response forces anywhere, the EU must first have a clear view of the political picture and the strategic conditions for the use of force or for “preventive deployments“ of a peace-keeping force to a crisis situation. This was neither the case in Somalia nor in the Balkans, although the disintegration of Yugoslavia in a series of wars, which were each a combination between a civil war of ethnic-religious as well as political texture and a war of se-cession on the part of the non-Serb peoples, while for Belgrade it was each time a war of domination as well as of preserving the political unity of Yugoslavia, forced Europe to attend to the conflict in a murky situation. The peace-keeping and peace-enforcement roles could not really be assumed let alone played with success without the deployment of superior military force and an international mandate to act with force either by the UN or by the OSCE (the latter still being subject to authorisation by the UN WSR). This meant that it could not be played against Russia’s resistance at the UN, unless one would forego an international mandate to use force, as Nato finally resigned itself to do with no other political option left. Could the EU have acted in this way and could it have succeeded, even to the point of Nato’s incomplete and precarious success in June 1999 after the Kosovo war? Could it now consolidate the new situation under more favourable circumstances than those in early 1999 before Nato intervened with operation “Allied Force“ against Serbia/Yugoslavia? The answer is negative to the first question and dubious to the second.

The general wisdom of European policy-makers after the not yet ended Kosovo conflict has been expressed in the summary assumption, that there would not be a repetition of an interventionist military policy in the Balkans, of course not in the Caucasus or in North Africa and the Middle East: “Allied Force“ against Serbia and the Kfor experience, still of an open outcome in political terms, are no model for future Nato

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and EU policies of crisis management. If that is so, what will the consequences be in new crises on the periphery of Europe? Service of EU crisis reaction forces in small numbers to the OSCE or the UN, which means with Russian consent and participation in the deployment in any serious contingency in a region, where Moscow has an interest, is one possibility. But would the EU members want to do this together with Russia and without the US? Would Britain even be prepared to take part in such political operation without the Americans? Should Germany be prepared to do that and risk the adverse political consequences? If such an all-European operation of crisis management by "preventive deployment" to a dangerous region or "insertion" of forces into crisis situations of open violence were decided with the US and Nato not participating, would it then be likely that Washington would allow this with a Russian connection of the EU and the use of Nato assets? If it were to the South in the Eastern Mediterranean, for example on Cyprus, or in the south-east to the Lower Danube and Black Sea or again in the Balkans, would Turkey suffer such a European-Russian combination without American control and Nato responsibility? Would Israel, if the theatre of crisis management were Lebanon or Palestine, tolerate an all-European involvement with or without military force, but without US control? While European military observers and even interposition forces are welcome to stand watch of demarcation and disengagement lines in the Near East between Israeli and Arab forces and while such elements have already been deployed under the UN flag and control, such deployments could hardly serve as confidence-building presence if they represented a "European" operation. Israel would always insist on a solid US military presence and participation in any international set-up.

Wherever one looks, the political possibilities for a "strategically autonomous" European security presence or crisis management role, seem to be rather limited - which is, what the European governments have always maintained and seem indeed to expect from the foreseeable future. But in Washington the picture across the Atlantic looks different. In mid-March 2001 US defence secretary Rumsfeld repeated his warning, given in February in Munich in the presence of Nato secretary general Robertson, EU security and defence high representative Solana and various European defence and foreign ministers, by saying to a London newspaper⁷ that the American concerns about a weakening of Nato by the EU policies were still vivid and the hec ??? would remain „vigilant“ as to European policies in this matter and their repercussions on the Atlantic alliance. Therefore, it must be assumed, that the problem of harmony in the alliance has not yet been solved and not even adequately addressed on both sides of the Atlantic. The EU partners are not united behind the facade of their European Security and Defence Identity - in principle accepted by the US since 1996 - and they do not yet have a common perception of the ultimate purpose of their proclaimed European

7 See Daily Telegraph, March 18.

Common Security and Defence Policy, inspite of all the reassurances offered to the US and the alliance, to which they belong. There is a hidden agenda at least in Paris for a “European defence“ and the issue of a “European army“ for the future (expression used by French Defence Minister Alain Richard), while still undefined, looms behind the rhetoric as it has done for the last three decades in the plans of various political ambitions in European capitals, especially in Paris.

The idea of a European army is not accredited in Berlin or in the Hague and it is openly countered in London with the Blair government clearly in disfavour as are the Conservatives. This ambiguous concept of “European army“, refused by Britain but still propagated in France, and the equally ambivalent and not plausible concept of a “European defence“ by the Europeans in “strategic autonomy“ (also a French concept vis-à-vis the US) will continue, if not swiftly abandoned and laid to rest, to confound and frustrate alliance politics without any advantage to Europe’s autonomy, strategic or otherwise, nor to a real EU capability for meaningful military crisis response in international security support inside or outside Nato, with or without US participation and with or without “Russia on board“.

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