James Bindenagel / Matthias Herdegen / Karl Kaiser (eds.)

# International Security in the 21st Century

## Germany's International Responsibility

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# Contemporary Issues in International Security and Strategic Studies

Volume 1

Edited by
James Bindenagel, Matthias Herdegen
and Karl Kaiser


Center for
International Security
and Governance


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# Preface

What does International Security mean in the 21st century? Representatives from academia and politics are facing a variety of new challenges that threaten the stability of today's world order as well as the cohesion of our society. These challenges comprise failing states, massive violations of human rights, terrorism, increasing migration and conflicts over the distribution of resources. Some of the underlying causes include weak rule of law, lack of educational opportunities, global health issues, food insecurity, authoritarian rule over resources and shortcomings in cyber security.

Many of these underlying causes and resulting uncertainties are however not anchored in public consciousness. As a result, the German debate on security policy is lagging behind current developments.

In pursuance of breaching that gap the Center for International Security and Governance (CISG) was established at the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität in 2014. Creating a framework to enable a vital dialogue between academia and politics, the CISG decisively contributes to further developing policy-relevant research and teaching. Concurrent, the CISG's objective is to actively contribute to a greater understanding of Germany's growing role and responsibility in Europe and the world.

The book at hand should create an analytical basis as well as providing a fresh impetus to the public security debate in Germany, formulating new questions, analyses and problem-solving approaches. Simultaneously, the articles in this book aim at contributing to the global debate on security policy – corresponding to the strategic orientation of Bonn University as a locally embedded as well as a globally linked research institution.

Michael Hoch

Rector of Bonn University


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# Introduction

Europe seemed to have reached a "postmodern" paradise (Robert Cooper) at the "end of history" (Francis Fukuyama) when the 21st century started with the Charter of Paris as a guide. The Balkan wars, the last violent clashes on the old continent, had ended. The enlargement of the European Union and the NATO established a viable peace and security architecture for the continent that extended beyond the former ideological blocks of the Cold War.

These hopes for peace and security were, however, shattered by Russia's annexation of the Crimea and Russia's military intervention in the Eastern Ukraine, which defied international law and agreements concluded at the end of the Cold War. The Middle East has become rife with conflicts that are difficult to unravel. The threat of terrorism increased with the rise of ISIS. The uncertainty of China's peaceful rise threatens Asian stability. Politically and economically, tectonic change shifts the balance of power in favor of the Pacific region.

During the Cold War nuclear bombs and tank divisions represented the greatest threat to the security of the West. Today, however, threats are much more diverse. In addition to terrorism, there are refugee flows, resource conflicts, as well as underdevelopment, global issues of epidemics, climate change, food safety, the rule of law and information technology, present challenges to security policy.

Twenty-seven years after the end of the East-West conflict, Europe is no longer regarded as a haven of stability and a role model for other regions of the world but increasingly as a source of trouble spots and crises. War is taking place on European soil again, even if some do not want to call it a war.

The Euro crisis unleashed by Greece and Brexit severely damaged the European Union's unification and integration process. Added to these uncertainties are open conflicts of interest in European refugee policy. Germany has taken its role in the center of the continent and is increasingly criticized by its partners. The important steady dialogue with Russia has almost completely been shut down in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. The change in United States admin-


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istration raised fundamental questions about the nature of the transatlantic partnership and the NATO security guarantee.

In the European context, Germany increasingly finds itself in an unwanted leadership role. Despite the various and urgent wake-up calls, for example, by then German Federal President Joachim Gauck, former Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, the security policy debate in Germany still largely ignores the security realities in this new century.

The "Center for International Security and Governance" was established at Bonn University in 2014 together with the creation of a Henry Kissinger professorship to address this need for academic support for the international security and global governance debate. This reader is part of the Center's efforts to give new impetus to the security policy debate in Germany. It is the revised and expanded version of an earlier volume, which appeared in German in 2016 under the title "Internationale Sicherheit im 21. Jahrhundert: Deutschlands internationale Verantwortung" and was published by V&R Unipress. Just like the English version of the reader, the German edition was edited by Prof. James Bindenagel, Prof. Dr. DDr. h. c. Matthias Herdegen and Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Karl Kaiser.

For the purpose of an enlightened public debate, renowned domestic and international experts contributed to a panorama of the current international security challenges. At the same time, they also show strategic approaches to how to effectively and reasonably face them.

The editors would like to point out that while contributing to the German security debate, the authors alone are responsible for the opinions expressed in these contributions and that they do not necessarily reflect the views of the editors or of the CISG.

James Bindenagel, Matthias Herdegen, Karl Kaiser
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# I. Security and International Legal System: Collective and National Security Policy



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Matthias Herdegen

# Security in Modern International Law

## The pivotal role of security for the international legal order

The maintenance of security is a crucial element of the international legal order and essential for the proper understanding of its finality. Freedom from physical harm has been the guiding idea behind the international legal order since the end of World War II. The goal of international peace and security has also become the guiding operative principle of the United Nations, defining itself as a system of collective security.[1] This system relies on the general prohibition of the use of force with the exception of self-defence and the UN-Security Council's monopoly on the authorization of forceful measures to restore international peace and security.[2] This abundance of powers to take reasonable measures ensuring international peace and security[3] has vested the Security Council with the position often characterised as 'world board of directors'. They are a kind of trustees of the whole international community.

The guarantee of a minimum level of security is one of the decisive incentives for States to submit to an international legal system which requires them to abstain from the military enforcement of State interests. This incentive to refrain from the use of force recalls the old interrelation between subjection to authority on one hand and the expectation of protection on the other hand (*subjectio* and *protection*) as elaborated by Thomas Hobbes. In an ideal vision, the effective and consistent exercise of the powers entrusted to the Security Council stimulates and ensures full compliance with the UN-Charter's mandate by Member States (*pull to compliance*[4]). Ineffective or inconsistent exercise of the UN Security Council's powers may push States rather to rely on regional organizations of collective peace and security or even entirely unilateral action including eco-

1 Art.1 No. 1 UN-Charter.
2 Art. 2 No. 4 UN-Charter.
3 Art. 39ff. UN-Charter.
4 Franck, T. (1995). Fairness in International Law and Institutions, *Clarendon Press*, Oxford.


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nomic sanctions or the use of force. Nevertheless, universal, regional and other multinational systems of security are generally more symbiotic than opposed to one another.

## The progressive dynamics of the concept of "International Security" in international law

### 'International peace' and 'international security'

The concept of 'international security' is closely interwoven with the concept of 'international peace'. The powers of the Security Council are strictly bound to the 'maintenance of peace and security'. Beyond obvious 'acts of aggression', the Security Council may also take action in cases of 'breaches of the peace' and 'threats to the peace', which are not necessarily an 'act of aggression' in the technical sense.[5] International security is not subordinate to international peace, but international peace and security are co-dependent conditions of a stable world order. Threats to international security will necessarily affect international peace as well. Similarly, an expansion of the concept of international peace will also have repercussions on the concept of international security. In this regard, international security constitutes a fundamental value of the international order on equal footing with international peace.

The gradual expansion of the concept of international peace and, therefore, also the concept of international security is probably one of the most characteristic features of modern international law. Traditionally, international law followed a 'negative concept of peace' in which 'peace' was defined as 'the absence of war', meaning military conflicts between States. In modern times this concept is still present and could be extended by new means of aggression like cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure. Nevertheless, the purely negative concept of 'peace' has slowly but surely been replaced by a broader 'positive concept of peace'. In light of this development, 'international peace and security' have been subject to a gradual expansion, especially after the cold war. This 'enrichment' of international peace and security by new ingredients has three dimensions:

1. It extends the concepts of international peace and security to internal conflicts;
2. it includes the protection against non-State actors and non-military threats to the subsistence of States or groups within those States;

5 Art. 39 UN-Charter.


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3. it includes elements of 'pre-conflict' and 'post-conflict' management going beyond the scope of the traditional *ius ad bellum* and *ius in bello*.

## Security beyond international armed conflicts: the protection of human rights and international solutions for internal conflicts

The constitution of a positive concept of peace and security, first and foremost, is concerned with the protection of fundamental human rights and providing mechanisms for the solution of internal conflicts. This orientation is motivated by two insights: On a normative level, it recognizes elementary human rights and the internal peace of States as fundamental values of the international order beyond mere instrumental considerations. On a factual level, it additionally acknowledges the destabilizing effect of human rights violations for the international order, for example by causing uncontrollable mass-movements of refugees.

Examples for the effects of a positive concept of peace are the measures taken by the UN-Security Council to protect the Kurdish civilian population in Iraqi against state-induced terror by the Hussein administration[6], the measures against the military dictatorship in Haiti[7], the measures taken to overcome the 'human tragedy' in Somalia[8] or – more recently – the measures taken against the Gaddafi regime in Libya[9]. Thus, besides the protection against genocide and other substantial violations of international law, the protection of the civilian population against severe violations of humanitarian law in non-international armed conflicts and mechanisms for the solution of civil-wars, for instance by means of arms embargoes and the disarmament of military groups[10] or the authorization of multinational military operations[11], are dominating the scene. This positive understanding of security, with human rights at its core, is also the basis for the concept of a *responsibility to protect* (R2P) as described by heads of states and governments at the UN-Summit in 2005:

> "Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and

6 Security Council Resolution 688 (1991).
7 Security Council Resolution 940 (1994).
8 Security Council Resolution 794 (1992).
9 Security Council Resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011).
10 Regarding the 'intervention brigade' in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013); on Angola: Security Council Resolutions 1127 (1997) and 1173 (1998).
11 On Lybia: Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011).


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necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability."[12]

## Preserving the stability of the international order

The maintenance of international security is not limited to finding solutions for international and internal armed conflicts and the protection of fundamental human rights alone. Its ultimate goal is the stability of the international order itself. It embraces the sheer minimum of conditions for the existence of states just as much as the livelihood of peoples and minorities. The connection between international security (international peace) on the one hand and the foundations of a stable world order on the other hand has already been addressed in the declaration of the President of the UN Security Council on 31 January 1992 in all clarity:

> "The absence of war and military conflicts among States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. The United Nations membership as a whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters."[13]

In this sense, the access to vital resources like water is also part of preserving international security. It should be kept in mind that conflicts about water supply are one of the major sources of conflict in Central Asia and other regions of the world[14], just like conflicts about the distribution of other limited resources such as fossil fuel and other sources of energy. Furthermore, the protection of international routes of transportation as the lifeline of the global supply of goods is a significant aspect of international security.[15]

12 General Assembly Resolution 60/1. (2005). 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1, para. 138.

13 United Nations Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council, S/23500, 31 January 1992, *International Legal Materials* Vol. 31, p. 761.

14 See for example Grewlich, K. (2011). Geopolitik und Governance. Energie, Wasser, Herrschaft des Rechts in Zentralasien und Afghanistan, Nomos, Baden-Baden.

15 With regard to the fight against piracy along the coast of Somalia: Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008), Security Council Resolution 1846 (2008) and Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008).


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## Conceptual constraints of 'international security'

The positive concept of international security, which potentially embraces an exceedingly broad range of conditions for a stable international order, demands a close look at the conceptual constraints of 'international security' in order to avoid an uncontrollable extension of the term. Two essential components should be kept in mind, when assessing the conceptual boundaries of international security:

1. There must be a physical threat to the existence of States or a threat to the physical subsistence of individuals or groups of individuals; and
2. This threat must have international effects by destabilizing international relations or by threatening fundamental values of the international community.

These two fundamental components reconnect the guarantee of security to the fundamental structures and guiding principles of the modern international legal order. The boundaries of the concept of 'international security' determined in this way are certainly reached in case of the effects of climate change. Nevertheless, the declaration of the President of the Security Council already quoted beforehand also includes threats of an ecological origin as a criterion of international security.[16] Climate protection, however, should only become a matter of international security if climate change has an immediate effect on the subsistence of individual peoples or the physical existence of States.

At least since Immanuel Kant it has become a commonplace that there is a close connection between the internal order of States and their inclination to peace.[17] Nevertheless, regime change in the sense of transforming autocratic forms of government into democratic forms even today is no legitimate goal of the international order of peace and security. Still, regime change is often the inevitable consequence of an effective criminal prosecution of a heads of State of Government by the International Criminal Court or other international bodies of criminal justice as well as it is the typical result of a successful humanitarian intervention, be it with or without the authorization of the UN Security Council. This is amply demonstrated by the humanitarian interventions in Haiti, in the Kosovo conflict, and in Libya.

16 Statement made by the President of the Security Council, (2011), 2011/15.

17 Kant, I. (1795), Zum ewigen Frieden, Königsberg; see also Slaughter Burley, A. (1993) International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, *American Journal of International Law* Vol. 87, p. 255f.


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## The temporal extension of security: pre- and post-conflict management in international conflicts

The concept of international security has not only expanded conceptually but also temporally. It also covers pre-conflict measures far ahead of the outbreak of a full-fletched military conflict and includes post-conflict measures after a military conflict has come to an end. Pre-conflict measures include, for example, programs for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, thereby also serving the goal of conflict prevention. Examples for such measures are the resolution of the UN Security Council regarding the control over Iraqi nuclear facilities[18], the measures against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iran[19], and the sanctions against North Korea[20]. Post-conflict measures include the restoration of peace, for example in light of Art. 39 of the UN Charter, building efficient administrative structures[21], measures for the enforcement of state responsibility for violations of international law[22] as well as measures of post-conflict justice[23]. One prominent example for the post-conflict justice approach is the International Criminal Court, dealing with crimes of aggression, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.[24] The International Criminal Court offers an important contribution to the restoration of security by preventing uncontrolled acts of revenge going beyond the boundaries of the rule of law.

## Measures against threats by non-state actors

Even before the terror attacks of 9/11, it had been well established in international discourse that the system of collective security constituted by the United Nations must also include the protection against threats by non-state actors. The suffering of the civilian population induced by the terror exercised by regional war lords in failed States like Somalia has been characterised by the UN Security

18 Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002).
19 Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006), Security Council Resolution 1747 (2007), Security Council Resolution 1803 (2008), Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010).
20 Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006), Security Council Resolution 1874 (2006), Security Council Resolution 2087 (2013), Security Council Resolution 2094 (2013).
21 Regarding Kosovo: Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).
22 Regarding the establishment of the UN Claims Commission after the Second Gulf War: Security Council Resolution 687 (1991).
23 Regarding the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: Security Council Resolution 827 (1993); regarding the establishment of the International Tribunal for Rwanda: Security Council Resolution 955 (1994).
24 See Art. 5 Sect. 1 lit. b, lit. c and lit. d of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.


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Council as a threat to world peace and international security.[25] There are a number of resolutions of the UN Security Council directed against financing or other forms of support for international terrorist organisations by individual States.[26]

Today, massive terror attacks can also be qualified as 'acts of aggression' or a 'breach of the peace' in light of Art. 39 of the UN Charter. Following the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015, the UN Security Council has stated that the so called 'Islamic State' 'constitutes a global and unprecedented threat to international peace and security' and called upon the UN Member States to take all necessary measures to fight against this terror organization.[27] These terror attacks, constituting 'armed attacks' in light of Art. 51 of the UN Charter, trigger the right to self-defence against the terror organizations which orchestrated these attacks from foreign territory. The North Atlantic Council has also labelled the attacks of 9/11 an 'armed attack' in light of Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.[28]

Similarly, the French Republic characterized the terror attacks of November 2015 in Paris as an 'armed aggression' in terms of Art. 42 sect. 7 of the TEU and requested the 'aid and assistance' of other EU Member States as provided for in this provision.[29] Art. 42 sect. 7 TEU is modelled after the respective clause in the Treaty of the Western European Union and marks a qualitative difference to the NATO Treaty, which provides a duty to support the State under attack, but implies a broad margin of appreciation for the individual Member States as to how they intend to fulfil this duty. In contrast, the TEU obligates other Member States in case of an 'armed aggression' on the territory of a Member State to offer 'aid and assistance by all the means in their power'. This far-reaching obligation has not yet been internalized by the political class in Germany and the political sciences as part of Germany's *raison d'état*. This may also be a consequence of the ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court, which has put the assistance clause of the EU Treaty on equal footing with the NATO Treaty, watering down the actual meaning of the TEU.[30]

Another important aspect of the modern understanding of security is the

25 Security Council Resolution 794 (1992).

26 Security Council Resolution. 1368 (2001), Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004).

27 Security Council Resolution 2249 (2015).

28 Statement by the North Atlantic Council, Press Release (2001) 124 [online]. Available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm [Accessed 17 Mar. 2017].

29 Speech by the President of the French Republic, François Hollande, on 16 November 2015 to the Congress of the Parliament [online]. Available at: http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-devant-le-parlement-reuni-en-congres-3 (Accessed 17 Mar. 2017).

30 Bundesverfassungsgericht (2009). In: BVerfGE 123, 267 (424).


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concept of *due diligence* of States when dealing with private actors using the territory of a State as a basis for terror attacks against other States, be it physical attacks or cyber-attacks.[31]

## Unilateral options

The obligation to respect the territorial integrity of other States and the strict prohibition of the use of force in the UN Charter[32], as a matter of principle, exclude the military enforcement of national and international security interests. Nevertheless, the prohibition of the use of force in the UN Charter is not categorical, but it recognizes the right to self-defence in case of an 'armed attack' (Art. 51 of the UN Charter). The right to self-defence is also part of customary international law.

It is certainly one of the most controversial questions of international law, to which extent the right to self-defence also has a pre-emptive or even preventive dimension. It is widely acknowledged that a State may exercise the right to self-defence against armed attacks which have not yet 'occurred' but which are 'imminent'.[33] It is highly controversial, however, whether a State is permitted to neutralize another State's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction by military means, if the conduct of such a State nourishes the reasonable suspicion that an attack might be undertaken in the nearer future even though such a scenario may not be the most likely course of events and does not yet provoke expectation of an 'imminent attack'.[34] The national security strategy of the G.W. Bush administration (2002/2006)[35] has claimed a far-reaching right to preventive military strikes against States in possession of weapons of mass destruction, if those States have indicated their general will to pursue an attack and such an attack, if executed, would not leave any time for an efficient response. Other nuclear powers, at least to some extent, seem to follow this security doctrine in case of terrorist threats using weapons of mass destruction.[36]

31 See Herdegen, M. (2015) Possible Legal Framework and Regulatory Models for Cyberspace: Due Diligence Obligations and Institutional Models for Enhanced Inter-State Cooperation, *German Yearbook of International Law*, Vol. 58. p. 169–185.

32 Art. 2 No. 4 UN Charter.

33 See Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats (2004). Challenges and Change, A more secure world, para. 188: "[A] threatened State, according to long established international law, can take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate".

34 Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats (2004). Challenges and Change, A more secure world, paras. 189ff.

35 See Herdegen, M. (2017). Völkerrecht, 15th ed., Munich, pp. 249ff.

36 French Ministry of Defence, Projet de Loi de Programmation Militaire 2014/2019, Dossier


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International law has not yet found a satisfactory answer for such scenarios in which there is an existential threat without a reliable prognosis as to the likelihood of an attack. It is fairly unclear, whether the right to self-defence has a preventive dimension, which is at the same time safe from potential abuse. But even such normative uncertainty may serve a useful purpose. The possibility of a persuasive argument for preventive strikes can have a dissuasive or even deterring effect. At the same time, the uncertainty regarding the potential illegality of preventive strikes prevents States from prematurely taking resort to that option.

Another highly problematic scenario are unilateral 'humanitarian interventions' against genocide and other massive violations of human rights without authorization by the UN Security Council.[37] Similar to the issue of preventive strikes, leaving humanitarian intervention as an option may also have a deterring effect on oppressive regimes. However, the legal uncertainty covering the legality of this option will prevent an excessive reliance of States on this potential justification of unilateral military action.

## The Mandate of the Security Council and its Member States: Trustees of International Peace and Security

From the perspective of international law, the UN Security Council is vested with all the necessary powers to address all kinds of military disputes between or within States even before they have developed into full-fletched warfare or civil strife. The broad scope of the term 'international peace and security' as used in Chapter VII of the UN Charter[38] authorizes the Security Council not only to consider the 'classic' issues of 'war and peace' but also to take into account social, economic, and ecological threats to the stability of the international order. Nevertheless, the UN system still depends on the 'able and willing' among the Member States in order to make effective use of its abundant powers. The system of collective security established by the formation of the UN has been weakened by the selective exercise of its mandate in the preservation of international peace and security, often triggered by the geopolitical interests of the P5. Oftentimes the members of the Security Council need to be reminded that their position is

thématique, p. 53; National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020, Decree Nr. 537 by the President of the Russian Federation from 12. May 2009, in particular. paras. 26 and 30.

37 See Herdegen M. (2015), Völkerrecht, 15th Ed., Munich, p. 272ff.

38 For a survey of the powers of the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN-Charter see de Wet, E. (2004). The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council, Oxford/Portland.


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one of trustees and not of guardians of the own subjective interests. It is also hardly compatible with the position of trustees to avoid political conflict by abstaining from voting in the Security Council.

## The influence of international law on national security policy

It is unavoidable that the concept of international security as used in international discourse will have at least some repercussions on regional and national security policy as well. National security strategies or so called 'security doctrines' quite naturally are dominated by a more selective perception and evaluation of security interests. They reflect the respective national point of view and how regional conflicts affect the global order. Depending on the given circumstances, economic, ecological, or social risks are more or less prominent within the national security doctrines. The security doctrine of the Obama Administration of 2014[39], for example, mentions the security of 'livelihood' as one of the goals of the security strategy of the United States. It remains to be seen whether this approach will still be pursued by the Trump administration and whether it will be adopted by European security strategies, for example in the field of energy and transport.

## Regional organizations

Regional organizations like the Organization of American States, the OECD, the Council of Europe and the African Union have become a central element within the edifice of international security. Especially after the adoption of the so called 'Petersberg tasks', the European Union has also developed into a visible actor in security policy.[40] Within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy, the EU now plays a crucial role in conflict prevention and the mitigation of crises. Along with NATO and the UN, the EU has become a system of collective security, which also addresses threats from within the Union, like the fight against international terrorist organizations operating within the territory of a Member State.[41] Despite the potential of the mentioned organizations, they still

39 United States and Obama, B. (2015) National Security Strategy of the United States: The White House [online]. Available at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf [Accessed 24. Mar. 2017].

40 See Art. 42 sect. 1, Art. 43 Treaty of the European Union; see also Diedrichs, U. (2012), Die gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der EU, Wien.

41 Art. 222 Treaty of the European Union.


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need the permission of the UN Security Council when engaging in the unilateral use of force which goes beyond mere self-defence.[42]

## International law and 'strategic studies'

'International security' as a field of study cannot be reduced to one subject matter alone. It depends on the cooperation of international legal doctrine and 'strategic studies' and, therefore, combines the study of law, politics, and history. In his book *World Order* Henry Kissinger describes two columns of a stable international order of sovereign States: on the normative level, a reliable legal framework determining the permissible options for action and, on the factual level, a balance of power counteracting the disobedience of acknowledged legal rules by hegemonic powers.[43] In this light, international law does not provide a sufficient, but at least a necessary condition for a stable world order. Beyond the preservation of the sheer existence of States, international law also fulfils the function of preserving certain fundamental values, the protection of which, in extreme scenarios, may also require military means as *ultima ratio*. There is certainly a 'normative twilight zone' in which the permissibility or impermissibility of a reaction to substantial human rights violations is quite unclear. But even that sort of uncertainty, at least to some degree, can have a positive effect on the preservation of the international legal order. If the risks of acting in the normative twilight become too substantial, this will have a dissuasive effect rather than encouraging bold military engagement.

42 Art. 53 UN Charter.

43 See Kissinger, H. (2014). World Order, New York, p. 9, on the foundations of any international order (be it a world order, an international order covering major parts of the globe, or a regional order): 'Any one of these systems of order bases itself on two components: a set of commonly accepted rules that define the limits of permissible action and a balance of power that enforces restraint where rules break down, preventing one political unit from subjugating all others. A consensus on the legitimacy of existing arrangements does not – now or in the past – foreclose competitions or confrontations, but it helps ensure that they will occur as adjustments within the existing order rather than as fundamental challenges to it. A balance of forces does not in itself secure peace, but if thoughtfully assembled and invoked, it can limit the scope and frequency of fundamental challenges and curtail their chance of succeeding when they occur.'


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Ulrich Schlie

# World Order: The Future of the State System

## One

World orders are never static: they always change. As states engage in an unceasing struggle for power, their positions and roles are being perpetually reorganised, although the rules of that process are not always readily apparent. Power is distributed along a complicated mesh of influence lines. The essence of history is change. Developments in the fields of technology, economics, society, ideas or international law have always impacted the dynamics of inter-state relations. International constellations and domestic systemic change must be seen as one interrelated whole. The strength of any country's internal stability will be mirrored by the corresponding strength of its basic democratic consensus and consent over shared positions; the greater those two, the more predictable its foreign policy will be perceived to be. Conversely, revolutions or moments of political crisis – for example Russia after the October Revolution in 1918, Hitler Germany after 1933 or even Teheran after the Iranian Revolution in 1979 – frequently trigger a comprehensive reorientation of foreign policy and the desire for a fundamental revision of the status quo. Even today, there are a number of states – including Russia, Turkey or China – whose main strategic focus is the redistribution of power in their own favour. A quarter of a century after the radical transformations of 1989/90, events have confirmed the impression that the new constellation would be very unlike the relatively stable international framework of 1945. It came as no surprise, then, that the collapse of the Cold War order was followed by a number of border changes; and that most of the regions concerned are ranged along a fault line that runs from the Baltics via the Ukraine and the Caucasus to the Balkans. The second trend that stands in the way of a permanent order is the significant growth of instances of strategic instability. They hamper the ability of nation states to impose order. The resulting changes impact not only the state system as a whole, but also the very concept of politics, and the multinational institutional architecture. There has been a significant power shift towards Asia. Europe will have to make crucial decisions about its


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future strategic positioning. The United States of North America occupies a unique position, which puts it at considerable risk and makes it subject to a continuos erosion of power. At the same time the strength or weakness of America's capability to maintain order will continue to be of major importance.

The past twenty years have shown that the United States' unipolar position of global domination did not in fact make it any easier to realise Wilson's dream of a peace order based on a system of collective security. Instead, American domination came at the price of tensions in its own alliances and the significant growth of countervailing forces that contest U.S. pre-eminence. What Charles Krauthammer memorably called the 'unipolar moment' appears already to be over. In this nonpolar world, the traditional principles of balance and hegemony have lost their power to dominate the state system, making order more difficult to establish. Humanitarian interventions, even those sanctioned by international law, have also become more difficult. Throughout history, a balance of power never was a complete guarantor of peace: power factors have more than once been seriously misjudged. In addition, there is a trend for many different forms of state and nonstate actors to increase rather than decrease. What is needed to master the art of accurate prognosis is a correct assessment of newly emerging realities and longer-term strategic trends. We must also avoid an all-too frequent error: each generation fights the wars of the preceding generation without knowing it.[1] There is a tendency to view the structural questions of international politics too much through the lens of the past. An excessively Eurocentric worldview may be explained by the brief surge of hope that immediately followed the end of the Cold War. However, events since then have shown that Europe is nowhere near having any real influence in world politics, and that this will not change in the foreseeable future. Quite the contrary: strategic developments in other parts of the world have influenced the fate of the European continent to an unprecedented degree. An unvarying feature and apparently a timeless mirage of the international system is the old dream of domesticating power through law by means of a global government and global domestic policy, of containing power politics through a multilateral institutional architecture, and of mastering nationalism through institutionalising world politics. The notion of collective hegemony, which is currently embodied by the United Nations Security Council, first appeared in the international community in the eighteenth century; it has been around ever since, ringing the changes on what Heinrich Triepel called, in another context, the 'communality of Europe'.[2]

1 Brzezinski, Z. (1966). Tomorrow's Agenda. *Foreign Affairs*, (44), p. 662.
2 Triepel, H. (1942). Die Hegemonie. Ein Buch vom führenden Staate. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag.


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## Two

What are the major changes that occurred in the state system since the collapse of the post-war order? The spell of bipolarity was broken in 1989/1990, as was the discipline born from the awareness on both sides of each other's destructive potential. While this discipline had lasted, conflicts could usually be frozen, or at worst contained. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, at first glance a textbook case of a war between states, was a taste of things to come. It heralded a post-Cold War world that was internally fragile and lacked a balance of power. Had the Soviet Union still been fully operational, Saddam's invasion may well not have happened: Moscow would never have allowed Iraq to take such unauthorised aggressive action. Gone, too, soon after 1989, were the hopes for a continued growth of prosperity and for finding the solution to most of the world's problems. Phenomena that had been experienced as symptoms of transformation in the period between *Eleven-Nine* (1989) and *Nine-Eleven* (2001) increasingly consolidated into a prediction of the present: the dichotomy of integration at the centre – e. g. the ever-closer integration within the European Union – and decay (of states) on the periphery, for instance on Europe's periphery in North Africa; new threats beyond the military dimension; a shifting, or perhaps even dissolving, of the separation between public and private spheres; and as a consequence the manipulative curse – cyber war, Wikileaks, secretlessness – and the blessing – data transfers in the blink of an eye, limitless access to knowledge, the near-complete transparency of government actions – that are the gift of modern communications; on the one hand imperfect attempts to establish order – by, for instance, the United Nations – and on the other chaos, the relinquishing of sovereignty to a higher level and the simultaneous resurgence of the nation state.

The two central, and interrelated, principles of the state system – sovereignty and the balance of power – came into existence about a century apart. The term *sovereignty* was coined by the sixteenth-century French political philosopher Jean Bodin.[3] Sovereignty is a precondition for a state's membership in the community of nations. In its domestic actions, the state is sovereign: it acts without a superior power. In external interactions – i. e. between states – sovereignty is limited by the rules of the community of nations. Sovereignty is a prerequisite for a state being a subject under international law. The nature of power, which lies in the capacity to compel another to obey one's will, and which can be expressed by military, economic, technological and cultural instruments of power, has close ties with sovereignty. Max Weber rightly identified the

3 Bodin, J. (1583). Six livres de la Republique. Frankfurt: p. 143.


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'monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force'[4] as the defining characteristic of the modern state.

Not until the end of the Middle Ages did a clear separation between secular and spiritual spheres occur. Under enlightened absolutism the sovereign was seen as the first servant of the state. In the eighteenth century he becomes an organ of the state; he likes to have himself portrayed in uniform for his public appearances. State, nation, and population are the rationale for the sovereign's claim to power. The concept of a balance of power first entered politics in the aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Not until the universal Christian order had ended and the modern state begun did a new, supra-national order evolve which replaced the rules of succession. The balance of power principle ushered in a new maxim for international politics which remained dominant in European diplomacy until the end of the nineteenth century.

The other principle related to the events of 1945, nationality, also continues to exist, despite repeated predictions of the impending end of the territorial state; it has, in fact, been reconfirmed again and again. Paradoxically enough it was precisely the principle of nationality, the establishment of state authority based on the principle of the nation – a creation of the nineteenth century – that has survived the test of history. Even the decline of great empires in the twentieth century in itself confirms the prediction that overstretched states whose authority extends beyond the settlement area of their own respective nation are not sustainable in the long term.[5] From this perspective the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 can be seen as part of a sequence that began with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and of Tsarist Russia in 1918, the demise of the Habsburg monarchy – a multi-national, multi-ethnic state – and even the fall of the Third Reich.

The very term "great power" is reminiscent of the Edwardian Era; a time before the seeming equilibrium of power collapsed and the world tilted on its axis. The failure of diplomacy, misjudgements of the intelligence services, the unyielding automatism of mobilisation plans – all taken together resulted in, as Sir Edward Grey famously put it, the lamps going out all over Europe.[6] This world had seemed to be more predictable. Decisions of war or peace were the domain of the great powers, who believed their best remedy lay in intervention and a rush to war. Being a great power, at least until 1914, meant living life with under the illusion of being invulnerable. That is a major difference to the world we live in today. Events of the twentieth century have shown that military interventions can go wrong, and that they always come at a very high price. Decisions need no

4 Waters, T. and Waters, D. (2015). Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society. New York, p. 136.
5 Kennedy, P. (1987). The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York, Vintage Books.
6 of Fallodon, E.V.G. (1925). Twenty-Five Years 1892–1916. New York, p. 20.


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longer be sought primarily on the battlefield. But it is still the case that our current understanding of great power politics has been shaped to a very high degree by the results of two World Wars and a Cold War. The Second World War, and the geometry of power that was the result of the Yalta Conference, continue to be felt as incisive turning points: a fact reflected to this day by the composition of the United Nations Security Council. The external criteria for being counted among the great powers had already been set, but even in 1945, just after the end of the war, there existed significant doubts in Europe about the precise conditions for great power status. This was even more the case for the predictive part of the state system. Peace depended on the great powers, but, as H. Duncan Hall wrote at the time, 'the Great Powers are all enigmas. And who will dare to predict the future of an enigma?' Hindsight has shown that his cautious strategic forecast about China – written, remarkably, in 1945 – was an intelligent piece of analysis:

> "Who can say how many decades or generations China will require to achieve stable national government and the high degree of industrialisation necessary actually to make her a great power?"[7]

Later, as the fragile *pax atomica* ensured that war would be unlikely but peace impossible, it became common to refer to the two great atomic powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, as *superpowers*. T. R. Fox coined the term in 1944, referring to America's capacity to deploy its forces in multiple theatres across the world.[8] Superpowers were in a class all of their own, and the two states that were acknowledged to be in it possessed the dubious ability to utterly annihilate one other. It was precisely this ability that prevented their going to the last extreme. The end of the Cold War and the breaking up of the Soviet Union also brought an end to the superpowers. Only the United States is still in a category all of its own, and only it can claim to approach classical great power status in the fullest sense of the term. The United States is the custodian of the democratic order. It is possessed of unique military instruments of power, and it provides over 75 per cent of both the capabilities and finances in the North Atlantic Alliance. Russia's only inheritance from the Soviet Union, on the other hand, is its nuclear power status and its permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The successor state to the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, has however been refused superpower status – this is perhaps one of the reasons why Russia, like the rising power China, tends more than other states to practise traditional great power politics. The case of Russia also shows that dealing with an empire in decline is always a special challenge for international diplomacy.

7 Hall, H.D. (1945). The British Commonwealth as a Great Power. *Foreign Affairs*, (23), p. 594.
8 Fox, W.T.R. (1944). The Super-Powers: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union – Their Responsibility for Peace. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.


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Declining empires tend to use expansion on the periphery as a means of compensating for loss of status, while neighbours and opponents occasionally exploit obvious moments of weakness to acquire territory and prestige at the other's expense. The recent events in Ukraine have shown that in order to enforce its claim to great power status, Russia is prepared to resort to measures that can hardly be seen as confidence building and that will, in the long term, probably result in a serious loss of trust. Resorting to great power politics comes at the price of losing the trust of other players in the state system, and accepting their unanimous condemnation for violations of international law. There can be no doubt that this is a setback for the efforts of recent years to create order and confidence. But it is a reality of foreign policy that must be understood as an attempt to correct the severe loss of influence of the past twenty years and to compensate for what were, from Russia's point of view, defeats: such as the power shifts in the Balkans (e. g. the founding of the state of Kosovo) or having to tolerate the expansion of NATO. In the 1990s in particular, Russia underwent a painful process of power-political amputation. It was unable to prevent the – from its point of view unfavourable – power-political shifts in Europe: above all the eastward expansion of NATO, the reorganisation of the former Yugoslavia after a bloody civil war, and the ever-closer union – including political union – in the shape of the EU, which resulted in a strengthened Atlantic Europe.

It has been the bitter lesson of the present that in the post-classic world, classic great-power methods no longer achieve the effects that once characterised great-power politics. In the pre-1914 world the great powers saw intervention as a remedy: by gaining territory and status, they could improve their position and escape from a difficult corner. But that formula no longer holds. An international set of rules and international consensus have been put into place: any aggressor will suffer sanctions and economic losses that must be taken into account *a priori* in any grand strategy. Russia's current strategic situation demonstrates the limitations of great-power politics. It also shows the political price that must be paid for any miscalculation. As a result of the wholesale integration of individual states into an interconnected, mutually interdependent global economic system, political stability has become inextricably coupled with economic prosperity. This close integration is likely to make great-power conflict more difficult, although it cannot completely prevent it.

The great power category still exists, and achieving great power status continues to be a primary ambition in the system of states. But the criteria have changed, as have the mechanisms that guide the actions of states. This has a direct impact on the power balance between equilibrium and hegemony. There is no longer a clear line between great and regional powers, and differentiation is not always now possible. Today, great powers are states with widely differing characteristics: on the one hand Brazil, which has almost no military power and


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plays no dominant role in its world region; on the other nuclear powers like India and Pakistan; and again Japan, a state with an eventful history, great ambitions and a constitution that limits its use of force, as well as decades of externally-imposed abstention from power politics. One step down are the middle-ranking powers: an ambivalent category that includes states with relatively small populations (Australia), vast geographic expanse (Canada), and small surface areas (Italy, Norway). This list alone shows that there is no fixed definition of what a great power or a secondary power is, and that transitioning – even between categories, e. g. by acquiring nuclear weapons or as a result of domestic political developments – is always possible.

The two great changes in the international system – the relativisation of the territorial power principle and the concomitant relinquishing of sovereignty, as well as the increasing juridification and the supranationalisation of the state system – including the resulting coexistence, side by side, of classical nation states and supranational entities – impacts primarily the traditional struggle for balance and hegemony. The classic balance of power was based on a dualistic theory of balance, whereby several great powers kept one another in check. A return to this system, even in its special variety of a bipolar balance of terror, seems now impossible. The current constellation of international politics includes elements of transition that have certain similarities with the dissolution of the hegemonic system at the end of Bismarck's system of alliances and the rise of a polycentric world system. But the comparison can take us only so far, and this is chiefly due to changes of the definition of what power is. We need to look at the great powers in a different context. The great powers of old are not now the dominating players, and they are certainly no longer the only ones. The constellation has changed, too. With the British decision to leave the European Union a new balance within the Union is necessary and will undoubtedly lead to new power shifts. This phenomenon highlights the limits of the professional ability to make predictions, and it confirms the classical insight that it is always the unexpected which is the driving force of fundamental change in power relationships. France and Germany are still part of the European Union, and they have to deal increasingly with a fundamental crisis of European policy which affects all nation states in Europe and the functioning of EU institutions as well. The European Union, contrary to rhetorical statements, is neither a great power nor indeed a world power. The unresolved problem of power – the transfer of sovereignty on the one hand, the coexistence of nation states and supranational entities on the other – is also a structural problem for the European Union that awaits a solution, and one that increasingly overshadows Europe's political perspectives. Because the European Union has noticeable difficulties with its role as a great power: it has a High Representative, its own foreign service, and even a military staff, but against this weighs the fact that its (for the time being) three


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biggest members – France, Germany and the United Kingdom – have entirely different visions of Europe's future (including its role in global politics). While they support European integration, neither France nor the UK have given up their own claims to great power status, which they continue to pursue despite the existence of the European Union; indeed both have on occasion used the EU as a screen for their own national interests. Britain's ambivalence vis-à-vis European integration, which has now developed into the country's decision for Brexit, is rooted in the fact that it continues to pursue its own great-power politics. For a long time, the same was true for French foreign policy – for example, de Gaulle's vetoing of Britain joining the EEC; France maintaining its own nuclear forces; or the decision to leave the military integration of the North Atlantic Alliance, which was only reversed by the decision of the President at the time, Sarkozy, in 2009. The United States will probably be able to hold on to its superpower status a while longer, but it will get harder. Mistakes in American strategy – in terms of both hard and soft power – are beginning to make themselves more deeply felt. The U.S. will increasingly depend on the ability to forge alliances, more so than in the period between 1919 and 1989; primarily with the rising Asian powers, but also with EU states that are struggling on multiple fronts to maintain their own status.

Notwithstanding the changes in the state system and the new limitations of classical great power concepts: geopolitical disputes will still be on the agenda in the twenty-first century. The dividing line now runs predominantly between the states of the Western world with their free and democratic basic order, and autocratic states that are still with us, even after the end of the Cold War. The fact that this dispute is increasingly turning into a dispute between systems is one of the side effects that is partially related to the antagonism between open and closed societies and intensified by globalisation. The dispute itself is largely due to a growing anarchic-revolutionary tendency in the state system. All of which does not however change the following: it has become less feasible than ever to organise international politics into a coherent system; there is no longer a simple basic structure to the state system; and Richard Haas' laconic characterisation of the world as 'nonpolar' does, in all its apparent simplicity, probably come closest to capturing the essence of the world's unclear and confusing structure.[9]

The second significant development on the geopolitical scene since the 1970s has been the increasing differentiation of the state system. Lifestyle changes that used to be associated with different historical eras no longer occur sequentially, but simultaneously. Risks accumulate especially in those parts of the world where agrarian, industrial, and post-industrial societies exist in close proximity,

9 Haas, R. (2013). Foreign policy begins at home: The case for putting America's house in order. New York: Basic Books.


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such as in Africa. Africa is the continent that has, not without reason, increased its strategic relevance; so to speak *ex negativo* because of compounded multiple problems beyond the merely military, such as migration, epidemics, catastrophic civil wars, scarcity of resources and environmental destruction. Communications technology has turned out to be a great catalyst, enabling access to current trends for even the most far-flung regions of the world, and thus creating a demand for them. This frequently leads to tensions that result in striking juxtapositions of very different structures existing in direct geographical proximity in the twenty-first century.

## Three

Not only the great power concept, but also the concepts of the nation and the nation state have been subject to changes in the twentieth century, and this in turn had consequences for the system of international relations. The terms *nation* and *nation state*, although frequently employed interchangeably, are not in fact the same. They have often been used for nefarious ends. Two ideological wars in the twentieth century were waged the name of the nation, at a time when the era of the nation state was already over. It has been one of the more unexpected outcomes of those devastating struggles that what had been taken for the inferior entity, the supranational state with its long history reaching back to the pre-nation period or – even worse – the Restoration Era, turned out to be, faute de mieux, the model for the future. At the same time the limitations of the lone nation state became ever more apparent. All over Europe the transfer of sovereignty to supranational entities meant that national politics found its options increasingly restricted. Telecommunications and the media transcend national borders, the globalised financial markets act as sensitive global seismographs, Europe has a common currency. Non-governmental organisations like Amnesty International or the World Wildlife Fund, or multinational corporations that like to describe themselves as 'global players', wield unprecedented influence in international politics. Major political decisions are increasingly made at the European level. The result of this gradual transformation has been the erosion of the state's monopoly of force both from above and from below: the relationship between the nation-state and Europe is in flux. The transfer of sovereignty from the nation state to a higher level, the European Union, has meant that the future vision of the nation state became tightly bound to the future of the European Union, even though a real sense of belonging has so far failed to develop. Quite the reverse: proclaiming the supranational state as the shape of the future failed to prevent outbreaks of nationalistic passion over the past twenty years. We should therefore expect that the curbing of these passions


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will continue to be one of the major tasks of international politics. In eastern Central and South-East Europe, the strength of national ties and characteristics caused great tectonic shifts as early as 1989/90. These forces had been underestimated at the time, and they continued to be underestimated as politicians mistakenly believed that EU enlargement to the East would be a relatively uncomplicated process. It ended in the 1990s with a spurt of rapid and, in hindsight, unhealthy growth: the new member states – Romania and Bulgaria are good examples – are still grappling with the consequences. The continuing debate over Turkey's accession to the Union, with its noxious mix of political instrumentalisation and strategic indecision, only shows that there are limits to the EU's absorptive capacities. Two major events after 1990 put the European Union's capacity for action to the test: the extreme situation of civil wars in the Balkans following the collapse of the former Yugoslavia; and, in the last decade, Europe's impotence vis-à-vis a Ukraine that is deeply riven by internal factions and divided in its search for the best way forward. The EU failed in both cases. Both demonstrate the immediacy and the explosive potential of the nationalities issue – despite the general trend to ever-closer supranational integration and the relinquishing of sovereignty.

## Four

A situation where chaos is the new normal will make greater demands of tried and tested institutional solutions. It will require an openness to change – from the United States in particular – that has not yet been forthcoming. Neither the United Nations nor NATO nor even the European Union have a fully developed set of rules, internal mechanisms or political instruments needed to deal with this new reality. The major challenges for international security and global peace in tomorrow's world include the reform and strengthening of the United Nations; the essential step of consolidating NATO into a globally effective political alliance that joins North America to Europe in a mutual partnership; and, finally, as an indispensable European pillar, empowering the European Union so that it can perform genuine crisis management and have an effective foreign and security policy. These pending strategic adjustments will be the acid test in the struggle of order against chaos over the coming two decades. Diplomacy and military strategy are not mutually exclusive: in fact a changing world makes it particularly necessary for them to join together in a grand unified strategy, a task that will make demands on each individual member. Because one thing is true for all alliances and supranational organisations: they are only as strong as the engagement of their members allows them to be. Solidarity, loyalty and diligent


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care for alliances: these principles will retain their high values, making them strategic imperatives.

What conclusions in terms of security policy should we draw from these trends? There is, firstly, the simple realisation that changes in the geopolitical landscape lead to corresponding changes in security policy. This demands serious (re)consideration of, and – where necessary – changes to, major strategic decisions. In an increasingly complex – and thus unpredictable – world where the territorial power principle has lost its force, where both state and nonstate actors proliferate, and where asymmetrical threats have become increasingly likely, the successful implementation of international order will depend significantly on the initiative and on the preparedness of individual members to assume responsibility, so that effective international institutions and international law can be implemented. The key conditions will continue to have to be set in each individual nation state. If states are to survive, they will need to stand up to international competition.

In this process the static forces of tradition struggle against the evolving structures of global politics. A descent into an unruly degeneracy that might threaten our very existence can be prevented only by strengthening international law and the rationality of nations. This will create completely new challenges for diplomacy, crisis management and statecraft.

Prevailing imbalances – e. g. imbalances in military capacity between member states of the North Atlantic Alliance – make solidarity particularly necessary in matters of security policy. The greatest possible predictability at home, continuous adjustment, and a reliable assessment of national security interests are necessary prerequisites for the successful completion of global tasks. This gives outstanding importance to the principle of national security interests. Making sure that a nation's citizens are safe and protected from threats thus becomes a question of survival that makes strategic forecasts and their continuous reexamination a question of national survival. Conceptional vacuums always exact a high toll. The absence of a coherent strategy bespeaks a lack of political leadership and an inability to build consensus about the road ahead. The degree of clarity about strategies for the future, the degree of openness about the challenges of the present and the amount of courage and character in political leaders will determine the feasibility of doing what needs to be done for the present and the future. Because courage and character, as Henry Kissinger said at the 50th Munich Security Conference in February 2014 in his laudatory speech for former Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and former French President Valérie Giscard d'Estaing, are the most important prerequisites for statesmanship.[10] The

10 Kissinger, H. (2014). Laudatory Speech for Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing at


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secret of political leadership lies in the ability to go ahead with that which one has realised is the right thing, even against a majority. History is not a one-way-street. The essence of history is change. Change opens up new paths out of danger. People – suffering, patient, acting humans – are at the centre of history. A clear sense of direction, a sense of proportion, integrity and political judgement , as well as the ability to explain one's political actions and put them in a larger context, are the prerequisites for success. It is, paradoxically enough, the discipline of history that gives us a yardstick against which we can measure our ability to cope with the accelerating changes of our own time. The only possible conclusions about current international relations can be drawn by learning from the study of the past.

the presentation of the Ewald-von-Kleist Award on 1 February 2014 at the Munich Security Conference; unpublished MS.


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Joerg Forbrig

# Russia and the West: From Difficult Partner to Adversary

It was a brief quarter-century of hope between Russia and the West, which began with the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and ended with Moscow's aggression against Ukraine in 2014. In those 25 years, it seemed as though Europe's divisions could be overcome once and for all, as though the eternally warring continent could finally be at peace, as though the spirit and institutions of partnership, democracy, prosperity and collective security could be expanded to include all European states and societies. It appeared that this vision was also principally shared by Russia, and despite obvious difficulties in dealing with this large neighbor, optimism prevailed among most Europeans that this country, too, would ultimately follow the path successfully taken by most of the continent.

Instead, Russia has now completely broken away from the European consensus formed after the end of the Cold War. By annexing Crimea and with the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine, with its demonstrations of military and political power, and with its multifaceted pressures and influences on its neighbors, Russia has effectively given up its participation in the European (not to mention global) order. After initial surprise and horror, this set off an extensive debate in Europe and the rest of the West on the causes for this radical Russian about-face and its possible consequences and solutions.

All too often, however, this debate lacks not only an adequate understanding of Russia, but also the courage to strip away cherished interpretations and illusions based on years of relative cooperation, to realistically face the increasingly obvious: that Russia is now openly seeking confrontation with Europe and the West. The reasons behind this change for the worse can be found within Russia, and the consequences for the country itself, its neighbors, the West and the world, will be both dramatic and long-lasting. The West will struggle to find appropriate responses to these for years to come. Its immediate reaction to Russia's challenge – in the case of the Ukraine crisis – is encouraging; it was as self-contained, resolute and principled as Western policy on Russia will need to be in the future.


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## The changed foundations of Putin's rule

When Vladimir Putin took over the presidency from Boris Yeltsin in 2000, his primary task was to stabilize Russia domestically following the political, economic and social turbulence of the 1990s. The new President took on this task with a firm hand; he revised his predecessor's democratic and market reforms and created an increasingly authoritarian regime under the slogan of "managed democracy." All areas of Russian society were expected to submit to the power vertical of this regime. Nonetheless, many people in Russia applauded Putin's approach, since for all intents and purposes it did create the stability desired by large portions of the Russian public.

In reorganizing state and society, Putin benefited from a steep increase in world market prices for oil and gas, which have always been an important factor in the development of Soviet and then Russian systems of government. Between 2000 and 2008, Putin's first two terms, the prices for these raw materials quadrupled, from $30 to $130 per barrel. This glut of money allowed the Kremlin to provide loyal elites with unrivaled riches and the wider population with a rising income, as a reward for not questioning Putin's style of government. The deal was straightforward: political autocracy in exchange for material prosperity.[1]

However, this trade as not sustainable, as became clear when Putin returned to the presidency after a temporary job swap with Minister President Dmitry Medvedev. This political charade was accompanied by mass protests, which demonstrated that many Russians wanted political changes despite (or perhaps even because of) the country's growing prosperity, and they harmed Putin's legitimacy. In addition, the end of the raw materials boom was on the horizon – first as a result of the 2008 financial crisis and then due to the slowing economic growth in emerging countries like China, and finally with the turn toward unconventional energy sources in the United States and Europe. In order to counteract this weakness in domestic politics and in the overall economy before it eroded his power base, the ruler needed to strike a new deal with his subjects, as Putin recognized in a timely manner.[2]

As a result, Putin found a new way to obtain a commitment from Russian society. He invoked Russia's historic greatness and lamented the unjust way, in which the West in particular had treated the country since the end of the Cold

1 McFaul, M. and Stoner-Weiss, K. (2008). Mission to Moscow. Why Authoritarian Stability Is a Myth. *Foreign Affairs*, January/February Issue [online]. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2008-01-01/mission-moscow [Accessed 08 Feb. 2017].

2 Lipman, M. (2015). How Russia has come to loathe the West. *European Council on Foreign Relations* [online]. Available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_how_russia_has_come_to_loathe_the_west311346 [Accessed 08 Feb. 2017].


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War. Russia's superiority over a weak, crumbling Europe became a central theme, along with the task of defying the United States as a leading global power. For this purpose, it became necessary to re-establish the country's own sphere of influence in the post-Soviet region and to forge alliances with emerging powers that were often critical of the West. Ultimately, Putin even presented Russia as an independent civilization whose almost messianic duty was to provide the world with a different, presumably more just and timely order than the previous Western-dominated order.

Consequently, Putin's new social contract moved away from the material in order to concentrate on the ideological. From then on, the goal has been to fulfill Russia's self-declared historical mission, which takes precedence over all of the country's political, economic and social problems and for which everyone in the country must make sacrifices. At the same time, anyone who resists this duty is considered a traitor to the national cause.

Certainly, this shift in Russia's power structure had been on the horizon for some time. Phantom pains for the lost empire – whether it was the empire of the Czars, the Soviets or both – had never faded in Russian society. Putin himself lamented the fall of the Soviet Union as early as 2005, calling it "the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century," and in his revisionist speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference he declared direct resistance to American and Western policy in the world.[3] At the same time, the Kremlin had long indicated its claim to a sphere of influence, particularly in its immediate surroundings, where Russia either supported dictators or did its best to disrupt democratic efforts – in extreme cases even through military means, as in Georgia in 2008.

Nonetheless, these fairly disparate elements were not systematically merged into a general policy until recent years. Russian revisionism is now fully ideologically formed, and is communicated by politicians and propagandists without regard for reality or contradictions. It is institutionalized in many different ways, through Russian cultural policies and military doctrine as well as integration forums such as the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, as counterparts to Western structures like the EU and NATO. What is most important, however, is that Russia's anti-Western reorientation has now become a systemic pillar of Vladimir Putin's regime, given that this new revisionism now serves as a primary source of legitimacy for the Kremlin.[4] This has a range of serious consequences both internationally and domestically.

3 Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy (2007). *Washington Post* [online]. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html [Accessed 08 Feb. 2017].

4 Krastev, I. (2014). Russian Revisionism. Putin's Plan For Overturning the European Order. *Foreign Affairs* [online]. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-03-03/russian-revisionism [Accessed 08 Feb. 2017].


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## Consequences of the new Russian revisionism

First of all, a true balancing of Russian and Western positions and interests of the kind demanded by important Western voices – by way of negotiations and a new "Grand Bargain" – is fundamentally impossible.[5] The new Russian revisionism negates the European and international order of previous centuries and provides a diametrically opposed alternative. In place of self-determination by states and societies regarding their domestic political development and foreign policy orientation, the Kremlin applies a resuscitated "Brezhnev doctrine" to its immediate neighbors, demanding codetermination and veto rights. Instead of calling on multilateral mechanisms to solve disputed issues, Russia reserves the right to act unilaterally, for instance when it threatens to intervene to protect the so-called "Russian world" rather than ensuring the needs of Russian-speaking minorities through existing international forums and agreements. Conversely, Russia insists on the absolute sovereignty of the state and fundamentally rejects the validity of international conventions – from basic human rights and free elections to the rule of law and economic liberalization – since these allegedly represent Western influence in the same vein as "color revolutions" and political as well as economic subjugation.

In this way, Russia consciously positions itself in opposition to the previous status quo. These positions are purposefully formulated in distinction from presumably Western norms, and they have become fundamental for maintaining the power of Putin's system. Thus it is essentially unthinkable that the Kremlin would withdraw from any or all of its positions, since this would call its anti-Western identity and legitimacy into question. Conversely, if the West accommodated Russia even partially on individual points of these fundamental principles, it would weaken its own value base and create a dangerous precedent for the rest of the world. As a result, a resolution to the fundamental conflict that this new Russian revisionism creates for the international community is unthinkable as long as the the powers that be in Russia remain the same.

Second, the political mobilization of Russian society, which is the goal of this revisionism, requires the Kremlin to constantly seek conflicts abroad and present them, at least for some time, as successes.[6] In this sense, the annexation of Crimea worked very well for Moscow. It met with hardly any resistance from Ukraine, which lost this important part of its territory within days; it demonstrated how

5 Brzezinski calls for "accommodation" with Russia (2015). *offguardian* [online]. Available at: https://off-guardian.org/2015/03/28/brzezinski-calls-for-accommodation-with-russia/ [Accessed 08 Feb. 2017].

6 Pavlovsky, G. (2015). Russia's System of Managed Chaos, *The Moscow Times* [online]. Available at: https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russias-system-of-managed-chaos-op-ed-50433 [Accessed 08 Feb. 2017].


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limited the abilities and the will of the international community were when it came to truly protecting the territorial integrity of a European state; and it shocked all of Russia's neighbors with Russia's determination to take drastic measures in the post-Soviet region. Naturally, this success had the intended effect on Russian society. When Russia's new mission was proven successful in such an impressive way, the ranks closed behind Putin, including many people who had been critical of his return to power, and Putin's reputation soared to previously unknown heights.

The problem with this type of mobilization, of course, is that it is not permanent. Instead, elation over foreign policy successes ebbs fairly quickly, and life returns to the usual domestic Russian routines, the same difficulties from which the mobilization had provided a distraction. In addition, the long-term price of these short-term adventures gradually becomes apparent in the form of the material and social costs of annexing a territory like Crimea, or through the introduction of political and economic sanctions by the community of Western states.

Before doubts about the Kremlin's approach begin to spread, whether it is among the elites or in the wider population, it becomes necessary to move on to the next conflict. Correspondingly, Russian intervened in the Donbass region, which was likely meant to repeat the Crimea scenario. However, the local population largely ignored the separatist efforts of a few, which forced Moscow to take military action first through armed rebels and finally with regular troops; finally, the Kremlin agreed to hold political negotiations within the Normandy format and the Minsk process, though their outcome remains uncertain.

Thus robbed of a demonstrable result that could be displayed at home, the Kremlin diverted the Russian public's attention by taking the Ukrainian conflict out of the headlines and instead beginning its military intervention in Syria. In many ways, the staging of this intervention was similar to the aggression against Ukraine, although it was less about securing an exclusive sphere of influence than about asserting a fundamental Russian right to intervene in conflicts worldwide. Once it appeared that Russia was at a disadvantage in resolving the conflict in Syria, Moscow insisted on a place at the negotiating table through its military intervention on the side of the Assad regime. While the prospects for peace remain unclear, what is already clear is Russia's success, which is communicated to Russian society as follows: Putin's decisiveness prevented the West from yet again imposing its will on a sovereign state.

However, this conflict, too, will at some point exhaust its potential to interest and mobilize the Russian public. Accordingly, a new dispute will be sought out; at the moment, it is unclear what this will be. In addition to reviving the Ukraine conflict, it is just as possible that there will be an intervention in another of Russia's neighboring countries or Russian interference far from its own borders,


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as in Syria. It is also conceivable that there could be direct confrontations with Western countries, whether these are of a military nature or related to energy policy, carried out in cyberspace or through social influencing. Whatever the specific reason and the means used, Putin's Russia will need to seek open conflict with the West regularly in order to justify its stated mission and to ensure the necessary mobilization of Russian society.

Third, Russia's aggressive revisionism will involve dramatic changes to the country's political, economic and social life, which will make the country increasingly resemble a society in a state of war. To some extent, this development was already apparent before the Ukraine crisis, but it accelerated rapidly when the open confrontation broke out between Russia and the West. This is particularly obvious in the increased pressure on diverging views, which are now openly branded as a "fifth column" of the West. Additional legal limitations and administrative pressure have further limited the already-small playing field for independent civil society, forcing NGOs to declare themselves as "foreign agents" or to suspend their activities, and forcing more than a few dissidents into domestic or foreign exile. Purges in the state apparatus are part of the agenda – along with requiring artists and intellectuals to commit to the Kremlin's official political line. State propaganda is taking on increasingly shrill tones; as a result, Russian society is on the defensive, believing itself surrounded by enemies and gathering behind Putin to respond to the slightest criticism with suspicion and denunciation.

In the economic realm, too, there is a significant increase in state control.[7] Long before its open confrontation with the West, Russia had been moving toward state capitalism, in which the state directly controlled important areas like energy, finance and media while construction, traffic and the high-tech sector were in the hands of oligarchs loyal to the Kremlin. This longer-term trend is now accelerating for two reasons. First, the state – thanks to the sharp drop in revenue from raw materials and the increased difficulty of accessing international financial markets due to Western sanctions – is becoming the last possible lender for indebted companies. However, the Kremlin is primarily using its reserves to further expand its own share and influence in the Russian economy, and to secure the loyalty of economic elites. For another thing, the Kremlin has issued a call to replace Western imports. Russia's dependency on foreign technologies, along with food imports, was highlighted by Western sanctions and Russia's countersanctions, and has had dramatic effects on the economy and society alike. Accordingly, the Kremlin is attempting to jump-start domestic

7 Djankov, S. (2015). Russia's Economy under Putin: From Crony Capitalism to State Capitalism. *Peterson Institute for International Economics* [online]. Available at: https://piie.com/publications/pb/pb15-18.pdf [Accessed 08 Feb. 2017].



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production, but is relying almost exclusively on large companies that are owned by, or loyal to, the state.

Finally, there is an increasing militarization of the Russian economy and society. Building on longer-term programs to upgrade the Russian armed forces, the armaments and security sector is now becoming the focus of state attention and funding. Cuts in every area of society are being justified by the confrontation with the West, from social spending to public investments. Only the field of domestic and foreign security is spared. As an illustration, the Russian national budget for 2015 included a ten-percent cut for all expenditures with the sole exception of defense.

Politically and socially, economically and militarily, Russian is being remodeled internally to prepare the country for permanent external conflict. This process rescinds many of the positive developments of the last twenty years, and sets the country back by decades. At the same time, these structural changes within Russia are developing their own momentum, which will make it hard even for the Kremlin to change direction in the future – though it is unlikely it will move away from its confrontation with the West, for legitimacy reasons alone.

## How the West must assert itself against Russia

Given these fundamental changes in Russia's power structure and the multilayered confrontation that now faces the West, it is inevitable to completely rethink mutual relationships. This must begin with the fundamental insight that confrontation with Russia will be the norm in the long term. As the Western discussion surrounding the Ukrainian conflict showed, it is extremely difficult for many people, particularly in Europe, to believe this. After all, this Russian break with the West disappoints the hopes, efforts and partnerships of numerous political, economic and social actors over the last two or more decades. Nonetheless, it would be irresponsible to ignore this new reality and to harbor illusions about a return to the status quo ante.[8] Instead, we must clearly identify the aggressive and destructive course of the Russian leadership and take appropriate precautions.

First and foremost, this includes an unconditional amount of European and transatlantic solidarity, which in any case is constantly being tested. Within the EU, it is tested by differing ideas about European integration and controversies surrounding multiple crises; between the United States and Europe, there are

8 Forbrig, J. (2015). What's Ahead for Russia and the West? Four Scenarios. *German Marshall Fund of the United States* [online]. Available at: http://www.gmfus.org/publications/whats-ahead-russia-and-west-four-scenarios [Accessed 08 Feb. 2017].


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years of shared failures on the global political stage as well as latent anti-Americanism among many European decision-makers and citizens. Russia is increasingly and systematically taking advantage of these existing fault lines to paralyze Western decision-making processes and policies.

There are a series of possible steps to prevent Moscow's attempted destruction of the community of Western and democratic states – something that other emerging powers presumably observe with sympathy. For one thing, self-confidence and trust in shared values and joint institutions, severely damaged as they have been particularly in Europe, must be recovered. This self-reassurance can certainly be supported by excluding Russia (and other authoritarian states) from institutions that are intended to reflect this value base, but whose function is being hollowed out by the Kremlin and others – as has long been the case with the Council of Europe and the OSCE.[9]

At the same time, it is important that any political responses to Russian revisionism are tested for their potential to create divisions within the European and transatlantic partnership. In certain situations, as with the Ukrainian conflict, it may be tempting to respond resolutely to Russian aggression, not least by providing arms to the threatened country – but this is a decision that would have clearly divided Western partners amongst themselves. In these situations, Western unity must be given absolute priority, even if this sometimes means taking less action than some would like. Still, this consideration must not condemn the community of Western states to permanent inaction.

Second, it is essential to improve the resilience of European states, economies and societies and to systematically protect them from Russian influence. Especially following the Ukrainian crisis, the many vulnerabilities of individual European states and the EU as a whole to Russia have become obvious, and Moscow is more and more blatantly taking advantage of these to promote its policies. Such vulnerabilities include dependency on Russian energy sources and massive financial interdependency between Russia and some EU states; the presence of Russian state media and its influence particularly on large Russian-speaking populations within the EU; and connections between the Kremlin and extremist parties and milieus in various EU countries. In addition, there are the usual open flanks of developed societies, from open borders and tourism from Russia, which is important for some EU countries, to technological vulnerabilities that the Kremlin is increasingly utilizing for cyber-attacks.[10]

9 Krastev, I. and Leonard, M. (2014). The New European Disorder. *European Council on Foreign Relations* [online]. Available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/the_new_european_disorder322 [Accessed 08 Feb. 2017].

10 Bloomberg (2015). Cyberspace Becomes Second Front in Russia's Clash With NATO. *Bloomberg* [online]. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-14/cyberspace-becomes-second-front-in-russia-s-clash-with-nato [Accessed 08 Feb. 2017].


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It is important to keep an eye on these and possible other vulnerabilities, and to reduce them to the extent possible. After all, Russia has demonstrated a remarkable determination and creativity in using such flanks for its multilayered and hybrid, often covert and only sometimes overt conflicts. Accordingly, it is worth reviewing all interactions between Russia and the West, whether they are of a political or economic, social, media-related or technological nature. Divestments will be just as inevitable as the close monitoring of interactions that cannot be avoided. This will involve legal mechanisms, from EU competition law to national money-laundering laws and rules for media ethics, along with intelligence activities of the kind that have previously only been used to fight extremism and terrorism.

It will be especially important to improve the resilience of states along the eastern border of the EU and NATO, which are historically, geographically and socially exposed to Russian influence. Here, from Scandinavia and the Baltic states down through Central Europe all the way to Romania and Bulgaria, elements of traditional deterrence methods will naturally also be required. In recent years, Russia has massively expanded its military presence in this region – by arming its bases in the Kaliningrad region and Crimea, with large-scale maneuvers directed against neighboring NATO states, and with countless provocations along EU and NATO borders by air and by sea. The Western alliance has responded to these with moderate military means, from joint air traffic controls to a rapid intervention force to the modest deployment of NATO troops, but has not been able to completely assuage the security concerns of the affected states and societies. In this regard, much more political attention and greater material investments will be required to deter Russian military fantasies in this especially vulnerable area.

However, the West will not be able to limit itself to its direct relations with Russia, to its own security and to reducing Russian influence. Rather, the Kremlin – as was the case in Ukraine and in Syria – will regularly and primarily use conflicts in third countries to challenge the community of Western states and the model of international order that they represent.

Here the acute danger is to countries that are situated in the eastern neighborhood of the EU and that Moscow claims to fall within Russia's exclusive sphere of influence. The Ukraine crisis showed how determined Moscow is to defend its position, and by what means, but also the limitations of (particularly) Europe's political will and means to help. In doing so, however, the West risks giving up some of its fundamental principles and indeed its identity: the sovereignty of states and the right to self-determination of peoples, the inviolability of borders and the European postwar order, the project of a Europe whole, free and at peace.

Accordingly, it is important to proactively reach out to the states and par-


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ticularly societies of the eastern neighborhood, while rejecting Russia's hegemonic claims more decisively. Despite all of the difficulties with their internal reform processes, the three countries that are ready for European integration so far – Georgia, Moldavia and Ukraine – deserve the same support that the Central European transformation countries received in their day. In addition, the three countries should be given a clear European perspective and prospect for EU membership, regardless of the current resistance within the EU and purely based on progress with political reforms.

Similar long-term signals and generous aid should be given to the societies of the other three neighboring countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus – but not to the regimes of those countries, whose autocratic nature clearly conflicts with European values. Increased EU attention toward, and support of, Eastern European societies will facilitate their emancipation from autocracy, kleptocracy and domination by the Kremlin. This approach may not lead to short-term democratic changes and European integration everywhere, especially since Russia will certainly do its best to disrupt such efforts. In the long term, however, Western assistance will contribute to strong and self-confident societies that can protect themselves from manipulation by their own corrupt elites as much as from Russian meddling, as the Ukrainian example also shows.

Ultimately, of course, it will also be necessary to maintain communication channels and partnership offerings with the Kremlin despite all efforts at security, containment, deterrence and in some cases even isolation from Russia. At a minimum, as with the United States' existing practice of "de-conflicting," this may mean that confidential background contacts between political decision-makers and direct communication between the military on both sides are necessary in order to avoid dangerous misunderstandings and escalations. Beyond this, however, the previous approach of a deepest and broadest-possible collaboration with Russia must be reconsidered; after all, a numerous partnership offers, not least by Germany, have proven to be fruitless in the last two decades, and none of them could prevent the current confrontation.

Several important parameters must be kept in mind here. For one thing, the West must understand that from the Russian perspective, cooperation is primarily a tactical approach, but in no sense represents a departure from strategic confrontation with the West. The Minsk peace process on the Ukrainian conflict, Russia's participation in the Iran nuclear agreement, and the offer of an international coalition in the fight against the Islamic State are examples of such purely tactical cooperation on the part of the Kremlin. In addition, it is important to differentiate possible partnerships clearly by areas of conflict rather than accepting the quid pro quo pursued by the Kremlin. A possible collaboration with Russia in the case of Syria, however necessary and desirable this may be


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from a European perspective, should by no means result in Western concessions to Moscow in the case of Ukraine.

Furthermore, the European states in particular should be more aware that their largely bilateral collaboration with Moscow is not for the benefit of Europe, but primarily that of Moscow, since it weakens European solidarity against the Kremlin. For instance, privileged energy relationships between Germany and Russia and the desired expansion of the Nord Stream gas pipeline contradict the EU's planned energy union and the energy security of the entire community. Accordingly, all partnerships with Russia should be closely coordinated within the EU context, rather than being guided mainly by national interests and egos as they have been in the past.

Last but not least, the manifest weakness of the institutional framework of pan-European security and collaboration must be acknowledged. Neither regular EU-Russia summits and the NATO-Russia Council nor broader forums like the OSCE and the European Council have proven to be reliable channels for engaging Russia. At this early point in the likely long-term confrontation between Russia and the West, it may be hard to conceive of a major institutional triumph like a new Helsinki Final Act or a new Paris Charter; but in the long term, it will be necessary to find a shared basis and organizational form that includes Russia. Until then, however, the main burden of Western efforts to face the Russia challenge will be with the EU and NATO, which must be correspondingly organized and equipped.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the progress and results of Russia's new confrontation with the West will largely depend on how European and transatlantic politics respond to this changed reality. The responses will need to be just as multi-layered as the Russian conflict strategy itself. They should be based on the idea that nothing less than an international order is at stake – not just in Europe, but globally – that is guided by universal norms, a clear legal framework and generally accepted institutions. And they should be prepared for the new conflict with Russia to last a very long time.

Despite all of the obvious difficulties and weaknesses that the West has revealed in its confrontation with Russia so far, it has also demonstrated a strength of principle, resistance and solidarity that surprised many. Hence, there is hope that the European and transatlantic community will be able to overcome this fundamental challenge in the long term as well.


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Xuewu Gu

# China's Rise to Major Power Status and its Challenges for the West

Nowadays there are hardly any reputable observers who doubt that the People's Republic of China has become a major power. Above all, China's new power status is embodied by its weight as the largest economy, based on purchasing power, and by its real influence on geopolitical events in the 21st century. Today, there are hardly any global political issues that can reasonably be resolved without China's participation or against its will. The global climate agreement that was concluded in December 2015 in Paris is an example of how quickly a precarious conflict of interest can be resolved if Beijing acts constructively, and how difficult it is to achieve global consensus when it feels slighted. Above all, the nation of billions, which is still governed by communists, represents enormous challenges for the West, both regulatory and systemic.

## Regulatory challenges

One of the key questions associated with the rise of China is whether the People's Republic will become a regulatory power in East Asia due to its increase in power – one that not only has sufficient resources, but is also willing to ensure stability in the region. Many observers both inside and outside the region supported this idea just a few years ago and spoke of the Middle Kingdom as a "benign power," a term that was previously reserved exclusively for the United States to characterize its regulatory commitment in the world.[1]

However, the conditions for restoring China's traditional supremacy in East Asia do not yet seem to be sufficient. Above all, a Chinese regulatory force in the region would automatically mean a reduction of American influence in the Asia-Pacific region. It is highly doubtful that Washington is prepared to do this. In 2012, Obama's government announced that it would be putting a "rebalancing"

1 See: Machetzki, R. (2004). Ostasien in den Strömen des Wandels: Eine Weltregion vor dem "Stabwechsel" zwischen Japan und China? *China Aktuell* 8, p. 868.



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strategy into practice over the following years, with the goal of adding content and activities to the previously declared policy of a "return to Asia." The fact that the United States is increasingly seeing China's rise as a threat to its own position in East Asia, and is resolved to balance out this perceived threat, also seems to be a foregone conclusion.

As early as 2012, former US Defense Minister Leon Panetta spoke at a security conference in Singapore, where he discussed reorganizing the capacity of American naval forces from their current 50:50 ratio in the Pacific and Atlantic to 60:40 in favor of Pacific Asia. While Panetta expressly noted that this planned shift was not aimed at China, and that China too could benefit from an increased American commitment to security in the region, the government in Beijing no doubt clearly understands what this stronger American military presence means for the security of the People's Republic of China. It was extremely unsettled simply by the calculation that in the future, 6 out of a total of 11 US aircraft-carrier groups would be stationed in the Asia-Pacific region.[2]

In response, China intensified its efforts to build its own aircraft-carrier groups. At the beginning of January 2016, the Chinese Defense Ministry confirmed that the country was "well on its way" to building its second aircraft carrier. As reported in "Die Welt," the warship built in Dalian is "the first to be constructed without foreign support." "The CV-17 or Type 001A aircraft carrier weighs 50,000 gross register tons and is intended as a base station for the J-15 (the "Flying Shark") and other fighter jets. At least 40 airplanes and helicopters will fit on this floating airport."[3]

Nonetheless, China is not expected to surpass the United States' military power in the foreseeable future. In fact, the United States dominates China's security environment and growth conditions with its strong military and economic presence. Ever since the defeat of militaristic Japan in 1945, the United Sates has been very active in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan's development into one of the world's largest economic powers (until 2010, it was the second largest economy in the world after the United States, and was then replaced by the People's Republic of China) would have been just as inconceivable as the division of China and Korea if Washington had not carried out a massive containment policy against Moscow in postwar Asia, just as it did in Europe.

After the end of the Cold War between the two superpowers of the USSR and the US, the United States remained a Western Pacific power. Stationing about 100,000

2 Glaser, B. (2012). US-China Relations: Creating a New Type of Major Power Relations, in: *Comparative Connections. A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations* September Issue, pp. 1–13.

3 China baut seinen zweiten Flugzeugträger selbst (2016). *Die Welt* [online]. Available at: http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article150557177/China-baut-seinen-zweiten-Flugzeugtraeger-selbst.html [Accessed 13 Jan. 2016].


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soldiers through bilateral alliance treaties with Japan, South Korea, and Australia in particular has allowed the United States to play the role of a regulatory power in the region. The expansion of the US-Australian alliance treaty in 2012, the revival of the military cooperation with the Philippines starting in 2014, and the rapprochement with Vietnam over the last few years have all demonstrated Washington's determination to continue expanding its status as a regulatory power. Today, none of the powers in the region has a real chance of violently changing the existing power relationships against the will of Washington. The same is true for the People's Republic of China, even if Beijing has never officially acknowledged the United States' position of power in its home region.

There are increasing signs that the Chinese distaste for the American military presence in Asia increased dramatically with President Obama's policy of a "US return to Asia." In fact, Chinese public opinion has grown louder and louder, after abandoning Deng Xiaoping's early "low profile" *(tao guang yang hui)* policy. The move toward revising this strategy, which is characterized by passivity and required Chinese foreign and security policies to exercise restraint and caution for 30 years, is becoming increasingly popular – especially among the younger generation and intellectuals who see the US military presence in China's environment more as a threat than an opportunity.[4]

The latest movements in Chinese foreign and security policy have clearly demonstrated that Beijing no longer wants to accept the US-dominated security order in the region. China's determination in carrying out territorial conflicts with Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam, and the speed with which it constructed a landing strip on an artificially expanded island in the South China Sea, are unmistakable signs that the "Pax Americana" is no longer sustainable in the Asia-Pacific region. Whether Washington can find a way to settle this regulatory challenge peacefully remains to be seen. In any case, given the rise of China, the security order in the West Pacific requires a dramatic renewal, either with China or against its will. Both approaches would exact a significant price from the United States – material, ideal and mental.

## Systemic challenges

China's integration into the global economy, which facilitated its rise to major-power status, is in a certain sense also an achievement of the West's China policy over the last 35 years. However, the West will be condemned to constant dis-

4 See: Luo Yuan, Wu yuanmei youri, ying qizhixuanming la e han wuidu riben. *Global Times* [online]. Available at: http://mil.huanqiu.com/paper/2013-02/3615208.html [Accessed on 02 Feb. 2013].


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appointment if it continues to think in terms of "modernization theory," in other words persistently assuming that the economic liberalization in China will necessarily lead to political liberalization. The fact that this has not yet occurred is not a coincidence, but rather a development that was intended by the political, economic and societal elites. Developing China into a political system according to the Western model, one that embraces economic globalization, was never part of the Chinese reform policy. On the contrary – its goal has always been to test out the possibility of permanent prosperity without opening up the political decision-making processes.

Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union – the symbolic triumph of the liberal constitutional states over the unfree communist states – Western democracies appear to be surprisingly uncertain in terms of their own future. This uncertainty is expressed unusually strongly in their fear of China, which is constantly growing in light of China's rise. The euphoria over the "end of history" has been replaced by concern about a "return of an authoritarian regime." The sense that the world is not marching as expected toward universal-liberal democracy is becoming more common among intellectuals and opinion leaders. The fear is that the world of states will become polarized into different political camps, ushering in a new era of rivalry between Western liberal democracies and non-Western, but dangerous, autocratic regimes. John Ikenberry, one of today's leading American liberal thinkers, even mentioned clear indications for the emergence of an "autocratic international" association led by Russia and China. He is optimistic that Western democracies can win the perceived "beauty contest" in the end, but is concerned about the lasting nature of world peace in the 21st century. Liberals fear that a world shaped by democratic and authoritarian divergence and driven by competition over political regimes can only create more threats of conflict and war.[5]

Whether a democratic and authoritarian divergence would really lead to a new world war, as adherents of the theories of "democratic peace" posit with reference to Immanuel Kant[6], remains to be seen. A more serious issue for the West is the political challenge provoked by China's development model: the reviving of authoritarian regimes.

Overall, the future of the Western democratic model will depend greatly on its ability to propagate itself worldwide, in other words by moving non-democratic

5 See: Ikenberry, G. J. (2008). The Rise of China and the Future of the West. *Foreign Affairs*, 87 (1), pp. 23–37.

6 On the theorem of the correlation between democracy and international peace see: Doyle, M. W. (1986). Liberalism and World Politics. *American Political Science Review*, 80 (4), pp. 1151–1169; Layne, C. (1994). Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace. *International Security*, 19 (2), pp. 5–49.


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countries toward political liberalization and by democratizing their systems of government. China poses a serious threat under this aspect in particular.

Loretta Napoleoni points out that the Western modernization model has steadily lost its attraction in the wake of China's ongoing growth and the series of Western crises. Especially in developing countries, she says, China's "better capitalism," in the sense of political authoritarianism combined with economic freedom, is becoming more attractive. "If I were an Egyptian today," asked the French Le Monde commentator, "which economic model would I want to adopt? The Western one or the Asian one? Would I trust the Western politicians and companies who spent decades making deals with the same oligarchic elites who suppressed and plundered me, or would I be more likely to trust politicians and companies from emerging nations – people who until just a few decades ago were just as poor and powerless as I am now?"[7]

The future of the Western democratic model thus largely depends on whether its defenders can manage to shift the authoritarian centers like Russia and China toward political liberalization and/or democratization. Repeating the West's behavior toward Russia in its current dealings with China would be fatal for the future of the Western model of democracy. Russia's return to authoritarianism, which accelerated rapidly under the leadership of "perfect democrat" Putin following President Yeltsin's initial democratic attempts, certainly reflects the disappointment of Moscow's governmental class with the West's treatment of Russian interests as a major power. However, it also explains the failure of Western democratization policies in authoritarian centers. The arrogant euphoria over the "end of history" and the associated carelessness and naiveté in reorganizing Russia's power structures, which had never evidenced a liberal element in their entire history, were partly responsible.

When it comes to the possibility of converting China into a democracy according to the liberal Western model, the project will likely be even larger and its prospects even more bleak. There is a large, even insurmountable fault line between the two state philosophies. The differing Chinese and Western ideas about the state, its function, and its relationship to the country's population ensure that neither side will voluntarily accept the other side's form of government. If there is any fundamental way of thinking that has lasted over thousands of years, throughout all of China's political dynasties, it is the primacy of the collective, as already discussed in detail. In contrast to the primacy of the individual, which characterizes the philosophical, governmental and societal ways of thinking and behavior in the West, the primacy of the collective represents an at least theoretical reference point for all of the political and societal efforts in

7 Napoleoni, L. (2012). China: Der bessere Kapitalismus. Was der Westen vom Reich der Mitte lernen kann. Zurich: Orell Füssli Verlag, p. 9.


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China that have significantly influenced the country's political developments ever since its encounter with the West.

There is significant doubt as to whether the Chinese primacy of the collective and the Western primacy of the individual can be reconciled and/or balanced, given their internal contexts. After all, these two postulates are the two key concepts upon which the differing relationship between the individual and the state is based in China and the West.

However, Leibniz, if he were still alive, would probably not consider it an impossible task – not least because Confucianism and Christianity never represented an opposition to him. And based on his idea of a "European mission by the Chinese as a counterpart to the Christian mission to China in revealed theology," the West and China today – in the digital age, with its unlimited communication possibilities – should find it much easier to make connections between conservative-collective ideas in China and the liberal-individualistic attitude of the West.

Leibniz, living in the 17th century, was in fact more convinced that the differences between basic Chinese and Western values could be bridged than 21st-century Chinese and Westerners are. They are clearly lacking the vision that encouraged Leibniz in his optimism: the "intellectual treasures" from these two parts of the world, which he saw as excellent in different ways, would be fruitful for both sides thanks to extensive exchanges. It seems that neither the West nor China is currently able to renew its civilization on its own power. Both sides have become "fundamentalist" in their own ways.

While too great an emphasis on the "primacy of the collective" in China often prevents individual claims from being satisfied, an exaggerated individualism often disrupts the collective interest and public order in the Western states. John F. Kennedy's often-cited statement that one should not ask "what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country" may not come from Confucianism, but it can be read in a Confucian sense. If the West and China move closer to one another and each tries to adopt a part of the other's central way of thinking, integrating it into their own system of values, they could probably uncover enormous potential for renewing their respective systems.

The Western model of democracy will only have a chance to assert itself globally in the 21st century if the representative democracies in its home regions – Western Europe and North America – remain stable themselves. They are clearly in need of qualitative and institutional self-renewal in order to reduce their increasing vulnerability to demagogic and populist promises, a vulnerability that has been accelerated by the computer revolution. The sovereignty of political leadership by reasonable and responsible statesmen and stateswomen should be reinforced in the face of the possibility of a demagogic and populist seduction of the mass electorate.


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The fate of the "new democracies" in transition countries will significantly influence the future global prospects of the Western democracy model, because its global transferability is at stake in the 21st century. Strategically speaking, the systems established in East Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America serve as political buffer zones or peripheral areas around authoritarian centers like China and Russia. If the Western liberal democracies are able to help the new democracies achieve consolidation and prosperity, they will also strengthen their position in the systematic competition with authoritarian centers like China and Russia.

Given that the idea of an authoritarian state order is becoming more attractive for many peripheral countries due to their growing development tasks and modernization challenges, the dominance of liberal democracies in the world of states will probably decline. In particular, China's model of successful "authoritarian capitalism" is looking increasingly attractive to African and Latin American states – a circumstance that will further strengthen China in its search for an independent path toward political and economic modernization.

## Prospects for the Chinese-Western relationship

Authoritarian China and the Western liberal democracies can probably only reach a compromise through reciprocal learning. In fact, globalization is not only forcing both sides to learn from one another, but is also defining the direction of their learning. The political taming of globalization across national borders cannot be achieved except through a global balancing of interests and values. This balancing, the "golden mean," can only come about through a process of learning from one another – as a shared product of the learners, but always with an eye toward their own needs in each case.

Any attempt to consider one's own values as absolutely correct and to impose them on the other side would merely result in a pragmatic political solution. In this sense, Huntington correctly identified the "clash of civilizations" as the "greatest danger to world peace" and acknowledged, based on Lester Pearson's ideas, that "different civilizations must learn to live side by side in a peaceful interchange, learning from each other, studying each other's history and ideals and art and culture, mutually enriching each other's lives."[8]

8 Huntington, S. P. (1996). Kampf der Kulturen. Die Neugestaltung der Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert, Europaverlag: München, pp. 530–531.


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Jackson Janes

# Principle, Policy, and Purpose: The Balance of Values and Interests

The American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr once stated that the essence of statecraft is locating the point of concurrence between the parochial and the general interest, between the national and international common good[1]. Niebuhr emphasizes that realism implies an obligation to see the world as it actually is, not as we might like it to be. He warned that hubris can blind realism, finding expression in outsized confidence in both the power as well as the values of a country as being universal. Any country is susceptible to such temptations.

The narrative of the values and interests of any country is a reflection of its history and its interpretation of itself. In the case of the United States, values and interests are often presented as overlapping. This has been particularly true of the American narrative with its emphasis on exceptionalism in world history and the assumption that what the United States stands for is truly shared by all mankind. The mission of the United States has been portrayed from the beginning as one which serves as a beacon of liberty and freedom in a world which shares a common security and a common set of values. How one can pursue that mission best has always been the focus of debate in the US, but the ruling assumption throughout US history is that American interests are fundamentally in line with American values and in turn those values are universal. While that has not always been the case – one thinks of slavery as the original sin of the American Republic or dealing with autocratic leaders around the world as another illustration – the "city on a hill" image has been the overarching theme of American self-images.

During the post-World War Two period, the equation between values and interests became accentuated again within the framework of the Cold War standoff with the Soviet Union. The United States emerged as the leader of the Western network of alliances and began to use its dominant leverage to fashion a new order based on collective security and a liberal order anchored in liberal de-

1 Niebuhr, R. (1958). The World Crisis and American Responsibility. New York: Association Press, p.41.



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mocracy and a web of international institutions to further open commercial and financial ties while exporting democracy and markets to the developing world. Even though the confrontation with Moscow also involved relations with dictatorships which did not exactly embody proclaimed American values, American leaders continued to echo their commitment to the principles of freedom and democracy along with security and prosperity in a liberal Western order. The implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991 only underscored that mission with the assumption that the only alternative to the Western path had been defeated.

In his book "No One's World," Charles Kupchan has best described this phase as follows:

> "The collapse of the Soviet Union appeared to herald the ultimate triumph of the West [...]. The United States and Europe promptly teamed up to integrate their former adversaries into the Western order. The European Union and NATO opened their doors to the new democracies of central Europe. A panoply of global and regional institutions – the World Trade Organization, the North American Free Trade Area, the Asia Pacific Economic forum, and NATO's partnership for peace, to name a few – were created to promote trade, political liberalization, and geopolitical stability. Such efforts yielded impressive results. During the decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the global economy enjoyed robust growth and a wave of democratization swept not only Europe's east, but also Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Not only had the Western way been globalized, but history really did seem to be coming to an end."[2]

Overall the combined values of liberal democracy, capitalism, and secular nationalism were seen as the foundations of the new world order which lay ahead.

But that was a premature judgment.

In fact, the world continued to evolve in ways that would challenge visions of order as perceived by leaders in Europe and in the US. As developing countries such as China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia, along with a resurgent Russia, emerge with their approaches to governance systems, commercial relations, and perceptions of global order, the questions about what constitutes a legitimate and multi polar framework of international relations would confront the Western dominance of political order during the past two centuries. This represented a direct challenge to what has been generally referred to as the West. It is not only an ideological challenge, but also one measured in the dimensions of economic, military, demographic, and trade policies that do not always line up with interests or values of Western liberal democracies. Kupchan has framed this new development in the following way:

> "It is doubtful [...] that any country, region, or model will dominate the next world. The 21st century will not be America's, China's, Asia's or anyone else's; it will belong to no one. The emergent international system will be populated by numerous power centers

2 Kupchan, C. (2012). No One's World. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 73.


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> as well as multiple versions of modernity. For the first time in history, an interdependent world will be without a center of gravity or global guardian. A global order, if it emerges, will be an amalgam of diverse political cultures and competing conceptions of domestic and international order."[3]

What we can expect in the coming decades is an increasing diffusion of both power and ideas about how to craft both domestic and international relationships. The Western model of secular nationalism, industrial capitalism, and liberal democracy has been a dominant force since its emergence in the 18th century. Much of that was attributed to the material and commercial success of the Western order for the states of those which built it. The military strength and reach of those states underscored the weight of its influence in the modernization evolution. Indeed, the capitalist system was also a force of success and was adopted by many developing countries.

However, the adoption of systems and structures is not necessarily synchronized with the adoption of ideas and values. The impact of both culture and tradition have acted as a filter for countries in developing their own orientation toward the concepts of sovereignty, trade relations, the form of government they choose, and their definition of national interests. The result is a set of alternatives to global relations and order in the 21st century which may look very different than the 20th. Democracy and its structures in some states may have a different equation between the government and citizen, between the state and religion. As in the past the definition of sovereignty and regional interests will differ among states with competing interests whether they are liberal democracies or autocratic systems. And the web of international organizations and institutions which have shaped global governance during the past half century will be a platform for debate and contest in an arena of multiple modernities and power centers. The challenge will be to define how the competition over values, principles, and interests can unfold within a new consensus on rules which can sustain stability and security.

The transatlantic community has been central to the basis of international order for the past seven decades. That community has been formed on the basis of shared interests and values.

How will the United States and Europe respond to these new challenges? What will be the equation of interests and values which are not based entirely on the Western narrative? What will be the consensus on which diverse forms of capitalism, democracy, and governance as well as the arenas for global interaction can sustain stability? Or put another way – what will be the bargain that the 21st century will be built on? Henry Kissinger warned that "world order depends on a

3 Ibid., p. 3.


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structure that participants support because they helped bring it about".[4]That order will be a far more complex one in a multi-polar world.

While the peculiarities of American history reflect a preoccupation with the values underlying the founding of the nation as inherently universal, those values are also part of the narrative of other liberal democracies within their own respective historical narratives. The commitment to democracy, capitalist economic systems, and stability and security within a web of alliances was formed around a shared set of standards for the current members of the European Union and the members of the NATO alliance. Indeed those goals and values were written into the constitutions of many if not all of the nations in this web of cooperation. They have been constant reference points to this in transatlantic and even global institutions. Much of this was the result of the catastrophes of the first half of the 20th century and the common commitment to build a world in which such disasters could not be repeated. The Western nation victors of the war engaged in this effort to spread liberal democratic systems and a common economic order led by the United States. The confrontation with the Soviet Union strengthened the resolve in the context of the Cold War. Indeed the emergence of the many institutions which were to shape the international order around the US were based in Washington and New York. But the web of interlocking networks across the Atlantic served to fuse the national interests of Western Europe with those of the US. The United States also formed similar ties elsewhere in an effort to contain Moscow's ambitions in the developing world. But the most comprehensive framework was built across the Atlantic.

This effort was framed by what was defined as the shared values and interests symbolized in many ways by the wall in Berlin as defining both. After the wall and the Soviet Union with its block of nations collapsed, more organizations and networks emerged to encompass what was seen as a global opening to share the values of democratization and economic growth.

We need to keep in mind that throughout this period, those interests and values did not always overlap in a consistent manner. Relations with regimes which did not reflect shared values were part of the Cold War period and necessitated pursuing interests with autocratic regimes in alignment within the East-West standoff. That discrepancy was part of the reality of the global political confrontation including dealing with the Soviet Union directly. Across the Atlantic there were also continual clashes of interests despite shared values. The confrontation over the Suez Canal in the 1950s, negotiations with Moscow over nuclear disarmament, and more recently the conflict over the Iraq war highlighted the potential for dissonance in the value-based Atlantic community.

4 Kissinger, H. (2008). An end of hubris. *The Economist* [online]. Available at: http://www.economist.com/node/12574180 [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].


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There has also been continual friction over the deep and wide economic and trade relations across the Atlantic currently best illustrated by the debate over TTIP[5] today but with many previous cases of competition in conflict between two enormous markets.

Yet despite these clashes, during the initial period after the Cold War was deemed to be over, there was a good deal of hubris in the West. The Western values system and its modalities could be seen as now spreading around the globe in a flat world where billions would be able to join a global economy and escape poverty while Cold War conflicts might be tempered as stakeholders around the global be would invited to join the Western club of nations.

It was a vision short lived. There would be other visions emerging challenging the Western model and the framework in which it was built.

During the past quarter century, the balance of economic, military, and political power and influence has been in transition. The rise of China and India along with other powers including Brazil and the potential of temporary recovery of Russia has begun to challenge the primacy of the Western community. This can be measured in the metrics of economic growth, demographic expansion, military power and projection, and most exponentially the impact on the global governance network of both current institutions and alliances and those emerging anew. Whether it be the creation of China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or Russia's Eurasian Economic Union, among others, or the rising influence of countries like Turkey, Iran, or Brazil in their respective regions, the landscape of the world is changing with implications for more diversity and also debate within the international rules of the global order.

The leader of this trend is clearly China. The challenge it poses to defining anew the equation between economic growth and political liberalization will be significant.

Charles Kupchan described the implications of this trend as follows:

> "Just as Bismarck's Germany took advantage of the stability provided by British hegemony to expand its trade and influence, China is reaping the benefits, but not sharing the costs, of the global public goods provided by the United States. The US Navy guards the world's sea lanes, making it safe for tankers and freighters to circumvent the globe on their way to and from China's ports. The United States has been sacrificing lives of its soldiers and spending about $100 million annually to bring stability to Afghanistan; China meanwhile makes strategic purchases of the country's mineral deposits. As Washington organizes sanctions to convince Iran to shut down its nuclear program, China buys its oil. In general, American engagement in troubled parts of the developing world is often in the service of security – combating extremists, preventing civil conflicts, and addressing the socioeconomic causes of instability. In contrast, China heads

5 The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a proposed trade agreement between the European Union and the United States.


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> to the same areas to secure raw materials for its industrial machine. Beijing is also positioning itself strategically in more developed economies; in Brazil, for example, China has invested billions of dollars in ports and infrastructure. China's foreign policy, just like it's the domestic policy, is guided by an effective, even if cold-blooded, real-politik."[6]

China is just one example of a world in transition with diverse interests and competing national positions in an increasingly interwoven network of interests and values. The outcome of the conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and other regions of Asia as well as the uncertain path of Russia taken together present the challenge of forging a consensus around the goal of securing a stable and peaceful platform to engage in this ever more complicated global arena.

In light of these developments, questions arise concerning the sustainability of the transatlantic community and its foundation of shared interests and values in forging a new global order. How coherent and cohesive will that community be in meeting the transitions ahead? The track record of the past two decades is mixed. European-US relations have not been spared from the transitions going on around them. The immediate celebration of the end of the Cold War was followed by transatlantic conflicts over arguments dealing with the Balkan wars, Iraq, the responses to the great economic recession, cyber security policies, and trade negotiations, just to name a few. Yet in taking a wider look at the challenges facing Europe and the US, the reference to the shared values and indeed common interests resurfaced. Amidst various disagreements over policy options, shared strategic goals remained visible. Indeed the affirmation that the uniqueness of the transatlantic community was reflected in the necessity of working together to deal with the new emerging challengers and stakeholders in the global arena. As President Obama stated in 2010 "our relationship with our European allies and partners is the cornerstone of our engagement with the world and a catalyst for global cooperation. With no other region does the United States have such a close alignment of values, interests, capabilities and goals."[7]

That said, that close alignment has not always been a formula for coherence within Europe. The alignment of values, interests, capabilities, and goals *within* Europe – let alone across the Atlantic – is no easy walk itself. There are several challenges facing Europe simultaneously. One is the gap between the commitments and institutions contained within the EU Lisbon Treaty when it comes to implementing a common foreign and security policy and the current trend toward a renationalization among the member states. That stems from both the

6 Kupchan, C. (2012). No One's World. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 102.

7 Obama, B. (2010). Europe and America: Aligned for the Future. *The New York Times* [online]. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/19/opinion/19iht-edobama.html [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].


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political barriers to pooling sovereignty and the difficulty in forging a common policy when it comes to confronting challenges. The dissonance over the nature of military engagements has marked the effort to respond effectively to situations in Afghanistan, Libya, and of course Iraq. The current tensions over the refugee crisis has endangered the Schengen and Dublin policy on asylum and immigration policies, just as the crisis over Greece burdened the ability of the Euro zone to act in sync. There is no doubt that the European project is under duress in the aftermath of the recent global economic crisis. A backlash against Brussels has taken root in many national frameworks – most recently in Poland where the new government removed the European flag from its public buildings.

However, the impact of the terrorist attacks in Paris, with others anticipated elsewhere in Europe, have generated a call for European solidarity in meeting these threats. How that unfolds with regard to both policy coherence in Europe as well as in the fight against ISIS remains to be tested over the long run.

Meanwhile in the US there is a trend toward inward-looking interests and outsourcing certain obligations to partners, including Europe. Particularly in a presidential election year, the debate over American interests with regard to responsibilities, both financial and military, is in full form. At the same time, the mix of fear connected with terrorist attacks in the US along with the desire to eradicate the source of terror in the guise of ISIS is generating a highly polarized atmosphere which may be conducive for discussing multilateral approaches to these challenges.

In that context, a renewed emphasis on shared values and interests may emerge. That was recently demonstrated in Paris during the climate conference in which the combined effort of the US and European partners helped to forge a consensus with the rest of the world.

It is evident that the United States and Europe remain indispensable partners for each other. The combination and collaboration of resources available to provide for global stability are unique and irreplaceable. But the need for this partnership must be directed at working with the new actors and indeed rising powers to shape the parameters of a stable and peaceful world. To lead that effort rather than let it drift is the decisive challenge ahead. Here again, President Obama has painted a picture of what that world should resemble:

> "The United States supports a set of universal rights. And these rights include free speech, the freedom of peaceful assembly, the freedom of religion, equality for men and women under the rule of law, and the right to choose your own leaders […]. Our support for these principles […] is a top priority that must be translated into concrete actions and supported by all of the diplomatic, economic and strategic tools at our disposal."[8]

8 Obama, B. (2011). Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa. *The White*


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Those are the same values espoused by the European Union. Hence the need is to seek ways in which that support can be coordinated into those concrete actions with all tools available. Many of these actions will be found well beyond the boundaries of the transatlantic community – in Africa, the Middle East, or driven by common concerns wherever they are such as terrorism and climate change.

As Stefan Froehlich has written:

> "For the very reason that the EU in and the United States face the same challenges and problems that raise critical security, political, and social concerns they need to work together and make use of their comparative advantages in the military and security sphere and in the other global issues. Meanwhile both sides, especially in the United States, have accepted that traditional security concerns are increasingly bound up with problems which cannot be addressed by military power alone but that need a common and multilateral approach. […] No matter how much the two partners may differ on the perception of threat […] we cannot change the fact that a shared vulnerability is an unavoidable variable in today's world."[9]

A shared vulnerability was part of what held the United States and Europe together during the decades after 1945. But it was not the most important part. The basis of the transatlantic partnership was rebuilding a community of nations dedicated to building a future with fewer vulnerabilities and more opportunities for people to have the rights for which both sides of the Atlantic community stand. That community is now made up of a global audience which share vulnerability but also aspirations, share diversity as well as ideas about how a global order can and should look. Neither Europe nor the US can dictate the blueprint of that world. But by pursuing a narrative that aims to connect values with interests that address vulnerabilities as well as opportunities, they can argue that on a global scale, the sum can be greater than its parts if principle, purpose, and policies are in balance.

*House* [online]. Available at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

9 Froehlich, S. (2012). The New Geopolitics of Transatlantic Relations. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, p. 8.


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Christoph Raab

# Germany's Security Role in the 21st Century

In recent years, the number of international crises – the effects of which are increasingly spilling over into Europe – has grown. As a result, foreign and security policy are currently experiencing a distinct renaissance in Germany and Europe, and there is little reason to believe it will be a short-term phenomenon. Thus Germany, too, will need to focus more intensely than before on the challenges, its own security objectives and its interests in order to find appropriate responses to security threats in the 21st century.

In the Cold War, German foreign policy was largely oriented toward gaining recognition, participating in international relations, and overcoming the division of Germany. It did include a certain ambivalence toward the United States, namely in choosing between a Western alignment or a purely European anchoring, including in terms of security policy (for instance the European Defense Community project in 1952/1954), but this was almost completely obscured by the East-West conflict and the "great power confrontation".

When Europe's division was overcome starting in 1989, the security situation changed fundamentally for Germany. The "great power confrontation", with its dividing line straight through Germany and Europe, seemed to have come to an end. However, this "peace dividend" was only a brief illusion, and complex new security challenges quickly returned after German reunification. The conflicts in the crumbling former Yugoslavia, which only truly came to an end with the war in Kosovo, made it clear to European states and the European Union that they could not end a civil war in Europe without American intervention. It was apparent that European "buck-passing" within the transatlantic security architecture had its price.[1] September 11 and the asymmetrical threats of terrorist attacks represented a new kind of threat. There followed the military inter-

1 Over the past decades, the European members of NATO have spent considerably less on security and defence expenditure than the US. Since the 1990s, this imbalance has even increased. see: NATO (2015). Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence. Bruxelles: NATO. Available at: www.nato.int/ nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_06/20150622_PR_CP_2015_093-v2.pdf [Accessed 14 Mar. 2017].



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vention in Afghanistan, the second Iraq War, and almost simultaneously the major EU expansion to the east. Starting in 2011, there were the start and end of the "Arab Spring", the civil war in Syria, the Ukraine crisis in 2014, and most recently the refugee crisis. In fact, the constant use of the term "crisis" is fairly absurd here. It empties the term of meaning and no longer contributes to our analytical knowledge. The same can be said of the overuse of the term "security", which this article will address in further detail below.

Germany attempted to account for these cascading changes in the security landscape at a strategic level. Germany's understanding of its own role in the area of security policy has evolved significantly since 1990. Broadly speaking, the constitutional framework for Germany's international military activities has gradually been greatly expanded – always on the condition, however, that such activity must be performed as part of an international alliance. Some key phrases here are the "out of area" NATO missions, humanitarian intervention (the "Kosovo Air Campaign"), and the saying by then-German Defense Minister Peter Struck, "German security is also being defended at the Hindu Kush". This development is clearly illustrated by the German Army's White Papers from 1994 and 2006, which were written in conjunction with the further international development of the security concept. This process is still underway for the latest White Paper from 2014 concerning the cyber security dimension and to what extend offensive means can be acceptable. The considerable difficulties that various social classes had in accepting these changes will not be addressed here.

In particular, the 1994 White Paper faced the challenge of completely rethinking the security situation after the upheavals of 1989 and formulating a broader security concept in place of the systemically shaped approaches from the time of the East-West conflict – which left little room for individual and social factors – to account for the new realities. The 1994 White Paper states, "An approach is needed that considers the political, economic, societal, social, ecological and military aspects for the specific individual case."[2] This expanded security concept now also included sub-systemic and individualistic factors. That allowed for a broader intellectual approach, and was explicitly intended to help defuse conflicts before they turned into a violent escalation. At the height of the Cold War, security was understood to mean security for states, which then indirectly provided this security to their citizens as well. By contrast, the expanded security concept also relates security to the affected population groups. This is clearest in the concept of "human security", which this article discusses in further detail below.

The 2006 white paper further develops this idea to include the new concept of

2 The Federal Government of Germany (1994). White Paper 1994 – On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, p. 36.


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networked security, or the "comprehensive approach". This is a consequence of the expanded security concept; it requires military and civil actors to coordinate their analytical skills, resources, and objectives as much as possible in a concrete crisis situation, and to use them efficiently. In practice, of course, this runs up against the common experience that everyone is in favor of coordination, but no one wants to be coordinated. The fundamental problem, that a constantly expanded security concept makes it harder to find guidelines for specific security actions, was overshadowed by the challenges of the mission to Afghanistan. For the "army in operation". as it was defined in the 2006 White Paper, and for German society, it was more important to determine whether the mission in Afghanistan was considered a "war" or not.[3]

Following the logic of a "comprehensive approach", the concept "Responsibility to Protect (R2P)" was developed at the level of the United Nations. Its objective is to protect people from serious human rights violations and breaches of humanitarian international law.[4] First of all, it requires every state to ensure protection for its own population: sovereignty as responsibility. If a state fails to fulfill this responsibility, the community of international states can also support it, in other words intervene, using civil or military means.

As the number of hot spots grew worldwide and their causes became increasingly diverse, more and more aspects were added to the discussion surrounding the expanded security concept. For instance, the revision of the European Security Strategy in 2008 for the most part merely involved adding a few more factors that can cause crises. This situational expansion of the security concept brings with it the risk that the wrong decisions, based on individual aspects of the security concept, may ultimately lead to less security. It is no coincidence that this period (1998–2011) saw a whole series of military interventions by the West. The reason for this was a sense of universal responsibility for all crises worldwide, a sense that was derived from the security concept. It was not necessarily because the states that aligned themselves with the expanded security concept wanted to intervene, but because they fell into an argument-based trap that made it more opportune to intervene. Depending on the country's political perspective, this was sometimes seen more as a right or as an obligation. The expanded security concept also created a "moral hazard" problem: it seems plausible that radical Islamists were actually trying to force the West to intervene in some hot spots through their atrocities.

3 At a memorial service in honor of killed soldiers on April 4th, 2010 Federal Defence Minister Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg used the term 'war' to describe the incidents in Afghanistan which led to a fierce debate of the topic.

4 Developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001, the concept was accepted by almost all states at the UN World Summit 2005. It was first mentioned as binding under international law in resolution 1674.


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The German security debate in particular, however, continues to include a certain normative component, as can be seen especially in Ukraine and in the current refugee crisis. But the domestic political discussion and how Germany treats Turkey in terms of the refugee issue also demonstrate that German security policy is currently seeking a clear line between normative claims and practical politics given its limited options. Against this background, statements by German Chancellor Angela Merkel could be seen as an attempt to place new priorities on German foreign and security policy, to use resources more effectively and to better achieve their objectives.[5]

With the development of the expanded security concept, it was only logical that the European Union (EU), too, with its economic, social and ecological objectives during the 1990s, would increasingly be seen as a possible security actor. Even in the Maastricht Treaty, European security and defense policy (ESDP) was discussed as part of Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).[6] However, it was only the British-French St. Malo Agreement in 1998 that paved the way for real defense-policy and security structures within the EU.[7] This made it possible for the EU to evolve into a security actor in the sense of the expanded security concept.

After the moves toward integration in the 1980s and 1990s, with the completion of the EU Single Market, the introduction of the Euro and the expansion of the EU after the turn of the millennium, the field of security and defense policy integration was the natural next focus in terms of integration theory.[8] The wars in Yugoslavia were a major security crisis that led to the creation of the concepts of CFSP[9] and CSDP[10]. In the following years, Germany did not want to depend on the development of the two largest military powers within the EU, and extensively supported the development of CFSP and CSDP. This was followed by the institutional development of political-military structures, which were closely based on the NATO structures. Target figures were established for building up

5 "Nach Bewältigung der Flüchtlingskrise wird Deutschland ein Land sein, dass sich mehr mit Außenpolitik beschäftigt. Wir werden mehr in Entwicklungshilfe investieren und uns mehr um die Krisen in der näheren Umgebung Europas kümmern müssen." Chancellor Angela Merkel in the television show "Anne Will", 07.10.15.

6 Maastricht Treaty, 1992, Titel V.

7 European Union (2000). Joint Declaration Issued At The British-French Summit. Saint-Malo, France: EU Institute for Security Studies. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/French-British%20Summit%20Declaration,%20Saint-Malo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf [Accessed 14 Mar. 2017].

8 The Neofunctionalism, building on Ernst B. Haas, seemed to best describe the European integration processes at the time, even predicting further integration due to inherent constraints and so-called spill-over effects. The Uniting of Europe, Stanford 1958.

9 Common Foreign and Security Policy.

10 Common Security and Defence Policy.


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military and civilian forces, known as the Helsinki Headline Goals.[11] In the face of the 2003 Iraq crisis and the serious dissent between the United States and its European allies, the European Security Strategy was created under the leadership of the High Representative of the EU, Javier Solana – the first coherent attempt to define threats, interests and security objectives from a European perspective. As a result, the EU sent more than 20 civil and military missions to hot spots as far away as Central Africa. However, the effectiveness of these missions and the EU's overall political influence in these areas remained limited, since it became increasingly clear that the member states lacked the political will for integrated action. In addition, as CFSP and CSDP were further spelled out and put into practice, they were subject to increasingly clear limits, set particularly by the large member states. Some striking examples of this are Great Britain's consistent refusal to increase the very modest budget of the European Defense Agency, France's explicit refusal to accept the help of the "Nordic Battlegroup" during the CSDP's EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission along with its insistence on using national troop contributions, and Germany's abstention during the UN Security Council's vote on air strikes in the Libyan civil war to support the insurgents against Gaddafi. It is no exaggeration to say that security policies in Europe are currently being renationalized. A kind of institutionalized intergovernmentalism has been established that is also marginalizing the Council as an EU institution. This was made abundantly clear in another policy area, with the frequent special summits organized for EU state and government heads due to the crisis in Greece. It was no longer possible to deal with the problem using the normal EU Council procedures.

The international context for Germany's foreign and security policy has thus rapidly become more uncertain and more complex. The "West" as a whole is demonstrating a relative decline in power. In the 1990s, the extent of this was balanced out by the impressive economic and military power of the United States, the "only remaining superpower"; but in the years after 9/11, it became increasingly clear that even the United States' will and ability to act as a globally influential power were limited. US foreign policy has been hovering between the two poles isolationism versus internationalism ever since the Monroe doctrine in the 1820s. However, since the end of World War II, there has been a continuous period of internationalism. If the Trump Administration will put its isolationist claims into place it would be a major game changer for global security policy, for Europe and for Germany in particular.

After a phase of euphoria following the end of the East-West conflict, of deepening and broadening, the European Union has now lost much of its impact

11 European Union (n.d.). Helsinki Headline Goal. Available at: www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsupload/Helsinki%20Headline%20Goal.pdf [Accessed 14 Mar. 2017].


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and is facing strong centrifugal forces and critical questioning of the legitimacy of its actions. The outcome of the Brexit referendum is only the most visible expression of that, but the EU is facing numerous crises in parallel, all of which have the potential to further undermine its output-oriented legitimacy and contribute to its further undoing.

NATO is still functioning as a central transatlantic security architecture, but in a world governed by the expanded security concept it no longer represents the central security vector that it was at the time of the Cold War. Even Russia's changed behavior in recent years will probably not change this circumstance very much.

The United Nations (UN) still represents the world's power dynamics as of the end of the Second World War. These have undergone massive shifts in the meantime, which seriously limits the legitimacy and functionality of the UN and especially the Security Council. It remains an open question if the ongoing attempts at reforming the UN will be more successful in a world which moves more and more away from the bipolar world at the end of World War II and becomes increasingly multipolar.

Under Vladimir Putin, Russia currently sees itself as the wrecking ball of the "Pax Americana". Russia's direct military intervention in the Syrian civil war thrusts it into a Near East where the United States no longer pursues its security interests as consistently as it did in the past. Thus its activities have a stronger impact on Europe than on the United States. The refugee crisis is merely an especially visible expression of this. With the Syrian civil war, Europe faces a security challenge with a direct and severe impact that it lacks the tools to handle.

From Ukraine to North Africa, the "circle of friends" once convened by former EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso has become a "ring of fire". Borders are being unilaterally shifted; there are civil wars; Islamist terrorist groups are undermining entire states; many Arab societies have become both less free and more unstable following the "Arab Spring"; and the internet, through Facebook and Twitter, is no longer simply spreading the soft power of American values of freedom, but is increasingly being used for propaganda by authoritarian governments and to recruit and win over young people for the objectives of the Islamic State, among others.

Unlike almost all the other states in the West, Germany has experienced a relative increase in power during the last quarter-century since its reunification. After years of international demands, German President Gauck, Minister for Foreign Affairs Steinmeier and Minister of Defence von der Leyen formulated a new German foreign and security policy at the Munich Security Conference in 2014. The country plans to be a stronger partner for NATO, the EU and the United Nations when it comes to global crisis management, including in a military sense.


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For Germany, that means further developing the concept of security and making it more workable. Rather than continuing to expand, it should be made more useful for comparing the countries' relevant interests, for formulating security objectives, and as a basis for current political decisions.

One suggestion that would fit into the landscape of the dynamic and complex 21st century would be to define it based on context. Security within the European Union is different from security in the Near East, for instance, or in Africa. The drawback is that the more contextual adjustments are made, the less generally applicable the security definition becomes. The degree of decision-making freedom increases, along with the risk of arbitrary political decisions that are not based on previously defined objectives.

A second possibility to consider here would be organizing the further development in a process that could be seen as a kind of Helsinki 2.0:

The Helsinki Process showed the long-term effects that can be achieved through an agreement on principles that are initially very abstract and general, but can therefore be agreed upon by all sides. It would also be conceivable to bring together all of the actors currently involved in the "ring of fire" for a long-term discussion process. Including all of the relevant actors, some of whom are in open conflict with one another, would legitimize the results of such a process among all of the participants. Germany would be well-placed and would have the necessary credibility to launch such an initiative, which should be supported by the European Union – 2012's Nobel Peace Prize winner.

What were the requirements for launching the Helsinki Process, and what were the central mechanisms that ultimately led to the founding of a major international organization, the OSCE? And how much of this could be applied to the current situation?

Since the late 1950s, the Warsaw Pact in particular continuously signalled an interest in discussing security topics. However, this was only able to take place against the background of a global policy of détente and the Ostpolitik (Eastern policy) of the Federal Republic of Germany. Both sides, East and West, had a security interest in achieving more predictable behaviour from the other side. Finland was a neutral country, acknowledged by both parties as an arbitrator that was prepared to host the negotiations. Preliminary conferences clarified which issues were to be addressed in the actual negotiations. It was important for both sides to be able to include topics that were important to them – overarching principles rather than current politically contentious issues.

The final document, the Helsinki Final Act, was distinguished by three things: first of all, it was not a contract under international law, but a commitment by the states – that was one requirement for its adoption. Second, it was a "document of paradoxes" – that was a requirement to create a feeling of "ownership" on all


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sides and to legitimize the document.[12] Third, both sides succumbed to misconceptions in their interpretation of the results – that contributed to its long-term success from the Western perspective. The Eastern Bloc's recognition of borders was initially valued more highly than the freedom and human rights that the West was able to implement.

The situation in the "ring of fire" has some similarities to and differences from the situation at that time:

In contrast to that time, today we do not have two clear opposing blocs with several neutral states in the middle. There are significant nongovernmental actors, and organized interest groups play a much larger role even within the democratic states than they did in the era of the East-West conflict. In the Arab world, too, groups like the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups represent actors that are not considered capable of negotiating. In addition, there is no new "Finland" available, but Germany does currently have many characteristics that could make it a successful arbitrator under the right conditions. It has a certain influence even beyond Europe and it stands for balanced positions, for instance between Israel's right to existence and the interests of the Arab countries.

What is similar is that all of the relevant states have unmet security needs. For the most part, these are focused directly against one another, but the rise of radical Islamist groups with a desire to conquer is probably not in the interest of any of the regional powers. Furthermore, there are various hot spots that have long resisted any possible solution. Such a Helsinki 2.0 initiative would need to look at the overarching principles of cohabitation among peoples in the 21st century, without the risk of being exploited by the specific conflict issues as was the case in Helsinki at the time. Such a dialogue process between states with extremely different foundations could result in a new security concept. This would probably contain many elements of the expanded security concept. However, it could also address how to deal with religious sensibilities – a field that plays only a secondary role in Western security theory. Certainly the United States and Russia as well as China need to be a part of this process if it is to succeed.

The above analysis of the current security policy situation in Germany and Europe, the possibilities and limits of political action, and the proposed Helsinki 2.0 initiative allow us to draw several conclusions regarding the further development of the security concept:

The expanded security concept that was created at the end of the East-West conflict is outdated and needs to be adapted.

12 Matthias Peter (2015) Die Bundesrepublik im KSZE-Prozess 1975–1983. Oldenbourg: De Gruyter, p. 533.


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It should not continue to be expanded to include additional political dimensions. For one thing, that poses the risk of securitization; for another, it makes the concept more and more arbitrary and unsuitable as a political guideline.

The security concept should be made more flexible. In the 21st century, the foundations and framework conditions for political and geographic spaces are changing more quickly than before. A context-based definition of the security concept would allow it to be adapted more precisely to the yet-to-be-defined security needs of the specific conflict. At the same time, it must be ensured that the concept is not adjusted according to the issues of the day or potentially irrelevant political considerations. Such a mechanism could also prevent the "moral hazard" problem in which parties to the conflict use targeted actions that essentially force the West to intervene.

A basic understanding that any social issue can become relevant for security would be a good prerequisite for creating context-based definitions, which can then be applied to any hot spots that develop. These can be geographically or thematically related.

The current challenges for Germany and Europe are so great and so varied that Germany's entire political capacity is bound up in dealing with each of them. However, the question is whether these conflicts might not be symptoms of deeper changes, to which politics must respond with new approaches and new ways of thinking about security in the 21st century.


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Karl-Heinz Kamp[1]

# The Power of Institutions: NATO, the EU, and OSCE

Future historians looking back are likely to describe 2014 as a turning point for international security policy that, although not as dramatic, is comparable to 11 September 2001 on account of its implications for the transatlantic security environment. The key security institutions – NATO, the EU and to some extent the OSCE – are changing in terms of their role and relevance and, as a result, are coming under significant pressure to adapt. As the factors leading to this turn of the tide are fundamental and lasting – first and foremost Moscow's policy towards its neighbours and the upheavals in the Middle East – the new security situation will also prove to be permanent. Security in the 21st century and the power of institutions will be different from what was generally assumed prior to 2014.

## Three Game Changers

Three developments in and around 2014 present a new challenge for German and Euro-Atlantic security policy and necessitate adaptations at institutional level.

First of all, Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea revealed a policy change that the Russian leadership had long been planning. Russia defines itself as an anti-Western power and advocates an Orthodox nationalist worldview that contrasts with Western values, which it considers degenerate. In addition, Moscow thinks in terms of spheres of influence and grants only limited sovereignty to parts of what it calls the "near abroad". That is why the EU and NATO (and primarily, of course, the United States) are considered a threat – after all, it was these organisations that diminished Russia's *cordon sanitaire* by admitting Eastern European states. Moscow has also used military power to change borders in Europe, putting its own superpower ambitions before the European security order. Although in the long term Russia lacks the economic, military and soft

1 The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.


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power to underpin its claim to being a world power, it will continue to regard itself as such. Russia's policy is therefore not a spell of bad weather but rather a fundamental climate change in international relations.

A second game changer resulted from the upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa – frequently but imprecisely called the "Arab world". Outbreaks of violence by state and non-state actors far exceed conventional crises and revolutions. They are indicative of a lasting erosion of statehood, as a result of which states like Syria, Iraq and Libya are disintegrating, and spontaneously established caliphates are dissolving existing borders. Countless Islamist groups are fighting one another and receiving support from different regional powers. This is leading to an export of religious violence far beyond those regions and to the creation of huge floods of refugees into Europe, especially the well-off EU states.

It is virtually impossible for these EU countries to adopt military, political or economic measures to stabilise this conflict situation. Where states and governments cease to exist, there are no actors capable of taking action, on whose behalf (or against whom) it is possible to intervene. Even successful operations, such as the NATO intervention in Libya, do not lead to a stable order but apparently accelerate processes of political disintegration. It is little wonder that permanent intervention fatigue is spreading in European and North American societies.

Thus, NATO and EU members are facing a fundamental and long-term problem. Europe has to cope with the consequences of this development in the Middle East (conflict escalation, Islamist terrorism, refugees) without being able to fight its causes in the region effectively.

Less attention has been paid to a third game changer, which is often overshadowed by the first two crises: the rise of China and possible conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region. Unlike in the past, it is not possible any more to turn a blind eye to potential dangers in remote parts of the world. In the age of globalisation, geographical distance no longer provides a security buffer. Especially for Germany as the leading economic power in the EU and the fourth largest in the world, growing tensions in this region are of considerable significance for economic reasons, among others. Asia is also home to four nuclear powers (China, India, Pakistan and Russia) that are not always well-disposed to one another. In addition, there is the United States as a nuclear guarantor, as well as North Korea with its unclear nuclear status. In any case, the question of China's future role on the world's political stage probably has more global strategic relevance than, for example, Russia's future political course.


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## Effects on NATO

The North Atlantic Alliance, which by 2014 was still facing a possible loss of importance after the end of the Afghanistan mission, was propelled into the "Article 5 world" virtually overnight. Although national and collective defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty had always been NATO's top priority, the organisation had been doing less and less to meet this expectation. Instead, it had focused on crisis management outside Alliance territory – whether in Afghanistan or in the Middle East. Moscow's military commitment in Ukraine, President Putin's threats against his neighbours, and the revocation of the partnership with NATO stirred up old threat scenarios in Eastern Europe and required a double signal from NATO: a sign of deterrence to Russia to prevent possible aggression against Alliance territory, coupled with a message of reassurance to NATO members in Eastern Europe.

The new challenges of this Article 5 world, however, relate to the situation not only in Eastern Europe but also in the Middle East. NATO member Turkey borders Syria, Iraq and Iran, among others. An attack against Turkish territory launched from one of these countries would call for a demonstration of solidarity by all the other NATO members. An Article 5 situation could even arise in East Asia. A missile attack by North Korea on Alaska – a scenario that cannot be ruled out completely given the unpredictable regime in Pyongyang – would also, at least formally, activate the mutual defence clause.

In response to the new situation, NATO has initiated a fundamental shift towards deterrence and collective defence. This shift will not be limited to a few cases of unit augmentation but will instead be a long-term process that includes military measures and the Alliance's political decisions as well as controversial issues such as the future role of nuclear weapons.

This has conflicting consequences for the future relevance and power of the North Atlantic Alliance. On the one hand, it bolsters NATO's role as a guarantor of the security and territorial integrity of its members. The Alliance's original political function of strengthening the United States' institutional ties with Europe is also gaining importance again. Some states in Eastern Europe had in the past established bilateral relations with Washington because they felt they could not fully rely on NATO for protection, which was primarily involved in Afghanistan. NATO members in the south likewise rely on the military effectiveness of the Alliance and on the integration of the United States, but they inevitably focus on the dangers south and east of the Mediterranean.

On the other hand, NATO's relevance in other areas is dwindling. There are unlikely to be any major military crisis-management operations outside Alliance territory over the next few years. Such operations, if there are any, will probably be conducted by ad hoc coalitions and not by NATO as a whole. Thus, the


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hierarchy of the Alliance's three core tasks laid down in NATO's Strategic Concept (1. defence, 2. crisis management, 3. partnership) is changing. Crisis management is likely to drop to number three on this priority list, but partnership is also losing some of its importance. Not only are the chances of a pan-European security order shrinking now that the partnership with Russia has come to an end. Some NATO capitals are also losing hope that through cooperation they will be able to contribute to Russia's modernisation and democratisation.

NATO partnerships in the Middle East are also becoming less important. The Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative will hardly survive in their current form.

## The Role of the European Union

The European Union's importance for security policy has increased significantly, especially as a result of its response to the crisis in Ukraine. Despite all predictions to the contrary, the EU and NATO have proven that they are united and capable of taking action in dealing with Russia – a fact certainly underestimated by Putin. In addition, cooperation between the EU and NATO has led to a division of labour. The EU has concentrated on the non-military aspects of security policy and thus acquired a central role in the effort to manage the crisis with Russia. It has at its disposal a broad spectrum of economic and political measures to exert pressure through sanctions, support Ukraine economically, and enhance the resilience of other countries in Eastern Europe through its European Neighbourhood Policy. In line with its role, NATO for its part focuses on deterrence and Alliance protection and thus contributes to crisis management only to a limited degree.

The EU is experiencing a significant loss of importance as regards its ambitions to become a serious actor in military terms. The EU's military component (for example the EU Battlegroups) did not play any role whatsoever in the crisis in Ukraine. Neither does it have any territorial self-defence function as this task is clearly assigned to NATO. The EU Rapid Reaction Force, which was planned as early as 1999 and has undergone several modifications, had always been intended for conflicts outside the EU. If, for the reasons mentioned above, major military crisis-management operations outside Europe are, at least in the Middle East, virtually a thing of the past, the EU will have a permanent problem justifying its military ambitions. Military crisis management has also lost its importance for NATO, but the Alliance can always justify its own relevance by referring to the defence requirement.

Therefore, the future of the EU's capacity for military action does not lie in the


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long-term objective of establishing a centralised European Army that will replace the national armed forces of EU member states. Instead, emphasis must be placed on pragmatic consolidation through ever-closer military cooperation between willing EU members. A resulting *European Defence Union* therefore provides neither a contrast nor an alternative to NATO. It would instead become the European pillar of NATO, as was intended in the 1990s with what was then called the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI).

## The Future of the OSCE

Conflicting future developments are also evident for the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which is far less relevant than the EU and NATO.

The OSCE and its predecessor, the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), were absolutely instrumental in overcoming the East-West conflict and the division of Europe. The OSCE then became largely irrelevant despite performing important tasks such as observing elections in Eastern Europe. However, as the crisis in Ukraine unfolded, the organisation again received more attention, tasked as it is with monitoring the implementation of the Minsk peace agreement. The OSCE will gain further importance when Germany assumes the OSCE chairmanship in 2016 and seeks to modernise and strengthen the organisation as a whole.

Germany's plans are based on the fact that the OSCE is the sole remaining organisation in Europe (and beyond, if you count the United States and Canada, which are also members) that includes Russia. If institutional ties with Russia are to be maintained and possible cooperation not limited to ad hoc problems, the OSCE will remain indispensable far beyond the crisis in Ukraine.

Realistically, however, future developments of the OSCE, and therefore its long-term relevance for security in Europe, are fairly limited. The advantage of having Russia as a member, and thus obliging the country to participate in dialogue, is also the organisation's greatest disadvantage. As all decisions have to be unanimous, Moscow has the power to block the organisation. For years, it has been undermining the OSCE's fundamental principles, i. e. human rights, rule of law, and democracy. Moscow even believes it is acting consistently. As early as 1999, Russia's then Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov called the OSCE a Western tool for "forced democratisation".

There is also the problem of the OSCE's authority, which in the past was mainly derived from the treaties it supported, first and foremost the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). This agreement had been disregarded for quite some time and in March 2015 Russia withdrew from the CFE


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Treaty. As tensions in the region make renewed disarmament talks unlikely, the OSCE is lacking a central element from which to derive its claim to being a power that can shape politics. The mission in Ukraine alone does not justify this claim. Russia provides the third-largest contingent of observers, along with the United Kingdom and the United States, which means that there is little chance of any constructive work in this area.

In the end, the OSCE has only an "East-West" dimension. Accordingly, it does not play a major role in tackling the urgent problems in the south and associated threats to European security. Therefore, there is every reason to believe that the OSCE will again experience a significant loss of influence once the German chairmanship has ended and the conflict in Ukraine has disappeared from the headlines.

It is clear that Europe's security is determined primarily by NATO and the EU. In view of the dramatic challenges, it is crucial that the two organisations end their long-standing rivalry over who is the more important actor in security policy. The belief long held in Paris, but in few other European capitals, that the EU must become a tool by which to achieve emancipation from the United States, at least in terms of security policy, is now a thing of the past. European security is only conceivable in a Euro-Atlantic context.


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# II. Global Challenges


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Wolfgang Ischinger

# The Ukraine Crisis and the European Security Order

Our decades-long efforts to establish a crisis-proof Euro-Atlantic security order, which began more than 40 years ago in Helsinki, have failed – at least for the time being. All attempts to better integrate Russia, to prevent new dividing lines across Europe and to build a network of solid institutions, rules, and agreements have been unable to prevent old conflicts from flaring up and new ones from emerging in and around Europe.

Particularly the Ukraine crisis has become a threat to the security order of the entire European continent. Territorial integrity, national sovereignty and the renunciation of force – the annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of eastern Ukraine are jeopardizing all of these fundamental principles once agreed upon by all CSCE states.

The crisis over Ukraine, NATO's enlargement, and the EU-Ukraine association agreement have shifted the spotlight back on conflicts that had not played a major role, namely those in Moldavia and Georgia.

Still, the key to improving the European security order lies in Moscow – and in Ukraine. What is needed to restore the integrity of Ukraine and to strengthen the security architecture of the entire European continent for the long term?

## A Western dual strategy for the Ukraine crisis

Ukraine's territorial integrity, political-military security and its equally important economic rehabilitation cannot be realized in a permanently antagonistic relationship with its large neighbour Russia. A stable security architecture in Europe cannot be realized *against* Russia, but only *with* Russia.

However, many constructive suggestions will prove futile unless Russia implements a more cooperative policy. It takes two to tango. Meanwhile, security *from* Russia must also be guaranteed in Europe.

I propose a dual strategy with ten points, following the approach of traditional German Ostpolitik (Eastern policy); the strategy combines military security and


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reassurance elements on the one hand with the offer of comprehensive cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic region on the other.

First: A clear military message remains essential. Our eastern NATO partners in the Baltics and in Poland are unsettled by the Russian annexation of Crimea and the ongoing Russian support for the separatists in eastern Ukraine. The alliance rightly responded with a strategy of political and military reassurance. Just as our alliance partners proved their solidarity at the inner German border for decades, it is now up to us to demonstrate solidarity with our allies.

Second: military support for Ukraine should not be treated as a total taboo. A defenseless Ukraine would threaten European security in the long term as well. Of course, a renewed escalation of the conflict would not help anyone. Therefore the rehabilitation and democratization of the Ukrainian armed forces must be part of a comprehensively coordinated political process.

Third: Europe must continue to advance the energy union – with the dedicated goal of becoming even more diversified in its oil and gas imports, and in order to strategically reduce its dependency on Russia.

Fourth: Ukraine needs much more financial and economic assistance and backing. The focus on the political and military conflict with Russia has diverted attention from the second equally great threat to Ukrainian stability: the risk of economic and financial collapse. Investor and fund manager George Soros correctly pointed out that our economic and financial assistance for Ukraine is of an existential nature, and thus is much more important than punishing Russia with sanctions.

The "Draghi model" can help illustrate this. Just as the ECB President was able to calm the markets with a single sentence, the EU could clarify that it will do everything in its power to support Ukraine on its path to economic recovery. Such a public declaration could create new hope for Ukraine.

Of course, such a declaration on its own is not sufficient. If action is to follow, it will cost money, a great deal of money – which is not readily available anywhere in the EU due to the crisis in Greece and the large number of refugees coming into Europe. But what is the alternative? Wouldn't the political, military and financial follow-up costs of a collapse of what is by far the EU's largest eastern neighbor potentially be even greater?

At the same time, such a financial support program cannot provide a free ticket for the Ukrainian government to postpone upcoming reforms, especially in the area of fighting corruption. On the contrary, clear progress in this area must be a prerequisite for receiving support.

Fifth: It is about much more than the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian budget. Faced with the largest security crisis since the fall of the Soviet Union, the EU has an opportunity to demonstrate the appeal of the European canon of values. We owe this to Ukrainian civil society, especially to all those who were demon-


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strating on the Maidan – not against Russia, but against a corrupt Ukrainian elite that was depriving young people of their chances for a European future. These people – young journalists who reported on misappropriation, a new generation of politicians fighting nepotism, nongovernmental organizations promoting mutual understanding and conciliation between ethnic groups – represent the hope for a better Ukraine, a European Ukraine. Visa-free travel, more scholarships for Ukrainian students and support for nongovernmental organizations on site are just a few of the tools that Europe can and should use here.

This is one side of the dual strategy: reassurance of NATO partners and extensive help for and collaboration with Ukraine. The other side must consist of elements that are particularly directed towards Russia.

Sixth: As far and as long as Moscow and the separatists do not fully support the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, the sanctions must remain in effect. But Kiev must also be actively involved in the implementation of Minsk, or the sanctions will lose their political meaning. Here, clear words towards both sides are needed.

Seventh: The dispute over Ukraine's NATO prospects must be resolved in the interest of Ukraine. De facto, the alliance has already taken a negative decision on the question of Ukraine's NATO membership. Only the government in Kiev – understandably – still clings to this idea.

The EU could tie its offer of financial support for Kiev to the expectation that Ukraine defines itself more clearly as a bridge between East and West, following the example of Finland, Austria, or Switzerland. While this decision is solely up to Ukraine, it could direct attention toward what can currently be achieved: an independent, self-determined Ukraine with links to both East and West.

Eighth: The exclusion of Russia from the G-8 circle is politically not helpful. Especially in light of the situation in Crimea, however, this can hardly be reversed in the short or medium term without a loss of face for the West. One possible way out could be to use the "5 plus 1" format, which clearly demonstrated its potential in the Iran negotiations, as a pragmatic platform with Russia beyond the Iran case. It would also finally provide a format for crisis management in the Ukraine case in which the United States would be a full participant. Neither the Normandy format nor the so-called trilateral contact group of the OSCE includes Washington; this is neither in the interest of Ukraine nor in that of the EU.

Ninth: All OSCE member states, including Russia, must jointly look for ways to strengthen the European security architecture. Conventional and nuclear arms control must be put back on the agenda as shared projects of confidence-building and crisis prevention. The persistent nuclear threats leave no room for military muscle plays in Europe. Visions for strategic economic collaboration are also worth considering, based on earlier concepts – "from Lisbon to Vladivostok."


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After all, the OSCE, which had practically been declared dead, has now proven itself in a time of crisis – especially through the monitoring mission, working under extremely difficult conditions in Ukraine. What would make more sense than taking better advantage of the multilateral framework of the OSCE in order to focus more strongly on security and collaboration throughout Europe after the Ukrainian crisis? Even during the Cold War, a diplomatic political process was set in motion. We should now offer it to Moscow. The objective must be to see whether we can work together to affirm, strengthen and, where applicable, supplement the established European security principles and codes of conduct. It is then up to Moscow to say yes or no – and in the case of a no, to further isolate itself from the 57 member states of the OSCE.

Tenth: Regardless of the next steps that Russia chooses, the greatest responsibility for a secure and stable Europe lies with the EU member states themselves. But while security crises around us are intensifying, Europe's defense capabilities continue to decline. The defense budgets for the EU member states are currently at an extremely low level.

The time has come to finally introduce the principle of integration and synergy into the field of defense and armament as well. That would not only help the EU strengthen its security capabilities, but would also send a clear signal to Russia.

This is particularly important as the United States no longer wants to play the role of Europe's protective power – a plausible plea considering the size of the European pillar in the transatlantic alliance. In 2007, military expenditures by European allies accounted for 30 percent of all expenditures of NATO states, while in 2013 it was barely 25 percent.

Defense integration and an increase in efficiency are thus no longer merely nice visions, but represent a sheer necessity. Compared to the resources currently in use, though, Europe's clout is quite small. Jointly, EU member states maintain about 1.5 million soldiers, which corresponds to the number of US soldiers. At the same time, while the EU countries have six times as many different weapons systems as the United States, the actual military power of the EU represents only a small fraction of that in the US. This fragmentation is not sustainable in terms of finances or capability.

European governments are aware of this ineffective and inefficient use of resources. They also realize that cooperation and integration is the only way to overcome this dilemma. According to a McKinsey study, conducted in cooperation with the Munich Security Conference in 2013, European countries could save more than 30 percent a year – 13 billion euros – by working together more closely in procurement. And yet Europe does not even have a joint procurement plan at this time.

Naturally, defense integration limits national sovereignty in an important


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core area. But what is the worth of sovereignty if any single European nation can no longer act on its own? It becomes sovereignty without meaning and thus an outdated way of thinking.

Latest with the Treaty of Lisbon, it should have become apparent that Europe's future wealth and security will largely depend on whether it can move away from these old ways of thinking, whether nationalistic thinking becomes a thing of the past and Europe decides to act collaboratively instead. As conflicts flare up and new crises emerge in our neighbourhood, we need to exploit the opportunities offered by a unified Europe. When, if not now, is the right time to promote a more effective European foreign and security policy? A strong EU that speaks with one voice and acts jointly can also have the radiance it needs to strengthen the security order throughout the entire European continent.


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Harald Müller

# Security Policy Today

Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation have become familiar Instruments of foreign and security policy during the Cold War and afterwards. They are needed today. The world in the early 21st century is not simply strange, chaotic and confusing; to the contrary, it presents well known security problems. Solutions to these problems are worked on in the competent departments of the Foreign Office as well as of the Ministry of Defense, they are being inquired by the experts of independent institutes and non-governmental organizations. This simple fact proves that the allegedly missing security debate in Germany – about which I have been hearing with increasing amazement for the last thirty years, because I have felt all the while to be involved in exactly such a debate – has been permanently existing. The allegation that this debate is missing reflects the frustration of the self-styled guardians of national security about the refusal of the people in the street and the politicians in office to debate, think and do what these guardians would like to be thought and done. This deviance of reality from the desired, however, is typical for democratic communities – thank god! – in the light of the manifold internal and external challenges which democracies are confronted with. For that reason, we should deliberate our security problems without hectic and adapt our solutions to the challenges without crying wolf every day. This is what I wish to try in this essay.

## Arms Control, Non-proliferation, Disarmament: Elements of cooperative security policy.

Security policy among state consisted historically largely of confrontation, arms races, alliance building and preventive wars – that is, of the unilateral quest for security in a context of seemingly insuperable rivalry and hostility. Arms control tries a different pathway: It accepts that states live in conflict with potential adversaries. But it seeks the cooperation with these actors in order to minimize


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the risks of modern war which could escalate to the nuclear level given European and global constellations. Arms control works by containing, reducing or – at best – completely neutralizing these risks.[1]

Stability and confidence building are the magic words of arms control. Stability means that in a crisis situation no party feels pressured to strike first because all know that the adversary needs preparation time as well before being capable of striking. All parties involved can hope with good reason to defend against, or to survive an attack and to regroup afterwards for further successful defense. Stability means also that the strategies of the antagonists are fundamentally defensive and do not emanate threatening signals. Stability means, finally, that armament efforts are sufficiently transparent to exclude the possibility of bad surprises such as sudden technological breakthroughs.

For developed societies and their complex national economies, making war is counterproductive. It costs money, destroys much value and can result in total annihilation. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation are products of modern political reason (following the trajectory of the enlightenment) which wants to realize long-term national interests and, simultaneously, western liberal values such as the preservation of human life and integrity: Interests and morals go hand in hand. Self-styled "realpolitik" cynics ridicule promotors of arms control occasionally for being naïve idealists; this condescension is untenable and certainly no expression of political reason. Cynics have invented the *bonmot* that arms control is "impossible when needed" (that is, in times of hard political conflicts) and "useless when possible" (when states cultivate amiable relations anyway).[2] This sounds cool and realistic, but it is not true.

Modern arms control started with its humanitarian branch: the Swiss Henry Dunant, shaken after having observed the suffering on the battlefield of Solferino in the war of Italian unification, committed himself to the creation of norms for conducting war. These norms were designed to spare soldiers from unnecessary suffering and to isolate the civilian population as far as possible from the effects of the weaponry employed. It was no naïve idealist who stood at the cradle of modern arms control, but an empathic realist desiring to mitigate the horrors of war. He did not dream of abolishing war.

When arms control is able to play a role even while war was raging – Dunant's starting point – then it should be usable in *any* phase of a conflict short of fighting as well, as long as the conflict parties are capable of investing their political reason. Only if this condition falls away will arms control lose utility.

1 See Müller, H. and Schörnig, N. (2006). Rüstungsdynamik und Rüstungskontrolle. Eine exemplarische Einführung in die Internationalen Beziehungen. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

2 Gray, C. S. (1992). House of Cards. Why Arms Control Must Fail. Ithaca New York: Cornell University Press.


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Arms control is no panacea which will be effective always and everywhere in order to manage conflict. It would have been of no use towards Adolf Hitler, and it makes no sense in the conflict with the terrorist regime of the "Islamic State". The IS must be vanquished, its power destroyed, its followers eliminated or directed towards other goals compatible with human co-existence. Where the objectives are as unlimited as the readiness to use force, political reason cannot work and must be restored by the strong will of the community of states to defeat evil.

The situation is fundamentally different in the contemporary world of *states*. Here, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation have a chance to achieve their classical goals, notably stabilization of interstate relationships. In the following, I endeavor to demonstrate the validity of this proposition by discussing different conflict constellations.

## The West and Russia

Western-Russian relations are sort of back to 1968: An outrageous breach of international law has taken place: 1968 the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact under Soviet leadership, today the annexation of part of another country, Ukraine, in breach not only of general international law but of specific assurances given by Russia to Ukraine in 1994 (Budapest Protocol) when Ukraine handed back its inherited Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia and joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon state. Defiant Russian saber-rattling (including nuclear overtones) provoked demonstrative answers by NATO – exercises close to Russian borders, deployment of troops and long-range flights of US bomber aircraft to the Russian neighborhood. Dangerous misperceptions and misunderstandings are possible again. NATO and Russia both wish to preserve their geostrategic positions, both believe in their right to do so. But even so, neither wants a war with all escalation risks involved.

This situation cries out for stability measures in a typical mixed relationship combining conflict and cooperation. This is the classical constellation enabling arms control. No one can say that this is impossible with Putin because of Crimea. The same harsh propositions were uttered – I remember this well – in fall 1968 about Breshnew. At the same time, the negotiations for the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty were finished under American-Russian leadership. Only one year later, American and Soviet diplomats were busy negotiating the first round of strategic nuclear arms control, which would become three years later SALT I and the ABM Treaty. Simultaneously, the Brandt/Scheel government in Bonn initiated West Germany's "Ostpolitik" that opened the floodgates for the first wave of all-European détente. History teaches, therefore, that a change back to cooperation can happen very quickly.


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The West must use arms control to neutralize the Russian fear that the West could use its global military superiority – which is only missing in a few local spots such as the Baltic region – for military blackmail or for taking out Russia's retaliatory capability in a concerted first strike. Vice versa, the West must be insured against the possibility that Russia abuses local superiority – such as in the Baltic region – and/or forms of hybrid war, e.g. the employment of secret service or paramilitary actors, for destabilizing her neighbors. This is a complicated mission for arms control, because the asymmetries creating insecurity, namely global Western and local Russian strength are hard to neutralize by single measures. A completely new approach in conventional arms control and confidence-building is required. Such an approach must combine constraints on main weapons systems like in the CFE Treaty with constraints on troop deployment and movement in certain spaces (notably close to borders) and reenforced transparency. One could also think about liaison officers stationed in the headquarters of the other side disposing of real time connection to their own headquarters.

Nuclear arms control needs a revival on all levels as well.[3] It must include both sub-strategic and strategic nuclear weapons, maybe even in combination, as the proposal for global limits envisages, whereby the partners would determine on a national basis the mixture of warhead types and related delivery system, though in full transparency and with effective verification. A solid reduction of the permitted number of strategic warheads is highly relevant for the stability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and a signal to the smaller nuclear weapon states to accept binding limits to their arsenals as well. This step, however, would be conditional on the readiness of the USA to talk as well about constraints on the development of national missile defense and on long-range, highly accurate conventional weapons (e.g. conventionally armed intercontinental ballistic missiles or the hypersonic glider under development); Russia and China are concerned that their own second strike capability might be compromised and take their own countermeasures.

Russia tends to confront US superiority with immature threat gestures of the type "you cannot intimidate me!" while China seeks to cover the slow but steady growth of its strategic arsenal with the pretense of weakness and innocence. This attitude of Beijing rhymes badly with the robust defense of doubtful territorial claims in the South Chinese Sea.

3 Neuneck, Götz 2015: Nukleare Abrüstung – Game over?. WeltTrends, Nr. 102: pp. 30–35.


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## The West and China

The most dangerous arms race confronts the protector USA and the regional and global challenger China in East and Southeast Asia. This race has been developing in the direction of dangerous destabilization over the last few years. Both sides conclude from the standard scenario featuring a confrontation over the control of the Taiwan Strait the necessity for possessing options for far-reaching conventional first strikes. China pursues an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) posture. For this purpose, it accumulates mid-range ballistic missiles that could be used against approaching US aircraft carrier groups as well as against US air bases in Southern Japan and works eagerly for cyber- and anti-satellite warfare in order to neutralize the decisive IT-element of US superiority.

The US, in turn, prepares deep strikes into the Chinese mainland in order to preempt these planned Chinese options (Air/Sea Battle). While this concept has been de-emphasized in the last years of the Obama Administration in order not to overload US-Chinese relations, it remains a logical option which also fits American strategic culture.

The operational preparations of either side make sense only in the context of an offensive first strike. The nuclear escalation potential of this constellation is frightening. What would either side do in the expectation of defeat? It is also hard to believe that in a rapidly developing military exchange, headquarters would keep strict control over units – the problem that led almost to fatal escalation during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. This situation calls for urgent arms control efforts as well. It constitutes a breaking point in global great power relations that could trigger a worldwide catastrophe in a crisis.[4]

## Non-proliferation

Fortunately, the great powers are not only connected through conflicts and disputes, but they share also certain vital interests with each other. All want and need to contain IS terrorism and to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction – not only to further states but to non-state actors as well. In East Asia, they work together for containing the risks emanating from the incalculable Kim-regime in North Korea, armed with nuclear weapons. In the Middle East, the Vienna agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) succeeded in halting the militarily relevant parts of Iran's nuclear program. If both sides play by the rules and use the chances to build better

4 Friedberg, Aaron L. 2005: The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?, International Security 30 (2), pp. 7–45.


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relations, the hostility between the West, notably the US, and Iran could be built down, and both the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the region could muster significant security gains. The JCPoA is carefully designed and imposes on Iran far-reaching constraints and a very strict verification regime, comparable with that to which Iraq was subjected after the military defeat of 1991. At the same time, it provides Iran with the much desired expressions of respect and a symbolic eye-to-eye level. This result speaks for the reason prevailing on all sides and demonstrates that perseverance in multilateral negotiations remains the most promising option in this field; the alternatives would have been war or the unstoppable creeping closer to the nuclear bomb by Iran.[5]

In the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the success of the initiators of the "Humanitarian Initiative" to unite two thirds of the UN membership behind the project of a ban on nuclear weapons, and the refusal of the nuclear weapon states and their allies to even participate in these talks signifies the worrisome division of the NPT community. Credible and significant disarmament steps by the nuclear weapon states, as discussed above, are urgently needed to mend fences and give the NPT its credibility back in the eyes of the vast majority of its (non-nuclear armed) parties. This could trigger the readiness on their side – missing in recent years – to strengthen the non-proliferation toolbox as well: more effective verification measures, global standards for export controls and for nuclear security, joint actions in case of unjustified withdrawals from the NPT or of outright breaches of the Treaty.

## Disarmament

As the last paragraph showed, nuclear disarmament is a divisive subject. Traditional security experts believe in the indispensability of nuclear deterrence.[6] Promotors of nuclear disarmament point to the high risks and ultimate probability of proliferation and nuclear war as long as nuclear weapons exist. Both positions are statements of belief that cannot be proven, only be argued by using counterfactuals. I am myself a supporter of disarmament as the result of a risk calculus, but I think that a prudent, incremental process combined with a process of changing general security relations is the most promising path; the process which ended the cold war between 1986 and 1992 is the template.[7] Similar to the

5 Müller, Harald 2015: Khameneis rote Linien: Eine Bewertung des "Iran-Abkommens", Frankfurt/M, HSFK-Report 2/2015.

6 Rühle, Michael 2009: Good and Bad Nuclear Weapons, Hamburg, Körber Stiftung, Körber Policy Papers 3.

7 Müller, Harald 2000: Nuclear Disarmament: The Case for Incrementalism, in: John Baylis/


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impact which the expected risks of future climate change took on the 195 participants in the Paris Conference of 2015, persuading even reluctant actors to agree to the first serious agreement on climate policy, the risks of a future nuclear confrontation could lead to new thinking in the direction of nuclear disarmament. But even before such a change takes place, reasonable steps could be taken such as reducing existing nuclear arsenals, lowering the level of nuclear alert, renouncing first use of nuclear weapons or withdrawing sub-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe.

## The role of Germany

Germany is one of the few countries which have been conducting for more than a generation cooperative security policy continuously and consequently as essential part of foreign policy, even when the political constellation has been less conducive and when unilateralists were at the helm of the powerful ally USA, like during the first Reagan and the George W. Bush Administrations. Given what German weapons did during the first half of the 20th century, this behavior betrays successful learning from Germany's own history. A visible reward was Germany's participation in the Iran negotiations, eye to eye with the permanent members of the UN Security Council.

As a consequence of this continuity, Germany disposes of an excellent corps of expert diplomats who work in this tradition and defy the current political trend which is averse to arms control and disarmament. Strangely enough, this policy field is hardly mentioned when German "responsibility" is invoked in national debates on external policy. It has to be emphasized that a leading role for Germany in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation remains an essential part of this responsibility.

Robert O'Neill (Hrsg.), Alternative Nuclear Futures. The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World, Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 125–143.


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August Hanning

# The War on Terror

During my time as President of the German Federal Intelligence Service and as State Secretary in the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, the "war on terror" was one of our most important tasks. I often asked myself whether we were perhaps overestimating the significance of the phenomenon of terrorism. If we try to statistically measure and analyze the danger that terrorism poses in the lives of individual citizens, we quickly come to the conclusion that these threats are actually negligible compared to other civilization-related risks, for instance road traffic. However, if we instead look at the effects that terrorism has on society and politics in our Western countries, the results are quite different. I believe there is no other area of our social reality in which individual perpetrators or small groups can achieve such immense political and societal effects through violence, at a relatively low cost. Every responsible politician and the security authorities are thus well-advised, even forced, to pay close attention to the phenomenon of terrorism.

What exactly do we understand terrorism to mean? This has been the subject of bitter debate in the United Nations for years, without leading to a generally accepted conclusion. At a high level of abstraction, the definition seems relatively simple: terrorism is any use of violence or violent actions against an existing political order. It becomes more difficult when we try to distinguish between terrorism and legitimate resistance. This raises a hotly debated fundamental question: is resistance to a political order that is considered illegitimate justified under certain conditions or not? And even if a particular political order is considered illegitimate, can any means be used to change this political order, or does the international legal system need to ensure that the lives of innocent citizens are protected? This question of definition is only seemingly academic. It conceals the virulent problem currently found in Syria and in Yemen: should supporting the anti-government opposition be seen as "promoting terrorism," or "supporting legitimate resistance to dictatorial regimes"? In practice, these perspectives, which vary according to each party's interests, frequently complicate the necessary international collaboration in the war on terror.


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If we look at the situation in Germany from this perspective, there is still broad consensus that the country's constitutionally guaranteed political order is considered legitimate, and that any attempt to change this political order through violence or violent acts that threaten the lives of citizens must be described as terrorism.

In order to evaluate the threat level in Germany, the political and societal goals of the terrorist activity in question are extremely important. Here we can distinguish three major areas:

- left-wing terrorism coupled with social revolutionary objectives;
- right-wing terrorism coupled with ethnic and sometimes racist ideologies;
- and religiously motivated terrorism.

## Left-wing terrorism

Left-wing terrorism in Germany was a significant challenge for politicians and security agencies in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This terrorism has its origins in the student uprisings of 1968–69. Early on, extremist groups within the student movement began to promote the violent overthrow of what they described as the "post-fascist" political system in the Federal Republic of Germany.

At first, "violence against property" was promoted as a legitimate tool in the political battle. These extremist student movements produced the Baader-Meinhof Group, which referred to itself as the "Red Army Faction" and considered itself a spearhead against the "imperialist regime" of the Federal Republic of Germany. It saw violence against people as a legitimate means of political war. The goal of the RAF was to systematically eliminate political and business elites. The state's protective measures and countermeasures provoked by these attacks were to unmask it as a "dictatorial police state."

Ultimately, the RAF failed due to successful prosecution, for one thing. The security agencies were able to arrest nearly all of the group's leaders. In addition, there was a lack of societal support for their objectives. The RAF never achieved its goal of gaining the hoped-for support from intellectual elites and workers.

Since the end of the RAF era, no comparable activities have been observed on the left-extremist end of the spectrum. In extreme left-wing circles, targeted attacks on people are still considered taboo. However, certain groups in the so-called "autonomous movement" are worrying, since they do not shy away from using violence against dissenters or police officers during violent demonstrations. Unfortunately, the last few years have also seen increased attacks on public institutions, commercial enterprises and "luxury vehicles" in which the collateral danger to people is accepted. Still, as yet this potential for violence has


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not coalesced into targeted terrorist attacks against people. There is also no indication that we are currently dealing with professional structures of violence of the kind seen during the RAF era.

## Right-wing terrorism

Historically speaking, the phenomenon of right-wing terrorism was first observed in Germany after World War I. Tightly organized right-wing groups murdered Bavarian Minister President Kurt Eisner, Finance Minister Matthias Erzberger, and Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau. Only a few of the perpetrators were caught and convicted. Many members of these extreme groups later joined the National Socialist SA. During the Nazi era, the right-wing terrorism of the Weimar Republic became a fixed part of the state's practices.

After World War II, right-wing terrorist phenomena were not observed again until the end of the 1960s. Until then, they were likely prevented by the traumatic experiences of National Socialism. However, there were repeated examples of individual violent acts motivated by right-wing terrorism. The largest terrorist attack ever carried out on German soil, the "Oktoberfest Attack" in Munich in 1980 in which 13 people were killed and another 211 injured, is ascribed to the right-wing extremist scene.

The "Nazi underground" forms a special chapter in the book of violent right-wing terrorist acts. Between 2000 and 2007, a group led by Thuringian neo-Nazis Uwe Böhnhard and Uwe Mundlos murdered nine immigrants and a female police officer. It took a long time to trace these murders back to a right-wing terrorist source because the circumstances and apparently random choice of victims without any "terrorist message" made it difficult to ascribe a motive to them. Even now, their reasons for choosing the victims and the question of whether the perpetrators were supported by right-wing extremists or groups have not truly been clarified.

Recently, the right-wing extremist scene received a significant boost from the refugee crisis. In response to Germany's seemingly unlimited acceptance of refugees, the country's political discussion became strongly polarized. Attacks on refugee homes and asylum-seekers' accommodations increased sharply in 2014 and 2015. It is to be feared that this trend will continue to grow, and that we will be confronted by a new wave of right-wing terrorist violence.


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## Religiously motivated terrorism

The most serious terrorist attacks in the Western world were committed by Islamist extremists at the start of this millennium, in the name of religious jihad. In their actions, they invoked a specific interpretation of the Koran, which they believe calls them to engage nonbelievers in violent battle and to defend and spread Islam. Some important bearers of this Islamist ideology are the group al-Qaeda, originally established by Osama bin Laden, and more recently ISIS, a group operating in parts of Syria and Iraq. In the Western world, the largest terrorist attacks took place at the World Trade Center in 2001, in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005.

Until now, Germany has been spared from large-scale terrorist attacks in its own country. However, a total of 21 tourists, including 14 Germans, died in April 2002 during a terrorist attack on the Tunisian peninsula of Djerba that was attributed to al-Qaeda. Another major attack happened some month ago in Berlin, 12 people died, a lot more have been heavily injured. It should also be remembered that three of the World Trade Center attackers, including their leader Mohammed Atta, had previously lived in Germany. Until now, further attacks in Germany have been prevented by the work of the security authorities, with a few exceptions. It is also worth noting the attempted bombing of two local trains in July 2006 by Lebanese Islamists, which caused only minor damage due to the faulty bomb construction.

Based on estimates by German security authorities, the risk of further Islamist-motivated attacks in Germany is relatively high.

A special problem is posed by the "foreign fighters," in other words jihadists who formerly fought in Afghanistan and are now primarily fighting in Iraq and Syria alongside Islamist groups. A significant number come from Europe, including Germany. If they return, they will pose a significant danger. They have combat experience, and there is always the risk that they will continue their jihad in Europe and Germany. Even the attacks in Paris were largely planned and carried out by terrorists with combat experience in Syria.

During the last months the German security agencies observed more and more attempts by extremist islamistic groups to recruit supporters among the refugees in the refugee camps.

## Strategies for fighting terrorism

From Germany's perspective, terrorist acts and the formation of terrorist groups are criminal acts that must be fought using criminal-law methods. I believe it has been an appropriate strategy in Germany to combat terrorism not


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with military means, as a "war against terrorism," but instead using police resources.

However, this path requires appropriately prepared and equipped police agencies. In the past, impressive steps have been taken both with police equipment and with the legal instruments. Nonetheless, developing these capacities remains a constant task given the growing threat. Monitoring communications is especially important here. Larger-scale terrorist attacks require extensive preparation and a corresponding level of communication among the participants in the attack. If we are to uncover such terrorist attacks in a timely manner and/or investigate perpetrator groups after the attacks, effective communication monitoring is a key element in order for the police to work effectively and to conduct their investigations. In the opinion of the German police authorities dealing with Islamist crimes, there are still major deficits in this area, which I believe must be rectified as soon as possible.

Other important elements in fighting terrorism are efficient border controls as well as a close and efficient international exchange of information, both within Europe and to a lesser degree with all states threatened by terrorism.

Unfortunately a practice has emerged in Germany in which demonstrators at the extreme left end of the spectrum believe that the ends – the alleged or actual fighting of right-wing extremism – justify all means, including violence.

At the extreme right end of the spectrum, tendencies can be seen toward creating "foreigner-free zones," or playing up participants' roles as protectors of public order and security in place of the police. In the area of religiously motivated terrorism, efforts to establish isolated parallel societies with their own "God-given" rules are creating significant concerns.

A misguided tolerance for these developments is extremely dangerous when it comes to protecting domestic security. It is essential for society to strictly reject violent means to achieve political goals, regardless of their content, and to strictly uphold the state's monopoly on the use of force while also implementing consistent criminal prosecution.

At least as important as police measures are preliminary investigations by intelligence services. They have the necessary tools to identify extremist efforts early on, and are able to infiltrate the structures of extremist groups and to recognize their potential dangers. The significance of intelligence work, particularly in fighting terrorism, is unfortunately chronically underestimated in Germany. If we follow the public debates about German intelligence work, we get the impression that a large segment of the media sees intelligence more as a threat to civil freedom than an important institution to protect the citizens of this country. Here it is completely overlooked that intelligence work has been able to prevent a significant number of terrorist activities that would have had serious consequences for life and limb of our German citizens. Major figures in media


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and politics should consider that it does not make sense to demand top performances from security agencies and especially intelligence services on the one hand, and at the same time to discredit them through ongoing and often irrelevant public criticisms.

The German Parliament, too, must ask itself, given the current threats, whether it is really opportune to bind up significant resources for the already narrowly staffed German security agencies by continuously creating new investigating committees. I also do not believe that we have an urgent parliamentary or administrative control problem in the area of intelligence services, but rather an efficiency problem; and I wish the German Parliament would focus on this issue instead.

## Preventative "soft" strategies for fighting terrorism

Even now, and more so in the future, strategies for quickly recognizing and fighting extremist ideas in society will become more and more important in addition to the "hard control measures" to prevent terrorist activities. The causes of terrorism cannot be primarily counteracted by police authorities or intelligence services; this is a societal task that we must all take on. In order to successfully fight terrorism, it is essential to dry up the breeding ground for extremism and terrorism. In particular, Germany's historical experience with right-wing and left-wing terrorism shows that these phenomena always became dangerous when perpetrators believed they were acting on behalf of segments of the population. In other words, they believed they could rely on a broad base of sympathizers.

Particularly in light of the unfortunate political polarization in the refugee debate, I believe it is important to overcome our mutual speechlessness. Especially a democracy like ours depends on a healthy culture of debate and respect for others' opinions. The question of how many refugees from non-European countries should be allowed into Germany, and under what conditions, is fodder for an excellent debate. If public debate on this issue is stifled, it merely provides a breeding ground for extremists, who then become a mouthpiece for the alleged "silent majority" of the population.

In the area of Islamist terrorism, it is extremely important to support young Muslims growing up in Germany. They often experience conflict between a conservative family home and a society that seems to be subject to completely different values. Within this conflict, they long for identity-building values and orientation, which makes them vulnerable to the Islamist propaganda that is disseminated online and in certain mosques. The seemingly simple codes of


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conduct and promises of happiness commonly offer a clear orientation that they hope will resolve their internal conflict.

It is essential that young Muslims in Germany also be given a fair chance to participate and advance in our society. Germany's active Muslim organizations play an important role in this situation. They are decisively called upon to do their part to help integrate the Muslims who live here.

However, the mainstream Christian society must also participate. The dialogue with Muslim societies that was initiated under Federal Minister Schäuble, with the German Islam Conference, must be extensively continued. Regardless of how we interpret the hotly debated sentence "Islam is part of Germany," the mainstream Christian-influenced society in Germany must acknowledge that a growing number of Muslims has immigrated to Germany in recent decades and must be granted a legitimate place in society.

## Forecast

Terrorism in all of its forms will continue to pose an ongoing threat to our societies. In a world shaped by increasing globalization, we cannot cut ourselves off from the world's hot spots. The attacks in France, Belgium and Berlin, along with the refugee movements from Africa and Asia, have clearly shown us that we do not live on a secure island here in Europe.

For extremist groups of any stripe, there will still be a constant temptation in the future to achieve significant social change with relatively little effort. The events in Paris, Brussels and Berlin were – not incorrectly – interpreted as attacks on our open society. I personally have never been able to comprehend how greatly the September 11, 2001, attacks changed the face and the social climate of the United States. The same is true for the RAF's attacks on Germany in their day. Afterward, the climate in Germany and our previously casual approach to security risks were very different.

Thus it is important to keep making every effort to prevent further serious terrorist attacks in Germany. On the one hand, this is the responsibility of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies; but it is equally a task for politicians and society. Preventing further terrorist attacks is not just an urgent task in order to avoid harm to our citizens, but is just as important in order to prevent a serious change in our social climate. I have always been concerned that more larger-scale Islamist attacks with a lot of victims in Germany would permanently poison the climate between mainstream Christian society and the Muslim minority. Even larger attacks from the extreme left or right end of the spectrum would change the political climate in our country in the long term. So far – thank God – we have been spared from this. I hope we will manage to keep it that way.


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Oliver Gnad

# Is Germany Capable of Strategic Planning? Anticipatory Governance as the Foundation for Future-Proof Decisions

## Strategic foresight for an opaque future

### Huntington's world

The dissolution of the Sykes-Picot order in the Middle East and the annexation of the Crimea are a pointed reminder that geopolitics will remain as strong an influence in the 21st century as in the centuries before. A ring of instability is gradually forming around Europe that is not only threatening the stability and prosperity of the Old Continent but also challenging the European project.

Yet after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the West set out to cash in its "peace dividend" and invest it in promoting democracy. Successes, such as the expansion eastwards of NATO and the EU, seemed to be keeping pace with setbacks, for example in the Western Balkans, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. The overall course was not in question. On the contrary – a deaf ear was turned to Samuel Huntington's warning that the end of the leaden, bipolar world order would see a resurgence of conflicts delineated by cultural and religious identity.

A quarter-century on, Huntington's forebodings appear to be justified. And cynical observers might even claim that Francis Fukuyama's prediction of the "end of history" also seems to be coming true – but in a complete reversal of expectations. We are seeing the decline of a world order that was built between 1917/1919 and 1943/45 upon the principles of western values and institutions – an order that defined not only the contours of the political world map but also international law and by extension virtually all the rules governing international relations. In effect, this so-called post-war order was an affirmation of the 300-year-old Westphalian System – but this time with global aspirations and under western hegemony.

As yet, there are few signs of any new principles emerging for a future world order. That is why transitional phases like this are so highly charged – even more so, when they involve the rise and fall of great powers. Nevertheless, there are



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trends, factors and actors that we can reasonably assume will play a role in shaping any new order(s).[1]

It is therefore imperative that we do not wait too long to engage critically with the direction, form, structure and timeframe of such evolutionary processes and their complex and dynamic causal effects. The outcome of these processes will influence the quality of life and the prospects of hundreds of millions of Europeans for decades to come.

## Navigation aids for terra incognita

But are we really in a position to anticipate the broad sweep of the future if we did not even see the crises of our own times brewing – the Arab Spring, the formation of the "Islamic State", or the Ukraine crisis? If we find it difficult to judge whether we are dealing merely with a series of one-off events, or with the "long lines" referred to by Huntington – or perhaps with fundamental, system-changing developments?

And how good were our anticipatory skills when it came to identifying other epochal events? Did we see the global economic crisis coming, and in its aftermath the Euro crisis? Or the fracking revolution with its far-reaching implications for climate change, or the so-called "rare earths crisis" of 2010/2011, which laid bare the fragility of the German economy due to its dependence on raw materials? And last but by no means least, the Fukushima nuclear disaster? We neither anticipated these events and developments, nor were able to make adequate sense of their consequences.

At first sight, it appears naive to call for better predictive abilities – particularly in politics. After all, the prevailing characteristic of the future is its unpredictability. But herein lies a fundamental misunderstanding regarding forward-looking policy planning. The diplomatic service will not be including clairvoyance in its training schemes now or in the future, and policy impact assessments will not require the use of crystal balls. In fact, only a minority of phenomena are "black swans" – unexpected, unheralded or highly improbable events causing disruption.[2]

Forward-looking policy planning is not about predicting future developments but about improving analytical capabilities as the basis for strategic policy

1 While demographic change and climate change are long-term trends that elude short-term policy-making, the melting ice in the Arctic caused by climate change is an influencing factor that will change the rules of operation within the geopolitical architecture. And it is a well-worn platitude that international developments are no longer influenced by state actors alone.

2 See Taleb, N. N. (2007). The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. New York: Random House.


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planning. Leon S. Fuerth, national security adviser to Vice President Al Gore from 1993 to 2000, coined the term "anticipatory governance" for this.[3]

Anticipatory governance draws upon a host of proven foresight methods and scenario planning instruments. They provide aids to navigation in the terra incognita of the unpredictable. They can be used when quantitative methods and the extrapolation of past experiences are not sufficient to allow robust, forward-looking decision-making. Qualitative, structured analysis techniques deliver robust results, whether in crisis early warning systems or when looking for hitherto unexplored development paths and overlooked policy options.[4]

For the future is opaque – full of opportunities and risks. We should regard it as a repository of potential policy options. With limited resources at our disposal, the challenge for strategic planning is to survey this reservoir of potential futures so as to best utilise the opportunities arising, prepare adequately for risks, and build resilience where possible. However, neither governments nor international companies have so far been ready to take this challenge on.

## "It's the bureaucracy, stupid!"

### Thinking strategically: an everyday necessity[5]

To what extent, then, is Germany able to exercise strategic foresight and anticipatory governance? This is a country in which security, social peace and prosperity are particularly dependent on external events and developments – one that is profiting more than most from globalisation, and is therefore also more vulnerable.

If we are prepared to go along with the provocative view put forward by Joachim Raschke and Ralf Tils some years ago, then the treatment of strategic issues in policymaking can in the best case be described as "tinkering". Everyone works on their own little patch, without an instruction manual and without

3 Fuerth, L. S. with Faber, E. M. H. (2012). Anticipatory Governance – Practical Upgrades. Equipping the Executive Branch to Cope with Increasing Speed and Complexity of Major Challenges. Washington DC: Project on Forward Engagement/Elliott School of International Affairs – The George Washington University, p. 3.

4 For a comprehensive overview see Heuer, R.J. and Pherson, R.H. (2015). Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis. 2nd ed. Los Angeles: CQ Press. See also Beebee, S.M. and Pherson, R.H. (2015). Structured Analytic Techniques in Action. Los Angeles/London: SAGE; Tetlock, P.E. and Gardner, D. (2015). Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction. London: Cornerstone.

5 See Raschke, J. and Tils, R. (2008). Politische Strategie. *Forschungsjournal NSB* 21 (1), pp. 11–24.


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consulting anyone else.[6] If that is really how things are, then what has caused this shortfall in strategic thinking? It is a state of affairs that forces policy-makers into reactive crisis management, erodes public compliance and thus undermines legitimacy. To put the question differently: If policy-makers were to increase their strategic capacities, to what extent would this open up new scope for initiative and action?

First, we need to clarify our definitions. The concept of strategy is amorphous and is used with at least as much profligacy as the concept of sustainability. Traditionally, a distinction is made between operational tactics and strategy – the latter addressing fundamental, long-term issues. Less formally, we could say that "Do the right things!" is a strategic challenge, while "Do things right!" is tactical. If we broaden our definition to cover both aspects (this is intended as a plea!), almost all political actions can be accorded strategic significance. Strategic thinking then becomes a basic requirement of any political administration. And this is necessary, because the role and function of the political apparatus has changed fundamentally in the past two-and-a-half decades – away from an emphasis on sovereign duties towards the management of networking structures (governance as opposed to government). The challenge is to see things both ways; the German diplomat Thomas Bagger has coined the term "network politics" for this.[7]

## New obscurity

We live in a world of increasing volatility, uncertainty, dynamism, complexity and ambiguity. In this "VUDCA" world, states must contend with the demands of around 100,000 multinational enterprises, more than 50,000 globally active non-governmental organisations, countless cash-rich foundations and private investors, as well as mercenary armies, organised criminals, and terrorists – the latter with a destructive potential hitherto vested solely in states.

An example from the underworld of organised crime: In 2014, states invested around USD 1.2 trillion globally in defence – chiefly in building up and maintaining their military arsenals. The income of organised crime networks in the

6 See ibid., p. 11.

7 See Bagger, T. (2013). Netzwerkpolitik. *Internationale Politik (IP),* January/February 2013, pp. 44–50; Bagger, T. and von Heynitz, W. (2012). Der vernetzte Diplomat. *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, October 2012, Supplement 1, pp. 49–61. See also Straßheim H. (2011). Netzwerkpolitik. Governance und Wissen im administrativen Austausch. Baden-Baden: Nomos.


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same period was almost twice this amount.[8] Whereas military hardware is only effective across an extremely narrow spectrum, financial assets can be channelled flexibly into every conceivable public or private sphere.

The rapid pace of globalisation is reinforcing this "new obscurity"[9]. Statistics on the movement of goods and people underline this: In 2014, the daily number of flights worldwide was around 200,000; each day, around 9 million people and more than 115,000 tonnes of goods were transported to their destinations. That adds up to around 3 billion people and over 42 million tonnes of goods per year. In contrast, container shipping fleets transport more than 9.5 billion tonnes of goods and raw materials across the world's oceans annually – all but unnoticed. That is 226 times the amount of air freight. And the trend is emphatically upwards.

However, in its knock-on impacts, globalisation itself is outdone by one of its own side-effects: the paradox of increasing interdependency on the one hand and growing global fragmentation on the other. While mutual economic dependency is increasing – due to globally interlinked value chains, for example – the dissolution of historical interdependencies is leading to a decline in influence and control based on centralised structures.[10]

This phenomenon is taking hold at a time of fundamental change in international power structures. The "unilateral moment" of American dominance following the end of the Cold War has given way to a phase of multipolarity – likely to be long-lasting, lacking an obvious hegemon and therefore characterised by clashes of interests, shifting alliances and latent conflict.

## "Everybody is ignorant – only on different subjects"

All this reveals the limited scope and influence of a policy-making structure that aligned itself with the processes and demands of the emerging national economies (and military/industrial complexes) at the end of the 19th century. Its operating principles have remained essentially unchanged to the present day:

8 See Glenn, J.C. and Florescu, E. (The Millennium Project) (2016). 2015–16 State of the Future. Washington D.C.: The Millennium Project, p. 145; 176.

9 The term "new obscurity" ("*die neue Unübersichtlichkeit*", sometimes also translated as "new complexity") was coined by Jürgen Habermas and has become a fixed term of reference for Germany's then Federal Foreign Minister, Dr Frank-Walter Steinmeier. See Habermas, J. (1985). Die Neue Unübersichtlichkeit. Die Krise des Wohlfahrtsstaates und die Erschöpfung utopischer Energien. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken*, (29), pp. 1–14.

10 Still of seminal importance today: Friedman, T.L. (1945). The World is Flat: The Globalized World in the Twenty-first Century. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. A highly recommended monograph on globalisation: Iriye, A. and Osterhammel, J. (2013). Geschichte der Welt. 1945 bis Heute: Die globalisierte Welt. Munich: C.H. Beck.


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compartmentalised to a high degree according to jurisdiction, strictly hierarchical and thus vertically structured, mechanical in its procedures and sluggish in generating coherence.[11]

A political apparatus which organises its forward planning chiefly along the lines of departments and responsibilities is inclined to ignore weak signals of change that do not comply with its organisational logic. To describe this as a structural inability to perceive and adequately evaluate emerging trends would be an exaggeration. However, without substantive cross-departmental and social interlinkages, political administrations tend to find change management problematical. As a result, they struggle to reach any deeper understanding of the dynamic, complex interactions between impacts and actors. Political administrations organised by department therefore incline towards a world view that is often over-simplified, always fragmented, and sometimes deterministic and linear. And because urgency frequently takes precedence over importance, short-term pressure to act dominates routine administration. There is often simply too little time for longer-term thinking or strategic planning. For all these reasons, the response of political administrations to uncertainty and change is, almost without exception, reactive not proactive. The American columnist Will Rogers summed up this phenomenon as long ago as the 1930s with the ironic observation that "everybody is ignorant – only on different subjects".

But in the "VUDCA" world, ignorance and indifference can have far-reaching long-term consequences. The sustained disregard of global warming is a good example. The challenges of this new world leave us in increasing need of orientation in what is unfamiliar terrain. Climate change, causes of conflict, the fluctuating global economy, epidemics such as Ebola, cyber security – these are so-called "wicked problems" that pose a growing threat to the stability of the social and political order; they are highly complex and defy linear solutions. Chameleon-like, they change their appearance depending on the context and the angle they are seen from. Addressing them demands lateral, not linear, thinking. Complex systems require navigators, not reductionists, with an instinct for emergence and not, for example, logical rigour. Government on auto-pilot will no longer do.

What we need is the ability to perpetually question and modify past strategic decisions, as well as one other crucial quality: patience in strategy-making. If decisions are to be fully effective, ongoing management of the constantly changing systems is needed, from within and without. Monitoring and fine-tuning are thus indispensable for successful strategy implementation. As Winston S. Churchill put it: "However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results."

11 See Fuerth, L.S., Anticipatory Governance, p. 3.


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This demands a fundamental review of the roles that government and the political administration are expected to play. "The state" is no longer an omnipresent, omniscient, infallible Leviathan. To reinstate the state in the "VUDCA" world as an effective instrument for forming opinion and consensus in society as a whole, societies and their institutions need to see themselves as learning, co-creative systems. This is a prerequisite if they are to develop strategic ability and proactively plan a future according to their own designs. Conversely, inertia, fear of change and lack of courage result in risks being identified too late and opportunities squandered.

## Germany's unspoken consensus to forgo strategy

### German power and German inaction

The key question is therefore: Is Germany capable of strategic planning? The sobering answer is that its capacities appear to be limited. On the contrary, there seems to be an unspoken social consensus to get by without any strategy at all. To operate strategically, it is necessary to cultivate not only an aspirational vision that has broad social acceptance (e. g. seeing Germany as a country of immigration, or the European Union as an "ever closer union") but also, most importantly, an idea of how visions of the future will play out in practical, every-day situations. In short: Societies will only let go of present achievements and embrace the future if they are offered compelling, plausible imagery.

The Euro crisis demonstrated how societies, if caught unprepared, react when their normative visions of the future collapse unexpectedly. The ensuing mix of muddling through, whistling in the dark, and pronouncements that "there is no alternative" prompted the admonition from abroad that German power is now less a cause for fear than German inactivity. The remarkable thing about this particular phrase is not so much its content as its author: Radosław Sikorski, Poland's Foreign Minister at the height of the Euro crisis in 2011. According to Sikorski, structural reform in Europe could only be led by Germany, the "indispensable nation" (!) – criticism of Berlin's crisis management notwithstanding, and despite concerns about German dominance in Europe.

Although it went almost unnoticed, he called into question the decades-old general consensus that determined the role of pre-unification Germany: that Germany would only lead – if it led at all – from behind. That it would favour consensus, never race ahead, and always be a good advocate of the collective interests of its allies.

The reasons for Germany's disavowal of strategy are obvious: The original foundation of the German nation state was a geostrategic provocation in itself. It


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led to the First World War, which ended with a flawed peace that already bore the germ of a second global conflagration. The Second World War was conducted in the name of a German people that approved the physical annihilation of dissenters in order to secure what it felt was its rightful position in Europe and the world.

## "Auschwitz: Never again!" – a substitute for strategy?

Since then, we Germans have based our role in the world on two principles, justified in equal measure on moral and historical grounds: "No more war!" and "Auschwitz: Never again!" Every generation since the war has drawn the same instinctive conclusion: Because "Germany is too big for Europe, but too small for the world" (Henry Kissinger), we have outsourced all strategy processes to supranational institutions.

This worked well as long as collective interests coincided with individual interests and roles were clearly allocated. Strategies were formed, and security guaranteed, in Washington, while in Europe political stability was secured through economic integration – and security was made use of. Notable French and German ventures questioning or even reversing this division of labour included Charles de Gaulle's "empty chair" policy in NATO and the establishment of France as a nuclear power, as well as Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik" and Helmut Schmidt's insistence on the NATO double-track decision.

We have long been aware that this simple formula is no longer effective – that 20th century responses have lost relevance in our world. Yet still we look on from the wings, helplessly watching the disintegration of order, stability and security – foundations we cannot do without if we wish to uphold our way of life and our social and political order in the long term. Like Alice in Wonderland, we stumble from one crisis to the next, with just one goal in our sights: defending the status quo as far as we possibly can. But in the words of Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, "If we want things to stay as they are, everything will have to change."

Our efforts to come to terms with our recent past may have been exemplary, but one thing is missing: the long overdue debate on Germany's vital interests – and on the resources, skills and collective determination we must summon to assert them. Clarification of this will also require German society to conduct a broad-based discussion of when and why Germany would be prepared to go to war. Since the armed conflicts in the Western Balkans, Iraq and Libya, if not before, we have known for certain that "even the wars you don't wage can change you".[12]

12 Ulrich B. (2011). Wofür Deutschland Krieg führen darf. Und muss. Eine Streitschrift. Reinbek


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### The Maidan in Kiev as a turning point

Let us turn back the clock to late January 2014. Germany's Federal President, Joachim Gauck, has just opened the 50th Munich Security Conference. His speech on Germany's role and responsibilities in the world attracted considerable attention. Gauck observed that Germany is changing perceptibly from "a beneficiary to a guarantor of international security and order". In the face of limited American capacity to deliver, he said, Germany is in any case increasingly responsible for its own security and that of its partners. These striking words deflected attention from the more gentle aspects of Gauck's speech. Indeed, the ensuing media storm drowned out one of the key passages completely: "We would be deceiving ourselves," said Gauck, "if we were to believe that Germany was an island and thus protected from the vicissitudes of our age." Few other countries have such close links with the rest of the world as Germany does, he added, making it particularly vulnerable to any "disruptions to the system". For this reason, "the consequences of inaction can be just as serious, if not worse than the consequences of taking action".

The relevance of this statement became clear a short time later. Three weeks after Gauck's speech in Munich, the barricades on the Maidan in Kiev were in flames, and four weeks after that Russia annexed the Crimea. And in June 2015, the Levant became the front line between the Orient and the Occident when the "Islamic State" declared its caliphate.

Yet despite all these developments, the impression remains that Germany is still bound by its self-imposed disavowal of strategy, for fear that anything else would relativise an essential part of its raison d'état – the credo "No more war!".

## Group mentality and other cognitive pitfalls

### When the solution becomes the problem

But it is not just bureaucratic hurdles and collective attitudes that we need to overcome on the road to better strategic planning abilities. Much weightier – because we are unaware of it – is the fact that our cognitive structures present a massive obstacle to forward-looking strategic thinking.

Graham T. Allison's ground-breaking analysis of the decision-making process during the 1962 Cuban crisis gave us a better understanding of such phenomena as undifferentiated "groupthink" – the truncation of decision-making processes due to pressure to conform, or the unspoken assumption that future develop-

bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, p. 13.


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ments are ultimately little more than a linear continuation of the past and are evidenced by incremental, not disruptive change.[13]

We owe a particular debt to the work of two behavioural economists, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who have made us (more) conscious of many these of unconscious cognitive biases. But we are still a very long way from incorporating this knowledge into political and strategical decision-making processes. Decision-making on future policies is frequently dominated by opinions, collective mindsets, shared experiences of socialisation and semi-official truths – instead of broad-based, structured analytical methods.[14]

The Ukraine crisis: historical analogies and political fallacies

To illustrate how knee-jerk cognitive reactions still influence global politics today, let us take two random examples: interpretations of the Ukraine conflict and perceptions of the "Arab Spring".

First, a look at how the analogy of the Cold War is being applied to the Ukraine conflict. Admittedly, it does indeed appear that one of the objectives of Russia's current "neighbourhood policy" is the creation of a *cordon sanitaire* around Russian territory in the form of buffer zones and spheres of influence similar to those typical of the Cold War. However, the present dispute between "the West" and Russia does not match the historical blueprint as it lacks not only an overarching ideological, teleological framework but also the direct mutual threat of military action between the main protagonists. The requisite political alliances are also missing. For one of the key provisos for the functioning of the Cold War was a bipolar world order and the ability this gave the superpowers to project their interests and power globally, through proxies if necessary. Our multipolar, inter-dependent world fulfils none of these conditions. Historians therefore favour another historical analogy: the so-called "long" 19th century. From American independence and the French Revolution in 1776 and 1789 to the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, this era saw sweeping international realignment. It was marked not only by the rise and fall of great powers but also by extremely rapid social and economic change – and therefore also by a high potential for international and social conflict.

But amidst all these efforts to seek guidance based on historical interpretation, no-one is asking the crucial question: What for? What is the point or the purpose of such comparisons? In reality, the marginal benefit is practically non-existent. In contrast, an approach based on strategic foresight and anticipatory governance is free of all overloaded empirical assumptions and in the best case makes

13 See Allison, G.T. and Zelikow, P. (1999). The Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 2nd ed. New York: Longman, pp. 13–75; 143–196; 379–407.

14 See Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1947). Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. *Science* 185 (4157), pp. 1124–1131; Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.


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use of weak, haphazard signals, first indications and initial, tentative interpretations. Daniel Kahneman suggests that "hindsight bias" – the tendency to see everything retrospectively as logical and inevitable – is actually one of the greatest threats to forward-looking policy formulation. Attempting to derive patterns or even axioms for future action from historical case studies ultimately produces a truncated world view marked in the worst case by ideology – a world view that is intolerant, indifferent and insensible to developments that do not conform to its own prejudices. No-one has summed up these cognitive pitfalls more trenchantly than the Austrian philosopher Paul Watzlawick: "If your only tool is a hammer every problem looks like a nail."

A world view directed towards the future would possibly come to quite different conclusions about Putin's intentions and potential next steps. This kind of strategic foresight would probably focus instead on new areas of conflict and little-exposed aspects such as:

1. the Arctic, which will soon be free of ice in the summer due to global warming and as a result become a region of global geostrategic significance,
2. Iran, which will play a key role in any kind of political order in the Greater Middle East,
3. the People's Republic of China, without which Moscow will scarcely be able to carry out its plans to create a Eurasian Economic Union in Central Asia,
4. the danger of a "cold" cyber-war that paralyses western infrastructure (such as electricity and internet grids) with minimal effort, causing immense economic harm.

All these – and many other – plausibilities barely register in the sights of strategic planners if they cling to old patterns that cloud their view and their perception.

## Arab Spring: turning a blind eye

A further example of the power of cognitive pitfalls is the "Arab Spring". How could regimes topple within just a few weeks right across the Mashreq without intelligence agencies, think-tanks or exile groups being prepared for it? Why were no precautions taken? Wasn't a change of regime the all-consuming goal of American policy in the Near and Middle East? A plausible answer is that the collective mindset simply excluded this possibility.

Since the end of the Second World War, the dominant leitmotif of western policy in the Middle East has been stability. In fact, there is no region in the world where geopolitics and the vital interests of the West have dovetailed so closely: access to the abundant oil fields of the Arab world and the Persian Gulf, the freedom of the seas and straits and Israel's integrity and security. Besides Israel,


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other reliable agents of this US-dominated geopolitical approach included Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The fact that the Arab states exhibited massive deficits in democracy was tacitly accepted in view of the clear prioritisation of security over the desire for democratisation. The inevitable consequence was that the West became all but blind, deaf and dumb towards any social transformation processes beneath the lethargic top layer of the elites.

Nothing changed until 17 December 2010, the day on which Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian, set fire to himself – news of which spread through the country like wildfire and led to open revolt against the regime of Zine el-Abine Ben Ali. The West reacted with astonishing passivity to these developments. This was partly because American policy in the Middle East was undergoing realignment under Barack Obama, but also because the vehemence of this movement led by young activists caused complete disorientation; within just a few weeks, it changed the political balance in North Africa fundamentally. And last but not least, the western world was preoccupied with its own far-reaching economic crisis.

Yet the signs of increasing destabilisation, in Egypt in particular, could hardly be overlooked. A key factor here was a massive deterioration in the availability of basic food supplies in 2007 and 2008. The reason for this was a sudden shortage of grain and milk products on the world markets, which led to social and political unrest in more than 60 countries. In Cairo, too, there were hunger demonstrations and, even at that early stage, calls for the Mubarak government to resign: "Get lost Mubarak! We're risking our lives queuing for bread," proclaimed a handbill on 6 April 2008. The regime had thousands of people arrested for illegal trading in flour and foodstuffs as well as looting.

This scenario repeated itself just two years later, largely unnoticed by the international public. As the world's largest importer of wheat, Egypt is extremely vulnerable to external influences; the country imports a third of its wheat from Russia. When southern Russia suffered a severe drought in the summer of 2010, prices on the world markets for a tonne of wheat rose from USD 157 in June to USD 246 in August. By February 2011, the price had risen to USD 350 – an increase of 80 per cent within one year alone. Even with the disastrous year of 2008 as a baseline, food prices rose a further 70 per cent on average. Egyptians now had to spend up to 40 per cent of their monthly income on food. In January 2011, escalating food prices and out-of-control youth unemployment in combination with the sustained crisis of legitimation affecting the country's political system since 2005 finally led to open rebellion in Cairo, further encouraged by the Tunisian "Jasmine Revolution". It took just three weeks to sweep away Hosni Mubarak's stable regime of three decades.[15] And it is not improbable that this

15 See Litovsky, A. (Earth Security Group) (2014). The Earth Security Index 2014. A dashboard


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scenario could recur in the near future as a result of the water shortages and increasing salinisation of the Nile Delta caused by climate change. More than 80 per cent of Egyptians live in the delta.[16]

A direct correlation can therefore be drawn between the availability of natural resources, the stability of political systems and regional security – a nexus that has attracted scant attention to date in security policy scenarios. For good reason: The staff of defence ministries is made up mainly of military personnel, with a few scientists and at most a handful of climate experts. Ethnologists, cultural scientists or experts with in-depth regional knowledge or personal experience of migration are conspicuously absent.

Yet without this heterogeneous expertise, we lack the antennae to detect the innumerable influences that can affect the stability and security of today's highly networked societies with all their mutual dependencies.

## Five proposals for improving anticipatory governance

If we intend to get to grips with the "wicked problems" of the "VUDCA" world, a good starting point would be to fine-tune how governmental departments collaborate (the whole-of-government approach), draw clearer distinctions between short, medium and long term planning horizons, and create new patterns for interaction between governmental and non-governmental actors. But more is needed.

What is required is a rethinking of the structure and quality of strategy formulation and implementation. Based on Leon Fuerth's experience as national security advisor to Vice President Al Gore, a combination of the following measures could significantly improve anticipatory governance and early warning of crises:

1. inter-departmental integration of strategic forward engagement methods in the policy planning process (e. g. in preparing and processing white papers),
2. introduction of horizontal budget lines, i. e. budgets geared to inter-departmental, long-term future objectives rather than to departmental concerns (which would in turn require permanent coordination and harmonisation of departmental policies),
3. an intra-governmental network for orchestrating and implementing holistic governance approaches (e. g. by reforming the German Federal Security Committee),

for the transition to a resource secure future. pp. 14–15, [online]. Available at: www.earth-security.org [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

16 Ibid. pp. 32–37.


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4. systematic, comprehensive impact assessment of policy based on a range of time horizons and policy alternatives (ex ante, ad interim, ex post; municipal, national, international),
5. a monitoring and feedback system that continuously questions requirements, expectations and political performance (similar to the German Government's climate and sustainability strategies), creating a self-learning system.[17]

In this way, anticipatory governance can not only improve political performance but also consolidate the legitimacy of elected leadership structures and public institutions. For if these can no longer shield their citizens from crises, manage change or utilise future potential, the floodgates are thrown open to populism, extremism and fear-driven debate.

Conversely, without a credible future narrative, politics remains mired in the administration of present concerns and past achievements. Pressure for change is then equated with destabilisation of what is perceived to be a secure status quo. Instead, policymakers must aim to explore every conceivable future scenario, notwithstanding the complexity or obscurity of the current situation. In our increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex and contradictory world, it would be wise to build up a stock of effective options for shaping a secure future where life is worth living – in other words, to build resilience. After all, the future is opaque – and it's plural.[18]

17 See Fuerth, Anticipatory Governance, p. 4.

18 "The future is plural", see Schwartz, P. (1991): The Art of the Long View. Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World. New York: Crown Business.


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Stefan Heumann[1]

# Security in Cyberspace: the Limits of Nation-State centric Approaches to Security in Global Networks

Data processing and the underlying IT systems have been widely adopted in our societies. Today, central economic, social, and political institutions could not function without them. Cyberspace has become a commonly used term to describe the totality of our interconnected IT systems.[2] Security experts have been pointing out the growing significance of cyberspace to national security for many years now. The debate about a possible cyber war gained broad public attention with the attacks on Estonian government agencies, banks, media and corporations in April 2007.[3] The attackers used "denial of service" (DoS) attacks to overwhelm the web servers of important Estonian government agencies and economic organizations, making them inaccessible for internet users. The alleged claim that Russia was behind or at least supportive of these attacks sparked a broader debate about whether and how cyberspace could become a focal point for military conflicts in the future.[4] This discussion mainly focuses on the question of when state activities in cyberspace can be considered an act of war. In the Tallinn Manual, a manual on cyber warfare, NATO attempts to answer this question and defines rules for how NATO member states should respond to cyber-attacks.[5]

The spread of digital technologies and their connectedness create numerous

1 The author would like to thank Jan-Peter Kleinhans, Dr. Thorsten Wetzling and Dr. Ben Scott for their comments and constructive criticism.

2 German Federal Ministry of the Interior. 2011. "Cybersicherheitsstrategie für Deutschland", p. 14.

3 Schmidt, M. (2007). Cyberkrieg gegen Estland macht Westen ratlos. *Der Tagesspiegel* [online]. Available at: http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/cyberkrieg-gegen-estland-macht-westen-ratlos/859486.html [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].

4 Davis, J. (2007). "Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe". *Wired* [online]. Available at: http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-09/ff_estonia?currentPage=all [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].

5 Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (n.d). *NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence* [online]. Available at: https://ccdcoe.org/tallinn-manual.html [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].


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new targets for state actors to attack in cyberspace. When IT systems of energy providers, financial service providers and logistics companies get connected to the internet, they also become potential targets for cyber-attacks. Thus the fast growth of our IT networks dramatically increases the number of potential attack points in cyberspace.

It is not just difficult to determine the threshold when cyber-attack is supposed to be considered a military attack. Intelligence agencies also use hacking methods to access information. But those hacking methods could also serve as a first step to manipulate or sabotage IT-systems. In addition, the boundaries between civil and military spheres are blurry when it comes to cyber security. Many attacks on IT systems come from non-state actors whose motivations vary widely. Criminals, for example, infiltrate IT systems to gain access to sensitive user data such as credit card information, which is then used to commit fraud. In contrast, politically motivated hackers see an attack on the IT infrastructure as a form of protest.[6] Hackers and criminals use the same methods as states when they are attacking IT systems. Thus it is often difficult to distinguish between state and non-state actors in cyberspace, especially if non-state actors are acting without direct support but with implicit permission from state actors.[7] The complexity of the issue and the lack of international consensus leave us without any clear norms where the legitimate boundaries of possible cyber-attacks begin and end.

## From the Snowden revelations to technological sovereignty

Cyber security has been discussed in the fields of science, business and politics in Germany for many years. Before the Snowden revelations, however, this mainly involved exchanges among specialized experts. The large-scale monitoring of digital communications between Germany and other countries, and the access of US security authorities to data stored in the US, generated a great deal of attention and outrage. The documents from the National Security Agency (NSA) revealed by Edward Snowden also suggest that the NSA and its closest partners in other countries, known as the "Five Eyes," are aiming to gain "informational supremacy" in cyberspace.[8] The strategy of "informational supremacy" does not

6 Addley, E. and Halliday, J. (2010). Operation Payback cripples MasterCard site in revenge for WikiLeaks ban. *The Guardian* [online]. http://www.theguardian.com/media/2010/dec/08/operation-payback-mastercard-website-wikileaks [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].

7 Schneier, B. (2014). More Data on Attributing the Sony Attack [online]. Available at: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/12/more_data_on_at.html [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].

8 Rosenbach, M. and Stark, H. (2014). Der NSA Komplex. Edward Snowden und der Weg in die totale Überwachung. München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.


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just include the development of capabilities to infiltrate foreign IT and telecommunications systems. These capabilities were also employed in order to spy on German governmental institutions.[9] Other states, too, such as Russia and China, have pursued geostrategic and military objectives in cyberspace for several years now.[10]

German politicians were unprepared for the Snowden revelations and its implications for protecting German interests in cyberspace. Specialists in the ministries have been thinking about the new security challenges of digitization for many years now, but little attention was paid to this issue at the cabinet level.[11] With the Snowden revelations, the German government came under pressure to explain how Germany and its governmental institutions could be better protected against spying by foreign secret services. Data security – regardless whether the data is from public agencies, businesses or regular citizens – became a central challenge for politicians almost overnight.

It is not surprising that politicians, given the significant public pressure to act, drew on traditional security categories and concepts in their search for quick answers and solutions. For instance, in July 2013, Chancellor Merkel declared that German law applied on German soil, and added that close allies like the United States and Great Britain were naturally expected to observe this rule.[12] This statement by the Chancellor reflected the idea that the concept of territorial (German soil) sovereignty (German laws) also applied to cyberspace. In the fall of 2013, under the headline of technological sovereignty, the German government formulated its policy to respond to the challenges associated with digital surveillance programs by foreign governments.[13]

What does technological sovereignty mean? This concept was largely un-

9 Neue WikiLeaks-Dokumente: NSA spioniert Kanzleramt seit Jahrzehnten aus (2015). *Der Spiegel* [online]. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/wikileaks-nsa-spioniert-kanzleramt-seit-jahrzehnten-aus-a-1042737.html [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].

10 Heickerö, R. (2010). Emerging Cyber Threats and Russian Views on Information Warfare and Information Operations. Stockholm: FOI Swedish Defense Research Agency.

11 One major exception is the resolution on a cyber security strategy for Germany by the federal cabinet in February 2011. The leading party for the implementation is the Federal Ministry of the Interior. (http://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/Themen/IT-Netzpolitik/IT-Cybersicherheit/Cybersicherheitsstrategie/cybersicherheitsstrategie_node.html). Apart from this resolution, little attention was paid to the issue of cyberattacks on the cabinet level before the Snowden revelations.

12 Vitzthum, S. T. (2013). Auf deutschem Boden gilt deutsches Recht. *Die Welt* [online]. Available at: http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article118207603/Auf-deutschem-Boden-gilt-deutsches-Recht.html [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].

13 The term technological sovereignty can be found in the chapter "Digital Security and Data Protection" in the coalition agreement (agreement between CDU, CSU and SPD after the federal election on September 22nd, 2013): CDU, CSU and SPD (2013). Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten: Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD. pp. 147–148.


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defined from the beginning of the debate, and various actors attempted to appropriate the term for their own purposes. Even though clear definitions of the term are lacking to this day, the use of the term sovereignty makes it unmistakably clear that the concept was intended in terms of categories of the nation-state. Sovereignty refers to the state's power to act. However, this power to act is territorially limited. The state's monopoly on the use of force within its territory is at the heart of sovereignty. Sovereignty is manifested by the fact that the state does not only assert its jurisdiction inwardly, but also seeks to have its control within its territorial borders recognized by any outsider. In other words, sovereignty also entails the state's ability to not only prohibit, but also to effectively prevent other states from interfering in any unauthorized way within its territory.[14] For prominent state theorists, the sovereign's monopoly on the use of force is associated with a duty to provide protection. Thus Thomas Hobbes derives the legitimacy of the modern state from its ability to protect the population.[15]

From this perspective, surveillance of communications of German citizens and government agencies are direct attacks on German sovereignty. Such activities call into question the German state's ability to adequately protect its governmental institutions and citizens from foreign interception of their communications and data.[16] With the concept of technological sovereignty, German politicians transferred their understanding of territorially defined statehood to cyberspace and sought to formulate their response to the challenges of foreign surveillance accordingly.

## Technological sovereignty as a national security agenda

The most prominent policy proposals under the banner of regaining technological sovereignty highlight how old, familiar security concepts are now being applied to cyberspace. The basic premise is that the principle of territoriality should also govern our thinking about cyberspace. According to this logic, every component of cyberspace in which German citizens, companies and state agencies are active must be brought under state control in order to defend them against possible attacks from "outside." That means the communication and

14 Krasner, S. D. (1999). Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

15 Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan. London.

16 Hoffmann-Riem, W. (2014). Stellungnahme zur Anhörung des NSA-Untersuchungsausschusses am 22. Mai 2014. *NSA Untersuchungsausschuss* [online]. Available at: https://www.bundestag.de/blob/280846/04f34c512c86876b06f7c162e673f2db/mat_a_sv-2-1neu-pdf-data.pdf [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].


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data processing systems used in Germany – hardware as well as software – should be developed and manufactured by German companies, in Germany, wherever possible. In addition, data transmissions between German communication participants should only take place via domestic German lines if possible, rather than routing them through foreign networks. And finally, data from German citizens, companies and public agencies should also be stored in Germany.

Plans for a domestic German internet were publicly brought up by Deutsche Telekom in the fall of 2013.[17] Since this attempt violated the assumptions of a uniform European internal market, it was further developed into the "Schengen routing" plan and initially met with broad support from politicians. Both Chancellor Merkel and IT Commissioner Neelie Kroes adopted the idea.[18] As a rule, Schengen routing was discussed in conjunction with the requirement that user data only be stored within Germany or at least within the Schengen zone.[19] Only data localization, the requirement to store German data in Germany, could end the need for data transfers to data centers in foreign territories.

In the wake of the Snowden revelations, politicians did not just shift their focus to the geographic aspects of data storage and transport. They also created a direct connection between the "nationality" of IT companies and the trustworthiness of their products in terms of security. American and other foreign IT providers were now seen as a security problem. Instead, only providers located in Germany and certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) were seen as the highest standard for ensuring Germany's security in cyberspace.[20] However, the German as well as the entire European IT industry is weakly positioned in the global IT business, aside from a few niche markets. When it comes to basic hardware like network routers and computers, or important data processing software, the European IT industry is not competitive in many critical areas. Consequently, politicians drew on analogies from the aviation industry.

17 Ein Internet nur für Deutschland (2013). *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* [online]. Available at: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/netzwirtschaft/plaene-der-telekom-ein-internet-nur-fuer-deutschland-12657090.html [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017]; Blank, P. (2013). Deutschland-Routing: Mehr Vertrauen ins Netz. *Blog.Telekom* [online]. Available at: http://blog.telekom.com/2013/10/15/deutschland-routing/ [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017]; Reißmann, O. (2013). Überwachung im Internet: Telekom drängt auf Gesetz für nationalen Datenverkehr. *Spiegel Online* [online]. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/telekom-draengt-auf-gesetz-fuer-nationalen-datenverkehr-a-932976.html [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].

18 Clauß, U. (2014). So würde Europas 'Schengen-Internet' funktionieren. *Die Welt* [online]. Available at: http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article126343060/So-wuerde-Europas-Schengen-Internet-funktionieren.html [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].

19 Wenzel, E. (2013). Schengen Routing und der NSA Skandal: wie die Euro Cloud die Internet Welt verändern könnte. *Cashkurs Trends* [online]. Available at: http://go.guidants.com/q/db/ac/a/a9299018c441084.pdf [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].

20 Heuer, S. and Ramge, T. (2013). Konjunkturprogramm Cyber-Angst. *Zeit Online* [online]. Available at: http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2013-10/prism-nsa/seite-5 [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].


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Airbus was cited as a successful example of European industrial policy that successfully challenged US dominance in the aviation sector. They suggested that an "IT Airbus" could do the same for the European IT industry.[21]

Based on the logic of national sovereignty, implementing the above measures would create a German and/or European cyberspace that would at least theoretically make it harder for foreign security agencies to access the data stored there. As already mentioned above, preventing other states from unauthorized interference within your territory is the core element of national sovereignty. For many political decision-makers, this logic is plausible because it is based on a familiar security concept. It is difficult for the state to protect its citizens and interests in other countries. Only within its own territory, where the state's authority is supposed to be unchallenged, can the state truly guarantee security and protect its citizens.

## The internet as globally networked cyberspace: the limits of technological sovereignty

As a security response to the cyber-threats that the Snowden revelations made visible to the broader public, the concept of technological sovereignty combines traditional, state-centered security ideas with the new technological challenges of increasing digitization and global networking. However, the debate surrounding technological sovereignty fails to take into account the central aspects of the internet as a network of networks. Because of this structure, the internet evades a simple binary understanding according to which a territorially defined interior cyberspace could be protected from a clearly distinct exterior cyberspace. In order to avoid the common misconceptions associated with the term "cyberspace," the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) coined the term "Internet Interconnection Ecosystems" several years ago, emphasizing the complexity and interconnectedness of the internet.[22] It is possible to secure a single space, but not a network made up of tens of thousands of networks. This distinction is especially important when it comes to state activities. An "unsecured" public space – e. g. a public park or a square – can be "secured" by an increased presence of security agencies. However, this logic does

21 Rinke, A. (2013). Europa träumt vom 'IT-Airbus'. *n-tv* [online]. Available at: http://www.n-tv.de/wirtschaft/Die-Folgen-des-NSA-Skandals-Europa-blaest-zur-IT-Aufholjagd-article11151961.html [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].

22 Resilience of the Internet Interconnection Ecosystem (2011). *European Union Agency for Network and Information Security* [online]. Available at: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/critical-infrastructure-and-services/inter-x/interx/report/interx-report [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].


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not work for a network of networks. In order to emphasize its networked character, the term "internet" instead of "cyberspace" will be used below.

Territorial boundaries did not play a role in the technical development of the internet in the 1960s, 70s and 80s. The architects of the internet were working on technical solutions to connect computers to one another as easily and efficiently as possible.[23] The core elements of this version were a decentralized network and transport protocols that could send data packets from one end of the network to the other without any central coordination. This was the precondition for the rapid development of the internet in the first place. New users can easily connect to the internet as long as they meet the basic technical requirements. Their location and territorial jurisdiction do not matter. Apart from agreeing on a few basic technical standards, central coordination was neither necessary nor desired. Connecting countless information networks and their associated computers and users into a global infrastructure provides the foundation – as already mentioned – for what we refer to as the internet today.

The free and global exchanges of data formed the basis for the internet's success and growth over the past decades. The possibility of communicating and offering services across borders made the internet a key driver for globalization. Thanks to its global structure, the internet created new spaces for people to freely express their opinions and exchange ideas. As a result, authoritarian political regimes like Iran, China and Russia place a higher value on state control of the internet. They see technological sovereignty as a central aspect of national security. Of course, these states are primarily attempting to regain control over people's access to and use of information.[24] The obligation for internet service providers to store data within their own national boundaries mainly serves the purpose of enforcing state censorship. And the creation of an isolated "national internet" is primarily used to prevent the state's own citizens from accessing critical (uncensored) information.[25] For authoritarian states, controlling the flow of information may be crucial to their own security. In this case, though, security refers to critical and thus undesirable reporting and the potentially resulting mobilization and protests. Authoritarian states largely see technological sover-

23 Leiner, B.M. et. al. (n.d.). A Brief History of the Internet. *Internet Society* [online]. Available at: http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/Brief_History_of_the_Internet.pdf [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].

24 Freedom on the Net 2014. Tightening the Net: Governments expand Online Controls (2014). *Freedom House* [online]. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN_2014_Full_Report_compressedv2_0.pdf [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].

25 Lu Stout, K. (2015). China's Great Firewall: Fortune at the expense of freedom?. *CNN* [online]. Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2015/03/25/asia/china-internet-censorship-kristie-lu-stout/ [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].


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eignty as a way to protect their own claim to power by controlling the media and the exchange of information.

Because of the global network that underlies the internet, territorial location cannot prevent cyber-attacks. IT systems and data cannot be protected from attacks through defined geographic localization. As long as an IT system is connected to the internet, it can also be attacked through the internet – and that applies to every system in the world, from anywhere in the world. But this does not mean that we have no means to secure our IT systems and data. High standards for IT security and strong encryption are very effective means to protect data and systems from unauthorized third-party access. The location of the system itself provides for little protection from cyber-attacks. The effectiveness of national routing regimes is also very limited.[26] Compromised routers could allow third parties to access data passing through them even remotely. Here again, strong encryption rather than the routing route offers the best protection.

In an age of global value chains and rapid innovation cycles, the possibilities for a German or European "IT Airbus" are also very limited. Today's IT systems are generally built using components from many different manufacturers around the world. Due to highly specialized supply chains, 40–50 control computers in modern cars can come from dozens of different manufacturers. These manufacturers in turn procure certain individual parts from other companies. The same is true for laptops and smartphones. While the device may bear the name Apple, Samsung or Dell, in reality it is made up of components from Intel, Nvidia, Broadcom, Sanyo, Micron and countless others. This division of labor and specialization creates cost efficiency and makes the ongoing innovations in the IT sector possible. The global structure and networking of the IT industry make it unrealistic to establish effective national alternatives to the large international players in the IT industry. The high investment costs for research and development are difficult to raise in nationally confined areas and/or markets, due to the limited scaling effects. And using state subsidies and financing poses a risk of failed investments, if publicly funded projects are out of touch with the needs and demands of the market.[27]

26 Meyer, D. (2013). Why keeping internet traffic within borders is a tall order. *Gigaom* [online]. Available at: https://gigaom.com/2013/10/14/why-keeping-internet-traffic-within-borders-is-a-tall-order/ [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].

27 Beuth, P. (2013). Chaos Computer Club kritisiert Trickserei der Regierung. *Zeit Online* [online]. Available at: http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2013-03/de-mail-sicher-bundesregierung [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].


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## IT security: smart policies for a global network

An exclusively nationally defined security agenda for the internet does neither fit with Germany's international focus and security interests nor with the technical realities of a global network. Germany's export oriented economy is tightly interwoven with other countries. National isolation in the IT sector would therefore create a direct conflict with the integration of the German economy into the global economy. After all, German companies themselves heavily rely on international communications and data exchange. Isolating itself from the international IT market by introducing its own unique national security standards would meet strong resistance from German industry. Thus it is not surprising that German industrial and economic associations did not support the demands of Deutsche Telekom and politicians for more technological sovereignty.[28]

What, then, are the alternatives to the political measures associated with the concept of technological sovereignty?[29] The most effective protection against undesirable access to data is strong encryption.[30] Strong encryption acts like a safe during transport. Even if the safe is intercepted, it is useless unless it can be opened. Purely national transport paths are not only difficult to reconcile with the global architecture of the internet; they also offer limited protection, for instance because they can be canceled out by manipulated routers. As already mentioned, servers connected to the internet can be attacked from any location. The choice of location does not protect them from hackers. However, we do need international agreements and legal standards between the EU and the United States to regulate the circumstances under which security agencies are permitted to access data stored in the cloud.[31] And instead of pursuing unrealistic dreams

28 Sievers, U. (2014). Ein Schengen-Routing ist faktisch schon da. *vdi nachrichten* [online]. Available at: http://www.vdi-nachrichten.com/Technik-Wirtschaft/Ein-Schengen-Routing-faktisch-da [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].

29 See in particular: Kleinhans, J.-P. (2015). IT-Sicherheitspolitik: Aktuelle Themen, Entwicklungen und Handlungsfelder. Policy Brief. *Stiftung neue Verantwortung* [online]. Available at: http://www.stiftung-nv.de/publikation/it-sicherheitspolitik-aktuelle-themen-entwicklungen-und-handlungsfelder [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].

30 Hohmann, M. et al. (2013). Technological Sovereignty: Missing the Point?. *Global Public Policy Institute* [online]. Available at: http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/user_upload/media/pub/2014/Maurer-et-al_2014_Tech-Sovereignty-Europe.pdf [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].

31 Kleinhans, J.-P. (2015). Die Cloud im rechtsfreien Raum – Wie regeln wir den Datenzugriff durch Sicherheitsbehörden im 21. Jahrhundert?. Impulse. *Stiftung neue Verantwortung* [online]. Available at: http://www.stiftung-nv.de/sites/default/files/impulse_die_cloud_im_rechtsfreien_raum.pdf [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017]; Boehm, F. (2015). A Comparison between US and EU Data Protection Legislation for Law Enforcement. Study for the LIBE Committee. *European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies* [online]. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/536459/IPOL_STU(2015)536459_EN.pdf [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].


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about an IT Airbus, the German government should focus much more intensely on strengthening international security standards. Public procurement is another strong lever that can help promote the development of secure software and hardware.

Internet security is a complex security challenge that cannot be handled using outdated, state-centric concepts like the idea of technological sovereignty. That does not mean the state should not play a role in the area of cyber security – quite the contrary. In the future, states will have more responsibilities in cyber security than ever. As recent hacks demonstrate governments need to do a better job of protection their own IT systems and networks. And as more and more devices and infrastructures connect to the internet, governments will play a crucial role in setting up regulatory frameworks that promote better IT security. Still, open, free, and internationally minded countries like Germany will only be able to effectively exercise this role, if they move beyond traditional security concepts that heavily focus on territorial control. Because of its underlying global network, the internet requires a security concept that is not based on territoriality, but rather on the security of the technologies used in the network.


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Matthew Smith / Matthew Green

# A Discussion of Surveillance Backdoors: Effectiveness, Collateral Damage, and Ethics

## Introduction

After more than a decade of relative quite the crypto-wars are heating up again. Terrorist attacks Paris[1] and San Bernardino[2] are being used by politicians as well as intelligence and law enforcement agencies to call for weakening security systems to aid surveillance and forensic analysis to fight terrorism. A number of different strategies are being proposed. These include banning default encryption – such as the encryption found on iOS and Android; building backdoors into cryptographic protocols to allow government access in "exceptional" circumstances; software backdoors – such as "forced" data backup systems; and finally, stockpiling and using 0-day vulnerabilities instead of patching them. All of these strategies extend the power of intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

At the same time the rise of hacking/attack related security events is leading to a call for improved information security across the board. Thousands of critical software vulnerabilities (CVEs) are found every year, and estimates indicate that the cost of data breaches will exceed $2 trillion by 2019[3]. These threats have not been confined to corporate networks; most worrying are the recent addition of attacks against cyber-physical systems and critical infrastructure. The first well known example is the Stuxnet virus discovered in 2010 which attacked and destroyed Iranian centrifuges in the Nantaz Uranium enrichment facilities[4]. A

1 Froomki, D. (2015). Signs point to unencrypted communications between terror suspects. *The* Intercept [online]. Available at: https://theintercept.com/2015/11/18/signs-point-to-unencrypted-communications-between-terror-suspects/ [Accessed 13 Feb. 2016].

2 Lee, S. (2015). Did The San Bernardino Shooters Use Advanced Encryption Or Not? Newsweek. [online]. Available at: http://europe.newsweek.com/san-bernardino-shooters-encryption-fbi-407938?rm=eu [Accessed 13 Feb. 2016].

3 Juniper Networks. Cybercrime will cost businesses over $2 trillion by 2019 [online]. Available at: http://www.juniperresearch.com/press/press-releases/cybercrime-cost-businesses-over-2trillion [Accessed 13 Feb. 2016].

4 Anderson, N. (2012). Confirmed: US and israel created stuxnet, lost control of it. *ArsTechnica*



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more recent example is the use of the BlackEnergy malware to breach the computer systems of the Ukrainian power system and then subsequently hack the SCADA control units causing a power-outage for around 80.000 Ukrainians in December 2015[5]. While these attacks are the most spectacular there are a whole range of serious incidents. Attacks against our banking system – such as those recently levied against the NASDAQ stock exchange[6] or babyphones[7] show that virtually no area is safe.

The debates around both these problem domains are heating up, however, they are often being discussed as separate issues. This is unfortunate, as on a technical level they are linked and should be discussed together. In this article we propose that the debate be framed in the context of collateral damage to help guide the decision making process.

## Actors

There are a large number of actors and motivations involved in the security of our digital infrastructure. In the context of this discussion we will differentiate between the following actors. The actors are described from the perspective of the U.S. and Germany, i. e. states with high technological capacities but also high reliance on technology.

– State-own: This is our own national government, for which we are evaluating the options. While each government has many sub-actors, such as intelligence agencies, national and provincial law enforcement agencies, and the military, for the sake of simplicity we will subsume them as a single state level actor. Also to simplify the discussion, we will adopt a somewhat idealized assumption there are only two distinct motivations for the state: to keep it citizens and society safe (i. e. national security) and to keep its citizens and society free (i. e. privacy, freedom of speech, democracy, due process, etc.). We also assume that our state has an inherent wish to behave ethically, safeguarding both the security and rights of its citizens and avoiding unnecessary collateral damage when forced to act aggressively. This is naturally an over-

[online]. Available at: http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/06/confirmed-us-israel-created-stuxnet-lost-control-of-it/ [Accessed 13 Feb. 2016].

5 Goodin, D. (2016). First known hacker-caused power outage signals troubling escalation. *ArsTechnica* [online]. Available at: http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/01/first-known-hacker-caused-power-outage-signals-troubling-escalation/ [Accessed 13 Feb. 2016].

6 Goodin, D. (2014). How elite hackers (almost) stole the NASDAQ. *ArsTechnica* [online]. Available at: http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/07/how-elite-hackers-almost-stole-the-nasdaq/ [Accessed 13 Feb. 2016].

7 Lee, D. (2013). Hacker 'shouts abuse' via Foscam baby monitoring camera. *BBC News* [online]. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-23693460 [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].


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simplification, however it will allow us to put the different technological possibilities into perspective.

- State-allies: These are states considered allies, i. e. states which have close ties in intelligence and surveillance matter, such as the "five-eyes" partnership of cooperating intelligence agencies. We assume that allied states operate under similar ethical structures as our own.
- State-friendly: These are states considered friendly, i. e. states which to a certain extent are likely to cooperate on some aspects of intelligence operations but on a case by case basis. We make fewer assumptions about ethical characteristics of these states, but assume that amongst these states there is a wish to avoid antagonism. Note that this does not imply that there is no governmental or industrial espionage going on, but merely that it is causes more of an outcry when it is uncovered, as with the revelation that the US was surveilling Angela Merkel the chancellor of Germany.
- State-adversary: These are states which are the targets of intelligence operations, and which represent threat actors against us.
- Terrorist-professional: For the sake of this article we consider terrorist to be non-state actors who have an interest in harming others for ideological reasons. In the context of this article we classify terrorists as professional if they have training and are motivated to keep their activities secret from the government and invest in counter-surveillance. Additionally we consider the fact that many organized terrorist groups have significant funds. For instance it is estimated that in 2014 the Islamic State received between $1 and $3 million U.S. dollars per day in oil revenue alone[8]. Terrorist are ethically unconstrained and will not only condone collateral damage but often actively seek it.
- Terrorist-amateur: In contrast to the professional terrorist we consider the amateur to have little or low training and lacks the skill to for instance install secure messaging apps or other security precautions. This is not to say that they are ineffective, merely that they do not benefit from organisational knowledge on how to protect their IT resources.
- Criminal-professional: We assume that professional criminals are motivated by profit and have a support infrastructure and sufficient funds to dedicate to counter-surveillance efforts. These criminals have a higher skill level and motivation to cover their tracks, and are thus willing and able to invest resources into using encryption and other security technology to remain undetected. We make no assumptions on the level of collateral damage criminals

8 Swanson, A. (2015). How the islamic state makes its money. *Washington Post* [online]. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11/18/how-isis-makes-itsmoney/ [Accessed 13 Feb. 2016].


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find acceptable. However, there is a tendency to want to avoid detection, which often makes limiting collateral damage a prudent move.
- Criminal-amateur: As above the amateur label is applied to the tech-skills of the criminal, i. e. these are criminals who do not have the knowledge or the skill to implement counter-surveillance methods. Again we make no assumptions about ethical constraints.
- Criminal-state-backed: This is the most interesting class of criminal. These actors are either covertly run by states or they have a tacit agreement with the state they operate in and thus operate without fear of prosecution. An example for this kind of group is the Russian aligned CyberBerkut hacking group[9], and China's Axiom group[10]. What makes these groups particularly interesting is that they potentially have nation state capabilities and motivation, but provide deniability for their sponsoring governments. Consequently they are less ethically constrained than the states themselves. The combination of nation state attack capabilities and lack of consequences gives a significant attack advantage to states willing to employ these threat actors.
- Company-security-conscious: A tech-savvy company which is motivated and capable of installing and correctly using encryption and security software. We assume that companies are law abiding and have the same ethical characteristics of their parent state.
- Company: A normal company using only standard IT.
- Civilian-security-conscious: A tech-savvy civilian who is motivated and capable of installing and correctly using encryption and security software. We assume that civilians are law abiding and have the same ethical characteristics of their parent state.
- Civilian: A civilian using only standard IT.

## Technology

The current debate over terrorist and criminal use of encryption technologies has led to a number of proposals, some of which have been formalized into proposed legislation. In this section we provide a summary of the various proposals that have been advanced.

9 Pawlak, P. and Petkova, G. (n.d.). State-sponsored hackers: hybrid armies? *ISS* [online]. Available at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_5_cyber___hacktors_.pdf [Accessed 13 Feb. 2016].

10 Stone, J. (n.d.). China-Backed Hacking Group Axiom Said To Have Attacked 43,000 Computers. *IB* Times [online]. Available at: http://www.ibtimes.com/china-backed-hacking-group-axiom-said-have-attacked-43000-computers-1714879 [Accessed 13 Feb. 2016].


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## Ban (default) encryption

Perhaps the simplest demand currently levied at the tech-industry is the request that companies such as Google and Apple turn encryption off by default or even remove encryption options entirely. We will now discuss the ramifications of this option for each of the actors.

- Terrorist-professional: This strategy will have little to no effect on professional terrorist, since installing after-market encryption is not difficult given the right support infrastructure. Indeed, both Al Queda and the Islamic State have published security guides for using open source encryption software[11].
- Terrorist-amateur: A terrorist who is not aware of government surveillance or incapable of installing after-market encryption could be negatively impacted by these actions. It should be noted however that the Paris attacks were coordinated using unencrypted text-messages. Thus encryption was not the problem in this case and banning encryption would not have prevented the attacks.
- Criminal-amateur: Criminals who do not have the skill or motivation to install after-market encryption will be affected by this option.
- Criminal-professional: Professionals criminals, such as members of organized crime groups, will be largely unaffected.
- Criminal-state-backed: The same goes for state-backed criminals.
- Company-security-conscious: Naturally companies can install after market encryption. However, unlike above the additional costs must be seen as collateral damage. In large corporations deploying encryption solutions can easily run into the millions of dollars. This has driven the adoption of secure enterprise services such as BlackBerry's BES.
- Company: Unlike terrorist and criminals who have a very high intrinsic motivation not be caught by surveillance, most companies primary objective is not security. Thus, the additional costs of installing after-market encryption is too high for most companies and thus they become vulnerable to adversaries. This must also be seen as collateral damage.
- Civilian-security-conscious: Even though civilians can install after-market encryption, history has taught us that not many are interested in doing so. This creates a big problem for encryption software, which relies heavily on network effects. To be useful, many people must install and use the software, creating a disincentive for early adopters. Indeed, email encryption software,

11 Zetter, K. (2015). Security manual reveals the opsec adviceisis gives recruits. *Wired* [online]. Available at: http://www.wired.com/2015/11/isis-opsec-encryption-manuals-reveal-terrorist-group-security-protocols/ [Accessed 13 Feb. 2016].


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which has been around since the 1990s, has seen little to no adoption even amongst the security conscious citizens, due to lack of adoption outside of security circles. While there will always be pockets of encryption such as amongst security researcher and in some cases dissidents, it is unlikely to ever become mainstream without it being a usable default. This must also be seen as collateral damage, since these civilians are now more vulnerable to criminals and surveillance. While from the point of view of the own state the latter might not be seen as damage but a positive capability, the lack of encryption also facilitates other states to spy on our citizens. It also opens the door for state overreach, which is a legitimate concern.

- Civilian: Installing after-market encryption software is more than can be expected from most ordinary civilians. Thus a large swathe of innocent civilians will have no way to enforce their digital privacy. This particularly critical if a state is run by an oppressive regime.
- State-own: On the positive side the state has a much easier time reading messages. However, as described above this will mainly include the low level criminals and terrorist too inept to install after-market encryption software. Catching inept terrorist and low level criminals is naturally a good thing, however, it needs to be weighed against the amount of collateral damage this option creates.
- State-allies: This also holds for allies.
- State-friendly: This also holds for friendly states.
- State-adversary: Baning default encryption has the potential to benefit adversarial states. It makes spying on us easier. It also makes it easier for totalitarian states to spy on their population, which should also be seen as collateral damage for us, since strengthening totalitarian states can pose a danger to us.

Beyond the analysis above, the single greatest challenge in banning default encryption is determining which encryption is to be banned, and what legislative framework would enable this. This is made particularly challenging due to the availability of foreign service providers and installable "apps", which can easily substitute encryption capabilities even when they are removed as default options in products such as phones and computers. Moreover, banning encryption has speech implications that go well beyond the security issues that we address in this report.


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## Cryptographic Backdoors

While banning default encryption is the simplest option technologically speaking, many legislators and technologists recognize that this could dramatically harm security. An alternative proposal is therefore to preserve end-to-end encryption capability, while adding a "backdoor" capability that governments may use in exceptional circumstances.

This option is one of the most technologically complex. Cryptographic backdoors can be implemented in several different ways. A first is by sharing the private keys with trusted third parties. This is akin to making a copy of your house key and providing it to the government. An example of a system that follows this model is the MIKEY-SAKKE system proposed by GCHQ[12].

A different option is active "key escrow", in which the encryptor enciphers the communication under an additional law enforcement key or keys. This is akin to adding a second door with a government issued lock to your house. Aside from legal, sociological and ethical issues, these approaches have serious technical drawbacks. Foremost among these is the problem of securing and managing exceptional access keys, since key management at this scale is extremely complex and error prone. To be practical, many different organisations and a large number of staffers would need access to the key database, which poses a severe risk. Moreover, a compromise of this database would be catastrophic – not to mention next to impossible to detect and recover from. For a more in-depth look at the technical risks the reader is referred to Abelson et al[13]. Making this option even less feasible is the question of who gets the backdoor keys. In the United States, various proposals have placed this responsibility with U.S. companies such as Google and Apple, who would design backdoors and hold keys to use at the U.S. government's request. It is unlikely that other countries would be comfortable with such backdoors for devices sold in their country; or at the very least, they would expect to get copies of the keys as well. If any state opts out of the system, those threat actors with resources and motivation to use encryption can simply use devices purchased there. Naturally states can try and limit the important of such non-backdoored devices, however, considering the difficulty of stopping the illegal import of arms and drugs it seems unlikely that it is a viable

12 Bell, C. (n.d.). Analysing mikey-sakke: A cryptographic protocol for secure multimedia services [online]. Available at: http://pubs.doc.ic.ac.uk/mobius-mikey-sakke-analysis/mobius-mikey-sakke-analysis.pdf [Accessed 13 Feb. 2016].

13 Abelson, H., Anderson, R., Bellovin, S. M., Benaloh, J., Blaze, M., Diffie, W., Gilmore, J., Green, M., Landau, S. , Neumann, P. G., Rivest, R. L., Schiller, J. I., Schneier, B., Specter, M. A. and Weitzner, D. J. (2015). Keys under doormats: mandating insecurity by requiring government access to all data and communications. *Journal of Cybersecurity*, 1(1), pp. 69–79.


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option to stop the import of software. Since many products are multi-national, this issue gets even more complex.

The final type of crypto backdoors are those built on the algorithmic level, such as found in the NSA-designed Dual EC DRBG algorithm[14], which was recently found to be present in devices manufactured by Juniper Networks. With this kind of backdoor the standardisation process of cryptographic protocols is manipulated to weaken the protocols in such a way that the manipulating actor can break the encryption, but hopefully no one else can. The security of this approach can rest on several factors.

- Obscurity: the hope that no one else figures out how the protocol was weakened. Since cryptographic protocols receive a great deal of scrutiny this is often an unsafe option.
- Secret knowledge: The backdoor requires some secret knowledge to work, such as large prime numbers which were used to create public parameters. As with the key sharing approach this suffers from the fact that the secret knowledge is a master-key which would need to be both shared to be useful but kept absolutely safe so it is not stolen and abused. And also as above it is a problem when interacting with allies. As above recovering from compromise is extremely difficult, since it requires the public parameters of all devices to be changed.
- Computational Power: The backdoor decreases the amount of computational power needed to attack the system to a point where the actors resources are sufficient to break the system, but hopefully not to a point where other actors can also break it. At the time of the backdoor creation this might be a feasible defence against criminals, however not against other nation states. Advances in computing power add an additional layer of risk to this approach.

An additional consideration in adding algorithmic backdoors is the possibility that a sophisticated attacker may be able to re-purpose the backdoor mechanism to create a surveillance system aimed against the country and organizations promoting the original backdoor. Indeed, a recent vulnerability report from Juniper Networks provides strong evidence that such an attack may have occurred in 2012, when several Juniper devices were modified with "unauthorized code" that repurposed an existing Dual EC DRBG backdoor to create an encryption backdoor for some unknown attacker[15].

14 Dual EC DRBG is an algorithm proposed by the NSA and NIST in 2006. It was later withdrawn by NIST due to indications that the algorithm contained a surreptitious backdoor. See e. g., Perlroth, N., Larson, J. and Shane, S. (2013). N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web. *New York Times* [online]. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html [Accessed 13 Feb. 2016].

15 Cybercrime will cost businesses over $2 trillion by 2019 (n.d.). *Juniper Networks* [online].


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All the above backdoors can added overtly or covertly. However, the two options based on cryptographic keys are harder to hide, since analysing the source code or binaries would uncover them.

If the backdoors are included openly such as with MIKEY-SAKKE they are likely to be as ineffective as the banning of encryption – merely adding operational costs to those actors intent on achieving secure communications. If the backdoors are hidden, they may become more effective since targeted actors would not know they need to use alternative systems. This is difficult to achieve, however, in a setting where protocols and source code are properly reviewed for security. When successful it is also an attack that damages the reputation of standardisation committees[16], and leads to an unfortunate situation in which several potentially allied nations add vulnerabilities to the systems, all of which increase the chances of discovery and consequently collateral damage. The collateral damage however is less severe since exploiting this kind of backdoor takes more effort, i. e. key material needs to be stolen or cryptanalysis capabilities are needed. However, the damage done to the reputation of the standardisation committee and the knock-on effect on business may be severe for the continuing operation of those entities.

## System Backdoors

The final way for law enforcement, intelligence agencies or criminal organisations to gain access to encrypted information is via system level backdoors. These backdoors allow some form of access onto the devices themselves. Again there are a number of ways these can be implemented.

– Log-in/Master-account: In systems which already contain user management an additional, potentially hidden, account is added to the system to allow the attacker to access the system with high privileges. If no user management/log-in functionality is present, it can be added as part of the backdoor. A good example of such a backdoor is the AMX case where accounts for "Black Widow" and "Batman" were added by unknown parties to the AMX AV systems. The AMX system are used amongst other by the White House and the US military[17].

Available at: http://www.juniperresearch.com/press/press-releases/cybercrime-cost-businesses-over-2trillion [Accessed 13 Feb. 2016].

16 See e. g., the steps NIST has taken to restore confidence in its encryption standards following the Snowden leaks, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/ government-announces-steps-to-restore-confidence-on-encryption-standards/ [Accessed 13 Feb. 2016].

17 Deliberately hidden backdoor account in several AMX (HARMAN Professional) devices.


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- Special-Purpose-Vulnerability: Similar to the master account this backdoor code allows access to the system, however the code is camouflaged to look like a naturally occurring bug/vulnerability. This has two benefits, a) it is harder to find by others and b) it offers deniability. Such backdoors have been discovered in critical software, such as the Linux Kernel[18].
- Naturally-Occurring-Vulnerability: Writing secure software is extremely hard, even without powerful actors intentionally inserting vulnerabilities, thus there are a host of naturally occurring vulnerabilities, which when found can be used as a backdoor. Indeed, this is currently one of the most fruitful techniques used by law enforcement and national security agencies, and is likely to continue to be productive for many years to come.

The first two types of backdoor are added intentionally and are under full control of the attacker. As before this can be done overtly or covertly. An advantage of adding the backdoor overtly is that the security of the backdoor can be examined. It would also be possible to use secure authentication techniques to the backdoor. However, when done overtly all problems from overt cryptoback door described in the previous section apply, making the system fairly ineffective. Actors with an interest evading surveillance will use alternative systems and the question who has access must be negotiated with allies. Neutral parties might steer clear of products with such overt backdoors. As before, the covert case is more effective, since without knowledge of the backdoor actors will not avoid them. However, an interesting observation can be made about such backdoors found in the wild. The authentication used to protect the backdoor is usually of very poor quality, e. g. there are hard-coded plain-text passwords contained in the backdoor. This doesn't make sense from a security perspective, since these credentials can be reverse engineered giving further parties access to the backdoor. Possible reasons for this phenomenon are:

- Deniability: An actor creating a covert backdoors has an interest in not being exposed. This makes using secure authentication techniques more risky, since the capability to authenticate would be good evidence of authorship of the backdoor and thus culpability for it.
- Stealth: Secure authentication credentials can be harder to hide in the code, since they would show up as cryptographic artefacts.
- Incompetence: Similar to regular authentication systems some backdoor developers might just make bad judgement calls.

http://blog.sec-consult.com/2016/01/deliberately-hidden-backdoor-account-in.html [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

18 Felten, E. (2003). The linux backdoor attempt of 2003. *Freedom to Tinker* [online]. Available at: https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/the-linux-backdoor-attempt-of-2003/ [Accessed 13 Feb. 2016].


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On a technical level the last possibility can be addressed, however the first two options seem the most likely, suggesting the problem of badly protected backdoors is inherent to the approach. This is unfortunate, since that means third-parties including criminals will continue to be able to detect and exploit these backdoors. This is a worst-case scenario, since such hard coded backdoors are much easier to exploit than the cryptographic backdoors, which at least require the attacker to obtain a privileged network position (e. g. to intercept traffic). These kind of backdoors also usually offer more access to the victims data than the cryptographic backdoors. Thus the potential for collateral damage is the greatest in this scenario.

## Discussion

Finding the right balance between security, privacy and surveillance is a complex problem. The current practice of intelligence agencies adding covert backdoors into system deployed world wide is hugely risky and carries with it a significant potential for collateral damage, since criminals or adversarial states can misuse the backdoors. To the best of our ability to judge, the current calls by law enforcement agencies for overt backdoors will mainly impact people who do not think anybody would want to spy on them, i. e. they will not affect the terrorists or organised criminals who are the targets of the people bringing the anti-encryption arguments. However, overt backdoors will cause collateral damage and have negative impact on businesses and on the right to privacy.

What seems clear is that there are no perfect solutions. Governments need to be able to enforce their laws and protect their citizens from adversaries, however, this should not be done at any cost. Just as we place restrictions on ourselves in war, we need to place restrictions on ourselves in matters of surveillance. In war the debate is rooted in ethics and any benefits of a type of attack must be weighed against the potential for collateral damage[19]. We accept higher costs, even in the form of lives, to ensure that collateral damage is minimised. As we have argued above, in our case policymakers must also take into account the probability that sophisticated actors will find alternative communication channels that largely neutralize any government action; potentially leaving policymakers with all of the costs and limited benefit.

Unfortunately, currently the surveillance debate is polarised with absolutes

19 Murphy, J.F. (2012). Some Legal (And A Few Ethical) Dimensions Of The Collateral Damage Resulting From NATO's Kosovo Campaign. pp. 1–27. or Pawlak, P. and Petkova. G. (n.d.). State-sponsored hackers: hybrid armies? *ISS* [online]. Available at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_5_cyber___hacktors_.pdf [Accessed 13 Feb. 2016].


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being pushed by both sides. It is highly unlikely that either extreme – total surveillance or total privacy – is good for our society. Finding the right balance should be framed as an ethical debate centred around the potential for collateral damage. Clearly identifying and quantifying which threat-actors could be caught with which forms of surveillance and weighing the benefits to society against the actual and/or potential collateral damage should help both sides to see the problem more clearly.


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# Environmental Risks and Human Security in the Context of Global Change

## Introduction

We encounter environmental risks in two fundamentally different forms, namely in what are known as abrupt and in "creeping" processes. The abrupt processes include well-known natural hazards, such as earthquakes, falling and sliding processes, volcanic eruptions, flooding, storms, etc. The creeping processes include, for instance, droughts and erosion processes. According to the UN Secretariat for Disaster Risk Reduction, major natural events in the period from 2000 to 2012 were responsible for damage totalling 1700 billion dollars, affected 2.9 billion people and caused 1.2 million deaths[1,2]. It must, however, be said that the mechanisms for recording damage worldwide vary significantly and that reliable figures are lacking in many countries, above all relating to smaller events.

## Risk analysis and management

A risk arises when hazard processes occur in locations where they threaten people or material values (a rock fall far from human settlements and activities is thus not a risk within this linguistic usage). Quantitatively, the risk is defined by the damage to be expected from a hazard process. However, considering the damage alone is not sufficient for the risk analysis and risk management. Instead, it is important to know the details of the hazard damage process.

The Institute for Environment and Human Security at the United Nations University (UNU-EHS) has developed a risk index, the so-called World Risk

1 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (2013). Disaster Impacts 2000–2012 [online]. Available at: http://www.preventionweb.net/files/31737_20130312disaster20002012copy.pdf [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

2 Center for the Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (2015). The Human Costs of Natural Disasters. A Global Perspective [online]. Available at: http://www.emdat.be/publications [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].



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Index, which divides the overall risk into four components for selected natural hazards, namely storms, earthquakes, floods, droughts and sea level rise:

- *Exposure:* Exposure to hazard processes, i. e. the probability (or frequency) of their occurrence,
- *Susceptibility:* the probability of damage occurring if an event happens, e. g. buildings collapse,
- *Lack of coping capacities*, i. e. capacities to reduce negative effects if an event happens, e. g. evacuation,
- *Lack of adaptation capacities*, i. e. capacities for long-term strategies to reduce damage.

The components b) – d) are summarised as *vulnerability.* While exposure is primarily defined by environmental parameters, i. e. is of a "physical nature", vulnerability is largely a result of socioeconomic, political institutional or cultural framework conditions, for instance the question of whether buildings are constructed earthquake-proof, whether efficient healthcare systems and evacuation and rescue organisations exist, whether experience from previous damage events is implemented by the public sector, etc.

UNU-EHS has calculated the four risk components by taking into account a variety of indicators for 171 countries (the data is insufficient for the remaining countries). The figures have been updated annually since 2011 and published in the *World Risk Report* [3] together with *Alliance Development Works/Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft.* The countries with the biggest overall risk are some of the Pacific Island states as well as many of the poorest least developed countries.

3 United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security and Alliance Development Works (2011–2015). World Risk Reports 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 [online]. Available at: http://collections.unu.edu/community/UNU:1882 [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].


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


Figure 1. Worldwide Risk Distribution: Exposure, Vulnerability and Overall Risk[4]

4 United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) and Alliance Development Works (2015). World Risk Report 2015. MediaCompany – Agentur für Kommunikation GmbH.


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Figure 1 shows that the exposure in some industrial countries, e. g. Japan, the Netherlands and New Zealand, is high. However, they exhibit low vulnerability due to their very good institutional structures. The situation is contrary on the African continent. Here, exposure is generally low to moderate, but vulnerability is predominantly very high. This means the high risk in these countries is not so much caused by major environmental impacts but rather by a lack of capacities needed to prevent them, to react to them if they occur and to adapt to them in the longer term. These underlying risk factors are discussed in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (cf. chapter 4). They cannot be understood in a climatic or technical context, but only in a larger socioeconomic and political context.

However, important correlations exist between the various risk components. For instance, population groups with lower incomes or minorities are often pushed into areas with higher exposure, e. g. into flood plains. This problem often occurs in informal settlements in fast-growing urban areas. In this case, exposure thus cannot simply be reduced to meteorological and hydrological factors. Furthermore, time-based dynamics of the risk and the vulnerability are to be taken into account. Large areas of the European Alps were still "poorhouses" 200 years ago, with a very high risk of natural hazards for their inhabitants. However, economic development in the cities, tourism and new technical developments have made it possible to significantly reduce the risks in the mountain regions and increase living comfort so that they have now become privileged residential areas in many places. All four of the risk components addressed above are thus responsible for this improvement.

## Influence of global change

As the preceding statements show, environmental risks are not only determined by the actual environmental influences but also by social, economic, political and cultural factors. Various aspects of global change will thus have a significant influence on the development of the risk landscape. Three effects are singled out below:

Global warming will generally lead to more frequent and more severe meteorological and hydrological events and thus to an increase of risks. This concerns, above all, storms, floods, melting of glaciers and increase in sea level. As the regionalisation of the climate forecasts is still difficult, it is not known exactly where the meteorological effects will be most severe. In view of the other risk factors mentioned above, however, it is to be feared that the poorest sections of the population will generally be affected most heavily, as they have the smallest coping and adaptation capacities.


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Significant urbanisation, above all in less wealthy countries, has a major influence on the development of risks. One aspect, the link between poverty and exposure, was already discussed in the previous chapter. In rapidly growing conurbations, institutional structures often have difficulties keeping up with the speed of change, which increases the risks overall. However, this should not lead to the conclusion that urbanisation is generally unfavourable for risk development. The economic strength of cities as well as education and research institutions have also contributed significantly to reducing risks in surrounding areas through economic resources and knowledge (see the example of the European mountain regions mentioned in the previous chapter).

Technical and academic progress, above all regarding satellite systems for earth observation, in modelling and in communication technology, has enabled major improvements in weather forecasts and the development of early-warning systems. Progress in these areas has not been exhausted. The possibilities of social media for early warning, in particular, have barely been tapped into.

These and other global trends should be taken into account in the further development of reducing environmental risks, both in terms of new possibilities and also new risk factors.

## International mechanisms: post-2015 agenda

2015 and 2016 are two particularly important years in the context of reduction of environmental risks. As many as five fundamental international processes, all characterised by international conferences and corresponding agreements, contain important steps:

- Reduction of disaster risks. Conference: Third United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, 14th–18th March 2015 in Sendai, Japan. Result: Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030.
- Financing global development. Conference: Third International Conference on Financing for Development, 13th–16th July 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Result: Addis Ababa Action Agenda.
- Sustainable development goals. Conference: United Nations Sustainable Development Summit, 25th–27th September 2015, New York, USA. Result: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, with the 17 sustainable development goals.
- Climate change. Conference: 21st Conference of the Parties, 30th November – 11th December 2015, Paris, France. Result: Paris Agreement.


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– Humanitarian aid. Conference: The World Humanitarian Summit, 24th–26th May 2016, Istanbul, Turkey.
  Objective: forward-looking orientation of humanitarian aid.

The central mechanism for the reduction of environmental and disaster risks is certainly the Sendai Framework. It follows the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005–2015). In the Sendai Framework, emphasis is increasingly placed on "preparedness", i. e. on good preparation for a crisis, instead of pure intervention during a crisis and reconstruction. Not only the aforementioned early warning systems play an important role here, but, for example, also the development and above all the observance of suitable construction regulations, e. g. for earthquakes and equitable spatial planning. The underlying factors also mentioned above, such as poverty, corruption and conflict, will remain a major challenge. Insufficient progress was achieved in this field during the term of the Hyogo Framework.

The Sendai Framework should also be reflected in more comprehensive Sustainable Development Goals. Sustainable Development Goal 13 (in particular subgoals 13.1 and 13.2) focuses on measures to reduce the risk of disasters, in particular relating to climate change. The implementation of the Paris Agreement will be a crucial prerequisite for reducing the risks of natural disasters or at least not allowing them to increase further. The observance of what is known as the two-degrees goal is generally viewed by climate researchers as a limit, above which it is no longer possible to adapt fully to the climate consequences and thus widespread damage is to be expected over the longer term.

The conference in Addis Ababa ultimately looked at the fundamental questions of financing future development programmes. In the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA), industrialised countries are called on to abide by the 0.7 % threshold for development collaboration (which is as yet only fulfilled by a small number of countries). However, it is also clearly shown that the significant need for financing cannot be covered by traditional development collaboration and aid programmes alone. Instead, an increased involvement of the private sector will be required, without taking responsibility away from intergovernmental aid. The AAAA also lists sustainable industrialisation, the removal of trade obstacles, the development of national and international control mechanisms, the combatting of illegal business, and the facilitation of knowledge and technology transfer as further important prerequisites. These topics play a key role with regard to the long-term reduction of disaster risk, especially in poorer countries.


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Friedbert Pflüger

# Europe's Natural Gas Sector and the Quest for Energy Security – Geopolitics, Current Developments, and Implications for the Broader Security Debate

## Introduction

When in the early 20th century the British Royal Navy began to convert their fleet from coal to oil in order to gain a strategic advantage over Germany, the parliamentary opposition charged that this would cause Great Britain to become dependent on foreign exporters. Yet Winston Churchill, then-First Admiral of the Navy, replied: "Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone." His response marked the birth of the concept of energy security as we understand it today. Furthermore, with his emphasis on variety, he had identified the dominant answer to the security challenge, namely diversification of supplies.

Ever since, the predominant concern of policymakers has been to avoid becoming overly dependent on a single or few exporters by diversifying their supplier base. While today security of oil supplies is less of a concern due to the large number of producers and the globalized nature of the oil market, Europe still faces significant risks to its energy security, particularly in the domain of natural gas. The main concerns have to do with Russia's preeminent role as a gas supplier and the dependence of large parts of Europe on Russian imports. Russia currently accounts for around 39 percent of the EU-28's natural gas imports (2013 data). Moreover, most Eastern and Central European countries rely on Russian imports for the majority of their gas supplies, and the Baltic states and Finland are in fact 100 percent dependent on Russia.

Increased geopolitical risks have led to heightened concerns across Europe, in particular in the wake of the Russian-Ukrainian gas crises of 2006 and 2009, and more recently as a result of the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing Ukraine conflict. These developments have led European policymakers to accelerate their efforts to identify possible alternatives in order to alleviate the dependency on Russian gas exports and to be better able to mitigate potential shocks in the event of supply disruptions.


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## Europe's diversification prospects

Faced with diminishing domestic reserves and an uncertain future for the development of its own shale gas sector, the EU has recognized the increased need for a diversification strategy as an alternative to a growing dependency on Russian supplies. In order to gain a better understanding of Europe's strategic situation, it is necessary to take a closer look at the potential alternative suppliers and critically evaluate their prospects as well as the geopolitical risks.

The main diversification options include US shale gas in the form of LNG shipments as well as exports from a range of suppliers in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the Caspian region, either through LNG or as piped gas via the "Southern Gas Corridor". However, most of these options will only materialize in the mid- to long term. In addition to that, many alternatives are subject to significant geopolitical risks of their own. Finally, any possible supply arrangement is dependent on the underlying economics proving viable.

### US shale gas

Of all the potential alternative suppliers, the United States currently stands out as the clear frontrunner. Since 2006 shale gas exploration has led to an increase in America's proved natural gas reserves of over 2.5 trillion cubic meters (tcm) – more than Norway's total proved reserves – to currently 8.5 tcm. In 2009, the US also surpassed Russia as the world's leading producer of natural gas.

As a result, US companies have started to seek permission from the Department of Energy to export shale gas via LNG shipments. Up until now, 14 non-Free Trade Agreement (FTA) LNG export projects have won approval; around 40 more projects are being reviewed. Therefore, the US stands to become a significant exporter of natural gas in the near future. Together, the 14 approved terminals hold a capacity of 144 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year. This is more than the entire annual export volume of Qatar, which is currently the world's leading LNG exporter.

However, it is far from certain that large quantities of US LNG will ultimately make their way to Europe. First, while higher gas prices overseas have created incentives to export resources, LNG projects face domestic opposition. The US petrochemical sector, for instance, led by Dow Chemical, has mounted a campaign against gas exports arguing that the US should instead focus on maintaining a competitive edge in its industrial sector. And several conservative groups, including the Tea Party, are fundamentally opposed to any kind of energy exports as they regard them as inconsistent with the goal of energy independence.


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Moreover, the current lower oil price levels worldwide also imply diminished oil-indexed gas prices, which threatens the economics of LNG exports. Even if global oil prices recover, US exports will first and foremost go wherever the profit margins are highest. Asia still constitutes 75 percent of the global LNG market, and many experts expect prices there to eventually recover, primarily due to the lack of viable alternatives.

Nonetheless, the United States is the most likely candidate as an alternative supplier in the short to medium term. In particular the record US trade deficit as well as the higher European price levels compared to Henry Hub prices create incentives for the country to boost its exports. Also, it remains a possibility that Europeans are willing to pay higher prices, or a so-called "security" premium, in order to diversify their supplies and boost energy security. This, however, is relatively unlikely due to the unwillingness of the European public to subsidize fossil fuel consumption.

Either way, the earliest LNG exports could begin as early as 2016, with most projects scheduled to come online between 2017 and 2019. Finally, even in the event that most US LNG exports will ultimately not go to Europe, the indirect effects on the gas markets via increased competition could still benefit European importers and help increase their bargaining position vis-a-vis their current suppliers.

## Azerbaijan and the Southern Gas Corridor

With proven reserves of approximately 0.9–2.55 tcm, Azerbaijan is expected to become an important gas supplier to Turkey and the EU in the mid-term. Its main development activities are focused on the Shaz Deniz II field in the South Caspian Sea. The approval of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) by the Shah Deniz Consortium in June 2013 represented a breakthrough toward the realization of the Southern Gas Corridor, which will enable Caspian gas supplies, and possibly additional deliveries from Middle Eastern sources, to be exported to Europe via Turkey.

TAP's initial capacity of 10 bcm of gas per year is expected to become available to European markets by 2019. An eventual expansion could double the volume. However, while TAP will help diversify the EU's supplier base, it is no panacea, as its initial capacity amounts to less than 5 percent of Europe's annual gas demand.


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## The Eastern Mediterranean

Substantial discoveries of gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean have opened up the prospect of the region becoming an additional alternative supplier to European consumers. The initial estimates of the offshore reserves off the coast of Israel and Cyprus range around 1.1 tcm. However, the geopolitical situation – in particular ongoing tensions between Turkey, Cyprus and Israel – makes the exploitation of the resources challenging.

One proposed export scenario consists of the construction of a pipeline from the Israeli Leviathan field via Cyprus to Turkey. In addition to serving the needs of gas-deprived Turkey, this project could also contribute to the diversification of European supplies since a share of the resources could be fed into TAP. An alternative solution was put forward by Israel's Energy Minister Silvan Shalom. His plan would include the construction of a much longer East Med gas pipeline, which would also link the gas fields of Israel and Cyprus, but instead lead to Greece.

Either way, realizing the potential of the Eastern Mediterranean region as a major supplier to Europe faces significant geopolitical obstacles. Furthermore, it would require a multi-billion Euro investment. Even if the project manages to overcome these challenges, substantial gas supplies to Europe would only become available in the medium to long term.

## Iraqi Kurdistan

Iraqi Kurdistan holds vast reserves of natural gas, which are estimated to range anywhere from 2.8 to 5.7 tcm. Even the most conservative estimates would be enough to satisfy Europe's total needs for over five years. Thus Northern Iraq is poised to become an important player in the natural gas sector in the mid- to long term.

The most likely export option would be through a pipeline to Turkey, from where a share of the supplies would reach European markets via TAP. The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has continually emphasized that its main focus is on piped gas exports to Turkey because of the proximity and strategic location.

However, energy supplies from Iraqi Kurdistan to neighbouring markets face a number of serious challenges. Ankara's escalating conflict with the PKK coupled with the deteriorating security situation across the region has started to put a strain on the KRG's strategic relationship with Turkey. Moreover, Erbil's relationship with the Central Government in Baghdad remains difficult, partly due to differences over the exploitation of the country's energy resources. Despite the


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dramatic economic development of Iraqi Kurdistan, Iraq as a whole remains a weak state and the advance of the forces of the Islamic State into Kurdish territories in the summer of 2014 could only be deterred through US airstrikes. As long as the security situation remains uncertain, the large-scale development of Iraqi Kurdistan's natural gas resources will be a daunting challenge.

### Iran

With an estimated 33.6 tcm of natural gas, according to BP, Iran trumps Russia as the world's largest holder of reserves. As a result Iran has the potential to be a major player on the global gas scene. However, its strained relations with the international community over its nuclear program and the tight sanctions regime put in place by Western nations have prevented the country from developing its potential and turning itself into a major gas exporter.

What is more, Iran suffers from outdated infrastructure and huge inefficiencies. Despite its tremendous reserves, the country is in fact a net importer of natural gas as it continues to flare about 11 bcm every year. This amount almost equals Azerbaijan's total yearly output. Moreover, its domestic consumption is the third highest worldwide, mainly due to large government subsidies.

While Iran's potential has so far been inaccessible, the recent breakthrough in the negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran holds the promise to fundamentally alter this situation, should Iran honour its commitments and the sanctions be gradually lifted beginning in December 2015.

The Iranian energy sector is in dire need of investments. Up until now, the commercial terms available to foreign companies had been deemed relatively unattractive. Yet Iran has announced that it will unveil a new type of contracts – so-called Iranian Petroleum Contracts (IPCs) – at a London conference scheduled for December 2015. These changes should help incentivize sorely needed investments into the Iranian energy infrastructure. The potential returns are impressive, not least because of the country's massive reserves. In addition to that, Iranian projects have a very high success rate estimated at 79 percent, compared to the global average of around 30 to 35 percent. As a result, potential investors have already started to explore new opportunities.

Iran's most likely export option would be via LNG to global markets, including Europe. This way, Iran would follow a general trend among major suppliers who increasingly prioritize LNG development in pursuit of demand diversification, just as importers seek to broaden their supplier base. With its vast reserves, Iran would have the ability to dramatically impact competition across world markets. The development of the remaining South Pars phases alone would be enough to increase its annual production capacity by about 160 bcm.


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As long as the political situation continues to improve, Iran has the potential to become a global energy powerhouse. Yet even if the political climate continues to improve, it will take huge investments and many years for this potential to materialize. Therefore, Iran might only become a supply alternative for Europe in the long term.

## Australia

Australia is already the third-largest LNG exporter, and with reserves of over 3.7 tcm and an estimated 318 bcm coming into production by 2018, it is destined to play an increasingly large role. During the past decade the Australian gas sector has seen investments of over 200 billion USD. Its recent development projects include the world's first LNG produced from coalbed methane.

However, as the country challenges Qatar as the world's leading LNG exporter, it faces a number of serious obstacles. Increased competition, in particular due to the development of US shale gas, and relatively low oil-indexed gas prices will likely make it difficult for its relatively higher cost LNG ventures to remain competitive. As a result, it is unclear whether Australia will be able to attract enough capital to complete is ambitious projects. Furthermore, a number of Australia's LNG developments have seen cost "blow outs". Australian projects are estimated to cost between 20 and 30 percent more than comparable ones in North America or East Africa, thus effective spending control is an even greater challenge.

As a result, Australia is unlikely to become a viable alternative for Europe in the short term. Even with improved cost control and a recovery of the global oil price, the primary markets for Australian LNG may well lie in Asia. Still, increased gas supply across Asia may lead to displaced supplies, which could then become available to Europe. In addition to that, increased competition should place downward pressure on Asian prices, which could help make the European market more attractive to global suppliers.

## Where do we go from here?

The prospect of additional gas suppliers and increased competition across global gas markets is a positive development for Europe and other gas-consuming regions. However, it is also evident that – with perhaps the exception of US LNG – most alternatives to Russian gas supplies will not become available in the short term, and all the options discussed here are subject to various constraints and challenges. Moreover, many future export options involve substantial geo-


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political risks of their own. Even if these obstacles can eventually be overcome, the underlying economics must be viable for Europe to enjoy genuine alternatives to Russian gas, which is far from certain.

For the foreseeable future then, Europe will have to rely on Russia for a substantial amount of its energy needs. While it is in Europe's interest to continue to explore opportunities for diversification, it will have to pursue a complementary strategy of continued cooperation on the basis of mutual interdependence. Europe and Russia have in fact maintained an energy partnership for over 50 years, which endured some of the worst periods of the Cold War. The German-Soviet "Gas for Pipes" deal established in 1970 was based on mutual interests, and the ensuing period of détente-helped pave the way for German reunification and the end of the partition of Europe.

In this context, it is important to bear in mind that from the perspective of exporting countries energy security means security of demand. As a consequence, Russia is equally dependent on a reliable consumer base. Despite Moscow's efforts to diversify its export destinations, Europe still constitutes 70 percent its gas exports. Moreover, the recent downturn of the Chinese economy has raised doubts whether the massive projects that Moscow and Beijing agreed on in 2014 will actually come to fruition.

Meanwhile, the European-Russian energy cooperation continues despite the recent political differences. For instance, Gazprom decided to expand Nord Stream's 3rd and 4th legs in partnership with Shell, E.ON, and OMV. In addition to that, the second quarter of 2015 saw an increase in Russian gas supplies to Germany by almost 50 percent, the largest since 2010. The rise of independent energy companies in Russia such as Novatek strengthens the argument for continued cooperation and is also a positive development for both regions, as it will serve to spur competition, thus enhancing efficiency and increasing Europe's supply options.

In sum, interdependence as a complementary strategy to continued efforts to diversify is both a proven approach and a fundamental reality. This has important implications that go well beyond the field of energy itself, as it underscores the need for a pragmatic foreign policy approach based on continued dialogue and the pursuit of common interests. Legitimate disagreements must not jeopardize peaceful coexistence and the continuation of mutually beneficial forms of cooperation.

In the field of energy, this approach will serve both sides' security needs, as Russia is equally dependent on reliable partners. Moreover, continued interdependence necessitates regular interactions, which has the potential to lead to positive spillover effects in other domains. Seizing the opportunities of interdependence has a significantly higher chance to contribute to an eventual rap-


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prochement than a strategy of confrontation and isolation. For this to become feasible, Europe and Russia need to find a new modus vivendi.



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Lena Guesnet

# Conflict Resources and Human Security

## Introduction

Even after the end of the diamond-financed civil wars of the 1990s, and despite the creation of the Kimberley Process for certifying raw diamonds, the debate surrounding raw materials used by violent actors remains relevant. With the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, the United States passed a law that was intended to block financing for conflicts in the DR Congo. Now the European Union, too, finds itself in the middle of a legislative process that defines the same raw materials as conflict resources and wants to take them out of circulation worldwide.

Both of these indicate that the issue of conflict financing through raw materials, and corporate responsibility on this issue, have made it into the political agenda. What is less discussed and politically regulated are the conditions under which raw materials are extracted, particularly with regard to social and environmental questions. The concept of human security makes it possible to include these areas and to create a broader understanding of corporate responsibility.

This chapter will first characterize issues pertaining to conflict resources and second, address threats to human security in the resource sector. The final section will derive conclusions regarding the responsibilities of corporations (and states).

## Conflict resources and resource conflicts

In the last two decades, many publications have addressed the issues of conflict resources and resource conflicts[1]. Blood or conflict diamonds have become in-

1 Overviews can be found in Rosser, A. (2006). The political economy of the resource curse. A literature review. Brighton (IDS working paper).; Cuvelier, J., Vlassenroot, K. and Olin, N. (2013). Resources, Conflict and Governance: a critical review of the evidence (JRSP Paper 9); Koubi, V., Spilker, G., Bohmelt, T. and Bernauer, T. (2014). Do natural resources matter for interstate and intrastate armed conflict? *Journal of Peace Research*, 51 (2), pp. 227–243.


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famous in the public eye due to the civil wars in West Africa and Angola in the 1990s. Mining and trade of diamonds controlled by the conflict parties played a significant role in financing those conflicts. Violence affected diamond mining, since civilians were forced to dig for diamonds under the threat of violence. At the same time, the armed groups used the resulting income to finance arms and munitions. That made diamonds a conflict resource *par excellence*.

Proceeds from the resource sector remain a source of income for armed groups. Some current conflict resources include gold in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Colombia, diamonds in the Central African Republic, rubies in Myanmar, and oil in the regions controlled by the Islamic State.

The public debate, and to some extent the academic debate, repeatedly emphasize the security risk inherent in resources: It is assumed that raw materials will play an increasingly important role as a reason for conflicts[2]. They are considered both an object of and a reason for international and domestic resource conflicts. A certain inclination toward geo-determinism can be discerned here[3], which includes not only non-renewable mineral resources like diamonds and oil, but also renewable resources like water and land as well as the plants grown on it.

Two different explanations must be distinguished: in the Malthusian tradition, it is assumed that a shortage of raw materials creates distribution conflicts. Literature on the "resource curse" and the "paradox of plenty" correlates an excess of raw materials with weak/poor government leadership, violent conflicts, and a dysfunctional state economy. However, the findings remain contradictory, and no causality has yet been proven[4].

It should be noted that neither the presence ("greed" argument) nor the absence ("grievances" argument) of raw materials is a sufficient criterion to cause the outbreak of a conflict. Rather, the respective political, social and economic factors must be considered in each conflict situation along with historical influences, and the effects of a surplus or deficit of resources must be analyzed in terms of these many interlinked causes. In the absence of such underlying conflict lines, a shortage situation could also lead to increased co-

2 UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) (2009). From Conflict to Peacebuilding: the Role of Natural Resources and the Environment.

3 Korf, B. (2015). Zur Politischen Ökologie der Gewalt. In: B. Korf and C. Schetter (Eds.). Geographien der Gewalt. Kriege, Konflikte und die Ordnung des Raumes im 21. Jahrhundert. Stuttgart: Borntraeger (Studienbücher der Geographie), pp. 72–92; Oßenbrügge, J. (2015). Kontinuität der Ressourcenkonflikte und kommende Klimakriege. In: B. Korf and C. Schetter (Eds.): Geographien der Gewalt. Kriege, Konflikte und die Ordnung des Raumes im 21. Jahrhundert. Stuttgart: Borntraeger (Studienbücher der Geographie), pp. 93–115.

4 Rosser, A. (2006). The political economy of the resource curse. A literature review. Brighton (IDS working paper).


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operation.[5] Thus, it must be noted that resources do not act as the sole object of conflict nor the sole cause; rather, they act indirectly within a network of competing interests. During a conflict, on the other hand, securing access to lucrative resources can become an end in itself. This occurred during the Second Congo War (1998–2003), when maintaining the wartime economy became more urgent than finding an (in any case unlikely) military solution to the conflict[6].

The increasing importance of raw materials in financing conflicts – especially in relation to the global shifts after the end of the East-West conflict[7] – provoked counter-reactions. The civic and political initiatives to create more transparency in the resource sector (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, EITI; Publish What You Pay, PWYP), to establish responsibility along mineral delivery chains (Dodd-Frank Act; EU legislation on conflict minerals) and to certify conflict-free raw materials (Kimberley Process for raw diamonds, Fairphone, Certified Trading Chains) are all expressions of this.

Certainly, this can be considered progress. In particular, the implicit acknowledgement of governmental and corporate responsibility for the (unintended) consequences of their actions is welcome. Nonetheless, some deficits remain, which will be explained below using the example of the Kimberley Process (KP).

The Kimberley Process for raw diamonds was established in 2003, in no small part in response to the civil campaign against "blood diamonds." It was the first institutionalized cooperation between companies, governments and civil society in the raw materials sector. Its goal is to protect legitimate trade with diamonds by excluding conflict diamonds – defined as raw diamonds contributing to finance rebel groups – from trading. This is supposed to be guaranteed by disclosing the delivery volumes and the export/import data, and ultimately by certifying the diamonds as conflict-free. As an innovative trailblazer, the Kimberley Process achieved a great deal. Still, it was not able to completely prevent the financing of rebel groups using diamonds. For instance, since the overthrow of the local government in May 2013, all of the violent actors in the Central African Republic have used diamonds, among other things, to purchase weap-

5 In the 19th century, for example, cooperation agreements were concluded between the Kikuyu and Maasai tribes in present-day Kenya, who were competing for livestock. These agreements made it possible to house Maasai children with the Kikuyu during periods of drought, since the Kikuyu were less impacted due to their lifestyle, and to ensure the children's survival.

6 Aust, B. and Jaspers, W. (2006). 'From Resource War to Violent Peace'. Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). *Bonn International Center for Conversion*. Bonn (BICC Paper 50).

7 Berdal, M. and Keen, D. (1997). Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Some Policy Implications. *Millennium – Journal of International Studies*, 26 (3), pp. 795–818; Le Billon, P. (2000). The political economy of war: what relief agencies need to know. Overseas Development Institute. London (HPN Network Paper, 33).


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ons. Thus the rebels were able to illegally sell the stones they obtained through violence (even if some of these have not yet made it onto the world market), and to reinvest the profits into their fight.[8] The KP's fine-meshed monitoring network did not manage to catch these conflict diamonds. Thus smuggling of these valuable stones remains a major problem that even the KP cannot effectively block.

In the past, the KP's narrow definition of conflict diamonds has also proven to be problematic. Limiting it to use by rebel groups fighting against a legitimate government leaves out other violent situations surrounding the diamond sector. For instance, the Zimbabwean government exercised violence against miners in the Marange mine in 2008, and people were injured and killed. However, the KP could not reach an agreement to expand the definition of conflict diamonds to include governmental violence.[9]

The debates within and surrounding the Kimberley Process also show that its focus on the dichotomy between conflict diamonds and conflict-free diamonds is too narrow if the goal is to promote peaceful conditions in the diamond sector.

Nonetheless, the Kimberley Process is an important tool for generating more information about the diamond sector and making it publicly accessible. This transparency gained through the KP makes it much easier to identify existing problems more precisely. At the same time, the KP offers a forum where companies, governments and civil society can work together on solutions.[10]

Still – as with the discussion regarding the definition of peace as the "absence of war" (negative definition) or as "positive peace" – it would be desirable to widen the focus in the resource sector as well. The narrow concept of "conflict-free resources" could then be replaced by "peace resources," which are mined under humane and environmentally friendly conditions. The concept of human security can provide a solid basis for this.

8 The Enough Project estimates the value of the illegal diamond trade and taxation at 3.87 to 5.8 million dollars a year. The majority of these diamonds (and gold) are smuggled into the neighboring countries of Cameroon, DR Congo and Sudan (see: Agger, K. (2015). Warlord Business. CAR's Violent Armed Groups and their Criminal Operations for Profit and Power. *Enough Project*).

9 Nonetheless, diamonds from the Marange region were embargoed by the KP, since their trade could not be tracked and thus was not compliant with KP rules.

10 This does, however, require a willingness to collaborate that is currently questionable. The coalition of nongovernmental organizations declared a boycott of the KP for 2016 because the chairmanship is moving to the United Arab Emirates, which in the past repeatedly expressed its disregard for civil society (see Max, D. (2015). Civil Society Organizations to Boycott KP in 2016. *Idex* [online]. Available at: http://www.idexonline.com/FullArticle?Id=41335 [Accessed 12 Mar. 2017]).


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## Human security in the resource sector

From the perspective of human security,[11] it is interesting to look at locations where raw materials are mined and traded without violent conflict. Here it is noteworthy that human security and thus human development are often thwarted when it comes to resource projects[12]. This is even more striking because resource projects and particularly major resource investments in developing countries are partly justified by stating that they can contribute to a country's development. For instance, the World Bank (WB), as a multinational institution, supports investments in the extractive industries (oil, gas, minerals) in order to help reduce poverty.

However, the literature refers to contradictory developments that occur regularly in resource-rich developing and emerging nations as well as in areas with resources. These take place on two levels: at the national level, the "resource curse" can refer to a combination of institutional, economic and societal problems. At the local level, the focus is on the effects that can be observed immediately surrounding resource projects.

As a result, the Extractive Industries Review (EIR) commissioned by the World Bank recommended that the WB only invest in extractive resources at the national level under certain circumstances. First, it needed to ensure that the state was not already involved in conflicts and that there was no threat of this; second, that the rule of law and good governance were in place; and third, that labor and human rights as well as environmental standards are respected. These "enabling conditions" are considered a requirement in order for investments in the resource sector to help reduce poverty. If they are not met, the World Bank should not invest[13].

At the local level, in other words at the site where major projects are conducted, civic and academic studies refer to systematic difficulties[14]. Since every

11 The concept of human security, as a positive security concept, includes more than just the absence of threats (freedom from fear). It directs attention toward human well-being (freedom from want), which is shaped by food security, economic security, health security, environmental security, personal security and political security (see UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (1994). Human Development Report 1994, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press).

12 Gamu, J., Le Billon, P. and Spiegel, S. (2015). Extractive industries and poverty. A review of recent findings and linkage mechanisms. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 2 (1), pp. 162–176.

13 WB (World Bank) (2003). Striking a Better Balance. Volume 1. The World Bank Group and Extractive Industries. World Bank, Washington, DC [online]. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/17705 [Accessed 12 Mar. 2017].

14 See Hilson, G. (2002). An overview of land use conflicts in mining communities. *Land Use Policy*, 19 (1), pp. 65–73; Guesnet, L. (2012). Folgen der Erdölförderung für die Konfliktdynamik im Tschad. In: M. Reder und H. Pfeifer (Eds.). Kampf um Ressourcen. Welt-


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resource project involves changes in land use and in the area available to the local population, an increased risk of conflict is prevalent. Especially in developing and emerging nations, land remains the most important resource for ensuring the population's survival. The question of access to land and fair compensation in the event that land is seized for resource projects is therefore especially relevant for human security, and an issue that arises systematically.

Furthermore, environmental incursions, soil, water and air pollution, alongside the fear of negative health implications, contribute to the concerns of the local population. The best-known example of negative environmental and social impacts in the extractive sector was and remains the Niger Delta, where oil extraction had, and still has, devastating effects. While the type and scope of environmental effects can vary widely depending on the project and the resource at hand, it is striking that this issue occurs in many different cases.

In addition, resource projects influence the local social, cultural and economic circumstances. This can create or intensify grievances that have a potential for conflict. Even compensation processes that aim to make amends for the negative consequences of projects can create their own conflict dynamics, for instance in regards to the appropriateness of the compensation or to participation in / influence over the negotiations. There is also a major challenge here when it comes to the question of land: fair compensation would need to ensure that the affected parties are able to cover their basic needs at least as well as before[15].

In the extractive sector, it has been proven that industrial mining[16] primarily has negative effects in terms of reducing poverty[17]. The EIR, too, determined that "the environment and the poor have been further threatened by the expansion of a country's extractive industries sector"[18]. In other words, the human security of those directly affected by extractive resource projects tends to be threatened rather than enhanced.

The wealth of examples and the recurring issues in both the extractive and the

ordnung zwischen Konkurrenz und Kooperation. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer (Globale Solidarität – Schritte zu einer neuen Weltkultur, 22), pp. 86–101; Hoinathy, R. (2013). Pétrole et changement social au Tchad. Rente pétrolière et monétisation des relations économiques et sociales dans la zone pétrolière de Doba. Paris: Karthala.

15 Brot für die Welt; Bonn International Center for Conversion (Eds.) (2014). Auf die Entschädigung kommt es an (Dialog 13).

16 Ibid. The distinction between industrial and artisanal mining is important here, because the latter can contribute to reducing poverty and to human security.

17 Gamu, J., Le Billon, P., Spiegel, S. (2015). Extractive industries and poverty. A review of recent findings and linkage mechanisms. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 2 (1), pp. 162–176.

18 WB (World Bank) (2003). Striking a Better Balance. Volume 1. The World Bank Group and Extractive Industries. Washington: World Bank, DC., p. 42 [online]. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/17705 [Accessed 12 Mar. 2017].


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agrarian sector suggest that individual cases indicate a systemic problem. Accordingly, it would be helpful to seek an answer to these difficulties both at the level of the individual local case and at the level of national and international regulations that can systematically influence resource projects.

## Securing human security

As shown above, the resource sector holds threats to human security at several levels and to varying degrees. This includes both resource-based conflict financing by violent actors and threats to human security in extraction areas – especially in developing and emerging nations. In order to promote human security around resource projects, a systematic approach to these problems is required. One important step would be to tie the extraction of resources in general to social and environmental criteria. Not only should companies be held accountable for not obtaining raw materials from violent actors, but should also be required not to endanger human security in the extraction areas.

A global regulation approach that requires environmentally and socially responsible action in the resource sector would have the potential to positively affect both issues. There is already a good model for this: the "Protect, Respect and Remedy" framework unanimously approved by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2008, and the accompanying "UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights" from 2011. According to these, it is the task of the state to *protect* human rights and the responsibility of companies to *respect* them, and there must be tools in place to actually *remedy* abuses.

Of course, this is a completely voluntary instrument. It has already led to some improvements, since companies are increasingly obligated to comply with the voluntary principles and have adapted their standards accordingly. But given the size and scope of the constantly recurring problems, even greater efforts are needed in order to have an effect on the structures in the resource sector. This requires a binding international contract[19]. In fact, since 2014 an intergovernmental working group convened by the UN Human Rights Council has been working to develop a mechanism that requires "comprehensive, effective and sustainable protection for human and labor rights as well as environmental protection"[20]. In order to ensure that this mechanism is implemented, it will need

19 See Müller-Hoff, C. (2015). Alle Rechte – keine Pflichten. Schutz für Mensch und Umwelt – Eine Orientierungshilfe im Dschungel der Diskussion um Unternehmensregulierung. FDCL-Verlag. Forschungs- und Dokumentationszentrum Chile-Lateinamerika e. V. – FDCL. Berlin: FDCL-Verlag.

20 Translated by the author. See Müller-Hoff, C. (2015). Alle Rechte – keine Pflichten. Schutz für Mensch und Umwelt – Eine Orientierungshilfe im Dschungel der Diskussion um Unter-


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to be both binding and enforceable. Only then will it provide a basis that forces governments and companies to fulfill their responsibilities toward human security.

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Christian Schmidt

# Food Security as a Contribution to Security Policy

I can well remember the 2011 Munich Security Conference. Filled with hope and joy, we watched what was happening on Tahrir Square via a live video link. Together we tried to find answers and develop strategies to strengthen the push for democracy in the Arab Spring and at the same time to ensure that the transition was managed smoothly and carefully. But history caught up with us more quickly than we thought.

The Arab Spring came as a surprise for most security experts as well. It was not triggered by any political thunderbolt. It was caused by a number of factors coming together. But one major factor in an opaque situation was the extreme rise in food prices. This drove people from all walks of life onto the streets. European history also contains many examples of uprisings brought about by hunger and starvation. It is impossible to prove the factual accuracy of Marie Antoinette response to peasants screaming for bread to "let them eat cake", which she is purported to have said on the eve of the French Revolution. But it shows very clearly what hunger can drive people to do and how great the gap can be between the starving and the well-fed.

Even today, a large section of humanity spends over half their income on food. Price hikes due to food shortages then become existential threats. The poorest are hit the hardest: the ten percent of the population that have 1.90 US Dollars or less to live on per day. Price increases make it almost impossible for them to provide adequate food for themselves and their families. This leads to fear and desperation and increases the likelihood of unrest. Unrest that is caused by hunger and poverty but that may be exploited for political purposes or may lead to widespread political protests.

What is more, food insecurity combined with limited income opportunities, both within and outside the farming sector, can lead to people being left with no hope or prospects for the future. In Europe, we are also familiar with this phenomenon: in the 17th and 18th centuries, whole hosts of people left their villages and towns to seek their fortune in the "New World". Today the largest migration movement worldwide is from rural to urban areas. People are tempted by the



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hope of finding a better life for themselves and their families. But the integration of rural migrants often exceeds the capacities of towns and cities. The rapidly growing populations of towns and cities, combined with insufficient access to food, may ultimately also lead to unrest and ultimately to political instability. Agricultural ministers from throughout the world will therefore meet in Berlin in January 2016 at my invitation to discuss how we can ensure that the growing urban centres are supplied with adequate food.

## Causes of food insecurity

The current global supply of food would theoretically be enough to provide everyone in the world with adequate food. But many people do not have access to adequate food. Other factors that prevent hunger and malnutrition being overcome include insufficient regional supply, bad storage capacities and high post-harvest food losses. In the long term, these problems will be exacerbated because the world population and, consequently, the worldwide need for food and agricultural commodities are growing more quickly than agricultural production.

By 2050 the world's population is expected to grow to 9.7 billion. At the same time, incomes will continue to grow, particularly in developing countries. As prosperity grows, the demand for higher-value foods such as meat and dairy products will grow as well. But the manufacture of livestock products places greater demands on resources than plant-based foods do. Added to this is the growing use of agricultural commodities for material and energy purposes. According to estimates by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), the worldwide demand for agricultural products will grow by up to 70 percent by 2050.

A challenge such as this can only be met by an agriculture that is both productive and sustainable i. e. that is efficient, environmentally friendly and socially acceptable as well as resource-conserving. The resources required for agricultural production (soil, water, nutrients, biodiversity) are limited. There is limited scope for expanding these resources, particularly the amount of land devoted to agriculture. On the contrary, throughout the world land is being lost every day to infrastructure measures, industrial use and the expansion of urban conurbations.

In the long term, climate change will also lead to significant yield losses. The weather phenomenon El Nino has already provided clear evidence of this, causing acute aridity and consequently crop failures in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa but also in parts of Asia.

Weak governance and corruption play their part in preventing producers,


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particularly from developing countries, from tailoring their products to meet market needs.

It is clear that if agriculture does not react appropriately to these challenges, then global food security will not just be caused by distribution problems but will instead also be caused by significant shortages in supply. This would have a severe impact on global peace. It is our responsibility today to prevent such a situation at all costs.

## The 2007/2008 food crisis and its political consequences

In addition to the upheavals and revolts of the more distant past, the 2007/2008 food crisis also showed very clearly what consequences food shortages could have. For a long time, supply and demand for agricultural products was balanced by international trade and storage. Until the beginning of this millennium, the European Union's greatest challenge in terms of agricultural policy was to solve the problem of structural surpluses. Large areas of land in the European Union were therefore set aside and thus could no longer be used for agricultural production. Throughout the world, less and less attention was devoted to agricultural development. The consequences of failing to bolster agriculture sufficiently in developing countries went almost unheeded during this phase. Indeed, the export subsidies in place in many industrialised countries even undermined regional agricultural structures.

All these factors, together with a general price hike on the raw commodities markets, finally led between late 2007 and mid-2008 to the price of wheat, maize and rice rising dramatically on world markets and remaining high for a long time. These price hikes led to severe supply problems which caused food riots, some of them on a huge scale, in a large number of countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and America.

This development drew attention to the global interplay of the markets, thus highlighting another factor that makes food security a global problem that can only be solved by joint action from the international community. For this reason, Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel put the subject of food security on the international agenda during Japan's G8 presidency in 2008. The G7/(8) and G20 have been addressing this problem ever since. They have also taken institutional measures to improve market transparency and make information freely accessible by setting up the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS).The aim is to prevent a repetition of the erratic price movements we saw in 2007/08.

The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted at the UN Sustainability Summit in New York in September 2015 also accord food security a prominent place. The second goal explicitly addresses global food security and


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support for sustainable agriculture. The realisation that sustainable agriculture must be the key to food security worldwide has now been acknowledged at international level. This is an important milestone, as agriculture had not featured as a focus of development cooperation for more than 20 years. The current situation in the Middle East provides particularly clear evidence that the networked approach followed in security policy must also, and in particular, establish consistency in food security. Security must be understood to relate both to quantity and quality.

## Food security measures

In cases of acute famine, it is imperative to provide rapid support to those affected. The international community provides short-term humanitarian aid in cases of emergency and catastrophes. The World Food Programme was set up in 1961 by the UN General Assembly and the FAO to provide those in need with food in emergencies (e. g. victims of drought catastrophes or refugees).

The world food supply can only be secured in the long term by an efficient, locally adapted, sustainable agriculture and the development of economically attractive rural areas. This includes supporting the downstream sectors of trade and processing, not least in order to be able to supply urban centres with high-quality food. According to a study by the World Bank, investments in agriculture play a greater role in food security and social development than investments in other economic sectors. Increasing productivity in agriculture creates jobs and consequently income. Ultimately, this will make it possible to sustainably ease and reduce the causes of migration and political instability, factors which may otherwise set off large-scale unrest at local and regional level.

The extent to which the amount of agricultural land can be expanded is, however, usually very limited – and also usually comes at a high ecological cost. This means that productivity on existing land must be improved. Some of the agricultural land that currently has low yields in parts of Africa, Asia, South America and Eastern Europe has the greatest potential for growth. What is needed is responsible investment in agriculture. To invest, farmers need access to banks and credit. This presupposes the recognition and protection of existing rights of tenure over natural resources, above all land and water, as provided for in the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security that were adopted in 2012. The Voluntary Guidelines provide the international community with assistance and guidance and are intended to ensure that investments also benefit those affected by hunger and malnutrition. I and the FAO are taking action to promote the global implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines. Safe and


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equitable access to natural resources provides planning security and reduces the potential for conflict.

In addition to this, the aim must be to support family farming and in particular strengthen the role of women. Small and medium-sized family farms are the foundation of agricultural production in emerging economies and developing countries. They account for around 60 to 80 percent of the food produced in developing countries. Yet smallholders and women frequently have little or no access to credits, natural resources such as land and water, markets, infrastructure or agricultural inputs. They need training, appropriate and up-to-date information and targeted advice in order to participate in markets effectively. The tenure rights of women and of small and medium-sized family farms must be strengthened and safeguarded, as must their involvement in investment decisions that could restrict these rights.

But we in industrialised countries also bear responsibility: the decisions we make on what foods to buy and consume have an impact on how agricultural commodities are produced. Based on the instrument of voluntary commitment, I am taking action to try and ensure that all agricultural commodities used in Germany and beyond are produced sustainably.

## Conclusion

International food security and consequently the implementation of the human right to food plays an important role in peacebuilding and security policy. Agriculture is a key instrument not only for food security but also for the political and social stability of a region. When developing security-policy strategies, we should bear in mind agriculture and its potential for assisting food security across the globe. We need internationally coordinated strategies to bring about a turnaround.


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Stephan Klingebiel / Annamarie Bindenagel Šehović

# Making Global Health Governance Work: Recommendations for How to Respond to Global Health Post-Ebola

## Introduction

The Ebola pandemic again raised the spectre of a global health crisis as a crisis of global proportion and of global concern. While the 2014–2015 pandemic was locally concentrated, it required responses on a local scale with a global scope. Its trajectory was the subject of volatile predictions, confused communication, imperilled responses and panic. It presented at once a health crisis, with severe economic repercussions, and a threat to peace and security, especially in the region and even beyond. It remains a lesson for global health post-Ebola as well.

In the immediate term, responses to Ebola, and similarly locally concentrated but globally relevant pandemic threats, should be twofold.

- To bring the **immediate crisis under control.** Here we propose a set of short-term actions that are based on a much stronger commitment and coordination by the international community. Above all, these are geared towards establishing an acknowledged and legitimate global health leadership structure: based in the United Nations system and supported by key global players such as the United States and the European Union.
- In overcoming the latest Ebola outbreak with a view towards drawing conclusions to prevent another such crisis, international actors need to reflect on the **structural aspects undergirding this crisis.** Three elements of such a response need to be recognised. First, the Ebola pandemic, and similar threats, constitute a global crisis; in addition to the individual impacts of infection, a global pandemic can easily lead to a panic in which health, social, economic and political costs are impossible to quantify. Second, these are a health crisis not only for those infected with and affected by the Ebola virus, but also for the most affected region – in health, economic and security terms (as people seek health care apart from Ebola or pandemic treatment). Third, Ebola poses a health, economic and security crisis for the (West) Africa region and beyond: its spread threatens the fragile gains made in the post-conflict societies of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The broader West Africa region


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and the Sahel are characterised by fragile social cohesion, as people struggle to sustain livelihoods curtailed by quarantines, fear and falling trade while authorities work to maintain and manage socio-political tensions. Ebola and other pandemic eruptions (currently Yellow Fever in the Democratic Republic of Congo; cholera in Haiti, for example) likewise threaten societies, economics and polities where they occur; fear of them fans out far further afield.

The 2014–2015 Ebola crisis illustrates the shortcomings of the way international cooperation is organised. In rising to the challenge of a committed, coordinated response, the following points must be acknowledged.

- Ebola's eruption into densely populated urban areas reinforces the vital necessity of functioning local, national and global health systems. Zoonoses are likely to multiply; learning to predict and prepare for them is vital.
- It makes it clear that weak and fragile local systems, especially in a post-conflict setting, pose not only a local hazard but a global threat.
- Current crisis response mechanisms of the international community are neither effective nor adequate. To a large extent, the situation is caused by chronic underfunding of the core functions of leading international institutions.
- There are urgent opportunities that the international community should take advantage of to improve the workings of the (global) health sector, e.g. comprehensively supporting health systems' development and the Framework Convention on Global Health (FCGH).

## Ebola – What kind of crisis?

The Ebola crisis of 2014 was unique.[1] The speed with which this previously contained disease has become a pandemic is of a different order of magnitude than with previous outbreaks of other diseases. Its trajectory is being ascribed to the accelerating pace of globalisation and the accompanying (under)development. Its potential for harm is reminiscent of the 1918 Spanish Influenza, but global responses to HIV and AIDS can offer interim lessons.

The three worst-affected countries of 2014–2015 rank in the lowest tiers in terms of human development and health indicators. They have the lowest life expectancies (<60; in Sierra Leone ca. 45 years), the lowest levels of health expenditure, the lowest numbers of skilled birth attendants at birth (<50 per cent) and the highest maternal death rates (hundreds of times greater than

1 That said, as Sonia Shah argues in *Pandemic* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016), the eruption and spread of Ebola should have been foreseen.


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Western figures) in global comparison. The continued spread of Ebola in that region threatens this already vulnerable record. The virus' ability to (silently) spread further underscores both the frailty of potentially affected states and populations, and highlights the dire need for effective prevention and response at the social, economic and political levels.

The World Bank published dire predictions about the potential economic costs of the pandemic over the short- and medium terms. These costs have implications for health systems, health care and the education of health personnel, among other things.

| | **Short-term impact 2014** | **Medium-term impact (2015 – Low Ebola)** | **Medium-term impact (2015 – High Ebola)** |
|---|---|---|---|
| Guinea | 130 million (2.1 %) | -43 million (0.7 %) | 142 million (2.3 %) |
| Liberia | 66 million (3.4 %) | 113 million (5.8 %) | 234 million (12.0 %) |
| Sierra Leone | 163 million (3.3 %) | 59 million (1.2 %) | 439 million (8.9 %) |
| Core Three Countries | 359 million | 129 million | 815 million |
| West Africa | 2.2–7.4 billion | 1.6 billion | 25.2 billion |

Figure 1. Lost GDP due to Ebola in dollars and as Percentage of 2013 GDP.[2] Note: All values are expressed in 2013 US dollars.

More specifically, Ebola impacts health and governance on multiple levels.

- Regional: Even when this most recent Ebola pandemic was brought under control in the worst-affected countries, these suffer in its wake. Loss of human capital, economic constriction, food insecurity and weakened trust in government and security linger. The region still carries the image of a bastion of illness. Racist overtones permeate global perceptions. These latter are intensified in the 'migrant crisis' affecting Europe.
- International: The first cases of Ebola in Europe and the United States demonstrated the virus' global reach. International actors increased their efforts to deal with the crisis, though there are huge gaps remaining in terms of leadership, capacity and vital equipment. To a large extent, what responses were mounted were organised and implemented by the militaries of high-income countries, sometimes without the proper medical support necessary to ac-

2 The World Bank (2014). Ebola: New World Bank Group Study Forecasts Billions in Economic Loss if Epidemic Lasts Longer, Spreads in West Africa. The World Bank [online]. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/10/08/ebola-new-world-bank-group-study-forecasts-billions-in-economic-loss-if-epidemic-lasts-longer-spreads-in-west-africa [Accessed 20 Oct. 2014].


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tually stem – as opposed to quarantine – the pandemic. These military interventions were precarious but, were largely requested and welcomed by the worst-affected countries. The longer-term implications of mobilizing militaries to intervene in health crises is the subject of much debate. The fact that the role of states and (external) militaries are unresolved with regard to pandemic response is an enormous challenge. Establishing a functioning international system to deal with the tremendous coordination requirements is critical. A legitimate, mandated global health government system – as opposed to voluntary global governance – is lacking, even in a basic sense.

## Tracing the trajectory from HIV and AIDS to Ebola: Mining for lessons

The global response to HIV and AIDS offers some insights and lessons, despite key differences in affected populations, incentives for governments to act and the effective time it has taken to mount a response now taken for granted.

- The lead response remains with the United Nations Security Council and the Secretary-General, not with a new institution (such as UNAIDS), nor the World Health Organisation (WHO), whose leadership and legitimacy are being called into question.
- WHO plays a technical role in publishing treatment and care guidelines and training medical personnel, such as it did the Cuban doctors who responded to Ebola in Sierra Leone.
- The funding arm for HIV and AIDS, UNITAID, might be serviceable in funnelling emergency funds to the Ebola, or other pandemic, response.

In a show of progress, HIV and AIDS were highlighted as a global problem by rights activists, and today the *rights* of Ebola victims regarding access to treatment are undisputed. The recent UN acknowledgement at the end of 2016 of its culpability in bringing cholera into Haiti is likewise a sign of rights' ascension.[3] The lawsuit against the UN also indicates a shift towards accountability on the part of international organizations, which may well change the remit of health response – but it has not done so just yet.

As in the response to the HIV and AIDS pandemic, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution S/Res/2177 2014, calling on countries to respond to Ebola and for the international community to act. Furthermore, as was also the case with HIV and AIDS, the necessary response to Ebola must come

3 See http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/08/18/490468640/u-n-admits-role-in-haiti-cholera-outbreak-that-has-killed-thousands.


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from: the highest ranks of global health and global health governance; the security apparatuses charged with preventing conflict and protecting peace; industry and philanthropy that are prepared to, and compelled to, do "their part".

## Missing global health governance: Who is in charge?

In terms of the response to Ebola, existing global health governance arrangements have proven to be neither functional nor sufficient in terms of coordination and oversight on the one hand, or in terms of magnitude on the other. Most notably, following the first confirmed case on March 25, it took WHO – which is the designated international leader in health and emergency response – until August 28 to declare a global health emergency. In taking so long, it forfeited legitimacy even before its director, Dr Margaret Chan, stated that it was only a "technical agency".

**Box 1: WHO – A key actor?**

When thinking about health crisis situations, WHO should have the leading global role: "WHO is the directing and coordinating authority for health within the United Nations system. It is responsible for providing leadership on global health matters, shaping the health research agenda, setting norms and standards, articulating evidence-based policy options, providing technical support to countries and monitoring and assessing health trends."

However, in terms of health standards, not all UN member states have clear commitments to follow, for example, the recommendations on travel regulations regarding the Ebola crisis. In terms of operational capacity, WHO is not in a financial position to react in a significant way.

The approved budget for 2014–2015 was US$ 3.977 billion. This is a minor increase compared to the previous period (2012–2013) but lower than the previous two budgets. The allotment for crisis responses in that budget was also reduced, from US$ 469 million (2012–2013) to US$ 228 million (2014–2015).

The approved budget for 2016–2017 (WHA68.1) was US$ 4.4 billion, and includes US$ 236.6 million, or 8 % more than the previous. However, the amount foreseen for crisis response was further reduced from US$ 469 million (2012–2013) to US$ 228 million (2014–2015) to (anticipated) US$ 204.5 million (2016–2017).[4]

Looking beyond WHO, in order to garner the action necessary, and to ensure its efficacy in fighting the pandemic outbreaks such as Ebola and beyond, four points must be kept in mind.

First, successful policy depends upon its resonance, applicability and im-

4 Source: The World Health Organization [online]. Available at: http://www.who.int/about/finances-accountability/budget/PB201617_en.pdf?ua=1 [Accessed 15 Jan. 2016].


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plementation at the individual, local, State, international and global levels. Second, the order of priorities for a successful response (political, medical, and economic) must be defined. Third, the actors who are to lead the different areas of response must be identified. Fourth, the possibilities and most expedient ways for carrying out the chosen response must be determined.

After initial and expanded interventions by global health actions, the political response to Ebola, as to HIV and AIDS, got off the ground. Critical to it were actions by:

- Renowned NGO Médecins Sans Frontières, whose staff and equipment are heroically deployed and employed alongside local medical practitioners, and the non-medical teams such as those responsible for the highly technical and dangerous task of burial, remain on task. Their guidelines were largely been adopted by the US Centres for Disease Control.
- The United States sent a handful of medical experts and logistics personnel. President Barack Obama pledged 3,000 troops to Liberia at the request of that government. They built 17 medical facilities where Ebola can be treated. The United States has also committed US$ 500 million (plus) of a global US$ 2 billion effort to combat the disease. It named an Ebola "czar". The facilities threatened to become redundant after the epidemic receded, and most were indeed closed. Requests particularly on the part of the Liberian government, and preliminary proposals to transform these into general medical facilities have fallen on deaf ears and not come to fruition.
- The German government also appointed an Ebola Ambassador, and committed to organise air transport facilities jointly with France and to provide a mobile hospital and medical equipment. However, the EU sent fewer than 200 support staff. The EU itself never named an Ebola leader.
- Of the BRICS, China initially sent about 50 personnel, and followed up with an additional ca. 150.
- Cuba, relative to its size, sent the largest number of – and the most vital – support personnel: doctors, about 300 total. These went going to Sierra Leone, which lost its only epidemiologist to the epidemic.
- In addition to passing Resolution 2177 (2014), the UN deployed UNHAR (Humanitarian Air Relief) to facilitate logistics support to Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.
- The UN also named two Ebola chiefs – David Nabarro, UN System Senior Coordinator for Ebola Virus Disease, and Anthony Banbury, Deputy Ebola Coordinator and Operation Crisis Manager.

Although the World Bank sent US$ 105 million within nine days of announcing its contribution to Liberia's Ebola response, the systemic collection of and use of money to fight Ebola – to ensure access to treatments (hydration salts) and


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protective equipment, and to shore up buckling health systems while planning for the economic (re-)habilitation of the worst-affected region – have been non-existent. This lack of coordination poses perhaps the direst problem to the challenge of global health responses in the event of future pandemics.

## Conclusions

There are four things undermining any response – let alone a sustained response – to Ebola and beyond:

- chaotic and ineffective communication about medical protocols and risk-management;
- insufficient international action, particularly on the part of national governments and global health governance structures, which could – and must – funnel financing, personnel and equipment to the hardest-hit region and put them all to good use;
- uncoordinated international action;
- and a failure of the multilateral system of global health governance *vis-à-vis* fragile states and vulnerable people to identify and assume responsibility and accountability for confronting the global threat of Ebola or other pandemic and acting on this information.

We propose a twofold approach with short-term actions and structural responses. Regarding **short-term aspects,** we recommend six actions.

1. Designate one command centre for the response to Ebola / pandemic outbreaks as a health crisis – at the UN, for instance through the UN Secretary-General's office, and not at WHO, which has shown neither the capacity nor inclination to assume a leadership role beyond some technical support.
2. Delineate the health protocols necessary to be followed by those directly confronted with the virus, and clarify the points of release of any changes through the command centre.
   - Mandate compliance with the protocol – hygienic regimes must be mandatory.
   - This should include the direction and voluntary/compulsory production of – preferably at (reduced) cost – protective gear by the UN and member states. (Requests for protective gear at US hospitals are rising – the worst-affected region needs them most and the gear should be donated at or below cost.)
   - Incentives (such as high-income countries paying for protective gear) and sanctions (companies shut out of contracts if they do not produce and


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provide such equipment) on governments and companies should be used to enforce these provisions.

3. Deploy a rapid reaction force(s) of the UN, via UNHAR, in cooperation with the African Union, EU and NATO member states, as well as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the Gulf States. This could be coordinated out of various centralized command centres, such as the US Africa Command (AFRICOM, based in Stuttgart, Germany). Indeed, this is already happening in order to support the logistical needs for equipment – including laboratory equipment, protective gear, medical personnel and support staff – to be sent to most affected countries, such as Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone during the 2014–2015 Ebola pandemic. This is not a military intervention but humanitarian action supported by (military) logistics experts.
4. Deploy local and imported staff and equipment; quarantine, treat and habilitate those infected and affected by the disease to stem the tide of Ebola / pandemic disease, including as is currently relevant, cholera.
5. Employ local and imported staff and equipment to respond to other health emergencies and contingencies.
6. Establish corridors of relief and rehabilitation plans to provide for health care beyond Ebola triage, food security and agrarian production; this could serve as a forerunner to a necessary "Marshall Plan" for afflicted regions, so that Ebola, and future disease outbreaks, can be better contained.

In order to remedy this, in addition to the direct medical response to Ebola / pandemic outbreaks, attention needs to be paid to a number of glaring structural gaps in global health governance that this pandemic has laid bare. Our responses to those issues include four actions focussing on **structural aspects.**

1. The international community needs to reflect on how the (global) health sector is supported by development cooperation. Since assistance for the health sector is increasingly organised around specific diseases (such as special funds to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria), Ebola's, in anticipation of another (zoonotic) pandemic, spread is a clarion call for a more systemic approach to health systems that is integrated and comprehensive.
2. Furthermore, the virus's spread and the devastation that it is wreaking showcase the shortcomings of this approach, namely that health challenges addressed by development cooperation in fragile and weak state settings cannot substitute for robust local or national systems and responses.
3. Ebola, like HIV and AIDS and cholera, make it clear that weak and fragile local systems, especially in setting of post-conflict and post environmental catastrophe, can create major global impacts.


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4. Current crisis response mechanisms of the international community are neither effective nor adequate. Although international actors are reacting, with considerable delay, specialised international institutions have abdicated leadership responsibilities. To a large extent, the situation is caused by chronic underfunding of the core functions of leading international institutions.

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# III. Implications for Germany


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Herfried Münkler

# Germany's International Responsibility

Whenever people talk about responsibility in the political context, especially in international relations, they refer to a vague and often ambiguous concept. In general, responsibility means a diagonal line between protecting or asserting a country's own interests and its duties to provide public goods. Public goods, such as security and freedom, are those goods that no one can be excluded from, even if they did not contribute to their availability. While the willingness of a country to take responsibility in the first case relates directly to the benefits it receives, exactly the opposite is true in the other case. The greatest benefit from public goods is with those countries that receive all the goods without participating in the costs of their production. Game theory refers to these actors as "free riders". When travelling in a car, they do not contribute any efforts or pay any transportation fees, but, although they neither steer the car nor enjoy the more comfortable seats, when it comes to going from A to B, they receive the same benefit as those who made sure the vehicle was moving in the first place. In the future, the Federal Republic of Germany will no longer be able to benefit from international security without contributing much to its existence. Therefore, it is currently in the midst of a relearning process. For Germany, this process is obviously difficult. But it is also unavoidable as the United States have been retreating from their position as a protector of European security, while the number and intensity of hot spots along the edges and in the periphery of Europe have been growing and Germany's importance within the European political order itself has been increasing.

However, responsibility is not only a conceptual diagonal between a country's own interests and the collective good. It is also a line between requirements and expectations on the one hand and the available capacities on the other (including the political will to use these capacities). Here, too, the conditions have changed in recent decades. In the era of the bloc confrontation between East and West, for each side security mainly meant to have a reliable ability to prevent and/or limit threats from the other side. In such symmetrical constellations, security was predictable to a certain extent. The end of the East-West conflict eliminated these


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conventional threats, leading to a greater peace dividend (lower costs to achieve the same result). However, new challenges developed subsequently. As they are much more diffuse, they created a situation in which the benchmark for security risks are no longer external threats but the vulnerability of societies and states. Vulnerability and resilience, thus, have become key categories in a security order in which it is hard to name the challengers, how they will behave, and what means they will use. As the challenged parties shift their security strategy from threat to vulnerability, they can respond more flexibly to unexpected and unforeseeable events. However, the new strategy cannot establish a security regime as stable as the one found in the age of external threat scenarios. The restructuring of European military forces, including the German army, was and is a direct expression of this change.

Yet, the greatest and most momentous change in the European security situation, including Germany's special role in it, comes from a change in the ideas about political order and its essential elements. Since its take-off in the 16th and 17th century, Europe's conventional organizational structure based on a territorial state and the associated regime of territorial borders. In the second half of the 20th century – in Europe, but also globally –, this order was superposed and in some cases even replaced by a regime of flows. Here, the central organizational element is not borders, but the unlimited movement of capital and information, goods and services. In recent decades, these two organizational structures complemented each other. The regime of goods and capital flows created a significant increase in wealth for Germany, thanks to its strong focus on exports, while the distribution of wealth was oriented toward the geographic limits of the territorial state. This was an ideal situation for Germany, but now it has been called into question since streams of refugees entered the border-free constellation of flows. This question of opening or closing borders is politically controversial in Germany and even more so in the European Union. At the moment, it is impossible to tell which direction Europe's political order will take. However, it is conceivable that there will be a new arrangement of flows and borders that must account for the various interests of the European states.

It is only as a part of those dramatic changes of international constellations that Germany assumes greater responsibility. It is, thus, inaccurate to say that Germany is "growing into" a position of greater responsibility. Rather, this strong commitment is embedded in a process of structural transformation. Although the time span, results and persistence of this transformation cannot be predicted, one can categorize Germany's new responsibilities into three geographic rings. The outer ring, tending to have global dimensions, concerns Germany's economic and general political interests, especially the export of goods. This includes its interest in the peaceful development of East Asia along with the South Asian region, sub-equatorial Africa, Central and South America.


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Germany has a strong interest in the existence of peace and stability in these regions, but it will not and cannot contribute much to the cause. Here, Germany benefits from peace and stability without making any major investments.

This outer geographic ring contrasts with an inner ring, in general represented by the area of the European Union. This is where Germany's responsibility is the greatest, and where a failure would have the most serious consequences. The central imperative is to keep the EU together, counteracting the strong centrifugal forces that have been developing since the EU's southern and eastern expansions. These expansions have made the European Union's societal structure more heterogeneous, and the new diversity of political cultures bound together in the Union has narrowed shared understandings of democracy, the rule of law, and liberality. The concept of Europe as a "community of values" became more of a postulate rather than a fact. Moreover, the financial and refugee crises have severely shaken the reliability of the contracts providing the fundament of the Union. In recent months, the European project has virtually reverted to an association of states pursuing their own separate interests, while the "Brussels institutions" – the Commission and the Parliament – have neither the will nor the ability to counteract this development.

As a result, the EU has seen a transfer of power to the intergovernmental level, the Council of Ministers, with the German government playing a key role in creating and financing compromises. In consequence, however, Germany also has the unpopular duty to ensure that contracts are followed and respected as well as to guarantee that any exceptions made do not constitute new privileges in the Union, but that they remain exceptions. In this dual role as the European Union's "paymaster" and "taskmaster," Germany is increasingly subject to attacks and hostility from several member states. Thus, in executing its EU duties, Germany must be careful not to fall into a minority position. This has become much more difficult with the obvious loosening of the traditional Berlin-Paris axis. As a result, Germany has recently focused on its role as "paymaster" and only occasionally performed the duties of a "guardian of contracts." Of course, this only assures the cohesion of the Union in the short term; in the long term, centrifugal forces will continue to grow if there is no "guardian of contracts." Furthermore, it is clear that Germany can only play its assigned role within the EU if the government's political freedom is not limited by the rise of right-wing or left-wing populist parties. The assumption of Germany's international responsibility in the inner ring depends on a tenuous prerequisite: the vast majority of the German electorate must accept the country's specific role in the EU, expressing its support through corresponding voting behavior. In light of the rise of right-wing and left-wing populist parties in most of the other EU states, the German electorate's earlier resistance to populism is an exception – and it is unclear for how long this will remain so. A loss of Germany's role as a "power in


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the middle" holding Europe together, however, would probably mean the end of the European Union in its existing form.

In principle, the sketched tasks within the EU already exhaust the limits of international responsibility that Germany can bear. Yet, in the middle between the outer and inner ring, there is another geographic ring of international responsibility. Germany's dilemma as a central European power has to do with the fact that it can only successfully manage the tasks in the inner ring if it also addresses the challenges and responsibilities of this middle ring. Geographically speaking, the middle ring includes Eastern Europe, the Near East, the Mediterranean coast opposite Europe, and the northern edge of sub-Saharan Africa from Mali to Somalia. The challenges in this region arise from a variety of factors, but they consistently come down to the problems of disintegrated or disintegrating forms of government. They affect Europe in at least three ways: in the form of infiltration by violent actors from civil war zones who want to extend their sphere of violence to Europe; in the creation of uncontrollable waves of refugees who surge across European borders, posing a challenge for the economic capacity and social balance of EU nations; and finally, in the emergence of neo-imperial ambitions among some political actors in the outskirts of Europe, which could cause the currently separate civil-war hot spots to become a single huge conflagration that can no longer be controlled or resolved using political tools.

There are two main "post-imperial" regions that have become a special challenge for Europe, and thus for Germany. In the broadest sense, the problems in both regions resulted from the disintegration of various multinational and multi-religious empires at the end of World War I: the Habsburg Empire, the empire of the Russian tsars, and the Ottoman Empire. Since their disintegration, respectively, since the end of the intermediate phase, in which Yugoslavia acted as "Little Habsburg" and the Soviet Union saw itself as the successor to the Tsarist Empire, national identities and religious affiliations have become politicized, employing them to declare friendship and enmity. One of these post-imperial regions reaches from the western Balkans across Ukraine and the Caucasus to the Caspian Sea; the other includes the Arab part of the former Ottoman Empire: from the Levant to the Indian Ocean, from Mesopotamia to the Libyan desert. Both regions did not manage to produce a system of stable nation-states or to develop economic prosperity. Rather, economic prosperity remained limited to short time periods and specific geographic areas, thus offering no compensation for the lack of political and identity-forming structures. In consequence, authoritarian structures and even dictatorial regimes emerged. In a number of cases, their inflexible ultra-stability has recently collapsed into civil war.

The Europeans, including Germany, will not be able to solve the problems of those regions – at least not alone and not in the short run. Taking international


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responsibility here means to make a sustainable contribution to stabilize and develop these regions politically as well as economically whenever possible, to transform smoldering wars of all kinds into frozen conflicts, and to find a partner who helps to stabilize and pacify the region. Contrary to a common assumption, this partner does not always have to be the United States, which in any case has shifted the center of its power projection to the Pacific region. It also can – and in some cases must – be Russia. Particularly in relation to Russia, Germany has a special role. During the Ukrainian crisis, it became clear that it is both willing and able to play this role.


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Norbert Röttgen

# Strategic Challenges for Germany's Foreign Policy

As Niccolo Machiavelli has taught us, states are self-interested and strive for their survival, integrity and prosperity. Despite the fact that Germany refused to speak about its own interests for a long time[1], the new White Paper 2016 does lay them out: "ensure freedom, security and prosperity for our citizens, to promote peace, and to strengthen the rule of law."[2] For decades Germany has pursued these interests in alliance with its European and international partners within an international system of supranational organisations and international law. This strong adherence to multilateral organisations constitutes one of the pillars of Germany's security strategy. The country supports a rules-based international system not only because of its normative conviction but also because such a system is vital for Germany's national security.

After the end of the Second World War Germany regained sovereignty, counterintuitively, by sharing power and firmly integrating into the Western alliance system. It renounced weapons of mass destruction and established an army whose sole purpose was self-defence. For its security, it relied heavily on the security umbrella provided by NATO. While Germany's security policy certainly changed with the end of the Cold War, the reliance on multilateral institutions has not. Multilateralism remains at the heart of Germany's security strategy.

One could define strategy as the use of power in pursuit of an objective.[3] A country's strategy can be challenged in two ways: a new geopolitical environment can cause a state's objectives and interests to change; and/or internal or external factors can impact the instruments used to reach defined goals. In both instances the strategy needs to be readjusted.

The 21st century has confronted us with both types of challenges. First, there is

1 Schwarz, H.-P., and Lucas Schneider, D. (1994). Germany's National and European Interests. *Daedalus*, 123(2), pp. 81–105.

2 The Federal Government of Germany (2016). White Paper 2016 – On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, p. 24.

3 Freedman, L. (2006). The Transformation of Strategic Affairs. Abingdon, Oxon: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 9.



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a new geopolitical environment, in which the law of the fittest is taking over and the rule of force replaces the rule of law. Second, the weakening of international institutions is undermining Germany's strategy of multilateralism and negotiation. These challenges should be examined in turn.

## A new geopolitical environment

Spoiled by the peaceful end of the Cold War, Europeans held the firm belief that conflicts are solved by sovereign states at the negotiation table and that national borders are respected – even among unequal partners. But Russia's annexation of Crimea and its involvement in the Ukrainian civil war call into question our long-held beliefs of how the world works. Russia's aggressive conduct teaches us that a Hobbesian reading of international affairs is not as far removed from reality as we might wish. The world is in danger of returning to an international system where might makes right.

The conflict in Syria lets us draw similar conclusions. While Europeans insist that there is no military solution for Syria, countries like Russia and Iran produce military realities on the ground, paving the way for their kind of political outcome. The fact that Europe does not have a seat at the table when Russia, Iran and Turkey meet in Moscow to discuss the future of Syria speaks volumes: it shows that brute force is taking over control. Without the capacity and the willingness to enforce the international law we try to uphold, our value-based system is toothless. Yet Western democracies continue to act as if the system were still working. We insist on talks and negotiations, while ignoring that others do not want to talk or do not stand by their own words. Aleppo is the tragic illustration of this phenomenon: Assad and Russia bomb their way to victory, execute people in their own homes, and commit mass murder while the West lodges outraged protests and negotiates without leverage.

Europe may currently only play a limited role in deciding the future of these conflicts, but it is nevertheless severely affected by them. Chancellor Merkel said in 2009 that European policy has become a part of our domestic policy.[4] One might say today that foreign policy has become a part of domestic policy. Never before has, for example, the reaction of Afghani refugees to a Turkey-EU agreement or American investors to a Greek announcement on public spending been so important to ordinary men and women in Germany. The increased interest in foreign events can lead to anxiety and to a desire for security, which in

4 Merkel, A. (2009). Humboldt-Rede zu Europa von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel [online]. Available at: https://www.hu-berlin.de/de/pr/medien/aktuell/reden/humboldt-rede_merkel [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].


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turn pushes citizens to seek comfort in isolationism and a re-nationalized Europe, contributing to the dissolution of the international order.

The refugee crisis is just one example of how international conflicts are coming home to our towns and villages. International politics have in fact reached personal computers and smartphones. The conflict in Ukraine, for example, is as much a war of information as it is an armed conflict – it is fought with fake news and on social media, fuelling distrust in the mainstream press. Amid reports about Russian cyberattacks during the US presidential election, fear of Russian interference with European elections in 2017 is on the rise.[5] The head of our domestic intelligence service, the BfV, says cyberattacks are already being directed against German parties and lawmakers.[6]

Thus at the end of 2016, Germany finds itself in a new geopolitical situation in which force risks to dictate the international agenda, where states cannot take their territorial integrity for granted, and citizens personally feel the repercussions of foreign policy. Germany's security strategy will have to respond to these new challenges.

## Germany's new toolkit: a responsible mix of power

The West is suffering from intervention fatigue. The wars of the past decade in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the intervention in Libya, all failed to produce the intended result: stability, security, and democratic structures. Instead, after 15 years our military presence is still necessary as Afghanistan remains unstable and is falling back into the hands of the Taliban. Iraq has become the breeding ground for the Islamic State and Libya is descending into chaos. While the motives for these wars might have been different, their effect on the Western psyche is similar and cumulative. Western powers have no desire to get caught up in another costly war in another Middle Eastern country. Moreover, the economic crisis of the past years has put budgets under stress. As a result, military spending has been cut dramatically. The Dutch army for example scrapped its last tank division in 2011.[7] Since 2008, Europe has lost 25 % of its firepower.[8]

5 After US Election Hacks, France Girds Against Cyberattacks (2016). *The New York Times* [online]. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2016/12/15/world/europe/ap-eu-france-election-hacking.html [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

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Europe is therefore not only lacking the will for military operations but also the capabilities.

In a world that is in danger to return to "might is right", we risk losing relevance and the power to shape the international order. To counteract these developments we first and foremost have to accept a geopolitical reality: negotiations have limited success without a big stick in your pocket. By continuing to drain military capabilities, Europe is robbing itself of the necessary leverage for successful political solutions. The Defence Ministry's announcement of an eight percent increase[9] in the defence budget for 2017 is a step in the right direction – as the White Paper 2016 acknowledges, however, higher spending must be coupled with better procurement coordination with our European allies for it to be truly effective.[10]

Of course, Europe will need to employ non-military tools to regain influence as well. As one of the world's most powerful and trade-driven economies, Germany should lead a push to levy European sanctions against Russia for its support of the murderous Assad regime. Moscow must see that its brutal actions have consequences. Indeed, using economic instruments to achieve political goals – with trade and investment deals as carrots and sanctions and trade conditionality as sticks and – will be an essential element of European strategy going forward.[11]

Cyberwarfare is the newest of all threats. In the past, experts have focused on what the Americans call "a cyber Pearl Harbor,"[12]a massive attack on civilian infrastructure. We are right to be wary of such an attack, possibly one carried out by non-state actors. However, recent offensive uses of cyberpower have been more insidious, relying on the spread of disinformation and propaganda (as in Ukraine) or on the release of stolen information (as in the 2016 United States elections). With federal elections approaching, it will be necessary to invest more in cyberdefense and to build up offensive capabilities to provide a deterrent. A cybersecurity education program could also teach citizens how to protect

Available at: https://causa.tagesspiegel.de/politik/zukunft-der-bundeswehr/die-zukunft-ist-europaisch-oder-gar-nicht.html [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

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themselves from phishing scams and other hacks. In short, cyber-capabilities must take their place alongside soft power and economic instruments as the non-military aspects of Germany's toolkit.

## Enfeebling Multilateral Institutions

In a turbulent global situation like this, strong alliances of like-minded partners are ever more important. Though if one challenge can be said to be at the heart of all of these crises, it is the enfeebling of multilateralism and international institutions – in other words, the weakness of the EU, the UN, and "the West" in the face of today's crises. The European Union is too preoccupied with internal crises to implement effective policies in its neighborhood. The UN Security Council, blocked up by Russian and Chinese vetoes, limits its ambition to limiting the damage. And should the new American President Donald Trump stand by his harsh campaign criticism of NATO, the future of the alliance could be in danger.

These are ominous developments for Germany's security strategy. Germany is not only dependent on NATO for its own security, but as one of the world's top export nations, it has a vital interest in a stable international order and the respect of the rule of law. The Federal Republic has no interest in the survival of the fittest. As a nation that seeks to work peacefully and in concern with its partners, it is Germany's task to help rebuild multilateralism.

## Europe at a breaking point

Before the signing of the Treaty of Rome, Konrad Adenauer highlighted the objective of a new period of European integration. Going beyond the prevention of war between European nations, integration should "ensure that Europe and the European countries retain their value, relevance, and standing in the world."[13] These words ring as true now as then: with each passing year, Europe makes up a smaller percentage of world economic output and the world population.[14] [15] And Germany, strong as we are, makes up only a small part of Europe.

13 Buchstab, G. and Schreiner, R. (eds.) (2007). Konrad Adenauer and the European Integration. Sankt Augustin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung [online]. Available at: http://www.kas.de/upload/ACDP/GB_Katalog_KA.pdf [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

14 International Monetary Fund (2016). World Economic Outlook. Subdued Demand: Symptoms and Remedies. Washington [online]. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

15 Eurostat (2016). Share of world population 1960, 2015, 2060 [online]. Available at: http://ec.


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The need for collective action is clear; the time for acting solely on a national level is long over.

The European Union, however, is in the most severe crisis in its history. Populist, anti-Europe movements across have reacted to the influx of refugees with calls to turn inwards and close borders. Efforts to bring stability back to Greece drag on, threatening our shared currency. Much of Europe is still reeling from the financial crisis of 2008. The unemployment rate in Spain is around 20 %; in Italy, 15 %; in France, 10 %.[16] For young people the figures are much worse.[17]

The UK, of course, has voted to leave the EU altogether. Germany should be concerned with protecting the integrity of Europe and the four freedoms on which the EU is built – leaving our Union should not be an attractive prospect. However, Britain is too important a partner for us to allow it simply to drift away from Europe. One option would be for Britain to enter a Continental Partnership with the EU. Under such an arrangement, Britain would stay in the internal market and have more control over the movement of labor, at the cost of contributing to the EU budget and giving up its say in determining EU rules.[18] Whatever the outcome of Brexit negotiations, continued close security cooperation between Britain and the EU is indispensable.

How can Germany, Europe's most powerful state, steer the EU out of this crisis? By acting as a problem-solver, not as a know-it-all, as Germany is too often seen. The linkage here is unavoidable, and a comprehensive compromise is the key. We in Berlin, correctly, call for solidarity from other member states with regard to caring for refugees within Europe and fighting the terror and poverty that causes these people to flee their homes. But Germany must also be willing to give ground on the energy and economic issues dividing the EU. Concretely, that means member states with struggling economies should have more room for manoeuvre in terms of budget deficits – as long as they pledge to reform their economies in return.

On the energy front, Germany should listen to the concerns of Poland and other eastern countries about the Nord Stream II gas pipeline. It's hard to make

europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Share_of_world_population,_1960,_2015_and_2060_(%25)_2.png [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

16 Eurostat (2016). Unemployment rate 2004–2015 [online]. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Unemployment_rate_2004-2015_(%25)_new.png [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

17 Eurostat (2016). Youth Unemployment 2015Q4 [online]. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Table_1_Youth_unemployment,_2015Q4_(%25).png [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

18 Pisani-Ferry, J., Röttgen, N., Sapir, A., Tucker, P. and Wolff, G. B. (2016). Europe after Brexit: A proposal for a continental partnership [online]. Available at: http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/EU-UK-20160829-final-1.pdf [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].


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the case that increasing Europe's gas dependence on state-backed Gazprom is in line with the EU Energy Union strategy's stated goal of diversifying energy supplies, or that it makes political sense to turn away from existing land pipelines, a source of transit fees for Slovakia and war-torn Ukraine, in order to reward a country against whom the EU has sanctions.[19] The pipeline may be an economic project, but it has ramifications well beyond the energy sphere and must therefore be evaluated for its political effect.[20] Either Europe has solidarity in all areas or nowhere at all.

Repairing Europe is both itself a strategic challenge for German foreign policy and a necessary condition for the overcoming of Germany's other challenges. Only by solving its internal crises can Europe take on more responsibility.

## Waning Western Alliance

If there is a debate about precisely which countries make up the West, the values of the West are clear and timeless. Liberal democracy, freedom of conscience and expression, the rule of law, personal responsibility – these are the values that Germany, Europe, and the United States seek to uphold. In this world of crumbling multilateralism, the West as a political concept is also under threat. Agreements and alliances provide the platform for the West to spread its values. Rebuilding the West starts with strengthening the bonds underpinning it.

In the past years, the Western alliance has come periodically under attack: the NSA scandal and growing anti-Americanism[21] among the public have weakened Germany's ties to its American partner. Meanwhile, opposition on both sides of the Atlantic has likely buried the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and with it a chance to bind Western economies together and establish an economic system of rules that reflects Europe and America's shared values. As the incoming Trump administration hints at policies opposed to these values, there is potential for the Transatlantic Alliance to further deteriorate. This is a challenge for German foreign policy. The United States is and will remain an irreplaceable part of the West, regardless of the disagreements Germany may

19 European Commission (2017). Energy Union and Climate [online]. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/energy-union-and-climate_en [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

20 Lang, K.-O. and Westphal K. (2016). Nord Stream 2: Versuch einer politischen und wirtschaftlichen Einordnung. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik [online]. Available at: https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2016S21_lng_wep.pdf [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

21 Stokes, B., Poushter, J. and Wike, R. (2015). America's Global Image. Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center [online]. Available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/23/1-americas-global-image/ [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].


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have with the Trump administration. Striving to rebuild the West as a normative concept should be one of Germany's strategic priorities.

Donald Trump heavily criticised NATO during his election campaign, deploring that the United States is paying for everyone else. Harsh tone aside, he is certainly not the first one to call on Europe to step up and contribute their fair share. In 2011, former US Secretary of Defence Robert M. Gates criticised the European contribution to the intervention in Libya, where European NATO members ran out of crucial ammunition less than a month into the conflict.[22] "There will be a dwindling appetite and patience in the US…", he warned, "to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defence."[23]

Despite the continuous admonitions by US and NATO officials, despite the heavily discussed American pivot to Asia as well as the planned reduction of US defence spending[24] Europe has been unwilling to listen. Yet European member states have the greatest interest in maintaining and sustain NATO. Without a powerful EU foreign and security policy, NATO is the core supplier of security on the European continent. European member states should therefore step up and take responsibility for the Alliance's future. Europe should support a Europeanisation of NATO not to please America's new president but because acquiring the capability to take care of own security is in Europe's interest. Here there is a specific role for Germany to play. Leadership from Europe's strongest economy "would be the greatest boost to NATO's future."[25]

22 DeYoung, K. and Jaffe, G. (2011). NATO runs short on some munitions in Libya. *Washington Post* [online]. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nato-runs-short-on-some-munitions-in-libya/2011/04/15/AF3O7ElD_story.html?utm_term=.7b0d624388eb [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

23 Gates, R. (2011). SDA Speech on June 10th 2011 [online]. Available at: http://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581 [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

24 In 2011, the US Congress passed the so-called Budget Control Act which stipulates a reduction of security spending of $450 billion and further cuts on the defence budget of $550 billion over the next ten years. See Kori S. (2012). US retrenchment is right and overdue. In: Heisbourg, F., Ischinger, W., Robertson, G., Schake, K. and Valasek, T. All Alone? What US retrenchment means for Europe and NATO. London: Centre for European Reform (CER) [online]. Available at: https://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2012/rp_089_km-6278.pdf [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

25 Burns, N., Wilson, D. and Lightfoot, J. (2012). Anchoring the Alliance. Washington: Atlantic Council [online]. Available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/files/publication_pdfs/403/051412_ACUS_Burns_AnchoringAlliance.pdf [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].


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## Conclusion

The strategic challenge Germany faces in the 21st century is twofold. The rule of force is on the verge of replacing the rule of law, just as more and more cracks are appearing in the multilateral foundation of Germany's security strategy. Germany should respond by improving our own tools of pressure and coercion in order to bring more leverage to the bargaining table. Not because we want to contribute to a more belligerent world, but because we have to be able to keep the aggressors in check. For the moment, economic sanctions are our toughest most effective coercive tool – and we cannot hesitate to use them against those who commit atrocities.

This we will do even as we seek to shape the international order into one that is ruled by law, that does reflect Western values, and that does solve conflicts by peaceful negotiation. Germany can play a leading role in bringing NATO and the EU back together and in rebuilding the West as a political concept. This is a time for German leadership on the model set down in our Basic Law – "to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe" is our duty.[26]

26 Deutsches Grundgesetz, 23 May, 1949. Bonn.


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Hans-Dieter Heumann

# Germany's Responsibility for International Security

## Introduction

German security policy seems to exist in a kind of "magic triangle": Responsibility for international security, challenges and European interests. Today, responsibility is explained less in terms of the problem of German history than based on the necessity for dealing with the political challenges of our current era. This is compounded by some states' expectations that Germany will provide leadership in dealing with the current crises. The perception of these crises as disjointed – "world out of joint" – explains the longing for order.

Terrorism and the flight of hundreds of thousands of people to Europe remind us that the crises are taking place in our immediate vicinity. Thus Germany's greatest foreign-policy and security interest is in creating a regional and global order that is shaped by rules. This is due partly to the fact that Germany is the most globalized country in the world.[1] It has recognized that it no longer stands alone in this world, but must always act at a European level.

This context is reflected by the current security discussion in Germany. German President Gauck spoke at the Munich Security Conference in January 2014 on the topic of "Germany's international responsibility"[2] followed by Minister for Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Minister of Defense Ursula von der Leyen. The Foreign Office summarized the conclusions of its "Review 2014" of German foreign and security policy using three terms: "crisis,

1 Manyika, J., Bughin, J., Lund, S., Nottebohm, O., Poulter, D., Jauch, S., and Ramaswamy, S. (2014). Global flows in a digital age: How trade, finance, people, and data connect the world economy. *McKinsey Global Institute* [online]. Available at: http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/global%20themes/globalization/global%20flows%20in%20a%20digital%20age/mgi%20global%20flows%20in%20a%20digial%20age%20executive%20summary.ashx [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].

2 Gauck, J. (2014). Deutschlands Rolle in der Welt: Anmerkungen zu Verantwortung, Normen und Bündnissen [online]. Available at: http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Joachim-Gauck/Reden/2014/01/140131-Muenchner-Sicherheitskonferenz.html [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].


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global order, Europe." New departments are being established to deal with these issues.

## Responsibility

It is sometimes overlooked that Germany is not just taking foreign-policy and security responsibility now, but began to do so soon after the founding of the Federal Republic. This applies to the rapprochement with Israel, reconciliation with France, and Germany's integration into the "West," the European Union and NATO. With its strong conventional armed forces in NATO, the implementation of the NATO double-track decision and the détente policy, Germany has made perhaps the most important contribution to overcoming the division of Europe and thus the end of the Cold War. After German reunification, the new responsibility of the "Berlin Republic"[3] was discussed. This claim was exercised with the Federal Constitutional Court's 1994 verdict, which allowed the use of the German army abroad as part of a "collective security system," and with Germany's participation in the NATO mission to Kosovo in 1999. Germany was the third-largest provider of troops for ISAF in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the army has up to 5000 soldiers in the field, on military missions around the world. Today, Germany is working side by side with France to fight terrorism in Syria, Iraq and Africa. The thesis about the contradiction between responsibility and power politics, espoused by Hans-Dietrich Genscher has long since been disproven.

Today's discussion about Germany's responsibility for security has less of a historical basis; instead, it follows the partners' expectations in the face of current crises. A large majority of the representatives of politics, business and society in 26 countries around the world expects Germany to act as a leader in Europe and in the crises that affect Europe.[4] Some examples include not just the financial crisis in Europe, but also the wars in Ukraine and in the Middle East. Is Germany the central power in Europe?[5] Is there a "New German Question"?[6] This question will be of great importance when President Trump really does implement a retreat from foreign policy and demands more European burden sharing.

3 Karl Kaiser (ed.) (1998). Zur Zukunft der Deutschen Außenpolitik, Reden zur Außenpolitik der Berliner Republik. Bonn.

4 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (2015), Deutschland in den Augen der Welt, Bonn and Eschborn: p. 64ff.

5 Münkler, H. (2015). Macht in der Mitte – Die neuen Aufgaben Deutschlands in Europa. Hamburg: edition Körber-Stiftung.

6 Garton Ash, T. (2013). The New German Question. *The New York Review of Books* [online]. Available at: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/08/15/new-german-question/ [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].


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The new "White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr" emphasizes a new tendency that developed after a speech of president Gauck in 2014. It highlights Germany's willingness "to accept responsibility and to assume leadership" (p. 23). Furthermore, it expresses clear national interests, including those of a trading nation. New is, that this position of the German government is increasingly accepted by the German population. In October 2016, 41 % of the population wanted Germany to become more involved in managing international crises (Studie Körber Stiftung von November 2016). Even though this is still a minority, it indicates a clear trend. Will these new claims actually be put into practice? What becomes apparent is that the new position is increasingly understood as a military obligation, as seen with the deployment of the Federal Armed Forces in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Eastern Africa.

## Political challenges

From a European perspective crises are taking place in the immediate southern and eastern regions. The shift is apparent when we look at a description of the challenges for the European security strategy from 2003. It begins with the words, "Never before has Europe been so prosperous, so secure and so free."[7]

Germany's responsibility for security does not just consist of crisis management in a narrower sense. It must be prepared for this, but the responsibility goes beyond that. It lies in a strategic, networked, comprehensive approach to foreign and security policy. The EU's strength comes specifically from this combination of civil and military means. German and European security policy should begin with a strategic analysis of the crises, their backgrounds, and the "long lines" of their development. This will make it possible to connect strategy and diplomacy. Diplomacy can be successful if it is strategically oriented.

From a global perspective, the most important challenge is probably the rise of Asia, especially China. Will it play out peacefully? How will China and its neighbors deal with territorial conflicts? How will the United States' Pacific orientation affect the balance in East Asia ("rebalancing")? But above all, what does this mean for Europe?

Europe must look beyond its neighbors in a dual sense: it has security-related as well as economic interests in East Asia. Nearly half of global trade relies on secure shipping in the China Seas, and this particularly applies to the trading

7 Ein sicheres Europa in einer besseren Welt – Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie (2003). *Themenportal Europäische Geschichte* [online]. Available at: www.europa.clio-online.de/quelle/id/artikel-3523 [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].


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nation of Germany. The European Union conducts strategic dialogues with China regarding maritime security. It demands regional integration in East Asia, in part through a close collaboration with ASEAN. It is well on its way to becoming an important actor in Asia. China maintains a partnership with Germany that is closer than with any other member of the European Union.

The "long line" also includes the change in the transatlantic relationships. The United States' Pacific orientation is accompanied by restraint in other parts of the world. This tendency will likely be reinforced by President Trump. The United States expects a greater division of labor from Europe, especially within Europe itself. One of the constants of the transatlantic partnership, though, is the fact that it is indispensable, even in times of tension between Europe and the United States. This applies not just to solving conflicts around the world and responding to global issues like terrorism, organized crime, cyber security, energy security and climate change, but also to securing the shared Western standards for globalization.

Europe is beginning to address these challenges. The European Union has now realized that the crisis in Ukraine has fundamentally altered its relationship with Russia – that this crisis forces them to evolve beyond their trade-related role and to become a geopolitical actor. In fact, in the eyes of Russia, Europe and NATO have been playing this role since the end of the Cold War. The sense of alienation is deep-seated. Russia no longer has a pan-European focus, but rather a Eurasian one. Ultimately it sees itself as a pole in the multi-polar world, and is turning toward China. The challenge for Europe here goes beyond crisis management according to the rules of the Treaty of Minsk. Germany in particular, which plays an acknowledged leadership role in this crisis, is pursuing the objective of a pan-European peace order. As the head of the OSCE in 2016, it will be able to make sure this issue is on the agenda.

The difference between crisis management and a strategic security approach is even more apparent in the relationship between Europe and the Near East. Without a doubt, the immediate threat lies in the wars, the collapse of states, and above all in the Islamic State ISIS's claim to a caliphate that reaches at least from the Mediterranean to Iran. However, a strategic analysis should also take the collapse of regional order into account. This order was created after World War I and established by the colonial powers. In particular, the 2003 war in Iraq shattered this order. It remains to be seen whether a new order will be created along the lines drawn by Sunnis and Shiites and their strongholds in Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The challenge for European and German security policy is identifying the "long lines" of this development and above all the future actors in the region. Which states, both within and outside the region, are open to diplomacy that will increase security in the region? Is the necessary rapprochement with Saudi


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Arabia and Iran possible? Isn't there already a level of understanding between the United States and Russia on the Syrian issue? The agreement with Iran on its nuclear program is not just an example of the power of diplomacy, but has already changed the strategic situation in the region and opened up new possibilities for diplomacy. The United States is already prepared. The EU, whose role as negotiation leader in the 3+3 format is often forgotten, should take advantage of this moment.

## European interest

Germany's most important interest is in maintaining a global and regional order that is defined by rules and values. This is also where Germany's responsibility lies. Interests and values converge. In a multi-polar world, Germany can only exercise this responsibility as part of a Europe that has the power to act. Europe's new raison d'être is to become an international actor that defends the values and interests of its members.

As early as 2003, the European security strategy determined that the European Union, the strongest trading power in the world with 28 member states and about 500 million people – with the euro as the second-most important international currency and numerous civil and military missions – is "necessarily a global actor."[8] The new "Global Strategy for European Foreign and Security Policy" from 2016, insists that in light of all these crises the world expects a stronger Europe.

What is the EU's strength? First of all, the EU sets rules within its region that member states must adopt when they join the Union. It can transform states, even if this ability clearly declines as the states grow increasingly distant from the core of Europe. Second, the EU's strength lies in its comprehensive approach. No other actor in the world can combine and utilize economic and political as well as military resources in this way. This ability has also made the EU an actor particularly in conflicts in Africa, which by their nature can only be resolved by combining civil and military means. It also represents added value compared to NATO. In conflicts like the Ukrainian crisis that also require a collective defense, the EU can naturally only act in addition to NATO.

The EU's weaknesses as an actor are known. However, the history of European integration has shown that the European Union continued to develop its ability to act especially in times of crisis, even if it did not always follow the rules of the

8 Ein sicheres Europa in einer besseren Welt – Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie (2003). *Themenportal Europäische Geschichte* [online]. Available at: www.europa.clio-online.de/quelle/id/artikel-3523 [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].


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contracts. This was highlighted by the financial crisis in Europe. The euro did not fail even during the crisis in Greece because the EU was able to take political action. It developed new instruments like the European Stability Mechanism and the Banking Union. Based on lessons from Greece's crisis, it will reinforce the integration of the euro zone. Germany, France and the European Commission are working on plans to supplement the currency union with an economic and fiscal union. Ultimately, even the refugee crisis demonstrates that these problems can only be solved by a European policy.

The financial crisis did in fact create "more Europe" (German Chancellor Angela Merkel), not less. Is the same thing possible in the area of security policy? The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is now facing its first major test. In terms of its military capabilities, there is a growing understanding that increasingly scarce resources will make Europeanization of the defense industry unavoidable. The European Council resolved this in June 2015, and the German government followed up with a strategy paper[9]. It is clearly becoming more and more difficult for the governments of member states to assert their national sovereignty reservations. The companies long ago realized that only a European arms industry can survive on the world market.

Finally, the history of European integration also shows that only a vanguard can bring about progress. This vanguard has almost always consisted of Germany and France. This should once again be possible. In view of the Brexit this is even more urgent.

9 Strategiepapier der Bundesregierung zur Stärkung der Verteidigungsindustrie in Deutschland (2015) [online]. Available at: http://bdi.eu/media/themenfelder/sicherheit/downloads/20150708_Strategiepapier_der_Bundesregierung_zur_Staerkung_der_Verteidigungsindustrie_in_Deutschland.pdf [Accessed 08 Mar. 2017].


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Karl Kaiser

# Responsibility for Transatlantic Security

The advent of the administration of Donald Trump has created an unprecedented degree of uncertainty as to the future international role of the United States and its impact on world politics. Nevertheless transatlantic relations remain central for German interests in foreign and security policy. They continue to shape major elements of Germany's emerging responsibilities in international affairs, and profoundly influence the evolution of world order.

## The Centrality of Transatlantic Relations

The Germany that got reunited in 1990 owes its security during the Cold War as well as unification itself to an essential degree to the United States. Their relationship with each other was special and of particular intensity not only because of the Allied rights deriving from the war settlements, but above all because of America's role in rebuilding Germany's democracy and economy as well as preserving the security of Berlin and Western Germany against a possible Soviet aggression.

The agreements, which led to the unification of Germany terminated the special rights of the US as a former occupying power and the restrictions of German sovereignty. The end of the East-West conflict, notably the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, induced many observers at that time to consider the dependence of Germany on American protection as obsolete. Here and there even NATO was judged as a superfluous and abolishable relic of the Cold War.

However, such opinions receded into the background when the wars in the Balkans demonstrated the inability of Europe to contain the conflicts and the US had to intervene in order to cease the bloodshed. This happened although at that time the European Union made some important steps in the direction of a common foreign and security policy. Moreover, it became increasingly accepted that despite the significantly reduced threat of an open aggression from the East


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new security threats deriving from failed states, genocides, ethnic cleansing or terrorism required a continued close cooperation between America and Europe. The adopted strategy of NATO changed accordingly. The terror attacks of September 11, 2001, reinforced these opinions and induced Chancellor Gerhard Schröder to declare Germany's "unrestricted solidarity" with the United States.

Reacting to these attacks Germany, along with some other European allies participated both in the military intervention in Afghanistan, which the US organized as well as in the later NATO intervention. But at the same time grave disagreements rocked the German American relationship: on the intervention in Iraq, which it opposed along with France (and Russia), on NATO membership in the near future for Ukraine and Georgia, which Chancellor Merkel (quietly supported by other NATO members) vetoed, on the intervention in Libya, when Germany abstained in the UN Security Council and refused a participation of its military. Further tensions arose after the revelation of surveillance by the CIA and the NSA of German politicians and institutions.

However, the communality of interests in the fields of foreign policy and economics as well as the affinity and close cooperation, which had been built in decades past let these divergences fade into the background. That was even more true for the impact of Russia's annexation of Crimea and its intervention in East Ukraine. The breach of the agreements which had been concluded with Russia's participation, the clear violation of the Ukrainian territorial integrity, which had been promised in the agreement on Ukraine's denuclearization and Moscow's claim to have a right of intervention in other countries to protect persons of Russian identity signaled the end of the European order of rules and agreements, which had been agreed upon at the end of the Cold War.

The necessity of classical defense and deterrence returned and with it the revitalization of NATO as produced in the Summit of Wales, which reconfirmed the indispensable role of the US for the organization of European security. The steps undertaken by President Barak Obama afterwards, namely the dispatch of troops and materials and his trip to Eastern Europe, demonstrated again the special role of the US and acted as a signal of firmness vis-à-vis Russia and as reassurance for the East European member of the alliance. Reversely it was reconfirmed that any long-term policy, which aims at a constructive role of Russia in organizing European security, requires a coordinated transatlantic policy.

On Ukraine policy as well the US and the EU succeeded in implementing a coordinated policy focusing on diplomatic means, mediation and economic support of Ukraine, although some forces in the US Congress that opposed the European position, pushed for a military support of the Ukrainian government. Chancellor Merkel played a leading role in developing a series of differentiated sanctions linked to the Minsk Agreement in close coordination with the Obama


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Administration and succeeded in keeping the EU united behind the sanctions despite opposition both at home and in Europe.

The crises in the EU, notably of the Euro, and the events in Ukraine were instrumental in reorienting the focus of the Obama Administration on Europe after having earlier indicated a strategic "rebalancing" toward the Asia-Pacific. That apparent shift had generated considerable concern among Europeans, who feared a reduction of American engagement in European security.[1] These concerns had originally been caused by aspects of retrenchment in Barack Obama's foreign policy which went beyond the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq which he ended. Though he eventually gave in to the pressures of Britain and France and took part in the intervention in Libya, Obama afterwards considered it a failure and saw it as another indication of Europe's "free rider" mentality (to which Germany's abstention must surely have contributed).[2]

Obama drew a "red line" with regard to the use of chemical weapons by the Assad-regime in Syria but then decided unexpectedly in August 2013 not to use the military force he had threated earlier even though all preparations (including bombardments by the French air force) had been made. He later confessed to be "very proud of this moment"[3] although no other of his major decisions drew such an amount of criticism and did as much to undermine America's credibility as a world power among European and Middle East allies.[4]

Throughout the Obama presidency American and German policies on international trade were very close. Both countries – Germany as member of the EU – strongly supported efforts to further liberalize international trade through new multilateral agreements, notably in the field of non-tariff barriers such as regulations. Although there was domestic opposition on both sides, which Donald Trump later exploited and reinforced in the US, the Obama Administration succeeded in negotiating the Trans Pacific Partnership agreement (TPP). The US negotiations with the EU on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) made progress but not enough to be successfully concluded before Obama's departure. Another round of transatlantic trade liberalization, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada was, however, successfully concluded.

1 Kaiser, Karl and Muniz, M. (2013). Europe, too, needs an Asian pivot. *Europe's World*, pp. 92–96.

2 Goldberg, J. (2016). The Obama Doctrine. The American President talks through his hardest decisions about America's role in the World, *The Atlantic* [online]. Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ [Accessed 27. March 2017].

3 Ibid.

4 Kaiser,K. (2016). Transatlantische sicherheitspolitische Verantwortung. In: Bindenagel, J., Herdegen, M., Kaiser, K. *Internationale Sicherheit im 21. Jahrhundert, Deutschlands internationale Verantwortung*, Bonn: V&R unipress/Bonn University Press, pp. 229–236.


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## Germany's Changing Role in Transatlantic Security

The security policy of the Federal Republic has emerged in an almost exclusively Atlantic framework. During the East West conflict European approaches either failed – like the project of the European Defense Community – or remained of marginal importance such as the West European Union. Although West Germany became the largest conventional military power in the defense of Europe's center its foreign and security was deeply shaped by the country's past. It was characterized by a "culture of restraint" of "never again", "never alone", and "politics before force", i. e. a rejection of the aggressive policies of the past, the imperative of always acting jointly with partners, and the preference for political rather than military approaches.[5]

In the years following unification Germany cautiously expanded the scope of its foreign and security policy. In the field of diplomacy following the end of the Cold war Germany played a more substantial role in working out international agreements and in their implementation and in a number of initiatives in the field of European integration. In the realm of security policy Germany gradually expanded the role of the Bundeswehr leading finally to the first incidence since World War II of putting German soldiers in harms way when NATO intervened in Kosovo. The Bundeswehr was increasingly participating in EU Missions, took part in the "Coalition of the Willing" of the US led intervention in Afghanistan after the attacks of September 11 and later became a major contributor to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Despite these important manifestations of a growing security role of Germany, which implied a recognition of the legitimate function of military force, pacifist attitudes of the past stubbornly persisted within German society.[6]

As opinion polls repeatedly demonstrated even a decade after unification a majority of the German population opposed military engagement outside national boundaries, supported a middle position between East and West, and even rejected the policy of coming to the aid of an attacked NATO country despite the obligations of Article V of NATO. Germany's refusal to take part in the invasion of Iraq was no doubt influenced by this state of public opinion (though it was strategically the right decision) as was the German abstention from the Libya intervention.

These discrepancies between the persistent neo-pacifist majority in public opinion and the growing demand from foreign partners (widely shared by the

5 Maull, H.W. (2015). Deutsche Aussenpolitik. Verantwortung und Macht. In: Hellmann, G., Jacobi, D., Stark Urrestarazu, U. Früher, entschiedener und substantieller? Die neue Debatte über Deutschlands Aussenpolitik, Special Issue no 2, *Zeitschrift für Aussen-und Sicherheitspolitik*, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, pp. 213–237.

6 Ibid.


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German political class) for a greater international role of Germany may have been the main reason for major German politicians to unleash a new debate on Germany's international responsibilities. Federal President Joachim Gauck, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen simultaneously used the Munich Security Conference of February 2014 to argue in favor of an enhanced international role and greater responsibility of Germany. The German Foreign Office moved to stimulate a public debate on a more active foreign policy by organizing a broad survey of opinions and advice among national and international experts on Germany's role. Its results were then presented in numerous public meetings in Germany.[7]

## The Challenge of the Trump Administration

By the time Donald Trump was elected President in November 2016 the international role of Germany had evolved considerably. Though Brexit created an additional major crisis in the EU beyond the problems of Greece, it has accelerated Germany's rise to a leadership role in the EU. To be sure, Germany has attempted to keep the Franco-German partnership and its special role in the EU going but the political and economic problems of France have inevitably limited its ability to lead. The German government of the Grand Coalition led by Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier had become the closest partner of the US in implementing the sanctions policy vis-à-vis Russia and had also played a crucial role in successfully concluding the nuclear deal with Iran. The Berlin government, like most of its European partners acted on the premise that in order to deal with the main security problems of the day, namely a potential Russian aggression, cyber-attacks, and terrorism its policy should be based on a strong EU and a vibrant transatlantic relationship. That conviction was framed and underpinned by a broader consensus of shared beliefs between the US and Germany in free trade and multilateralism.

The election of Donald Trump has created an unprecedented degree of uncertainty by challenging fundamental elements of what had been the shared basis of American and German foreign policy. During the campaign Trump had called NATO "obsolete" and questioned the assistance commitment, which Germany and the rest of European NATO members regard as the foundation and guarantee of freedom, national independence and peace in Europe. To be sure, Trump's reference to the insufficient contributions of some allies to the defense budget contained a core of truth, but it appeared secondary in comparison with the

7 See *Review 2014* [online]. Available at: www.aussenpolitik-weiter-denken.de/en [Accessed 27 Mar. 2017].


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shocking rejection of past US policy of respecting the NATO commitments. At the same time Trump has displayed a degree of praise for Russian President Putin and a disregard for the consequences of Russia's annexation of Crimea and intervention in East Ukraine, – in stark contrast to both his predecessor's views and those of the Europeans.

Similarly his views on the European Union represent a reversal of half a century of American foreign policy, which had invested considerable resources to help Europe overcome its age old rivalries and wars that had twice necessitated an American intervention, and in doing so helped create a remarkably successful system of peace and prosperity through integration. By contrast Trump adamantly welcomed Brexit, predicted the further departure of members and declared that he really did not care much about the future of the EU.

During his campaign and notably in his inauguration speech Trump advocated a kind of narrow minded nationalism under the motto of "America first", that Europeans generally consider to have been at the origin of the European disasters and wars of the past. That same nationalism has been the basis of Trump's rejection of free trade, multilateralism, and globalization, which Europe and Germany in particular regard as the basis of their prosperity. His stress on national control and rejection of interdependence has also motivated his negative views on multilateral internationalism, as illustrated by his desire to drastically cut back America's contribution to the United Nations and international aid.

Perhaps the gravest consequence of Trump's becoming President is his apparent desire to abandon America's traditional role of using its power to support and secure a rules based world order that incorporates the values of the West. To Europe and, of course, a large part of the globe's nations, this US role has always been the indispensable basis of world order and their own security.

Reacting to the strong criticism of his views from both inside the US and from allied countries Trump has recently attempted to pacify some of these fears he created by appointing some personalities to his cabinet, who have a record of or predisposition toward the traditional posture of US foreign policy, notably the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security and – after the unfortunate interlude with General Flynn – the present National Security Advisor. Some of them accompanied the Vice President to the Munich Security conference in February 2017 and attempted to reassure the Europeans by reconfirming America's commitment to NATO. The Vice President went to Brussels to demonstrate a positive attitude toward the European Union (which had not been mentioned in any of their speeches in Munich). Visits by British Prime Minister Teresa May and German Chancellor Angela Merkel gave an opportunity to reconfirm America's commitment to NATO, and the American Ambassador to the


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UN in no uncertain terms condemned Russia's annexation of Crimea and its intervention in East Ukraine.

At the time of writing it is therefore by no means clear what policies the Trump Administration, hobbled by the consequences of the President's reckless tweeting mania and mired down in Congressional enquiries of links between the Trump campaign and Russia, will eventually pursue on these central issues of American foreign policy. No major speech has been held to circumscribe a foreign policy strategy in order thus giving a unifying orientation to all parts of the Administration.

In this situation of uncertainty it would be wise for Germany and the EU to stick to the policies that have been the basis of Europe's and Germany's security and prosperity. This means, first, to strengthen NATO in its capacity of deterrence and to increase the German contribution to joint defense by increasing its defense budget and enhancing its contributions to conflict prevention and settlement through the UN, OSCE, and the EU. Part of Germany's efforts to reach the 2 % of GNP goal for defense expenditure should consist of helping partners through transfers, including France to sustain her nuclear force de frappe as a European force while remaining under national French control.

Vis-à-vis Russia Europe should neither recognize the annexation of Crimea nor abandon a sanctions policy until Russia observes the terms of the Minsk Accord and ceases to intervene militarily in East Ukraine. When and if that happens Europe and the West must be ready to offer Russia a resumption of economic engagement and efforts to jointly improve the security situation in Europe.

For the European Union the challenge of Trump's policy above all necessitates holding together and for Germany as its most powerful member employing all its resources to uphold this goal. This will require renewed efforts to speak with one voice in foreign policy, to organize its internal diversity to allow willing members to move ahead in integration, to seek a reasonable relationship with the UK after Brexit, and to strengthen a European defense structure capable of that should include an effort to end the absurd waste of resources due to the multitude of national weapons systems.

Europe must now consider itself the standard bearer of openness, liberal trade practices, and rules based multilateralism, which have been and will remain the basis of prosperity and security. In pursuing this goal Europe will be able to count on a large part of the globe's nations as allies along with a significant part of the US Congress, American business and American society. Of course, no effort should be spared to offer Washington cooperation in these fields hoping that those internal forces will support such a course.

After World War II an Atlantic civilization emerged between North America


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and Europe.[8] Under American leadership a community of democracies and market economies developed with a tradition of cooperation among governments and interaction of societies and elites of a density found in no other region in the world. The Atlantic area became a genuine zone of peace as well as prosperity and for those reasons became an indispensable component of world order. As the Trump Administration deviates from past American policy it will be Europe's responsibility to uphold the basic tenets of this Atlantic civilization.

8 Kaiser,K.(2017) Atlantische Zivilisation. In: Kühnhardt, L., Mayer, T. *Bonner Enzyklopädie der Globalität,* Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2017, Vol. 2, pp. 1063–1069.


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Joachim Krause

# What Are the Tasks Facing the German Defense Policy?

After the end of the East-West conflict, the international environment of reunified Germany was defined by the absence of a strategic conflict situation. The Federal Republic of Germany found itself bound up in transatlantic, Western European and pan-European cooperative structures. Maintaining, further developing and adapting these structures to new developments, where applicable, became the main task of German foreign and security policy. Germany was part of a zone of peace and cooperation that had never existed to such an extent before. Germany's main foreign-policy interest was (and still is) maintaining this cooperative international order, expanding it, and acting as a stabilizing force even in conflicts outside this zone. Since the mid-1990s, the German defense policy has mainly involved creating the material conditions that will allow the German army to participate in international peacekeeping and peace building operations with other armed forces. Accordingly, the German has armed forces have been reduced, re-equipped, and reorganized over the last two decades and consequently the draft has been suspended. Political decisions about the use of the armed forces are made cooperatively by the government and the parliament. This German security and defense policy is somewhat outdated today, for three reasons.

For one thing, it has become clear that it is much harder and more complex to take over tasks in stabilization operations than was originally believed. This was particularly demonstrated by the German army's mission as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The largely civilian approach initiated by the community of states in late 2001 soon proved to be ill-conceived, inflexible, and lacking in material support. Its only lasting effect was to create a new unified Afghan state that was as corrupt as it was ineffective, and that helped the Taliban gain popularity and carry out its attacks. The ISAF's increased efforts to secure the civil development of Afghanistan were nothing more than an attempt to smooth out the failures of its civil approach. Any new attempt at stabilization or nation-building will need to take the lessons of the


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Afghanistan mission to heart. In particular, it will be important to develop and implement a promising combined civil and military approach.

Second, it should be noted that almost all political decisions for or against the use of the German army showed a lack of strategic justification. Most of these decisions were made under unclear conditions and high time pressure; they fell back on vague phrases and platitudes taken from everyday political language, and named unrealistic goals. The mission in Afghanistan was, and still is, justified by the "war on international terror" – even though this war has long since shifted to other regions. The participation of German marines in the UN operation UNIFIL-II was intended to stop arms smuggling to Hezbollah. To date, the operation has not intercepted a single ship with weapons for Hezbollah, which is still receiving massive arms deliveries from Iran. The international operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo took place without any clear strategic goal, and more or less fizzled out. So far, all of the federal administrations have shown a marked reluctance to define strategic requirements for the use of the German army. Instead, the guiding idea had been to be participating in operations that have symbolic or alliance-related significance – but only those where German soldiers are not exposed to serious threats.

Third – and this is the most important aspect today – we can no longer assume that German foreign, security, and defense policies take place within a global and regional environment in which there are no strategic divides. In fact, we are in a phase of global political transition that reveals at least four lines of strategic conflict.

– *The first strategic divide is between Russia and the West.* This strategic conflict was not the intention of the Western powers; it was unilaterally declared by Russia (most recently in 2013/2014). This development cannot be attributed to faulty strategic decisions or arrogance on the hand of Western governments. Rather, the core of the problem is that Russia is ruled by a greedy power vertical, whose domestic legitimacy was so fragile that it requires a controlled foreign conflict with the West in order to stabilize its regime. Present-day Russia's armed forces are by no means comparable to the Red Army (especially in terms of their ability to conduct a large-scale invasion), but their modernization efforts in recent years suggest that Russia's leadership believes it has relative advantages in the military area.. It is hard to predict how long Russia's strategic challenge will persist, and what the further consequences will be. Putin's policies themselves contributed to a wave of nationalist mobilization in Russia that is now developing its own momentum. Nowhere else in Europe is one confronted by such militant and aggressive rhetoric from politicians and the media as in Russia. Russia's ability to strategically challenge the West is actually limited, but Russian leaders are trying to alter the political status quo through military intimidation, subversive activities, cyber


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sabotage and other means of hybrid warfare. They are still trying to exploit economic dependencies (such as in the field of natural gas and petroleum supplies). Given the falling prices of petroleum and natural gas, the effects of Western sanctions and the loss of international investment capital, however, Russia is currently in a phase of economic decline. Nonetheless, German defense policy must keep an eye on Russia as a strategic opponent with military (including hybrid) operations – one that may evolve into a military challenge if the economic indicators continue to show a downward trend.

- *The second strategic divide is with Iran.* Just like the Russian government, the leadership in Tehran constantly demonstrates that it is seeking out conflict with the West and that it sees the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia as its archenemies. Here, too, the reason for this dogged search for strategic hostility comes from the country's power structure. The Islamic republic has long since ossified; it has become a state in which yesterday's revolutionaries are getting rich from the proceeds of petroleum exports and are pursuing an aggressive, imperial foreign policy in order to maintain their power. Iran's ability to become a strategic challenger of the West is even more materially limited than that of Russia. Nonetheless, the strategic successes it could achieve in the region are remarkable.
- *The third, emerging, strategic divide is the one between China and its neighboring states, and between China and the United States.* While Russia and Iran are regional powers (although they do not enjoy hearing this) and will remain limited threats as long as they do not use nuclear weapons, China is currently the world's largest country by population, with the second largest economy – and it is also on its way to becoming the world's leading industrial nation. China's rise represents a tectonic shift with wide-reaching geopolitical consequences. China is led by a government that grew out of a failed communist state elite, and which is corrupt and domestically unstable. Here, too, excessive nationalism, militarism and aggressive international behavior are elements that stabilize the domestic power structure – particularly when economic growth slows down. In comparison to Russia and Iran, China is creating a different kind of strategic competition. For years, the People's Republic of China has tried to absorb the entire South China Sea as its own territorial waters – as if Germany were to claim the entire Baltic Sea as its territorial waters – and is taking increasing military action here as well as in the East China Sea, or creating faits accomplis. While China's neighboring states are seeking support from the United States, Beijing is beginning to threaten the places where Washington has a military presence in the region: with precision missiles, air-based weapons, submarines, and by utilizing outer space and cyberspace. The military competition that is developing here is of a severity and significance that only few people in Germany realize. In the region itself,


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the issue is much discussed. Even if it remained limited to the region, any military conflict between Washington and Beijing would have wide-reaching consequences for Germany.

– *The fourth strategic divide is that between the Western world and Salafist jihadism.* A new form of totalitarianism is emerging In the Muslim world, comparable to Bolshevism and the National Socialism of the 20th century, whose first manifestation is the "Islamic State" found in the region of Syria and Iraq. This new wave of totalitarianism is the most extreme form of a broader tendency toward political ideologization of the Muslim religion, which is a consequence of a deep societal crisis in the region of the Middle East.

The first three strategic divides named above make it essential for German policy to focus on traditional strategic conflicts again. The new situation may involve alliance obligations (as in the case of the Baltic states) for which the German army so far is not sufficiently prepared. In addition, Germany is politically largely unprepared to deal with a situation in which important trade partners like China, Russia and Iran become strategic opponents.

The challenge posed by Salafist Islamism and jihadism is fundamentally different. This is no longer just "terrorism", but a new form of totalitarianism comparable to the two other totalitarianisms of the 20th century: Bolshevism and National Socialism. Both were primitive, violence-prone worldviews whose representatives were resolved to kill millions of people in order to pursue their political objectives, because they belonged to either the wrong race or the wrong class. In the moment when the followers of a totalitarian ideology succeed in bringing a powerful state under their control, a fundamental change takes place in international politics.

The changed strategic landscape also means that the established systems of Western multilateral security and defense cooperation are now so weakened that we can no longer assume they will be able to withstand strategic competition. NATO is only able to provide a limited collective defense now, and the EU has completely given up on its ambitious 1999 objectives in the area of joint security and defense policy. The political relationship between the United States and Europe has been strained to a previously unseen extent by the 2003 Iraq War and the NSA scandal of 2013/2014 and future divides are looming ahead with the Trump-Administration in power. The political will to overcome these crises is not apparent on either side of the Atlantic. Even within Europe, the level of unity and cooperation is now minimal due to widely differing national interpretations of security interests and increasing nationalist tendencies. In addition, the NATO member Turkey is becoming an unpredictable factor, and the partner state of


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Saudi Arabia is implementing a policy of confrontation with Iran that is partly disturbing and dangerous.

Given these tectonic shifts and the associated challenges, the German defense policy needs to reorient itself. This will require strategic reconsideration that must go beyond what has previously been addressed in the Foreign Office's 2014 Global Review or the 2016 White Paper process. The federal government emphasizes that Germany will do more to help preserve the international order. In terms of its contribution to the defense policy, that could mean the following:

Germany must invest significantly more in the area of defense than before. The framework conditions have already been established: 2 % of the gross domestic product for defense purposes (a voluntary commitment by all NATO member states; currently, Germany only spends 1.17 %) and the upper limit of 370,000 soldiers in the German armed forces, according to the *Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany* of September 12, 1990 (currently 175,000 soldiers). The armed forces must be able to conduct defense operations of varying intensity with other alliance partners in Europe and the neighboring Near East for a reasonable period of time, while at the same time maintaining longer-term stability operations like the one in Afghanistan as part of a new civil-military approach. This will make it necessary to question central elements of the army reform of the past decades.

Germany must work to revive transatlantic and European structures in the areas of defense and security. This can only succeed if Europe's strongest country is also willing to take on corresponding burdens. In particular, NATO's integrated defense structure must be resurrected (especially for emergencies in the Baltic Sea region and in southeastern Europe), along with a serious initiative to create a European military force that can make real advances.

Above all, Germany must lead and carry out a strategic debate that realistically assesses the nature of the challenges on the one hand, and develops and utilizes a mixture of civil and military instruments on the other in order to deal with these challenges. It is politically extremely difficult to hold this debate in Germany, because taboos and pacifist attitudes have been established that reach all into the top political ranks. As a result, security risks have been downplayed and political debates were conducted at an ideological level. These strategic debates must address the following: how can we deal with a Russia that consciously seeks out strategic competition with the West? What is the necessary ratio of deterrence, sanction policies and dialogue? What short-term, medium-term and long-term strategies can be developed for the Near and Middle East? How can states in the Near and Middle East realistically be stabilized? What lessons can be drawn from Afghanistan? To what extent can we work with Russia and Iran, and where and how do they need to be contained? What international, European and national strategies are appropriate for dealing with Salafist jihadism (and ultimately also


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with political Islam)? How can we prepare for an intensified confrontation in East Asia? How do we treat important trade partners if they see themselves as strategic challengers? These strategic debates must also, and particularly, address the interferences between the various crisis arenas and challenges. Whether such a debate is possible in Germany depends on whether the federal government is prepared to exercise a high degree of political and strategic leadership.


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Christoph Schwegmann[1]

# The White Paper 2016 – Defining Germany's new Role

German white papers[2] appear almost as rarely as the Loch Ness monster. While other nations provide regular or even yearly updates of their national security strategies, Germany's white papers have time to age – the 2006 volume also followed a ten year gap. There are two reasons for this unhurried pace: One is domestic and has its roots in coalition politics. The other is best to be explained by Germany's great luck of being located in a rather stable security environment.

First published by Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt in 1969, the white paper on German security was an invention by a Federal Ministry of Defense that has managed to keep authorship ever since[3]. This was primarily possible due to the two-part structure of the paper. While the first part is dedicated to German security policy ("Die Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands"), the second part informs about the future of the federal armed forces ("Die Zukunft der Bundeswehr"). In this respect the white paper has a mixed character: In its first half it constitutes the highest ranking strategy paper in the hierarchy of documents on German security policy. The second half works as a sub-strategy of the Ministry of Defense derived from the first half. This tradition has occasionally been questioned, not only from within the coalition government, whose Foreign Office actually leads the security policy dossier, but also from parliament and from security policy experts who routinely call for a "real" national security strategy written by, or at least in, the Chancellery[4].

1 The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.

2 Official translation of the German word "Weißbuch" (literally Whitebook). See: The Federal Government of Germany (2016). White Paper 2016 – On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence.

3 White Papers were published in 1969, 1970, 1971/72, 1972, 1973/74, 1975/76, 1979, 1983, 1985, 1994, 2006 und 2016.

4 See Schockenhoff, A. (2008). Die Debatte ist eröffnet und Streit erwünscht: Warum Deutschland eine Sicherheitsstrategie braucht. *Internationale Politik*, Mai 2008, p. 89; and Deutscher Bundestag (2016). Lehren aus dem Ausland und Argumente für die Erarbeitung einer nationalen Sicherheitsstrategie der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Ausarbeitung. Wissenschaftliche Dienste, Ausarbeitung WD 2–3000–049/15.


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However, coalition politics in Germany and the so-called "departmental principle" (Ressortprinzip) make such changes rather difficult. In coalition governments – the rule in the German Federal Republic – at least two, but often three parties (the Christian Democrats alone consist of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU)) have to agree on the politics of the government. Compromises on policy are therefore often already fixed in the coalition treaty in order to avoid disruptive conflicts with party wings at a later stage. In 2005, when the first grand coalition since 1969 was formed between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, it was thus agreed upon beforehand that a new white paper should be published in the next year.[5]

This was indeed completed in due course by the head of the Ministry of Defense's planning staff and his small team[6]. The negotiations with the Foreign Office and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development proved difficult in a number of areas, but they were completed within the timeframe. Having started the process in January, the white paper 2006 was published by October the same year. This was quick work.

The content reflected the new experience of military intervention – in the Balkans and especially in Afghanistan – and the impacts on the Bundeswehr. By (re-)introducing the comprehensive or network approach ("vernetzte Sicherheit") to security policy, it returned to German discourse the old Clausewitz paradigm that military is not a means in itself, but rather one instrument among others in pursuing politically defined goals. Collective defense was still highlighted as a main task for the armed forces, but because missions abroad were regarded as the more likely task, they absorbed – in light of ever tightening budgets – the most attention for planning, procurement, training and doctrine.

The publication of a new white paper was also considered on several occasions during the 2009–2013 term of the Christian-democratic / liberal coalition. But at a time when German soldiers in Afghanistan were facing ground combat for the first time since World War II, there was little appetite to start negotiations with the Foreign Office. Especially as Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle steadily promoted a "Peace Policy" (Friedenspolitik) and a culture of military restraint (Militärische Zurückhaltung)[7]. In that light, military planners considered the

5 Coalition agreement between CDU, CSU, SPD (2005). Gemeinsam für Deutschland – Mut zur Menschlichkeit. Berlin; There was also an unpublished 2005 version of a White Paper of the red-green coalition (Social Democrats and The Green / Buendnis 90) that never saw daylight due to the early federal elections.

6 The then head of the Planning Staff, Ulrich Schlie, is also contributing to this volume.

7 See Westerwelle, G. (2013). Interview: In meiner Amtszeit war deutsche Außenpolitik Friedenspolitik. *Der Tagesspiegel* [online]. Available at: http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/guido-


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White Paper 2006 a sufficiently modern and valid strategic framework. Instead of a new version, Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière issued new defense policy guidelines in 2011 in order to reflect the new structure of the Bundeswehr as a consequence of the armed forces reform and the suspension of conscription that started in 2011[8].

The White Paper 2016 followed a completely different script. At the Munich Security Conference in January 2014 the German hosts raised attention with three speeches by (in order of appearance) new Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, Federal President Joachim Gauck and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (then in his second term). All set the same tone, expressing the need and will to bridge the gap between growing demands for a more active German role in international security policy and declaring Germany's readiness to assume more responsibility and leadership.

The speeches should not imply that Germany had been standing on the sidelines. Exactly the opposite was true. For decades already the country had been a very effective promoter of and investor in international organizations and regimes along the full spectrum of economic, development and environmental politics. Beside its many other commitments within the EU, NATO and the UN, Germany was the main troop contributor in the Balkans and, for years, the framework nation of the northern command for the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Despite 55 German soldiers losing their lives at the Hindukush, Germany was still regarded as a reluctant power in the security realm – a reluctant leader. This was to change, and the White Paper 2016 is the manifesto of this new attitude.

The "White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr" was written and finalized in the Ministry of Defense[9]. The first part on Germany's security policy, however, received this time significant input from the Foreign Office, which was tasked with writing a first draft of the security policy chapters. The White Paper 2016 was eventually endorsed by the cabinet as a paper of "The Bundesrepublik Deutschland", and not just the Ministry of Defense, a first for a white paper. Thus, at least the first part of the White Paper 2016 can indeed be regarded as Germany's National Security Strategy.

The entire process was also characterized by an open discourse and exchange

westerwelle-im-interview-in-meiner-amtszeit-war-deutsche-aussenpolitik-friedenspolitik/9218714.html [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

8 German Federal Ministry of Defence (2011). Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien. Nationale Interessen wahren – Internationale Verantwortung übernehmen – Sicherheit gemeinsam gestalten. Berlin: German Federal Ministry of Defence.

9 This time a White Paper Task Force headed by a Brigardier General was established under the Political Director in the MoD with Defense Minister von der Leyen having a strong personal commitment during the whole process.


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with partners and society. Over a period of one year, no less than ten workshops with a total of 1,800 participants debated such issues as alliances, the comprehensive approach, crisis prevention, development and security from cyberspace, among other topics. Consultations with allies were equally thorough.

The paper offers answers to the challenges that occurred in 2014 – right after the Munich speeches – and that changed the security situation in and around Europe profoundly. In 2014 the occupation and annexation of Crimea and the breakout of armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine showed that Russia was no longer playing according to the rules of the Helsinki Principles, behavior that immediately threatened Germany's Eastern neighbors, namely the Baltic countries and Poland, and raised concern all over Europe. Collective defense was suddenly back on the agenda. At the same time, terrorist attacks in France and Belgium served as reminders of the reach of the so-called ISIL or Da'esh across Europe. All were severe problems that added to already existing ones like terrorist threats; the new crises and violent conflicts in the Near and Middle East, Northern and even in Sub-Saharan Africa, like in Mali; pandemics and structural challenges like failed states. Many of these phenomena are root causes for the mass migration to Europe. Evolving dangers from cyber space also gained ever more significance, with their potential to damage Germany's open and liberal society as well as its export-oriented economy and its many medium-sized global market leaders.

Against this background the White Paper 2016 portrays Germany's concept of security in five parts: (1) The self-defined consequences of Germany's role in the world, (2) Germany's values and security interests, (3) Its strategic priorities, (4) The key national and international areas of engagement through which government goals and priorities will be pursued, and (5) The comprehensive and multilateral approach that Germany regards as the only promising solution on both the national and the international stages.[10]

Without spelling out these elements in full detail, it seems fair to conclude that the core of the strategy is the full commitment to a security concept reliant on alliances and partnerships. It's an approach deeply rooted in the DNA of the Federal Republic, as West-Germany's sovereignty after World War II – and especially the establishment of the Bundeswehr in 1955 as a contribution to collective defense – is inseparably linked to transatlantic and European integration.

Today the government firmly believes that in times of mutual dependence in the domain of security, Germany's interests and goals can best be served by close cooperation and coordination with allies and partners, preferably within multinational frameworks and in a rule-based global order. Germany is aware that its

10 The Federal Government of Germany (2016). White Paper 2016 – On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, p. 11.


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interests, if not its destiny, are interwoven with those of their allies and partners, and that it can only protect its territory, interests and values – and therefore unfold the economic, social and cultural potential of its society – with the help of others. First among them is the United States, the main security provider for NATO's collective defense.

With only a single set of forces to offer its allies, Germany calls for a greater coherence between NATO and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union. NATO is the strongest and most capable military – but also political – alliance in the world. The EU is a unique union of states that share parts of their sovereignty in a common market with common freedoms under common laws. The Europeans share common institutions and policies, they have a parliament and, most of all, a broad mix of civilian (e. g. economic, financial, judicial, police) and military instruments. The EU can thus contribute to the security of the European people in cases where the alliance is not (or does not want to be) involved, or as partner of NATO and/or the United Nations, as seen in Afghanistan or the Balkans. Germany sees these pillars of its security as mutually reinforcing, and it aims to strengthen both.

In the 2016 version of its white paper, Germany particularly stresses the need to further implement the comprehensive approach from 2006. It is therefore intensifying its inter-ministerial cooperation with regard to information sharing, crisis prevention and especially capacity building of partners. On the EU level, Germany is pushing for a more integrated civil/military approach to conflict management that includes common planning. Resilience and cyber security are frequently mentioned as tasks that deserve a whole-of-government approach and the attention of a wide range of players on the national and international level including NATO and the EU – not only for defense, but also for disaster relief and civil protection.

With regard to military challenges, the white paper 2016 elaborates on Germany's efforts to close the European military capability gaps defined by NATO and the EU. The government commits itself in both parts of the paper to a better resourced and funded Bundeswehr and points to progress toward NATO's defence spending goal.[11] Of great importance, and widely unchallenged in NATO, is Germany's ambitious approach to close the capability gaps in a multilateral way via the Framework Nations Concept. This concept underlines that Germany is not only willing to invest more, but better. Germany's efforts are also strictly placed in the context of wider European needs to develop a more modern and coherent capability profile that eventually matches the demands of NATO and the EU alike.[12] In this context the white paper clearly expresses a swing from

11 Ibid., p. 117.
12 Ibid., p. 96.


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expeditionary warfare to collective defense – without denying the full range of operational tasks the Bundeswehr will continue to fulfill in its missions and in preparation for collective defense.

The firm commitment of Germany to a stronger political and military role is put into perspective by a paragraph on sustainable security, underlining the need to treat security policy as a cross-generational responsibility: "Sustainable security means interlinking the security of states, individuals and successive generations as well as the many different areas that development and security have in common."[13] This vision is underpinned by the promise to provide necessary resources, personnel and expertise and to maintain necessary capabilities and key technologies.

For observers of German politics, however, it seems less important what Germany says than what it actually does. Therefore it should be stressed: Germany has delivered. With its leading role in the Minsk Process on Ukraine; as the major European contributor to NATO's assurance measures and the enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltics; with its enduring commitment in the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan; with continuing lead functions in NATO operation KFOR and an expanded role in the UN mission in Mali; and with its prompt contribution to the Counter Da'esh operation over Syria and the effective training, advice and equipment for Iraqi, mainly Peshmerga, forces for the same fight, Germany is keeping its promises. At the same time, the country has also drastically enforced its crisis response and prevention instruments, including humanitarian aid and economic support for many partner countries in crises regions.

In such a rapidly spinning world it is difficult to predict the expiration date of the White Paper 2016. But there is great reason to believe that the attitude towards a more active Germany foreign and security policy will last.

13 Ibid., p. 57.


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Stefan Mair

# Economic Interests in Germany's Security Policy

Germany's economic success and the prosperity of its society very much depends on its industry's ability to export and import goods and services, to invest abroad and to repatriate the profits made there. 2015 exports accounted for half of Germany's GDP from, exports and imports together for 86 %. One job in four depends on exports, in the manufacturing sector one out of two[1]. Four fifth of the export revenues are created by the (1) automotive sector, (2) the tools, machinery and equipment branch, (3) the electronic sector as well as (4) chemistry and pharmaceuticals. Almost 36.000 German companies hold a capital stock of close to one trillion Euro outside its borders. Most of these companies belong to the same four manufacturing sectors.

Still Germany's exports and investments are focussed on Europe and North America. The EU accounts for 58,6 % of Germany's exports and for 41,2 % of German foreign direct investment, the US for 8 % and more than 25 % respectively. But emerging economies, especially China, have gained tremendous importance[2]. German industry's specialisation in premium consumer goods as well as high quality investment goods was a perfect match for the needs of a rising middle class and rapid industrialisation in emerging economies. China now accounts for 7.6 % of German exports. Though its share in the capital stock of German companies held abroad is compared with the EU and the US still rather low (6 %), it has become one of the main destinations of German FDI in

1 Statistisches Bundesamt (2017). Deutscher Außenhandel im Zeichen der Globalisierung [online]. Available at: https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Aussenhandel/Gesamtentwicklung/AussenhandelWelthandel5510006159004.pdf;jsessionid=98547E042C579D2ADC53CF3F2D84FE18.cae2?__blob=publicationFile [Accessed 28 Mar. 2017].

2 Statistisches Bundesamt (2017). Deutsche Exporte im Jahr 2016 um 1,2 % gestiegen [online]. Available at: https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2017/02/PD17_045_51.html [Accessed 28 Mar. 2017]. Deutsche Bundesbank (2016): Bestandserhebung über Direktinvestitionen. Statistische Sonderveröffentlichung 10, https://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/Veroeffentlichungen/Statistische_Sonderveroeffentlichungen/Statso_10/2016_bestandserhebung_direktinvestitionen.pdf?__blob=publicationFile [Accessed 28 Mar. 2017].


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the past years. This illustrates that increasing exports were just one effect of the emergence of new markets. Foreign direct investment brought German companies closer to their consumers, met the ever-pressing demands of foreign governments for the localisation of production and, last but not least, enabled German companies to remain internationally competitive by building-up global value chains.

Without any doubt, Germany's economy is one of the prime winners of globalisation. According to the Globalisation Report of the Bertelsmann Foundation globalisation earned the German population €1,270 per year and capita in the period 1990–2014[3]. Germany is the most connected big economy in the world (rank 7 of 140)[4]. But interconnectedness means at least interdependence, in some cases even dependency. The outward-oriented German economy depends on the ability to bring goods and commodities to Germany and to take them to foreign markets, on the security of its investments abroad, on the demand for its goods there and on the unhindered transfer of capital and revenues. Germany is among the major economies the most vulnerable one for external threats and security risks.

Three very different incidents illustrate this: The increase in piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden in 2008 endangered the security and efficiency of the trade and supply chains of German companies on the so important maritime route which links Europe to the Persian Gulf and East Asia. Though the international community's Operation Atalanta and enhanced efforts by ship-owners to protect their vessels resulted in a far-reaching elimination of this risk, piracy remains a problem in other parts of the world and has become a real cost-factor. Secondly, Russia's annexation of the Crimea peninsula and its support for separatist forces in Ukraine triggered off sanctions which constrain the ability of German companies to do business in Russia. Moreover, Russia's aggression contributed to a general economic deterioration in Russia and Ukraine and raised doubts in the stability of Europe's state and peace order which in turn affects the growth perspectives of European economies. Finally, the numerous conflicts and crises in the Middle East do not only impair the supply of European economies with oil and gas from the region and limit business opportunities there, it also caused a massive influx of refugees into Germany. This resulted in the partial suspension of the Schengen agreement which in turn undermines the efficiency of European cross-border value chains which are so crucial for German industry's competitiveness.

3 Böhmer, M., Funke, C., Sachs, A., Weinelt, H. and Weiß, J. (2016). Globalisierungsreport 2016. Wer profitiert am stärksten von der Globalisierung? Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, p. 17.

4 Ghemawat, P. and Altman, S. A. (2016). DHL Global Connectedness Index 2016. The State of Globalization in an Age of Ambiguity. Bonn: Deutsche Post DHL Group, p. 30.


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These are just a few examples of conflict-driven and geopolitical developments which affect Germany's economic interests. More orderly, they can be classified in three categories:
- the immediate protection of property and staff,
- the access to raw materials, supply and markets and
- the creation of a secure, stable and conducive international environment.

German security policy has to take such economic interests into account and to preserve them.

## Economic Interests

### Protect property and staff from immediate threats

As stated, German companies hold a capital stock of close to one trillion Euro abroad. This amount does not only reflect the value of properties, machinery, primary and intermediate products necessary for production, it also indicates the responsibility companies have for numerous employees abroad. Almost 7 million people work for German companies internationally. Furthermore, real property is not the only asset which German companies expose by foreign direct investment: intellectual property is almost equally important. When leaving national and European jurisdiction, German investors face manifold risks: They can be illegitimately expropriated after a regime change or suffer from state failure; they can be object of crime (from cyber-crime to theft), espionage, terrorism and vandalism; their employees and assets can be affected or marooned by violent conflicts; and they can be harmed by natural disasters. Moreover, the increasing permeability of European borders enables transnational crime, industrial and state espionage as well as international terrorism to hit business in the home market. Finally, the emergence and comprehensive character of the cyber-space makes borders as protection against some of these risks more and more invalid.

Managing these risks is a prime responsibility for companies themselves. But some forms of hedging are not at their disposal and require the active involvement of states and governments. Only they can conclude investment protection treaties. Only they can exert political pressure on rogue states or contribute to the stabilisation of failing states. Only they have military, intelligence and police means to counter one or the other threats mentioned above. What does this mean for Germany's foreign and security policy? Four priorities emerge from the interest in protecting property and staff of companies operating abroad:


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- expand and strengthen the network of bilateral investment treaties and put investment protection high on WTO's agenda;
- improve the capacity to ensure cyber security and engage in multi-lateral efforts to counter cyber-crime and cyber-espionage;
- focus on the stabilisation of failing states that have an economic significance;
- develop German capabilities to protect staff and property of companies exposed to violent conflicts.

### Access to raw materials, supply and markets

German companies are an integral part of complex and multi-levelled value chain structures and depend on the stable and regular supply with fossil fuels, strategic minerals and intermediary goods. This means that the access to these goods and commodities, the integrity of supply chains and trading routes and accessibility of markets are essential economic interests. These interests are compromised by a variety of actions and policies. Again, conflicts, state failure, crises, crime, terrorism and disasters can undermine the supply with goods and commodities – either at the place of origin or on the way to the place of destination. Governments restrict the export of fuels and strategic minerals to achieve political or economic goals. Protectionist measures bloc or limit the market entry of German companies. Sanctions and other economic means of exerting pressure can exclude German business from certain markets.

Here, the ability of companies to manage and hedge risks by themselves is rather limited because most of them are caused by state interventions and violent actors. It is the prime responsibility of governments to deal with restricted access to raw materials, supply and markets by focussing on four spheres of action:

- expand the network of regional free trade agreements, strengthen the multilateral trade regime and preserve the interests of business and consumers in them;
- make export restrictions subject to international agreements and bilateral diplomatic efforts;
- develop appropriate security strategies to protect trade and supply routes of strategic importance;
- create mechanisms to limit the negative effects of economic sanctions on German business.


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## Secure, stable and conducive environment

Globalisation provided German economies with vast opportunities. It opened up formerly closed and peripheral markets, gave German consumers and companies access to a broad variety of commodities, goods and services, and resulted in the establishment of global value chain structures which enabled German business to remain competitive. But the success of German companies in global markets does not only rest in the superiority of their business models, high productivity and competitiveness, the quality of their products and strength of their brands. It also depends on the conduciveness of the international environment they operate in. After the end of the cold war, not only the countries of the former Soviet bloc but also many other emerging economies turned to market principles or at least certain form of capitalism – from the communist People's Republic of China via many quasi-socialist systems in Africa to the mixed economies of India, Indonesia and Brazil. More and more economies adopted liberal economic rules. These national policy changes were reinforced by the work and guidelines of multilateral institutions like the IMF and World Bank, WTO and OECD – equally committed to market economy, the primacy of private property and entrepreneurial freedom. Liberal, in the perception of many: Western economic norms seemed to become more and more universal.

Yet, this is about to change. Not because the efficiency of market rules for the allocation of scarce resources is generally put into question. But the financial crisis in 2007/08 encouraged efforts for more regulation. Concerns about climate change and social inequalities have resulted in demands to control and correct the externalities and imbalances of markets. And above all, emerging economies are less and less willing to play to the rules defined by others. All these developments can affect the operations of German business. If discretionally and selectively applied, more regulation and restrictions will undermine its competitiveness. If illiberal forces re-define the rules of the world market, it will probably not be to the benefit of German companies. The blocking of international organisations, the massive state intervention in markets, the promotion of business interests by public finance, the increasing role of state-owned enterprises, the strategic take-over of prime movers of key technologies, the building-up of infrastructure to create dependencies and the use of economic means to exert political pressure and vice versa can result in an international economic system dominated by states or their institutions and not by private companies.

European countries are not in the best position to complain about these developments. Because in the past, they themselves resorted to some of the means listed above. In addition, populist and illiberal forces are on the rise in Europe and the U.S. as well and turn against free trade and globalisation. But the state interventions of some emerging economies have reached a new quality


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recalling the era of mercantilism and the end of the first wave of globalisation right before World War I. Some evidence already demonstrates that globalisation is losing pace and that the space for economic freedom in some markets is getting squeezed. It is of utmost importance that Germany maintains and improves the liberal international environment its companies are operating in by giving priority to the following three activities:

- make sure that regulatory interventions to achieve economic and non-economic objectives are applied as universally as possible and do not undermine the levelness of the playing field;
- engage with emerging powers in an active dialogue on feasible and appropriate adjustments in the global economic rulebook without undermining the functioning of market principles;
- build strategic alliances with liberal economies worldwide to balance Europe's relative loss of economic power and further shape the global order.

## A Responsive Security Policy?

Economic interests are of course only one dimension of national interests. Security, political, social and ecologic interests also have to be taken into account. However, economic interests must be given special weight – due to three reasons. First, only well-functioning economies can ensure the long-term prosperity of societies. Secondly, economies create the revenues a state needs to sustain the means of its foreign and security policy: a diplomatic corps, military capabilities and development aid. Thirdly, the economic power of a state is a crucial element of its hard power. The size and dynamics of a market, its share in international trade, the control over scarce and strategic resources as well as innovation and technology have always been important determinants of the influence and power a government has at its disposal. Economic dynamism is, however, also an important factor for the attractiveness of a country, its ability to create voluntary allegiance, i. e. its soft power. Thus, a determined preservation of its economic interests reinforces Germany's capabilities to pursue its interests in general.

Correspondingly, the most recent White Paper on German Security Policy refers in three of its six identified key national interests to such with a strong economic imprint:

- maintaining the rules-based international order on the basis of international law;
- ensuring prosperity for our citizens through a strong German economy as well as free and unimpeded world trade;


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– promoting the responsible use of limited goods and scarce resources throughout the world[5].

So, the objectives are clearly defined but how about German security policy's ability to achieve them? In answering this question, the focus is usually put on resources and finances, on the effectiveness of government institutions and their level of interoperability. Certainly, other contributions to this book take such an approach. Here, three other factors shall be discussed which constrain and challenge German security policy to protect economic interests.

The first one is deep-rooted in Germany's foreign policy identity: the culture of restraint. Both historical experience in the first half of the last century and the successful civilisation of German foreign policy in its second half resulted in a broadly shared popular sentiment: Germany fares best if it does not get involved in foreign entanglements. If such an involvement were unavoidable, the preferred role in it was that of the paymaster: stabilise fragile countries by development aid, mitigate quarrels in the EU by financial transfers, contribute financially to military interventions of others. Without any doubt, this role has changed significantly in the past 25 years. But the majority of the German public still seems to believe in it and to prefer it. Again and again, opinion polls on foreign and security policy show the same result: Germans would like their country to be a big Switzerland and generally oppose the deployment of military abroad. Moreover, there is an increasing tendency in Germany to turn against globalisation. So, the need to do more to protect economic interests abroad, to live up to the interconnectedness and interdependence of German business is confronted with a popular unwillingness to accept this reality. Partly, this attitude is shared by business itself. Many senior managers seem to regard foreign and security policy as a black box, which tends to make things more complicated for them than easier and which is in general not needed or beyond their influence. Two factors might explain this: on the one hand, successful businessmen are convinced that they can cope with any problem and risk which might arise, even with political ones. And German businessmen were for many years dedicated followers of the paradigm of the end of history. Most of them seemed to be convinced: in the foreseeable future, the whole world would subject itself to liberal norms and rules. It was stated above, how misleading this assumption might be – not because we see a re-emergences of geopolitical rivalry but a replacement of geopolitics by geo-economics. That is a world, in which governments mainly resort to economic means to achieve foreign policy and geo-

5 The Federal Government of Germany (2016). White Paper 2016 – On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, p. 24.


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strategic ends and in which they use foreign and security policy to realize predominantly economic objectives.

Rejection of globalisation and unwillingness to bear the costs of global public goods is not exclusive to the German society but getting even more pronounced in other Western states. The most prominent and significant expression of this is the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. During his campaign it became very clear that Trump regards the openness of the American economy more as a threat than an opportunity, that he does not seem to care about the economic consequences of foreign policy decisions and that he expect allies to contribute the same share to security arrangements as the US do. The consequences of this for economic interests in Germany's foreign and security policy are rather obvious: (1) Germany might become itself target of punitive American measure against countries with which the US hold excessive trade deficits; (2) it might get entangled in trade wars between the US and other important economies; (3) it might lose an indispensable partner in the shaping of global liberal norms; and (4) it will have to shoulder more responsibility and costs in dealing with security risks and international conflicts. As controversial many of Trump's announcements on his administration's foreign security policy were, his complaint about American allies' free-riding on security policy cannot totallybe discarded. The consequences even of a partly withdrawal of the US from world politics or a reversal of its strategic orientation would be tremendous for German business.A policy reversal of the US on how to deal with Russian interference in the Ukraine might seriously undermine the stability and security of the Baltic and Central Eastern Europe states which in turn are important economic partners for Germany. A further withdrawal of the US from the conflicts in the Middle East would affect Europe's oil supply and might again increase the influx of refugees, undermining the cohesion and structural stability of European societies. And finally, a more confrontative American behaviour in South East Asia and a more robust handling of US-China relations could prove that it was a European miscalculation to leave the preservation of peace and security in East Asia more or less exclusively to the US.

So, Germany will have to accept more international responsibility and more human and financial costs which come along with this. But it cannot fill the gap alone, which a relative withdrawal of the US from international affairs will create. A real Common European Foreign and Security Policy is needed. For business it is difficult to understand why there has been hardly any progress in this field while the single market for goods, services, capital and the free movement of people has become reality in the EU. Until recently, trade policy had been the only really functioning communitized field of EU's external policy. Unfortunately, it seems to work less and less as a model for a common foreign policy because it has become itself under enormous pressure. It has become a prime target of the anti-


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globalisation movement in Europe and suffers from re-nationalisation efforts. In a moment, when the preservation of economic interests abroad requires more Europe, Europe seems to get more fragmented and inward-looking. This clearly thwarts German economic interests. Most of Germany's big companies and many of its small and medium-sized ones are European companies in nature which regard the single market as its home market and rely on transnational European value chains. The preservation of economic interests in and for a European single market requires a real common foreign and security policy of the EU.


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Tilman Mayer

# Demographics as a Security Challenge

Can demographics erode the international order? Only those with an alarmist attitude will be able to respond with an unqualified yes. After all, the international order as a whole is not on trial; but in certain regions it is hard to dispute that demographics have created circumstances that it would be disastrous to ignore.

Demographics, or demographic change, cannot have an erosive effect in the short term. But the eye of a reputable beholder cannot just rest briefly on a region. The example of Europe, and especially Germany, in the summer of 2015 represents an occurrence that had not been expected with such intensity and at such short notice – a refugee movement and migration of unexpected scope.

Certainly this occurrence poses a challenge to the cohesiveness of German society. But is it too soon to say that even Germany's security situation is challenged? From the current point of view in the fall of 2015, this demographic occurrence also demonstrates that, in a conflict, the responsibility for ignoring or failing to predict the demographic situation falls to the observers, and/or to the society that has been struck blind in this regard. At the moment, this migratory challenge cannot yet be conclusively assessed from a security perspective. It would be naïve to overlook the potentials for conflict in Germany and Europe. The obvious goal is to see and resolve the challenge within the larger context of the Near East conflict.

The Arab Jasmine Revolution is often explained by the increasing size of Arab families, and especially the number of unemployed sons. Beyond a certain increase, it is said, the results will always be bellicose. Thus if the thesis is correct, the demographic development could provide a likely prediction.

However, demographics in general are not suitable for explaining sudden societal crises, due to what is known as demographic inertia. This term expresses the fact that demographic processes develop slowly and can only be identified over the long term. This must always be taken into account. Still, there are some recognizable processes that should absolutely be considered as possible future developments if we are to avoid falling into an implausible attitude of dismay


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post festum, as though we had never heard anything about these crises before. Therefore let us look at a few demographic processes that are relevant for security.

There are certainly many demographic processes with consequences that are open to interpretation, which in other words cannot be interpreted or understood from a solely demographic perspective. In this regard, political demographics are helpful; here, both of the interpretative contexts – political and demographic – are considered and discussed at the same time.

Urbanization, for example, could be relevant as a result of enormous domestic population growth because it allows greater control of societal development, as is currently the goal in China. It could therefore be hypothesized that urbanization policies create more peace and stability-oriented policies. The vulnerability of large cities would certainly be in play if a highly urbanized state resorted to military adventures. Is it possible to develop the hypothesis that high levels of urbanization help maintain peace? Despite the experiences of the Second World War, this is worth investigating and considering.

Aging population: This does not just mean having a smaller share of young people, which is not ideal in military terms, but also comes with a general attitude that has more to do with peace than with war.

Conversely, regions with a large share of young people, in other words with strong societal growth and/or populations, are shaped by demographic dynamics and intra-societal competition, which could develop a readiness for conflict and a desire to discharge it externally if a corresponding mobilization took place or if populists gained power.

Aging can potentially represent a factor for peace, but if the other party – for instance in the Mediterranean – is densely populated, aging is also a risk because it can potentially set off large migration processes. Migration as a risk? Yes, if it is disproportionate or if there is cultural divergence. It is worth investigating how aging populations without migration, for example Japan, see themselves in terms of security.

If we consider potential conflict regions where demographic development contexts are apparent, this allows us to develop scenarios that can almost certainly be prevented. The speculative moment here is less important than the opposite case, in which such preventative considerations never took place and one is unprepared to confront reality. Thus from a security perspective, it is irresponsible to neglect demographics. On the other hand, strategic thinking has of course always taken the strength of military contexts into account. Here, however, there is also a focus on the fact that entire population structures and population processes must be seen in conjunction with security considerations and strategic thinking. Thus strategic research must also take demographics into account in its interdisciplinary canon.


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Honestly, however, it must also be emphasized that demographic figures alone do not constitute a requirement or an evaluation. It is correct and fair to say that data remains open to interpretation and requires an experienced assessment. On the other hand, it is also true that the all-too-clear demographic structures suggest certain interpretations that are relatively undisputed, even if these are only interpretations.

In addition to the first urbanization criterion and the aging process, let us now consider some other demographic challenges.

Shrinking regions, in contrast to overpopulated regions – a vague term – are not yet the world's major demographic problem. Some implosive regional developments have been apparent for decades without evolving into a conflict situation. In other words, conflicts do not necessarily need to arise simply on the basis of a demographic and regional situation if there are no other transformation processes at work. Accordingly, if conflicts can be predicted, caution is advised. Initially, a situation analysis is merely a status description. Its dynamic trend may be apparent, but the whole picture must be taken into account in order to evaluate the situation.

The situation in Israel and Palestine can certainly not be fully explained without looking at demographic development. Birth trends have been a political issue for decades – fertility rates can create circumstances with a structural impact that changes the security situation.

Another example is the contrast between different demographic dynamics along China's northern border with Russia. The sparse population in the Russian region is noteworthy. A demographic drop-off has occurred and persists, but as yet without any effects – for instance an encroachment by the Chinese side. The economic decline in Russia creates additional dynamics. Siberia is another region of Russia whose implosive development troubles the distant center of Moscow. We could name many historic cases of shrinking regions that, unlike Russia, did not go unnoticed for long, many of which contributed to conflicts and erosion.

Urbanization, as we said, is a global trend. It is worth investigating whether it is relevant from a security perspective. If we consider a society's degree of urbanization, we might discover various connections. Afghanistan, which is constantly under threat of war, has an urbanization level of 23 percent, and civil-war-besieged Yemen has an urbanization level of 32 percent. Syria's level of urbanization, at 56 percent, is too low to protect it from conflicts. And Gaza, with an urbanization level of 72 percent, is the counter-example to the hypothesis – its high level of urbanization should have protected it, but this is absolutely not the case. Another notable example is the demographic difference on the Korean peninsula. Here, the north has a 60-percent urbanization level, while the level in


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the south is 83 %. Despite its impressive urbanization, the militancy of North Korea remains unbowed in Pyongyang.

Other demographic indicators could be discussed based on the examples of individual countries. For instance, let us look at birth rate trends.

Germany has a birth rate of eight births per 1000 residents; the rate per 1000 residents is 43 in Sudan, 36 in East Africa, and 44 in Central Africa. The overall fertility rates are correspondingly different: 5.2 in Sudan, 4.4 in Yemen, 4.1 in the Palestinian territories, 4.9 in Afghanistan – compared to Germany's 1.4 children per woman of childbearing age. Some regions in Africa thus deserve our full security-related attention. After all, paying attention to security issues also means taking a preventative strategic look at development trends, both in advance on site and from an outside perspective. It is to be hoped that this will take place.

This picture of the situation can also be supplemented by comparing the sheer population growth from today to 2030 and 2050:

| | **today** | **2030** | **2050** |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sudan | 40.9 | 61.7 | 105 |
| West Africa | 349 | 509 | 784 |
| East Africa | 388 | 562 | 841 |
| Central Africa | 149 | 229 | 378 |
| United States | 321.2 | 359.4 | 398.3 |
| Yemen | 26.7 | 35.7 | 46.1 |
| Palestinian territories | 4.5 | 6.6 | 9.2 |
| Israel | 8.4 | 10.6 | 13.9 |
| Afghanistan | 32.2 | 45.8 | 64.3 |

Table 1: Predicted population growth (in million)

In the highlighted crisis-ridden countries with especially high overall fertility rates, the rate of girls' participation in secondary education is significant. While it is 39 percent in Sudan and 40 percent in Yemen, it is (allegedly) 86 percent in the Palestinian territories and 38 percent in Afghanistan (70 percent for men).

Population size is a weight and a politically decisive factor, but only if the population also produces a society that can keep up with modern developments and even help drive them, as in China. India, by contrast, is ascribed a great deal of significance and even greater expectations, but its performance is relatively weak compared to its population size and the clear contrast with China. In other words, demographic size can mean political strength and/or weight, but this is not necessarily always the case. Claiming that size in and of itself is technologically insignificant is also ignorant. The Chinese People's Liberation Army, the largest army in the world, should never be underestimated.


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If we generalize from the demographic global majorities, the world is already Asian. When President Obama emphasizes the United States' Pacific option, one of the reasons is that the opposite Asian coast represents a clear challenge to the United States in geographic, geo-strategic and geo-economic terms. From a Eurasian perspective, we have the same challenge in Europe. If we expanded the purely demographic analysis to include other development factors like the job market, economic growth, climate trends, education levels, the military budget and much more, the image would gain further shape and detail and the security scenario would become more rigorous. We can only hope that this issue is also at the forefront for government and NATO circles.

If we single out geo-economic development, securing strategic raw materials could create distribution conflicts because the demand for raw material supplies will change as demographic figures shift. This can already be observed. We have already mentioned Africa's growth, and the continent will not want to keep exporting mainly raw materials in the long term. Raw material supplies in Europe cannot be considered secure, and this will have consequences for societal development. In this regard, the geo-economic and geopolitical search for and development of alternative energy sources is critical for survival. The demographics and growth-based rivalry for strategic raw materials is more than just a security-related challenge.

Traditional true immigration societies depend on natural population growth supplemented by migration. Together, they supplement one another in reality. This is not currently working in Germany, where there is a serious fertility gap. More than other countries, Germany depends on migration. The proportion of people with migration backgrounds is increasing.

It remains to be seen how Japan's alternative path of allowing almost no migration will play out. Japan's attitude toward China, of trying to get away with almost no apologies for the past and fighting with China over islands in the South China Sea, actually requires more manpower, so it is a risky and bold approach from a security perspective due to their lack of demographic support. Japan is betting on homogeneity, while Germany and other countries have departed from this path. Even the China of the Han Chinese does not give the impression of seeking out additional multiculturalism in addition to its respected minorities.

Nonetheless, migration is hard to evaluate from a security perspective. The United States would be unthinkable without it. However, if integration requirements are unsuccessful, migration can mean conflict – whether it is latent or already manifest.

How many battalions does the Pope have? Only a few countries and states have the luxury of not worrying about demographic circumstances. Even the Castel Sant'Angelo in Rome was not able to protect the papal state. So it seems reasonable to see demographics not as fate, but as a significant factor in interna-


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tional politics, to grant it the appropriate respect, and to consider it in a timely manner.


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Maximilian Terhalle / Bastian Giegerich

# The Munich Consensus and the Purpose of German Power

In December 2015, *Time* chose German Chancellor Angela Merkel as its person of the year, calling her 'Chancellor of the Free World'[1]. A month earlier, *The Economist* had named her 'the indispensable European'[2]. The tendency to project outsized expectations onto the individual reflects a wider phenomenon: German economic and political power in Europe has grown, partly because Germany weathered the 2008 economic crisis relatively well, and partly because of the lethargy of other European powers, including France and the United Kingdom.

With power came responsibility: firstly, for financial and economic stability, goals pursued with vigour by Germany's minister of finance, Wolfgang Schäuble, whose medicine of fiscal discipline for all left a bitter aftertaste; secondly, for crisis diplomacy, when Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and its continued support for separatists in eastern Ukraine shook the foundations of Europe's security order; and thirdly, for a wave of international refugees fleeing savage violence and collapsing states, when the humanitarian impulse led Merkel to welcome migrants in numbers that now threaten to overwhelm capacity in Germany and beyond, putting the stability of her own government in doubt. Nevertheless, Germany watchers see the 'sleep-walking giant' finally awakening[3]. There is thus a 'new German question' to answer: will Germany be able to provide the leadership Europe needs[4]?

1 Vick, K. and Shuster,S. (2015). Chancellor of the Free World. Time [online]. Available at: http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2015-angela-merkel/?iid=coverrecirc [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

2 The Indispensable European (2015). The Economist [online]. Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21677643-angela-merkel-faces-her-most-serious-political-challenge-yet-europe-needs-her-more [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

3 See Hyde-Price, A. G.V. (2015). The "Sleep-Walking Giant" Awakes: Resetting German Foreign and Security Policy. European Security 24(4), pp. 600–616; and Fix, L. (2015). Eine deutsche Metamorphose. Vom unsicheren Kantonisten zur europäischen Führungsmacht. Internationale Politik, pp. 56–9.


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Germany is indeed trying to do its share to close the gap between supply and demand in foreign-policy leadership, both within and beyond the European Union. A new White Paper on security policy and the future of the German armed forces, expected in the summer of 2016, is an opportunity to provide further strategic direction. To put German security policy on a sustainable footing, policymakers should try to answer a question they traditionally have tried to avoid: what is German power for?

## The Munich consensus

Just five years ago, in March 2011, Germany's foreign-policy leadership had drifted off the transatlantic reservation. Berlin's decision to abstain from UN Security Resolution 1973, which authorised intervention in Libya to protect civilians, raised questions about its willingness and ability to join key allies and partners in their pursuit of international-security goals. Former Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski famously said in Berlin in November 2011 'I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity', signalling that the times when other European governments welcomed German restraint had passed[5]. Retrospective unease and a sense of isolation, paired with appeals by important partners for a more active German role, simmered for a good three years before a new narrative, aptly summarised by a think-tank report under the heading 'New Power, New Responsibility', was constructed[6].

The 2014 Munich Security Conference provided the venue for the official articulation of this narrative. Speeches by Federal President Joachim Gauck, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Minister of Defence Ursula von der Leyen expressed a growing realisation that some adjustment to close the gap between expectations and output in security policy had become necessary. The themes of the Munich speeches were mutually reinforcing. Gauck argued, in a powerful address:

Germany is globalised more than most countries and thus benefits more than most from an open world order – a world order which allows Germany to

4 Ash, T.G. (2013). The New German Question. New York Review of Books [online]. Available at: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/08/15/new-german-question/ [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

5 See Sikorski, R. (2011). I Fear Germany's Power Less Than Her Inactivity. Financial Times [online]. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/b753cb42-19b3-11e1-ba5d-00144feabdc0 [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

6 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and German Marshall Fund of the United States (2013). New Power, New Responsibility: Elements of a German Foreign and Security Policy for a Changing World [online]. Available at: https://www.swp-erlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/projekt_papiere/GermanForeignSecurityPolicy_SWP_GMF_2013.pdf [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].


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reconcile interests with fundamental values. Germany derives its most important foreign policy goal in the 21st century from all of this: preserving this order and system and making them fit for the future … In my opinion, Germany should make a more substantial contribution, and it should make it earlier and more decisively if it is to be a good partner.[7]

The president's call for a more substantial contribution was echoed by Steinmeier, who added that 'a culture of restraint must not turn into a culture of refraining from engagement. Germany is too big to comment on global policy from the side-lines'[8]. Von der Leyen declared that 'indifference is not an option for Germany. As a major economy and a country of significant size we have a strong interest in international peace and stability'[9].

Two years later, the Munich consensus has not radically transformed German foreign and security policy, but it has certainly propelled the debate forward. It represents a deliberate attempt to reconcile adaptation pressures and policy, an attempt that will remain flawed as long as German policymakers shy away from substantiating it with an underlying strategic purpose: to contribute to reforming and actively defending the liberal international order, the basis for Germany's prosperity.

## The spectrum of leadership

The link between material power and international responsibility rests on the notion of political leadership: the calculated act of launching calibrated political initiatives, based on forward-looking grand strategy[10]. Leadership is the practical expression of the purpose behind a country's vital interests, and how it wants to promote and defend them. Leadership is not, of course, crisis-independent. Sometimes the need to fight fires, real and political, will dominate agendas for extended periods of time, and it would be futile to suggest that these

7 Gauck, J. (2014). Speech at the opening of the Munich Security Conference, 31 January 2014 [online]. Available at: http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Reden/2014/01/140131-Muenchner-Sicherheitskonferenz-Englisch.pdf;jsessionid=9FFBCE935EA18E7094771188719F5164.2_cid379?__blob=publicationFile [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

8 Steinmeier, F.-W. (2014). Speech at the Munich Security Conference, 1 February 2014 [online]. Available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2014/140201-BM_M%C3%BCSiKo.html [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017]. Translated by the author.

9 von der Leyen, U. (2014). Speech at the Munich Security Conference, 31 January 2014 [online]. Available at: https://www.securityconference.de/fileadmin/MSC_/2014/Reden/2014-01-31-Speech-MinDef_von_der_Leyen-MuSeCo.pdf [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

10 Bukovansky, M., Clark, I., Eckersley, R., Price, R., Reus-Smit, C. and Wheeler, N. J. (2012). Special Responsibilities. Global Problems and American Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


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are occasions where no leadership is on display. Even crisis leadership, however, should have a broader purpose, lest it disintegrate into a purely tactical approach, with no sense of direction and little connection to vital interests. Put briefly, it is purpose that defines political leadership.

To what extent, then, has Merkel's government demonstrated security-policy leadership[11]? Five examples can help us understand Germany's choices and actions. Firstly, Russia's seizure of Crimea fundamentally challenged the post-Cold War settlement in Europe, and put Berlin's rhetoric to the test. While Ukraine was not a NATO member, some of President Vladimir Putin's messages vis-à-vis the Baltic states turned the occupation into a test of Western military credibility. With the United Kingdom, at that time, essentially dropping out of the management of the crisis, Berlin, in close coordination with France and strategically reassured by the US, positioned itself at centre stage. Merkel led all of the discussions with Putin. While Russia could not be expelled from Crimea, she succeeded in signalling that the supposedly morally corrupt West was ready to contest Putin's strategic calculations. Consequently, Merkel became the driving force behind an increasingly piercing set of economic sanctions against Russia, only stopping short of Moscow's exclusion from the lifeline of international financial transactions, SWIFT (the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication).

The Merkel government went even further. Notwithstanding Germany's persistent problems in military capacity, the Bundeswehr formed the backbone of NATO manoeuvres held in Eastern Europe, and accepted responsibility for setting up the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), a core measure agreed at NATO's 2014 Wales Summit, and a commitment recently reinforced when Berlin accepted the rotating framework-nation responsibility for the VJTF in 2019[12]. A renewed focus on collective defence triggered by Russian assertiveness might feel to some in the German armed forces to be leading the Bundeswehr back to its cultural comfort zone. This was never found in the expeditionary operations of the past two decades, focusing rather on high-intensity

11 Axiomatically, German leadership perceives itself as the reflection of Franco-German consultations. See Krotz, U. and Schild, J. (2013). Shaping Europe. France, Germany, and Embedded Bilateralism from the Elysee Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

12 Major, C. (2015). NATO's Strategic Adaptation: Germany is the Backbone for the Alliance's Military Reorganisation. SWP Comments, no. 16 [online]. Available at: https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2015C16_mjr.pdf [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017]. The demand for a visible German role in these manoeuvres was nicely captured by the Estonian defence chief, Lieutenant General Riho Terras: 'We need to see the German flag here […] Leopard tanks would do very nicely.' See The Economist (2014). On a Wing and a Prayer. The Economist, p. 26.


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combined-arms warfare waged for existential purposes[13]. Recent plans to increase defence investment from 2016–30 to €130 billion, which would amount to an extra €3–4 billion of investment per year, are focused on rebuilding the historically underfunded German army[14]. Whether a political initiative with a 15-year horizon will be implemented as advertised in early 2016 remains to be seen, of course, but it is clear that a shifting perception of the security environment is the core political driver. As von der Leyen explained when announcing her plans, 'if we want external security […] then we have to invest'[15].

Shifting to another area of intense diplomatic activity, thwarting Iran's nuclear ambitions has been a key concern for Western states ever since Tehran's development of uranium-enrichment capability was made public by an opposition group in 2003. Germany participated in the subsequent international negotiations, in both the 'EU3' (with France and the United Kingdom) and 'P5+1' (with, additionally, the United States, China and Russia) settings. By 2012, it had become clear that the talks had not halted Iran's nuclear plans. The US imposed tailored sanctions against the financial and economic sectors of Iran's heavily resource- and export-dependent economy, and the EU followed the American lead. An embargo on Iranian crude-oil imports, Iran's exclusion from SWIFT and sanctions on European-based insurers and re-insurers of oil tankers, struck Iran's domestic economy hard, coercing Iran's Supreme Leader, the key decision-maker in national-security-related issues, into serious negotiations[16]. In all, Germany was party to the negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme for more than a decade. Its financial and economic dominance in Europe gave it a role in imposing sanctions and promising relief from them in exchange for demands articulated by the P5+1, and, following the application of this coercive pressure, Berlin further helped to push Iran to adopt the comprehensive agreement reached in July 2015.

The desire of Gulf states, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, to hedge against Iranian power has triggered intense debate in Berlin,

13 For the argument that Germany's military culture does not provide a well-developed frame of reference beyond the core task of high-intensity warfare, see Sangar, E. (2015). The Weight of the Past(s): The Impact of the Bundeswehr's Use of Historical Experience on Strategy-Making in Afghanistan. Journal of Strategic Studies, 38(4), pp. 411–444.

14 See Ombudsman: German Army Is "Short of Almost Everything" (2016). Deutsche Welle [online]. Available at: http://www.dw.com/en/ombudsman-german-army-is-short-of-almost-everything/a-19005841 [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

15 von der Leyen, U. (2016). Interview with Ursula von der Leyen at ARD-Morgenmagazin [online]. Available at: http://www.ardmediathek.de/tv/Morgenmagazin/Bundeswehr-Verteidigungsministerin-wirb/Das-Erste/Video?documentId=33002044&bcastId=435054 [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

16 Terhalle, M. (2015). Why Revolutionary States Yield: International Sanctions, Regime Survival and the Security Dilemma: The Case of the Islamic Republic of Iran. International Politics, 52(5), pp. 594–608.


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given that Germany is seen by those governments as a potential provider of capable military hardware. Requests for German-made main battle tanks and other equipment tend to trigger public debates about the morality of German defence policy. The dominant narrative in German political discourse holds that arms exports are, by definition, destabilising, and likely to fuel either external conflict or internal repression in the receiving countries, when these are autocratic regimes. Saudi Arabia's growing security-policy assertiveness, for example, poses a difficult challenge. Pursuing regional stability requires cooperating with a number of actors, not all of whom are likely to be liberal democracies. To deny this implies a binary choice between security and freedom; Western governments are asked to provide both[17]. The controversy caused in late 2015 by a leaked German intelligence report, which suggested Saudi Arabia would develop an increasingly assertive foreign policy to counter Iranian influence and might turn into an 'impulsive interventionist', underscores the point. The German government was quick to point out the importance of Saudi Arabia as a partner in the development of solutions to conflicts in the region, but did little to engage with the substance of the report, most of which was not particularly surprising in substantive terms[18].

Germany had no part in striking the 2013 US–Russian agreement that led Syria to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention and accept that its arsenal would be taken out of the country for destruction. After the deal was made, however, Berlin played a useful role in supporting the negotiated outcome by assisting in the destruction of some of the stockpile, which was shipped to Germany for this purpose between September 2014 and April 2015. Syria was at that point already well on its way to turning into what *The Economist* recently called 'a nasty complex of wars within a war'[19] with clear regional and international dimensions. Berlin then took a decision that had until then been a taboo for German policymakers: namely, to supply lethal aid to an active conflict zone. In the summer of 2014, Germany might not have acted first, but over the space of several weeks it moved from supplying humanitarian aid, to non-lethal aid, to tactical support: it equipped and trained what amounts to a light-infantry brigade of Kurdish Peshmerga in northern Iraq to fight the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or

17 von Geyr, G.A. (n.d.). Mit Autokratien umgehen. In: Braml, J., Merkel, W. and Sandschneider, E. (eds), Außenpolitik mit Autokratien. DGAP-Jahrbuch Internationale Politik, 30, pp. 379–384.

18 Braun, S. and Krüger, P.-A. (2015). Bundesregierung empört sich über BND. Süddeutsche Zeitung [online]. Available at: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/saudi-arabien-bundesregierung-empoert-sich-ueber-bnd-1.2765939 [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

19 War in Syria: The Peril of Inaction (2016). The Economist [online]. Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21693208-russian-daring-and-american-weakness-have-changed-course-warfor-worse-peril [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].


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ISIL). Deliveries included machine guns and ammunition, anti-tank missiles and a small number of armoured vehicles. Up to 150 German personnel were deployed to northern Iraq in support. The rationale was threefold: ISIS was causing a humanitarian catastrophe; it poses an existential threat to the people in the areas it controls; and it attracts foreign fighters, a significant number of whom have EU passports, and might turn into a direct terror threat once they return from the battlefield[20].

In broader diplomacy, Germany insisted that there had to be a negotiated solution but did not actively shape the agenda. Berlin was by no means the only Western government that woke up late to the fact that the options for its preferred outcome, a negotiated settlement, were being shaped by Russian military intervention. In the end, it was the terrorist attacks on Paris in November 2015 that triggered more direct German involvement after a week of reluctant deliberations. Berlin decided to provide a solidarity package based around reconnaissance missions with six *Tornado*s for the air forces already fighting over Syria, a frigate to join the French carrier group in the eastern Mediterranean and an increased deployment to Mali in order to provide relief for French forces on operations there. The possibility of a concrete threat to Western societies and, in particular, the perception of an immediate threat to its own population, apparently changed the German position within those seven days[21]. It used to be that Germany would insist on a UN resolution to sanction military action, but the pressure of French, British and American expectations, and domestic threat perceptions, persuaded Berlin to do something to demonstrate its commitment in the fight against ISIS[22].

A final case of German evolution concerns China's efforts to carve out a sphere of influence in the East and South China seas. Germany's export-driven economy has benefited hugely from the openness of international shipping lanes, in no small measure based on the protection and presence of the US Navy. Yet Berlin has never bothered to think systematically about the preconditions of

20 Kohler, B. (2014). Berlin will Kurden aufrüsten. Waffen für die Infanterie des Westens. Frankfurter Allgemeine [online]. Available at: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/naher-osten/berlin-will-kurden-aufruesten-waffen-fuer-die-infanterie-des-westens-13108327.html [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

21 58 % of Germans support the decision to provide military reconnaissance in the fight against ISIS. See Frankenberger, K.-D. (2015). Wer soll's richten? Frankfurter Allgemeine [online]. Available at: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/kampf-gegen-den-terror/wer-kuemmert-sich-um-die-sicherheitspolitik-13948722.html [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

22 It should also be noted, however, that an increased Mali engagement had been in the works before the Paris attacks, thus more directly supporting the argument that Germany had looked at this particular case from a strategic, and not just a crisis-driven, perspective. See Hanisch, M. (2015). Eine neue Qualität des Engagements. Deutschlands erweiterter militärischer Einsatz in Nord-Mali. Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik. Berlin: Federal Academy for Security Policy (BAKS).


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its economic wealth with regard to the Asia-Pacific. As recently as 2010, a sitting federal president, Horst Köhler, resigned after being heavily criticised for suggesting that military means might sometimes be needed to protect trade and sea lines of communication.

Since then, there have been signs that Germany is rethinking its approach to the region, and hence to China. The strongest signal is the German government's support to Thyssen-Krupp Marine Systems, among others, in their bid for contracts relating to Australia's planned new $50 billion submarine force[23]. India, Indonesia, Singapore and South Korea have been German customers in the past. To suggest that Germany does not have a direct stake in the regional security dynamics that affect these states would be short-sighted. Regardless of the future success of the Australia bid,[24] the sheer size of the potential contract, Australia's geostrategic position and the way Germany's move has been perceived by others in the region make it almost inconceivable that key officials have not thought about the political rationale behind their support for German businesses.

* * *

The overall picture is mixed, but is not one of policy failure. In some cases, Germany is beginning to show significant signs of leadership. When Russia invaded Crimea, red lines were drawn immediately. Support for the Australian submarine fleet is a sign of strategic decisions being made with regard to a distant, but crucially important, region. A combination of negotiations and sanctions proved ultimately useful in reaching a nuclear deal with Iran, and Germany did its fair share. Yet the conflict in Syria seems to suggest that Germany is still partly undecided about the core purpose of its power.

For better or worse, relationships between major powers determine international politics. The first half of the twenty-first century will, essentially, settle the question of whether China and Russia can be accommodated into the existing Western liberal order without war[25]. Neither Beijing, since the 1970s, nor Russia, since defeat in the Cold War, has had a major say in the political settlement that underlies today's order, which, in turn, has tremendously benefited Germany. The current major-power peace, which has allowed much of the world to prosper, might disintegrate quickly unless influential states focus their diplomatic efforts on preserving it. Deeply anchored in the West, Germany is one of those states.

23 Hein, C. (2015). Deutsche Waffen fuer Australien. Frankfurter Allgemeine [online]. Available at: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/unternehmen/ruestungsexporte-deutsche-waffen-fuer-australien-13909187.html [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].

24 Ibid. The likeliness of success appears high, because Thyssen Krupp has offered to build and maintain the submarines in Australia.

25 Terhalle, M. (2015). The Transition of Global Order: Legitimacy and Contestation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.


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The key will lie in standing up to challengers to liberal order in a way that combines firmness on principle with flexibility over details. This is an easy approach to prescribe, and a very difficult task to achieve in practice. Should Germany and other Western powers tacitly concede some of China's territorial claims? Would such accommodation satisfy China's ambitions or would it merely encourage China to go more aggressively after other and more comprehensive claims? A conversation with Russia about rebuilding Europe's security order should start with a clear-eyed assessment of which principles can be saved, and which need to be adjusted to reflect new realities. Yet giving Putin a major part of what he apparently wants, a veto on NATO and EU expansion, requires giving up on the idea that European countries are free to choose their own alliances. The goal of negotiations about order would not be to socialise Russia into something that it is not – a liberal democracy interested in strategic partnership – but to identify ways to work out a compromise between Western and Russian interests.

Western powers must also be ready, on occasion, to throw an elbow. One potential way in which Germany could apply pressure to Russia and China, if it chose to do so, would be to take advantage of both countries' heavy dependence on oil and gas – for Russia, the most important source of external revenue, and for China the fuel for economic growth. Both Russia and China succeed in exploiting divisions over energy policy among Europeans, who seek economic and commercial rather than strategic gains. Germany could send a strong political signal by obstructing Russia's pipeline plans,[26] and could begin conversations aimed at shifting China's interest away from Russia's oil and gas supplies.

All such choices, however, come with serious costs. In order to judge which costs are worth paying, Germany's sense of purpose will be crucial. And aligning power, responsibility, leadership and purpose will be a tall order for Berlin. The way in which the Munich consensus emerged – a slow-burning, reflective response to external expectations, rooted in long-term domestic debates about Germany's role in the world – is something of a hindrance. Germany was asked to do more, and so it has, but that is only a first step. One key issue will be whether Berlin's new approach receives recognition and encouragement from other important European states, drawing Berlin into the closest circle of their trusted relationships. An early indicator might be a remarkable interview the British defence secretary, Michael Fallon, gave at the end of January 2016, suggesting

26 Kafsack, H. (2015). Streit um Nord-Stream-Ausbau. Gegen den Gasstrom. Frankfurter Allgemeine [online]. Available at: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/europa/osteuropa-wehrt-sich-gegen-bau-von-nord-stream-pipeline-2-13944914.html [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].


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Germany had finally been elevated to the status of a 'top tier ally', which from now on would place it alongside France and the United States, and would require significantly deepened exchanges of intelligence[27]. Rather than an invitation to a newcomer, this elevation is closer to an acknowledgement of Berlin's growing influence in international-security affairs, where previously it had been passive. The task now is to continue to define what 'doing more' with that influence means, and which German interests it is meant to serve.

27 Buchsteiner, J. (2016). London will Deutschland als "Hauptsicherheitspartner". Frankfurter Allgemeine [online] Available at: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/europa/f-a-z-exklusiv-london-will-deutschland-als-hauptsicherheitspartner-14031723.html [Accessed 28 Feb. 2017].


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# IV. Conclusion


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James Bindenagel

# Security Policy Responsibilities and Strategic Studies in the 21st Century

> "[…] in November 1990, the month after the reunification of Germany, the heads of the states and governments of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe met in Paris. The highlight was the signing of the Charter of Paris on the 21st of November. All 34 member states committed 'to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations.'
>
> At a time when 'a new era is dawning in Europe', they proclaimed the mutual respect for their national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes […]. If there is a symbolic date marking the end of the post-war period for the whole of Europe, it was the 21st of November 1990. Today, 25 years later, not much of the good intentions of November 1990 is left."[1]

The Peaceful Revolution of 1989/90 confirmed the wisdom of a world order that shared power in multilateral institutions. Indeed the principles and ideals that form the foundation of the liberal order were so effective that the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama 27 years ago prophesized the end of history. The Western model had triumphed over the totalitarian and authoritarian challenges of the 20th century.

A quarter century later after the end of the East-West conflict, Europe is no longer a refuge of stability nor does it present itself as a model for other regions in the world, rather it is increasingly seen, domestically and internationally, as a trouble spot of conflict. Even though many people do not want to see a troubled Europe at war, war has once again broken out on European soil. Crises surround the continent, not only in the Middle East but also in Northern Africa and Central Asia. Climate change, the war in Ukraine, cruelty of the Islamic State, a refugee crisis and the Syrian Civil War all concretely threaten German security, even without clear ways and means to name the threat.

1 Winkler, H.A. (2015). Denk ich an Deutschland. Was den Westen zusammenhält. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung [online]. Available at: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/heinrich-august-winkler-was-den-westen-zusammenhaelt-13815991.html [Accessed 03 Mar. 2017].


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## Traditional Understanding of Security Remains Relevant

For more than 350 years has the Westphalian Peace, even with the advent of globalization of the European state system, governed relations among states. Security policy consequently has become a regular international political issue influenced by realism in foreign policy particularly between great powers. The horrific wars of the 20th century underscore the importance of interstate behavior.

Tensions between security threats and security policy even today dominate relations among States. The conflict in Ukraine demonstrates that this classic understanding of security policy has lost none of its relevance to today's security debates. For Germany, and in part for Europe as a whole, the Ukraine crisis represents the emblematic return to the normalcy of a Hobbesian world that resembles civil wars where everyone is insecure, belying the thought that Europe after the end of the Cold War had left such a Hobbesian world behind. Today's world is such a world where especially great powers and their conflicts remain a central determinant of our security.

The United States perspective of a Hobbesian world is valid, while it remains the only superpower and is at odds with other great powers. The US role as the global world order policeman, despite the country's missteps, is still indispensable in an international system that has no credible international security institution. Donald Trump's election as American president in 2016 has become a stress test for the U.S. international role in that he has questioned the international institutions, including NATO, which provides security to the US and Europe.

Russia has turned out to play in the global order, or as some have said to play its role as a disorder power. Even when Russia's potential to shape politics appears to be limited to its neighborhood, Russian military action affects politics beyond the immediate region. It is clear that Russia is key to conflict resolution, as seen in the management of the Syrian Civil War or negotiations for the Iranian nuclear weapons agreement.

The same can be said emphatically in recent years for China. The Middle Kingdom is no longer simply a rising economic power; it is a military power to be taken seriously. The question whether this military potential will contribute to securing the peace or destabilizing the region. That answer will shape the global security architecture for years.

In comparison to the remaining power of the global superpowers in the years after the end of the Cold War, the hope that accompanied the world order's institutions to secure global peace, neither the United Nations nor NATO is today in a position to secure peace. The European Union as the most influential geo-economic power in Europe was fenced-in by Russia in the Ukraine crisis, despite


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Russia being seen by former U.S. President Barack Obama as a mere regional power.

## Revising the Definition of Security

The conflict in Ukraine has made clear that our traditional definition of security is in urgent need of updating. While this conflict is one between at least two states – Ukraine and Russia – it is at the same time a Ukrainian domestic conflict between its majority population, which is Western-oriented and seeks alignment with the EU and Ukraine's Russian-oriented population in the Eastern provinces of Ukraine turning to Russia.

Hybrid military operations such as the Russian-deployed forces in the conflict in Ukraine have become more ubiquitous in the decades since the end of the Cold War. While classic warfare and conflict among States has increasingly declined, internal conflicts have dramatically increased as shown in Somalia, Ruanda, and Bosnia to name just a few examples.

More often now non-state actors have waged wars and conflicts. Although the Islamic State has self-proclaimed itself as a state, it is in no way a traditionally understood state; it, al-Qaeda or Boko Haram rather than states are better understood as internationally run terrorist organizations. Practical politics and academic research have long ignored and played down this new form of war. German political scientist Herfried Münkler moves the debate front and center in the public debate with his book of the same "Die Neuen Kriege" ('The New Wars') addressing the Iraq War and the fight against terrorism.

George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq contributed to the fundamental change in the definition of security. War today is not only conducted between states, it now includes fighting strategies ('war on terrorism'), undesirable societal conditions ('war on poverty') or unwanted substances and their effects ('war on drugs').

The proliferation of names for war are expressions of a phenomenon that Danish political scientist Ole Waever describes under his category of 'securitization.' Waever posits the concept of securitization to enrich the political discourse of relevant security issues that then allow a wider range of countermeasures to deal with these new security problems. Such an approach opens the way, among others, for financial measures to deployed against the 'war on poverty' or military deployments against the 'war on drugs' that once was the sole responsibility of the police.

The concept of securitization recognizes a political, rhetorical strategy, which includes an integrated approach based on critical monitoring of the relationships among security and other issues. Although there is an offer to link various


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critical areas of security interests, the question remains whether the definition of security in the 21st century must be broadened to remain relevant and useful.

Western societies will certainly face in today's world security more threats, not only military or other violent conflicts, whether internal or international between states. A reasonable and politically useful understanding of myriad security and security policies requires developing a strong understanding of the challenges as well as comprehensive answers to the threats they pose. The rising flood of refugees reaching Europe reveals in concrete terms the consequences of such threats if in an indirect way. Instability on the continent's periphery threatens in the long-term the stability of Europeans' societies as evidenced by the rise of populist and nationalist actors who use the refugee problem to shake up the foundations of the free, democratic order in Europe.

In addition to the classic diplomacy and military instruments, trade, development and other instruments are added quickly to the conflict prevention and conflict resolution toolbox. People on the edge of the globalized find true security only they have not only freedom and peace to live, but also a vision in which they can pursue peace and prosperity. A just world order has long been a prerequisite for security that begins with the first step of fighting poverty and promoting human rights against abuses.

Climate change and environmental policy deal with threats through the predicted flood of refugees, which is already a reality and, in the meantime, the fight against global warming has gained wide acceptance to prevent undermining the environment that sustains life. One does not have to wait for Hollywood to dramatize threats posed by environmental and natural catastrophes against international security. The fate of the survivors of Fukushima after the Tsunami hit the coast of Japan is a grim reminder of the danger the natural world poses to security. At the same time, energy and electricity are also relevant security issues in modern societies. Without access to raw materials and their sustainable exploitation, our societies cannot survive. The digital society is equally threatening; the cyber-attack on the German Bundestag demonstrated in no uncertain terms that cyber security is no longer a game for techie nerds.

## Implications for Germany

Issues in international security in the 21st century discussed in this reader are only some examples of developments and phenomena that threaten our societies today. Other non-military threats, not only in the form of nuclear missiles or tank divisions, have long manifested the dangers for our security.

German Federal President Joachim Gauck formulated his call for Germany to accept more international security responsibility in the future at the Munich


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Security Conference in 2014 to address these issues: "I wonder if it isn't time for the universities to offer more than a mere handful of chairs where German foreign policy can be analyzed. Doesn't research on security issues need to be invigorated, to boost work on matters such as defense against cyber-attacks by criminals or by intelligence services?" His request was more of a description of an absolute necessity than it was a well-intentioned advice.

This reader recognizes the questions posed in the aftermath of the president's speech using the term 'security policy' when critics warned the President against the hasty militarization of German foreign policy and especially stretches across the borders of the current academic and policy debate shortcomings in the Federal Republic. The debate has consistently been conducted among exclusive and in many ways isolated elites – circles of experts in the Bundeswehr, the Foreign Office and partially business. Deliberations have left out relevant academic or economic expertise, or the debate did not intensively engage the consequences for the understanding of security in Germany. Security remains seen too often exclusively in military terms. Our book "International Security in the 21st Century: Germany's International Responsibility" unites clear analyses of multifaceted, multidimensional tasks including issue areas of climate change, energy, food security, health security, cyber security, development policy and others that could gain public acceptance much more easily than military deployments.

Consequently, this reader addresses security issues in a broader context confronting Germany and seeks to make its contribution to a deeper understanding and finally a definition of security and Germany's international responsibility. Domestically the challenge is to define which responsibilities to consider or which ones to disregard, and from these remaining to determine which issues its citizens will accept.

The interrelationships between domestic and foreign policy play an increasingly important role in defining security. The refugee crisis shows clearly the globalized and networked world of the 21st century, and as in the Syrian Civil War offers both a foreign policy security policy disaster in the form of fertile soil for domestic security threats from nationalist and populist movements. Alternatively, these populist movements, while not strong enough to determine German security policy, will play a role.

In Germany, the necessary political discourse over security and its global development is running behind reality. Germany has been comfortable in its belief the country is a 'civilian power' as coined by German political scientist Professor Hanns Maull, but neither German political nor academic elites have been able to define Germany's role with civilian and without military power in the pallet of threat scenarios.

Germany's unique historical responsibilities and a clear moral dimension are


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ingredients in Germany's responsibility for security. The Basic Law with its political prudence is the legal determinant of Germany's security policy, and the constitution guides the law especially with its adherence to universal inviolability of human dignity. Germany is facing the question of counterbalancing new challenges to freedom and security in so many areas that pose questions of how much security must Germans seek; how much can they achieve and what security can they afford.

The international community accepts this increased German role, and in fact, the then Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski speaking in Berlin in 2011 said he feared Germany's inaction, not German tanks. Germany finds itself in the same dilemma with the global leader the United States; the U.S. has regularly experienced demands for its leadership on the one hand, and if too excessively practiced or when it is left out, on the other hand, is harshly criticized. In other words, leadership is a professionally difficult balancing act between domestic and international demands.

The Federal Republic of Germany has not found the perfect answer to its particularly difficult challenge of defining its role and function in concert with other powers. Just what role Germany can and will play and how will it insert its understanding of security in the world order is the subject of much discussion. Despite the many unknowns in the current security debate, one thing is certain; Germany must find and define its role in the context of the Euroatlantic community.


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## The Center for International Security and Governance

The Center for International Security and Governance (CISG) was established at Bonn University in connection with the creation of the Henry Kissinger Professorship in 2014. The goal of the CISG is to foster research and teaching in the field of international security studies and to facilitate the advancement of the security policy discourse in Germany. The focus of the CISG's work is the enhancement of the notion of "security" as well as the scientific monitoring of policy-making in the field of transatlantic relations and international law.

Building on diplomatic and political expertise on the one hand and scientific research on the other, the CISG aims at harnessing the experiences from recent history in order to address current challenges in international security policy; with the goal to make this information available to the professional public. Through this work, the CISG tries to provide new impulses and strategic approaches for conflict resolution and prevention within the national and international security policy debate.

The CISG's executive board comprises former U.S. ambassador Prof. James Bindenagel (Henry-Kissinger Professor and head of the CISG, Bonn University), Prof. Dr. DDr. h. c. Matthias Herdegen (Director of the Institute of Public Law and Director of the Institute of International Law, Bonn University), and Prof. Dr. Stefan Talmon (Co-director of the Institute for International Law, Bonn University). Chairman of the board of trustees is Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Karl Kaiser (Associate, Transatlantic Initiative, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School).

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