

[Start] [★03:16.370] [☺] [★10.294] Planning/Outline if the ☒☒☒☒☒☒ of the ☒☒☒☒☒☒ of the essay★: ☺-

◆Intro:◆T☒Problem◆(different◆forms◆of◆logic◆in◆different◆languages★/culture s★),◆Thesis★◆(★★N★ot◆tenable,◆logic◆is◆universal★)★,◆Outline:★☒☺-

◆Main◆Part:◆★★★★first◆paragraph:◆position◆of◆the◆text,◆second◆paragraph:◆★★★★★★★★☺☺★★★★Oshimas☒★☺★★★★ARgum☒☒☒☒arguments◆against◆this◆a pproach,◆third◆paragrph☒☒☒rgh:◆a★lternative◆approach◆of◆universal◆logc, ☒☒ic,◆fourth◆paragraph:◆consequences◆for◆different◆acadme☒☒emc☒ic◆fields ☺-

◆Conclusion:★★★★Thesi☒☒☒☒☒Summary◆of◆discusi☒sion,◆final◆defense◆of◆t hesis[★13.265]☺☺[★19.967]The◆Indispenad☒n☒bility◆of◆Universal◆Lgo☒☒og ic★★★★☺☺[★19.557]As◆globalizatop☒☒ion◆becomes◆a◆more◆and◆more◆appe☒ arent◆phenomenon,◆the◆different◆culut☒☒tures◆of◆the◆world◆are◆able◆to◆commu nicate◆and◆ex★☒☒★interact◆more★freely◆and◆quickly.★★★★Cultur ★al◆i☒differences◆cann☒t☒☒not◆be◆denied,◆th★us◆an◆interesting◆question◆f or★★eurocentric★philosophe☒hers☒s◆and◆scienceist☒☒☒☒ists◆arises:◆is◆t ☒logic,◆which◆was◆always◆thought◆of◆as◆a◆universal★★★ly◆valid◆scienc e★,◆also◆a◆merely◆culture-

dependent◆phenomenon?★★★★There◆are◆many◆schoa☒lars◆who◆argue,◆for◆exam ple,◆that◆Aristotle◆would◆hav☒e◆develoop☒☒ped◆an◆entirely◆f☒different◆for m◆of◆logic◆if◆had☒☒e◆hadn't◆been◆Greek◆but◆Mexican.◆[★27.162]Therefore,◆one◆ might◆ask◆whether◆the◆questio☒☒☒☒☒☒☒☒☒☒☒☒not◆onl☒ly◆the◆langua ges◆differ◆from◆each◆other◆(they◆obviously◆do),◆but◆also◆the◆underlying◆log ic★☒.◆In◆this◆essay,◆I◆will◆argue◆that◆the◆posi★☒☒☒☒☒☒☒☒☒☒☒☒it ◆is◆impossiv☒ble◆to◆have◆a★relativistic,◆culutre☒☒☒☒ture- ded☒pendent◆account◆of◆log★ic◆and◆that◆logic,◆in◆contrary◆to◆the◆implied ◆position◆above,◆is◆indeed◆universal.◆To◆do◆so,◆I◆will◆first◆of◆all◆introduce ◆the◆positi★on◆of◆thise☒☒☒ose◆who◆claim◆that◆logic◆is◆relative.◆after◆th

at, I will argue against this position by formulating counter-arguments. In the next step, I will present a promising, alternative approach of universal logic and finally point out the consequences for other fields of science if this concept is denied.

Alice Oshima argues that the structure of different language is significant for different concepts of logic. As an English sentence does not digress and is linear in that it is arguing in a straight line, this changes in sentences of other languages, e.g. Persian and writing, which emphasise the coordination in contrast to the English subordination. Other examples would be the indirect style of Asian writing, the digressive style of Spanish writing, etc. Oshima draws the conclusion, that, because of these differences in the respective writing style, the underlying rhetoric and the underlying even the underlying logic is dependent on the language it is written in. This ultimately leads to a relativization of our concepts of philosophy and science, as Dufrenoy, for example, suggests. One should always be aware of the eurocentric context in which one formulates one's ideas. The concept of Oshima and Dufrenoy seems to be a promising way out of cultural imperialism and hegemony. However, it is a deeply flawed and irrational concept as it blatantly contradicts itself: it uses the ways of arguing which go back to Aristotle and universal, logical principles in order to dismiss universal logic. In other words: they refer to something they originally wanted to dismiss. If they didn't use consistent ways of arguing,

their entire system of thinking would collapse and they would be regarded as unjustified, irrational thinkers. However, they say that consistency, at least logical consistency, is not necessary anymore; thus, their way of arguing is caught in a performative contradiction. To cut a long story short: they contend that their content is not in line with the way of arguing they employ. After having proven the internal inconsistency of Dufrenne's position, it is necessary to develop an alternative to culture-


















dependent logic. I would argue that there are some logical presuppositions that cannot be doubted rationally, e.g. P or not-

P. Anyone who doubts these basic logic principles, which basically go back to Aristotle, is on his way to a self-

contradiction and, thus, to leaving to a rational discourse. Rational or ideal discourses are those in which their participants communicate freely and without strategic interests; one could say that an ideal discourse is the free negotiation of compromises on the basis of universal, logical laws of logic. Habermas's and Apel's discourse-

ethics provide a stable basis for the development of such an universal discourse which is independent of cultural boundaries as only the formal ways of arguing are regarded as universal, not any content of the discourse. Thus, any eurocentrism or cultural imperialism is avoided as no normative statements or ethical values are transported into another culture, but only a formal way of finding achieving universally valid compromises

ses. This solution seems to be a much more [16.119] honest alternative that
 n. being over-
 tolerant and put universal principles of logic into doubt in a
 n irrational way. [14.490] The consequences of these two different
 fferent approaches are obvious: the former approach makes it impossible to du
 discuss any serious content, be . . . ' . . . , be it normative or descri
 ptive , with speakre . . . er's . . . s of another language as not only the languag
 e but also the . . . basic l . . . principles of logic differ. Thus . . . us,
 this seemingly . . . toleratn . . . nt position makes inter ethnic and unter
 intercultural communication impossible or . . . at el . . . least reduces
 it to a mere exchange of meaningless utterances which are not abl
 e to carry any tru unt intersubjective truth. . . . The latter approach
 , however, makes scientifc . . . ic and moral discourse between cultures possible
 as it provides a solid basis for intere . . . cultural communication. The minam . . .
 in . . . mal . . . conditions for a rational discourse are specified, but no conten
 t if . . . s prematurely s regarded as granted Thus, Therefo
 re, honest and . . . intersubjectively valid . . . communication which is rele
 vant for both sides and nit reducible to a mere exchange of . . . personal op
 inions is only possible [10] . . . [10] . . . within th . . . e latter framework
 of Habermas and Apel. This essay has given conclusive evidence that
 t Oshimas . . . 's position is flawed and should be replaced by . . . a universal
 ist approach in form of a . . . theory of discourse as provided by, for example, Ha
 bermas. It is impossible to [22.883] say that logic principles are cul
 ture dependent and at the same time . . . us make use io . . . of . . . of ths
 es these principles as t . . . they are preconditions for any form of arguing
 which is suppose . . . sed to be rational. Thus us, the presuppositio
 ns of argu ing in a rational discourse are [47.493] indispensable
 . Logic, one can conclude, is universal ans must also be accepted

by♦Dufrenne♦and♦★Oshima★★.♦★★★★★Ar★A♦Mexican♦Aristotle♦wo★uld♦have♦co
me♦up♦tiwith♦exactly♦the♦same♦logic♦as♦did♦the♦★"oriiginal"♦ineon
e♦in♦Anceiient♦gGreece.[★16.902][][★16.199][]such♦★★★★★★★★★[
★→A[★01:19.547][[★39.799][Stop]