Handa sa laban araw-araw?
(Ready to fight every day?)

Readiness to Political Action and Sense of Entitlement: How strong is Citizenship in the Philippines? With a Special Focus on International Call Center Agents

Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors der Philosophie im Fachbereich Südostasienwissenschaften der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn

Vorgelegt von
Niklas Reese
Aus Quezon City (Wuppertal)

Bonn 2015

Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Christoph Antweiler

Zweitgutacher: Prof. Dr. Karl Husa

Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 14. Januar 2015

Abstract

The aim of this dissertation is to identity the sense of citizenship prevalent in the Philippines. Citizenship here is defined in two respects: an active dimension (exercising voice) and a passive dimension (claiming rights or sense of entitlement).

Findings from a series of problem-centered interviews with call center agents are complemented by the outcome of several annual surveys by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), especially the ISSP surveys on government (2006), social inequality (2009) and citizenship (2004) and validated by the analysis of media columns and societal artefacts over the last 10 years.

While the first part of the dissertation analyzes why trade unions and other forms of collective interest representation hardly develop in the call center setting (economic citizenship), the second part identifies readiness to political action and expectations towards the state (political citizenship) in the context of an "informal security regime" (Geoff Wood). The main part of the study is followed by a postscript offering an outlook on opportunities and limitations of citizenship in the Philippine social and cultural context.

The work contains several theoretical discussions of basic concepts and issues arising when sense of citizenship, especially in a non-European context, is analyzed. These include critiques on the theory of citizenship and on precarity, the middle class(es), citizenship in a non-western context, spaces of the political and post-national citizenship. In sum, a sense of citizenship is identified as full of requirements so that the stand-by citizen is rather considered the norm.

The work comes to the conclusion that there is no general lack of a sense of citizenship among Filipinos. However as they have never experienced a comprehensive public service and consider such "unrealistic," their expectations as citizens are in practice low. The state is considered as enabler, not as provider, so that self-help is given priority. Such rather communitarian sense of citizenship is identified as conniving with a neoliberal governementality of responsibilization. Only among those with a left political socialization can a sense of citizenship, as assumed in most scholarly literature, be identified, with substantial expectations towards the state, demand of accountability and an identity as political subject (professional citizenship).

Table of Contents

0. Deutsche Kurzfassung der Dissertationsschrift 9

0.1. Aufbau und Struktur der Arbeit 10

0.2. Theoretische Fundierung und Ergebnisse der empirischen Erhebungen .. 11

0.3. Reflexion der Forschung / Postskript 18

1. Introduction 21

2. Methodological footing – Some explanations on the research procedure 31

2.1. Stages of the research 34

2.1.1. Preparation phase 35

2.1.2. Field work 36

2.1.3. Validation phase 41

2.2. Integration of quantitative and qualitative evaluation and survey methods 43

2.3. Autoethnography 45

3. Case study - part I: "Citizenship" in a work setting 53

3.1. A preliminary definition of citizenship 53

3.2. Are the unorganized organizable? 57

3.3.The sample 59

3.4. No sunshine industry - Problems at work 62

3.5. Why should it especially be precarized (middle class) getting active? 68

3.6. Political mobilization – ridden with prerequisites 69

3.6.1. Some sociological reasoning ahead 69

3.6.2. Prerequisites for political action 73

3.6.3. Mediating structure and action – Bourdieu's habitus 75

3.6.4. Political socialization 78

3.6.5. Walking the talk: from consciousness to action 86

3.6.6. Frames, opportunities *and* resources 88

3.6.7. A question of justice and dignity 92
3.7. Precarity as social condition 97
3.8. Neoliberal governementality: The paradigm of responsibilization 109
3.9. Precarization and collective action – an oxymoron? 117
3.10. Middle class – what is that? 119
3.10.1. Class imagination: the paradigm of lifestyle 121
3.10.2. Global middle class as cultural orientation 127
3.10.3. Lifestyling as class formation? 132
3.10.4. A third way: Combining class structure and class-consciousness 137
3.10.5. Three to four basic middle class fractions 141
3.10.6. Middle class more than a matter of opinion 144
3.11. The precarized new middle class: resourceful and still longing for something 147
3.12. (Marginal) Middle class in the Philippines 154
3.12.1. OCWs as the new middle class? 161
3.12.2. Of "Burgis" and other socio-cultural approaches 162
3.13.3. Can the respondents to the study be considered "middle class"? 164
3.13.They did it: Uprising around the world 169
3.14. Why Eastwood (Manila) and San Pedro St. (Davao City) are not (yet) the Tahrir Square 171
3.15. Subjectivities: Motivation to join the call center 173
3.16. Individual action 178
3.16.1. Adaptation 180
3.16.2. Professionalization 186
3.16.3. Everyday resistance 191
3.17. Why is collective protest so few? And the unions even less? 195
3.17.1. The no-union-policy discourage some agent as they fear to get terminated or discriminated against 197
3.17.2. It is not clear whom the agents should turn to 200
3.17.3. Individual compensation and grievance procedures (Token participation) 201
3.17.4. Exit instead of voice: leave and join other call center 208
3.17.5. Transient character of the workforce 211

3.17.6. Individualism ... 214
3.17.7. Violations of rights and the lack of humane working conditions is considered "normal" ... 216
3.17.8. Downward comparison ... 219
3.17.9. Distinction ... 221
3.17.10. Unions are stigmatized ... 227
3.17.11. Underestimating their market power ... 228
3.17.12.Youth? – Not a reason! ... 229
3.18. Are activists more prone to unionizing? ... 231
3.19. Women: "*matiisin*," martyr and apolitical? ... 244
3.20. What to do to create trade unions in the call centers? ... 248
3.20.1. What could serve as a point of contact? ... 250
3.20.2. Excursion: Lessons to be learned from the experience of organizing Indian call center agents (UNITES) ... 253
3.20.3. Are unions really the solution? ... 255
3.21. Transcending the workplace as arena of struggle ... 259
4. Case study – part II: Citizenship beyond work in the Philippine context ... 266
4.1. What is citizenship? ... 269
4.1.1. Communitarian, republican and (neo)liberal concepts of citizenship ... 275
4.1.2. Duties and/or rights? ... 281
4.2. Citizenship - a western concept? ... 286
4.3. Spaces of the political ... 306
4.4. The (nation) state: is it still *the* space of agency and entitlement? ... 316
4.5. Sense of citizenship among selected young urban professionals in the Philippines ... 330
4.5.1. How to measure sense of citizenship? ... 330
4.5.2. STEP ONE: profiles of citizenship ... 331
4.5.3. STEP TWO: On political and social rights and the political system ... 333
4.6. Perception of the political system ... 337
4.7. Social service ... 344

4.8. "Somehow, gamay, nag-expect ko" 349
4.9. Dealing with an informal welfare regime 352
4.10. *Maningkamot*, moral behavior and communitarianism 355
4.11. Active citizenship 359
4.12. Responsibilization and moralism 366
4.13. Disembedded citizens? 369
4.14. Conclusion 374
4.15. Are the respondents representative for the Philippines? 383
4.16. Perception of the political system 388
4.17. Social service 392
4.17.1. Conclusion 402
4.18. Dealing with an informal welfare regime 404
4.19. It's still hard work.... 416
4.20. Active citizenship 420
4.21. Is there a specific middle-class profile on political participation to be discovered in the ISSP surveys? 425
4.21.1. Do self-placement or occupation matter? 433
4.21.2. Do gender, age or location matter? 435
4.21.3. Does party matter? Maybe, but the data don't allow clear conclusions 439
4.22. Does country matter? 443
4.23. Only abroad? The little influence migration culture seems to have on citizenship attitudes 455
4.24. Conclusion 462
4.24.1. Comparison between general sample and qualitative sample 470
5. Food for thought: Looking out for chances of citizenship 475
5.1. Starting point: The "negative narrative" 475
5.2. Barriers to citizenship 480
5.3. Educational system 492
5.4. Nationalism in the Philippines 501
5.5. Can a positive counter narrative be told? 503

5.6. Resources of citizenship 505
5.7. Standy-by citizens 516
5.8. The narrative of the middle class as prime democratic mover 520
5.9. Middle class self-understanding 523
5.9.1. Communitas – a dream in vain? 530
5.10. Moralism 532
5.11. Do it yourself: The connivance of communitarism and neoliberalism 537
5.12. Outlook 543
6. References 545
Literature 545
Expert interviews and Focus group discussions (Validation) 564
Abbrevations of Philippine dailies 565

0. Deutsche Kurzfassung der Dissertationsschrift

Ausgangspunkt der vorliegenden Arbeit ist die Beobachtung, dass es zwar nicht an Kritik an den politischen Zuständen in den Philippinen mangelt oder an Analysen, welcher Reformen es bedürfte; allerdings wird (wenn überhaupt) meist nur sehr oberflächlich der Frage nachgegangen, *wer* die Akteur/innen des Wandels sein könnten. Auch wird die Frage selten gestellt, ob ein solcher Wandel nicht nur von den selbst erklärten „Anwälten des Wandels“ (*change advocates*) aus der Zivilgesellschaft, sondern auch von der Mehrheit der Bevölkerung für notwendig gehalten wird.

Die Arbeit will die Potentiale wie auch die Begrenzungen von Bürgersinn in den Philippinen identifizieren. Dabei wendet sie sich dem Betrieb (hier: Callcenter) als möglicher Arena von Bürgersinn ebenso zu wie dem staatlichen und öffentlichen Raum. Dabei nimmt sie insbesondere (meist) junge städtische Berufstätige in den Blick, die durch ihre Arbeit in den transnationalen Raum eingebettet sind und vergleicht ihre Konzepte von Bürgersinn mit denen, die sich für die philippinische Gesellschaft als Ganze identifizieren lassen. In einem der Studie angehängten Teil („Postskript“) wird ein Ausblick auf Chancen und Begrenzungen von Bürgersinn im philippinischen Kontext unternommen.

Die Arbeit beginnt mit einer theoretischen Erörterung grundlegender Konzepte und Fragestellungen, die aufkommen, wenn es um den Bürgersinn (sense of citizenship) unter jungen und prekarisierten Mittelschichtsangehörigen geht. Einleitend führt die Arbeit die Annahme dar, dass eine Korrektur der politischen Institutionen (*righting institutions*), wie sie dem Diskurs um gute Regierungsführung zugrunde liegt, nicht ausreichend ist: Solange diese Institutionen nicht durch aktive Bürger/innen bevölkert werden, so die gängige Annahme in der Literatur zu Bürgersinn, drohen sie früher oder später zusammenzubrechen oder werden zumindest nachhaltig geschwächt.

Eine lebendige Demokratie ist auf aktive Bürger/innen angewiesen, die in der Lage und bereit sind, sich an der Ausübung der politischen Macht zu beteiligen bzw. diese zu kontrollieren. Sie sind eine Voraussetzung für das moderne Projekt der Demokratie, was sich besonders in der „großen Geschichte“ von der Mittelschicht als demokratischem *Movens* widerspiegelt (eine “Geschichte“, der im Postskript ausführlicher dargelegt wird).

Ein solcher aktiver Bürgersinn wiederum erfordert ein gewisses Anspruchsbewusstsein, das in der vorliegenden Arbeit auch als passiver Bürgersinn begriffen wird. Solch ein Sinn von Ansprüchen und Rechten gegenüber dem Staat und anderen Dienstleistern dient als Grundlage, um Rechte und politische Veränderungen auch aktiv einzufordern.

Die Arbeit definiert Bürgersinn daher in dieser doppelten Dimension: einer gesellschaftsgestaltenden Dimension und einer, die Ansprüche bzw. Rechenschaft einfordert. Bürgersinn basiert hier auf explizit modernen Prämissen, nämlich auf der Annahme, dass die persönliche Situation das Ergebnis eigener und fremder Entscheidungen und Strukturen ist, die ergo als veränderbar wahrgenommen werden, sowie auf der Annahme, dass man in der Lage ist, einen Beitrag zu einer solchen Veränderung zu leisten (Selbstwirksamkeit).

0.1. Aufbau und Struktur der Arbeit

Der empirische Hintergrund dieser Arbeit ist eine Längsschnittstudie über drei Jahre, die sich mit der Wechselbeziehung von ökonomischer, politischer und psychologischer Prekarisierung und sozialer Mobilisierung unter den Bedingungen von Transnationalität beschäftigt hat. Dazu wurden in den Philippinen biographische und problemzentrierte Interviews mit (meist) jungen Berufstätigen durchgeführt, die in internationalen Callcentern im städtischen Raum (Metro Manila, Davao City, Dumaguete) tätig sind oder waren.

Die insgesamt vierzig Befragten wurden durch theoretische Probenziehung (*theoretical sampling*) ausgewählt, also durch qualitative Forschungswerkzeuge. Dennoch folgt die Arbeit einer doppelten Forschungsstrategie: Neben der Erhebung von eigenen Daten im Feld wurden auch Sekundärquellen wie statistische Daten, Nachrichten und Monographien ausgewertet - und zwar in Hinblick auf die Leitfragen der Interviews sowie die Fragen, die im Fokus der theoretischen Ansätze stehen, welche ich zur theoretischen Grundlage der Arbeit gemacht habe und die eine Hintergrundfolie zu den Leitfragen der Interviews bilden. Der empirische Teil der Arbeit basiert auf zwei Teilen: der erste präsentiert die Ergebnisse der qualitativen Studie unter den Callcenter Agents in Bezug auf ihre Arbeitssituation und die Möglichkeit kollektiver Interessenvertretung dort, der zweite beschäftigt sich mit ihren Erwartungen gegenüber dem Staat und ihrer Bereitschaft, politisch aktiv zu sein. Die Ergebnisse der problemzentrierten Interviews des zweiten Teils wurden dann mit quantitativ erhobenen Daten, v.a. aus den jährlichen Studien des *International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)*, wie denen zu Regierung (2006), Bürgerschaft (2004) und soziale Ungleichheit (2009), verglichen. Diese dienten als Quelle, um die Erkenntnisse aus der qualitativen Forschung in einen breiteren Kontext einzubetten. Schließlich wurden die Ergebnisse des ersten und des zweiten Teils jeweils einer kommunikativen Validierung im Rahmen von Fokusgruppendiskussionen mit den Beteiligten und von Experteninterviews unterzogen.

Dem Überblick über den Forschungsverlauf folgt ein Kapitel, in dem speziell die gleichzeitige Verwendung von quantitativen *und* qualitativen Methoden bei der Gewinnung und bei der Auswertung der Daten begründet. Dieses Kapitel (2.2.) erklärt, warum der Autor die exklusive Gegenüberstellung beider Forschungsansätze für unnötig und eine *reflektierte* Anwendung von Methoden aus beiden Bereichen für gewinnbringend hält.

Im einleitenden Abschnitt über den Forschungszusammenhang befindet sich auch eine ausführliche Reflektion über die Rolle des Forschers. Autoethnographische Überlegungen werden im weiteren Verlauf der Arbeit immer wieder aufgegriffen, vor allem im Kapitel über Bürgersinn als möglicherweise westlichem Konstrukt (Kapitel 4.2. im zweiten Teil der Arbeit).

0.2. Theoretische Fundierung und Ergebnisse der empirischen Erhebungen

Im ersten Teil der Studie wird zuerst die Frage behandelt, was die Befragten für problematisch an ihren Arbeitsplätzen halten – Arbeitsplätze, die gewöhnlich durch hohe Jobunsicherheit und andere Formen der Prekarität charakterisiert sind. Die forschungsleitende Frage hier ist: Warum sind trotz eines beträchtlichen Problemdrucks bis dato keine Gewerkschaften in den Callcentern entstanden – und warum ist auch sonst kollektives Handeln unter den Agents kaum ausgeprägt?

Nach der Skizzierung der arbeitsgebundenen Probleme, die von Agents in Callcentern identifiziert werden, fokussiert der Teil der Arbeit auf die Strategien der Agents, diesen Problemen zu begegnen (hauptsächlich mittels Anpassung und Formen alltäglichen Widerstands). Schließlich werden fünf umstandsgebundene (‚objektive') und fünf wahrnehmungsgebundene (‚subjektive') Ursachen hervorgehoben, die den weitgehenden Mangel an kollektiver Interessensvertretung erklären:

Da ist zum einen das weit verbreitete Verbot von Gewerkschaften in philippinischen Callcentern, das auf einige Agents abschreckend wirkt. Zudem erscheinen individuelle Beschwerdeverfahren auf den ersten Blick als wirksame Alternative zu gewerkschaftlicher Interessenvertretung. Agents wechseln außerdem eher das Callcenter als ihren Beschwerden Ausdruck zu verleihen. Und schließlich ist die Belegschaftszusammensetzung nicht von Dauer. All diese Gründe können als umstandsgebundene Ursachen gelten.

Auf der anderen Seite gibt es mehrere Gründe, die eher wahrnehmungsspezifisch (*framing*) sind. Etwa der ausgeprägte Individualismus, der als typisch für Gruppen mit höherer Bildung gelten kann. Des Weiteren sind Verletzungen der Rechte und der Mangel an menschenwürdigen Arbeitsbedingungen in den Philippinen an der Tagesordnung und werden daher als Normalität verstanden. Die agents begreifen sich als relativ privilegiert und distinguieren sich zudem nach unten, was sich unter anderen in ihrem Verständnis von Gewerkschaften äußert: Gewerkschaften werden als Organisationen für Arbeiter betrachtet, nicht aber für „Kundenberater" wie die agents. Zudem sind Gewerkschaften als radikal, laut und konfrontativ stigmatisiert. Schließlich unterschätzen die agents ihre eigene Marktmacht. Daraus ziehe ich den Schluss, dass nicht vorwiegend repressive Regulierungen, sondern in erste Linie gouvernementale Strategien, vor allem die Internalisierung von Regeln innerhalb individueller Lebensstrategien die Entstehung von Gewerkschaften und anderen Strukturen kollektiven Handelns verhindern.

Dass kollektive Aktion in philippinischen Callcentern wenig ausgeprägt ist (von der Existenz von Gewerkschaften ganz zu schweigen), wirft die Frage auf, in wie weit sich darin generell ein niedriges Rechtsbewusstsein bzw. ein wenig ausgeprägter Bürgersinn widerspiegelt - oder ob sich ein solcher »sense of citizenship« vielmehr in anderen gesellschaftlichen Bereichen äußert. Dies zu ergründen hat sich der zweite Teil der empirischen Arbeit zum Ziel gesetzt. Hier standen im problemzentrierten Interview mit den an der Studie Beteiligten folgende Fragen im Zentrum: Sind sich die Befragten ihrer sozialen und politischen Rechte bewusst, und ist es die Regierung, von der sie diese einfordern - oder sind es vielmehr andere soziale Institutionen wie Familie, Netzwerke und/oder andere Gemeinschaften? Welche Rolle weisen die Befragten sich selbst in einem Prozess des sozialen und politischen Wandels zu; wünschen sie überhaupt, die Gesellschaft zu verändern, und für wie realistisch halten sie dieses Unterfangen? Da zwar der Staat nicht der einzig mögliche Garant von Rechten ist, ihm die moderne politische Theorie jedoch hier eine besondere Rolle zuweist (und die Staaten selbst einen Großteil ihrer Legitimität aus einem solchen Anspruch ableiten), liegt der Schwerpunkt im zweiten Teil der Arbeit auf der Rolle, die dem Staat und der Regierung von den Befragten zugewiesen wird.

In beide Abschnitte, welche die empirischen Ergebnisse darlegen, sind mehrere theoretische Reflexionen eingeflochten, die als Grundlage zur Interpretation der empirisch gewonnenen Ergebnisse dienen. Dazu gehören Abhandlungen über die Definition von Bürgersinn, über den Zusammenhang von Prekarisierung und Organisierung (wobei begründet wird, warum die Annahme, dass Prekarisierung per se die [politische] Handlungsbereitschaft schwächt, zu hinterfragen ist) und speziell die Frage, warum es gerade die prekarisierte bzw. die untere Mittelklasse sein sollte, die (politisch) aktiv wird. Ein ausführliches Kapitel (3.10.) widmet sich auch der Definition des schwammigen Begriffs „Mittelklasse" und Kapitel 3.12. versucht sich an einem Überblick über die philippinische(n) Mittelklasse(n) als soziologischem Phänomen.

Im zweiten Teil der empirischen Arbeit folgen weitere theoretische Reflexionen. Kapitel 4.2. legt dar, dass *citizenship* ein Konzept ist, das sich zwar historisch besonders im Rahmen der europäischen Moderne entwickelte, das aber deshalb keineswegs ein „unphilippinisches" oder unasiatisches Konzept ist. Hier (und in anderen Teilen der Arbeit) wird besonders auf das Faktum Rekurs genommen, dass es nicht *die* eine westliche Gesellschaftsidee gibt, sondern es zumindest drei idealtypische Ansätze zu unterscheiden gilt: Neben einem liberalen (der in nicht-westlichen Gesellschaften oft mit dem Westen gleichgesetzt wird) lässt sich idealtypisch auch ein kommunitarischer und ein republikanischer Ansatz identifizieren. Diese Ansätze unterscheiden sich sowohl im Menschenbild als auch in der Rolle, die sie dem Staat geben und der Gewichtung von Rechten und Pflichten, die damit im Zusammenhang stehen. Die letzteren beiden Ansätze erweisen sich als sehr anschlussfähig an die philippinische

Sozialphilosophie, in der die intersubjektive Person (*kapwa*) im Zentrum steht. Gegen die immer wieder zu vernehmende Annahme, die moderne Gesellschaft und mit ihr der Bürgersinn seien bloß westliche Importe, spricht auch, dass sich die Philippinen nicht als genuin nicht-westliche Gesellschaft beschreiben lassen, sondern vielmehr - wie für postkoloniale Gesellschaften typisch - von kultureller *Bricolage* bestimmt sind.

Als wesentlich für die Ausgestaltung des Bürgersinns kann auch die Frage gelten, welche Anliegen und welcher Raum als öffentlich und als politisch definiert wird, sowie die Frage, ob der Nationalstaat in Zeiten von Globalisierung und neoliberaler Responsibilisierung noch als zentraler Raum politischen Handelns betrachtet werden kann. Beiden Fragen ist daher ein eigenes Kapitel (4.3. und 4.4.) gewidmet.

Des Weiteren wird die weit verbreitete Annahme, dass die Möglichkeit zu migrieren politische Aktivität entschärft, von der vorliegenden Arbeit nicht unbedingt geteilt. Da es jedoch bislang nur wenig Forschung zu diesem Thema gibt, können die Antworten hier nur sehr vorläufig sein. Diese Arbeit kommt allerdings zu dem Ergebnis, dass selbst unter denen, die in den Philippinen bleiben, eine kulturelle Zugehörigkeit (im Sinne einer Kulturnation) ausgeprägt ist. Dies äußert sich aber nicht notwendigerweise in politischer Aktivität zugunsten des Gemeinwesens.

Die theoretischen Reflexionen machen deutlich, dass politisch aktiv zu werden eine voraussetzungsvolle Angelegenheit ist, die - wie Theorien sozialer Bewegungen betonen - von Weltanschauungen bzw. Sinnverstehen (*framing*) ebenso abhängig ist wie von der Einschätzung von politischen Möglichkeiten und der Verfügung über politisch relevante Ressourcen. Hierbei spielen auch persönliche Erfahrungen und politische Sozialisationsbedingungen eine Rolle. Da Bürgersinn stark mit einer Bereitschaft zu politischem Handeln in Verbindung steht und diese wiederum besonders vom Sinnverstehen der Akteurinnen und Akteure abhängt, wird der ersten dieser drei Dimensionen sozialen und politischen Handelns im Theorie- wie im Praxisteil eine besondere Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet. Das Hauptinteresse der Forschung war es darum nicht, »objektive« Situationen von Benachteiligung zu erfassen, sondern herauszufinden, ob diese auch als solche wahrgenommen werden, wie Menschen mit ihrer Unzufriedenheit umgehen und ob dies auch in kollektivem Protest und Interessensvertretung münden kann.

Die Arbeit kommt im Hinblick auf Staats- und Politikverständnis zu den folgenden wesentlichen Ergebnissen:

- Unter den Befragten ist eine Staats- und Gesellschaftsvorstellung vorherrschend, die mit starken kommunitarischen und zu einem gewissen Grad auch republikanischen und liberalen Schattierungen versehen ist.

Vor allem für diejenigen ohne organisatorische Vorerfahrung (in Gewerkschaften, politischen Parteien etc.) ähnelt der ideale Staat ein wenig einem *pater familias*: Er soll leiten und „alles zusammenführen", Ordnung schaffen, und "uns alle ein besseres Leben führen lassen, um so sicherzustellen, dass wir unser Möglichstes tun, unsere Potentiale zu verwirklichen", wie es ein Befragter ausgedrückt hat. Einige erwarten von der Regierung auch, dass sie die Familie bzw. die Eltern mit Hilfe von Gesetze und Verordnungen anleitet, sie an Werte erinnert und „die Menschen aufklärt, was eine faire und gute Regierung ist."

Der Staat wird auch sonst eher als Ermöglicher denn als Gewährleister betrachtet. Zwar sind die Erwartungen dem Staat gegenüber auch dann ausgeprägt, wenn es um soziale und öffentliche Dienste geht. Es überwiegt also nicht der Wunsch, einfach nur von der Regierung in Ruhe gelassen zu werden; trotzdem sind die Erwartungen meist auf die Zeit begrenzt, in der "jemand die Regierung wirklich, wirklich braucht".
Die Befragten bringen einen aktiven Bürgersinn zum Ausdruck, wobei Bürgerpflichten mehr betont werden als Bürgerrechte. Zudem spricht niemand von Rechten, ohne zugleich auf korrespondierende Pflichten hinzuweisen. Auch wenn Rechte zum Ausdruck gebracht werden (etwa eines auf kostenlose Hochschulbildung), werden zugleich Pflichten, die damit einhergehen, erwähnt (etwa im öffentlichen Dienst zu arbeiten oder zumindest nicht nach der Ausbildung das Land zu verlassen). Die Realisierung von Rechten wird als Kooperation zwischen Staat und Individuum begriffen, und so unterstreichen einige Befragten auch die Idee, eine Gegenleistung zur Voraussetzung staatlicher Leistungen zu machen.

Auf die Bitte, „kurz zu erklären, wie Politik in den Philippinen funktioniert", fiel kaum eine Antwort positiv aus, und gemeinhin ist das Vertrauen in Politiker/innen niedrig. Dennoch führt die Unzufriedenheit mit der Leistung des politischen Systems (oder mit der fehlenden programmatischen Orientierung von Parteien) bei den meisten Befragten nicht dazu, dass sie Demokratie oder Politik generell ablehnen (Institutionsverdrossenheit führt also nicht zu Politikverdrossenheit). Selbst jene, die nicht die Veränderung des Systems im Sinn haben, sind gespalten, ob sie die schlechte Leistung als gegeben hinnehmen sollten (*government kasi* – es ist halt die Regierung), oder ob sie eine moralische Verbesserung von Politiker/innen für möglich halten.
Die "negative Erzählung", die in den philippinischen Medien, aber auch in der Politikwissenschaft weit verbreitet ist und die das philippinische politische System und

die politische Kultur für "beschädigt" (John Fallows) hält und die Politiker/innen für nichts als korrupt, egoistisch und reaktionsunfähig, ist jedoch umstritten; gerade diejenigen ohne organisatorische Erfahrung betrachten diese negative Erzählung als eine unzulässige Verallgemeinerung.

Die Befragten bringen zwar ein Anspruchsbewusstsein im Hinblick auf politische und soziale Rechte zum Ausdruck – dieses ist aber rudimentär: Unter politischen Rechten verstehen sie vor allem eine "negative Freiheit" (tun, was sie wollen), weniger aber ein Recht auf Mitbestimmung. Dass sich das politische System bzw. die Art, wie Politiker/innen agieren, nachhaltig verändern ließe, glauben höchstens diejenigen mit einem linken organisatorischen Hintergrund.

Gleichzeitig wird die Gewährleistung sozialer Rechte zwar von fast allen Befragten als eine zentrale Rolle des Staates betrachtet, diese Rechte werden aber mehr oder weniger auf die Grundbedürfnisse beschränkt und zudem mit einer Bedürftigkeitsprüfung verknüpft. Dies wird zum einen damit begründet, dass die Philippinen bloß ein „Dritteweltland“ seien; zum anderen entspringt die Begründung einem Realismus, der nicht glaubt, dass dieser Staat mehr gewährleisten würde.

Zugleich hat sich auch herausgestellt, dass das Wissen über ein weiter entwickeltes Wohlfahrtsregime, höhere Löhne für die gleiche Arbeit oder einen verlässlicheren Rechtsstaat in den Gesellschaften des globalen Nordens - ein Wissen, das die Befragten durch ihre Arbeit in einem transnationalen Raum erworben haben - nicht zur Entwicklung eines höheren Anspruchsbewusstseins gegenüber der Regierung auf den Philippinen – oder gegenüber den Callcentern – führt.

Unter solchen Umständen ist es eher unwahrscheinlich, dass der Siedepunkt des Unmuts, der in zahlreichen mediterranen Gesellschaften Proteste ausgelöst hat, die von der prekarisierten Mittelschicht getragen wurden (Arabischer Frühling), in den Philippinen kurz bevorsteht. Dies dürfte zumindest insofern gelten, als dass Prekarisierung und soziale Ungleichheit (auch im globalen Maßstab) als mögliche Auslöser betrachtet werden.

Die Befragten sind sich der sozialen Netzwerke, wie Familie oder Freunde, bewusst, auf die sie in Situationen der Not zurückgreifen können (was sie von der Regierung nicht erwarten); sie bevorzugen es aber, sich selbst zu helfen. Hier ist besonders auffällig, welche Rolle der Leistungsmythos (auch in den unteren Klassen) spielt, der als typisch für moderne Gesellschaften gilt. Der eigenen Leistung (*maningkamot*) wie auch Bildungsanstrengungen wird fast alles zugetraut; auch dies ist ein Grund, warum vom Staat eher erwartet wird, Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe zu leisten. Darin findet sich auch eine Rechtfertigung für soziale Ungleichheit und für das Argument, dass Bedürfnisse über die grundlegenden hinaus nicht umsonst erfüllt werden sollten. Gerechtigkeit wird eher als Verfahrensgerechtigkeit und Chancengleichheit ausbuch-

stabiert denn als Verteilungsgerechtigkeit, während staatliche Transferleistungen meist kritisch beäugt werden.

Der Öffentliche Dienst wird eher als Dienstleistung verstanden, die Steuer- und Beitragszahlern zu gewähren ist, und weniger als ein Bürger- oder Menschenrecht. Die Rechte von Menschen in Not hingegen werden eher mit Mitleid ("luoy" / "awa") begründet - wiederum eine Ansicht, die nicht völlig auf einem Rechtsansatz beruht.

Während sich aus den Daten, die dieser Arbeit zugrunde liegen, schließen lässt, dass die Mehrheit der Filipin@s[1] keine (neo)liberale Politikhaltung aufweist, sondern vorwiegend eine kommunitarische, die auf das Subsidiaritätsprinzip setzt und die Regierung als "letzten Ausweg" betrachtet, so erweist sich solch eine Denkweise doch als anpassungsfähig an ein neoliberales Staatsdesign, das stark auf Responsibilisierung als vorwiegender Regierungsform in Sinne des Gouvernementalitätsansatzes setzt. Diese Annahme wird im Postskript in einem eigenen Artikel ausführlicher begründet.

Die Befragten erklären sich bereit, sich politisch zu engagieren (lassen den Worten aber weit weniger Taten folgen). Gerade jene ohne (vorherige) organisatorische Einbindung fokussieren dabei jedoch vorwiegend auf moralische Fragestellungen und individuelles Wohlverhalten, während strukturelle Veränderungen kaum Erwähnung finden. Daher folgt die Arbeit der philippinischen Sozialwissenschaftlerin Evangeline Sucgnag, die zwei Arten von politischer Aktivität unter Filipin@s unterscheidet; auf der einen Seite ein proaktives, auf öffentliche Entscheidungsfindung fokussiertes Engagement (das sich in der vorliegenden Studie gerade unter jenen feststellen ließ, die nachhaltige Erfahrungen in der philippinischen Linken gemacht haben) und auf der anderen Seite eine Art von Engagement, das sich als konkret problemlösend versteht, wobei letzteres das typischere Verständnis von Bürgersinn in den Philippinen ist. Während beide Ansätze (die Erzeugung politischen Drucks bzw. vorbildliches Einzelverhalten) weitgehend alternative Ansätze sind, so bringen sie doch beide einen starken Sinn für politisches Handeln (*agency*) zum Ausdruck. Keiner der beiden Ansätze ist nur auf passiven Bürgersinn ("Anspruchsmentalität") begrenzt; beide betrachten einen aktiven Bürgersinn als bedeutsam.

In einem Vergleich der Ergebnisse der qualitativen Studie mit quantitativ gewonnenen Daten, die vor allem im Rahmen des ISSP erhoben wurden (siehe oben), konnten zahlreiche Ergebnisse validiert werden. So zeigen auch diese Daten, dass die Unzufriedenheit mit dem politischen und Wirtschaftssystem nicht so dramatisch ist, wie

[1] Um nicht ständig Filipinos und Filipinas auszuschreiben, verwendet die Arbeit die lateinamerikanische, geschlechtsneutrale Schreibweise mit dem @-Zeichen.

sie die negative Erzählung schildert. Trotz negativer Erfahrungen, die sie mit dem System gemacht haben, scheinen Filipin@s in allgemeinen und aus allen Klassen eher mehr als weniger zufrieden mit den Realitäten zu sein. Allerdings sinkt die hohe Zustimmung, welche allgemeine Aussagen erzielen, sobald konkrete Beispiele staatlicher Aufgabenerfüllung zum Thema gemacht werden.

Auch die quantitativen Daten bringen zum Ausdruck, dass die Idee des Wohlfahrtsstaates für Filipin@s kein Fremdwort ist. Der Gedanke sozialer Gleichheit findet eine hohe Akzeptanz, ebenso wie die Erwartung an den Staat, soziale Garantien zu bieten und Schritte in Richtung sozialen Ausgleichs zu unternehmen. Die Erwartungen der Bürger/innen an den Staat gehen über die Aufgaben eines Nachtwächterstaates hinaus. Nichtsdestotrotz gilt es, diese Aussage zu qualifizieren: Progressive Besteuerung - ein wesentliches Instrument, um erweiterte Leistungen *und* sozialen Ausgleich zu erreichen - findet vergleichsweise wenig Zustimmung in den Philippinen, und die Akzeptanz sozialer Ungleichheit in Bereichen wie Bildung und Gesundheit ist beträchtlich. Die ISSP-Daten unterstreichen den Eindruck, dass Filipin@s weniger soziale Umverteilung als wichtigsten Weg zur Verbesserung der Einkommen zu betrachten scheinen, sondern eher die Schaffung von günstigen Bedingungen für die Erzielung eines menschenwürdigen Einkommens. Auch hier bestätigt sich, dass Filipin@s von ihren Mitbürger/innen eher erwarten, sich selbst zu helfen, und dass sie Erfolg im Leben vornehmlich mit Fleiß und Ehrgeiz in Verbindung bringen, während sie weniger von der Regierung erwarten, soziale Ungleichheiten auszubügeln.

Zudem sind Erwartungen, die an den Staat gerichtet werden, vor allem von dem geprägt, was man kennt und erwarten kann (was als gering eingeschätzt wird). Der Denkbarkeitsraum ist verhältnismäßig eng. Einen Schluss, den man für die politische Bildung aus diesen Ergebnissen ziehen könnte, wäre daher, dass es nicht an einem Fundament für Bürgersinn mangelt. Als Herausforderung könnte eher gelten, konkrete Ansprüche und Erwartungen zu wecken, wie die staatlichen Verpflichtungen, denen prinzipiell zugestimmt wird, weiter ausbuchstabiert werden können. Hier könnte es sich als hilfreich erweisen, auf weitergehende Erfahrungen, die philippinische Migrant/innen in anderen Ländern gemacht haben, zurückzugreifen.

Über die Gründe für die erstaunlich hohen Zustimmungs- und Zufriedenheitsraten, die der öffentliche Dienst und die generellen Aussagen zu Bürgersinn bekommen, sind sich die befragten Expert/innen uneinig. Halten die einen diese in erster Linie für sozial erwünschte Antworten, sind andere der Meinung, dass im philippinischen Kontext die Ergebnisse quantitativer Studien nur eine geringe Validität aufweisen. Sie halten etwa das Instrument von Fragebögen für inkompatibel mit der philippinischen Auskunftskultur, um auf diese Weise valide Daten gewinnen zu können. Die vorliegende Studie trägt dem Rechnung, indem sie a) quantitative und qualitative Methoden kombiniert und b) quantitative Ergebnisse vorwiegend zur Validierung qualitativ gewonnener Einsichten und weniger als aussagekräftige Ergebnisse für sich allein genommen betrachtet.

Dabei hat eine Berechnung der jeweiligen Korrelationen ergeben, dass Klassenlage (ob anhand von Bildung, Einkommen oder Beruf gemessen), aber auch Alter, Geschlecht oder Wohnort keinen wesentlichen Zusammenhang mit der Stärke des Bürgersinns aufweisen. Zwar besteht eine leichte positive Korrelation zwischen Zugehörigkeit zur Mittel- und Oberschicht und den meisten (aber nicht allen!) Einstellungen, die Bürgersinn befördern; sie ist aber nicht besonders signifikant. Nur wenn es um Selbstwirksamkeit geht, sind die Werte unter den Befragten, die der Mittelklasse zuzurechnen sind, signifikant höher als die derjenigen, die zu den unteren Schichten gehören.

In der qualitativen Studie hat sich hingegen der organisatorische Hintergrund als zentrale erklärende Variable herausgestellt: Insbesondere jene, die einige Zeit in einer linken politischen Organisation eingebunden waren, erweisen sich am unzufriedensten mit dem gegenwärtigen politischen und ökonomischen System und fordern am deutlichsten einen intervenierenden Wohlfahrtsstaat ein. (Aber auch sie weisen keine Versorgungsmentalität auf, wie dies neoliberale Kritiker/innen des Wohlfahrtsstaats häufig behaupten.) Die „linken Aktivist/innen" sind auch am ehesten bereit, dem Staat auf die Finger zu schauen (*accountability*).

Bei der Auswertung der quantitativen Daten wiederum (bei der kontinuierlich auch Vergleiche mit den korrespondierenden Daten aus Deutschland und anderen Gesellschaften, die vom ISSP erfasst werden, gezogen wurden), ließ der Datensatz keine vernünftige Korrelation zwischen Zufriedenheit mit der politischen und ökonomischen Leitungen des Staates und den Variablen politische Orientierung oder organisatorische Erfahrung zu. Hier hat sich wiederum die Zugehörigkeit zur philippinischen Gesellschaft als signifikanteste erklärende Variable entpuppt; eine Variable, die wiederum in der qualitativen Datenerhebung ohne internationalen Vergleich blieb.

0.3. Reflexion der Forschung / Postskript

Die Arbeit endet mit einem ausführlichen Postskript, in dem Fragen, die aus forschungsethischen Fragestellungen (vor allem die mangelnde Akzeptanz weißer Forscher/innen, welche die *Fitness* von Filipin@s für Demokratie und Moderne evaluieren) aus dem wissenschaftlichen Teil der Arbeit ausgegliedert wurden, in Form eines Essays erörtert werden. Ein erster Teil widmet sich der Frage, welche emischen Ressourcen die philippinische Alltagskultur bereit hält, die bürgerschaftliches Engagement behindern oder aber befördern könnten.

In einem ersten Schritt werden Elemente kultureller und gesellschaftlicher Praxis in den Philippinen skizziert, die für Hindernisse für Bürgersinn gehalten werden. Dazu gehören etwa ein verbreiteter Privatismus/Familialismus, der mit einer mangelnden Wertschätzung des öffentlichen Raums und einer begrenzten Anerkennung des

fremden Anderen einhergeht; des Weiteren eine Haltung, die öffentlichen Dienst vornehmlich als Großzügigkeit und Entgegenkommen, nicht aber als ein Bürgerrecht betrachtet. Auch die Prävalenz hierarchischer Beziehungen und die Schwierigkeit, mit Kritik umzugehen, werden als Grund für einen unterentwickelten öffentlichen Diskurs identifiziert.

In einem zweiten Schritt werden dann mögliche emische Ressourcen für Bürgersinn lokalisiert. Dazu gehören unter anderem ein ausgeprägter Gemeinschaftssinn (*baya-nihan* und *pakikisama*) und der potentielle Sinn für den Nächsten (*pakikipagkapwa*). Auch der ausgeprägte Sinn für persönliche Ehre/Würde (*dangal*), Einfühlungsvermögen (*pakikiramdam*) oder die durchaus vorhandenen Formen, Unzufriedenheit auszudrücken und Rechte einzufordern (*tampo*, *kulit*, *reklamo*, *pasaway*), könnten als Quelle für eine Anerkennung des Anderen als auch als Grundlage für die Realisierung von Rechten dienen. Zwar sind diese Haltungen und Verhaltensweisen nicht manifest politisch, um eine Unterscheidung aus der politischen Sozialisationstheorie aufzugreifen; sie sind aber durchaus latent politisch; können also auch in politischer Hinsicht wirksam werden.

Zugleich wird der Gedanke entwickelt, dass Bürgersinn sich nicht unbedingt in einem konfrontativen, einfordernden Verhalten äußern muss (wie für den Westen charakteristisch), sondern dass er zu einem gewissen Grad mit kulturellen Spezifika verträglich ist, wie etwa der Tendenz, eher um etwas zu bitten als etwas einzufordern oder Konfrontation zu vermeiden.

Schließlich wird eine wesentliche Annahme gemacht, die sich nicht nur auf die Philippinen beschränkt, nämlich dass „Berufsbürgertum" (Chantal Munsch bzw. Erik Amna), wie es unter politisch Aktiven anzutreffen ist, die Politik als Teil ihrer Identität betrachten, gesamtgesellschaftlich eher die Ausnahme darstellt. Der »Gelegenheitsbürger« (*stand-by citizen* – Erik Amna) dagegen dürfte eher den Normalfall darstellen. Die Unzufriedenheit in der Fachliteratur und im politischen Diskurs, die zuvor in der Arbeit Erwähnung gefunden hat, ist daher möglicherweise eher auf zu hohe Erwartungen, denn auf eine grundsätzliche Abwesenheit eines Bürgersinns zurückzuführen.

In einem zweiten Teil skizziert das Postskript erste Umrisse eines mittelklassenspezifischen Bürgersinns. Dieser Teil verdeutlicht, wie sehr sich die philippinische Mittelklassen den Narrativ von der Mittelklasse als Motor der Demokratie und gesellschaftlicher Entwicklung zu Eigen gemacht hat, sich aber zugleich als vernachlässigt begreift. Hieraus ergibt sich auch ein ambivalentes Verhältnis gegenüber dem Ideal universaler Demokratie. Die Chancen einer klassenübergreifenden Allianz gegen Prekarisierung werden daher als begrenzt eingeschätzt. Dieser Teil der Arbeit basiert allerdings vorwiegend auf Kolumnen aus den führenden Tageszeitungen der Philippinen und fokussiert demnach ganz auf die Absichten von Bürgersinn, nicht auf die Praktiken. Dieser Abschnitt kann zudem nicht bereits als empirisch gesättigte Dar-

stellung gelten; letzteres musste aus Zeit- und Platzgründen unterbleiben und gilt daher als Forschungsdesideratum. Schließlich wird der in dem begrenzten empirischen Material deutlich hervortretende Moralismus (den auch bereits der Hauptteil der Arbeit identifizieren konnte) einer kritischen Prüfung unterzogen; nichtsdestotrotz wird er als anschlussfähig für die neoliberale Responsibilierungstrategie gewertet, was als weiteres Hindernis für das Entstehen einer sozialen Bewegung gegen gesellschaftliche Prekarisierung in den Philippinen betrachtet wird.

In einem abschließenden Abschnitt werden schließlich mögliche Folgeforschungen identifiziert, etwa eine empirisch umfassendere Darstellung eines Bürgersinns innerhalb der verschiedenen Fraktionen der Mittelschicht oder eine Nachzeichung von Bürgersinn in der philippinischen Geschichte.

1. Introduction

"Water will sooner or later boil when placed over fire. The question for the youth is, when will we reach a boiling point? When do we say I want change now?"

(Rachel Pagdagdagan (24), Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10.1.2009)

Dissatisfaction with the situation in the Philippines is widespread. Not only a look into the column section of any broadsheet teaches one so, the latest *Ulat ng Bayan* (Report of the Nation) by Pulse Asia in December 2013 (Source: *Growth, joblessness and poverty*, Business World, 21.1.2014[2]), shows a worsening perception of quality of life and of the state of the national economy. 43% of the respondents said, they were worse off than 12 months before while 41% said their personal circumstances had remained unchanged. Only a small minority (15%) said their personal situation had improved. And nearly every second respondent (45%) expected no change in his or her economic circumstances in the coming 12 months – despite an economy growing by around 7% annually.

But a look into the newspapers reveals more than that. There is a cry for change. That change is needed seems to be a commonplace, one could even say: a platitude, in the Philippines. Interventions into the public space such as posters, artworks, streamers or street graffiti prove how pervasive the rhetoric of change is in public discourse, just as listening to everyday conversations or the omnipresent sarcasm and jokes. There is no lack of indications *what* needs to be changed. But *who* should be the actors of change?

Here, one usually encounters an endless repetition of appealing to moral values and individual heroism (*bayanihan*) - leading even the former President Ramos to initiate a Moral Recovery Program in 1993. Likewise, the myth of People Power is evoked in many occasions, when problems needing redress arise and when one do not expect politicians to (be willing to) solve them. This is illustrated, among many others, by Mags Maglana in her column *Power as power does* (Sun Star Davao, 13.05.2014) on people power as panacea to resolve the Mindanao power crisis. Meanwhile, the editorial of Sun Star Davao (19.5.2014) tackling the issue of the annual hike in tuition rates conjured that "in the early '70s and in the '80s, a small increase in tuition could already spark widespread rallies and boycotts of classes. That is no longer happening today. … Preventing the rise in the cost of education needs vigilance and unified action by those affected by it." What it needs though to make such "unified action by those affected by it" (ibid.) happen, is usually left in the dark.

---

[2] Due to the extensive use of newspaper sources and other public media in this work, articles only quoted once or twice are not included into the references, while newspaper articles are usually indicated within the text. The common procedure of absorbing *every* source in the references would bloat the references immensely.

During the height of martial law, Abraham Pascal Sarmiento Jr., editor in chief of the Philippine Collegian, the campus paper of the University of the Philippines (Diliman), hotbed of activism at that time, asked "*Kung hindi tayo kikilos, sino ang kikilos?*" (If we do not act, who will?) [As well as: "*Kung hindi ngayon, kailan pa?*" (If not now, when?)] This slogan eventually became the rallying cry of a political movement idealized up to today as the heyday of political activism in post-colonial Philippines. A very similar phenomenon of idealizing a movement is the one triggered by the events in 1968 in Germany, my other society of reference.

Despite having spent much of my professional and activist life in social movements for the past 15 years, the question "*kung hindi tayo, sino?*" has boggled me increasingly. Who are civil society and academe calling on to be actors when declaring and explaining the need for change? Not only national, but also global challenges need such actors. How will future society come to terms with social uncertainty and (global) social inequality politically? How will it resolve "global challenges" such as climate change and shortage of resources? And how will it deal with the precarization of work life and political structures, chosen as trailhead in this work?

Are the ones clamoring for change hoping for a rejuvenation of social movements to assure that these changes will take place in a fair, just and inclusive manner? Or are they pinning their hopes on well meaning state actors? Common sense in political science sees the state as such actor. The "good prince" – whether "she/he" is democratically elected or an autocratic ruler or even the Leviathan - populates political literature for centuries.[3]

While Romulo Virola, Secretary General of the National Statistical Coordination Board of the Philippines (NSCB) cries out, "are our economic managers really not smart enough to have learned the ropes of development and come up with programs and policies that will translate into better quality of lives for the marginalized sectors of our society?" (Virola et al. 2013: 4), pundits hardly believe that government can be this change agent in the Philippines, except for times of political elation like the "Yellow fever" (Reese 2010a) during the presidential campaign of the incumbent president Aquino in 2010.

As most politicians come from the elite, they are not *of* the people, but they are furthermore also believed not to be *for* the people. Here the columnist and assistant professor of sociology, Arnold Alamon, articulates the thoughts of many people during the occasion of the 28th anniversary of the EDSA uprising: "If there is any lesson that the past few decades have taught us, it is that elite rule is equivalent to predato-

---

[3] The »good prince« is a concept, says Horst Günther in his historical overview on "rule"(*Herrschaft*) that can be traced back to absolutism, wherein already then "monarchic mythology in literature and public opinion ... depicts the king as generally good, only surrounded by bad counsels" (Horst Günther [1982]: Herrschaft. In Reinhardt Kosseleck (ed.): *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, Vol. 3, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, p. 27). It is described as a concept "culminating in a large-scale analogy with the divine laws of musical harmony... a domain of political theology ...., trying to put into practice the imagination of a "deus in terra"... a playing field on which all secret longing for the stately caprice and royal freedom of human self-confidence could seemingly be displayed without risk."

ry governance. Left on their own, they will milk this country dry. So what do we do to arrest this downward spiral? Politics, which simply means the care for public life, must not be left in the hands of our national and local elite" (Source: Sun Star Cagayan de Oro, 25.2.2014). The political analyst Roland Simbulan (*Grassroots movements and electoral politics*, PDI, 21.2.2010) also argues that, "the real hope lies in deepening the processes of democratization, to strengthen and widen grassroots citizens' movements which can act as an effective countervailing force against the economic, political and military domination of the oligarchy." Should the powerful be made to act as an agent of change, they (the defenders of the status quo) need to be engaged by civil society agents in a strategy of »cooking« through reformist initiatives from above *and* social movements from below, called the "bibingka strategy" by the land reform scholar activist Saturnino "Jun" Borras in his homonymic book of 1999. But can one expect such action for change *by* the people and under which circumstances are they ready for political action?[4]

Traditional approaches to development and democracy did not see readiness to political action by the people as crucial and primordial. They follow(ed) the assumption that if markets, elections, legal frameworks and civil society organizations are working, then citizenship identities will follow (cf. DRC 2011). In such approaches people are perceived as consumers (the neoliberal approach); as users and choosers (the state-based approach); as voters (electoral-based approach); holder of legal rights (human rights approach); or, as beneficiaries (by most NGOs). All of these approaches are putting citizens on the receiving side and see them "rarely as drivers of political and social change in their own right" (DRC 2011: 5). The "magic triangle of democracy" of Hubertus Buckstein (in Breit/Massing 2002) with its basic points of institutional arrangements, civil rights and civil qualifications is an example for such an active sense of citizenship (i.e. readiness to political action). In the original, "civic virtue" (*Bürgertugend*) - is only considered secondary by Buchstein who considers it merely as one qualification among others.

Approaches sidelining the sense of citizenship are more and more questioned, mainly because approaches locating change (for the better) mainly beyond human agency such as the belief in the invisible hand (laissez faire) or as historical determinism, i.e. expecting that things can but only change once the circumstances are ripe (historical materialism) are losing appeal. The same cannot however necessarily be said about

[4] The "participation ladder," originally published by Sherry Arnstein (A Ladder of Citizen Participation, *JAIP 35 (4)*, 1969, 216-224) , considers participation »by the people« as the deepest form of participation. Here six forms of participation are identified: co-option, compliance, consultation, co-operation, co-learning and finally collective action. Only the very last form of participation, where "local people set their own agenda and mobilize to carry it out in absence of outside initiators and facilitators" is defined as purely »by the people«.

Likewise the ALNAP Global Study of 2003 came up with a typology of participation in humanitarian action and even identified six stages of lesser participation before reaching the stage of "local initiatives" in which "the affected population takes the initiative, acting independently of external organizations and institutions [and in which] the project is conceived and run by the community" (Source Harvey/Lind 2005:44).

another approach, which is the religious belief that change will be brought about by divine intervention.

Even the approach using the paradigm of good governance, which is based on the assumption that institutions 'just' have to be set right to make democracy and market economy blossom , got bruises: Evaluations of this approach came to the result that it is not sufficient to build and strengthen representative institutions (such as competitive elections), an independent judiciary and a strong legislature. It asserts that as long as these institutions are not »inhabited« by active citizens, they are likely to collapse or weaken sooner or later. Efficient political institutions or well-intentioned development interventions alone, building on passive citizens as bearer of rights realized by good governance measures, will not make a democracy work, as Castles/Davidson (2000) believe.

In synthesizing approaches to the role civil society organizations and social movements play for deepening democracy, Coelho and Van Lyres come to the conclusion that "even the participatory governance literature remains very focused on institutions, and … more emphasis needs to be given to the role of citizen mobilization in supporting vibrant institutions. … Democracy is not built through political institutions or developmental interventions alone. Citizen organizations and their mobilizations can make a difference - by articulating concerns, developing capacities for political engagement, mobilizing for democratic change and pressuring states to act more accountably through democratic policy processes" (Coelho/von Lieres 2010: 11, 18).

Coming up with another situationer underlining the 'objective' need for change alone (e.g. Reese/Werning 2013), will not be enough as a raw conscientization approach imbued by the strivings of enlightenment might believe, attributing the persistence of the status quo to ignorance. Rather, I believe in the literature quoted, that it needs (as well) people's political activity that holds the ones in power accountable by mobilizing the people concerned, letting them organize and by this get politically involved. In short: it needs the practice of active citizenship. And to make this happen, a sense of citizenship is a necessary (though not sufficient) requirement - next to political opportunity structures and the command over social and political resources and skills or reliable collective action structures (as will be argued below).

The assumption that citizenship action is crucial for social and political change also served as the starting point of a ten-year project by the Development Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation and Accountability (DRC) at the University of Sussex. In one of its final papers the DRC team formulates its starting point this way: "Questions have been raised about the ability of participatory institutions to perform in political contexts that lack vibrant associations and social movements" (Coelho/von Lieres 2010: 11).

The assumptions by DRC resonate well with the big hopes set for society and social movements nowadays. Civil society (in the broader meaning of *Bürgergesellschaft*, not only *Zivilgesellschaft*) is the buzzword nowadays in European and American-inspired

models. Neoliberals as well as critics of (neoliberal) globalization pin their hopes on citizen action (though both with quite different aims), both having been disillusioned with the experience of state socialism and its promise of change from above.

On the other hand, the community (be it at the level of the state or neighborhood) is given again more importance under the conditions of precarization (see chapter 3.21.: *Transcending the workplace as arena of struggle*). Does this revival of community action go along with a sense of citizenship to claim rights, benefits and entitlements from the public, as well as a sense of passive citizenship which could also utter itself in appropriating public resources, where based on a understanding of legitimacy, i.e. being entitled to do so (direct action) – or does it weaken passive citizenship, i.e. a sense of entitlement towards who ever is considered as provider?

The DRC project defines *sense of citizenship* as “an awareness of rights, knowledge of legal and institutional procedures and disposition toward action“(Gaventa/Barrett 2010: 57). This makes it a mental disposition synonym to “readiness to political action” rather than to political consciousness. In literature on political action and social movements, such a disposition towards action is considered to rely on three dimensions a) the framing of a situation, b) an appreciation of political opportunities and c) the command over political resources. Furthermore, personal experiences and upbringings are considered as facilitators for the readiness to (political) action (in detail: see below).

Approaching an (active) “sense of citizenship” from another side, we can define it as based on a (form of) political mindset in recognizing that 1) ones’ personal situation is a result from (own and external) decisions and structures which are thus 2) considered to be alterable and further by 3) believing that one is capable of contributing to such change (self-efficacy).[5] Thus for a consciousness to be political, it requires not only (1) a consciousness of one’s own rights, and/or a sense of entitlement to social and public services, but it also includes (2) the belief that society and the social conditions can be influenced and changed and thus (3) a sense of citizenship expresses itself in the potentiality of political action – or the readiness to get active when time comes (which Amna 2010 calls ‘stand-by’ citizenship, see the post-script for more details).

Amna underlines the importance of cognitive structures facilitating the readiness to act and criticizes that “the studies on political participation have a strong bias towards concentrating on manifest political behavior ... and too little effort seems to have been expended in capturing the various stages that can precede concrete political activities [like] basic feelings about civic issues” (2010: 194). Expecting a sense of

---

[5] Detlev Claußen (in Claußen/Geißler 1996: 25) defines »politicization« in a similar way. He singles out two traits (1) on the level of consciousness, as an "awareness of interdependencies between politics and society,” i.e. recognizing a political causality of events, of which the individual is affected and (2) on the level of action "overcoming passivity (...) in favor of participating in interventions into given conditions, relations and processes."

citizenship as prerequisite for political activity is also what the concept of *moral economy* outlined e.g. in Edward Thompson (1963) and James Scott (1990) is based on. Here the will to change and the readiness to action do not arise from an »objective« miserable situation of exploitation, inequality and poverty, but it is a notion of legitimacy within an (implicit) social contract that triggers political activity (likewise Walton/Seddon 1994, Piven/Cloward 1977).

According to Moore (1982), the will to change and the readiness to political action arise precisely then when inequality appears to be arbitrary and unfair. Therefore, the analysis of the mental constructions of social actors plays a crucial role (in this direction also Gramsci theory of hegemonial power).

As everyday frames, they however do "not constitute a coherent value system or world view," says Pinches (1991: 182), but "are part of a fragmented, largely contradictory set of attitudes, variously invoked, depending on the situation at hand. "In everyday use, moral indignation about injustice is (thus) not a logical, philosophical kind of reasoning that results in a definition of a just order. Common principles are vague, simple and contradictory" (Pinches ibid.). We should therefore not expect worldviews to be without contradictions. "Such everyday concepts of justice are thus what Borchgrevink calls "public practical knowledge … open to anyone … [and] learned primarily by doing" (2014:218). It is also a kind of "*abgesunkenes Kulturgut*", i.e. it has incorporated scientific knowledge and cultural concepts and at the same time 'corrupted' them in turning them common and practical.

In the eyes of Scott, Thompson and – paradigmatically - of Bourdieu in his concept of Habitus (1979), these "cognitive maps" (Wood 2004) or "navigation maps" (Claußen 1996: 151) –these cognitions serving to process situations, i.e. to filter, linguistically define, evaluate, and finally organize emotions and actions - are not voluntarist-idealistic or a mere consequence of insight. Rather, they are always as well articulations of social situations and social conditions and the outcome of a historical learning process. That political and social behavior takes place in a dialectics of action and structure is also the bottom line of the governementality approach in the tradition of Michael Foucault.

Governementality here is a term under which Foucault subsumed institutions, practices, techniques and strategies by which a society is rendered governable, employing techniques, establishing procedures, forming mentalities and normalizing rationalities and so producing the citizens/subjects most suitable to its policies (microphysics of power/biopolitics). Foucault considers the state here not to be the only 'government', governance is rather part of a "regime," referring to a set of rules, practices, discourses and structured interests that manage society and constrain individuals through compliance procedures. These rules and norms may be imposed from above using forms of political power (macropolitics), or they may emerge informally out of regular face-to-face interaction (micropolitics).

This resonates with Gramsci's concept of hegemony or the ideas within Paolo Freire’s pedagogy of the oppressed, assuming that capitalism works best when it wins the hearts and minds (Gramsci) and “the oppressed are housing the oppressor” (Freire). Foucault however goes further than Gramsci and Freire by placing self-production at the center of consent creation. As our bodies are produced by external and self-management day in day out, we reproduce the system every day anew; a kind of internal encroachment.

At the same time, one should also not assume that a manifested political behavior necessarily reflects the framing, a view that Asef Bayat believes Scott limits himself to in the tradition of Max Weber, raising the plea that “this intentionality, while significant in itself, obviously leaves out many types of individual and collective activities whose intended and unintended consequences do not correspond“(Bayat 2000: 543).[6] Nevertheless, this writing agrees with the theories in question that a framing favorable for political action is widely *facilitating* such behavior.[7]

The presence of a sense of citizenship might even be of higher relevance in societies where there is a significant discrepancy between norm and reality of rights like in the Philippines (Franco 2011) and where the assumption of the effectiveness of codified rights (validity assumption - *Geltungsvermutung*) is so far even more to be put into question than in other societies (Baer 2011). Just because a right is codified in law does not necessarily mean that it gets “real” in the lives of the people, especially those who are powerless or disenfranchised. Hardly any debate of poor people’s rights in the Philippines misses to state that “there is no lack of laws … in the Philippines. The problem is enforcement” (Michael Tan: *Child rights and WCST*, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 28.1.2014).

The connection between awareness and practice here is dialectical: “More aware citizenship, coupled with stronger citizenship practices, can help to contribute to building responsive states which deliver services, protect and extend rights, and foster a culture of accountability” (Gaventa/ Barrett 2010: 56).[8] Claiming codified rights was ever since a significant contributor to their enforcement.

---

[6] Interesting enough, Scott himself is self-critical about the importance he gives to frames: “It is perhaps not entirely surprising that intellectuals further removed from political combat and from the working class itself have fastened on analysis that ascribes a nearly coercive influence to the product of their own class, that is, ideology!” (Scott 1985: 317).

[7] According to David Snow (following Hellmann 1997: 32), interpretation patterns (also called master frames) have to meet three main functions: they must be able to offer a convincing definition of the problem, also giving an answer to causes of and responsibility for the problem; they have to announce convincing solutions and they must be able to motivate people in a way that they can be mobilized. Furthermore master frames must be empirically credible, understandable and culturally saturated and be able to build bridges to other protest potentials, stage applications of the problem solution extend the range of application and facilitate transferability to related problem areas. Organizers thus (also) need "interpretation competence" (ibid.) as the example of organizing in rural Negros as Rutten (2000) shows.

[8] As Gaventa and Barett assume that citizen engagement is pivotal to make “democratic institutions [i.e.: institutional arrangements such as fair elections, the rule of law, and a free and open media] deliver,” they consider “the degree to which a democracy fosters a sense of citizenship [using indicators like an awareness of rights, knowledge of legal and institutional procedures, disposition towards action, organizing skills and the thickness of civic networks] as a complementary standard to measure the state of democracy” (ibid.).

For understanding insufficient (citizen) action for a change in the Philippines, it might be a useful endeavor to investigate cognitive structures facilitating the readiness to act. After having summed up findings under which circumstances poor people in the Philippines (the so called *common tao*) might get active – and indeed got politically active (Reese 2008a), I decided to look at another segment of society which is considered to be even more prone to political action – the middle class. It is widely considered to be the main carrier of civil society (myth of the middle class, see below), social mobilizations and political protest, but has been lesser looked at than the lower classes from the perspective of class-specific behavior. (Usually researchers – coming in most cases from the middle classes themselves – are not conscious about how class-specific their predicaments are, just like men, heterosexuals and white people aren't either.)

The middle class as whole is a construct of historical discourse, but a social location is where numerous social conditions, milieus and subclasses gather and therefore too broad a residual category.[9] To keep the subject workable, I limited the empirical part of the study mainly to a specific segment within the middle class: young urban professionals mainly belonging to what Bautista (2001) calls "marginal middle class," a class which is no longer worker class, but not yet established middle class. Furthermore I again operationalized the sense of citizenship by a research focus I am following for several years now: focusing on how people in and from the Philippines cope with social insecurity and to what extent their precarious social condition influences their political concepts (cf. among others: Reese 2005, Reese 2006, Reese 2008a, Reese 2008b, Reese 2010b) – with the aim to better understand under which circumstances social insecurity leads to political mobilization. One of the pivotal questions here is: Are poverty, social insecurity and (relative) deprivation perceived at all as a socio-political product and/or as an outflow of one's social (and global) position and can they so serve as a trigger for social mobilization?

Thereby the (marginal) middle class is as much a pertinent class to research on when it comes to precarity as the lower class (usually the focus of vulnerability research, which mainly concentrates on mere survival strategies). Even if usually above the fault line of a disposable income, intermediary positions are a precarious social condition or position (*soziale Lage*) as well, as I will show later.[10] Looking at the middle

---

[9] In defining "class," "milieu" or "stratum," multiple dimensions are applied. Next to socioeconomic variables, also cultural variables such as self-positioning, lifestyles and habitus (Bourdieu) are included. See in more detail below.

[10] A social condition (*kalagayan* in Tagalog, cf. Kerkvliet 1991) can be described as a cluster decided upon by "living conditions which have effects on the acting of persons and the satisfaction or denial of their needs, no matter if the persons are conscious about it or not, whether they interpret their living conditions in such or in another way"(Hradil 1987: 158) "Condition" here picks up (more than the German *Lage*) the pluri-valence of *conditio* as state and provision. There are several dimensions in which the (socially unequal) distribution of life chances and living conditions utter itself: socio-economic and political ones (income, property, power), welfare dimensions (social security, health, participation) and social dimensions (integration, self-fulfillment) (ibid.). Features such as sex/gender, race, age and cohort belonging or place of residence further determine the distribution of life chances. All these dimensions and determinants broaden or narrow the latitude of pursuing one's life without determining it. According to Hradil, all these dimensions and circumstances together form the living condition (*Lebenslage*) of a person (or a household) and its chances to realize its personal goals in life (which might differ quite from each other).

stratum might be of special interest to understand how resources such as higher education and a disposable income, two major characteristics of middle class, influence the political mindset. Do they show a habitus of pretension as Bourdieu considers the (lower) middle class to do and does this make them rather rely on their individual skills and resources and as consequence keeps them from joining forces with others, at least where issues of livelihood are concerned?

As even the marginal middle class is too broad a social position to be the body of a limited qualitative research, I have concentrated on young urban professionals working in transnational workplaces with precarious employment conditions in the empirical part of the study, a group I once baptized "Global intermediary class" (Reese 2008c). I chose the transnational location as the discussion on middle class citizenship in the Philippines is very much connected to its role as a main provider of migrant labor in the current global labor regime.[11] The millions of migrant workers (Overseas Contract Workers) are widely considered as harbinger of democratization due to their exposure to societies considered democratically- and socially- more developed (see chapter 4.23. *Only abroad? The little influence migration culture seems to have on citizenship attitudes*).

Focusing on international call center agents (ICCAs), as this study, promises several insights. They are a rather new phenomenon in Philippine society; they are widely considered as new middle class; they are based in the Philippines (where they could here and now act as citizens); and, at the same time they can be considered part-time migrants, when resorting to a broader concept of migration as Aya Fabros (2007: 150) has considered call center work as "a different form of migration, one that is social and temporal, rather than spatial." (Most respondents strongly agree to this idea, one of them even calling ICCAs "virtual OCWs.") The ICCAs work for a foreign employer but are still immersed in the Philippines and furthermore most of them still have not clearly established their belonging to the middle class – at least not on a global level. But rather than describing this specific social location of »being in between the worlds« (which was done more extensively in Reese 2008c), this study focuses on the readiness to (political and collective) action among people with work experience in international call centers.

Even by focusing on this very specific group, I expected to capture some insights on the sense of citizenship among the (marginal) middle class (and people in precarious conditions in general), as international call centers nowadays serve as *the* employment opportunity for most qualified Filipin@s.[12] Here one can meet people in preca-

---

[11] Even those middle class members remaining in the Philippines are, to a significant extent, part of a global society as they obtain their income, but also some of their culture, values and their patterns of consumption to a substantial degree from abroad. That the Philippine culture has a long and diverse colonial history further reinforces and deepens this embeddedness.

[12] Filipin@s is a gender – sensitive term which includes Filipinos as well as Filipinas. It is copied from a social movement practice in Latin America.

rious life situations showing social aspiration, i.e. people from the marginal middle class.

While it is empirically limited, the study wishes to present preparatory steps for developing a more comprehensive study on citizenship in the Philippines, including a historical derivation of forms of citizenship in the Philippines and identifying cultural resources ("reserves" as the ethnologist Thomas Hauschild calls them; I thank Christoph Antweiler for this link-up) for citizen action in the Philippines. Even if the empirical part is by no means representative, as it is mainly based on interviews with the respondents on the probability of collective action, it nevertheless suggests that it has created a template of how further – more representative – data could be created on citizenship – among people in a similar social condition and beyond.[13] Such is suggested in a post-script essay on citizenship and middle classes in the Philippines (*Food for thought: Looking out for chances of citizenship*).

The study aims to contribute to:

(a) broadening the discourse on precarization, which has so far largely been confined to the global North, by contrasting the findings for the industrial societies in the North with insights from societies with an "informal security regime" (Wood 2004). So far, such has usually been only considered in a polemical and very undifferentiated warning against a "Brazilianization … of the West" (Beck 1999: 7). [A very recent exception: Dörre/Schmalz 2013.]

(b) diversification of the theory of global social inequality, where the middle class so far largely acts as a residual category and is usually arrested in a dualization of elite and subaltern (cf. Reese 2008c: 45f.).

(c) differentiation of the discourse on the role of the middle class(es) in political processes in the global South which is still largely focused on either poor people's movements or the upper (middle) class.[14]

The Philippines was chosen as the case study as I am focusing on this society as a journalist and a social scientist for fifteen years now (being part of a socio-political information center on the Philippines in Germany and teaching development studies in the Universities of Passau and Bonn). The research project can so be considered as a form of applied research and has been undertaken with a reflective and politically-heuristic interest. The observations I made during my several travels to the Philippi-

[13] This is also what Matuschek et al. (2011. 24) suggest in their research on "being Left" (*Links sein*): "Even if methods of qualitative social research can at best provide a glimpse on practices and orientation patterns, this way perspectives on »life politics« are opened, surpassing abstract [political] camps and socio-structural classifications, illuminating their material and ideological backgrounds. This can be followed by representative studies which then show on the basis of plausibility assumptions the prevalence of such orientations and practices."

[14] Cf. as examples mainly dealing with the Asian (middle and upper) class the compilations of Becker (1999) and Pinches (1999a).

nes, Southeast Asia and Latin America in the past years flowed into the study as a kind of upstream fieldwork. My questions which came up while being active in the field of development education, served as much, as a trigger for this research.

This work has two steps. After outlining in more detail which role political consciousness plays for getting politically active, how people come to develop a political mindset (sense of citizenship) and why it should especially be the precarized – and among them its middle class faction – who should get active, I will focus in the first empirical part of this study on the work sphere to investigate the potential of political action there. As I will come to the conclusion that action there is limited, I will draw out if more political action can be expected within the sphere beyond and around the workplace.

2. Methodological footing – Some explanations on the research procedure

"Perhaps, in this country, if you want to understand how democracy works, you should spend less time in seminars and media fora. You should spend more time in the buses and jeepneys with people."

(Elfren Cruz: *The Filipino and democracy*, Business World, 10.5.2010)

The empirical background to this work is a longitudinal study in connection with a research project by the University of Bonn on the interrelation of precarity and social mobilization under the circumstances of transnational location/migration. The Philippine sub-study focused on young urban professionals who work or have worked in international call centers—workplaces usually characterized by job insecurity and other forms of precarity, factory-like working conditions and disembeddedness – but nevertheless much sought after by job seekers.[15]

The data collected was mainly in the form of biographical and semi-structured interviews, i.e. qualitative research tools.[16] Nevertheless, I followed a dual research strategy (like Schultheis/Schulz 2005): Next to collecting my own data in the field, I additionally analyzed secondary information such as statistical data, news articles and monographs (desk research), guided by the issues brought out during the interviews

---

[15] This study is limited to call centers catering to foreign accounts for practical and substantive considerations. The practical consideration was that this allowed building on knowledge, expertise and material gathered in a previous study done (Reese 2008c). Moreover, international call centers are also the most discussed segment of the BPO industry in the Philippines.

[16] Using participant observation as a research strategy did not turn out to be appropriate for this study, i.e. being employed as call center agent was ruled out due to time constraints. Short observation visits were also ruled out as it would have created too much attention, including the risk that it might lead to call center agents being formally banned by the call center management to participate in the study.

and by the questions that are in the focus of the theoretical approaches I have chosen. This was done for the sake of complementing and validating the collected data, for the purpose of theory generation, and finally, for the contextualization of the results. This was also to avoid unnecessary duplication in data collection, i.e. to minimize the effort asked from the respondents for the purposes of research. At the same time the respondents and the experts interviewed were considered as kind of key informants, who enlightened, falsified or confirmed/underlined what secondary literature said.

To bring (groups of) people to "like to talk about the topic in a detailed and highly differentiated way," the sociologist Robert Gugutzer (2004: 13) observed, "is not an easy task anyway; but more than that it is obvious that quantitative methods of social research are largely unsuitable for such task as differentiated subject-specific responses cannot be obtained with standardized questionnaires." The selected focus of the study (sense of citizenship) and its assumption that it is relevant how social realities are framed by the respective members of society, by itself suggests that it is best to use primarily qualitative methods through which subjective perceptions and interpretations can be *understood* in a more differentiated way.

By focusing on such *Sinn-* or *Motivationsverstehen* (Max Weber), i.e. understanding (*verstehen*) how people perceive their environment and which meaning (*Sinn*) they give to and what motivates their actions, and by trying to capture imaginations, relevance systems and everyday realities shaping social actions, this study stands in the tradition of a sociological approach in society which tries to understand and give meaning to social developments from the perspective of the people involved. 'Objectively' similar living conditions can be perceived ('understood'), valued and processed in very different ways which leads Hradil to even state that "social inequality exists especially in experiencing and processing 'objective' life conditions and in the consequences this has for action" (Hradil 1987:137). Understanding here requires more than simply the observation of actions, but requires knowledge of the intentions actors have and meanings they create. Thus, in this study, particular attention was given to when and how respondents conceptualize (= theorize) their actions and thinking.

At the same time, the study does not remain at the level of pure interpretive understanding (*Sinnverstehen*). It goes on to embed the answers given by respondents into the social context. Such approach is based on the premise of Bourdieu's concept of habitus, that the mental structures which underlie the subjective perceptions of the people, are founded in the social context in which they have developed (see below for more details). Bourdieu warned to take the emic concepts which derive from a mere tracing of relevance systems at face value – also as research participants often take the context of their lives for granted and do not speak of it. Hence, the mode of mere inquiry itself limits the findings a research can create.

Bourdieu also assumes that people "do not have the whole meaning of their behavior at their disposal as a direct given of consciousness, and ... their actions always includes more meaning than they know and want" (Bourdieu following Fuchs -Heinritz /

König 2005: 129). This does not necessarily imply that the researcher would know better than the respondents themselves – claiming a prerogative of interpretation (*Deutungshoheit*) and accusing them of »false consciousness« -, but this points to the importance of triangulation (such data triangulation by the means of secondary data or researcher triangulation by the means of expert interviews) to complement the respondents' relevance systems. (At the same time, the giving of feedback by respondents on the outcome of analytical triangulation or data triangulation from secondary data, might again "rectify" what they take as a matter of course as Bourdieu outlined [ibid.]. Options will be more open, where "practical consciousness" is developed.)

As opinions and assessments of actors are systematically connected to their position within the objective structures, Bourdieu proposes to sociologists to include objective structures, such as opportunities, laws, relations, statistical regularities into the analysis as they serve as parameters of thought and action.

This is also in line with the approach of a dual research strategy by Schultheis/Schulz which is followed in this study. Schultheis/Schulz consider the triangulation of answers given by respondents in biographically oriented research with structural data of importance, as "personal accounts tempt to look for explanations for actions (and failures) in one's own biography" (2005: 22). This is why it is necessary to surpass "a mere every day understanding" by the respondents, trying to "follow up economic and social determinants, the constraints of the labor and market … [or] the consequences out of the withdrawal of the state from welfare … ergo the mechanisms that cause the suffering" (ibid.).

Approaching sociological realities this way may lead to a situation wherein life-world concepts of people are shaken by the presentation of structural data; Bourdieu however hopes, that this would also give people the chance to get conscious of their own habitus, which might be a first step towards change in case that their habits stands in the way of what they want to achieve (cf. Fuchs -Heinritz / König 2005: 131f.). Bourdieu considers an interview - in which respondents might be "asked again and again" (Schultheis/Schulz 2005: 22) with the hope that this will "deliver explanations that go beyond how the respondent represent themselves" (ibid.) - as a "Socratic work" that is supposed "to help the respondents in expressing themselves. For this sake he [the interviewer] should make suggestions that could help the interviewee and provide him the chance for connect" (Bourdieu 1997: 792).

For capturing class formation and the emergence (or non-emergence) of social movements through the linking of social structural changes and social conflicts at the macro level with orientation patterns of individual and collective actors on the micro level, it has been proven fruitful by several studies on precariousness and social change in central Europe - such as Bourdieu's "La misère du monde" (Bourdieu 1997, first: 1993), the research project „Gesellschaft mit begrenzter Haftung“

(Schultheis/Schulz 2005) or Beck's "Eigenes Leben" (Beck 1995) - to choose an interview series as main research tool. For Philippine society, this present study enters new territory.

Furthermore, this work wishes to contribute to the further development of political action theory in a context of precarious living conditions by drawing on the data generated and picked up (Grounded Theory). This effort has also been motivated by the presumption that a mere application of modules from the classical (i.e. western-liberal) citizenship construction kit would, but only create, another *kalabasa* award ("pumpkin" as metaphor for a failing mark in the Philippines).

The use of theories is also founded in the fact that we never perceive reality unfiltered – its perception (and at the same time evaluation) is always mediated by everyday theories, be they worldviews, be they assumptions or be they other mental 'fictions'. As Kathy Charmaz outlines in her contribution "*Grounded Theory in the 21st century: Applications for Advancing Social Justice Studies*" (in Denzin/Lincoln 2005), they can be deployed as "sensitizing concepts, to be explored in the field settings. Then we can define if, when, how, to what extent, and under which conditions these concepts become relevant to the study" (ibid.: 512). Despite employing *theoria* (Old Greek for view), the fundamental test for a sociologist drawing conclusions still should be: Is an argument backed by data? This calls for caution in the use and the creation of (new) concepts (*apprehensions*), no matter how much scientists desire to grasp reality. In my case, the data I was able to collect have not turned out to be so clear-cut as to come up with a set of political types to which I could easily assign coping and action patterns the respondents consistently resort to – even if type formation is a core objective of grounded theory. It would do too much to force to box the data and the respondents in this way. Their actions appeared to be so diverse, many of them engage at times contradictory strategies depending on the situation, which disallows coming up with neat categorizations. Such categories did not emerge in a saturated manner from the research and would therefore have appeared as imposed. The study so rather describes the coping mechanisms and mental concepts discovered without assembling them to coherent types of citizenship attitudes and assigning respondents to such.

2.1. Stages of the research

The study is divided into three phases: a preparation phase (pre-interview phase), an interview phase (which again was split into three phases), and finally a validation phase.

2.1.1. Preparation phase

The first phase of this study (starting 2008) was dedicated to the development of research questions. This included an intensive and extensive study of literature, exploration in the field of study and interviews with practitioners in organizing. The research question however already emerged within three preliminary studies (e.g. a research project on social protection in Asia, a research and educational project on coping with social insecurity in the Global South [Reese 2005], but also in the context of participating in collective political action against progressive precarization in Germany [Reese 2008a, Überlebenswelten 2005]). Familiarity with the researched life world of International call center agents (ICCA) in the Philippines was already established within another preliminary study (Reese 2008c).

Eventually guidelines for the respective interview phases were developed based on the research questions, modified before each interview phase on the basis of previously collected data and subjected to a pre-test to ascertain that the guidelines were also practicable.

At the same time, respondents were chosen following the principle of theoretical sampling (Lamnek 2005: 191) and using short questionnaires and specific inquiries, and the snowball system. I chose to initially follow the snowball principle as it is common in Philippines to draw on gate openers (go-betweens or *tulay*) in order to gain trust/minimize suspicion and generate the willingness of individuals to help and provide information. Being referred by an acquaintance or friend seemed even more preferable as we assumed that the prospect of being interviewed by a Western researcher could cause additional anxiety.[17]

Wherever we still missed special profiles according to our sampling criteria, we took extra efforts to track down individuals who have the attributes of the lacking feature. For example, some respondents were recruited by approaching them in front of call centers. While it was easy to find agents who were a) working in different call centers b) young, c) male or female, d) gay and lesbians, e) single or in a relationship, f) of local origin or having moved to the site of the call center, g) with or without experience in social and political organizations *and* g) who visited schools of excellency or educational institutions of lesser prestige - so called "diploma mills" -, some profiles had to be specifically aimed for, such as older ICCAs who already maintain a family of their own. Despite months of effort, we were not successful in integrating the rarest of all features in this study: a father who is older and has a family, and who, as traditional male breadwinner took up regular and long term employment in a call center. Individuals with this attributes are only very few in the industry – and with the few that we were able to finally to identify we did not succeed to conduct at least one interview.

---

[17] The same is also considered helpful in a Western – here: Austrian - context, as Girtler (2001: 65) lines out: "It is pivotal for … a research above all that the observer must do everything possible to be introduced in the social field of interest to him in a successful manner. The observer therefore needs personal contacts…to be accepted by the observed group."

It was also part of the theoretical sampling to *not* restrict the research to the National Capital Region, i.e. Greater Manila, where majority of call centers are located, as did the other previous researches in the call center setting (Sale/Bool 2005, Fabros 2007, EILER 2008). We included one regional center and one provincial center as well. As regional center we chose Davao City and as provincial center, we chose Dumaguete City. I have been researching for the last fifteen years especially in these regions or I have otherwise built deeper contacts here. I was therefore able to make use of existing networks that could serve as a starting point for finding respondents and have built up structures of trust and understanding which are relevant for discussing the outcomes of a research with sufficient confidence.

2.1.2. Field work

The heart of this work is a longitudinal study conducted over a period of three years. This is made up of three interviews, with preference for the same respondents. An introductory biographical interview was followed by two problem-centered interviews. The second and third interviews mainly had the features of a respondent interview (also known as the focused interview) which Truman et al. (2000) differentiate from informant interviews. In informant interviews, interviewers pick up whatever informants share on their own accord; in respondent interviews, the interviewer intends to remain in control. Even if the interviewee's views and feelings are allowed to take their space, such interviews are structured to some extent by the interviewer. "In this type, or style, of interview the central point is that the intention is that 'interviewers rule'; their agenda is what matters." (Truman et al. 2000: 240). All three-interview sessions were formulated based on a guideline that operationalized the central research topics and questions. The guidelines contained some closed questions in the form of a short questionnaire to record some personal data but also to capture where the respondents locate themselves and their family of origin on a social scale (subjective class belonging). Most of the questions were semi- structured, some were open questions.

The interviewers (i.e. me and my research assistants) came back again to (most of) the questions specified in the guideline in the course of the interviews and also when the thread of the interview took a different path from the contents suggested in the guideline. Although no interview structure should be imposed on the respondents to give them the opportunity to describe in detail their views and to also raise issues that were not mentioned in the guide, the interviewers were at the same time, badly concerned to focus on tackling specific topics. This is in order of generating a data body that allowed to a limited extent for frequency distributions.

The field study thus cannot be considered a "free" field research with a purely inductive approach as propagated by Girtler (2001). In the informant interviews conducted by Girtler it was the informants creating the categories, while the researcher was primarily a listener, by and large limiting himself to the generation of a narrative. In this

this study again it was important to also check whether the concepts commonly used in political action theory resonate in the life world of the respondents. (For example we asked what a "citizen" is to them, how they define "social inequality" or how one could identify someone as "poor.")

This study is also only to a limited degree characterized by "shared ownership," where interviewer and interviewees "jointly define research objectives and political goals, co-construct research questions, pool knowledge, hone shared research skills, fashion interpretations and performance texts that implement specific strategies for social change, and measure validity and credibility by the willingness of local stakeholders to act on the basis of the results of the action research" (Denzin/Lincoln 2005: 36). We (the research team) explained to our respondents the research interest of the study and how we intend to make use of the findings before starting the interview (transparency). We recognized opportunities for disagreement via regular feedback spaces (among others, by starting each succeeding interview with a presentation of the summary we made of the previous interview session for each respondent) and we explicitly pointed out to the respondents their chance to leave questions unanswered. Opportunities for amending the research agenda were taken into consideration as well and we put special importance to including the participants into the process of interpretation of the data by the means of validation workshops, which allowed them to affirm or reject the representations made about them in the findings. The findings were provided and presented to them in a language comprehensible and easy for them to understand. We also kept up with the respondents while the study was ongoing and invited them to public presentations (which were attended by only one respondent once). By these means, we tried to provide the respondents with the greatest possible openness for feedback and transparency throughout the whole research process. But nevertheless, it was predetermined what to research on, which issues will be raised and which methods will be used.[18]

The respondents were also allowed to speak in whatever language they prefer: English, Tagalog and/or Cebuano, an opportunity of which they made extensive use. This was to ensure that they feel most at ease to express their thoughts and ideas. In addition, we assumed that life world concepts can be most easily expressed in one's own mother tongue, no matter how fluent in a second or third language one is. As every language is culturally determined and shapes meaning and influences of action (as much as actions and experiences shape meanings), we ourselves also used Filipino terms when applicable. No matter how good their English, the respondents still connected to a term like "ulaw" or "hiya" rather than to "ashamed."

[18] As such, the strong criticism of "hooks" towards a researcher-centered research approach applies at least in parts to this study as well, when s/he says: "I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. … I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become mine, my own. Re—writing you, I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still the colonizer, the speak subject, and you are now at the centre of my talk. Stop" (hooks following Truman 2000: 36).

The researcher himself is fluent enough in any of the three languages used to understand the main idea of what has been said (and by making use of a mishmash of local languages and English, which is typical among many Filipin@s and in the Philippine context, he established some rapport with the respondents). But he also drew on the research assistants in understanding the meaning of what was being said – during the interviews as well as when analyzing the transcripts.

For securing the data gathered through interviews, we mainly used a recorder (which was transcribed later) and raw notes were only made from time to time to keep the "conversation with a purpose" (Robert Burgess) as natural as possible. In the course of the interview, it was often that the recorder was soon forgotten [but this was placed on the table at the beginning of an interview and when this was switched on, it created a "solemn setting"' as described by Kaufmann (1999:89): "There is a tape recorder in front of you and you do the whole thing for the sake of science"]. The request for a feedback gave us credible assurance that even taking notes from time to time was not considered as a significant disturbance.

Overall, we can say that the overwhelming majority of the respondents were extremely friendly and ready to give information. They were glad to assist us and appreciated that someone took interest in the way they look at things. Some respondents even told us that they were grateful to have been included into the research project as it helped them to reflect on their own thoughts and experiences.

But this only happened in retrospect; what originally motivated the respondents to agree to be interviewed (22 of the 34 respondents originally interviewed stayed until the end) is hard to say. Next to the interest of sharing information about one's life and the willingness to help, it was probably as well the interest to be better understood by a public that is full of prejudices towards the new industry they are/were working for. The interest of our research however to better understand why there are no unions and even more: how organizers could learn from the research was only shared by the respondents who had an activist background –and who even once tried in vain to organize agents themselves.

In October 2010, field research started with the conduct of biographical narrative interviews with 34 former and current ICCAs. The focus of this first interview was on coping with precarious living and working conditions and on the importance of networks, migration experience and biographical tipping points have in this regard. It was a form of interview that still relatively strongly followed the idea of an informant interview. Its aim was to let the respondents narrate, i.e. tell their life stories and share their perspectives on the work and their life situation. Although operating with terms such as precarity, transnationalism, everyday resistance or citizenship, the items in the guideline for the biographical interview were designed in a way that allowed the respondents to be as open as possible so that they can create their own categories. Only when the flow of narration slowed down, elements of prompting

questions or dialogue were used to encourage deeper discussion of certain areas. The guideline here was mainly used as a checklist and less as a questionnaire- unlike in the problem-centered interviews following.

The biographical interviews with their more personal components also served the purpose of building trust, which helped to ensure that respondents would continue to join the next interview phases and feel comfortable to open up.

Here, the warning by Susan Chase (in Denzin/Lincoln 2005: 670) was not confirmed, i.e. that biographical storytelling and being able to tell a life story building on an identity of oneself is specific to western and modern societies based on the myths of autonomy, do-ability and progress (Wahl 1989). The desire to lead one's "own life" (Beck 1995) could also be encountered considerably among our respondents - accompanied by a consistent narrative of one's own life (bio-graphy).[19] Certainly, this also indicates one reason to question the clear-cut distinction of "modern and western" vs. "non-western" (=pre-modern) societies.[20] (More on this later.)

In March and October 2011 (specific months are used as in the Philippine context, terms like "spring" or "autumn" create confusion!), two separate problem-focused interviews followed. These were largely based on semi-structured questionnaires, but also including some ranking exercises (on problems within the workplace, sense of belonging to different communities or rating of citizenship-relevant statements). As such simplification of individual responses inevitably involves some loss of information, we asked the respondents to qualify their answers to allow for insight into the contextual and action-relevant meaning of their answers.

[19] The observation on the high prevalence of "selfies" are posted in Filipino Facebook accounts, especially among the target group of this study, is another indication of this finding. In 2014, the Time Magazine even identified Makati, City as the "Selfie Capital of the World," being the "city with the most number of »selfie«-photos uploaded on the social network" (Manila Times, 11.3.2014). Two more Philippine cities (Pasig and Cebu) were on the top ten of a list of 459 cities.

[20] The term "modernity" meanders between a historical (i.e. contingent) understanding and a theoretical (i.e. often normative) understanding; therefore, it is contentious to define modernity and "the term modernity has stayed dazzling up to today" (Osterhammel 2010: 1187). Some use 'modernity' in a descriptive way, as collective term for a bunch of social and political developments which have nowhere so clearly taken place than in (Western) Europe in the last 500 years. It turns into a normative term, when only the way things developed in Europe are considered "modern" (often going along with advising "the rest" to follow "the west").

Some would consider as "modern" that everything turns contingent and there is nothing one can rely on anymore and so simply reduce the principle of modernity to being the big destructor: disenchantment, profanization or reducing traditions and taboos to simple conventions – an approach we already find in the Communist Manifesto where it says that "the bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part. The bourgeoisie (...) has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his »natural superiors«, and has left no other nexus between people than naked self-interest, than callous »cash payment«. It has drowned out the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value." If 'modern' means that nothing can be taken for granted anymore, making doubt and reflection inherently modern attitudes, then the "great transformations" (Polanyi) of democratization, individualization, secularization or capitalism are more results of modernity and not requirements for being modern. Such a definition would again make nationalism and return to traditions 'unmodern'. Probably the contradiction between a historical and a theoretical and normative approach can hardly be resolved and both approaches to be considered when using the term 'modern'.

While the first problem- focused interview dealt with coping mechanisms and options of protesting within the workplace, the second revolved around the relation of the respondents to society and politics – this was to enable us to make conclusions about their readiness to political action beyond the workplace. 22 of the original 34 respondents agreed to be interviewed for a second (and later third) time, while six new respondents replaced the 12 respondents who did not. For the new respondents a condensed biographical-narrative interview was done first to make their data comparable to the ones who stayed on. All in all 40 former or current ICCAs were interviewed.

Concomitant to the second and the third phases of the research, we conducted a few "control interviews" with people working in simple employments and with lesser formal education (domestic workers and sales personnel in shopping malls) to get an idea on how class- and workplace-specific the responses are from our better educated respondents from the call centers. All in all, these involved only nine interviews given the limitation that the team only has one researcher and one assistant at that time. Definitely, these interviews cannot even claim to be even "more or less," a representative for responses from ordinary workers. However, even these few interviews resulted in some surprising responses. The results suggest that features like identification with one's job, dissatisfaction with lack of participatory elements in work, dreaming of making a career or the belief that "maningkamot" (hard work) is *the* way out of poverty (i.e. a feature of the governementality of responsibilization), are pronounced among members of the lower class as well and are not only middle class specific characteristics, as often believed. (This is also later confirmed by the secondary data from the ISSP surveys; cf. chapter 4.15.: *Are the respondents representative for the Philippines?*).[21]

Findings from another research (Reese 2013b) further support this assumption, which also at the same time reiterates that the belief on *maningkamot* does not exclude one's hope in "*swerte*" or good luck to escape a life full of hard work. One should not also preclude that the poor - just like middle class individuals - are working hard not only for the sake of earning money, but that they also draw self-fulfillment from it (professionalism). But as class comparison is not the focus of the qualitative research, such evidence is just included as a form of "bricolage" (Levi-Strauss) where applicable, to sharpen the findings.

---

[21] Likewise Freddie Obligacion undertook a study among urban lower class women which came to the conclusion that "the poor, low socioeconomic-status respondents showed a strong achievement orientation, self-efficacy, and high self-esteem. Low success expectations did not weaken motivation for self-improvement thanks to the compensating effects of a high regard for achievement, self-efficacy, and high self-esteem"(Idem. [2003]: Social Class and Cognitive Framework in Filipino Women. Ph*ilippine Journal of Psychology 37/1*, 62-73: 62). In a rural setting, Borchgrevink (2014) again identified diligence as one of the three basic values among farmers.

2.1.3. Validation phase

The fieldwork for the first phase was completed in October and November 2012 by conducting focus group discussions in Manila and Davao[22] to which all respondents were invited and which were attended by a total of 21 respondents.[23]

Here, the consolidated results and the conclusions drawn were presented to the respondents and they were asked to provide a feedback (communicative validation). In addition to the reasons for (non-) organization, the following issues were put to discussion:

- What are your insights and/or reactions on the presentation?
- What are the possibilities of organizing ICCAs or of collective action inside the call center?
- Why is it so hard to organize within the call center?
- Is the absence of unions or the rarity of collective action in call centers a sign that the Filipino youth is un-political?

At the same time, the results were presented to and discussed with experts who in their organizational or scientific work are involved with ICCAs. These expert interviews should contribute to the embedding and validation of the findings from the interviews. The presentation also served as the opportunity of making the results known to key persons. The expert interviews likewise served as a tool for further data generation, for example, on the question whether and in which ways trade unions and the academe pick up and represent the concerns of ICCAs.

Part of the communicative validation was presenting the results at the annual meeting of the Asian Pacific Sociological Association in Quezon City on 22.10.2012; and, during separate lectures at the School of Labor and Industrial Relations at the University of the Philippines Diliman (26.7.2013) and at the Ateneo de Davao University (13.9.2013). Moreover, the results were presented in lectures at the University of Passau (27.11.2013) and the University of Bonn (10.12.2013). These were also published in extracts (Reese 2013a).

As an ecological validation by participant observation in a call center was not suitable for practical reasons (already explained above), communicative validation of the findings played an even bigger role. Under the circumstances, it was considered the most appropriate method to determine the validity or "rigor" of the research.

---

[22] The five respondents from Dumaguete did not find time to attend the validation workshop: one got pregnant, one moved and two had dropped out earlier. And the fifth did not want us to conduct a workshop with only him as the participant.

[23] It was quite a challenge to assemble respondents. There was a high response from participants confirming to join, but finally out of the ten who confirmed to join, only four actually showed up. Three cancelled due to sickness, one because she was previously absent from work due to sickness and could not miss another shift (short notice of movement of shift), one had to rest after a night shift, and one had to go on a business trip. Others were too busy with their studies. The difficulty in bringing them together was only partly related to their call center work. It was also due to being overworked, the very little flexibility in work arrangements of professionals in general and of having jobs that are not “8 to 5.”

For quantitative data within the experimental and survey traditions, one can usually resort to criteria such as ‘internal validity‘, ‘external validity‘ or ‘generalizability‘, ‘reliability‘ and ‘objectivity.‘ These criteria however cannot simply be applied when following a widely qualitative approach. Nevertheless, qualitative research requires validation as well and it is not necessary to abandon the criterion of external validity in favor of merely holding findings valid for the respective context in which they were collected, i.e., by simply "reproducing clearly and colorful" (Girtler 2001: 146) what has been *understood*. This study was concerned with coming up with findings that are possible to transfer to other settings and are typical for the research field, but which are drawn in a scientifically acceptable manner.[24]

In the quest for as much representability and validity as possible, and also for qualitative data, alternative criteria were developed. Most of them are connected to forms of communicative validation. In ascribing salience to one interpretation over another, such criteria include *credibility* (paralleling internal validity) and *confirmability* (paralleling objectivity) of data (Robson 1993: 403), *defensible reasoning* and *plausibility* (Guba and Lincoln in Denzin/Lincoln 2005: 205). Furthermore, qualitative responses and findings can be *consistent* as well (paralleling reliability), for instance by working (as in our case) with control questions and raising crucial issues during different phases of the longitudinal study. Just like the criteria of relevance (what is the claim’s relevance for knowledge about the world?), the other criteria mentioned require social judgment. Their meanings are arrived at through consensus and discussion in the scientific community *and* with the people inhabiting the research field.

Such criteria also resonate with a socio-constructivist concept of *reality* as found in the approach of *Sinnverstehen*, a concept which is based rather on maxims such as self-evidence, plausibility and effectiveness rather than on the philosophical-logical concept of truth based on maxims such as coherency or non-ambiguity – a point pivotal to the concept of “subjective class belonging” or “felt precarity” (see below). »Reality« and »fiction« here are not complete opposites, but each »reality« has a fictitious component.[25]

Triangulation of evaluation via communicative validation, which also took during informal discussions and exchanges during the research and the evaluation phases, provides the opportunity to consider the research object from multiple perspectives, viewpoints and positions to increase the breadth and depth of the research.

---

[24] To be focused on the typical is a form of generalization, which might wrong the individual not fitting into the general statement. It neglects the infinite diversity of human life and is evidence that sociology is a modern science wanting to capture the character of large-scale societies and make them tangible.

[25] This does not necessarily mean throwing the baby out with the bath water, giving up truth and reality as basic concepts as Jean Baudrillard does, assuming that it is ultimately impossible to have knowledge of the real world and to distinguish between reality and illusion. According to Baudrillard, we all design our own reality and 'reality' is entirely manufactured through the mass media, with science being no more than "a label attached to some currently popular ideas" (Madry/Kirby 1996: 184).

Next to the maxim of being transparent towards the respondents, the high priority given to communicative validation in the research is also the reason why this study is written in English. Publishing the study and its interim reports in English was considered mandatory so that the respondents and other people are able to provide environmental validation which can still be included into the analysis of the findings. "Our interpretation or characterization should, in principle, be found plausible by those whose actions are being interpreted," as Scott (1985: 139) expects. This procedure though added another problem to the study: Even trying my best in transferring big chunks of concepts and quotes from the German to the English language system, certainly some relevant dimensions might have therein been 'lost in translation'.

2.2. Integration of quantitative and qualitative evaluation and survey methods

As already mentioned several times, the study's primary interest was not to be able to generalize its findings, but to understand connections and relations as well as to contribute to theory building (grounded theory). This does not however necessarily mean dispensing with generalization altogether and efforts were made to at least submit findings as generalizable as possible. To achieve the collection of more complete and detailed data, to avoid an unnecessary under-complex analysis of the data *and* to validate the data collected in the interviews or by other qualitative methods such as observations or document analysis, the study has, where expedient, included *simple* quantitative evaluation and survey methods with a "*certain caution*" and "*in a reflected way*" as suggested by Prein et al. (1993) in their landmark article on "strategies for the integration of quantitative and qualitative evaluation methods."[26]

Regarding the data collection, in the first place, the desk research is to be mentioned which greatly resulted to the collection of quantitative data. This data in turn badly needs communicative validation as it, at times, considerably contradicts common sense as in the case of the results of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and also other SWS surveys which were used in this study (see detail the chapter 4.15.: *Are the respondents representative for the Philippines?*). To a limited degree, the encoded items that were integrated into the interviews or the encodings created by interpretation of the qualitative data are of quantitative character as well, although the small sample size and the non-randomness of choosing the respondents only allowed limited generalizations.

---

[26] Working by across-methods-triangulation in a phase model, i.e. using only qualitative methods for the development of categories, but employing merely quantitative methods on the basis of an expanded sample to come up with weighted conclusions would be a *very cautious* version of such integration. Such an approach though was not an option due to limited resources (time, money). That sociologists like Randy David question the use of quantitative methods altogether (see conclusion to part II) further puts such phase model into question.

Quantitative data were not only collected but quantitative methods were also used for analysis. This was primarily by building frequency distributions and calculating modes, medians,(quasi) mean values and in (cor)relating several answers to each other with the help of a measure of association (especially Lambda [λ], Phi [ϕ], Eta [η] and Somer's d). This study though did not compute correlation coefficients meant for metric data only (like r), even if the data is just of ordinal scale, a procedure other studies do. One example for the correlation of precarity and right-wing orientations is that of Sommer 2010.[27]

In line with the aim of providing better understanding, quantitative methods were used in the first instance to *describe* the sample and illustrate relations within the survey group. These were not used to forecast probabilities (external validity). Aware that one can only draw conclusions from a qualitative sample about the population in a very limited way and with great caution, this study nevertheless assumes that the calculated figures at least allow for stating trends.[28]

To reveal the fact that a certain type was hardly represented in a sample while another might have dominated the sample, in my opinion, not only answers to the criterion of transparency but also suggests illustrating such distribution by providing numbers. Moreover, making a trend statement with respect to distributions in a study which (also) intends to be an exploratory study within a phase model like this study, lessens the risk of developing arbitrary hypotheses (cf. Prein et al 1993: 11f.).

Definitely, the negative link between performance orientation and being in favor with unionism (see below) within the sample could only be detected applying the method of correlation for illustrative purposes.

The usual objections to such an approach also do not say that distributions within small samples categorically differ from those in a given population and quasi- statistics and therefore are without any illustrative value beyond the sample. They simply warn that here, the generalization of statistical nature is improper and generalizations should be made with caution and with explicit reference to the non-representativity of the sample.

Such an integration of qualitative and quantitative methods however, is regarded by many as a taboo in qualitative research, also expressed in a heated debate within the research project at the University of Bonn, in which parts of this research have been

---

[27] As the sample is small, I rather relied on Lambda (λ) and other contingency coefficients rather than Chi square based coefficients. Usually I used λ (and checked the contingency with the Fisher exact test when using a 2*2 table) in case of contingencies (nominal values). Where λ was unavailable with the chosen explanatory variable or had too high a probability of error, I resorted to ϕ. When correlating nominal with ordinal values, I usually chose Eta (η). When ordinal values were compared with ordinal values I chose Somers' D (*d*). I collated these values with other contingency or correlation coefficients. Where these coefficients come to significantly different results, this is mentioned. As the purpose of using these coefficients is to express 'more or less-correlations', smaller aberrations were however not considered of relevance.

[28] Terms such as "more or less," "the majority," "most" and the like are by the way, often argued with in qualitative texts as well, but often without giving numbers (quasi-statistics, -distributions, - correlations).

conceived, a debate which finally ended in dissent. Prein et al. (1993: 5) speaks of a "frontline between qualitative-interpretative and quantitative-statistical procedures," preventing these approaches to be integrated, even if it is expedient and can be scientifically justified. Why not aim for at least "a modest level of generalization," as Lamnek (2005: 186) recommends, and not content oneself with plain existential statements ("There is"), as »there is«-statements are of a very low significance. A sociologist should not stop being amazed of "what's out there"(*was es nicht alles gibt!)*, but rather move on in searching for the "typical" and "significance" of a single case. Lamnek (2005: 187) speaks in the case of results that are obtained in such manner of "representation" (but not of representativity in the statistical sense).

When according to Lamnek (2005: 186) "being concerned with the typical" is what characterizes qualitative social research, it should not be out of touch with an everyday understanding of "typical" and similar terms which also have a quantitative dimension. Terms such as "extreme type" (Lamnek 2005: 86), "regular occurrences in the material" (ibid.: 231) or "important types" (ibid.: 186) or statements such as "in classifying between essential and non-essential" (ibid.: 186), also get quantified in everyday life (important = many). Only by discussing distributions, a researcher can determine what an "important type" is at all (unless s/he argues in a normative manner). To deny this quantitative connotation on theoretical grounds, in my opinion, is deceiving the reader who will in all probability, furnish qualifications such as "important" also with a quantitative dimension as well. To categorically keep a distance to quantitative statements seems to me to be more an expression of distrust towards the reader of a study who the researcher thinks is not capable of interpreting statements with caution, but allegedly does "conclude offhand from parts to the whole" (Lamnek 2005: 187).

Considering that Paguntalan (2002) conducted semi -structured interviews with only 16 single women workers and took the life stories of ten women workers as special base for her study on female laborers in export processing zones; and, Karaos (1997) validated her conclusions (based on two quantitative data sets) on "Democracy and Citizenship Among Middle Class Families" with ten respondents interviewed, I believe that a sample consisting of 40 cases is broad enough to base some far reaching conclusions– especially as the research team applied data triangulation by consulting further secondary data.

2.3. Autoethnography

It is widely believed that quality assurance in research, demands for a maximum of non-interference by the researcher leading "to the lowest possible presence of the interviewer, meaning tending to his absence as a person with feelings and opinions" (Kaufmann 1999; 24). Kaufmann, however, made the experience that "restraint by the interviewer triggers a very specific caution in the respondent that prevents him/her

from getting too involved in the interview; the non-personalization of questions is followed by a non-personalization of the answers"(ibid.).

The need to win the trust of our respondents and make them comfortable to share with us their thoughts, made it appropriate for us to share about ourselves. Generally, it is likely that when people engage in a conversation and open up, the more the conversational partner (*kausap*) opens up and appears as a 'person like you and me.' This allows (yes, requires) the researcher to also share about him- or herself. Especially in a post-colonial context where a researcher located further up in the social hierarchy (being white, educated, male and/or with a higher class background), is often even explicitly confronted with the idea that one knows »it« better only based on this cultural capital.

"The ideal [interview situation]," says Girtler (2001: 162), "would be, if the researcher can bring a respondent who for him is an expert, to look at him [the researcher] as someone whom they »must« tell and explain something." The more comfortable the respondents feel, the more likely it is that respondents take on that role. "De-importantization" or "unlearning privileges," as asked for in post-colonial theory, here is an important contribution to a situation in which respondents consider themselves as experts, as well as to a "permissive, non-authoritarian, collegial-friendly atmosphere of trust," which Lamnek (2005: 361) considers an "indispensable prerequisite for narrating." In getting involved into the talk, however, the researcher should only do this in doses, as this conversation does not have the purpose of making respondents listen to lectures of the interviewers, but them (respondents) sharing their stories. The balance between involvement and detachment, of which already Norbert Elias spoke (cf. Hinz 2002), must be balanced again and again.

Herewith, the challenges posed by a conversation-centered research approach for the scientific soundness of a study, are not yet exhausted. Another is mentioned by Manfred Küchler (following Lamnek 2005: 129) who finds that "in a conversation-centered approach scientific soundness strongly takes place in the detail of research activity and ... is only inadequately verifiable from the outside."

Furthermore, interviews are discursive phenomena, written by interviewee *and* interviewer: "We are implicated in what we write. The stories we tell are as much about ourselves as about the subjects of our research," as Groves and Chang (2002: 335) observed.

The prominent role understanding and interpretation play in the field of qualitative research when analyzing the findings, as well as, the importance of the researcher to be accepted, are all factors that assign to the personality of the researcher a special role. His personality, his behavior, his openness, and last but not least, his self-reflection, influence data collection and evaluation to a large extent (cf. in detail Girtler 2001). This unavoidable interference of a researcher into a research process was encountered in different forms in this study.

On the one hand, we performed a researcher triangulation, either by researcher and current research assistant taking turns in conducting the interview, so that a rather selective perception, of which Lamnek (2005: 624) gives warning of, can be moderated and the vantage point be extended.

The local research assistants recruited in order to facilitate access and understanding, however, did not only act as a co-interviewer, and largely, as organizer of the interviews. They also acted as cultural guides and translators. Even if I have a sufficient command of the vernaculars used in the interviews, the assistants helped me to decipher added layers of meanings and interpretations and helped lessening the peril of "disastrous misunderstandings" (Denzin / Lincoln 2005: 707).

They also made me aware of the dos and don’ts of a culture which is still partly foreign to me despite the many years I have moved in it. This way upsetting respondents should be prevented, which can turn out as a problem especially in a culture in which misgivings and feelings of unease manifest themselves rather by *exit* than by *voice*.

In addition, by conducting (most) interviews jointly by a German researcher and a Filipino research assistant, an effect Brian Owensby in the Brazilian context termed "*para ingles ver*" (for an English to see) might be mitigated. He defines it as “the sense that Brazilians, when interacting with outsiders and particularly outsiders from Europe or the United States, respond by trying to live up to the expectations they want foreigners to have of them and so diminish the distance between themselves and outsiders. … particularly those widely thought to embody successful modernization. The experience of living one’s life as though in relation to a projection of modernity based on a screenplay already written has been integral to Brazilian life in the twentieth century“ (Owensby 1999: 71). This effect can also be encountered regularly in the Philippines (and reverts into a downright foreigner-bashing whenever the feedback given by the foreigner is not favorable).

On the other hand, “autoethnographic” (Tedlock 2005) reflections took a center stage in the research process and reflections on the positionality of the researcher(s) run through the whole writing. Especially for a study situated in a post-colonial context, such reflections on the »setting in life« (*Sitz im Leben*) of a research and its being bound to specific places, perspectives and epistemological interests are highly relevant. Next to a detailed reflection on the question of whether social realities in a supposedly non-Western society can be "understood" with a dispositive developed in “the” Western context like the citizenship discourse, autoethnographic reflections, i.e. a “reflexivity to deconstruct or monitor ... field roles and relations” (Groves /Chang 2002: 339), have been made on the role as a white, male, »luxury-precarized« researcher with a social movement background and political yearnings, grown up in a socialized bourgeois society and socialized as the son of a protestant pastor in an educated middle class (*bildungsbürgerlichen*) setting. For this reason, I refrain from using apparently objective terms such as “the researcher” or "the author,” but call a person a person: “I.”

Epistemologically, so Michael Hinz in a study on a controversy in science that has attracted much attention (between Norbert Elias and Hans Peter Duerr), it is "appropriate to avoid projections of our own yearnings or fears on the subject matter by permitting committedness in the research process in a controlled fashion and to reflect them as not to fall into an attitude of exaggerated »pseudo –distancing«" (Hinz 2002: 127).

In the present study, the researcher (= I) had to find a way to deal with the possible contradiction between the desire to detect resources for citizenship and counter-narratives to the prevalent negative narrative on readiness to political action in the Philippines, on one hand (cf. the post-script *Food for thought: Looking out for chances of citizenship*), and to stick to *understanding* the mental structures with which people locate themselves in the political field - a challenge, as these mental structures are not necessarily "fostering emancipation, democracy and community empowerment [and] redressing power imbalances" (Tedlock 2005: 202), which public ethnography or public sociology (Michael Burawoy), made as its aim.

Discontent with the social conditions – indeed even outrage - have motivated the researcher, much in the spirit of public ethnography, to "direct attention to matters about which something ought and might be done" (Michael Fischer in Denzin/Lincoln 2005: 203). However, at least in scientific work this should go along with openness for the fact that respondents do not feel this outrage to the same extent and that this should also not be expected from them – no matter how subliminal. It has to be taken into consideration that "radical politics and moral indignation belonged much more to the investigators of unemployment than to its victims. Again and again, journalists, novelists, and social scientists recorded their disappointment that the unemployed blamed neither capitalism nor government, but mainly themselves" (Kinder/Mebane 1983: 147).

That such perceptions (like considering the social conditions outrageous), do influence a conversation and easily translate into socially desirable responses - this assumption can be considered substantiated. If one sticks to the role of a scientist, one should merely identify reasons if and why respondents do (not) feel such outrage – and not talk respondents into a problem, which is not theirs. Research ethics also advise not to do so as a researcher is not a psychologist and might not be able to absorb the outrage generated. Even Bourdieu, to whom political intervention was not alien, challenged researchers "to avoid the infliction of a problem" and instead to adopt an "attentive attitude" and a "committed openness" towards the respondent (Bourdieu 1997: 787), adhering to Spinoza's principle *non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari, sed intelligere* - not to laugh (at), not to lament, not to despise, but to understand (Bourdieu 1997: 13). Out of quest for such openness, I chose a purely formal definition of "citizenship," also involving "ugly citizenship" (political action for non-emancipatory ends) – and not a normative definition as it often happens in the spirit of a good go-

vernance mindset – or from an »emancipatory« angle like for example Claußen (1996).[29]

The strong connection Claußen establishes between recognizing a political causality of events of which the individual is affected and "overcoming passivity ... in favor of participating in interventions into given settings, relations and processes" (Claußen 1996: 25), needs to be differentiated in at least two ways: (1) Political awareness does not necessarily trigger political activity but can as well lead to an insight of the futility of such activity, (2) political interventions are not necessarily "intervention in the setting" (Claußen, ibid.) oriented towards reforms, but can also manifest themselves in an attempt to stabilize the status quo (conservative), even if »political« is often equated with "unconventional and deviant thought and action" (Claußen, ibid.: 23).

Much has been published and debated on regarding the sense of citizenship in general and concretely in the Philippines as well. Implicitly or explicitly, the question on how willing and capable members of society may participate in the shaping of society has accompanied political theory ever since. This clashes with the requirement of a doctoral thesis to come up with something “new” functioning as main currency (code in the sense of Niklas Luhmann) in the field of modern science.

This writing does not claim to be a “never seen before.” It would be dishonest to say that the ideas presented here have not yet been thought of - and it can be considered rather a kind of piracy to do so, as all human expression is standing upon the shoulders of giants. Jonathan Lethem is quite right when saying that "basically all ideas are second-hand; consciously or unconsciously, they are fed by millions of external sources, and he who memorized them uses these ideas on a daily basis, as contented and proud as someone living on the false belief that he has generated them himself" (following Martin Butz and Fabian von Freier: *Man kann nicht nicht zitieren* [*You cannot not quote*], Deutschlandfunk, 13.9.2013).

A sociologist especially cannot seriously deny such genesis of human thought and aspiration. As a sociologically oriented work, this writing therefore does not aim to be sui generis, but wants to "focus as second-order observer on how others see the world," as Randy David describes the role of a sociologist (*Seeing something others don’t*, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 30.1.2014).

The innovative aspect of this writing is therefore rather, that it lets discourses that are largely conducted apart from each other get into a conversation with each other – discourses on precarization, transnationalism, the global periphery and on citizens-

---

[29] Likewise, Silver only considers those “forms of *resistance*” as ‘political’, “that contribute to *renewal* and *transition*” (2005: 230). Such definition de facto excludes every action from being political that which is supportive of the status quo (not resistant), as well as, all which clamor for a rectification of social processes (not renewing) – eventually only “Left” action can be considered “political”!

hip, here especially, what I call "sense of citizenship"[30] - and this is mainly done by using the Philippines as a case study. In summary, I hope to find answers to the question of how to elicit potentials for political activity under the conditions of precarity not offered by the single discourses. Can societies such as the Philippines be pulled up as proof that highly precarious societies can be governed easily (governed in the sense of Foucault) - or even governed easier? Or can on the other hand (pre-) political resources for citizenship 'and social mobilization be identified that are commonly overlooked?

The selection of picked up thoughts and social facts for this writing may be a bricolage (Claude Levi-Strauss), but this work has not restricted itself to simply collecting and associating bits and pieces, it also tried its best to make sense of them by analytical reflection.

The writing is a mixture of social philosophy, discourse analysis and data gathering. Empirical data were collected with different research methods, theoretically integrated - and further complemented by excursive socio-philosophical reflections of particular concern to the problem of this study. For instance: a) a more differentiated problematization of the concept of citizenship quickly at hand in political argumentation: Comparable to other moral values, the appeal to "citizenship" seems to be considered a panacea [not only] in Philippine newspaper columns, b) outlining the concept of responsibilization in the Foucauldian tradition, which the author considers a vital form of governance of middle class subjects - or c) the heated topic on whether it can be considered cultural imperialism to work with concepts like citizenship and rights in general when analyzing an allegedly non-western society like the Philippines.

"Any ethnographer will –at the latest when sitting at the desk – get aware of the distressing fact that coherence is not inherent in social structures and events themselves, but is created by the work of storytelling," says the anthropologist Andrea Lauser (2004: 48f.), who has presented numerous researches on the Philippines. Researchers and scientists are often tempted to narrate such a coherent story – an attitude anthropologists refer to as '*holistic bias*', "where everything seems to fit into the picture; achieved by ignoring, or giving little weight to, the things that don't" (Robson 1993: 403).[31] But such desire conflicts with the claim of sociology as empirical science which should "not proceed in generalization and abstraction further than the empirical material allows"(Raiser 2013: 4).

As my approach is furthermore discourse-oriented and follows as a predominantly qualitative research rather the worm than the bird's eye view, the element of bricola-

---

[30] It is interesting to note here that such approach is also quite novel to legal science, as the law sociologist Thomas Raiser (more on this approach see below) discovered: "The research on acceptance [of rights] (is a) young, methodically still underdeveloped research area" and "the sense of justice plays so far only a peripheral role in legal reflection" (Raiser, 2011: 55).

[31] For Greven (2009: 73) such "observer position supposedly overlooking »the whole«" reflects "rather fantasies of omnipotence and of artists than empirical knowledge that is controllable."

ge is even more pronounced, making it all but impossible to speak a final word on the topic of citizenship and readiness to political action among the Philippine (lower) middle class. This study sets for itself as goal the identification of necessary construction sites and elements developing a theory of citizenship in the Philippine context - in particular on the basis of empirical findings from two empirical part studies: on 1) readiness to political action within the working environment and 2) attitudes of citizenship beyond the working environment. In absence of a Filipino emic theory of citizenship (cf. in detail chapter 4.2.: *Citizenship - a western concept*), sense and practice of citizenship are usually measured against points of references developed within a western-liberal citizenship theory, also done so by Filipino scientists and analysts. It is quite likely that this results in the giving of a *kalabasa* (failing mark). This risk has been a continuous reminder in the course of the writing, which therefore heuristically tried to avoid coming up with such a conclusion (but partly failed in that as the conclusion of part II of the case study shows). Moreover, in order to counter a quick grading of *kalabasa* – reflected in such a statement as "only in the Philippines" which is ready at hand (better: at mouth) of disaffected Filipin@s (and often accompanied with a deep sigh) - at times I placed specific phenomena in the Philippines in relation to similar ones from Germany. I have also placed the conclusions on chances and impediments for citizenship in the Philippines in a rather essayistic postscript to counter such hazard. Nevertheless I have not refrained from any such evaluation, well aware about the peril a merely descriptive approach towards the 'other', remaining in a depiction of social realities as merely »diverse« and colorful as en vogue in post-modern approaches.[32]

I consider this a more appropriate approach as a researcher with western origin. Too many Westerners have described, analyzed (and finally brushed off) societies of the Global South (or in a similar way popular cultures in the societies they hail from), without asking themselves whether their own society meets the high standards with which they grade societies of the South.

Literature on good governance often tends to narrate an idealized history of the emergence of citizenship and modern statehood. It also often limits this narrative to European history (which also holds true for literature on citizenship in the Philippines, cf. the chapter 4.2.: *Citizenship – a western concept*). Political realities in the Atlantic world on the other hand, are much less scrutinized (if at all) than the decried backlogs in so called »developmental societies«. For the developed world, the congruence of political ideal/claim and reality is de facto silently assumed – a case of validity assumption (*Geltungsvermutung*), which is also prevalent in legal science (cf. Baer 2011: 139).

Such an approach stems from a harmful tradition of colonial and classist ethnology that has also provoked criticism from Filipino scientists (cf. in detail: Enriquez 1992).

---

[32] On this peril of such "Whatever!" (Fay 1996: 8) cf. Kuno Füssel, Dorothee Sölle and Fulbert Steffensky (Eds.) (1993): *Die Sowohl-als-auch-Falle. Eine theologische Kritik des Postmodernismus*, Luzern 1993: Edition Exodus.

It is part of unlearning privileges and of »provincializing« Europe as post-colonial theory calls for a) to dig for roots of citizenship also outside the Western world (cf. chapter 4.2.: *Is citizenship a western concept?*) as well as b) to consider one's own society in need of reform not only on a national scale, but also in global scope. This is why comparing Northern and Southern realities (here: especially the Philippine and the German society) happens in this work with a synoptic intention: Even if the writing concentrates on the Philippines, I hope to identify challenges for the practice of citizenship beyond the Philippine context as well.

3. Case study - part I: “Citizenship” in a work setting

3.1. A preliminary definition of citizenship

Gaventa and Barrett define *citizenship* as “the ability to exercise voice and claim rights from states and political authorities“(2010: 57). Citizenship is therefore made up of two dimensions – an active dimension (exercising voice) and a passive one (claiming rights - or nowadays it is rather more often termed: demanding accountability). Both dimensions are considered as core elements of good governance - next to elements such as government effectiveness, rule of law, political stability, absence of violence and regulatory quality and control of corruption (Kabeer/Haq Kabir 2009).

If citizenship is defined as "voice" and "accountability,” then an active and a passive dimension likewise characterizes “sense of citizenship.” It can be defined as a) considering oneself or others to be rightfully entitled to something (passive sense of citizenship or sense of entitlement) and b) being ready to stand up for what one considers 'right' (active sense of citizenship and readiness to political action). “Rights” here is a stronger term than the one that is usually used in development theory, which is “needs.” Needs can be turned into “demand” when one has the necessary purchasing power, but needs is not something one can claim and fight for (rights-based approach).

The legal sociologist Thomas Raiser (Raiser 2011) further distinguishes between a sense of justice, rights consciousness and legal knowledge (next to acceptance of rights or legal obedience as a form of recognizing the rights of others).[33] Raiser thereby assumes that "regardless of all prior contact with the law people have a ...sense of right and wrong [and] emotionally grasp what is allowed or prohibited, which claims one may raise, which obligations one has and how the behavior of others is to be appraised. ... This sense of justice ... does not distinguish between convention, law and morality, but appears as an undifferentiated ability to judge.” Such a sense of justice serves as “a predetermined yardstick for the recognition or non-recognition of specific legal provisions” (ibid.: 56).

As this study focuses on the sense of entitlement, Raiser’s second term, which is rights consciousness, is here of higher relevance. Hereunder, Raiser subsumes "all ideas of right and justice memorized by a person, ... towards which that person orients his or her social behavior and when judging the social behavior of others" (ibid.: 57). For that matter "one and the same person [might] develop a clear consciousness of what is right in certain situations which might be vague in other situations” (ibid.).

---

[33] In the German original the terms are: Rechtsgefühl, Rechtsbewusstsein, Rechtskenntnis, Rechtsakzeptanz and Rechtsgehorsam.

How articulate this awareness is "depends on many factors, among which individual talent, intelligence and level of education, age, personal experience, and last but not least the frequency and intensity of the legally relevant situations encountered play an important role" (ibid.). Furthermore, Raiser distinguishes this individual from a collective consciousness of what is right (Raiser 2013: 330), understanding it as part of a specific "legal culture." He defines this collective awareness of rights, as "empirically explorable epitome of values, norms, institutions, procedures and behaviors, present in a society and based on what is right."

As far as individual consciousness is concerned, Raiser draws on Lawrence Kohlberg's differentiation between a pre-conventional, a conventional and a post-conventional orientation (on Kohlberg's theory see below).

As the sense of justice and consciousness of rights do not distinguish between law, morality and convention (Raiser 2011: 57) – with the individual rights consciousness also reflecting "judgment patterns which are supra-individual, handed down or molded by the spirit of the time" (ibid.: 59) - legal knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of legal provisions and rights consciousness do not necessarily imply its acceptance, and to an even lesser extent, legal obedience as Raiser assumes (ibid.: 63.). Drawing on the concept of legal pluralism one may also term it this way: Just knowing about the legal situation does not mean that state law is considered the overriding legal principle.

Susanne Baer, legal sociologist and judge at the German Federal Constitutional Court, approaches the issue from a different angle. As already outlined, she notes that law studies are based on an assumption of the validity of codified law. This is an assumption that traditional law studies have in common with political science. The latter in the same way often stops in identifying the presence, or the lack of, certain political institutions (for Southeast Asia cf. Rüland 1998), concluding without further investigation from their presence on their effectiveness. Sociology of law starts off by raising the question whether law really prevails, i.e. is accepted, claimed and observed. "What is right then is also determined according to whether a rule is recognized as valid and people act accordingly" (Baer 2011: 90). "To analyze law in reality," so Baer (2011: 27), law sociology thus "(has to) use empirical methods." Both Baer and Raiser agree: Only an empirical study here allows valid answers.

To determine such a legal effectiveness in an empirical manner, Baer goes on, it is pertinent to ask, "what reasons make people pursue claims – i.e. develop »rights consciousness« - or refrain from them and what makes them »mobilize« law by going to court" (Baer 2011: 27). The present study aims to come up with preliminary answers with regards to especially young urban professionals in the Philippines.

Baer anyway assumes a precedence of a sense of entitlement (*Anspruchsbewusstsein*) when she wrote that, "if people make use of rights, put them in action, thus mobilize law, they need to be conscious about their rights and have to know them; for pushing own rights and needs, .. one must also have a sense of entitlement, i.e. believe that a

right is also »his right« (2011: 209). Baer speaks here of a "claim knowledge" (*Anspruchswissen*) as "subjective belief to have enforceable rights of one's own, thus able to make a claim on them" and notes that this claim knowledge is an instrumental knowledge: "If we believe we can achieve something with the help of the law … we make use of it, if we expect to lose, we do not do so" (ibid.: 213).

The little chance, especially non-privileged Filipinos believe to have, when bringing a case to an ordinary court is likely a reason why according to a study quoted by Franco (2011: 35) "rural Filipinos demonstrated a strong aversion to using state law and a preference instead for using... private justice [and other kinds of settlements] to settle disputes." (All in all, the study of Franco proves true for the Philippine case most of the general findings on barriers to seeking justice raised by Baer and Raiser in their introductions to law sociology.)

This is confirmed in the expert interviews in 2014. David (2014) so believes that what appears as legal pluralism, might simply be an economical consideration. He asks, "if you insist on your rights according to labor laws, where do you run? Is it worth asserting these rights? How much time would it take to resolve a case like this compared to just negotiating?" Likewise, while Hernandez (2014) believes that people are informed about their rights from the media (considering ignorance of one's rights mainly a rural and lower class phenomenon), she states at the same time that "people do not go out of their way to claim their rights. … If people are assisted by someone like a lawyer or a patron, it is more likely that they not only know their rights but also claim them."

Baer however distinguishes this »claim knowledge« from an "attitude of entitlement" (*Anspruchshaltung*), but without defining exactly what this is. Should she mean by an "attitude of entitlement" of a claim that lacks legal 'backing' (in Tagalog: *akala*), such attitude would still be included into what this study tries to identify as "sense of entitlement," as such "attitudes" can lead to a process in which mere claims in the course of a political struggle eventually turn into enforceable rights. Pivotal for this writing however is that Baer connects this attitude of entitlement explicitly with the concept of citizenship when she wrote that "in a legal order people only ... get citizens … if they ... switch to (a position of) entitled subjects" (Baer 2011: 214).

I will leave this discussion for now with this sketch of "sense of citizenship" and will come back to it and expand it in the later course (Part II: Citizenship in the Philippines). One look ahead however is vital at this point - a short consideration of the question of which space actually is assigned to sense and practice of citizenship. Going back to the definition of citizenship by Gaventa and Barrett which served as jump-off point ("voice and claims rights from states and political authorities"), spaces outside the arena of state are here strictly speaking not included.

This restriction of citizenship to state and "public sphere" though - closely linked to the emancipation project of liberalism and carried mainly by male and white bourgeois in the Atlantic world - has ever since been contested. (More in the chapter 4.3.: *Spaces of the political*.) The feminist movement claims that "the private is political." Secondly, under the neoliberal character that goes along with privatization, i.e. a self-de-responsibilization of the state and a responsibilization of people (Bröckling, Krasmann and Lemke 2000), detecting a sense of citizenship is more dependent than before on a) recognizing non-state actors as political agents as well as b) addressees of accountability. The state focus turns problematic where the state has not (yet) sufficiently evolved or where it is 'rolled back'. Additionally, globalization weakens the linkage between a sense of citizenship to a sense of nationalism, i.e. to a clear identification with a nation state (or a "container state" as termed in theory of transnationalism, cf. Pries 2008) serving as guarantor of rights and addressee of right-based struggles.

Following these considerations, passive citizenship cannot only focus on the state as bearer of duties. We are not only political but also economic citizens as the concept of economic democracy which accompanied the trade union's movement ever since underlines. Additionally, globalization no longer does not allow reducing "sense of citizenship" to a sense of nationalism and a clear identification with one nation state, a still prevalent perspective despite the growing literature on transnational and post-national citizenship.

Questioning which space(s) are to be considered as political, is already an expression of citizenship. This has accompanied political conflicts between the trade union movement and the liberal establishment, social movements and the state, and last but not least, the women's movement and the patriarchal status quo.

Finally, besides this matter of disputing over the adequate space of citizenship, the advent of neoliberalism raised again the question of what is the right balance between active and passive citizenship. While the welfare and the developmental state's focus is on service delivery, which additionally highlights the *production* of a disciplined citizen as a desirable subject (passive citizenship), neoliberal governementality again puts more emphasis on "do it yourself," be it by 'empowering' communities (helping them to help themselves), supporting entrepreneurship or by stigmatizing the 'undeserving poor'. By this, categorical citizen and human rights turn into conditional and revocable »customers« and »client« rights are understood as contractual obligation and are therefore based on mutual obligations (Hartmann 2005). Analyzing the conditional cash transfer programs implemented worldwide (in the Philippines as *Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program* – literally: Helping the Filipino family to *cross* [sic!] - or the Agenda 2010 in Germany), one can observe that neoliberalism no longer conceptualizes social policy as safeguarding but merely as bridging or stepping stone (Gsänger 2001); especially the focus on market-oriented education and the limitation of health services to the »essential« illustrates this. The paradigm of an »activating welfare state« discredits the concept of social protection (safeguarding) as an

unconditional and indivisible individual claim as "benefits gravy train" (*soziale Hängematte*). Social rights and claims here are only justified where obligations towards an imaginary community have been previously fulfilled. I will further elaborate this concept of responsibilization in more detail below.

3.2. Are the unorganized organizable?

The first part of this study deals exactly with such a case of exerting citizenship within the realm of "economic democracy" which is chosen as the example for citizenship outside of the classical (i.e. liberal) realm of citizenship. The question tackled here is why one can only observe so little (collective) representation of interests among ICCAs in the Philippines. Is it that they are simply "unorganizable" (Choi 2004)? And is it especially the social uncertainty (precarity) of their life paths and of their working conditions that aggravates the problem of ICCAs getting organized?

After outlining some work related problems Filipino ICCAs identify, and further delving into theoretical considerations of why this social group is expected to get politically active, this chapter will focus on the strategies the agents employ to counter their problems (mainly accommodation and everyday resistance). By highlighting five objective and six subjective reasons (or reasons by circumstances and reasons by framing), I conclude that it is not repressive regulation policies, but rather the formative power and the internalization of discourses of rule within individual life strategies that are preventing the establishment of unions and other collective action structures.

In which way precarity influences political action, and especially, action within the working environment is a question haunting sociologists nowadays, as well as activists (not only) in Europe (cf. Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 2013, Castel/Dörre 2008, Dörre/Fuchs 2005, Castel 2000+2005 among others). One of them is Bourdieu, who in 1998 believed that "as [precarity] leaves the future in the bleak it denies those affected every rational anticipation of the future, and above all denies them the minimum of hope and faith into the future, essential especially for a collective rebellion against an intolerable presence. ... The unemployed and workers who find themselves in a precarious situation can hardly be mobilized because their ability to design future projects is affected. ... You must have at least a minimum amount of power to shape the present in order to create a revolutionary project as the latter is always a thoughtful effort to change the present in reference to a future project." Dörre confirmed this view from his perspective in a radio interview in 2013 (Dörre 2013).

In the Philippines as well, activists are concerned that young urban professionals do not organize themselves and often accuse them of being politically disengaged. Agents in international call centers, which nowadays offer employment to hundreds

of thousands of well-educated young people, are specifically highlighted here as they are considered *the* employment opportunity for college graduates.

However, in the case of the young urban professionals included in this study, reactions of despair to a precarious life are not evident. Nearly three out of four respondents (28 out of altogether 40 participants) said they have "clear life plans," four out of five strongly disagreed with the statement that "when a person is born, how things are going to work out for him/her is already decided" (Prevalence Index [PI] of .11[34]). The same number also strongly disagreed with the statement "seeing the way things are, I find it hard to be hopeful for the world" (PI = .14). Most say they are very optimistic about their future (PI = .82). Much less though believe they can plan their life freely (PI: .60[35]).

Research on precarity and vulnerability usually assumes that if not leading to despair, social insecurity promotes individual coping mechanisms, in the Philippines called *diskarte*, in Brazil *jeito* and among European sociologists "flexible opportunity orientation" [Vester in Schultheis/Schulz 2005]).

But this assumption does not hold true even for poor peoples' movements, wherein precarious life conditions *can* also very well lead to unrest, protest and resistance (Walton /Seddon 1994; Piven/Cloward 1977, Moore 1982, Thompson 1963). Scott (1976) and Silver (2005) connect uncertainty under certain circumstances even with radicalism, especially when precarization a) attacks and undermines the social contract in force (moral economy) and it victimizes many people at the same time (Scott 1976: 193).

That precarization can catalyze political reactions and collective mobilizations among members of the middle class was proven by what happened in the last years around the Mediterranean Sea (Portugal, Spain, Egypt, Greece and more others) and up to settings more similar to the Philippines like Chile and Brazil, where young professionals were neither all just left in despair nor simply muddling through their precarious lives, but took their issues to the streets. These political reactions disprove the consideration, that precarious living and working conditions generally are to be blamed for a lack of political mobilization and collective political protest as Bourdieu does.

---

[34] The **prevalence index** is computed by weighing the responses to an item. Where five options to answer are given a "totally agree" is weighed with 1 and a "don't agree at all" with 0. An "agree more or less" is weighed with . 75, a "no idea"/neither nor etc. with .5, an "actually don't agree" finally with .25. ("Don't agree at all" is not weighed, but the cases are included into the denominator). In the case when an item only has four possible responses (for instance: totally agree/more or less agree/actually not agree/not agree at all), the strongest approval is weighed with 1, agreeing with reservations with .66, disagreeing with reservations .33 and again the total disapproval is not weighed, but the cases are included into the denominator). When everyone totally agreed, the prevalence index thus would be 1, if no one had agreed at all 0. In both cases a total balance for all the answers results in a value of .5, so that the numerics reflect the "completely balanced" view about an item within the sample group.

[35] This is actually the *only* item on mental resources which got an ambiguous response, to the other nine items nearly all respondents either consistently agreed or disagreed.

Nevertheless it is a fact that young urban professionals in the Philippines do *not* (yet?) follow their peers in other parts of the world. They do not even form trade unions or other associations to represent their interests as of now. In 2007, the sociologist Aya Fabros finished her masteral thesis on "call center regimes and experiences in the Philippines" (Fabros 2007). She ends by urging that "there is a need for further study on the possibility of more organized, collective resistance in the call center industry. ... It would be useful to identify factors that would facilitate, as well as hinder, the formation of collective organizations such as unions or co-ops"(Fabros 2007: 273).

As in the context of industrial societies (which happen to be the same serving as benchmark for citizenship and good governance in general), representation of interests within the working environment has ever since been capitalized. It seems to be reasonable to have a look into the reasons why there is so little practice of economical citizenship when researching on the sense of citizenship in general.

The empirical background for the conclusions drawn in the first part of this study, are the first two interview stages of the aforementioned longitudinal study, as well as secondary literature on Filipino ICCAs, and *complemented by* secondary literature on the case of call center agents in India. The latter, done as an analytical literature on the case of Indian call centers, is more detailed when it comes to collective action and unionization. The situationers on the Indian case (Noronha/D'Cruz 2009; Taylor et al. 2007), show striking resemblances when describing the industry and even to a large extent, describing the mindset of the agents in comparison to what my own research and secondary literature report about the Philippines. I can therefore assume that differences between the Philippine and the Indian context are only gradual.

3.3. The sample

Of the total 40 respondents we recruited by theoretical sampling, the sex ratio was nearly balanced: 24 females vis-à-vis 16 male respondents.



Figure 1

30 out of 40 respondents were between 21 and 30 years old when they joined the study; two were younger than 21; five were between 31 and 40; and, only one respondent older than 40 (44 years).

14 of our respondents visited a "school of excellence," so to say the Philippine Ivy League. This includes the different branches of the University of the Philippines (Diliman and Davao campus), as well as the Ateneo Universities in Manila and Davao. 23 did not visit one of these college/universities for their college course, while we

did not get clear specifications from three respondents. (Only) one of the respondents never visited a college.

23 respondents graduated from college, two even took up post-graduate courses, 14 finished at least two years of college and as mentioned one never visited college.

10 respondents work(ed) in Manila, five in Dumaguete, while 25 respondents were from Davao, the hometown of the research assistants and the base of the researcher during the field visits in the Philippines.

28 of 40 migrated locally for job and educational reasons, while 12 studied and worked in cities that were their hometowns. ('Only' 21 of their families though had some migration history.) While 16 research respondents experienced moving from their place of birth to other parts of the Philippines because of their parents' job assignments and/or circumstances in their families, 17 came from the provinces or rural outskirts and moved to the cities to study and then later took up the work opportunities that were particularly offered by the call center industry. However, only eight migrated explicitly to be hired as call center agent.[36] Meanwhile, four respondents even already migrated overseas once in their life, more than every second (23 out of 40) has family members or close relatives who are either abroad or who had been overseas migrant workers.

32 respondents worked as floor agents, while seven were promoted to be quality agents; one respondent had a management position.[37] For 19 respondents, being an agent is their first employment, while 21 collected working experiences before joining the call center. 33 out of 40 worked in a graveyard shift, four did so before, while seven never worked in the night shift.

Ten respondents work(ed) for less than six months in a call center when joining the study; seven worked there 7 to 12 months, five between one and two years; eight two to three years; and, eight for more than three years.



Figure 2

As far as (subjective) class belonging is concerned, six respondents classified themselves as "upper middle class," 21 considered themselves middle class and 13 considered themselves lower class. Comparing their

---

[36] Work and education though are not the mere reasons for them migrate: Some respondents pronounced the impression that their rural community offered less chance for individual and professional growth. Some agents characterized the place they come from as "simple" and "laid back." In describing her hometown, a Davao respondent says, "You will be stranded for life [in rural home]…*kasi ang growth mo parang ang tagal* (your growth seems to take so long). You won't grow. Unlike here in the city, life is fast. Life in the province is very slow." Concurs another, "(The city is) like a new environment, because if you're in a place where you grew up, you'd become stagnant...I would not stick to a place if I feel there's no improvement or I'm not growing... This would also be my step towards higher level in my journey in life. Experience is my purpose."

[37] One respondent voluntarily demoted herself from a management position which she found too tiresome, to be a "minion"(self-statement), i.e. a simple floor agent, again. For that she was forced to change the call center.

own social position to that of their families of origin (only involving 28 survivors who joined the third interview cycle, which was done with a social ladder of ten steps), nine out of 28 considered themselves to have not experienced any social uplift (same classification in both cases), six respondents identified a slight uplift (+1), four a more significant uplift (+2), and one even a considerable uplift (+3, from step 4 to step 7). On the other hand five respondents determined a slight descent (-1), two a more significant descent (-2) and one respondent even experienced a sort of social relegation (-3, from 8 to 5).

17 of the 28 respondents previously (*dati*) considered themselves poor, five still consider themselves poor (*ngayon*) and only six never considered themselves poor. Just like the comparison one's own class belonging with the classification of one's origin, that the inconclusive subjective impression of being poor shows the limits basing class belonging (merely) on self-evaluation. In the case of social mobility, several of the classifications made by the respondents are difficult to reconcile with the information collected in the biographical interviews by the researchers. The case of the self-assessed social relegation is one of them: from what we learned about the family of origin of a respondent (the father being a publically employed janitor) it is difficult to understand the classification as upper middle class (step 8).

Likewise considering oneself poor is only imperfectly connected to the placement within the social ladder: While of the 17 respondents no longer feeling poor, five do so despite the fact that they placed themselves on the same ladder step as their family of origin; three respondents don't any longer consider themselves poor even if they experienced a slight (-1) descent. Only nine of those no longer considering themselves poor experienced some slight uplift. Among the six respondents again who "never" felt poor, three at one time or the other, placed themselves only on step 4. (Again four respondents once felt poor despite coming from an upper middle class family, i.e. step 6 or 7.) Only in the case of the five respondents feeling poor now, one can more or less see a connection to their self-grading. Two indeed place themselves on step 3, two have experienced a considerable descent (-2 resp. -3). Only one of the five (still?) feels poor despite having risen from step 3 to 5.

Finally, 20 of the respondents had prior organizational experience in a political or a community organization (mainly Leftist political student organizations, but also NGOs or mainstream youth councils); or in another organized initiative of exerting citizenship in a broader sense. 20 respondents never did so before.[38] Out of convenience, I will in the following sections call the respondents with organizational experience "activists" and the ones without organizational experience "non-activists," as the term "people without organizational experience" is simply too bulky. Calling all of them "activists" though is not totally to the point as "activist" in the Philippines is

[38] The contingency of those with higher educational attainment (college graduate *as well as* having visited a school of excellence) with an organizational background is low: $\lambda = .20$ *and* .22 when the educational attainment is considered as the explanatory variable.

a term closely connected to Leftism. Although half of those with organizational experience who participated in the whole study (16 of 28) made these experiences within Maoist and non-Maoist Left groups (i.e. 8 of the 16 with organizational experience), four of the 16 with organizational experience did definitely not gain them in such setting, while for the remaining four it could not be clearly be established where they gained their organizational experience.

At this point, it would be pertinent to compare the profile of our theoretical sampling with a statistically drawn profile of ICCAs in general. While much information can be found on the size of the industry, on income, as well as aggregated data of employment figures (DOST 2012 among others), unfortunately there is only few data available on the features we chose for our theoretical sampling. Most data were related to economic indicators (business and consumption).

In 2011, 77% of the Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) employees (48% of them working 2011 in international call centers) were working in the Metro Manila region, 6% less than four years before (DOST 2012: 4; 19). The Nielsen Outcall Report of 2013 again describes the typical BPO consumer a college graduate, aged 24 to 29 with 70% to 80% of BPO workers working in night shift (Rappler, 17.7.2013). According to the National Statistics Office in the Philippines in 2005 (the newest data available on this site, sic!) 58.8% of the ICCAs were women.[39] But I was neither able to access statistical data on class background or the quality of college education – leave alone organizational experience.

The scant statistical data I was able to retrieve nevertheless proves that the sample is "typical," consistent with the way Lamnek (2005: 166) defines this term, distinguishing it from "representative."

3.4. No sunshine industry - Problems at work

Describing the working and living conditions of ICCAs and characterizing them as precarious and as "a different form of migration, one that is social and temporal, rather than spatial" (Fabros 2007: 150), has often been done. No other previous study to the one referred to here, extensively described working conditions and transnational location of ICCAs (Reese 2008c).[40] Beyond the glossy projections by the industry itself (see picture) there is no doubt that job dissatisfaction and high work stress are widespread among ICCAs. The findings of our research mainly reaffirm former fin-

[39] Source: http://www.census.gov.ph/sites/default/files/attachments/aodao/article/Gender%20Factsheet%20-%20Women%20In%20Business%20Process%20Outsourcing%20Industries%20-%20March%202009%20-%20No.09-02.pdf. Accessed 19.2.2014.

[40] As there is not much to add to the description of transnational job location to what has been outlined in 2008c, there will follow no further extra description of it in this writing.

dings on the nature of call center work (Fabros/Pascual 2007, Fabros 2007, EILER 2008, Reese 2008c, Sarkar 2008, Noronha/D'Cruz 2009, Messenger/ Ghosheh 2010).

Another reason for not dwelling on the description of the "objective" situation in the (international) call center industry is that the **main interest of this research** was not to capture "objective" situations of "exploitation," but rather to find out if agents consider the situation to be problematic. Doing so also follows the grounded theory strategy. "Adopting grounded theory strategies … results in putting ideas and perspectives to empirical tests," as Charmaz (in Denzin/Lincoln 2005: 512) declares.

The study was mainly interested to see which strategies ICCAs resort to in handling such dissatisfaction, if »interest representation, « i.e. voice and protest belongs to these strategies, and finally, if they consider collective interest representation. This also includes exploring if and how the traditional way of expressing collective grievances and goals – trade unionism – might develop among ICCAs. (Individual and collective interest representation outside of the call center setting was then the subject of a further research step, covered in the second part of this writing.)

Why trade unions? It is considered by researchers on precarity as the most effective form of interest representation for jobholders. "Politics of de-precarization require the promotion of the self-organization of supposedly unorganizable," believe Dörre and Fuchs (2005), considering further that "under the premise of a political culture of self-

Figure 3: Advertising the international call center industry. Advertisement on an urban bus, Metro Manila, 2010

organization and resistivity (*Widerständigkeit*), it is not impossible that precariously employed develop preferences for collective action strategies. Unions could here develop specific organizational offers for precariously employed, also as they have a sophisticated system of consultation and services tailored to the problem of job insecurity."

I will keep the sketch of the problems they encounter during work *mentioned* by our respondents short. This sketch shall mainly serve as mere background for the chapters on how they deal with these problems, as well as a refutation of the claim by the information technology-Business Processing Association of the Philippines (iBPAP), that call centers agents do not organize because "the BPO sector does not have any labor union, as groups like these only exist when particular rights and privileges of the workers aren't met," as Genny Marcial, external affairs executive director of the iBPAP, believes (*Labor unions wither away in PH call centers*, Manila Times, 16.7.2013). "[The employees] once tried to have a labor union, but it did not last whether locally or internationally, because their needs are properly met" (ibid.).

We observed that problems among BPO workers are strongly related to the type in which ICCAs work: Most call centers belong to the *mass servicing model* which Noronha and D'Cruz (2009) characterize by their factory-like features such as tightly scripted tasks and the assembly line like dispatch of callers, accompanied by highly repetitive tasks and high performance demands to be done within short cycle times, all of it ensured by elaborated surveillance mechanisms. Such working conditions are common for most of our respondents. ICCAs act here as little more than "mouthpieces often following scripted dialogues and detailed instructions and enjoying little autonomy" (ibid.: 3). 36 of the 40 respondents to this study work(ed) in a setting which largely resembled such description, with the remaining four working in call center settings belonging to the *high commitment service model.* Here jobs entail complexity and control for employees "who must interpret information and use their judgment to provide individually customized solutions to customers whose requirements are more complex and demand specialized servicing" (Noronha/D'Cruz 2009: 4). Agents here for instance verify compensation claims made to insurance companies, including 100.000-dollar claims. Another, and probably more spread kind of high commitment setting are the IT-freelancers developing websites. Work in such a setting cannot easily be standardized and so agents are granted more autonomy. Recognizing the dilemma of keeping business process outsourcing more cost-efficient than the place the business process was outsourced from without compromising customer orientation[41], Human Resource Management (HRM) draws on much responsibilization in the high commitment service model; the mass servicing

[41] There was a similar form of outsourcing in the American colonial period when "personnel indigenization was actually a practical policy for the Americans because it cost less to hire a Filipino" (Enriquez 1992: 9). It was especially this "personnel indigenization" that exactly led to the existence of a recognizable middle class!

model meanwhile draws heavily on traits of disciplinary governementality (see below for the terms).

Four "negative cases" (Lamnek 2005: 191) to the prevalent mass servicing setting are not a substantial base for comparing both work settings – particularly as two of the four "high commitment"-agents dropped out after the first interview cycle. We nevertheless chose not to recruit replacements for them as already the biographical interviews indicated that these agents have little to complain about. They can be considered the "workers aristocracy" (*Arbeiteraristokratie*) in the call center setting. These respondents disclosed that they experience a high degree of self-determination and self-fulfillment in their work, solving formidable problems and often executing tasks near to their educational attainments and this within due time. They were treated as professionals and hardly experienced being decided upon by the management (*Fremdbestimmung*). Problems did not rank high in their narratives about their work, satisfaction thus did. Even if these glimpses can only be assigned anecdotal value due to the small number of such respondents, we considered it of little probability to detect here, of all places, resources for collective interest representation where such does not even arise in the mass servicing context - by far the more prevalent type of BPOs in the Philippines.[42]

Figure 4: research process

Ranking of problems by one respondent. Prepared cards with problems mentioned in secondary literature were given to each respondent asking them to „please pick the cards containing the issues which are also taking place at your work as well."

They were requested to rate the mentioned problems as "pressing problems" (grabe talaga /*pinakagrabe*), "significant problems" (grabe), "minor problems" (ok na lang), "no problem for me" (walang problema) or "wala na" (this problem does not occur in my work) - and put them in such way into five columns /from left to right).
(The red device in between the cards is our MP3 recorder serving to capture the interviews without too much disturbance)

Work arrangements in mass servicing call centers demand and extract the maximum capacities of call center workers in order to meet industry expectations. Research in such setting demonstrates that "though management talks in terms of quality, in reality, their focus is quantity"(Noronha/D'Cruz 2009: 22). This yields the perception among several of our respondents that less value is placed on the agents, as long as they generate profit for the call center companies. Says one of them: "They just care about performance…you get your salary, and perform." Another agent describes her experience this way: "You're taking calls non-stop; you're very bombarded to the point that you cannot even take a break because they're holding it off. You cannot even pee, swallow saliva or drink water because, for them, calls should be disseminated." While an agent may be allowed to check on clinic services if unwell, the company's disapproval is reflected on the former's metrics and "reliability" scores. Another respondent answers: "Imagine that every minute *tumutunog 'yung* phone *mo* (your phone rings)…You don't have the time to breathe; *isasagad ka nila sa pader, parang* (they will push you to the wall, it's like) they will exhaust all the means…"

Not a single respondent (including the two remaining high commitment cases) denied that there is performance pressure when asked about their problems at work in the second interview series - and only six out of 28 said it is not a problem for them at all, while 15 were saying it is a major (*pinakagrabe/grabe*) problem. In the overall, one can consider it the most pressing problem mentioned during our interview series, having a weighted gravity index of .57.[43]

Similar numbers are found for the items *vacation and sick leaves are denied* (17 consider it a problem; weighted gravity index: .55) and *excessive and tedious workloads* (for 14 a problem, weighted gravity index: .53). In these cases, hardly anyone denied that these problems exist. In other cases the perception is more split. For 16 respondents *forced leave, lack of security of tenure and easy termination* are a problem (weighted gravity index: .55), but five say there is no such problem and additional five, they don't consider this a problem. For 13, *due process in cases of termination* is a major problem,

---

[42] I cannot support this statement with exact numbers. This kind of classification is not common in the Philippines; it is therefore unlikely to find numbers on the distribution of these types of call centers. Any respondent and expert though could easily relate to this distinction and agreed as well that most of the call centers are of the mass servicing type.

[43] I came up with a weighted "gravity index" for heuristic and illustrative purposes, weighing the response to each specific problem item - weighing a *pinakagrabe* with the factor 1, a *grabe* with .666, a OK lang .333 and a *walang problema* with .1 [as they are at least aware of the problem] and then multiplying it with the ratio of given responses to a specific item by 28, the total number of respondents. (An unweighted gravity index again left out the last step, thus not including information on how often a problem was mentioned.) A gravity index of 1 would be reached if every respondent considered a problem *pinakagrabe*, a gravity index of 0, if no respondent even encountered that problem. Here, three problems got a gravity index of around .55: performance demands, forced leave/lack of security of tenure/easy termination and the denial of vacation and sick leaves. Excessive and tedious workload follows with a gravity index of .52. 11 items have a gravity index of .40 to .49 (with the "no union policy" at exactly .40). Nine additional problems at least have a gravity index of above .33. Only 12 problems prepared or additionally mentioned by respondents have a gravity index of less than .33, which can be defined as "*walang problema*" for the big majority of our respondents.

Methodological note: I am well aware of the fact that the grading the respondents gave to each problem is of ordinal and non-metric scale. Comparing the different gravity indices among each other thus is also only of ordinal scale, just like school grades assume that an average score of 1.4 is better than an average score of 1.7 (although not necessarily 0.3 scores better).

while six said they don’t know about this problem, and six say it is no problem for them. (The remaining respondents considered these problems as manageable [*OK lang*] with a weighted gravity index of .45) Likewise, while nine said they find it a (big) problem that they have no say in working conditions (like restroom breaks or work quotas), seven don’t see it as a problem and six are not even aware of such a problem.

Next to experiencing the toll of physical labor, emotional labor strains them as well. “*Sa isa ka* project, 80 *na akong* calls *na nakuha*, 80 *ka* emotions *pod ang akong naigawas kanang adlawa* (In one project, I got 80 calls, and so I also went through 80 different emotions for those calls in a day),” complains an agent from Davao. Agents consistently referred to their work as 'repetitive', 'robotic', 'no-brainer,' 'toxic' or 'stressful.'

Tax deductions from salaries and payments for social security belong to another complex of complaint. Six out of 22 consider them as pressing, seven as significant and five as minor problems. The gravity index is a staggering at .57 (although the weighted gravity index is only .45 due to missing responses). Of lesser relevance, but still significant is the number of respondents (12 of 28) who, despite the comparably high pay - categorized the issue of low wage as both pressing and significant (12 again said it does not arise as a problem for them; this leads to an unweighted gravity index of .46 and a weighted gravity index of .43).

A third complex of problem is of social nature: Respondents often mentioned it as a problem to end up in a daily routine of “*kaon, tulog, trabaho (eat, sleep, work)…walay (no) physical activity*” (Davao respondent). This kind of problem is considered as mainly caused by night shift work, but just like night shift, it is considered as part of the job. While only seven said, they don’t encounter the problem of staying in touch with friends and family at all, 14 out of 28 considered not staying in touch as “not a problem” or as “ok lang,” with only two considering it as *grabe* and three as *pinaka-grabe*.[44] Reconciling work and family as well is only a significant problem for 8 out of 28 respondents; shifting schedules for only 8 out of 28 respondents; night shifts again are not considered a (major) problem by 13 out of 20 graveyard shifters in this study.[45] (Interestingly enough, the admittedly very limited sample shows no connection between working in a graveyard shift and staying in touch with family and friends. While the problem “staying in touch with friends and families “ only has a d of .09

---

[44] We were also told about several strategies of staying embedded like managing the distance in space with the aid of technology/new media (“You find ways, but the communication is still there, like it’s just one text away. … Thanks to technology”), negotiating for fixed days off, choosing a call center where the weekend is off or joining the (daytime oriented-) web development world.

[45] Six respondents found regular night shift work significantly problematic, six considered it a minor problem (ok lang), ten respondents mentioned on their own sleep disorders during the biographical interviews and 17 mentioned health problems such as hypertension or obesity. Two respondents from Metro Manila, on the other hand, even preferred to work at night as a way to escape the urban inconvenience of this Megapolis, while a Davao-based agent preferred night shift as it made it easier for her to perform her role as a mother to three little kids.

with working or having worked in a graveyard shift, "reconciling family life and job" has even a slight negative correlation of d=-.05. A correlation between graveyard shift and insomnia or other health problems cannot be established either as we have not systematically surveyed these items, but simply noted them when mentioned (within the biographical interviews).

A fourth complex is the dissatisfaction with existing problem solving mechanisms, with 13 out of 27 considering it a problem that they have no say in the computation of wages (weighted gravity index: .38); 15 out of 28 considering it a problem to have "no say in working conditions" (weighted gravity index: .36); 17 out of 28 complaining about shifting schedules (weighted gravity index: .34); 10 out 28 complaining about denial of benefits (weighted gravity index: .30); and, 22 out of 28 saying there is no proper grievance mechanism, of which 11 of the 22 considering it a major problem (weighted gravity index: .37). Town hall meetings, hailed as a proper proxy for unions by the management, are especially considered a disappointment as will be outlined in more detail further below.

Another problem often encountered, which I will illuminate later in this writing, is the disappointment with features violating the concept of a professional and workplace-like favoritism in regards to promotion or "schedule bidding."[46]

3.5. Why should it especially be precarized (middle class) getting active?

"If exploitation alone were a necessary and sufficient condition of rebellion, much of Southeast Asia and the Third World would surely be in a semi state of civil war" (Scott 1976: 193).

Agents have problems - some of them even significant or pressing: Of altogether 899 answers on rating problems by the 28 respondents, 165 were rated *pinakagrabe*, 148 *grabe*, 187 *ok lang* and only 206 *walang problema*; while there were only 193 cases raised that were identified by the respondents as problems they had not encountered. Even if one cannot consider every problem to be of same relevance to call center agents, the high number of problems once again proves the iBPAP wrong when arguing that "their [the agents'] needs are properly met" (Genny Marcial, external affairs executive director of the iBPAP, following Manila Times, 16.7.2013).

But as has been already until now rubbed in, considering something a problem does not necessarily mean that people resort to "voice," i.e. protest, as way of dealing with it. As the following chapter will outline: political mobilization does not generate its own momentum. Or to put it in another way: Despite citizenship being a socially desired comportment in modern, i.e. open, contingent societies in need of decisions,

---

[46] Next to serving as an incentive, an agent's request for preferred shifts is also considered as not violating the merit principle ("a very valid reason" in the words of a 22 year old female agent) when granted on the following grounds: "if you have a certain health condition…if you find someone else who wants your schedule… if you are pregnant employee…if you are studying or if you are a part time student, then you can suggest for a schedule" (ibid.).

[summed up in one word: political societies (Greven 2009)], in which many issues of one's own life are a result of decisions (own decisions, but also the decisions of others), acting as a citizen is not a matter of course. Rather, there is a "bunch of motives" deciding on the "mobilization of law," as Baer (2011: 209) as a law sociologist observed. Her observation is in line with the constructivist basic thesis of this writing (*Sinnverstehen*), broadened to the discovery that not only social relations, but as well the option of political agency first needs to be *considered*.

3.6. Political mobilization – ridden with prerequisites

3.6.1. Some sociological reasoning ahead

Even if it might be considered a bit too academic, a writing with the intent of identifying the possibility of practice of citizenship should not ignore that assuming agency is at least partly based on the assumption of a *free will*, which has ever since been philosophically challenged and put into question by several sociological pundits. Without this being the place to develop the whole debate, one can consider the antipodes of structure and agency - broken down to the individual level of *behaving* (*Verhalten*) and *acting* (*Handeln*) - as one of the basic pairs of (ideal type) opposites in sociological theory. Emile Durkheim (in *The Sociological Method*, first published in 1895) decreed that the behavior of social groups can only be explained in relation to the social facts preceding them in time and causing them - and not by the action of individuals. Historical processes have materialized, became independent and confront us as a fait social (Durkheim) as order, standard, norm, power or rule. "Most intentions are constituted out of social practices - rules, roles, institutions, laws, conventions," as Fay (1996: 42) summarizes the sociological method. Rules are more forceful than will and reason of the individual.

Following the sociological method, the concept of agency (and following that of citizenship) can easily be dismissed, as it is not people that determine the *faits sociaux*, but these in reverse determine the human. Roles shape us, conventions define what is "normal" and norms rule how things have to be done – all of them powerful institutions materialized through historical developments and forcing themselves upon us. Such normalization is accompanied by a "normative power of the factual" (Georg Jellinek). Standards then not only have a cognitive-constructivist and orienting character by getting part of frames, but also get the compelling power of a social fact (cf. Baer 2011: 90ff.). Society is considered as a 'text' and there is little space for individual authorship. The significant influence of societal belonging and normalization this study has carved out for citizenship attitudes (cf. chapter 4.22.: *Does country matter?*), at least, gives this entry some plausibility.

Structural functionalism and systems theory in the tradition of Niklas Luhmann again argue similarly and state that no matter what individuals intend beforehand (*ex ante*), the relevant subsystem they are acting in, strongly 'encourages' system-

coherent solutions – be it that the economical system strongly favors solutions based on prices and competition (with money being the code of this system) or be it the political subsystem strongly favoring solutions based on considerations of power. Due to the pressure of competition, attitudes prevail that comply with the needs of the system. In addition, »signals« which are not part of the system-specific code lead inevitably to »noise« (*Rauschen*). Furthermore, socio-biological and even psychoanalytical approaches as well stress that we do not pull the strings when it comes to our own life. Note that the classic work of the guiding spirit of behaviorism B.F. Skinner is titled "beyond freedom and dignity"!

Even individualization theory argues that we are doomed to a "collectively individualized mode of existence" (Beck 1983: 35), or as Bröckling expresses it, to a "hand-me-down diversity" (*Differenz von der Stange*, Bröckling 2007: 174). "Dependent on education, wages and consumption we all are faced with the same problems, a new mass fate," says Beck (1983: 35). "Despite an increase in options and freedom to decide, a stronger dependency on conditions beyond our reach has emerged, even more beyond our individual reach (economic cycles, cohort strengths, but also: opening times and standardizations)" (ibid.). At the same time, neoliberal (re)commodification demands for a "fully mobile single … basically living the life on his own" (Beck 1986: 191). Under such circumstances it is not the most reasonable to attempt to change the rules, but to focus on employability and adapt to the given circumstances. This leads to a lifestyle dependent on economic cycles and the situation, "assuming the character of short-term projects" (Schultheis/Schulz 2005: 580).[47]

Finally, socialization theory even if it is no longer closed to the idea of modification of the characteristics acquired in primary socialization, is not supportive of the idea that »anything goes« (more on that below).

Is human agency at the end hardly more than an illusion, fed by the grand narratives of modernity, autonomy and do-ability (Wahl 1989), universalizing (or democratizing) the autonomous idea of man?[48] These narratives promise that "all subjects shall [not only] have the right to participate in all functions of society," explain Bonn and Dubiel (1987: 49), "to benefit from the economy, to be educated or to have politically a say but above all, to write their own unmistakable life story." Showing a sense of agency might just be a proof for how well social facts have been internalized, in which the behavioral requirements of capitalism have materialized (a phenomenon Foucault calls self-government – see in detail chapter 3.8.: *Neoliberal governementality: The paradigm of responsibilization*).

For now this consideration must be enough, but it might bring comfort that even for classical Marx (ism) - reduced often to the trite statement »being determines consci-

---

[47] Employability, explain Schultheis/Schulz (ibid.) is "an orientation towards one's market value measurable in concrete demand and not striving for a permanent status; it expresses itself in contention with a conduct of life in line with economic cycles, and not clinging to long-term life plans."

[48] Wahl additionally counts progress and rationality to these "myths of modernity" (ibid.).

ousness,« conscientization is crucial. As Marx stated at the beginning of the first section of *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please, not under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under extant circumstances directly given and handed down [to them]" (Marx 1852/1972: 115). While indeed there is a strong color of determinism in Marx' writings (cf. ibid.), creating (class) consciousness (i.e. making a class in itself turn to a class for itself) is essential for the proletariat to take its role as subject of history as human history is considered a history of class conflicts.

Likewise, Scott who observes that, "far too much theoretical attention (much of it plainly unhistorical) has been paid to 'class' and far too little to 'class-struggle'" (1985: 296) and who further states that (picking up Thompson's dictum of the *making* of the working class): "class struggle is the prior, as well as the more universal, concept. … People find themselves in a society structured in determined ways (crucial, but not exclusively, in productive relations), they experience exploitation (or the need to maintain power over those whom they exploit), they identify points of antagonistic interest, they commence to struggle around these issues and in the process of struggling they discover themselves as classes, they come to know this as class-consciousness. Class and class-consciousness are always the last, not the first, stage in the real historical process" (ibid.).

Nevertheless, this short outing into sociological theory brings up strong caveats to be considered when arguing for (political) agency. These caveats should make one cautious about the bias of most of the citizenship literature towards voluntarism. This bias - very much in the tradition of western enlightenment and its myth of autonomy - easily leads to blaming the victim for not actively combating and overcoming their 'objective' deprivation, but putting up with everything. The modernization paradigm in development theory is an example for that. It stresses endogenous causes of un(der)development, among others mentalities and socio-cultural factors like lack of entrepreneurial spirit or clientelism. In the Philippines, one can find such a bias in the strong focus on moral values prevalent in the political discourse and strongly fueled and reinforced Sunday by Sunday in the sermons from the pulpits and the everyday declarations by the Catholic church, that creates the impression that Filipin@s only need to give themselves a start with "let's ….!" or "*mag… tayo.*" These are among the common responses to any problem (in more detail cf. the conclusion of part II). What is hardly mentioned here is that the lack of citizenship in the Philippines may as well be caused by centuries of colonialism, feudalism, neocolonialism and patriarchy – all of them structural reasons.

A distinction needs to be made here between methodological individualism and ontological individualism: While the approaches of interpretive understanding (*Sinnverstehen*) or Bourdieu's praxeology follow a *methodological* individualism and let us appear at least as "accomplices" (Christina Thürmer-Rohr) and not (only) as victim of the circumstances of life, *ontological* individualism (which neoclassic economics are based on) lets structures and circumstances vanish in the unquestioned assumption

of “*ceteris paribus*“ (cf. Reese 2004a). As economic problems are thus constructed as individual problems, the use of individual survival strategies is evident (a form of de-politicization). Social circumstances are modified into personal failure and so are politically defused, by “transforming collective experiences into individual life which people have to answer for on their own” (Michael Vester in Schultheis 2005: 273). Poverty for instance is then not primarily placed within the context of structural causes, so that the focus of poverty reduction is less on doing away with such causes (which would most likely require significant redistribution of resources, shares, income and wealth) but rather on “empowering,” i.e. mobilizing and responsibilizing the marginalized, and by this, major contributions from the better situated are not expected (*Pareto optimum*). Instead of solving social problems like unjust economic and political structures or cultural discrimination, the core question is how to overcome the paralyzing sense of powerlessness, successfully manage personal problems and make productive use of them. “It’s up to you!” Sven Opitz therefore defines empowerment in the neoliberal context as "the widespread assumption … that social inequality and poverty are a result of powerlessness and a lack of political participation, rather than of the actions of the rich, of economic policy or the capitalist system" (Opitz 2004: 71). Bröckling likewise considers the “empowerment imperative” as "professional support for an autonomous everyday life" (*power to),* disregarding the distribution of power in society (*power over*) and relegating the question of what caused the problems into the background. Personal responsibility is considered to be the "key skill of the neoliberal enterprising self,” which leads to a negation of state responsibility (in Bröckling, Krasmann and Lemke 2004: 55-62). The support of livelihood through projects, micro-credit programs et al. thus turns into the ideal way to reduce poverty. In such procedure, “the excluded are given the role of the main actors, if not the only actor,” says Zygmunt Bauman (in: Vom gesellschaftlichen Nutzen von Law and Order; *Widersprüche* 70 [1998], pp 7-21, p. 8). “Exclusion is presented as... suicide, not as a social execution.” And - *quod erat demonstrandum* - for the neoliberal mastermind Gary S. Becker and his economic theory of human behavior “most (if not all) cases of death are in a certain degree suicides” (following Bröckling et al. 2004: 215).

Is there then a ‘third approach’ that neither falls trap to voluntarism nor gives in to structural determinism? Is there any chance to stick to the assumption that citizenship counts? Desperate souls might find consolation in the ‘basic law’ of constructivism, outlined in the Thomas-Theorem. It says that if people define something as real and act as if it is real, this has an impact on reality (it makes this »something« real).[49] Ergo: Even if citizenship was an illusion and a sense of citizenship “false consciousness,” imagination alone would turn citizenship attitudes into a social fact and potentially make use of the tiny leeway the structures leave even in a worst case scena-

[49] This resonates with the interconnectedness of knowledge and power in the theory of Foucault. Here, the way of speaking (the discourse) has a real impact on practice, it gets ’true’. Talking about something constructs this something.

rio. Or, it might serve these souls well to insist on the existentialist "nevertheless" and focus on Sartre: "It doesn't matter what history has made out of us. What matters is what we make out of what history has made of us." Such a pragmatic approach would in exasperation just leave the never ending question of "agency or structure" unanswered and simply assume there is leeway which is more worthy to explore than to be discouraged by structural forces. Doing so could already be considered as being part of a sense of citizenship (sense of agency), which also includes the action-guiding assumption that things can be influenced and situations can be changed.

I further suggested a third approach that stays aware of structural constraints, but emphasizes human agency. It is the concept of *Sinnverstehen* which is based on Max Weber's approach to make social action (*soziales Handeln*) and not "behavior" the starting point of sociological understanding (*Verstehen*); again distinguishing such findings by a subject-oriented approach from 'objective', as if they were a natural scientific explanation (*Erklären*). Weber here assumes that *social facts* can only be understood when the subjectively meaningful acting of individuals and groups is chosen as starting point and producing social reality is put to the forefront (*Sinnverstehen*). This reconstruction does not only refer to action and the patterns of interpretation used by people to produce and maintain what is 'real' to them within social structures, but also extends to the social structures themselves in which they operate and which they reproduce by their actions (cf. Munsch, 2003: 9).

The approach of *Sinnverstehen* considers sociologically as crucial what social actors consider to be 'real,' from which perspectives actors experience their world and how they explain their actions – a kind of "theory of relativity in social science" (Vester 2002: 100). As outlined in the chapter on methodology (chapter 2.), the focus here is less on what might be scientifically 'true', the emphasis is rather on describing social realities, not explaining them.

3.6.2. Prerequisites for political action

The approach of explaining social realities by *Sinnverstehen*, well known in ethnology and therefore baptized "ethno-methodological approach," leads to the insight that "readiness to political action" (*Politische Aktivierungsbereitschaft*) and political action itself do not merely spring from an "objective criteria" (as exploitation, poverty or social inequality). This is contrary to what rational choice models imply, but also vulgar Marxist theory. Both consider people to act once they are off worse enough. The conclusion drawn is: the situation isn't bad enough yet or the immiseration of the proletarians has not yet reached the critical point to spark off a revolution.[50] A set of studies on food riots triggered by structural adjustment programs in the last quar-

---

[50] But one example for such vulgar Marxism is the statement by Juan Gatbonton (*Is there an anti-establishment vote in our future?*, MT, 12.6.2014) that "Thailand and the Philippines are the most unequal—and so potentially the most unstable (sic!) —of East Asia's emerging economies," basing his assumption on the observation that both countries "have also been the hosts to Southeast Asia's most enduring communist insurgencies."

ter of the 20th century (Walton/Seddon 1994) for instance, came to the result that "there was no close interrelation between the incidence of riots and national incidences of dearth and distress. ... Repeated inquiries have shown that riots do not occur in regions of the greatest sufferings, at the depths of economical slumps or at the highest price levels" (ibid.: 31). Overlooking such absence of causality has ever since lead to the marvel that "precisely those who most likely have reason to protest articulate it very rarely" (Hellmann 1997: 23). A crisis-laden character of social conditions alone is therefore *not* a *sufficient* condition that leads a latent conflict situation into apparent social protest, but merely a *necessary* starting position (Walton/Seddon 1994: 31).

Schmitt (2006: 19), summarizing the current state of research accurately, distinguishes six conditions which must be met so that collective protests occur: (1) There is a need not only for an 'objective' structural crisis, for instance, an unequal distribution of opportunities, but (2) people also have to (subjectively) suffer under such a crisis. (3) The reasons for this situation must be attributed externally, i.e. the responsibility has to be given to someone else (be it a person, be it »the system«) instead of blaming oneself. Moreover, one must (4) "dare to protest," for which next to "a minimum of education and self-confidence ... various resources and personal qualities are required, so that resentment is not accredited to ones own responsibility and acted out in a publicly perceptible manner." In order for this protest to be carried out collectively it finally needs (5) "categories creating collective identities" and (6) events triggering such shared identities and with a synchronizing effect. Hence, Schmidt draws the conclusion that "the emergence of social protest is a process with lots of requirements."

In this listing by Schmidt, the three dimensions of political action pivotal in social movement theory (i.e. theory on collective ways of exercising citizenship) nowadays are resonated: (a) frames, (b) political opportunity structures (highlighted in social movement theory by Sydney Tarrow) and (c) the command or access to political resources (knowledge, money, time, connections/allies, spaces among others).[51] [In more detail cf. subchapter 3.6.6.: *Frames, opportunities and resources*). While favorable political opportunity structures and resources are crucial for the *practice* of citizenship (Reese 2008a), understanding the *sense* of citizenship framing seems be the most relevant (but not only relevant) framework.

Highlighting the dimension of framing, one can detect that for structures to become 'real' to potential actors, they have to pass the eye of consciousness, i.e. the perception of these actors, as Anthony Giddens (1988: 290) says.[52] Even where (windows of)

---

[51] In this sense Conrado de Quiros states that "access is one of the definitions of not-poor" (PDI, 30.3.2010).

[52] Like Bourdieu, Giddens also mediates between the poles of agency and structure by distinguishing between rules and resources, choices and options. According to Giddens, "We can (only) choose and decide within our 'options,' which are restricted *and* provided for by socialization, by emotions and by the distribution of power and resources. People reproduce structures, but they alter them as well" (Giddens, ibid.). In a similar way, Brian Fay states that "culture and society shape our personal and

political opportunities exist, they must first be perceived as such. People must consider political and social structures as influenceable and as alterable (subjectively making use of objective opportunities). If they don't do so, and for instance believes instead that "there is no alternative" (Margaret Thatcher), it is likely that agency is rather exercised by adapting to the given circumstances than by exercising citizenship – as the former then appears to be the more rational approach. And as far as spaces of action are concerned, to understand how people frame citizenship, it is relevant to look at what they consider to be "public" and "common" and what should remain "private" (which most of the time are defined as "off limits" to political interference).

The German sociologist Reinhard Kreckel (1992) has suggested that the analysis of how individuals perceive and interpret their conditions of action and how they put them in relation to other individuals should be one of the central themes in research on inequality as these subjective interpreting of and referring to conditions of inequality is crucial for the reproduction and change of social conditions. "The same environmental features do not take effect in the same way on differing cognitive structures," says Schulze (1976: 135). The milieu approach (cf. chapter 3.10.: *Middle class – what is that?*) is but an example for this. Subjective ways of processing problems are open; it could be by rebellion or subversion, but resorting to forms of voluntary submission, to psychosomatic reactions or blaming oneself are just as likely.

In this spirit, Schmitt (2006: 18) points out that "often situations of discrimination are not perceived as something special" which especially is related to the fact that "people growing up in disadvantaged milieus ... internalize these conditions and therefore later consider situations of deprivation as a matter of course and as proper to them" as "usually new events are interpreted in terms of old knowledge" (Kinder and Mebane 1983: 144f). To be discriminated has become a part of their mindset, or their habitus, as Pierre Bourdieu calls one of his central concepts.

3.6.3. Mediating structure and action – Bourdieu's habitus

According to Bourdieu, whose theory transcends the theoretical dichotomies of 'subjective' vs. 'objective', of 'voluntarism vs. determinism,' historical events have settled into our mentalities, our habits, and our way to classify things and events and the way we act. Therefore, Bourdieu employs the metaphor of the body to express social practice; in his point of view social structures are virtually written on the body, they are so to speak incorporated or embodied (*eingefleischt*, literally meaning en-fleshed, as the term goes in German). Bourdieu integrates the structure and the agency approaches when stating that the habitus finds a match in the material and structural conditions within a »social field«:"The social reality exists ... in a double manner, in

---

social identities by enabling *and* constraining us, by selecting, mediating and preventing certain sorts of activity and outcomes. But they do not make us in the sense of determining who we are" (Fay 1996).

the things and in the heads, in the fields and in the habitus, within and outside of the actors” (Bourdieu 1996: 161).

This habitus is a matrix of action, perception and thinking which gets embodied in the course of socialization and again mirrors a long history of pre-individual experiences and cultural imprint. The habitus is “the incorporated social” (Bourdieu 1996: 160). Social structures are (partly unconsciously) reproduced, and reality, though merely created, turn into a self-evident social ‘nature’. Bourdieu calls this an “effect of naturalization” (1991: 27): “Differences created by social logic can in such a way create the impression to emerge from the nature of things" (ibid.). One’s own social situation is less traced back to the social and historical situation that generated them but rather ‘blamed’ on one’s own (limits of) action which appears as determined and do not get scrutinized. Cultural-historical given inequalities, which have developed through time and are internalized, are now reproducing the structures of society.

The habitus, says Bourdieu, makes most people only desire what they can reasonably expect, making a virtue out of necessity. “People unconsciously only want what they can get” (Bourdieu 1982: 189). Culturally and historically developed structures have been internalized and reproduced on a societal scale; a socially constructed reality has “naturalized” into a social(ly accepted) fact. For capitalism to function, the broad acceptance of a “stable framework within which competition and conflicts of interest can be managed without disturbing the overall unity of the circuit of capital“ is required as Bob Jessop (1983: 142) says.

The habitus encompasses patterns serving the perception of social reality - cognitive patterns which help to sort and interpret these perceptions; patterns of ethical order and estimation; aesthetic standards for the evaluation of cultural products and practices; and finally, patterns guiding individual action. The habitus is not only restrictive, but provides people as well with a ‘language’ to act. It is a kind of grammar allowing the formation of an infinite amount of sentences, but also setting the limits one may not exceed. The habitus thus mediates between constraints and actors. The clear, awake consciousness is no longer the locus of such [extended] “I,” but rather the body - in which consciousness and body form a meshwork. The habitus allows individuals a “practical sense” (*sens practique*), meaning “the ability to move around appropriately and resourcefully in social life in general and in specific social fields” (Fuchs-Heinritz /König 2005: 120); and »sense« is indeed understood here in analogy to physical senses.

The concept of habitus thus understands society neither, as simply man-made nor that the individual is merely a product of society, but considers the relation between individual and society as dialectical. Neither is the habitus simply imposed on us (heteronomous) nor is our acting (*ugali* in Tagalog) merely our own creation (autonomous); the habitus and its action dispositions limit and equip us at the same time (just like discourses do for Foucault); making us able to act in the first place; just like the command of a language enables us to think, to express our thoughts and to be understood. The concept of heteronomy then turns out to be an inappropriate term,

as our freedom is not only limited and "encroached" by society, but in fact is at the same time generated by it. Mario Candeias (in Castel/Dörre 2008: 373) speaks of an "entanglement of implementation and self-realization."

The anthropologist Michael Tan assumes that it is exactly the Tagalog *kaugalian* that "actually comes close to ideas of habitus"(PDI, 24.2.2009). *Kaugalian* says Tan is "a term that links the individual to society. This way, we don't pin all our hopes on an individual's 'change of heart' but instead see social structures as playing an important role. ... We need then to aim for a society where individuals can do good out of "*kusa*," a voluntary compliance that grows out of the 'disposition' referred to by philosophers."[53]

One prominent example for "habitus" in Philippine society is the practice of *hiya* (shame, *ulaw* in Cebuano), considered by Pinches to be a "key factor in understanding society and culture in the Philippines"(1991: 167). The concept of *hiya* includes the knowledge inscribed into the body on what is (considered to be) proper, and what is "*walang hiya*"(shameless), and thus, leading to feeling ashamed and wishing to "save face." The sense and practice of *hiya* are not embodied in the same way in all Filipin@s, but are specific depending on gender, class and ethnicity. And it does not only have a repressive function as in the powerful (*malakas*) shaming the *mahina* (powerless) to keep them down, but can as well be made use of by the *mahina* as a tool of resistance – like letting the powerful know they should be ashamed for not meeting what is expected from them. (The often-heard reproach that the privileged are *kuripot* [stingy] and not *mapagbigay* (generous) as they should be is a case for such.) *Hiya* can serve "both as instrument of subordination to the prevailing social order and as expression of class resentment and action"(Pinches, ibid.; cf. also Rutten 2006).[54]

As the social is embodied (as habitus), mentality changes are inert and social changes need some time to "translate" into changing habits. Where windows of opportunities open (or close), change in action patterns and attitudes does not necessarily follow suit. Bourdieu calls this phenomenon the "hysteresis effect" and considers the hysteresis of a habitus as one of "the reasons for the gap between opportunities offered and the disposition to seize them, one of the causes for missed opportunities and particularly for the frequently discovered inability to think historical crises in different categories of perception and thought than in the past, and may it be revolutionary ones" (Bourdieu, following Fuchs-Heinritz /König 2005: 263). An example here is the situation when impoverished middle class members who lost their disposable income, their respectable job, have to sell their own house (which they are occupying) and/or their car (all of which are traditional status symbols of the middle class), but

---

[53] Tan's assumption though does not go undisputed, as *ugali* could be still understood as an attitude too conscious as the sociologist Aya Fabros objects (personal conversation, February 15, 2010).

[54] Due to the relevance of such bodily aspects, politicization and political mobilization do not only require the change of frames (cognitive aspects), but also "body work," like overcoming *hiya* and "shifting from shame to pride" (Rutten 2006: 366) by trying to breathe slower, trying not to shake or trying to change expressive gestures in the service of changing inner-feelings (a method psychology calls 'embodiment').

still remain middle class in attitude (Newman 1996). [Lucky are those who are able to transcend their attitude by learning the "art of classy impoverishment" (*Kunst des stilvollen Verarmens*), as a German bestseller was once titled.] And people likewise don't get middle class by simply acquiring a better paying job, etc.

Just like Weber, Bourdieu chooses the actors and their practices as starting points in his theoretical approach, focusing on the aims and principles guiding their actions. He calls this approach "praxeology" (in: *Outline of a Theory of Practice* [1972], following Fuchs-Heinritz/König 2005: 129). Showing himself as more interested in strategies than in rules, which may include playing with the rules of social systems, structures, situations or institutions and by blaming structuralism for treating practice as a mere execution of rules, he argues in favor of dealing with practices in their own right.

While sharing with Weber the focus on mentalities as a scientific approach, it is the concept of inscription of the social on the body that Bourdieu shares with Michael Foucault. Both theorists share a special attention for the physical anchorage of rule and institutions (Foucault speaking of "biopolitics" or "biopower" in his lecture series *Society Must Be Defended* in 1976).

What Bourdieu says about the viability of institutions could, in other words, originate from Foucault as well: "An institution, for instance the economic system, is only completely and really viable, if it is permanently objectified not only in things, meaning to say in the logic of a particular field outreaching the individual actor, but also in the bodies, meaning to say in the permanent dispositions recognizing the requirements associated with this field and fulfilling them" (In: *The Logic of Practice* [1990] following Fuchs-Heinritz/König 2005: 283). Above all, the neoliberal mode of governance, i.e. 'responsibilization,' considered in this writing as a vital form of "biopolitics" in Philippine call centers, features a strong bias towards self-governance, making it difficult to draw the line between heteronomy and autonomy. People comply voluntarily (*wollen, was sie sollen*). The governementality of responsibilization exerts power as indirect governing, i.e. less by open controls and behavior formation, but mainly by influencing people and 'suggesting' certain behavior and offering 'guidance'. Freedom here is not a state but a practice, just as power is not a possession but an exercise, which can fail (Bröckling 2007, Opitz 2004, Bröckling et al. 2000).

3.6.4. Political socialization

"It was really a process that has made me what I am, I has molded the way I think."

(An activist-respondent about his high time of activism)

A sense of citizenship or a political mindset is nothing we are born with. The kind of political knowledge we have, the scope of our societal awareness and the development of our cognitive skills - essential for *how* citizenship is exercised (cf. Gaventa 2010; Kohlberg 1996) - they are all cultural capital acquired like any other attitude

through socialization, education, breeding, and not least, by one's own life experience. Schulze (1976) has extensively worked out that political issues are a) considered as complex and complicated and b) as unsatisfactory and problematic; furthermore as c) decisions on how to resolve them are found in a conflictual way; and, d) political issues are situated in an unfamiliar context, and so generate behavioral uncertainty. For these reasons it is easier to get politically active for those who have earlier learned (for instance in the parental home) to deal with complex, problem-loaded, conflictive and uncertain situations. One respondent of this research, who has manifold experience in organizations, cited an instance when she and other passengers of the van started discussing politics and stated that for her this was "*lingaw*" (fun). Meanwhile, another respondent, who has never been involved in politics stated: "I'm not really into society…I'm not even fond of listening to the news, I don't like hearing those bad things, those negative things."

Furthermore, research shows that individuals who grew up in an environment in which a) political developments are *often* followed and discussed and so are considered as relevant; b) conflicts are not swept under the carpet and where articulating disagreements/dissatisfaction (in Tagalog: *hirit*) is considered legitimate and not *bastos* (rude); c) and, one's own opinions are taken seriously are politically more interested and active and more capable of reflection and criticism than those who were raised in authoritarian settings (Wasmund 1982: 40f, Schulze 1976: 34, Matuschek 2011: 224). Such environment again makes the emergence of a "political personality" *more probable,* as it nurtures individuals to be more open to discourse and reflection; more willing to take the perspective of others and more able to be assertive; as well to more likely trace their distress to other factors and not blame themselves (Hopf/Hopf 1997: 46). What is true for active citizenship, also holds for its passive dimension: It is more likely to feel entitled, if "the social environment in which people live and grow up, sends out diverse and strong stimuli for the formation of a subjective rights consciousness" (Raiser 2011: 62), i.e. if children learn that they have rights which are also provided for.

"Conflict behavior of young people," says Schulze (1976: 152), "is not only depending on the distress they feel, but essentially on how socialization facilitates or inhibits the transformation of discomfort into action. It is less important what specific issues young people are exactly dissatisfied with; what is crucial is, to which extent they learn to translate discontent into behavior, which also influences how they will act politically in future."

The process of embodiment starts off at a young age, and as it is the first engraving of its kind, what has been written on our bodies in early years runs especially deep. Even if newer socialization theories consider "old dogs" to still be capable of learning new tricks (Claußen/Geißler 1996, Matuschek 2011 and already Schulze 1976 among others), they also affirm that the frames we use to look at life and with which we manage life remain "sluggish" (hysteresis effect) and cannot be changed at will nor by 'objective' disadvantageous situations. And as Rainer Geißler adds (in Claußen/

Wasmund 1982: 91): even when theoretically possible, patterns of interpretation and action strategies will normally not be changed without hardship or special incentive. In addition, an amplifier effect comes into play based on the need of selective perception to reduce the complexity of information and points of view, not least because it is much easier to perceive things with 'docking stations' already in place. Therefore, we rather take up information and viewpoints supporting our own beliefs and avoid those in conflict with our own convictions.

Researchers on socialization assume that "basic orientations [like those acquired in the context of latent and manifest political socialization] remain relatively stable over the course of life and also structure future learning by acting as structuring principles for subsequent perceptions" (Geißler in Claußen / Geißler 1996: 52). We could speak of a biographical path dependency: problem solving patterns and everyday theories we learned and developed have partly been habitualized.

However, socialization is seen nowadays as a more complex affair than in earlier times. By this, attention has turned from the family to other direct socialization agents such as schools, religious communities and other civil society organizations; to peers (allowing for the mediation of rules on a more equal footing); politicians (either serving as role models or as discouraging examples); or, the media. Current socialization theories also consider casual influences of the social environment to play a role in the formation of a political profile such as a life world which gets colonized by capitalism (Habermas) and in this way creates everyday self evidences (or thinking constraints), thus turning into a »hidden curriculum«. The more the 'lessons' from these diverse socialization agents are in accord with each other, the more they are considered "normal" and taken for granted and more deeply engraved into our bodies making it more difficult for us to challenge or resist them. But in return, this means that: the more the socialization agents are in disharmony, the more options for further development are being offered to an individual. "What exclusion means or how it is experienced everyday is always mediated by social representations of normality, of what a citizen is fairly entitled to, what he can expect from life or what he may interpret as impertinence" (Franz Schultheis in Busch et al 2010: 251). Thereby, higher expectations towards quality of life and political participation are favorable factors leading to protest, as Dieter Rucht (2013: 67), one of the leading German researchers on social movements, observed.

These cognitive structures develop through a "variety of civic communication and learning experiences in real or virtual life an individual takes part in, in his or her own socialization processes. From various social, cultural and economic backgrounds, he or she acquires a set of skills, knowledge, values, interests, motivations, and feelings of belonging" (Amna 2010: 199). This leads to the development of a more or less pronounced political consciousness – this being a requirement for a "sense of citizenship," as defined earlier and collated by Amna (in Amna/Ekmann 2009: 2) - to an attitude of "civic engagement," which he defines as "less direct or »latent« forms of participation." This civic engagement is similar to what has been called

"practice of citizenship" discussed earlier, although it cannot be equated to it as Amna here speaks of "an intellectual or emotional orientation towards conditions not solely concerning the individual or her/his family but issues of relevance for others" (2010: 194). This definitely is a normative definition of citizenship that transcends particularism and selfishness (or 'ugly citizenship' which includes non-progressive goals) which I have included into my short descriptive definition of citizenship.

Such behavior can settle into culturally typical patterns of problem solving over generations and then get inherited by socialization. Thus, we encounter culturally specific forms of "social habitus" (Norbert Elias) which have developed through history and have solidified to "historical-cultural spaces of experience" (Busch et al 2010: 15), for instance as colonial mindset or as seasoned experience with political patronage or the failure of political institutions.

Being collectively affected can also lead to the formation of generational mentalities, but this alone will not be enough, as the example of the "lost generation" in Southern Europe and the Arab world shows: Here some react with exit (migration), others with frustration (depoliticization), many react with adaptation and *diskarte*, quite a number though with "voice" (the Spanish protesters calling themselves *indignados* - Indignants). Decisive here as well is the process of a shared (re-) evaluation of one's experiences.

Interpretation and perception patterns (meaning systems), sediment into collective memory and are made culturally available to members of society, meaning: offered to *or* imposed on them as (dominant) views and identities. Foucault here speaks of a "*problematization*," referring to "historically specific ways how problems are perceived and defined (and) going along with specific solutions and processing strategies towards these problems" (following Bröckling et al. 2000: 32). »Problematization« defines which problems are to be recognized as problems, if at all; how they are to be conceptualized; and, which solutions and strategies for handling these problems are »sound«. Or, as the Philippine sociologist Herbert Docena says: "Politics is never just a struggle for power or resources; as sociologists have pointed out, it is also always a fight over what the fight is really all about" (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 18.10.2013).

Political consciousness is developed and shaped within specific political cultures, for instance, by dealing with people of authority, assessing and coping with situations of (social) uncertainty or by acting as an employee or as a family member. For instance, what people from one society might associate with a lot of fear or what basically is unbearable for them - be it because it is considered taboo or rude (*bastos*) behavior or be it that they are scared (*hadlok*) - could be within what is normal for people from other cultures.[55] Geert Hofstede for instance, considers dealing with uncertainty as an important dimension of such culture-specific differences. He defines this dimensi-

---

[55] In this sense, Dörre (2007: 40) believes that: "given a political culture of self-organization and of resistance, it is not impossible that precariously employed include preferences for collective action strategies into their individual compromise formations. How precarity is processed, finally also depends on the political culture of a country. "

on as "the degree in which members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations" (2001: 156). Hofstede believes that such feeling of being threatened expresses itself for example in a strong need for predictability and a preference for clear rules.

These meaning systems are thereby not socially homogenous, but arranged in a vertically stratified and horizontally differentiated social space. The social milieu approach (Vester 2002) illustrates that the social clusters ("class positions") are nerved by cleavages of different "basic values," i.e. ideological orientations and lifestyles, and that these social milieus and likewise political camps (which are not necessarily congruent with the social milieus), are the result of historical sedimentation. People in a similar social condition (*soziale Lage*) process, interpret and act on the circumstances they are mutually affected by differently: "The boundaries between the [political] camps have not followed clearly the fault lines of the power struggle between the upper and lower milieus as schematic class theories want it to be, but combine these with horizontal divisions which have developed and solidified in the history of modernization conflicts"(Vester 2002: 109).

Whether (a group of) individuals consider the circumstances which restrict and facilitate their life as alterable and influenceable or not and whether they understand themselves as a self-sufficient (liberal) or as an embedded (communitarian or republican) self (on this distinction see below), is also heavily influenced by the respective societal culture(s) these individuals are part of - and such self-conceptions are of high relevance to the question how one views agency. This also applies to protest: "The individual resisting subject," says Scott (1990: 118), "is an abstract fiction, resistant practices and discourses are social and part of socialization."

Such embodied knowledge does not only define the limits of our thinking and imagination, but also allows us to act with confidence. We may also avert new and unfamiliar situations and challenges because we have not learned, and thus, are not confident to deal with them. "People have a psychological need for stability and standardization," as Antweiler (2009: [7]) puts this fact.

Current theories of political socialization (cf. Hurrelmann/Ulich 2008) question the assumption that once a habitus disinclined to politics has taken shape, this is the end of the story (of citizenship). Such assumption forms the implicit or even explicit basis of approaches such as a) the theory of a culture of poverty, explaining political absenteeism and even lack of proactive behavior altogether by class, b) Freudian psychoanalysis considering the course of life to be more or less set in early childhood (primary socialization), or c) of culturalist approaches with their idea of "national characters."

Already Erik Erikson assumed in the 1950s that in each age, new development tasks arise. In the 1970s, the crucial "paradigm shift" (Hurrelmann/Ulich 2008: 15) in socialization theory took place, based on a "developmental model of a productive reali-

ty processing subject" which understands socialization as an “ongoing dynamical process of interaction between individual and society” (ibid.). In the new paradigm, the view prevails that at least in post-traditional and functionally differentiated societies socialization is lifelong learning (life span development), also because childhood cannot sufficiently prepare a person for the complexity of the role requirements in adulthood.

This also holds true for political socialization, at least for manifested in political socialization, i.e. the direct political experiences and interventions by socialization agents, more or less only starts in adolescence and according to Kohlberg et al., only then can the basic cognitive capacities develop that allow for grasping complex concepts and processes and imagining spaces beyond near range as typical for politics. The recency-model even considers the influence an experience has on political orientations and behaviors as “the bigger it is the later it takes place" (Wasmund 1982: 29). This takes into account the view that adulthood is the time when the “really formative and stable learning experiences are made” (ibid.: 30). Hopf and Hopf (1997:200) even consider only the thirties to be the time in life when political orientations and readiness to action “really stabilize.”

Nevertheless, problem-solving strategies that have been observed and acquired in childhood and adolescence, including latent political socialization, i.e. politically significant social attitudes and cognitive skills, as well as, personality characteristics that influence the political activity, are likely to have a significant impact here.[56]

We first try to handle biographical challenges “with the minimal strategies which have seemingly proven of value since early childhood and youth,” says Claußen (1986: 151) and “by applying the models of explaining the world which we employ in everyday life on complex political issues.” Or, as Henri Lefebvre (following Piven /Cloward 1986: 34f.) stated: “As long as we can live the everyday life, the old setting gets restored.”

Wasmund (1982: 30) tries to harmonize the different approaches by stating that "basic orientations are learned early and have a high degree of stability, while other political orientations are continually learned and modified, and finally a whole range of attitudes and behaviors are a response to the stimuli during adulthood, [so that] all three models have their explanatory value.”

In all stages of life, every now and then, opportunity structures develop which either facilitate politicization processes and the emergence of political commitment (Matuschek 2011: 253), or in contrary, lead to some departure from political activism. Ca-

---

[56] As far as the effect of genetic dispositions is concerned, newer socialization theories do not consider them as deterministic either, but rather assume that they unfold in a dynamic interaction with the environment, where "small random variations in conditions of development can build up to significant developmental changes in the long run" (Jens Asendorpf: *Genetische Grundlagen der Sozialisation* (*Genetic foundations of socialization*), in Hurrelmann/Ulich 2008: 77). Asendorpf regards the individual neither as a product of his genes nor as that of his environment, "as environments can be selected or produced depending on the personality and genetic effects can be altered by purposeful environmental change" (Ibid.: 80).

reer changes and new job placements (even just changing from being a floor agent into a management position), as well as turning unemployed, having new peer groups, as well as, macro-sociological changes, such as the adoption of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program in the Philippines and the land struggles that followed the program's implementation (cf. Reese 2008b), can get the ball of secondary political socialization rolling (this of course is depending on how much an analyst follows the recency-model or not).

Though education is a political resource of high relevance, "enhancing nearly every other participatory factor" (Burns et al. 2001: 365), purely cognitive processes such as education on the other hand have proven less likely to trigger political commitment just on their own. By this, theory merely rather assigns political education an amplifying effect (cf. Hurrelmann/Ulich 450 and Matuschek 2011: 222). If someone has not learned from one's own experience that change is possible, that change depends on "me" (self-efficacy) and that one has the right to make claims, neither a good book nor a stirring speech can drum political consciousness into the person. For example, research on prejudice comes to the conclusion that "the effectiveness of factual information and education is considered low as a separate procedure" (Peter Röpke in Wasmund 1982: 358). Here concepts of political education relying on the rationalist tradition of the Enlightenment and the anthropology of rational choice seem to overestimate the influence of arguments and political education. The same applies to the method of ethical appeal which is "of low stability" (Röpke, ibid.). In order to effect long-term change of prejudice, Röpke considers self-awareness, exposure and new group memberships as most promising approaches. Such new situations though need to be reflected so that traditional concepts are reviewed and new concepts established.

Especially times of major social changes are considered as periods of "de-routinization of life" (Roberta Ash in Piven/Cloward 1986: 34) and as times when social control by the everyday structures and habits collapse, making dissent to be more likely. The food riots in the aftermath of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) which Walton and Seddon (1994) described, are but one example. The SAPs eliminated crucial resources which supported traditional patron—client arrangements that ensured political loyalty of the masses which was negotiated for subsistence guarantees.

However, "motives do not suddenly and unexpectedly guide action... They are biographically interwoven and often already disposed as habit" (Matuschek 2011: 234).[57] Even if basic orientations are considered very stable (Wasmund 1982), especially a

[57] Franz Neyer and Judith Lehnart put such conditional plasticity into a nutshell (in their contribution *Persönlichkeit und Sozialisation* in Hurrelmann/Ulich 2008, p. 82) "Although people change during their lifetime, yet they remain who they are."

biographical crisis, reality shocks or dramatic and 'impressing' experiences might trigger a modification, at times even transform, such basic orientations.[58]

Such "key moments" (Matuschek 2011: 218) also most likely have the potential to shake conceptual systems, perception, interpretation and thinking patterns, unsettling the familiar world view, meaning: to turn the habitualized perceptions of problems, coping strategies and action orientations inadequate; to alter cognitive assessment processes; to shatter norms and value systems or overturn one's hierarchies of values, as Michel (2009: 30) believes, and after which, to let the willingness grow to acquire new perspectives on problems and new knowledge. An example for such might be the present case of the precarious youth protesting in Europe and beyond, for whom "time-tested solution patterns no longer hold" (Busch 2010: 17).[59]

But as mentioned before, not all the affected youth reacted in a politically active way. Such events can have an activating effect to those who have the confidence to be able to make a change (politically), but when this is missing, it may also have a discouraging or disillusioning effect, leading to depression or cynicism (Hartmann in Claußen/Wasmund 1982: 304). Such disturbing experiences might even lead to disorientation and disintegration.

Scott highlights the suddenness of such catastrophes when explaining their politicizing effect. "Only a shock of substantial scope provides a large body of the peasantry with a collective reason to act. If the shock is also sudden it is more difficult to adapt to routinely or incrementally and is more likely to be a sharp moral departure from existing norms of reciprocity" (Scott, 1976: 194). Likewise Walton and Seddon (1994: 108) believe that protest "results less from steadily worsening conditions throughout the period than from abrupt and palpable shocks." Just like the frog which continues to remain inside a pot that is heated very slowly, a creeping precarization to which one get can used to again and again, might have little potential for protest. Highlighting »catastrophes« (in the literal sense of turning moments), however does not mean that the change of political mindset cannot be a gradual procedure as well. Drastic events facilitate, but are not a pre-requirement for such, as Wasmund (1982: 37) outlines.[60] Erikson's identity theory is an example where both dimensions are combined:

---

[58] Research on civic courage came to the conclusion that people are often indignant about very specific topics and stand up against them, while they remain inactive in other cases where civic courage is needed as well. Such issues are often determined by key biographical experiences. Someone who experienced domestic violence might "never again" let a man beat his wife. (cf. *Der Held - Mehr als nur ein Mythos?* [The Hero - More Than Just A Myth?] - radioWissen - Bayern 2 - 22.08.2012.)

[59] Basic personality features even change more rarely (if ever), says the personality researcher Christoph Josef Ahlers (Deutschland, 21.2.2014), an assumption present day psychology agrees with. However, such personality features rather have the character of predispositions, which are at times, more pronounced and at others, take the back seat. What holds true on an individual level can also be said about different cultures: Individuality is primarily a question of a respective mixture of dispositions and manifestations, a "more or less" of each of them, and not the total absence of such orientations.

[60] The gradual dimension of changing one's mindset is underlined by the fact that as Claußen (1986: 153) assumes, that to "break out of everyday consciousness," it takes time and opportunity of "coming to terms with personal and socio-political contradictions without being under existential threat." The mentioned disastrous moments are certainly very much of such existential threat.

Gradual change in which self-identity develops in handling biographical crisis (or real dilemmas).

Our breeding (*Kinderstube*) can be transformed, but we can hardly just bid it farewell. Thus the milieu research (Vester 2002) came to the result that new milieus represent a "modernization" of older ones, but this is in a clear continuity to their parent milieu. Nevertheless, even when following the more skeptical perspective socialization theory has on the possibility of »mental revolutions« or »reinventing oneself«, we could nevertheless say in concurrence with Bourdieu that the »language« of habitus allows for many, many different »sentences«, making political action in general compatible with several political orientations. It therefore does not come as a surprise that this research observed that hardly any respondent generally ruled out political activity (more in the second part of this work). The question is rather: How long does it need for people to say "*sobra na* (it is enough);" under which circumstances would they then choose the option to voice out; and, what exactly would be the content of their political expression?

3.6.5. Walking the talk: from consciousness to action

"Commitment can only be understood in the context of life experiences and of biographical importance," says Munsch (2003: 9). This emphasis on life-world and personal experience influencing the manifestation of social and political commitment resonates well with the fact that republican approaches to citizenship (cf. the subchapter 4.1.1.: *Communitarian, republican and (neo)liberal concepts of citizenship*) states that responsibilities and obligations develop in social contexts, and the urge to *act* 'responsible' is dependent on contextual factors, unlike in the case of deontological *judgments* as cherished by Kant. This is stressed by the philosopher Hans Jonas in his book "Imperative of Responsibility" (University of Chicago Press, 1984), and is underlined by the supreme importance Emmanuel Levinas places on recognition, postulating that only the absolute claim of "the Other" on me makes me a person. Likewise the biblical concept of *chesed* (kindness/compassion/*pakikipagkapwa,* cf. Micah 6:8), assumes that it is awareness and sensitivity for and of "the Other," but not rational arguments, that let compassion emerge.

Agustin Rodriguez has developed such option for the »Other«, i.e. the stranger and the hetero-normative as preferable base of "exploring the discourse of democracy" (Rodriguez 2009) in the Philippine context. Having in mind that the "ungovernable margins, i.e. the urban poor, the Muslims and the indigenous people" (ibid.: 14), he considers "this displaced Other (to challenge) us to give up our place (at the center) or open it up to intrusion ... without assimilating that Other into our space" (p. 15), which is just the opposite of the omnipresent 'No ID, NO Entry' signs or the regular displacement of sidewalk vendors. He believes it needs "structures which themselves institute disturbance [in] a society composed of a multiplicity of rationalities, of life

worlds and world views, [that] can be the site of the human realization of every stakeholder" (p. 19).

Obligation emerges from the responsibility to a concrete other and not in being forced by an abstract principle the way Kantian duty ethics sees it where a sovereign subject comes *in foro interno* (before an internal court) to a moral judgment. May it as it may be, it is the concreteness of "the Other" (not necessarily Levinas' stranger, probably even rather the fellow being, the *kapwa* in Tagalog[61]), who makes such a judgment action-guiding (walking the talk).[62] This is the bottom line of considerations within political education theory in reaction to the dilemma raised within Lawrence Kohlberg's classical theory of moral development that consistency of moral judgment and moral action is not assured – also not by an individual will of self-consistency (Keller 2007: 38). Obligation requires motivational support and stabilizers, so that an "ought to" turns into a "must." "It needs the affective component of concern and empathizing with the needs of others," says Keller (2007: 23) who researched on moral action in the Chinese context, "to enable a moral disposition to action." (Not to be forgotten is the very relevant opportunity structures and resources stressed in social movement theory, but, as these are not in the focus of moral development theories they are not highlighted here.)

Yacat (2014) confirms such considerations for the Philippine context. He does not even think that a face-to-face situation is needed as motivational support, "but then I need some other emotional connection or a relational component to them" (like being a compatriot (kababayan). "It is more powerful for us to imagine the rights of fellow human beings because you also include yourself... in that sense you personalize it and people can relate to it instead of just saying the rights of human beings" (Yacat 2014). Here, it seems no surprise to me that the idea of the generalized other and the stranger as criterion of morality (as in the categorical imperative) has been made strong by philosophers and ergo is a rational concept, which might run counter to the strong emotionality considered characteristic for Filipin@s (Yacat 2014 and many more).

Even the critics of Kohlberg (such as his student Carol Gilligan), who hold on to his rational action theory and assume that moral action stays based on (possibly already habitualized) judgments (or their rejection) and is not merely caused by behavioral factors such as recognition, a sense of community or peer pressure - have argued that cognitive processes (understanding, reflecting, judgments) are insufficient to explain

[61] Enriquez defines *kapwa* as interpersonal selfhood, shared identity, "shared inner self" or "unity of self and others [which] stems from collective values shared with the whole of humanity and the deep respect for the dignity and inherent worth of a fellow human being." (Enriquez 1992: 52). More details are provided on this concept below.

[62] Paguntalan therefore suggests that "organizing efforts should go beyond explications of capitalism, oppression, and other big concepts and slogans that are mere abstractions for these young women. Solidarity with workers in picket lines proved more illuminating for women like the one they attended involving a strike among garment factory workers" (2002: 158f.).

(political) action, but need to be supported by emotional and affective factors (e.g. sympathy, feeling of care, guilt, shame, but also anger or pride). Such is not only relevant for ensuring that insights are translated into action, but already for making judgments. The importance of the word as *awa* or *luoy* (pity) has when Filipin@s explain why they help even strangers (or ask for their support), shows how relevant to action such feelings are outside of the culture in which Kohlberg's theory was developed.[63]

Neither 'objective coercion' (Kant) nor the 'force of the better argument ' (Habermas) are sufficient to ensure moral behavior. Even with a »clear head«, it is not unlikely that those who developed the skills for post- conventional judgments would actually behave as selfish as the »economical man«. Whenever an affective-motivational orientation towards the welfare of others is lacking, taking the perspective of others and knowledge of moral rule may be deployed in a strategically and manipulative way, as Keller explains (in Hurrelmann/Ulich 2008: 419).

3.6.6. Frames, opportunities *and* resources

The high relevance of frames facilitating or impeding political action has to be kept in mind when reasoning about the "objective" working situation in call centers and why or why not they trigger (subjective) political strategies. In this sense Aganon et al (2008: 48) consider the framing (here: trade union identity and purpose) to be the most important factor for revitalizing the Philippine union landscape which has the power to even overcome an unfriendly political-economic environment and the concomitant legal framework or union avoidance activities by employers.[64] Dörre and Schmalz (2013: 16) likewise underline the pivotal importance of frames when stating that "labor movements and trade unions (have been) for a long time an important reference point of a type of social scientific reflection called social criticism by Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello. … Without this criticism ... the world of work must have appeared as a mere accumulation of inherent necessities (*Sachzwängen*) from which there was hardly any escape for wage earners."

(Political) action however *not* only depends on politically supportive beliefs (frames) and on correlating affective-motivational orientations as outlined above, but also on the perception/detection of existing political spaces (for instance the reliability of

---

[63] In this way one of our respondents explained her support for farmers by saying "*maluoy baya ko sa ilaha kay kabalo man gud ko anang issue na land grabbing* (I really feel *luoy* with them as I know about this issue of land grabbing)." Even if the statement is followed by a longer analysis in sociopolitical terms, it is appraised with an emotional term.

[64] Another reason why framing might be the most relevant of the three dimensions of social action when it comes to the action of marginalized groups is that, such groups have lesser command over "hard" resources (money and power with which they could buy or enforce what they aim for) and therefore have to rely more, than others, on symbolical tools to pursue their aims. For such groups, "the establishment of widespread public demands is essential. They must take the legitimacy deficits of state policy as a starting point if they want to change something" (Kraushaar 2012: 212). Therefore, such movements are much more in need to turn public attention to the implicit social contract than integrated groups. A frame 'in force', i.e. largely unquestioned in society, is often their greatest resource.

institutions to facilitate political participation or the propensity for repression from the side of the ones in power) and favorable opportunity structures (which include economic trends, changes within political institutions, e.g. the destabilization of 'elite alignments', which again need to be discounted by 'negative opportunity structures' such as threats of repression by the powerful like being threatened by termination).

For conflict readiness to be promising, it also needs to be adjoined by conflict skills, requiring the command over/mobilization of necessary resources (economic and social capital to organize and survive a conflict, skills including cognitive competences, access to decision making structures, time resources, as well as, a favorable infrastructure to communicate with others, including a favorable personal social environment increasing the likelihood of successful action. Finally, resources such as creativity and fantasy can foster the belief that one can make a change (Böhnke/Dathe 2010: 17). Albert Alejo (in Reese 2008a) here also considers strategies, memories, knowledge and wisdom and having fun (even though there is sadness around) to be »resources of the poor«.[65] Altogether, such resources can "convert opportunities into actual political change" (Gaventa/McGee 2010: 17).

Nancy Burns et al. (2001: 365) observed that "the well-educated are more affluent, more likely to exercise civic skills and to receive requests for political activity, and more politically interested and knowledgeable." "The field of options of action is marked out by the respective position in the class structure," as Joachim Becker (in Ataç et al. 2011: 162) remarks. The expectation to act in a self-consistent way (converting judgment into action), can so be met much easier by a "well-funded" actor. It makes little sense to merely preach values without taking disempowering class inequalities into consideration; a limitation of a purely value-based education prevalent in the Philippines. Such can only generate behavioral dispositions (if at all), but not in itself provide for societal action. Claiming otherwise follows a »fiction of the equal,« upon which liberalism and many other ethical paradigms are based on (see below), in effect blaming the victim and diffusing the need for change of social circumstances.[66] Such approaches are often based on a "harmonist social utopia, of

---

[65] Even factors such as population concentration (population density) or the degree of organizing so far play a role for the emergence of protest movements. Both urbanization and over-urbanization are strongly associated with protest (Walton/Seddon 1994: 115), while community played major role for labor unrest in the 19th Century: "The growing number of unskilled workers and their concentration in the inner-city factory districts and working-class neighborhoods allowed both protests to quickly flash over between different categories of workers and factories, as well as the generation of a common class consciousness" (Silver 2005: 171).

[66] The **fiction of the equal** is a form of fallacy of the validity assumption. Just because rights are codified, they are not yet effective. But (neo)classical economic theory, which gives little attention to social inequality, is based on the axiom of universal equality usually mistaken for reality (a reverse naturalistic fallacy). It assumes that exchange and negotiation partners are equally equipped with resources and property rights and subject to the same restrictions, just like Hobbes based his model on the assumption that nature created man almost equal, while Rousseau and Marx have criticized the idea of a social contract as ideological as it creates the illusion of equal contract partners.

The unequal endowment with property rights is masked under the postulate of perfect competition in economic theory. If neoliberalism in this regard sees a need for improvement, it is only by coming to a fair distribution of the initial or starting conditions (start equality). More detail in: Reese 2004.

which all traces of power struggles have been erased" (Bröckling 2007: 195), based on the norm that all social interaction should focus on win-win cooperation, assuring for conciliation and balancing (or only permitting such as the Pareto optimum does).

Frustration thus is not enough to get politically active. As Niels Mulder comments (in his typical pessimism) on the Philippines: “The sense of being disgusted with the current political situation is pervasive. Such feelings though are not necessarily a stimulant to seeking positive change. They may also promote cynicism, escapism, sectarianism, indifference, consumer culture, or just dogged individualism and sheer survival orientation in an impoverished environment” (Mulder 2004: 91).

It is an idiosyncratic mix of growing dissatisfaction (framing), the perception of improvement in favorable political opportunities and of political resources getting available, which trigger protest. In the absence of such an appraisal, the psychological strain stays latent at best and only unleashes when the conditions "improve.”

Usually all three dimensions – frames, opportunities and resources, and we could also say: awareness, hope and the courage to act - have to come together and reinforce each other to spark action (cf. Kabeer/Haq Kabir 2009). With these, there is no chronological sequence necessary. Protest readiness and protest-affine cognitions, or "overcoming barriers in perception and acceptance, and surpassing a minimum threshold of being conscious about one’s own interests" (Willems/von Winter 2000: 43) are prerequisites for the decision to get politically active and mediating between opportunity and action. On the other hand, when favorable political circumstances and resources benefiting political action become available, this may (additionally) politicize. Schulze (1976: 142) expects the self-reinforcement of readiness to political action: Attitudes are not only determinants of action, but on the other way, are also influenced by action. In an authoritarian setting, many would not even get the idea of reflecting and thinking in a critical way.

As far as the disposition to claiming rights is concerned, it is usually not enough to have an awareness of such rights. It is also important to believe that they can be enforced. Such relies on faith in the political system and in the power of voice to change something.[67] “For that a protest movement develops out of the traumata of everyday life,” as Piven and Cloward (1986: 36) say when researching on poor peoples’ movements. They further added that the “the disadvantages and disorders experienced by people must be considered as unjust as well as alterable.” And Silver states, “the imagination of power has always been an important source of real force of labor” (2005: 34).

---

[67] Nonetheless, it might be too rational to picture the oppressed becoming active only after carefully weighing options and hazards, and coming to the conclusion that a struggle has a realistic chance to be successful. Especially, the consciousness of one’s own dignity often turns out as a crucial reason to get active through a gut reaction: “*Manalo man o matalo, ipaglalaban namin ito*“(Win or lose, we will fight for it), as a retrenched Overseas Contract Worker framed it (GMA News, 17.3.2010). We also asked our respondents to relate to this statement in the second interview series: 14 out of 27 “strongly agreed;” ten “agreed;” and, only two did “not agree.” Meanwhile, one respondent did not “agree at all.” (PI = . 81).

Finally, social embeddedness and the resulting social recognition and motivation are an - often neglected - reason for getting politically active and for "mobilizing one's rights" (Baer 2011: 211). "People more likely start a new activity, when they can do so with others. Taking up a new activity on your own when appearing as a newbie somewhere is often out of question or usually means overcoming one's inhibitions," as Munsch (2003: 11) observed in her study on "local engagement, social exclusion and the difficulties of community work." Klatt and Walter (2011) confirm the importance of such social contextualities for social and political involvement, which are often *also* a kind of bonding (*pakikisama*).[68] Precarious working conditions or unemployment in this context, also account for a lack of embeddedness and thus a lack of opportunities "to be asked" (Munsch: ibid.).[69]

"Collective protest" though is only one kind of social protest, as again, it is a special form of dealing with conflicts[70]. As Schmidt has outlined (see above), collective protest does not only require the presence of collectively shared affectedness and (action) frames - serving as "thickeners of claims and agendas" (Gaventa /McGee, 2010: 19) - but in addition, individual resources complementing each other and the shared perception of opportunities. Collective protest, especially when sustained and so turning into a social movement, is therefore usually only the culmination of a series of protests, starting off as everyday resistance and in the form of a hidden transcript (Scott 1990, for an overview: Reese 2008a). When considering that all three dimensions of successful protests are important and that such protests have yet to solidify collectively for a social movement to emerge, it gets obvious how full of requirements successful protest mobilizations are. It can be frustrated by the lack of a generally authoritative interpretative framework, as well as, by inadequate resources or unfavorable political opportunity structures, by the feeling of powerlessness, by failed attempts of political action in the past and more others (Cf. Rucht 2013: 268). For the above reasons, Roose points out that "protest movements and revolutions are highly complex social phenomena," which hardly anyone can foresee. He describes how the »Arabellion« could develop into such a successful mobilization -despite being "highly improbable." Therefore, "the idea that revolutions could be predicted is more than questionable in the face of such complexity"(Roose 2011: 7). In the span of

---

[68] Hartmann deems it necessary to defend those whose political commitment is socially motivated, against the reproach of being insincere. He considers such "motive entanglements" to be "functionally necessary to ensure a constant motivation in all the vicissitudes of life and all situational circumstances" (1982: 294). When political motivation is not at all a motive to them, he then does not expect sustained political commitment from their side (unless group membership politicizes them).

[69] A study on women who joined the resistance movement Hukbalahap or Huk during the Japanese occupation (1942-45), came to the conclusion that next to political reasons, many of the women also joined the Huk to be near their "loved ones" (e.g. husbands) or because they were attracted by the (alternative) culture among political groups, such as women escaping confinement to "a single home and a single man" (Lanzona 2004: 68).

[70] The various forms of dealing and settling conflicts is also confirmed by law sociology: The parties may evade, give in, appease and compensate [the other], negotiate and find compromises, fight or involve others and so collectivize and politicize the conflict" (Baer 2011: 227). Raiser here adds the violence dimension to such forms of conflict resolution by additionally pointing to the possibility of breaking up a conflictual relationship, as well by fighting "in the form of threat, extortion, obstruction and finally the use of physical violence" (Raiser 2013: 303).

one short year, all existing political assumptions were disproven: considering the Islamic world to be fatalist (Samuel Huntington even believed to have identified a culturally founded resistance among Arab peoples towards democracy; cf. Kraushaar 2012: 155); the Chilean youth to be meek, after being disciplined by more than 30 years of neoliberalism; and, European youth to be self-centered, consumerist and apathetic to act together (as Franz Walter assumed in a contribution to the magazine SPIEGEL on 7.5.2006).

There is no magic formula for getting social movements going and several intervening, process-oriented and interactive factors can "mess up all calculations " (Rucht 2013: 268). "It is in the nature of such complex processes that they largely elude prediction" (ibid.). Theories of political socialization, as well as political action research, can hardly provide more than to (try to) explain ex post how political action came about. Thomas von Winter asks us therefore to "say farewell to the notion of making general conclusions about the ability of marginalized groups to be organized, and instead try to answer the question which factors promote such and which are a hindrance" (in Willems/von Winter 2000: 55). Next to the question of how and why marginalized groups get organized, the "logic of collective non-organization" (Helen Schwenken) should also be looked into.

3.6.7. A question of justice and dignity

As further outlined above, numerous social historians have pointed to the fact that the desire for change and readiness to political action develop where ever inequality appears to be arbitrary and unfair. Among these are Edward Thompson (in *The Making of the English Working Class)* and James Scott (in *Domination and the Art of Resistance)*, just to mention the two most influential theorists. They and others like Barrington Moore in his book *Injustice,* points out that protest presupposes ideas of legitimation which actors often derive from the defense of traditional, i.e. established rights. Thompson (and later James Scott) calls this consciousness "moral economy." Nowadays, we could also call this a "sense of entitlement" or in the words of its spurners, an "entitlement culture" (Jemy Gatdula, Business World, 20.2.2014).

In such case, the status quo violates a social contract (encoded or unwritten) and thus it became inacceptable. *Ya basta, es reicht, enough is enough* or as it served as battle cry for the 1986 EDSA mobilization: *Sobra na, tama na, palitan na* (it is too much, it is enough, change it now). On the other hand, it might be that it is not the social contract but the social status of people that have changed, so that they consider themselves to be entitled to more (which was at the heart of several bourgeois revolutions). In one way or the other, protesters feel entitled to something that is denied to them (passive right-bearers).

Contrary to the (vulgarized) immiseration theory, as well to Maslow's pyramid of needs, the above mentioned theories support more the view that hungry men are not necessarily angry men, but might in the end, even rather stay hungry than protest if

they don't feel entitled even to minimal support.[71] Usually the sense of deprivation is a relative one, "this problem awareness is derived from the individual's circumstances in relation to current expectations and assurances they were made to believe. ... Crucial for assessing the individual situation is the particular standard of social normality and the socially mediated promise of prosperity" (Busch et al. 2010: 20). "Relative deprivation" also suggests that a person's impression of being more deprived in comparison to others of whom one thinks is less deserving than one's self, sparks protest. This is where envy, and also resentments, become politically significant.

The sense of being entitled to "means, which are enough for living" (subsistence), typical for the traditional moral economy, is widespread in the Philippines (as the second part of this work will prove). This does not also only include a social entitlement to property, but the expectation to be treated appropriately (accordingly class-specific and even status-appropriate), arising from a sense of *dangal* (dignity). The root word of right (*karapatan*) is *dapat*, which can be translated as "should," as well as "proper," "suitable" and "deserving" (English 1986: 416). When such entitlement is violated beyond one's capacity for forbearance (*sobra na*), this might lead to resistance, probably even in a collective manner as Enriquez claims, when stating: "If the *kapwa-tao* [shared self-identity with others] is challenged, the Filipino coping response is not *pakikisama* [going along with others], but *pakikibaka* [joining a struggle] even when he seems utterly powerless" (Enriquez 1992: 91). He illustrates this statement with a picture from EDSA I.

When researching on a sense of citizenship in the Philippines, the crucial questions therefore are: What exactly are the promises of Philippine society? Where, when and how are these frustrated? What do people expect from the state and other 'providers'? When do they experience relative deprivation? This study aims to give some answers for a start to that.

Another trigger for protest is the perception of being treated without due respect and recognition, wherein one's dignity is seemingly violated. Or as Scott said: "Resistance originates not simply from material appropriation but from the pattern of personal humiliation that characterize that exploitation" (Scott 1990: 111f).

Dignity recognition, as well as honor, are often mentioned next to economic issues as key indicators why people protest, resist and/or get involved. According to Beverly Silver, worker unrests can be attributed to a large part to the fact that "the notion that labor is a »deemed commodity« and each attempt to treat humans as goods »like any other« inevitably leads to deep grudge"(Silver 2005:34f.). Immigrant workers in America went on strike in 1912 for "bread and roses," i.e. for fair wages *and* to be treated with dignity. In an organized protest in 1987, street vendors in Ahmedabad,

---

[71] In his classic "The Making of the English Working Class," Edward Thompson shows, on the basis of the hunger unrests in 18th century England, that the protests at that time were not merely "rebellions of the stomach." They rather took place within a "context of a popular consent on what is legitimate or illegitimate on the market, in the mill, in the bakery and so on"(Thompson 1987:16). People acted "in consciousness (...) to defend traditional rights and customs"(ibid: 15).

Gujarat, expressed their struggle as being about "dignity and daily bread" (Nyamu-Musembi 2002: 10). Kabeer (2005: 13f.) reports of "untouchable" women in India who "spoke of the most important right as the right to survive ... but not at the expense of [their] personal and community honour." Kabeer further observed that "closely bound up with the demands for justice by many disempowered groups is a demand for recognition: recognition of the intrinsic worth of all human beings, but also recognition of and respect for their differences" (ibid.: 4).

Kabeer therefore considers sense of dignity and the demand for recognition as expressions of a sense of entitlement and also a practice of citizenship when citing members of a women's group: "Our experience of discrimination as women led us to demand fair treatment and respect for our dignity as human beings, and only thereafter to claim our rights and entitlements as citizens"(ibid.). Even when it is not "being expressed in explicitly political terms, or even in terms of particular rights and entitlements, "Cornwall et al. (2011: 20), connect citizenship to a sense of entitlement, of care, respect and dignity, a sense of "being and belonging," "a sense of longing for that which would make people feel as if they are recognized, respected and included."

This dimension is also captured in the high relevance (of dignity, integrity, honor) and expressions of respect or *amor proprio* or *garbo* (pride) have in the Philippine context – as concretely manifested through *pikon* (touchy) or when one easily considers negative comments or even a simple critic as an attack on one's own personhood. Pinches explains why lower class residents from the vicinity of Tatalon joined the EDSA mobilization in 1986 by highlighting dimensions of social estimation: "Material deprivation," he writes (1991: 174; 178), "is always mediated and given meaning through social relations. What matters most to people in Tatalon is the way others attribute or deny value to them as human beings. It is primarily in this context that wealth differences are to be understood. Indeed, it is the common tendency of the *burgis* to portray the lives of the poor purely in terms of material deprivation that people in the Visayan Area find so degrading and shaming. Seen as eking out a bare hand-to-mouth existence, they are effectively denied their own-humanity and culture. ... Urban poor in Tatalon feel humiliated by the fact that they cannot provide for and protect their families in the same way those among the burgis can."[72]

Another psychological, not material, reason for people protesting is when their self-fulfillment is hampered. Identity questions, specifically: whom do we understand

---

[72] Dignity can fuel action even when the fight seems forlorn as Kerkvleit outlines in the case of the Huk rebellion in Central Luzon: "Many peasants in Central Luzon said the question concerning the rebellion's accomplishments posed a false issue. It implied that those who supported and joined the rebellion had a choice. Most did not. One former Huk in San Ricardo summarized this view well: Even if we got nothing, it's not important. What's important is that we had to fight back. And we fought so well that the big people and the government will never forget us again. ... »We showed them [landlords and government] we weren't slaves,« an elderly man in Cabiao, Nueva Ecija said to me as he reflected his Huk days. «We didn't lie down like wimping dogs when they started to whip us. We stood up to them and fought for what was rightfully ours«" (Kerkvliet 1977: 269).

ourselves to be, is predominantly of high relevance in determining our interests and why we get active or stay inactive. This seeming truism should make us aware of the fact that one cannot simply take for granted as fact that for call center agents, their occupation is the most important identity. Another competing identity might instead be more important to their life and their self-understanding, like for example, being a mother, an artist, a born again Christian or a Leftist. And that it would rather be these other identities that would be the basis for them to join forces with others for collective action. It is not necessarily their being an employee or other elements of their social position that decide on the way they act politically (their profile of citizenship), as class theory assumes, but it might rather be their being (perceived) as a member of the middle class, a Filipin@ and/or a woman (Agarwala /Hering 2008: 6).

Their socioeconomic position (class in itself) does not necessarily shape their self-understanding (class for itself) or as Scott (1985: 43) says, "class does not exhaust the total explanatory space of social actions." In the theory of the so-called new social movements, ascriptive identities like ethnicity, regional origin or nationality, gender, religion or kinship groups and other interpersonal networks are often considered to be a stronger bases of collective identity and mobilization than class.[73] The upsurge of Islamism, the Indigena movements in South America or nationalism in the Balkans seem to be proof for this. Class though, can be such an identity as well when not remaining merely a 'thin" identity of collective affectedness and rational interest, but is also a basis of a "life style community," such as how the workers' movement in Germany was for around 100 years from around 1870 to 1970.

Redistributive movements, based on class affiliations, which have for the longest time been in the limelight of social movement theory, are now complemented by movements based on such ascriptive identities (women's and LGBT movements, indigenous movements, such as in the case of Ecuador or Bolivia, or religious movements), where recognition (of dignity but also of diversity) plays a significant role. (Such emphasis on these identities of course, does not, at the same time, preclude becoming active on the basis of class membership).[74]

These new (ly acknowledged) identities likewise modify the relevance of national identity, the other identity marker which has been dominating political theory. Although, this is only one among many other identities, and this is not necessarily considered the most important. The wane of the nation-state within the process of

---

[73] "Some objective interests are...both difficult to understand and subject to alternative cognitive screens, or framings," say Agarwala and Hering (2008: 10) in relation to the current Indian context. They go on by saying that "not all who are objectively members of a class may recognize that position; not all who recognize their location in a class structure will find that particular dimension of inequality most salient, or most amenable to change; not all who seek to alter the terms of their class position will find sufficient colleagues to make collective action feasible; and not all class-based collective action will be effective: much will be suppressed, bought off, tactically flawed, or ignored by political actors with alternative support bases."

[74] In the case of the qualitative study this writing is based on, the occupation is as important as the family belonging. Both are the only belongings included by a slight majority (13 of 22) among the three most belongings they have. Class belonging as well is still considerable, with 8 of 22 mentioning it and five considering it their most important belonging, which is just one less than family and occupation. (See more below.)

globalization further puts national belonging into perspective, so that Yuval-Davis calls for the transcending of "conceptual boundaries which … separate issues of nation and state from those of family, community or other belongings" (1997: 1) and asks for a "mediated and multi-tiered"(ibid.) concept of citizenship, recognizing people's membership in a variety of collectivities and communities of belonging.

And finally, it might also be a prevalent part of one's identity (*Selbstbild*) and life style to be involved into political action or resistance per se, "wish to participate in a (political) practice, but not dedicated to one [specific] political practice" as Matuschek (2011: 218) puts it, explaining such with a "desire to influence or design one's own social environment" (ibid.: 235), so that voicing out may also be part of self-fulfillment, even where problems are less pressing than for others who do not get active. Anselm Weidner even speaks of "resistance as lifestyle."[75] This for instance holds true for a type of citizenship Munsch (2003: 21) calls the "professional citizen" (*Berufsbürger*), or for the "ever-vigilant civic individual," which Amna (2010: 200) calls "active citizen."

Amna (2010: 196-198, similar Schulze 1976: 25) identifies six different motives for civic engagement: (1) obligation (a moral imperative), i.e. "the idea that not participating and just letting things be would be shameful"(p. 196); (2) individual fulfillment (Amna speaks of "importance to me," p. 197); (3) ability: skills which lead to "self-confidence about having something to contribute and being able to make oneself heard" (p.197f.); (4) "feel needed by someone else," highlighting the "significance of an invitation to action" (p. 198); (5) expecting self-efficacy ("It will work"); and, finally (6) fulfillment (or meaningfulness as Amna calls it): "It gives something back ... I do it because I belong. It is an act I do as a part of my lifestyle (sic!)" (p. 198).

Integrating self-fulfillment and socio-political action is also a feature of what Ulrich Beck calls "individualism in solidarity" (*solidarischer Individualismus*) or "political hedonism," practiced by "children of freedom" (cf. Id.: *Kinder der Freiheit*, Frankfurt, 1997 and Breit/Massing 2002: 107f). Individualism in solidarity transcends the classical assumptions of altruist and assentialist social commitment which is contrasted to selfishness. Social action here is part of self-realization and is done out of need for meaningful action, an idea that in a certain way, continues the long tradition of republicanism of man as a "political animal" (Aristotle). [Cf. Kaelin 2012 for the formulation of this concept in Hegel's philosophy, who conceptualized the state as "agency enabling freedom rather than limiting it" (p.66).] It transcends the idea that citizenship and social involvement are merely a service (=sacrifice), just as it overcomes the liberal tradition considering political action merely as an instrument to reach certain goals (Willems/von Winter 2000: 23), and not as a purpose in itself. Or, as the youth activist Carla Cucueco expresses it: "Ours is a generation that selfies [sic!] with the

---

[75] Anselm Weidner reports on middle class-based democracy movements in Eastern Europe: "For color revolutionaries »revolution» is an easy going and trendy lifestyle, as the Otpor-veteran Iwan Marowi explained: »You live resistance; that's a lifestyle! (...) Why shouldn't we also have fun in doing so and wear pretty T-shirts?" (Weidner 2007: 1101)

community to tell their stories to others…. I refuse to call this generation a me-generation but indulge me in changing it, as proven by the youth in this room today, in calling it a we-generation, or rather, a TAYO –generation [*tayo*: »We« used in an inclusive manner], because ours is a generation that innovates and finds solutions for the welfare of this shared world, for the welfare of our country, the Philippines" (Rappler.com, 9.2.2014).

3.7. Precarity as social condition

After clarifying under which circumstances people might get or not get political active, this chapter will look at the specific social condition in which the ICCAs are located and how it contributes to getting politically active. First, I will describe precarity as a social condition before then describing more in particular the middle location and its assumed relevance for political activity.

Precarity can be defined as conducting a life under insecure and unpredictable conditions. When insecurity gets a permanent feature of living conditions and constitutes a state of affairs for groups in society (*soziale Lage*), one can speak of the emergence of a zone of precarity delineated from a zone of integration above and a zone of decouplement below.

Robert Castel (2000) has located such three zones in western labor societies, where next to the consolidation of poverty and deepening of social divide and accompanied by partial exclusion, a manifold zone of instability is expanding, increasingly affecting people coming from the middle of society. Basing his classification on the social dimensions of work, social security and social relationships, he names the zone where protected standard employer-employee relationships prevail, people can rely on social security and where they enjoy reliable social relationships the "zone of integration." It is inhabited by the beneficiaries of modernization; Castel calls them "the integrated." Opposite to this zone, Castel places "the zone of decoupling," inhabited by groups which are more or less permanently excluded from regular wage labor and often also suffer social isolation. They are the superfluous, or as Castel calls them, "the excluded." In between these two zones one can find an intermediate zone which Castel calls the "zone of precarity," a sandwich position of instability. The ones inhabiting this zone are neither fully integrated (any longer), nor are they entirely excluded. Their condition is determined by employment conditions which lack security of tenure and/or are unreliable in securing one's livelihood. Castel consequently calls these group(s) "the vulnerable." They are neither (longer) completely integrated, but nor (yet) entirely left behind. In this zone Castel locates three sub-groups: The "hopeful," who are temporarily integrated, considering their precarious employment as opportunity; the "realists" for whom precarious employment and living conditions

are a permanent arrangement; and, finally the “satisfied” who have come to terms with precarity and even welcome it.[76]

The precarized stick in “social positions in limbo (*soziale Schwebelagen*), between prosperity and poverty” as Kraemer (2008a: 147) explains, managing their life in a “transitory interlayer, from which a further decline… is possible. But at the same time ... the tedious regaining of a once occupied position of (relative) prosperity is very well possible. This position of social indecisiveness (*soziale Unentschiedenheit*) is characteristic for the precarity of a social condition, and with it, its social distance to prosperity as well as to poverty”(ibid.). The zone of precarity is a “social zone of transition, in which the course is set either in the direction of social climbing or descending, integration or exclusion, establishment or relegation,” as Vogel (2006: 344) explains; it is a zone characterized by “social vulnerability” and “precarious prosperity.” Vogel calls it a “zone of social probabilities which revolve around imminent descent or worries of relegation, but not around certainties of exclusion.” It is a zone that is populated by “actors in uncertain, fragile situations, [thus] subjectifying structural hazards. Within this term, felt social inequality and uncertainty come into play.”

“The category of social vulnerability,” says Vogel (2006: 344), “can therefore be defined as a social relationship which resides between two poles: between the probability to be confronted with certain economic, social or symbolic risks and the capabilities to evade these risks respectively to mobilize resources against these risks.” “Vulnerability" says Cardona (in Vogel ibid.), “cannot be defined or measured without reference to the capacity of a population to absorb, respond and recover from the impact of the event. ... Vulnerability is the degree to which different social classes are differentially at risk.”

In this regard, the terms of precarity and middle-classness are related to each other. Following Wright (1985: 42—57), the middle class can be defined as an ambiguous, contradictory social location, as the classes within this stratum usually swing between bourgeois and proletarian actions and attitudes. It is especially an income beyond survival (disposable income) and a sense of aspiration that makes someone belong to this intermediary stratum (see in detail the chapter 3.10.: *Middle class – what is that?*). What differs though is the time dimension used. Precarity is a term describing current social conditions. Middle class in contrast is a term describing rather long term class formations and includes cultural dimensions as well. I can step out or step into precarity »overnight,« but it will need a longer time for me to become part of the middle class (or to fall out of it).

---

[76] In Castel’s model there are more groups in partly precarious conditions to be found in the zones of integration and decouplement: At the lower fringe of the zone of integration there are the »insecurely integrated« (named "the unsettled") and the »integrated at risk« “threatened by descent“ (terms following Dörre 2007). In the zone of decouplement again one of the two subzones are populated by those »willing to change« which might overcome exclusion. Truly integrated this are only the “securely integrated“ and possibly the atypically integrated “unconventional" or "self-managers,” while the only permanent residents of the zone of decouplement are “the ones who lost connection“ characterized by controlled exclusion or by staged integration. Castel (2000: 360) still distinguishes a "zone of care." This zone however is usually not picked up in literature.

“The sociological point of view now shifts from the margins to the center of society, towards the possible or probable sources of social exclusion and exclusion processes,” claims Vogel (2006: 346) for the German context. Vulnerability and precarity draw the attention to groups in society which (still) have something to lose. The precarity of wealth implies prosperity and the sense of social vulnerability is only known to those who have an idea of what social security and stability feels like” (ibid.).

Nothing must come up in the social and professional lives of those populating this zone: neither losing their job nor any chronic illness, no divorce or other family problems, no forced relocation, no unexpected financial demands or pressures. In this zone, life and household management resemble a fragile house of cards that collapses even when minor shocks occur. Resources are scarce and their use must be precisely calculated.

In process and probability terms, social vulnerability and precarious prosperity change the perspective by which social inequality is to be looked at. Instead of social locations and their statistical distribution, biographies and employment histories are now taking the focus and families and households take the place of individuals as units of managing insecurity. It would be a shortcoming to measure precarity by having a look at labor market data alone as precarity has a significant temporal and an over-individual dimension. Kraemer therefore urges us to not only consider the current employment relationship, but to include as well employment histories and the situation of the other household members when statements about precarious situations are made: "A precarious job situation is not synonymous with a precarious situation in life. … On the other side, it is also possible that an employee gets into a precarious situation in life only by the context of the household [he or she lives in], although neither the current working place nor his or her career history can be called precarious" (Kraemer 2008b: 245).

One swallow does not make a summer, and likewise, steady labor participation is not necessarily identical with a stable employment relationship. Coping with precarious working conditions depends to a considerable extent on reliable "relationships of reproduction" which ensure the reproduction of the individual manpower and mitigate the precarious dimensions of employment or ensure the compatibility of productive and reproductive work (household and educational work). The Fordist breadwinner model was built on such reproductive support, with a clear patriarchal list (*Schlagseite*), while in class societies de-precarization is usually based on the precarity of others, as illustrated by the complementarity of Madam and maid in the Philippines. The burn-out syndrome (20 of 28 respondents consider burnout a problem) and mental disorders, however point out that the relationship of production and reproduction has become precarious due to “overutilization” (Fabros/Pascual 2007) of manpower and to disintegrating social relationships.

In general, precarity has to be differentiated not only from exclusion (which is situated in the zone of decouplement), but also from poverty - though both terms are of-

ten treated as equivalent. Precarity is rather a relational category and its explanatory power significantly depends strongly on the definition of social normality standards. Although both states of affairs are strongly interrelated, one does not necessarily have to be poor to be forced to cope with precarious life conditions – self-employment and deregulated working conditions are only two examples. On the other hand, a life at the subsistence level is not necessarily precarious. People being able to satisfy their basic needs through self-sufficiency, barter and/or reliable benefits – meaning people which are not dependent on the market - have relatively secure life conditions. "Groups with a low but stable income might still be poor, but as long as their survival is not jeopardised, they do not acknowledge their living situation as desperate," says Erhard Berner (in *Defending a place in the city*, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 1997, p. 78).[77]

The student Paul Eugenio (in Manila Times, 1.1.2014) calls the social position of precarious prosperity "sandwich class" (where he counts himself in) and distinguishes it from the position of a (upper) middle class as well as from the (dirt) poor: "We are the sandwich class, newly liberated from poverty, our journey about to start. In fact, one mishap such as a typhoon, a family member in the hospital, or even a demolition, and we are bound to return to Misery Road. This vulnerability makes us anxious, constantly worrying about whether we can still enjoy this newfound freedom when we wake up the next day."

The concept of precarity developed within the context of the current transformations of its labor and welfare societies in Euroamerica which started with the introduction of Reaganomics in the 1980s in the USA, which again lead especially to the impoverishment of segments of the middle class (cf. Ehrenreich 1989 and Newman 1996). But can the concept of precarity be translated to a "global society" as well? Fred Scholz (2001) thinks so when seeing a concurrence of integrating and fragmenting processes on the global level leading to a tripartition of (integrated) "global places," (precarious) "globalized places "and (redundant) "segregated rest world."

Turning to the Philippines, the working conditions of the Filipino labor force in general can easily be identified as precarious with regards to insecurity of tenure and lack of social security mechanisms. The 2014 International Trade Union Confederation Global Rights Index (which encompasses 97 indicators such as workers' rights to establish or join unions, to collective bargaining and to strike and categorizes societies on a scale of 1 for "best" to 5 for "worst" in relation to their compliance with these collective labor rights), rated the Philippines along with 23 other countries on the

[77] Likewise the "story of Barangay Buliok" quoted by Canuday (2009: 65) describes this place in Muslim Mindanao in the decade of 1960 to 1970 (i.e. before the displacement caused by the civil war began) as *masagana* (abundant) because they had "several sources of income."

lowest scale (5), labeled as those where workers have "no guarantee of rights" (Manila Standard, 29.5.2014).[78]

Even if the Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics (BLES) only acknowledges 15% of all wage and salary work in 2011 to be precarious (BLES 2012: 6), while considering 40% of all employment "vulnerable"(which includes "own account workers" and contributing family workers); precarious work is rampant and comes in many guises: contractualization; »job order«-workers; project-based employment; and, contract of service or so called "volunteers" in health, education or social services delivery.[79] On the other hand, the radical labor federation KMU, estimates that around 80% of today's workers have a contract ending after five months or after completing a »project« (Source: Bulatlat.com, 4.3.2014). Though this number is probably bloated (considering the advocacy orientation of the KMU information policy), it nevertheless balances the low BLES-figure.

This aggravates the "political economy of permanent crisis" (Walden Bello in Fabros 2007: 27), wherein instability has become a permanent condition of daily life, aggravated by the proneness to natural disasters, which has become for many Filipinos and Filipinas a "simply accepted aspect of their daily lives" (Bankoff 2003: 2). Unlike in Europe, unemployment is not the main risk, but underemployment: 42% of the employees are considered underemployed and even those who are overworked often need to take up additional jobs (*moonlighting* or *sideline*). [For an overview on precarity in the Philippines: see Reese 2008a, 2013c and 2013d.]

The working conditions of call center agents have a strong dimension of precarity as well, even if, compared to other employees they receive a living wage and usually don't have to worry that their employers might not remit their contributions to the Social Security System. They can even avail of medical benefits from Health Maintenance Organizations, which supplement the payments to the mandatory health insurance Philhealth that is very basic. We so observed that at least, the respondents to this longitudinal study are only moderately worried "that the economic situation might affect their job or income": 17 respondents are more or less worried (three considering it as a pressing, nine as a significant and five as minor problem), but the weighted gravity index only adds up to .39.

Security of tenure though is a different matter: Whenever they work in an outsourced call center (which the majority of the call centers in the Philippines are), their tenure is "co-terminus" (TUCP 2012) to specific business accounts or contracts. The nature of the call center business is precarious as it is subject to seasonal peaks and lows because of client pullouts, as contractual arrangements usually do not disallow

---

[78] Countries included in this category as well are Bangladesh, China, Greece, India, Malaysia, Nigeria or Turkey.

[79] The BLES even affirms the Fordist "normal employment" (*Normalarbeitsverhältnis*) in considering the "norm of full-time protected regular wage and salary employment" as "commonly perceived" (BLES 2012: 3) in the Philippines and speaking of "usual non-wage benefits and social security normally found in regular employment contracts" (ibid.).

abrupt terminations or changes in clients' requirements and demands. And so, even after being regularized (after surviving a six-month probationary period), agents might quickly lose their job when the contract with a particular client ends and the group of workers that performed the operations does not get reemployed in other processes. Shares a former agent in Davao during this research: "When you signed up, it's stipulated in your contract that your employment is co-terminus with the account…if it closes or transfers, your contract will actually end as well" (a practice which is the same in the case of India: CWA 2005: 52).

The news portal Rappler, reports about 600 agents in Cebu who were even terminated without notice, commenting that this happened despite the fact that "the Labor Code requires that companies provide 30-day notice to their employees before closing shop" (Rappler.com, 20.9.2013).

Additionally, we can observe the temporary layoff of agents termed as "compulsory time-off," "voluntary go-home," "forced leave," "bench status" or "floating status."[80] One of our respondents had to regularly go on company-induced leave (CIL) when the workload was lean. During these periods, agents receive no compensation. By making employment contingent on specific business contracts in effect, the business risk is put on the workers.

Forced leave, lack of security of tenure and easy termination were so considered by nine out of 28 respondents as pressing problems; by six as significant; by three as minor; and, only by five as no problem while five have not encountered any of those mentioned in their work. This amounts to a gravity index of .52.

Furthermore, most agents are often directed to do overtime beyond the legally-prescribed work hours, forgo their rest days or have their already approved vacation leave cancelled, especially during peak seasons when there is high volume of calls. A new HR staff in a Davao interview reveals, "My work starts at 3PM up until *sawa* (fed up)… when you say *sawa*, you don't know when you are going to end, because there's a lot of work to do."[81] For 21 out of 28 respondents, overtime is kind of a problem, with four considering it as pressing; eight as significant; and, nine a minor problem (Weighted gravity index: .46).

The monotonous activity and the high performance demands also make burnout likely. Seven out of 27 respondents to this study considered the problem of burnout

---

[80] The "floating status" of employees is often justified by invoking Article 286 of the Labor Code, which allows the suspension of the employment relationship for a period not exceeding six months as a result of a bona fide suspension of a business or undertaking. Supreme Court decisions have applied this provision to justify the temporary layoff of personnel adversely affected by the completion or lack of service contracts to work on (Manila Times, 25.9.2012).

[81] Furthermore, the call center industry in the Philippines can be considered as precarious as its survival is based on competitiveness with other outsourcing destinations and on a favorable legislation for outsourcing in the societies of origin. Though in summer 2012 the US Congress once again has not passed a bill calling for insourcing, this could still happen anytime. Likewise, a strong peso might create the need to recompute the financial advantage BPO-companies have in the Philippines, a situation which, according to the Manila-based Center for Strategy, Enterprise & Intelligence, was reached in summer 2012 when the peso was up to less than 41 pesos per US-Dollar (CENSei Report Vol 2 No. 35, September 2012).

pressing; six as significant; six at least as minor [OK lang]; while only seven said it is no problem for them; and two answered, they never encountered this problem. This amounts to a "gravity index" of .49. Many agents believe that one can only cope with the working conditions in the call centers for a few years - five years is often being mentioned as a magical number. "All I want is to have a normal job" is an often-heard reply (cf. as well Reese 2008c).

Other issues of precarity within their working environment mentioned by the respondents are (as already outlined above), that vacation and sick leaves are denied: 17 consider it a problem; eight as pressing; nine as significant; and, two as a minor problem or a weighted gravity index: .55). The excessive and tedious workloads were considered as a problem for 14 (eight pressing, six significant, seven minor, weighted gravity index: .53). Hardly anyone denied the existence of these problems.

Precarity and insecurity are generally only discussed in relation to the economical dimension just outlined (*insecurity of tenure*). Although, it has at least two further basic dimensions: a political and a socio-psychological one.

At the **political** level, a growing legal and institutional insecurity can be witnessed across the world. With regards to social rights, we can witness disfranchisement (for instance by deregulation of labor markets and cutting social benefits), as well as lower enforcement (like in the case of voluntary compliance with labor rules outlined below). We can speak of political precarity when social rights are either not codified or even if these are institutionally anchored, these are not/no longer enforced and where participation in political affairs is at best token. One cannot rely on being put in the right even when being in the right.

When public services and infrastructure, which are supposed to ensure (good) living conditions of individuals and the society as a whole, are privatized, we can speak of a process of precarization that leads to a weakening of the individual, and thus collective chances to act.

Taking the example of the Philippines: De jure there is a multitude of laws which are to ensure the interests and rights of each and everyone. But these laws and law initiatives are not necessarily known by its beneficiaries: Hardly anyone of our respondents knew about the *Magna Charta Bill for Call Center Workers* or the *BPO Workers Protection and Welfare Act* (both simply reinstating provisions already provided for by the Labor Code).[82] In this sense Anna Leah Escresa, Executive Director of EILER - a labor research and service center established in 1981 which started to work with call center agents in 2008 and was the most audible voice of ICCAs in terms of advocacy in the field - considers it a problem that "in the Philippines, labor rights are not

[82] These bill were filed in Congress in 2010 and seek to guarantee call center employees, i.a. the right to organize and join labor organizations; the right to a safe and healthy working environment; the right to at least a one hour continuous meal break in the middle of every eight hour shift; the right to privacy, safety for night shift employees; and the right to be informed of the terms and conditions of their contract.

taught in primary and secondary education" and that "companies are maximizing on low awareness of labor rights" (EILER 2012). Every second respondent (13 out of 26) considered it thus a problem that there is no orientation on rights by the call center company or other institutions (six consider it as pressing, three as significant and four as minor problem), while nine were not even aware of such a problem (Gravity index: .34).

Nevertheless, lack of legal knowledge is not the only reason for not "mobilizing law" (Baer). In a 2007 research, Bool (following Sale 2012) for example noted that company work rules were available to 86% of her respondents and changes in company work rules were available for 77% (these are very similar numbers in Sale and Bool 2005). But in the legal culture in the Philippines, codified rights often compete with patronage, with private rules (be it the rules of the parents or the rule of the company) and with hierarchical relations which from early childhood on are accepted as superseding "public" rules (cf. Franco 2011). Thus, in the study conducted in early 2011 by the International Textile Garment and Leather Workers' Federation on working conditions in the Philippines and other countries, arrived at the finding that violations of national as well as international labor laws "were the rule" (Business World, 10.5.2011). In such a setting, the *mahina* cannot expect to be put in the right. In fact, several made the experience that laws are selectively used against them, banking on a justice system that favor the interests of the powerful and wherein court procedures dragged on for years and are influenced by wielders.

That private rules override laws is aggravated in a transnational setting when rules from the customers' society are paramount. This may cover North American work time, tools and metrics for agents, up to the observance of American instead of Filipino holidays (Reese 2008c) that even excludes payment of holiday premium on these days.

In the working world, such discriminatory implementation of rules and regulations by the ones in control is termed and accepted as "management prerogative" (TUCP 2012, Sale 2012). While most respondents answered that they would employ the *Magna Charta Bill for Call Center Workers* or the *BPO Workers Protection and Welfare Act* in compromised situations in the workplace after being informed about its content, and 22 out of 28 consider legal action a promising option, they don't believe it makes sense to turn to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) which they regard as being on the side with the business managers. (A notion that the management side sees just otherwise, believing like call center manager Suzanne Lu from Dumaguete City [viva voce, April 2012] that DOLE is always taking the side of the workers!)

Nepotism and favoritism in the process of promotions and shift distribution, as well as the personality and leadership of supervisors, also affect most agents. It aggravates the politics inside the call center, and for some respondents this leaves simple agents as "*walang karapatan*" (no rights). Relates an agent in Manila, "They have this,

'pag hindi kita kaibigan (if you're not my friend) and I'm the manager, if you are not close to me, I'm not going to promote you."

One of our respondents confirmed the assumption of discriminatory implementation of the rules when claiming that "they [the call center management] have a stipulation (in fine print) that they can change the rules whenever they want to [in the contract]," adding: "I knew what my rights were when I first went in and after a while since they said in the contract they can change whatever they want…I didn't know what my rights were anymore." Another agent gave the following answer: "(Y)ou're only informed about your rights in relation to company rules and regulations as if laws of the Philippines do not work here." Bearing witness to such loss of rights is this statement from an agent whose friend was terminated right after a call: "*(W)alang* (There is no) justice…after your shift, they will call you, and they will tell you it will be your last day (at work)." Management rules are more closely followed than the labor laws of the republic. As one agent interviewed by EILER commented: "There is a choice to abide by the constitution or to abide by the employment contract" (EILER 2008: 24).

A recent controversy around the BPOs further adds substance to such understanding. According to the legislator Raymond Palatino, BPO companies required their employees to report to work despite a presidential Memorandum Circular suspending work in all offices in the private sector in and around Metro Manila due to the heavy floods in August 2013. BPO companies reportedly sent messages to their employees, allegedly on the basis that BPO companies are not required to follow directives from the government (Source: *BPO workers are not 'waterproof'*, Manila Times, 2.9.2013).

The incumbent administration though supports such legal pluralism: The Department of Labor and Employment so explicitly "encourages" BPOs to self-regulate through so-called voluntary codes of good practices which is a key labor-reform policy of President Aquino. Labor Secretary Baldoz voiced this during a signing of such a code for the call center sector explaining that "the administration wants to move industries away from overdependence on government to self-governance in dealing with industry issues" (PDI, 12.12.2010).[83] In early 2013, in a press release posted on the DOLE-Website, Baldoz explained the policy of "moving steadily towards industry self-governance" to be in line with requirements of a globalized economy, saying that "the Philippines is moving inexorably towards the development of a culture of voluntary compliance with labor standards and occupational health and safety that will raise the bar of competitiveness of the Philippine economy" (www.dole.gov.ph/news/view/1977). At the same time, the DOLE plans to hire 574 "Labor Laws Compliance Officers," that "will help companies comply with the labor

[83] In this context, one can also situate the lifting of the ban on night work for women in 2011 which was consistently violated not only by the call center industry. Here a legal provision was changed to accommodate the "standard operating procedure."

standards set forth by the law" (Source: Business Mirror, 23.1.2014).[84] In the Davao Region alone, 30 compliance officers will be in charge of assisting more than 3,000 establishments in assessing their compliance of the labor law which is explicitly termed as "voluntary" (ibid.). We will see later that this kind of law regime is part and parcel of neoliberal governementality and its paradigm of responsibilization.[85]

One respondent to this research explicitly condones with such "legal pluralism" saying: "I don't know if there'd be a chance that we can have a solution to (pressing call center) problems because definitely as an industry, it must have ways to demand that whatever concept we [agents] have regarding labor rights/laws should not apply."

Voluntarism and the corporatist approach of tripartism are further enforced by cultural restraints on waging (open) conflicts and questioning higher ups. "In the Philippines we value so much hierarchy," as Binghay (2012) explains, further explaining that unions, being confrontational, "might not be the ideal form of representation" considering the "Philippine cultural menu." Sale (2012) partly traces this to the "Asian value of avoiding conflict… Instead of people rocking the boat, you go with it, because it is an easier task." He distinguishes this "harmonizing model" from a "coordinated model" with rules and regulations, prevalent in the continental model and the "conflictual model" prevalent in English-speaking countries. "These models then are reinforced by government and business policies."

At the **socio-psychological level** too, people have to cope with insecurity. The discontinuity of employment (casual work or project work) and of being locally disembedded (migration) weakens the integration in social networks necessary for coping with everyday life. In the case of this research, 30 out of 40 respondents said they had to discontinue former networks when taking up work in the call center, 19 of them said this was especially because of graveyard shifting. But in 26 of 40 cases, new networks developed as well, with 25 out of 28 feeling connected to the people around them (PI=.81[86]). (The incongruence of the total in responses is due to the fact that so-

---

[84] Under such circumstances of undermonitoring, the DOLE can even declare "wage violators in Davao not a major concern" (Sun Star Davao, 27.4.2012). Instead of focusing concern on the "at least 30% of more than a thousand business establishments" surveyed in the Davao region not complying with the wage orders, the DOLE-Davao assistant regional director Venerando Cebrano, called the 70% compliance rate in the region a "very remarkable accomplishment compared to other regions in Mindanao or even in the country as a whole." He further explained that "*ang atong resources sa gobyerno dili sapat para ma-cover tanan*" (our resources in the government are not enough to cover all [establishments in Davao Region]," referring to limited number of teams that will monitor compliance to implementation of minimum wages. "*Naa man dyud mga naga reklamo, natural lang na, maka assume ta na daghan na sila, pero wala sila naga complain*. (there are complaints about non-compliance [of minimum wage], that's only natural, we can assume that there are many of those cases, but they are not [formally] filing their complaint.)."

[85] The assessment is planned not only in cooperation with the employer's side, but also by including worker representatives (tripartism). It turns out though to be difficult to identify worker representatives in the call center industry also due to the absence of workers associations. According to TUCP, for now personalities from the wage board were appointed to represent the workers in the tri-partite councils (TUCP 2012).

[86] This also holds true for the 13 respondents who consider their relation to their colleagues as detached (though this only has a PI of .60), while the 12 not feeling detached at work, have a stunning PI of .98.

me items were asked in the first interview, while others were asked in the following interview series.)

But for some, it is easier to cope with such circumstances than for others. Feelings of insecurity and the need for security usually differ from person to person (and from culture to culture). This includes a milieu-specific appreciation of elements of precarious life, especially among artists (of life - *Lebenskünstler*) like the members of the activist group *Precarias a la deriva* in Barcelona who value "the accumulation of different knowledge and different skills and abilities by means of work and life experiences which constitute themselves anew and anew" (Precarias a la deriva 2004).

Only when individual safety requirements are not satisfied, a subjective feeling of insecurity arises. This perceived vulnerability is not necessarily concomitant with an objectively measurable and increased risk of unstable and unprotected working places, employment histories or circumstances of life. Kraemer speaks here of "felt precarization" (*gefühlte Prekarisierung)* which "feeds from a variety of experiences that are made not only in the workplace but in the social environment as well and show a profound transformation of previous expectational certitudes" (2008b: 247), although a feeling of precarization or exclusion doesn't necessarily go along with a social condition of precarization or exclusion (and the other way round).

Such "more »emotional« data are not less informative than statistical numbers or cognitively justified judgments, as Neckel (2008: 24) states in his article about "feeling underclass" (*Die gefühlte Unterschicht*). "Feelings such as fear, depression or resignation can turn to latent dispositions, continuously present and thereby coin [and color] the entire experience of the personal reality" (Neckel 2008: 24) Apart from external resources like job situation and personal integration (representing the opportunities of action), internal resources like expectation horizons, institutional confidence, tolerance of uncertainty, and finally, the feeling of personal achievement are crucial when it comes to action as well (cf. Neckel 2008: 26).

Already, during the transition to industrial society in Europe, "it (was) not the economic uncertainty alone, but also the breakdown of traditional certainties which unsettled the people" (Kaufmann 2003: 81). And expectational certitudes do not only have a historical, but also a class- and culture-specific dimension. For the German context, Kraemer notes that "numerous findings indicate that »felt insecurity« can be localized mainly in middle-class positions, while experienced precarization is increasingly to be found in classes underprivileged on the labor market " (Kraemer 2008b: 251). Exclusion or decouplement is not just a social condition, but an experience category as well. The question always, is as well, how the affected process their situation and on which strategies and value orientations this is based on. This is a reason why this research used the biographical method following the question of how people deal with their situation in strategies and values.

Strategies dealing with social insecurity and precarization are not randomly adapted but are developed and passed on which are specific to the milieu one belongs to. Dif-

ferent milieus process a similar social situation differently – let's say of recession, privatization and so on. Some are better prepared than others. Social situations destabilize less often within milieus which provide for social networks or successful strategies of handling scarce or uncertain resources, as Vester (2002: 102) remarks.

We may consider that in societies with an "informal welfare regime" (Wood 2004), which are not, incidentally at the same time by and large societies less individualized, strategies to cope with insecurity are still more common knowledge. This makes insecurity is less overburdening, and exchange and self-help networks are still more in place than in welfare societies, where formal institutions have inherited much of their functions.[87] For most people, there has been no end to the everyday presence of social insecurity through the course of time. In most societies of the South, least of all in the East Asian and Latin American industrial nations, informal, precarious working conditions have been the norm at any time in history. For the majority of the world population, the establishment of welfare state structures (along with decommodification and de-proletarization of their livelihood) has been piecemeal at most, and in reality for the majority, it did not lead to a formalization and standardization of wage labor (for the Philippine case: Reese 2013e).[88]

Shared precarity is half the precarity: In the case of the Philippines, networks of loyalties support individuals in their projects and in times of emergency. 26 of 28 respondents to the qualitative study observe that people in their environment help each other, 17 even observe this strongly (PI=.81).

As nearly all respondents either agreed or even strongly agreed to this statement, there was no use in correlating this with items as primary confidence in others, pri-

---

[87] Some approaches from all walks of the political spectrum even question that Fordism should further serve as a model to strive for. The Chilean economist Manfred Max-Neef for instance assumes that people who have not unlearned to cope with insecurity and uncertainty are better equipped to deal with global economic shocks, as they know how to survive independent of the global economy and of state welfare (in: taz, 12.3.2005). Michael Vester believes that the "underprivileged milieus (...) are better prepared to the upcoming social insecurity through the strategies of flexible opportunity orientation practiced for generations" (in Bude/Willisch 2006: 271). Castel calls it "one of the paradoxes of progress" that "the most developed societies are also the most vulnerable" (2000: 401). Schultheis/Schulz (2005: 583) speak of the "radically novel in the emergence of a »new« social question," where the gradual dismantling of social securities and the state withdrawal from the provision of public services "now hits highly individualized individuals, exposed to the cold wind of radical market socialization without defense as their habitus got accustomed to a minimum level of protection against the imponderabilities of daily life in a capitalist market society, a society which only continues to assume responsibility for its members in a very limited way." The crisis of the labor society and the limits of growth, both a pillar of first modernity, now might make the global North again societies in development and the ones experienced in dealing with precarity to »development workers«.

[88] The Rheinish capitalism, with its concept of a "normal employment" serving as "scaffold of life conduct" (*Gerüst der Lebensführung*; Martin Kohli) and including permanent (ideally life-long) full-time employment, secured by collective bargaining agreements and equipped with decent social insurance features, all allowing a (male) breadwinner to support a nuclear family (and acquire a house and car), in one word: a leveled middle class society, was an exceptional historical state even in central Europe. Martin Osterland (in Berger/Hradil 1990: 353) therefore speaks of a "return to the 'normality' of prior conditions which have only been temporarily interrupted by the unique constellation of post-war capitalism and its relatively persistent growth momentum." A growing number of people in Europe have to cope with situations, which an exclusive group (especially male skilled workers in large firms within industrial societies, occasionally extended to the production chain in the periphery) – forgot about during the "short dream of everlasting prosperity" (Burkhart Lutz), but were pretty normal for most other people in Europe: women, migrants and workers in prior times (cf. Castel 2000).

marily gaining strengths from others or how easy it is for them to ask for help from others. What can be gained from these contingencies though, is that several people rely in themselves even if they believe that they could resort to support networks (16 of 19 strongly agreed that people in their environment help each other. Nevertheless, they mainly rely on themselves).[89]

At the same time, these networks are obligated to provide solidarity and support. Mutual aid is an embodied and such a die-hard social norm, institutionalized in a strong inner sense of mutual obligation called *utang na loob* (literally: internal debt) and a sense of propriety, embarrassment and shame (*hiya*) which prevents the violation of such obligations (Cf. Reese 2013e). Such social capital compensates for some lack of material resources and economic capital. But from a political point of view, this mechanism is problematic: Again and again there are loud complaints that putting families and networks in the focus of attention leads to familial group egoism (*kanya-kanya*) and nepotism in the Philippines (cf. Karaos 1997: 114).[90]

It is furthermore important to recognize that the different dimensions outlined and categories of precarity usually appear in cumulative deprivation: One dimension of insecurity adds to the other, insecurity of tenure often goes along with distance to the power centers and, especially in the context of a labor-based society (*Arbeitsgesellschaft*), with experiences of isolation. It is therefore insufficient and even misdirected to consider the living conditions of a whole society as "secure" or "insecure." Greg Bankoff refers to a fact that is often neglected: "Social systems generate unequal exposure to risk by making some people more prone to disaster than others and ... these inequalities are largely a function of the power relations (class, age, gender and ethnicity among others) operative in every society" (2003: 1).

3.8. Neoliberal governementality: The paradigm of responsibilization

Precarity and precarization are no operational accident or unwanted side effects of capitalist economy. Just as much as it is part of governing feudal societies to keep mechanisms of patron-client relations functioning, precarity is a capitalist normality. There are principally no guaranteed conditions of employment in capitalism and the

---

[89] While 19 of 28 mainly rely on themselves, 19 as well mainly gain strength and energy from others. (Of the eight, who mainly confide in others, all but one also gains strength from others – and not from themselves.) The contingency between both items is though only very weak (in absence of λ: ϕ=.24). There is no contingency at all between finding it important to earn their own money and finding it easy to ask help from others (λ=.0) or expecting help from others (λ=.06).

[90] Indeed, one could find several examples confirming the impression that it may count as a valid excuse for wrongdoing to have "helped a friend" (Lawyer Roy Villasol conniving with the "butcher" Palparan, Source: PDI, 13.2.2012) or "preserved the family's honor." Ignacio Arroyo, brother-in-law of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, is used as an example when he was perceived to have impeded the persecution of the ex-president. In a necrological article (cf. *Iggy: The good brother*, MT, 30.1.2012), he was described as a "prime example of a Filipino who would go to great lengths to help members of his family during moments of crisis. Anybody who would rebuke him for doing what he did is not a Filipino" (ibid.).

"revocability" of employment is an inevitable consequence of an economic system that considers labor nothing else but as a factor of production. And just like the other factors of production, labor is subject to the rules of cost minimization and profit maximization, or the "law" of optimum factor allocation.

Precarity is not only the outcome, but in a sense, the functional condition of a market-driven production model, transforming labor into a commodity and oriented towards perpetual "creative destruction" (Schumpeter). The displacement of peasants into workers, a major catalyst of capitalism, was based on "regime uncertainty" as well, by 'freeing' people by force from the commons and traditional means of livelihood, in order to drive them into the factories. (Marx here spoke of "*doppelter Freisetzung*," literally: double setting free.)

Besides this, precarity is a feature of neoliberal governementality, in the guise of a "Do-It-Yourself"-orientation. Such change in the dominant form of governance – from a disciplinary regime to one of responsibilization – is comparable to a paradigm shift in the sense of Thomas Kuhn. Governance here is a term, which in the tradition of Foucault includes all institutions and practices from administration to education, guiding, managing and conducting people, and determines the discursive arena, decides what is 'sound' and may be said and what is "insane." Which knowledge gets 'common' and prevails, what is considered to be true and what is considered to be a problem (*problematization*), is always a question of power as well. There is no knowledge without power as Foucault says; there is nothing such as pure, neutral, objective knowledge that merely 're-presents' reality (Cf. Bröckling et al. 2000).

While the dominant production regime in "first modernity" (Ulrich Beck), i.e. fordism (with its focus on mass production), had an interest in disciplining and silencing the workers to make them but another element of the assembly line (according to Frederic Taylor's principles of scientific management, workers were "paid to work and not to think" (Madry/Kirby 1996: 28), "the dominant Taylorist-Fordist strategy of using labor seemed to have gotten an obstacle for further productivity improvements in many areas (but not everywhere), so often extended responsibilities of the workers were installed" (Voß/Pongratz 1998: 133).

External rule (*Fremdführung*) loses in importance compared to self-management (*Selbstführung*, terms following Bröckling 2007), a historical development also very much reflected in the theory of civilization by Norbert Elias where transition is described as transformation of »external constraints« into »self-constraints«, considered by Elias as mental requirement for (less as effect of) an industrial-capitalist way of life. Following Foucault, there has even been a governementality preceding this disciplinary regime: sovereign rule. The rationality of sovereign rule requires submission to the powerful (*Mächtige* in the sense of Max Weber) and refusal to do so is met with punishment. The rationality of the disciplinary system again builds on fitting docile bodies into appreciated plans of the government (*Herrschaft* in the sense of Weber) and deficiencies are met with (further) training and drill.

Liberal governance on the other hand aims to generate subjects who only want what is ‘reasonable’. This kind of governance requires the 'freedom' of the governed, and the rational use of this freedom is the condition of an ‘economic' government. Sven Opitz considers that “from the perspective of liberalism, the direct rule over the subject turns out to be unproductive” (2004: 125) and neoliberal policy can reach its political aims more ‘economically’ and ‘efficiently’ through individual self-realization (or self-exploitation). This is why it is pivotal for neoliberal governance to depart from direct and external rule which is exercising technologies of discipline, forming souls and training docile, compliant and useful bodies, and, instead delegating the responsibility and liability from formal state government to the individual subjects. Direct rule turns into indirect rule, directives into suggestions, instructions and guidance. Governance now means to activate commitment (mobilization) and readiness to make decisions under the sign of individual responsibility, independence and individual initiative (empowerment). In liberalism ‘freedom’ thus does not equal with “do what you want,” freedom can only be granted to those who are able to decide among ‘rational' alternatives of action. This is a reason why despite its citizenship rhetoric, liberal regimes have also only slowly granted citizenship to new groups (see chapter 4.1. *What is citizenship*).

Those who are not (yet) capable to do so, are still subjected to technologies of discipline and sovereignty in a neoliberal regime as well: Where self-management cannot be generated, discipline, repression and control (‘security measures’) are resorted to. Hegemony is "armored with coercion," as Gramsci said. As long as subjects do not yet know how to use freedom in a »responsible« way, they cannot yet be granted independence (but they will be taught so). The discourse of benevolent assimilation of the Philippines by the colonial US-American masters is an excellent example for such understanding, just as empowerment approaches in development projects nowadays are (cf. Berner/Philipps 2004, Schild 2004). And while nowadays, responsibilization is useful as a technology to activate the precarious (still having something to strive for), repressive technologies are employed against the superfluous, the 'risk populations' and the ones resistant to responsibilization (cf. Reese 2006a). (Nevertheless it is interesting to note that Filipino modernists such as Randy David consider the lack of discipline as a shortcoming of Philippine culture in its “evolution” [David 2014] to modernity. "People don't take rules seriously, but take them as suggestions,” David believes [ibid.]. “People take shortcuts; they don't put enough value to rules for these are modern rules.")

As the case study of the ICCAs shows, especially for the ones belonging to the mass service model, there is a coexistence of responsibilization and disciplining. Where responsibilization does not show enough satisfying results, elements of the governementalities of discipline and control are also drawn on. “Those who profit from what we are doing, they want to control us. And sometimes they control us with

kindness and sometimes they control us with fear," as a respondent commented during the first Focus Group discussion in Davao (FGD Davao 2012a).

In the governementality of responsibilization, coercion is less direct and obvious than in disciplinary governance, it is superseded by implicit threats which 'suggest' to the subject the necessity to care actively for their own life and permanently improve its human capital (lifelong learning) and put it to the market. "The leash gets longer, but it is not cut through" (Bröckling 2007: 63). The need to submit to the demands of the labor market (employability) is not considered as incommensurate with the utmost value liberalism puts on freedom, as its methodological ontologism has no understanding for structural violence (Galtung) which is simply "noise" (Luhmann) to it.

Often within neoliberally inspired empowerment projects, "there is no learning about duty bearers or accountability by anyone other than the self"(Howe/Covell 2010: 99). The enterprising self shall not blame success or failure on external influences (the 'system', society, government, etc.), but is primarily constructed as depending on choosing the right alternative(s). *You can do it, if you really want to!* is how the promise goes, including the threat: If you don't try hard enough, you might fail and that then is your own fault. Unlike in first modernity, people no longer ought to complete a group (team, community, nation) as an "organizational man," but the rationale of neoliberal biopolitics is to subjectify them as »accountants on their own« or as Beck (1986) says: "full mobile singles."

"The individual is free and forced to take responsibility for the success of one's life project. Especially young people see themselves faced with a situation in which brakes and crashes can no longer be derived from the rules and structures of the labor market. Rather, failure is assigned to one's self and one's lack of flexibility" (Busch et al 2010: 28). Or as Beck (1983) puts it into terms: a handicraft biography (*Bastelbiographie*) can easily turn into a crash biography (*Bruchbiographie*). "One may claim success for oneself. But one is also responsible for the failure. Own life, own success, own failure" (Brunhild Sauer-Burghard, following Yildiz Deniz: *Zwischen Kooperation und Konkurrenz - neue Lebensstile*, WDR 5, 5.6.1996).

In the case of citizenship theory, we can observe that while in the Fordist age, the focus was very much on passive citizenship (citizens as right bearers, the state as provider of public service), the neoliberal age stresses much more the dimension of active citizenship, i.e. citizen duties. The (neo)liberal emphasis of freedom does not only include the right to be bothered as little as possible by state and society but also includes the obligation to look after one's self (and one's family and neighbors) first, before calling on the community or the state, as Margaret Thatcher programmatically pointed out (in an interview with Women's Own magazine on October 3, 1987): "Too many people have been given to understand that if they have a problem, it's the government's job to cope with it. ... People must look to themselves first. It's our duty to look after ourselves and then, also to look after our neighbour. People have got the

entitlements too much in mind, without the obligations. There's no such thing as entitlement, unless someone has first met an obligation."[91] This is remarkable as usually liberalism, is connected with having rights, and its counterpart, communitarism, with having duties (cf. Jones/Gaventa 2002: 8). There has been a shift from "entitlement to obligation" (Hartmann 2005) in the context of the rollback of the welfare state in the Global North and the halt to the developmental state in the Global South, expressed in the design of social policies inspired by neoliberalism. Categorical citizen and human rights are turned into conditional and revocable "customers rights," understood as contractual obligation and therefore based on "mutual obligations."

It draws on the principle of subsidiarity (but without 'copying' the prerequisite of Catholic social teaching that the most local competent authority should be supported by more central authorities in fulfilling its tasks). [More on the rebalancing of rights and obligations in the chapter 4.1.2.: *Duties and/or rights?* in part II.] »Rolling back the state and unleashing the markets« as centerpiece of neoliberal structural adjustment programs argues for (more) responsibility, 'self-production' and risk-taking from the individual or from communities, the latter being a kind of collective individuals (cf. Berner/Philipps 2004 and Rüb 2003).

Informality and informalization can so be considered a way of governance, the way Bourdieu does, when considering precarity to be "part of a new form of ruling which is based on the establishment of uncertainty becoming a permanent condition and which aims to force the worker to accept their exploitation" (Bourdieu 1998). His line of reasoning: Self-management shall discipline the people and obstruct intentions of realizing emancipatory projects as insecurity is believed to force them back into competition and keep solidarity down. Fear of losing one's livelihood creates conformism and divides the governed (the gender rollback and xenophobia could be interpreted in this way). The already dropped out and the marginalized serve as deterrent reminder of what may happen if "people who work hard and play by the rules" (Bill Clinton) start to behave »unreasonable.«

Responsibilization though is not (necessarily) a perfidious and bogus plot by the *malakas* to keep the precarious in check, an understanding that is anyway incompatible with Foucault's concept of power as a more or less solidified social relation between persons and social groups, not possessed by a single willingly oppressive actor – be it *the* government, *the* capitalists or *the* CIA - but exercised and only real in the very act (Bröckling et al. 2000). Power relations of any kind only exist wherever they are 'actualized', i.e. exercised by the people involved. Neoliberalism »honestly« believes in risk and has an affirmative relationship to it, in its eyes constituting an incentive for innovation. Risks are not/no longer considered as deficit which should be eliminated or at least mitigated, but rather a pivotal condition for »individual development« and

[91] Three years before she explained in a speech to a Small Business Bureau Conference on 8 February, 1984: "I came to office with one deliberate intent: to change Britain from a dependent to a self-reliant society -- from a give-it-to-me, to a do-it-yourself nation. A get-up-and-go, instead of a sit-back-and-wait-for-it Britain" (Source: izquotes.com/quote/272128).

social progress. The neo-liberal mastermind Friedrich von Hayek considered underdevelopment thus as a matter of incompetence and backwardness or refusal to learn from the successful. And social justice in his eyes is an obstruction to evolutionary learning as "at trial and error, the error is neither seen nor experienced due to social protection“ (following Herbert Schui/Stephanie Blankenberg: *Neoliberalismus: Theorie, Gegner, Praxis*, Hamburg, 2002, p. 117). Gerhard Willke, being in favor of neoliberalism, says: If only "individual freedom of action is extended through deregulation, flexibility and the unleashing of market dynamics" - calling these three terms the "signature of neoliberalism," the "state of maximum self-determination" will come about (Idem.: *Neoliberalismus*, Frankfurt: Campus, 2003, p.29).[92]

Socialization researchers such as Böhnisch et al (2009: 64), believe that coping with uncertainty and precarity will be the "central challenge for individuals in second modernity."[93] "Institutionally patterned and accordingly achievable biographical handling certainties," typical for the first modernity, where socialization was considered completed after adolescence, turned into changing and unpredictable challenges of coping," and as Böhnisch et al. continues, "which is reflected in a disintegration of the course of life." The focus has shifted from social to self-organization, as Böhnisch et al. believe, thereby retracing the Foucauldian concept of discipline and responsibilization within socialization theory.[94] Thus, they believe that, "the competence to manage biographical uncertainty could develop into cultural capital and a new important dimension of inequality" (ibid.).

Ernst Lantermann et al. (2009) conclude that those "who can rely on his ability for »self-organization« and »regulation of uncertainty« and was able to develop considerable confidence into one's self, into others and into the future will be relatively well equipped."[95] Without those resources though, objectively precarious circumstances will quickly trigger a sense of being overburdened, develop into psychosomatic complaints and self-neglect. Or, they acquire right-wing orientations, in which fears of social descent and disintegration blend with a sense of powerlessness (Sommer 2010, similar Boris 2004 for Latin America). "Where precarization triggers a political reaction, it is not necessarily of emancipatory kind," says Sommer (2010: 272), as "downward social mobility and anomy are processed very differently according to

---

[92] Likewise in neoliberal governementality, "structural overtaxing is intentional," because as Bröckling believes (2007: 70), "it creates the kind of ongoing tension that never allows individuals to come to feel at ease," a position liberalism shares especially with sectarian Protestantism which eyes security with suspicion as allegedly leading to indolence.

[93] Second modernity is a term by Ulrich Beck which he distinguishes from Fordist first modernity and also calls "reflexive modernity," with modernity applying its own principle of reflexivity to itself.

[94] This approach moreover also puts the habitus concept (upon which this study is based on) in question, as socialization "can no longer be simply understood as a process of habituation" (ibid.: 37). But Böhnisch et al. assume that " in critical life situations, cores of the habitus come up which refer to bonds to social origin and gender" (p. 40), so that the habitus concept should not be shelved, but merely put into perspective.

[95] Beck assumed already in 1986 that "coping with anxiety and uncertainty will turn biographically and politically into a civilizational key skill in the global North as well" (Beck 1986: 102).

mentality and traditions within the milieu, be it authoritarian and resigned or be it democratic and in solidarity."

In an authoritarian reaction, violated feelings of justice (relative deprivation) and the fear of loss of status don't manifest themselves in protest against those in power (dominant groups or social elites), but in aversions and hostilities against groups considered as inferior and identified as the reason for personally experienced frustrations and grievances (Sommer 2010: 124), a phenomenon that Max Horkheimer termed "conformist rebellion."

Such resentments though also have the function to exclude competitors from scarce resources (Sommer 2010: 234ff); which could also be observed among the ICCAs interviewed for this research. These statements about Indian and American agents however were few. More relevant was their degradation of some callers as "white trash" et al. which served to enhance one's self-esteem (as Sommer describes for the German context, ibid.: 237).[96] But as such callers cannot be considered socially marginal groups, at least in the context of global society, such a reaction from the agents is at the same time an expression of "everyday resistance." An ambivalence which might also hold true for the more frequently reported reactions from the side of American and other foreign callers who have accused the Philippine agents to steal their jobs, and yet, who are nothing but "only Filipinos" or "monkeys."

Customers are cursed as stupid people, dull-witted or even white trash, while the agents consider themselves as knowledgeable, bright and university educated. But this downgrading of customers could also be understood as mechanism of keeping one's dignity (and therefore a form of everyday resistance), unlike similar distinction strategies played towards their main competitors, the Indians (Cf. subchapter 3.17.9.: *distinction* below).

Certain milieus are overwhelmed in coping with social change and fail to adapt to new requirements in society as Claudia Rademacher and Philipp Ramos Lobato (2008) outline in their article *Teufelskreis oder Glücksspirale? Ungleiche Bewältigung unsicherer Beschäftigung* (Vicious cycle or game of chance? Uneven coping with insecure employment). On the other hand, "labor entrepreneurs" (*Arbeitskraftunternehmer* - Voss/Pongartz 1998) - for whom "the economic logic becomes a biographical attitude" (Böhnisch et al 2009: 71) - thereby blurring the boundaries between paid employment and entrepreneurship, are those who "fit" best to nowaday's exigencies on the high skilled labor markets of neoliberalism, just like the those who secure »employability« by constantly adapting to the changing requirements in regard to work

[96] Call center agents strongly object to be considered merely dropouts by their American customers. (This is what the agents believe call center agents in the US are, reflecting a lack of knowledge about the similarly precarious situation college graduates in the global North are currently experiencing nowadays.) "Caught between two competing symbolic systems (race and class – NR) agents play up symbolic hierarchies of status and prestige to reconstitute their position in the exchange," believes Fabros (2007: 226).

and life. [97] They correspond to the model character neoliberal governementality promotes, the "enterprising self" (Bröckling 2007) which is making a project out of one's self. In the words of a Davao respondent: "Parang (it's like) you have this notion ba na mag-unsa na lang mi (what is going to happen to us), *ano'ng gagawin ko* (what am I going to do), *asa na mi* after (where we are going after). You don't know what to do."

Most successful in such setting is the one who knows best how to act and react in a pragmatic way; smart, flexible and willing to adapt, and who knows how to "organize," to "eke out" (*diskarte*) or to find a loophole (*magpalusot*). Such people might have given up (or have never followed) the idea of being able to design their life (leading a consistent biography), but who know how to creatively deal with a precarious life. *Diskarte* here equals to "getting accustomed to precarity" (Castel 2005: 125) and to habitualizing the "provisional muddling through" (Castel 2000, 357f.).[98] In this context, Gregory Wilpert speaks of a "neoliberalism from below": "The informal sector," says Wilpert, "is a kind of shock absorber of globalization and this is the function it fulfils in the neoliberal project of ruling from the top. But informalization is also the practical result gained from those people affected by globalization effects. Lacking convincing and feasible alternatives, they pursue a strategy of »neoliberalism from below«" (quoted after Elmar Altvater: *Ende des Kapitalismus*, Hamburg, 2006; p. 191).

Models such as the enterprising self however are not simple empirical facts, but "real fictions," as Bröckling explains: "The enterprising self does not describe an empirically observable entity, but the way in which individuals are addressed as persons, and at the same time the direction into which they are to be modified and shall modify themselves. This is a real fiction … a highly influential »as-if«, getting continuously modified and kept in motion by self- modification, moved by the desire to remain connected and driven by the fear to fall out of a social order associated to market mechanisms without performing such adjustment. To put it in another way: One is not an entrepreneurial self, one shall get to be one. And one can only get to be one as one is always already addressed as such" (Bröckling 2007: 47).

Addressing the caveat that the theory of responsibilization and the observation backing it have been made in the context of Western-industrial societies (here France

---

[97] Features of labor entrepreneurs according to Voß and Pongratz (1998: 132f) are an extended self-control by the employee, the need for enhanced commercialization of their skills and their performance, and a "enterprization" (*Verbetrieblichung*) of the conduct of life (i.e. self-management of everyday life and biography], with the effect that a model worker likens more and more a self-employed or an entrepreneur.

This includes the individualization of problems: Within a group of workers significant inequities can be created or constructed even among those on the same skill level (*divide et impera*). "In lieu of solidarity that used to prevail among professionals, competition between equals increases. The members of a group of workers are no longer united by common goals that benefit the group as a whole. Each individual must rather put forward what difference he or she makes in order to secure or improve one's own working and living conditions" (Castel, 2000: 59).

[98] Such "muddling through" impedes at the same time long-term security strategies: "Short term survival strategies ... ultimately impair long-term economic mobility," says Mike Davis (*Planet of Slums*, New York, 2006, p. 160). "Worsening economic conditions limit the capacity of urban working-class households to implement long term social mobility strategies, since it forces them to mobilize their inner resources and make extensive use of their labour force for basic survival."

and Germany) and cannot simply be transferred to a different context, I would like to call attention again to the structural heterogeneity of Philippine society ("semi-feudal, semi-capitalist" as a prominent analysis in the Philippines goes) and that the laid- down assumptions seem relevant, at least, for the sectors integrated into global capitalism and people within these sectors are exposed to the challenges of neoliberalism, post-Fordism, second modernity or however the societal system prevalent in the global center nowadays is called. The Philippines is so to say, a "semi-traditional" society or as Randy David describes, "trapped between the old and the new" (PDI, 14.12.2013).[99] The strong traits of responsibilization outlined in the empirical part of this study clearly show that most Filipin@s seem receptive to the neoliberal strategy of responsibilization (see the postscript for more details on *the connivance of communitarism and neoliberalism*).[100]

3.9. Precarization and collective action – an oxymoron?

As mentioned, collective action does not necessarily develop in the context of precarity. Usual reasons for these are:

- implications of neoliberal governementality leading to individualism and competition.

- lack of time, as it is all consumed in juggling with the insecurity of one's life conditions.

- lack of perspectives, as attention is directed to a day to day survival existence (encapsulated in the Tagalog saying "*isang kahig, isang tuka*", literally translated as "one scrape, one peck" or a hand to mouth existence).

- uncertainty and anxiety (especially the fear of being dismissed), blocking a defiant attitude.

- precarious working conditions handicapping labor organization due to a high level of turnover, high demands on time and a low identification with the work environment, expecting it to be a temporary anyway. This is further aggravated when wor-

---

[99] The Philippines might be a less modern society if "modern" is understood in the way Anthony Giddens does, i.e. "a short-hand term for modern society, or industrial civilization" (in *Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 94), which is associated with the idea of the world as open to transformation, by human intervention; a complex of economic institutions, especially industrial production and a market economy; and a certain range of political institutions, the nation-state, division of power and mass democracy. "It is a society—more technically, a complex of institutions—which, unlike any preceding culture, lives in the future, rather than the past" (ibid.). But it is not simply positive to be modern as the myth of modernity assumes (see above). The critique modernity has evoked in the West - be it its acquisitive materialism transgressing the limits of growth up to even considering the Nazi-industrial genocide as outflow of modernity - shows this.

[100] We might ask though if it isn't as relevant for a 'modern' society like Germany what David says in his column, i.e. "as a people, we Filipinos are caught in the difficult transition between tradition and modernity. Our traditional instincts, which incline us to take things personally in our everyday encounters with other people, are out of sync with the realities of modern living." Despite the "dialectics of modernization" (Münch 1994: 32) going on in "modern societies" as well, theories of modern society are unchallenged when applied there.

kers, like in the case of writers, home-based workers et al. are not concentrated in numbers in their places of work.

While we will later see that especially the first and the last points also hold true for the precarized considered to be part of the middle class; for the other points, we can assume that they are rather drawn from a social condition which Castel does not even consider to be part of the zone of precarity, but belongs to the zone of decouplement. This distinction unfortunately is not exactly taken up by literature. It so happens that the term "precarious" here is used very inconsistently, and in more cases than not, there is an inadequate distinction between the ones decoupled and the ones in a precarious situation. This might be so as the discourse on precarization is not only (and maybe even less) a scientific discourse, but very much embedded in a social struggle on preserving the gains of the (European) welfare state model against its neoliberal onslaught, summing up the undesired outcome of neoliberal governance as "precarity." Just like "precarious" and "poor" are not very well distinguished, "precarious" also becomes a synonym for decoupled. It is not only Bourdieu (1998) that cares little for a distinction, but Matuschek (2011: 239) as well, and when it comes to possibilities of political action, even Dörre (2007: 40) and Castel (2000: 384).

As research among the decoupled (Klatt/Walter 2011, Munsch 2003 among others) shows, other points are applicable for the long-term unemployed, especially those with a lower class background, than for the precarious, i.e. the ones being in a social limbo, particularly if they are from the middle stratum, who have command over political and educational resources. Precarity does not necessarily lead to the forming of a negative milieu and it is not necessarily associated with material deprivation, social negative attributions and stigmatization as permanent unemployment does - a fact that probably is of even higher significance in labor societies like those of Europe, where employment is even more connected to self-worth and societal acceptance than in the Philippines.

Merklen (2005), writing on the Piquetero-movement in Argentina, succinctly puts in a nutshell the way the precarized and the decoupled act differently, when distinguishing between "agriculturists" (*agricultores*) and "hunters" (*cazadores*). The precarized middle class here can be considered "agriculturists" following "projects" in life, while the precarized and marginalized poor are simply "hunters" who are always on the lookout for an opportunity (Vester and others speak of a flexible opportunity orientation) following "urgencies"(terms following Merklen). While the latter leads to clientelism, the former allows "forms of citizenship"(p. 189), even if Merklen considers them "more or less bastardized forms of citizenship" (ibid.). "Agriculturists" can act to a certain extent in a political way, demand for redistribution, recognition and system changes, openly contest the ones in power and have some future orientation (which allows them to have a sense of eventualities [*Möglichkeitssinn*] and a sense of aspiration). The "lack of control over the future is what radically separates the hunter from the agriculturist" (Merklen 2005: 192). Though I do not follow the conclusion which is often drawn from this comparison, namely that the decoupled

cannot be organized and politicized (cf. in detail Reese 2008a), research suggests that it is more likely for agriculturists than hunters to choose political strategies.

3.10. Middle class – what is that?

"Sense of aspiration" is one trait usually identified with the middle class. We can even say that it is one of the two approaches how to define middle class. The other – and more classical one – is to tie belongingness to the middle class to one's economic position, i.e. an income beyond survival (disposable income). In its crudest, as well as most popular form, the latter happens simply by equating a certain income bracket to the middle class - like the purchasing power-based arrangement of Philippine society into the classes A-E most common here.

Sociological definitions are usually not that simple. Like the structural-functionalist paradigm still very influential in sociological theory, they at least draw on higher educational attainment (which might be formal, but could be informal as well in the case of the old middle classes) and a professional occupation (with a certain degree of control and supervisory power) next to a disposable income as 'objective' criteria for defining "middle-class."

In line with these three dimensions, Savage et al (1992) distinguish three assets that allow the middle class to establish a separate class identity: property, bureaucracy and culture. Therefore, they identify three groupings within the middle class: one formed around property (bourgeoisie or petite bourgeoisie[101]); one around bureaucracy or organization (the managers and one could add: the executives and for third world countries, the comprador bourgeoisie and state classes); and finally, cultural capital (the professionals).

When picked up by society such definition of middle class may sound like the one the columnist John Mangun offers. In his article It is always about the middle (Manila Times, 1.8.2013), Mangun lists a variety of indicators for middle class membership: a personal bank account; ability to shop at large department stores and supermarkets; home ownership ("most people know that they are starting to succeed financially when they can buy a house"); health or life insurance; retirement savings; planned and regular vacations ("poor people cannot afford vacations; rich people get out of town whenever they feel like it."); (being) concerned about dividing their time between work and play; and, putting emphasis on a good education for your offspring. ("The rich and the poor do not worry about saving money for a child's college educa-

[101] In using the term "petite" instead of "petty" for what is called *Kleinbürgertum* (petite bourgeoisie) in German, I follow Glassman's argument that calling this (sub-)class "petty" is already a way of ridiculing their pragmatic and limited aims (Glassman 1995: 153) "Petty-bourgeois" is a cuss word used in a distinctive manner by upper class circles or the established Left (whose masterminds often also originate from the higher echelons), pulling to pieces a "parochial," but nevertheless "complacent" mindset of the petite bourgeoisie.

tion; middle-class people do. So, if you are putting away some money each month to get your kids through college, you are middle class.")

All in all, the "trappings of a comfortable life without the financial security of those in the upper AB class or the torments of hard labor—or worse, joblessness—plaguing the DE class," is the way the columnist Johnna Villaviray-Giolagon (in Manila Times, 22.9.2010) defines middle class. Such "comfortable life" (Villaviray-Giolagon) though, relies on a disposable and reliable income. Hence, "the No. 1 thing that people say is necessary to be part of the middle class is to have a steady job [or at least] some permanency to the employment" (Mangun, ibid.). Mangun then implicitly links middle class to precarity, considering it as a "social position in limbo." Kraemer (2008a: 147) puts it by stating that "perhaps, the best way to know if you are middle class is if you are the one hurt the most in an economic downturn or when the economy is mismanaged by the government's economic experts. ... Bad economic times do not affect rich people in terms of a change in lifestyle. They are insulated by their accumulated wealth. ... The poor are hurt, but not as much as the middle class in lifestyle terms. Sad to say, when you are at the bottom, there's no way you can go lower" (Mangun, ibid.).

The classical approach though does not assume that merely graduating from an institution of higher learning, enabling one to work as a professional and to earn a disposable income, already makes a person a member of the 'middle class'. Here as well, common sense considers a specific conduct of living and mindset as essential to be 'middle class' (as done by Werner Pfennig in Becker et al. 1999: 278, Ehrenreich 1989 or Lakha 1999: 265). What distinguishes the structural-functionalist approach from more culturally oriented approaches of social structure theory is that it assumes a coincidence of the meritocratic triad of education, occupation and income and a typical 'middle class'-behavior and does not further discuss this relation. Wherever groups considered themselves part of the middle class and show middle class attitudes without 'backing' this up with the equivalent income or occupation, they were simply considered "false middle class" (*falscher Mittelstand*) as Ralf Dahrendorf did.

3.10.1. Class imagination: the paradigm of lifestyle

The other way of defining middle class focuses less on socio-economic determinants (Joachim Raschke [1988] calls such focus "paradigm of distribution"), but rather zooms in on mental and cultural determinants (Raschke speaks of a "paradigm of lifestyle [*Lebensweise*]"). It does not put prime on »objective« class belonging, but considers most relevant if people think and act in a middle class way (middle-classness as mindset); an approach thus more compatible with the *Sinnverstehen*-approach. The difference in these two approaches of how to define middle class resonates the distinction in German historical science (cf. Schäfer 2009) between "*Bürgertum*" (bourgeoisie/middle class as a social group) and "*Bürgerlichkeit*"(cultural, specifically bourgeois attitudes), next to "*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*" (bourgeois society).

Jürgen Osterhammel summarizes such interpretative approach, when stating: "Who and what is a *Bürger*[102] cannot be reliably determined by the objective criteria of familial origin, income and profession. *Bürger* were the ones who considered themselves to be such and practically expressed this belief in their conduct of life – extensive research and discussions led to little more than this tautological result ... The middle class (*Bürgertum*) as a stratum or a class escapes a definitional access. ... It is easier to say what a *Bürger* is not: not a feudal lord who derives his self-understanding from land ownership plus genealogy, and not a manual worker in a dependent position" (Osterhammel 2010: 1080).

It is the position of social indecisiveness that characterizes much of middle class belonging. Unlike for most people at the extremes of the social spectrum, middle class positions are only partly inherited, and if so, they are usually acquired by an ancestor not long time ago; birth alone is no guarantee of eventual class position. "The true member of the middle class denies this fixity to which both upper and lower are committed. Life depends not upon birth and status, not upon breeding or beauty, but upon effort" (Margaret Mead in Ehrenreich 1989: 75). Or as Osterhammel (2010: 1081) says: "The successful *Bürger* owes his position to self-dependence and own performance. Nothing seems to be reliably inborn to him." At the same time, Osterhammel assumes that "something like a *bürgerlicher* Habitus is not necessarily bound to the cultural requirements of the West" (ibid.: 1086) and identifies the pursuit of respectability and reputation, distance to manual labor, the importance of domestic

---

[102] *Bürger* is not a term easy to translate into English: It can mean bourgeois, burgher, townspeople, commoner, but as well, citizen. And *bürgerlich* can be bourgeois as much as civil. It resonates with the Philippine *burgis*, though this is a rather pejorative term. Usually "*bürgerlich*" is simply translated with "middle class." To keep the variety of meanings, I will use the term "Bürger" and "*bürgerlich*" when referring to German sources.

*Mittelklasse (*literally: middle class) and *Bürgertum* though are often not used in a clear cut manner in German literature as well, but are often used interchangeably just like in English. At times *Bürgertum* is considered as a group with similar interests, value systems and ideas of social order and is considered as "socialization of middle classes... which happened under particular constellations and conditions" (Schäfer 2009: 179). Then again, *Bürgertum* is considered a social stratum distinguished from nobility and clergy on top and peasants and workers down below. In the latter case, there is no differentiation made between *Bürgertum* and *Mittelklasse*, at least as far as the 19th century is concerned.

virtues and the rational calculus also among Arabic, Chinese or Indian merchants (cf. as well the chapter 4.2.: *Citizenship - a western concept?*).[103]

A sense of aspiration and personal initiative can thus be considered the central hallmark of the middle classes. Middle class people must still work for a living and if they belong to the new middle class (see below) or the "professional middle class" (Ehrenreich)[104], their cultural capital (their main production resource) must continuously be renewed through fresh effort and commitment to "life-long learning," which requires discipline, orientation towards the future and self-direction.[105] They have little to hand down to their children because organizational skills and educational titles, unlike property are not inheritable.

Portocarrero (1998: 14) therefore considers "self-control and the orientation towards the future and progress … the most distinct markers of middle-class subjectivity." He further states that the "constitutive trait of the middle class ...[is] a method of life which revolves around discipline and self-control and which projects itself ideally towards growth and towards goals as social recognition, material comfort and more generally the exploration and development of one's own capacities"(ibid.: 18)[106]. For this reason, educational attainment is probably more significant than household income and even a professional occupation for considering one's self as part of the middle class. Education is, for them, as Owensby says, "more than for the rich who had nowhere to rise and whose resources generally preserved them against the dread of rapid downward mobility [or] manual workers whose circumstances precluded a realistic and widespread expectation of betterment" (Owensby: 1999: 95).

Other attitudes and virtues next to the sense of aspiration considered to be *bürgerlich*, i.e. »middle class« markers, are traditional frugality, hard work and a sense of duty, self-criticism geared towards performance orientation, self-discipline and gratification deferral, self-reliance, decency in both meanings of the word (moderate as well as appropriate) or cleanliness (cf. Portocarrero 1998, Dörre 2007, Schäfer 2009, Kocka

---

[103] These Asian middle classes were formed in Asia when population growth promoted a progressive social differentiation; trade and business expanded; and, when state administrations have been embellished, which created new employment opportunities on the middle levels of hierarchy; all of these factors also triggered the emergence of a broader middle class in Europe (Osterhammel 2010: 1088); for Asia (cf. also Pinches1999a: 10ff) and for the Philippine case (cf. Reese 2013f).

[104] Barbara Ehrenreich considers all those people to be »professional middle class« ,"whose economic and social status is based on education, rather than on the ownership of capital or property, which distinguishes them from petty bourgeoisie or executives and managers" (1989: 14). Even if they belong to the upper echelon of the middle class, the executives' command over power is a delegated one, which means that it is precarious and 'for the time being,' which is why Ehrenreich rejects the idea to consider the professional middle class to be part of the elite (ibid.).

[105] This may also be the reason for the anxiety found within middle classes, "a fear of inner weakness, of growing soft, of failing to strive, of losing discipline and will" (Ehrenreich 1989: 105).

[106] This preoccupation for respectability has been observed by Owensby (1999: 2) in the case of Brazil as well, where he observed that "their [the middle class'] lives were taken up by a concern for status, the pursuit of success through merit .., an irreducible affinity for respectable employment, a tortured desire for conspicuous consumption, a preoccupation with class, a desperate desire for moral superiority." Pinches (1999a: 41) observed nearly the same for Thailand.

2008 and others).[107] *Bürgerlichkeit* is so more or less closely connected to guiding principles and courses of action, "which enable the functioning of a self-managed society" (Schäfer 2009: 129). And Schäfer (ibid.: 130) indicates that "the bourgeois values and virtues might originally have been propagated by the bourgeoisie and have been especially widespread among them. But aristocracy or workers as well can become bourgeois (*verbürgerlichen*), while the bourgeoisie can distance itself from bourgeoisness."

Already, the author of the study *La clase media en Chile* published in 1947 considers all those whose social and cultural situation is a result of their own effort, their work and their studies to be part of the middle class (Werz 1999: 99). But when stressing the sense of aspiration, it stands to reason to not only consider success and showing insignia of success as a trait of "middle-classness," as Chavez (1998: 180) does, but already the imagination that one may be successful "if you really want to" (success orientation). Believing in the mere chance to set your own goals and stage-manage these chances, in for example, presenting rules of how to be successful by posting such rules and seeking advice from guidebooks, could already be considered as a middle class orientation. It is this attitude that makes them responsive to the mobilization imperative within neoliberal governementality of responsibilization.

Such 'aspirational middle class' might even be more pronounced in so called developmental societies, as aspiration and desire seem to be present before the hard facts of belonging to the middle classes have been reached (just as it has been among the workers movement in Europe and America during its formational years to avoid Othering the global South). "In common sense," says Portocarrero (1998: 15f.), "middle class as a social group stays defined on the ground of educational, occupational and income features. Well, when we distinguish people on ground of these »objective« criteria, the middle class may not be the majority; most people considering themselves to be middle class even if they are workers or big businessmen would not be included. ... A worker … might be much more influenced by values like moderation and progress. Despite his economic precarity, he may consider himself to be part of the middle class. He might think he doesn't have the position he wishes or deserves and so he leads his children to follow the way of conquering the fortune, instilling discipline and the wish of succeeding in them. ... It might be unjustified to say that this worker is »alienated« and hegemonized by foreign bourgeois values because his mentality and his social position don't correspond. ... The imagination is not secondary or derived, [it is] a social and objective dimension, a force

---

[107] Public cleanliness has been a specific middle-class concern in 19th century Europe, as well as in 21st century Manila. This made them lobby for 'beautification' projects (Rodriguez 2009: 84) and campaigns to clear out "dirty" and "unhealthy" slums and workers' habitats or street vendors "blocking" the sidewalks. Such obsession with cleanliness within the middle class can be considered as a distinctive behavior as well. "Alcohol politics" (Jun Naraval, personal information) for example, are prevalent in Philippine politics, meaning that middle class people oftentimes apply alcohol after shaking hands with lower class people.

which regulates the impulses, models, desires and serves as fundament for the identity."

The assumption of Portocarrero, that the aspirational middle class is especially pronounced can be backed up with the data of the 2001 ISSP on social identity, especially when it comes to the Philippines.[108] In the ISSP 2001, "lower, working, lower middle and upper (middle) class" were used as subjective class belongings as respondents were left to classify themselves. In the Philippines, 67,5% of the respondents considered themselves lower middle and 24,9% upper (middle) class. Among those who only visited elementary school, 65,6% considered themselves lower middle and 32,0%(sic!) upper middle class. On the other hand, 39,4% of the postgraduates considered themselves working class and 25,9% lower class![109] There is even a negative correlation between educational attainment and subjective class belonging (d=-.21), the only one detected among all countries that participated in the 2001 ISSP (cf. table 1).

BASE=1200 Weighted sample		Total	Country				
			Philippines				
			Total	R's subjective social class			
				Lower	Working	Lower middle	Upper
R's Education I: years in school	Not applicable, not available	28 (100%)	100.0 %	-	-	24.1 %	75.9 %
	1-7	470 (100%)	100.0 %	1.0 %	1.4 %	65.6 %	32.0 %
	8-11	429 (100%)	100.0 %	0.6 %	2.4 %	74.5 %	22.6 %
	12-15	229 (100%)	100.0 %	3.7 %	17.2 %	66.9 %	12.2 %
	16-19	23 (100%)	100.0 %	-	39.4 %	57.1 %	3.5 %
	20-70	2 (100%)	100.0 %	25.9 %	39.5 %	34.6 %	-
	Still at college,uni	13 (100%)	100.0 %	14.3 %	32.4 %	40.6 %	12.7 %
	Don't know	5 (100%)	100.0 %	24.0 %	24.0 %	52.0 %	-
	No answer, refused	1 (100%)	100.0 %	-	100.0 %	-	-
	Total	1200 (100%)	100.0 %	1.6 %	6.0 %	67.5 %	24.9 %
	Base for mean	1166	1166	18	70	801	277
	Mean	1.9	1.9	2.8	3.1	1.9	1.6
	Standard Deviation	0.98	0.98	1.75	1.28	0.89	0.80

BASE=936 Weighted sample		Total	Country									
			Germany West									
			Total	R's subjective social class								
				None	Lower	Working	Lower middle	Middle	Upper middle	Upper	DK,can't choose	NA
R's Education I: years in school	Not applicable, not available	5 (100%)	100.0 %	-	-	60.0 %	-	40.0 %	-	-	-	-
	1-7	30 (100%)	100.0 %	-	3.3 %	46.7 %	10.0 %	33.3 %	3.3 %	-	3.3 %	-
	8-11	645 (100%)	100.0 %	0.6 %	1.1 %	27.9 %	9.6 %	51.9 %	6.4 %	-	1.2 %	1.2 %
	12-15	64 (100%)	100.0 %	-	1.6 %	9.4 %	6.2 %	57.8 %	20.3 %	1.6 %	3.1 %	-
	16-19	139 (100%)	100.0 %	2.9 %	-	2.2 %	5.0 %	50.4 %	33.8 %	1.4 %	2.9 %	1.4 %
	Still at school	11 (100%)	100.0 %	-	-	18.2 %	-	36.4 %	18.2 %	-	18.2 %	9.1 %
	Still at college,uni	42 (100%)	100.0 %	7.1 %	2.4 %	2.4 %	4.8 %	47.6 %	23.8 %	4.8 %	4.8 %	2.4 %
	Total	936 (100%)	100.0 %	1.2 %	1.1 %	22.3 %	8.3 %	51.1 %	12.2 %	0.5 %	2.0 %	1.3 %
	Base for mean	900	900	11	10	206	78	476	114	5	0	0
	Mean	2.7	2.7	4.1	2.5	2.1	2.3	2.6	3.4	5.0	-	-
	Standard Deviation	1.21	1.21	2.07	1.65	0.66	1.00	1.23	1.48	1.87	-	-

BASE=2000 Weighted sample		Total	Country								
			Brasil								
			Total	R's subjective social class							
				None	Lower	Working	Lower middle	Middle	Upper middle	Upper	NA
R's Education I: years in school	1-7	1040 (100%)	100.0 %	0.1 %	31.8 %	37.6 %	12.7 %	12.6 %	0.6 %	0.7 %	3.9 %
	8-11	422 (100%)	100.0 %	0.2 %	18.5 %	41.5 %	19.4 %	16.8 %	0.2 %	0.7 %	2.6 %
	12-15	223 (100%)	100.0 %	0.4 %	12.6 %	42.2 %	21.5 %	20.6 %	1.3 %	-	1.3 %
	16-19	41 (100%)	100.0 %	-	9.8 %	34.1 %	31.7 %	22.0 %	2.4 %	-	-
	20-70	3 (100%)	100.0 %	-	-	-	-	66.7 %	33.3 %	-	-
	Still at school	35 (100%)	100.0 %	-	14.3 %	45.7 %	14.3 %	20.0 %	-	-	5.7 %
	Still at college,uni	4 (100%)	100.0 %	-	-	25.0 %	50.0 %	25.0 %	-	-	-
	No form school	143 (100%)	100.0 %	-	35.7 %	42.0 %	4.2 %	9.8 %	-	0.7 %	7.7 %
	No answer, refused	89 (100%)	100.0 %	1.1 %	19.1 %	58.4 %	10.1 %	6.7 %	-	-	4.5 %
	Total	2000 (100%)	100.0 %	0.2 %	25.7 %	40.2 %	14.8 %	14.4 %	0.6 %	0.5 %	3.6 %
	Base for mean	1843	1843	3	497	751	288	281	12	11	0
	Mean	2.2	2.2	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.0	2.2	2.2	1.9	-
	Standard Deviation	1.93	1.93	1.00	2.15	1.98	1.42	1.75	1.40	2.07	-

BASE=1149 Weighted sample		Total	Country					
			United States					
			Total	R's subjective social class				
				Lower	Working	Middle	Upper	DK,can't choose	NA
R's Education I: years in school	Not applicable, not available	3 (100%)	100.0 %	33.3 %	66.7 %	-	-	-	-
	1-7	25 (100%)	100.0 %	16.0 %	32.0 %	48.0 %	-	-	4.0 %
	8-11	138 (100%)	100.0 %	13.8 %	50.7 %	33.3 %	2.2 %	-	-
	12-15	682 (100%)	100.0 %	5.9 %	55.0 %	37.1 %	1.9 %	0.1 %	-
	16-19	268 (100%)	100.0 %	2.2 %	24.3 %	67.5 %	6.0 %	-	-
	20-70	30 (100%)	100.0 %	-	6.7 %	83.3 %	10.0 %	-	-
	Don't know	1 (100%)	100.0 %	-	-	-	-	100.0 %	-
	No answer, refused	2 (100%)	100.0 %	-	-	100.0 %	-	-	-
	Total	1149 (100%)	100.0 %	6.1 %	45.4 %	45.2 %	3.0 %	0.2 %	0.1 %
	Base for mean	1141	1141	69	520	517	35	0	0
	Mean	3.1	3.1	2.7	3.0	3.3	3.5	-	-
	Standard Deviation	0.72	0.72	0.71	0.58	0.79	0.78	-	-

Table 1: Contingency educational background and subjective social class, Source: ISSP 2001

[108] The seven ISSP surveys I rely on will be quoted according to the year they were undertaken. In this case, this seems needed for the sake of transparency, even if it violates the common rule to quote a work with the year it was published. In the references the usual way of quoting has been followed – but the implementation year has been emphasized with bold fonts to allow the reader to connect the reference with the quotation in the text.

As the table shows in the case of Brazil, the only other country with many poor people (or "society in development") in which the 2001 ISSP was undertaken, there is a much lower positive correlation between educational attainment (which usually has a high correlation with the other "social ushers" [*Platzanweiser*], i.e. occupation and income), but at least it is not negative as in the Philippines, where the subjective lower class nearly completely consist of those who have at least visited college!

In contrast to the case of East and West Germany and the Unites States, the mean of each educational group in 2001 steadily grew parallel to the higher educational level attained (positive correlation of .33 and .23).

In 2012 (ISSP 2012), there were some major changes (cf. table 2).

Table 2: Correlation educational attainment to subjective class belonging (dependent)			
Country	2001 (d)	2012 (d)	Number of those with ten years schooling or less considering themselves more than lower middle class (2012)
Philippines	-.21	.17	31,4%
West-Germany	.33	.20	74,4%
East-Germany	.33	.17	68,1%
USA	.23	-	Source: ISSP 2012
Japan	.11	.18	
Poland	.37	.17	
Spain	.17	.23	
Chile	.29	.32	
Brazil	.11	-	

While in the Philippines a slight positive correlation between educational attainment and subjective class belonging can now be observed (d=.17), in Germany the process was reversed (now d=.20/.17). In West and East German, around 70% consider themselves at least middle/upper-middle class (self-ranking 6 to 8), no matter what their educational background is. (These changes can probably be not merely explained with change of label for the self-evaluation from a class name to merely using digits, as the case of Chile and Spain show that this correlation can also 'improve'.)

---

[109] In 2009 (the latest available ISSP-survey), 6.1% considered themselves to be upper class, 4.2% upper-middle class, 57.1% middle class, 16.6% lower-middle class, and only 15.8% lower class. (0.2% did not answer.)

Such importance of aspiration for a middle class mindset would also explain the development of a "virtual middle class, before the economic basis for middle-class formation is established" (Gerke 2000: 154). For such a "virtual middle class," middle class belonging is "not necessarily dependent on income but [is] defined through social behaviour and lifestyle" (ibid.), for instance by the selective (!) consumption of Western consumer goods (nowadays, like the prevalent IPad or simply having an Apple logo on one's school bag), giving ones' life a middle-class 'touch'. A kind of attitude Gerke (ibid.) calls "virtual consumption" or "lifestyling," creating a middle class even in circumstances which lack the necessary socio-economic requirements. (The majority of the people Gerke describes economically belong to lower-income groups although in terms of education and occupation, they may be counted to the middle classes.)

Gerke defines "lifestyling" as a "superficial activity with no real consumption deriving from economic well-being ... expressing itself in resource pooling, borrowing of status symbols or window shopping and hanging around in shopping malls. This create[s] a symbolic environment that enhance[s] feelings of belonging to the middle class, as the items demonstrate leisure, the ability to travel, to be international -- values strongly associated with middle class activities" (Gerke 2000: 152). [See as example for such lifestyling the virtual consumption of Filipino Overseas Contract Workers in Dubai during an outing: Christ 2008: 58.][110]

This resonates well with Portocarrero's concept of imagination to belong to the middle class and finds proof as well in Owensby's description of the Brazilian middle class, which he portrays as aspiring to prestigious professional positions and often settling for much less, consuming manufactured goods and going into debt by doing so and thereby "living as much by their yearnings and fantasies as by objective reality" (Owensby 1999: 9).

By such "lifestyling," the virtual middle class tries to prove belonging to the middle class and distinguishes itself from the ones they consider socially lower, even if they have a similar socio-economic location. Gerke considers this to be a "part of the class formation process [as] the production of lifestyle is not just a personal matter; it is also directed towards the establishment of social boundaries and structures of exclusion, in order to establish a 'collective' identity" (Gerke 2000: 149). Consumption, higher education and middle class attitudes become a symbolic act signaling 'modernity' and membership in the ascriptive category »middle class«" (ibid.: 145).

Filipino migrant workers may serve as example: They often act as arbiters of lifestyles and act out as missionaries of 'modernity', as well as trendsetters of a new way of life, observes Soco (2008: 7). The more western their country of destination, the more this applies. OFWs on home visits are perceived to be acting as the know-it-all, brag-

---

[110] Following Owensby though lifestyling could be a "constitutive dilemma of middle-class consumption" in general, "always wanting more or better than a limited budget would bear" (Owensby 1999: 116).

ging about what they (allegedly) experience in their countries of destination and for giving unsolicited advice. For OFW-returnees, the popular notion of cosmopolitanism is manifested in conspicuous consumption, in the way they construct their houses, and also in their children or siblings' education. Soco states "some domestic workers I interviewed in Singapore believe themselves to be more modern now compared to when they were still in the Philippines, given that they have more spending money and that they are in a more technologically advanced country" (Soco 2008: 14).

Fabros observed something similar about call center agents, who are "find(ing) themselves with the purchasing power to consume goods and services that affirm and validate the identities they construct for themselves: for instance by drinking coffee at Starbucks" (Fabros 2007: 250).

3.10.2. Global middle class as cultural orientation

In the distinctive and pretentious behavior Soco and Fabros identified within the (virtual) migrant workers, another connection between aspiration of middle class-belonging and location in the Global South is reflected: one that is less of a developmental dimension, but more of post-colonial: Research from various societies in the former colonial world agree on the assumption that the West, or to be more specific, its established middle class which has been constructed as the guiding principle and cultural orientation (*Leitkultur*), serves as the legitimate culture of middle classes in postcolonial societies – in the form of a "universal middle class" (Ehrenreich 1989:19). Owensby e.g. states that "the existence of a Brazilian middle class was always unsettled in relation to what were assumed to be proper European and American middle classes. A defining aspect of the tensions inherent in this process is that the experience of being modern was mediated by the image of an idealized modernity located outside Brazil. ... It was an idea that took life from the visions of modernity issuing from New York, Paris, London, and Los Angeles, where it was supposed the modern had already been achieved" (Owensby 1999: 9f.). The same might be said with regards to the love-hate relationship the Philippines primarily has with the USA (cf. Reese 2008c). But even when it comes to Indonesia and other parts of Asia, "the most important unifying force among them [the new rich] is to be found in their new forms of consumption and public display derived largely from international middle-class fashion," as Pinches states in an introduction to a compendium on *Culture And Privilege In Capitalist Asia* (1999a: xii).

Here the ICCAs appear to be far advanced. They have a job within global economy; and are able to consume global goods (like the coffee at Starbucks). Unlike many Filipin@s, they do not only dream of "joining the global," but are already part of it. From the narratives of research respondents, there are indeed gains from their call center experience. The ability to speak and understand better the English language has boosted the confidence of many respondents in dealing with Western people. It

was a learning discovery for a Davao respondent in knowing more Americans as a people, and one agrees that the work offers the "opportunity to meet and be confident with Americans, to talk to American people." As relates one respondent in Manila, dealing with Caucasians is "always an experience, always a challenge."

Such cultural capital seems to be a pivotal means of social stratification in the Philippines. A respondent in Davao, who grew up in the province, shares about her community: "They are amazed…of the idea that you can speak in English. So they really compare, they come to you, you being here, being in this like that, you getting higher salary... Everybody would praise you - the friends of your Papa…the friends of your Mama… They love to compare you with their daughters. Take this as your model; she is like this, like that."

Figure 5: Advertising an accent course, Metro Manila, 2008

The Philippines is embedded into the global society by history, culture and the present. So their job at the international call center is not the first time ICCAs expose themselves to the western world; and this western world is rather gaining on them. One agent says, it is not difficult for her to adjust "to this kind of culture, 'cause I'm Filipino and at a young age I was bombarded with American culture." While one respondent in Davao stated that, "basically, I love watching English films. I don't really watch much of Filipino films." Another respondent explained that watching Western movies as a child instilled in her the appreciation for Western places. "When we saw movies that were shot in Paris, it's so amazing. So that was my dream when I was still young. And eventually I can't get rid of it…it's a burning desire. It's my desire to go to places…lot of places actually - Canada, US, then New Zealand."

Such post-colonial orientation is reinforced by a neo-colonial global society and its media (like through the ubiquitous middle class role model in the Western movies). Its impact on the middle classes may be greater as the middle classes are more exposed to these influences - be it by western-oriented education stressing the benefits of achievement and entrepreneurial merit; by employment in companies following 'international standards'; or, even by migration experience. At the same time, the middle classes act through their lifestyle and the circulation of western consumer goods as

middlemen (or "window" as Lakha [1999: 257], assumes for the case of India) of Western consumerism.[111]

In the case of the Philippines, this leads to a common sense that a "colonial mindset," i.e. an inferiority complex towards the West, is deeply rooted in the country. Enriquez (1992: xxi) even speaks of "the Great Cultural Divide separating the Anglicized Filipino from the masses." As signs for this are the ubiquity of whitening creams and skin applications; that English is the main language of educational instruction or that being able to speak it is a status symbol; and, the big relevance placed on US-culture. This model character of the West is often extended to the political sphere by idealizing the western political system and its workings. This might be one of the key points for explaining a weak sense of citizenship, as such glorification often goes along with a "negative narrative" about the Philippine situation. I will delve deeper into this in the second part of this write up, especially in the post-script.

At least it is part of this negative narrative that "the old elites messed up the country." "The fundamental weakness in the high-culture claims of the old elite is their association with economic backwardness and national humiliation," says Pinches (1999b: 295). The new middle class(es) thus seek salvation by participating in the "global," i.e. mainly western, culture." Michael Pinches states that for the Philippines, "many new rich reject or only conditionally accept the high cultural authority of the old elite. Indeed, like the younger generation of that elite, they are also subject to global fashion trends whose main arbiters are located outside the Philippines" (ibid: 295). This study, next to an earlier research (Reese 2008c, Fabros 2007), found considerable evidence that ICCAs understand themselves as part of a »global crowd«, for instance shown by their attitude of being proud when customers do not recognize them as Filipin@s or deriving a "certain pride ... from working in the frontlines of a transnational corporation or a Fortune 500 company and dealing with foreign customers" (Fabros 2007: 250). One former agent respondent to this study, shared: "I felt really proud when I talked to Canadians… It's very flattering because they thought I'm an American *kasi* (because) at that time, I tend to have that American accent." Many respondents also expressed appreciation to work in an "efficient" environment. One agent shares that directness and discipline, attitudes she learned already in her activist life, are "*actually nice din pala*" (actually nice as well). Several further claimed to have developed impatience, assertion, and a strong personality, particularly in dealing with domestic call center agents, when calling them – this time being the customer.[112]

---

[111] Interesting in this regard is that according to the ISSP survey of 2003 47,7% of the Filipino respondents agree (strongly) that "increased exposure to foreign films, music, and books is damaging our national and local cultures," while only 27,7% [strongly) disagree. (Among Germans only 28,5% believe likewise.) The correlation to educational attainment (=class) here is 0.

[112] Towards these local agents then, they might repeat what treatment they have received from foreign callers: "It is like hating your own;" explains the respondent, "I guess I'd like to make another Filipino agent's life hell also. It's everybody… If they get a Filipino agent, 'Oh my God! *Tanga-tanga naman nito…bobo naman* (They are really stupid, so dumb). They don't really speak English that well, their grammar is not good… They're not very well trained," an agent shared.

Mariel/Arriola (1987: 14) consider cultural westernization to be "the principal ingredient of burgis culture" in the Philippines, so that "the middle class ... notably the intelligentsia composed of teachers, students, university professors, artists, writers, and lower, level technocrats, are considered part of the burgis, even if they live barely above the poverty line because their education allows them to be in the mainstream of Westernized elite culture."[113]

Mariel and Arriola even understand the burgis as cultural migrants (which might be an over-exaggeration due to the anti-colonial intent of their publication): "The burgis lifestyle ... is more oriented towards the US and Europe than towards home and Asia. … Burgis values, aspirations, concerns, ways and tastes are identical to those of a Washington, D.C. yuppie. ... It is relying exclusively on Time and Newsweek's version of world events and Hollywood's definition of the meaning of life" (ibid.: 11). Mariel and Arriola further consider being burgis as "removed from the realities of a developing country. It is being trapped in a First World consciousness while living in the Third World" (ibid.: 14).

No matter how excessive such pretension (Bourdieu) towards the West is estimated, it surely is accompanied by a trait of distinction as outlined above for the case of the OCWs. "The idea of »being connected« to this class [the global middle class] emerges as an established condition of »social distinction«," as Chavez (1998: 194) explains for the case of Peru. "The disconnected are provincial, parochial and backward" (ibid.).[114]

Notably, part of the biographical plans of a majority of the respondents of this study is a life overseas. Two out of three (29 of 40) have long term goals of migrating to other global locations, preferably to modernized countries of the west, either for work or study. Only seven said, they don't plan to do so; while in four cases, overseas migration was not raised as an issue. As expressed by a respondent in Dumaguete: "(I)t doesn't always end in the Philippines…you need to dream bigger, dream higher." (Although nearly four years after the first interview, none of them migrated for good, even the ones who were determined to do so.)

The desire for the West is also partly a reason for the hierarchy among the destinations of migration: "In their [OFWS´s - NR] geographical imagination of places .. Europe is seen as more sophisticated than Asia and therefore, Filipino domestic workers in Europe would be classier than those in Singapore. They compare [i.e. distinguish – NR] themselves to Filipinos in the Philippines who belong to the same social class as they did when they were still in the Philippines" (Soco 2008: 6).

---

[113] This might be the reason why acquiring an educational degree from "overseas" has a high status. Just like "imported" goods, it seems to have a quality of its own. As Lakha (1999: 258) remarks, "like ... other global commodities, a foreign education and residency are prime markers of identity."

[114] Also compare Anne-Marie Fechter's considerations (in Reese 2008c) about the "young professionals" and their penchant for being "connected" and "global" in her study on transnational lives in Indonesia.

But such »colonial mindset« is not all-embracing. I have outlined earlier at least five caveats to this assumption (Reese 2008b: 50f.), amounting to the consideration not to equate global exposure (which can involve the overcoming of parochialism) and a desire for being cosmopolitan with a colonial mindset. One can for instance observe that while the west is considered to be rich and progressed in socio-economic terms, at the same time, it is considered questionable in moral terms: vices and broken families are often equated to Western lifestyle. Likewise Heryanto remarks that "in Indonesia, white people are considered by the new middle class as uniformly modern and are seen as carriers of the modernising spirit into .. social life: As the carriers of superior civilisation, high technology and modernity, they are looked up to culturally. ... Morally however they are regarded with suspicion. The *Landa* are notorious for their liberalist, individualist and materialistic dispositions" (Heryanto in Pinches 1999a: 161).

Likewise, orientation towards the »global middle class« did not lead the Philippine middle class to relinquish the employment of domestic workers. Having one or even several *katulong* ("helpers"), drivers or houseboys is considered by Karaos (1997: 116) as a middle class marker, just like it was among the European middle class in the 19th century in its quest to emulate aristocratic lifestyle. In the Philippines, unlike in Germany today, with its obsession for social equality, having domestic employees is not something to be justified, but rather a performance of a disposable income –a sign not only for semi-colonial, but as well semi-feudal characteristics within post-colonial, developmental societies. [115]

Furthermore, even when Western culture serves as cultural standard, Filipin@s do not simply copy Western lifestyles. Considerable enculturation (Roland Robertson introduced in 1997 the term "glocalization") of Western lifestyle can be observed such as the fast food chain Jollibee or pidgin languages like Taglish (the lingua franca of the lower middle class) creating terms like "*Paki-call ang* driver" (please call the driver) or *mag-drive,* which can quickly develop into *dina-drive* (being driven). Or taking an example from the interviews in this study, where such Taglish or Ceblish prevailed: "They are trying to compensate those people *na walay trabaho* (without work), they help *ma-lower* (to lower) down *ang* (the) unemployment rate *sa* (in the) Philippines…."[116]

---

[115] The pervasiveness of such cultural given, is reflected in the demand by the *Partido ng Mangagawa* (lit.: Workers Party), a Trostkyist party list in the Philippines, that the basic basket of goods should provide for a house-help, "since we [sic!] should not impose the burden of household chores and child rearing to the female parent. ... That is not anymore a luxury especially in the light of the insistence of the state that both parents must work instead of having just a single breadwinner" (The Manila Times 4.5.2010).

[116] Furthermore, one should not underestimate that there has ever since been a desire for being cosmopolitan and having a global mindset among the educated worldwide, not only in former colonies. This already holds true for the German elites considered progressive in hindsight, who have likewise oriented themselves towards the French, Burgundian and Dutch culture for nearly the whole second millennium, first the knightly, then the courtly, finally the republican culture.

Likewise, the wish to transcend the well known, to explore the new and exotic, to travel and to be exposed to foreign cultures, has a long tradition (from the grand tour via the plus ultra to the backpackers of our days), so a "global outlook" as the trade

3.10.3. Lifestyling as class formation?

The phenomenon of lifestyling resonates in a certain way with the classical concept of "class in the making" by Edward Thompson who says: "I do not see class as a »structure« nor even as a »category« but as something which in fact happens … in human relationships" (Thompson 1987: 9). "Class is defined by men as they live their own history, and, in the end, this is its only definition" (ibid.). And elsewhere, he says: "Class happens based on how individual men and women live their relations of production, how they experience their position within the ensemble of social relations with their inherited culture and inherited expectations and how they culturally process these experiences" (Thompson 1987: 268).

Even if the established middle class considers such lifestyling as "*walang ikabuga*," i.e. as mere self- bloating without having the necessary resources at hand to really be able to afford such lifestyle, lifestyling brings out the role middle-classness has as model for the rest of society: "Typical elements of the habitus of the educated middle class (*Bildungsbürgertum*) like deferral of gratification, the achievement orientation and striving for higher education have »trickled downwards« and turned into the social nature of a large part of the wage earners as well," as the labor sociologist Dörre (2007: 34) states. Likewise Kocka (2008: 8) says: "What once was bourgeois culture defined the bourgeoisie and distinguished it from other groups, has to a certain extent become common property: formal education, cleanliness, a certain achievement orientation, travel, knowledge of the world (today also by medial means). … Its principles and practices are widely accepted in other social settings as well, though not completely, and with much grading." And Chavez (1998: 170) says in relation to the Peruvian society: "The myths are the dreams of the people. ... For us the images of television nourish effectively the dreams, the myths of beauty – a certain beauty – the lightness of being successful and of an easy and happy life."

This pervasiveness of middle class culture makes it questionable how much non-middle class lifestyle can survive within societies oriented and modeled by bourgeois values and with the middle class serving as societal point of reference (myth of the middle class). But one way of distinguishing middle class habitus, even the virtual one, from lower class habitus might be that the aspiration of the former leads to action, while for the latter it remains a pure desire.[117]

---

unionist Josua Mata calls it (personal interview), is as much expression of a sense of aspiration as it might be a sign of an inferiority complex. In this sense, one respondent to this study explained: "It's fun to explore, to fit in to another shoes, another nationality… I like getting in the shoes of another person or that group, social group." As already mentioned in Reese 2008c, the pivotal question to distinguish cosmopolitan orientation from an inferiority complex seems to me: Are spatial and 'mental' migration undertaken to leave behind Philippine realities which are viewed as stagnant and below average, or are they undertaken to enrich one's own culture to give it a »new blend?«

[117] Such differentiation despite being heuristical might be supported by Bourdieu's observation of a "border between skilled workers and foremen who behave compliant to their class and employees who, at least in thought, are already on the way up" (1982: 609).

Ken Young likewise believes that this distinction is crucial in delineating middle from the lower class: “The middle classes are diverse. That diversity cannot be fully overcome by formulations - useful as they are - that classify them together as occupants of contradictory class locations. Rather, if they have unity at all, it does not derive clearly from structural location within society and economy, but more from subjective self—definition buttressed by a minimal material capacity to maintain realistically certain petit bourgeois aspirations, such as those related to social advancement through education, and a subjective belief (misplaced or otherwise) in their economic security and life-chances. Working-class people harbour fewer illusions about such matters” (Young in Pinches 1999a: 58).

Being in limbo makes it crucial for middle class people to market themselves, either for fulfilling the dream of social advancement or for keeping the achieved position. This may be an explanation for the big importance of healthy bodies, beauty and the “excessive care of the body“ within the middle classes, which Chavez (1998: 174) considers an essential trait of the middle classes as well. Just like other attitudes mentioned, they do not only serve the sense of aspiration (pretention as Bourdieu would say), but also serve to distinguish themselves from other social classes (in the terms of Bourdieu: distinction).

In here, conspicuous or demonstrative consumption comes in. Next to education, consumption is another important way of showing belonging to the middle classes. (And even education can be less productive and more consumptive or symbolic by displaying the parents’ ability to pay.) Demonstrative consumption is an attitude especially of people in a transitional state of class belonging, i.e. the new rich or the marginal middle class. For them demonstrative consumption is not (only) a way of showing off disposable income but also a kind of self-insurance of really/still/already belonging to the upper class in the first case and the middle class in the second case due to “socially palpable pressure to re-establish, constantly, middle-class membership” (Gerke 2000:146). The sprouting of western coffee shops in the Philippines, often patronized by ICCAs as well, may be an evidence for such.

Vicente Rafael (*A new social class*, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2.2.2014) spots a kind of variation of such marginal class, with an income far above the threshold of necessity, but (still?) characterized by a high sense of insecurity and by acting pretentiously. He calls this group “for want of a better word … aspirational class, … not wealthy, not poor, but able to trade on their media presence to seem as if they were part of a new elite, or more precisely, a virtual elite. They are part of an »imagined community« of the wannabe rich, if you will (sic!).” Rafael includes in this ‘class’ quite different people: Millionaires like the pork-scam-mastermind Janet Napoles, politically powerful families such like the Binay family, media figures like Vhong Navarro, as well as “the embassy personnel accused of exploiting OFWs in the Middle East [and] the low-level bureaucrats.” This “imagined community,” says Rafael, is characterized by being “very insecure about their economic position, having just enough money to live

live in one of the new condos. … The new condos reek of aspirational elitism, with little, if any, links to old money." And beyond that "economic insecurity comes with social and cultural insecurity. Unsure of their status, inasmuch as they don't belong to old money, they can only dissociate themselves from their origins, or at least that of their parents. Hence, while they are not yet where they would like to be, they know one thing for sure: They do not want to be part of the poor. … They accept poverty as a given that can be, with luck and hard work, overcome, but only on an individual basis. They thus shun collective action in favor of individual effort. They see themselves not as laborers but as entrepreneurs, as small business enterprises in and of themselves."

The Philippine (marginal) middle-income class can however only partly practice such lifestyle of conspicuous consumption. According to the Family Income and Expenditures Survey (FIES) of 2012, a nationwide household survey in the Philippines conducted every three years by the National Statistics Office (NSO), the marginal middle class (here defined as income bracket 100,000-249,999 per annum) still spends more than half of its income for food (51.3%), while the upper classes (250,000 annual income and above) only spend 34.9% for it. For education, transportation, health, household equipment, recreation and communication, here again, the marginal middle class can spend significantly less (in relative terms 30-50%, in absolute terms much more less) than the upper classes. In comparison to the lower income classes again the marginal middle class is privileged in *every* dimension (except when it comes to household expenses).[118]

Another way of "showing off"(*pasikat*) is to speak the legitimate language. In Germany, this means speaking High German with as little dialect-coloration as possible or in the Philippines, proving one's attainment of education by speaking flawless English (often even with an explicit American accent).[119] The upper middle class often uses English as lingua franca and chooses it as mother tongue for its children. The remaining middle classes often speak Taglish, a random mixture of Tagalog and English.[120]

Derogatory treatment of the lower classes can as well be considered typical for 'middle classness', as it expresses distinctive behavior (Bernardo 2013). Such attitude towards the "masa" is very pronounced in the Philippines where those from the upper classes call them "*baduy*" (not in style or lacks taste); "*jologs*" (trashy); "*bakya*" (a

---

[118] The results of the FIES can be accessed at www.census.gov.ph/content/2012-fies-statistical-tables.

[119] There is even a column in *The Manila Times* (called *English plain & simple* – sic!), where for more than two decades now the columnist (Jose Carillo) discovers the imperfections of how English is used in the public discourse of the Philippines. The qualification of English as "plain and simple" can be considered a way of ridiculing (i.e. distinguishing oneself from) the ones who don't speak flawless English. (And probably, most people would feel caught at one time or another, for not doing so.)

[120] During the US colonial rule, English won "the attraction that Spanish had in a previous era: that of altering one's place in colonial society by signaling one's ability to speak up to the source of authority" (Rafael 2000: 112). In US-colonial times, English was explicitly the language of social climbers and the colonial bureaucrats - ergo a middle-class language - as the elite continued to speak Spanish.

wooden shoe which the poor once wore); or,"*promdi*" (from the province) and "*taga bundok/bukid*" (from the mountains), which effectively equates middle-classness with urbanity (*urbanidad*). "Masa is the »othered« position, the one that must be distinguished against in order to establish one's own position as normative and thus efface it," as Marco Garrido (2008: 450) sums up the responses of middle-class women he asked to define the masa. [See also the chapter handling "Natural Differences" in Owensby 1999: 50ff.][121] Such distinctive behavior may also be a result of a social position in limbo, letting one to resort to a strategy of dissimilarity.[122]

In Reese 2008c, I described that call center agents show a similar behavior: treating the simple service personnel in global coffee shop branches in a derogatory way; considering themselves to be something better as they speak English more fluently; and, having more financial resources at their command than the *common tao*. Same is valid for ICCAs insisting on not being "workers," but "customer service providers" et al. (see below).

Soco (2008) observed a similar attitude among OFWs in Singapore, and Christ (2008: 30) reports from Dubai that "Filipinas working in the low-pay-sector see people from South Asia on a much lower level than themselves. Innumerable times I heard Filipinas complain Indians are »smelling« – as they allegedly never have a wash - or observed them [the Filipinas - NR] in the bus demonstratively holding a cloth before the nose and distinguishing themselves clearly by looking at South Asian men who don't let women enter first in the bus with adverse views and comments."[123] This

---

[121] Portocarrero speaks of a "disdain of the middle class towards the popular world, the constant demarcation of the borders" (1998:14). Distinction though is not always performed by turning away. It can also express itself in turning towards someone, but by that putting him or her in his place. As in the case of philanthropy: The role as guardian of the poor (*Armenpfleger*) resp. as benevolent colonialist has been constitutive for the formation of the Euro-American bourgeoisie in the 19th century. It gave a clear distribution of who is helper and needs to be helped. (For the Philippine case cf. Hilhorst 2003), this benevolence might also be accompanied by "a feeling of envy or nostalgia due to the – assumed or real – spontaneity of the popular life, to its simplicity and its bigger content" (Portocarrero, ibid.).

[122] Such attitude can also be observed among the (still) employed middle class in Europe and America; it seems a strategy to lessen the "fear of contamination," and at the same time, legitimize their own better position. By stressing the dissimilarity between them and the unemployed, they try to suppress the fear of falling (Ehrenreich 1989) and to keep up the illusion of controlling their own risks of losing their job by behaving well (Newman 1996).

Such distinctive, and thereby reassuring attitudes, though can also be observed among those, who are considered lowly by other social groups, which might even be most vociferous in their bashing of the "*baduy*" (most often also the "lumpen"). The (distinctive) disdain for the 'undeserving poor' therefore is characteristic of workers as well, who despite being lower class hold up 'bourgeois' values such as *maningkamot* and orderliness, both stemming "from insecurity, or 'social distancing' from those in superficially similar circumstances," Chavez (1998: xii) writes.

[123] Likewise Filipina migrants exhibited distinctive behavior when boasting about their relatively good command of English: A migrant interviewed by Christ expressed: "When they [employers S.C.] see Filipinos, most of them think that they are intelligent! Really! That's why most of the companies are hiring Filipinos. […] Especially in the interview, if you are with Indians: Sorry, I'm going to fit for this job! You know, you are going to feel proud of yourself, being a Filipino. […] I feel proud of myself whenever I have an interview with this Indian, with this Chinese" (Christ 2008: 42).

Bernando Villegas resonates such self-perceptions in a column in Business World (7.2.2010) claiming: "OFWs have characteristics that are superior to the average migrant worker from a developing country. From my own personal experiences and the testimonies of hundreds of people I have talked to abroad, Filipinos are preferred to others because they have better personal hygiene …., they are quickly adaptable to different cultures; they learn new languages more easily because of their own multi-

also reflects a racist distinctive behavior crossing class lines in the Philippines (kind of flip side of the whitening obsession): Black colored are generally looked down on (and Indians, are at least, darker skinned than Filipin@s).

Interesting enough, and apparently in contrary to Bourdieu's assumptions, the middle classes not only display distinction towards the lower classes, but also show distinction towards the "decadent" and "traditional" upper (leisure) class. The claim of cultural supremacy has been a bedrock of »bourgeois insurrection« in Europe ever since the bourgeois questioned the leadership of the aristocracy from the 13th century onwards, for instance by classifying aristocrats as "rabble"(*Pöbel*) (Cf. Maase 1997: 5 or Hayes 1992: 8-11).[124] The same holds true for Asia in the 19th century: "Already in the 19th century, from the perspective of the industrious and self-disciplined social middle, who were already keen on education, old elites were often considered as decadent and less capable" (Osterhammel 2010: 1090). And what was the "decadent" aristocracy for the Bourgeois revolution in Europe is equated to the rent seeking absentee landlord nowadays in the Philippines.

If Lofgren and Frykman state that "the middle class claims superiority for its lifestyle and attempts to impose it on other classes" (following Ockey in Pinches 1999a: 231), this also holds true for societies in transformation (developmental societies) nowadays. Here "people of moderate means could create ... lives morally and spiritually superior to those of the »capricious« rich" (Owensby 1999: 124). Middle classes in developmental societies thus do not only orient themselves selectively towards the West, their (middle class specific) sense of industriousness is also triggering 'upward distinction': Owensby cites a bank employee claiming that the "depravity of the upper classes and the degraded classes is their failure to work" (ibid.: 68).[125] Likewise in the case of the Philippines, Pinches has observed such upward distinction: "While much social prestige continues to be attached to an ancestry of landed wealth, aristocratic breeding and old elite family name, increasing normative weight is being placed on the ideas of industry achievement and merit, as more new rich join the old as

language background in the Philippines; they are multi-talented or multi-skilled; and … are able to give tender and loving care…"

[124] Hegel argued that "the rabble is distinct from poverty; usually it is poor, but there are also rich rabble." (Idem.: *Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie*, Stuttgart. 1974, Vol. 4. p. 608.) And Marx (1852/1972: 24) declared the finance aristocracy to be "rich not by production but by pocketing the already available wealth of others" (opposed to the interests of the productive bourgeois whom he considered as lead model) and as adopting a lifestyle "where money, filth and blood comingle. The finance aristocracy, in its mode of acquisition as well as in its pleasures, is nothing but the rebirth of the lumpenproletariat at the heights of bourgeois society."

[125] Already Aristotle was haunted by the problem that the rich and powerful are not necessarily the best (aristocrats) - be it the nouveau riche not yet have developed excellence or be it the spoiled nobility having degenerated and no longer aristocratic (Glassman 1995: 44).

the owners of wealth and property" (Pinches 1999b: 288).[126] Here they draw on the myth of the middle class providing them the impression to be bearers of modernity and progress or as one says in German: "*Wo wir sind, da ist vorne*" (Where we are, is upfront).

According to Ehrenreich/Ehrenreich (2013: 109), even the U.S. Department of Commerce has, in the meantime, entirely focused on aspiration as class determinant for the middle class. In 2010, it announced in a report that "middle-class families are more influenced by their horizon of expectations than their income: middle class families *seek* a home, a car, university education for their children, secure health and retirement benefits as well as occasional family vacations." "A definition," Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (ibid.) believe, "that excludes almost no one." And in the study on the "societal middle" in Germany, Paul Nolte not only considers "qualified and highly qualified workers who perform service" as part of this middle, but "those groups showing typical middle class mentalities, regardless of their profession or occupation" as well (Nolte 2007: 8).

3.10.4. A third way: Combining class structure and class-consciousness

Class structure and *class-consciousness* are two of four components of class Agarwala (2008) distinguishes. While *class structure* corresponds to Marx's "class in itself" (*Klasse an sich*), *class-consciousness* is present where members of a class have an understanding of their class-specific situations and interests.[127] When focusing on conducts of life as criteria (taking class consciousness as starting point), class analysis cannot simply rely on socio-economic data (taking class structure as starting point), as class belonging does not simply change by social upward or downward mobility but is tied to cultural dimensions and literally embodied in the habitus. Mentality changes are inert (hysteresis-effect) and social and personal change therefore more laggard than life chances. Impoverished middle class members, who lost their disposable income and their respectable job or have to sell their own house, may still remain middle class in attitude. As Newman observed with the "fallen" American middle class: "Whether unemployed, or working in jobs that place them in the working or lower middle class, in their minds they remain displaced executives whose attitudes, desires, and expectations are closer to those of the typical manager than they are to

[126] Likewise Marlen Ronquillo complains in his column *Empower the super rich, screw those below* (The Manila Times, 22.6.2013) about a "process of shifting to the plutocracy the portion of the national wealth and income that is not yet in their possession. And wipe out in the process the fast-vanishing middle class.... As in the case of the PPP [Public Private Partnerships], today's labor environment is suited to further prop up the rich and super rich and not empower a strong and a politically conscious salaried class. As we all know from history, an eviscerated middle class deprives a society of a vibrant center. And when the center cannot hold, the results are mostly ugly."

[127] Agarwala further distinguishes *class formation* and *class struggle*. While *class formation* again expresses the step of getting together as a commonly acting group (class for itself – *Klasse für sich* – following Marx), class struggle only happens where such a class acts commonly and politically pursuing their specific class interests *against* other classes.

those of the machinists, the delivery men, or the clerical workers alongside whom they now work" (Newman 1996: 90). In the same way, it is a well known fact, as Vester (2002: 82) reminds us, that members especially of upper milieus which are relegated socially, often do not only preserve the values of the culture they originate from but (unlike social climbers) also retain their networks and their social capital and in this way remain members of these milieus.

But similarly as the paradigm of distribution, the paradigm of lifestyle has its pitfalls. While the former simply equates a certain socioeconomic position with middle-classness, the latter might lose sight of the fact that the attitudes understood as middle-class markers are heavily related to educational merits or being embedded in middle class surroundings, i.e. depend on the command over cultural and social capital as requirement for social advancement or on a disposable income to be able to consume conspicuously to perform belonging. Taking the Philippine burgis as example: While the concept of the burgis is strongly socio-cultural and "the middle class ... is considered part of the burgis even if they live barely above the poverty line" (Mariel/Arriola 1987: 14), nevertheless "being afraid or ashamed to take a jeepney implies resources which can support a lifetime of taking taxis or having one's own car. One needs to have surplus income to be *burgis*" (Ibid.: 10).

At the same time, middle class behavior does not necessarily make one accepted as middle class; a bodily experience where »social climbers« are rejected by incumbents of an aspired social location.

In the same way, Portocarrero warns about throwing out the baby with the bath water: "To waive economic factors ... in defining classes ... would embrace a simplified mechanism, this time culture-based. ... To study the rise of the middle class can not be restricted to analyzing the appropriation or annexation of the discourse of modernity as if only the internalization of new beliefs and values has been important." (Portocarrero 1998: 15f.)

In line with the sociological third path taken, I consider it appropriate to transcend the dichotomy of "soft" (cultural and cognitive) vs. "hard" (socio-economic determinants), when trying to understand middle-class consciousness and action. Here I follow Bourdieu in expecting habitus and lifestyle to be normally (i.e. with high statistic probability) related to the social position a person or a group of persons takes (Bourdieu 1982: 585). But then again Bourdieu not only considers the imagination "unreflected" that only one feature (i.e.: usually one sort of capital) is sufficient to identify the constellation of social inequality (cf. ibid.: 208); he also singles out cognitive structures and practices, and here highlights the sense of aspiration considering it a main trait of *pretention*, which is the habitus of the (petite) bourgeois.

Eventually we might end up with a definition of middle class which combines socio-economic elements with conduct of living as reflected in the definition by a Filipino "confessing middle class person": "I believe in the middle class values of hard work,

good education, property ownership, stable family life, respectability, initiative, self-reliance and reasonable comfort."[128]

However, whatever way we choose, it is undisputed that the middle stratum is a social location where numerous social conditions, milieus or classes meet - with the classes within this stratum usually swinging between bourgeois and proletarian actions and attitudes. 'Middle class' is thus a more or less a mere residual category in between aristocracy and popular class. It is so broad that often, white-collar executives are considered part of this social stratum as well as an elite unionized labor (the so-called labor aristocracy), and when following a purely cultural approach, in fact anyone who shows a sense of aspiration is counted in.[129] The middle class thus is highly differentiated in itself– not only in regard to the social conditions, but also as far as the political interests of middle class members are concerned. Thalif Deen calls the term »middle class« thus a "vague sociological catch-all, presumably located between those in absolute poverty on the one hand and those with wealth and privilege on the other" (Thalif Deen: *Are Middle Class Protests Fallout from Poverty Alleviation?*, IPS, 17.7.2013).[130]

"*The* middle class" is a "notion that is fuzzy at the edges," says Ehrenreich (1989: 12), and like any other constructions of class, at least partly a result of data analysis. "There are so many borderline situations, and since people do move up and down between classes, a description like middle class may mean very little when applied to a particular individual" (Ehrenreich, ibid.). And at the end "only individuals act, not classes" (Kreckel 1992: 142).

The concept of middle class gets even more fuzzy, when other dimensions and determinants of social inequality are included (better: taken note of): not only economic, but as well social and welfare variables (like Hradil 1987 does) and beyond that, subjective variables like self-classification (like subjective class belonging), ways of life (Weber's *Stand*) and behavioral attitudes (Bourdieu's Habitus). Status inconsistencies are so most pronounced within the middle stratum which can be understood as the most contradictory class location, says Wright (1985).

Having identified elements and attitudes as 'middle-class' does not necessarily mean that middle class(es) can be easily identified. Many persons and groups may expose middle class traits in one dimension, but not in another (the mentioned status incon

---

[128] Quoted from Frederic Schaffer (2002): Disciplinary Reactions: Alienation and the Reform of Vote Buying in the Philippines, p. 4 - retrieved from: web.mit.edu/CIS/pdf/Schaffer%20-%20Disciplinary%20Reactions.pdf (11.3.2014).

[129] For the case of Thailand, Jim Ockey (in Pinches 1999a: 235) observed that "the prostitute, the university professor the bank manager, the independent farmer, the owner of a Chinese traditional medicine shop, the police officer and the soldier are all 'middle class' under various definitions, yet they have little in common."

[130] Eventually middle or center is to a large extent a positional description, just as world maps vary according to which region is put to the center. From below the "middle class" are the petite masters (*amo*); seen from above however, they are simply the higher assistants. To speak of »middle class« is already an expression of the middle-classness of the one talking.

Table 3: Contingency Self-rating / rating form outside	Class background (rating by researcher)				
Class background (self-rating)		Lower middle class	Middle middle class	Upper middle class	TOTAL
	3	0	2	0	2
	4	0	2	0	2
	5	3	3	1	7
	6	3	3	1	7
	7	2	1	1	4
	8	0	1	0	1
	No answer	3	1	1	5
	TOTAL	11	13	4	28

sistency). Newman (1996: 15) observed that "production workers in New Jersey's chemical plants may be working men on the job, but they are indistinguishable in

many respects from their middle-class neighbors at home - neighbors who are teachers, policemen, or clerical workers. [They are] blue-collar workers who have »arrived« in the middle class by virtue of the lifestyle."

Trying to capture middle-classness so aggravates a problem sociology as a descriptive and empirically based science generally encounters: Social realities are full of grey areas as (1) identities are often ambiguous and action patterns of people not always coherent over time; *and,* (2) sociological 'truths' are of statistical – not of ontological – character. There is no homogenous behavior by specific groups, neither "the" poor nor "the" middle class nor do "the" women think and act in the same way. Valid statements and conclusions based on empirical evidence are almost always "more than less" correct.

Grouping is a generalization about large groups of people. Class theory is just one example for that. According to Pierre Bourdieu, classes are not directly observable (meaning empirical) facts existing in a society. Classes (or class fractions) are not existent a priori, but a result of data analysis; they represent "homologous positions of various expression of characteristics in a social space" (Fuchs-Heinritz/König 2005: 58). Thus Schulze believes that "the more exactly one wants to grasp forms of existence, the more one gets lost in an ever more subtle system of empirical classes which finally dissolve themselves into individual cases, in case one carries the specification to the extremes" (Schulze in Berger/Hradil 1990: 413). Newer class theories in general agree that "classes [are] social constructions which must prove their reality fitness in, also scientific classification struggles" (Dörre 2007: 19).

How flurry the classification as middle class is, shows the divergence of rating as "(lower) middle class" and self-rating (in form of a rating between 1 and 10) by the respondents themselves (cf. table 3). 13 respondents out of the 28, who participated in all interview phases, were rated by the researcher as "lower middle class"(in di-

stinction from upper middle and middle middle class), based on the information they disclosed during the biographical interview, such as according to: occupation of parents, social-geographic profile, financial source for their college education, housing situation, their current job location, their income and their highest educational attainment. But these 13 classified themselves with a median of 5 ranging from 3 to 8 when asked to rank themselves in the second interview. There is no correlation between self and external classification by researcher (-.07).

3.10.5. Three to four basic middle class fractions

Beyond all the manifold groupings created within the intermediary stratum, some are explicitly or implicitly agreed upon by approaches trespassing the simple (one) middle class-concept, often combining socioeconomic and socio-cultural characteristics. One distinction is the one between old and new middle classes. While the »old« middle classes (often also equated with the term "petite bourgeoisie") have been present in society more or less since urban structures developed and comprise mainly craftsmen, merchants and petite traders (as well as the few bureaucrats, and in some instances, the lower clergy which had a strong administrative function specifically in societies colonized by catholic forces), the »new« middle class is a product of the bureaucracy of the modern state, of industrialization and of a capitalist economy based on the division of labor. While the old middle class has some command over means of production (economic capital), the main sort of capital the new middle class commands over is education as well as modern and urban (often global) culture (cultural capital).

The new middle class is most dependent on cultural capital, as they have reached nearly everything by the means of education. For them education serves as the central mechanism for securing position and wealth. They work hard to earn educational credentials so they may succeed on their own merits, or at least do almost everything to make education accessible to their children (one of the major motives for migration in the Philippines). They strongly believe in meritocracy which serves as backbone of the ideology of achievement (*Leistungsideologie*), the essential mode of integration within modern (bourgeois) societies (Kreckel 1992) and an ideology promising that " in principle it should be up to each member of society to make out of his life what he wants and to come as far as he likes by learning, school achievement and occupation" (Wahl 1989: 347). Such pursuit of success through merit and aspiration for social mobility and political leadership are very typical for the middle classes. Many of their job positions (social work, teachers, administrative tasks et al.) are open to 'entrants'.[131]

---

[131] But education has a symbolical value as well. Due to its essential relation to the grand narrative of modernity and its components - the myths of progress, feasibility/do-ability and autonomy (Wahl) - education itself is a symbol of modernity, making educational credentials considered 'modern'. Maybe this explains (next to the wish of distinction) why college degrees are aspired for in the Philippines even if they can't be 'converted' into qualification-adequate occupations. For the related Indonesi-

Among this new middle class again, there can be identified a veritable distance between:

a) the executive class or upper new middle class, made up of professionals, administrators and managers, executive employees, technocrats and senior civil servants, commanding a considerable social capital, especially directive power. Karl Renner and following him John Goldthorpe (1992) called this group the "service class" (*Dienstklasse*), as they share a distinctive employment status with "trust" as principal feature that employers necessarily have to place in these employees whose delegated or specialized tasks give them a considerable decision-making autonomy.

b) the executing class or lower new middle class, consisting of foremen, simple civil servants and employees. Goldthorpe calls (only) them the "intermediate class." In relation to the Philippines, Bautista (2001) has identified them as separate "marginal middle class," a class no longer working class but not (yet) established middle class.

The division within the new middle class between the higher and lower sections of professional, administrative and managerial employees is also where Bourdieu locates the border between upper and middle class in his model, the former deciding on what legitimate culture is, the latter trying to emulate this legitimate culture (pretension).[132] But in addition to this, new middle class members who are public servants also differ especially in attitudes from those in private employment, no matter if executives or executing middle class as their employment links them closer to the state.

As Bautista (2001: 134f.) has observed, this marginal middle class, especially the subsample of female respondents who originate or end up in this class, is extremely fluid, an indication perhaps of the precariousness of this class that borders on the old middle and working classes. In how far this segment can still be considered as middle class or rather should be considered part of the working class, is therefore an issue. This is less due to the fact that they are proletarians (i.e. non-owners of means of production) as the whole new middle class is proletarian when it comes to economic capital, but is not so at all when it comes to cultural capital (education). It is rather their lack of autonomy, their being subject to the decision-making authority of others which led some pundits to consider them »workers«. Newman for instance speaks of white-collar workers or knowledge workers as "their work is highly technical, they

---

an case, Gerke (2000: 148) concludes that "the main concern of the education system was neither quality nor knowledge transfer ... although those who possessed them were assumed to be 'knowledgeable' in the same way that those who owned the symbols of modernity were modern."

[132] In Bourdieu's tripartite division, the old upper class (aristocracy) no longer appears. He distinguishes a bourgeoisie (synonymous with "upper class"); a middle class, here (only) including the petite bourgeoisie; and, finally a popular class, i.e. the factions of the lower stratum. Bourdieu again divides the upper class into dominant and dominated fraction, the latter mainly the intellectuals, the educated middle class and the artists who still participate in the 'production'' of legitimate taste , unlike the petite bourgeoisie.

have skills and some credentials, but they often lack autonomy on the job" (Newman 1996: 15).

The disposition to consider oneself middle class is pronounced globally (for the Philippines see the elaborations on subjective class position in the ISSP 2001 above). In social theory and reality, the "line of respectability" dividing middle and lower classes is thus more contested then the "line of distinction," dividing upper and middle classes (on the terms cf. Vester 2002). Especially since the groups to be considered marginal middle class, in the diction of Bautista, strongly perform pretention and distinction to prove their belonging to the 'respectable' social stratum, not only driven by a sense of achievement but as well haunted by a "fear of falling" (Ehrenreich 1989). The distinction between employees and workers is a proof for that; while the first get a salary (*Gehalt*), the second 'only' get a wage (*Lohn*). In Germany, they even form different interest groups and employees usually don't call their interest groups "trade union," as this is connected to workers. Due to this self-evaluation, other pundits again do draw the line between routine white-collar workers and other workers (or even do not call white collar employees "workers" at all), even if the former share many traits and social situations with the latter.[133]

According to their self-understanding (subjective class position), the marginal middle class is thus definitely part of the middle class. But from a materialistic perspective on society (objective class position), they might rather be considered working class. From such a position Miraflor and Hizon (2008), state for the Philippines that "there is... no specific middle strata, only an illusory social stratification imposed to us to keep the working class divided, to de-class them and in the end muddle their true class interests."

It has to be taken into consideration as well that capitalist industrialization also split the old middle class (Wirtschaftsbürgertum/entrepreneurial middle class) into an upper and a lower segment. While the lower segment is congruent with the precapitalist old middle class, the upper segment, termed as "capitalist middle-class" (Osterhammel 2010: 1083) or "new rich" (Pinches 1999a)[134] developed with the expansion of production. Counting the latter into the middle class though is questionable. Where this term points to the really rich which have considerable executive power, not exercised on behalf of others, the "new rich" resemble in terms of economical and social capital much more the "old rich" then, than the middle class as sketched here.

---

[133] In the case of Indonesia, Gerke (2000: 151) observed that "lower-ranked bureaucrats with a monthly income similar to that of the lower class would not identify with those of similar class positions such as small- scale businessmen, lower-ranked members of the military and other wage workers. Instead, they would identify with higher-ranked members of the bureaucracy and attempt to imitate whenever possible the latter's lifestyle."

[134] The "new rich" is a term not precise enough to be simply included into the middle stratum; it includes everyone from big business self-made men up to migrant workers (Pinches 1999b).

A further distinction, often distinguished as a special category, are the "free floating intellectuals" (*freischwebende Intellektuelle*) whose social condition is similar to the one of professionals and managers, although they lack security of tenure and often a considerable income as well. They can rather be considered to be "deluxe precarious" (*Luxusprekarisierte*), a term which has been introduced with a delegitimizing purpose to the discussion on precarity in order to distinguish the (often most out-voiced) knowledge workers from the indigents at the bottom of the social ladder (Candeias 2006). Bourdieu considers them to be the dominated part of the dominating class. They have much in common with the grouping Ehrenreich calls the "culture producers (who) are not part of the working class nor are they a new middle class," (but) "salaried mental workers who do not own the means of production and whose major function is the reproduction of capitalist culture and class relations" (Ehrenreich, 1989: 12).

3.10.6. Middle class more than a matter of opinion

Fuzzy as the middle stratum may be, and it further gets more so by including several dimensions, class theory can nevertheless be of use as it "tell(s) us something about the broad terrain of inequality, and about how people are clustered, very roughly, at different levels of comfort, status, and control over their lives" (Ehrenreich 1989: 12). I will leave though the differentiation of the middle stratum with this point, indicating that it often can still be carried much farther. A not so rough differentiation shall suffice though, following Agarwala's and Hering's conclusion that the "big classes" (upper, middle, lower) have too little explanatory power when it comes to (collective) action, as well as group identification, interests, and culture in comparison to, for instance, occupational groups (Agarwala/Hering 2008: 14).

A more complex description of the social field though does not necessarily lead to making social inequality a mere matter of opinion. The milieu-model developed by the SINUS-institute which has researched much on lifestyles and milieus in Germany since the 1970s (cf. Vester 2002), is an example how the two axes of "social status" (socio-economic conditions) and "basic values" (socio-cultural lifestyle), can be integrated (cf. figure 6). While the dimension of social status here is measured by formal school education, profession and income (which implies control over [socio-economic] capital and [political] power [vertical inequality], the dimension of basic values is measured by [cultural] attitudes and mentalities [horizontal differentiation]). This way, the SINUS-model identifies all milieus (including people with shared common values, beliefs, lifestyles and aspirations), influenced, but not determined, by their socio-economical conditions.[135]

---

[135] The SINUS-model disproves the idea that an end to economic necessity and a disposable income within reach makes "anything go." The research by SINUS observed that even in the European welfare societies, mobility from one vertical strata to the other has been limited, although there has been a considerable horizontal mobility from 'traditional' mentalities to 'modern' and 're-oriented' ones. (Vester draws an axis from 'authoritarian' to 'self-determined' and 'vanguard'.)

Michael Vester (2002) has further developed the SINUS-milieu model. He draws two basic dividing lines between the different milieus. One is drawn in between the upper class (bourgeoisie/new and old rich) and the "respectable" milieus which include the established middle class and the petite bourgeoisie (line of distinction); the other line is drawn between the latter and the marginalized lower class (line of respectability), which cannot afford the habitus of pretention the middle stratum displays and is subjected to the necessities of life. These lines display that there is no complete permeability between the status groups, unlike the myth the rags to riches promises.





Figure 6: SINUS-milieus in Western Europe, Source: Ulrich Neuwöhner: Media, migrants and milieus, www.mediendaten.de/fileadmin/Migration/Texte/Media_Migrants_New.pdf (retrieved 2.2010)

Note: There has been a permanent redevelopment of this model with new milieus (or better: new naming of milieus). But the central set-up of this model - which alone is of relevance at this point - has more or less stayed the same.

As societal positions and self-conceptions have a significant vertical dimension and are mediated by one's position in the socioeconomic system or the market as outlined above, »class« is a possible starting point for social description and makes class theory more than just another "master narrative"(Agarwala/Hering 2008: 8). Nevertheless: to choose class as starting point (like this writing does), is a preliminary decision, done like any other theoretical decision, for the sake of reducing complexity. It is most likely an undue reduction to describe the social location of a person or a group only with regards to their class position. Following the intersectionality approach (at least gender and the race, probably even "body"), should be considered as well. (See for the dimension gender in the Philippines: Reese 2010b.) This work mainly enters the description of social grouping from the entry point of »class«, believing that it is *one*, but at least, *a* meaningful way of describing society, and is at the same time, conscious of the fact that such decision already shapes the description in a decisive way.

Furthermore, it has to be taken into consideration that the relation between milieu/class position and attitudes or actions is merely one of higher probabilities, and

not a deterministic one. Evidence for this is that, wherever surveys differentiate between class positions (e.g. the ISSP surveys as well as Bautista 2001), differences in attitude and positions between (defined, i.e.: constructed) classes turn out to be only of statistical nature ("more or less") and are often even only of marginal degree.

But even if despite all these caveats, the decision has been made for a materialist entry point, it might seem rather appropriate to speak of a "middle stratum" (*Mittelschicht*) or of "middle mass" (Lakha 1999: 264), instead of just using the historically highly loaded term »class«. Why stick to the term "class"?

Next to the mere acknowledgement that most English- or Spanish-written literature seldom make use of the term "stratum" (Schicht) - unlike the German discourse where the term *Mittelschicht* is well established - and usually speak of 'classes', even where the Marxist approach is not followed, »middle class« is a concept with a high everyday evidence. (It is real [*wirklich]* for most people, no matter how 'true' [*wahr*] it is.) "Middle class" is what Reinhard Kreckel calls a "real abstraction," a sociological concept that is neither a solely empirical or phenomenological fact nor a pure scientific construction. "They [real abstractions] are, despite all abstraction, real as they are familiar to the people concerned as well" (Kreckel 1992: 105).[136] But this does not necessarily imply that everyone means the same when speaking of "middle class."[137]

Especially where used in the singular, 'middle class' is rather a social narrative than an objective reality. It is an influential ideal and very powerful by that, so that one may even speak of a 'myth of the middle class', the way Leszek Kolakowski (*Die Gegenwärtigkeit des Mythos*, München, 1974[2]) and Franz-Xaver Kaufmann (Religion und Modernität. In *Soziale Welt, Sonderband 4*, Göttingen, 1986, 283-307) define the term 'myth': a social institution with the function to reduce complexity, give orientation and make sense of 'history' by turning it into a 'story'. 'Myth' is so to speak, the noun to societal reality (*soziale Wirklichkeit*) but not the opposite of 'truth'. At the same time a myth most often has an ideological dimension by legitimizing and at the same time denying social realities.

Such (narrative of the) 'middle class' can be considered the "social embodiment of a progressive modernity that prizes individualism, consumption, egalitarianism, meritocracy, associational spirit, and political involvement," as Owensby (1999: 3; 11f.) outlines. "The middle class" says Owensby (p. 11f.), "has in many ways been the central symbol of twentieth-century social life in the West, a reflection of Western anxieties and hopes. ... The middle-class narrative constitutes a principal thread in the broader story of modernization and liberal-democratic capitalism. ... Countries such

---

[136] In this sense, Owensby (1999: 256) as well uses the term »middle class« explaining: "I use middle class rather than middle sectors or middle groups because the people with whom I am concerned so often used class to describe their position in a society whose politics was laced with the language of class."

[137] Likewise, it might be scientifically more pertinent to speak of "intermediary classes" as this term underlines more than the term "middle" that classes cannot be understood without looking at their relation to the upper classes (pretention) and the classes below them (distinction). Anyway, I will hardly use this term, as it doesn't catch the prevalent social discourse in which the term "middle" is firmly established.

as Brazil were found hopeful or wanting, depending in part on whether they could boast a middle class. ... In countless unconscious and conscious ways, middle-class Brazilians judged their own lives according to the idea of the middle class, a »myth of the modern world« so compelling that they rarely had occasion to reflect upon its role in their lives."[138]

"The middle classes are the subject of modernity," Portocarrero (1998: 18) explains short and sweetly. "They are at the same time the creatures and the protagonists of modern time" (ibid.). The desire to be in the middle is therefore strong and it serves itself as a sign of societal inclusion, so that one always finds much more people locating themselves in the middle, even if 'objectively' they should rather be counted as underclass *or* upper class. Bautista also observes this attitude in the Philippines, where "capitalist respondents tend to downgrade their class while those in the working class assess themselves as higher in the class hierarchy" (2001: 109), which he attributes to "the general tendency of Filipinos to situate themselves close to the middle of the scales ... and their general assessment of where they are in the social ladder considering much higher or lower reference points" (ibid.).

Wherever the myth of the middle class is evoked, one usually only encounters the singular 'middle class', at times including the petite bourgeoisie, but usually solely focusing on the bourgeoisie, the "new rich" and the educated middle class (*Bildungsbürgertum*). Such partiality though is seldom specified and other classes within the middle stratum are rather excluded by omission from being counted to the drivers of democratization and progress. Taking the power of the middle class narrative into consideration, I will use the term »the middle class« in the following, especially when I am referring to the myth (therefore in quote unquote) and speak of middle class*es*, when I mean the different empirically based social groupings within the middle stratum.

3.11. The precarized new middle class: resourceful and still longing for something

It is considered typical for struggles of the precarized, especially if they are poor, to be more oriented towards securing the livelihood (*hanapbuhay*), thus making these more defensive. The precarized poor have two objectives, says Bayat (2000: 548): acquisition of vital resources (but not redistribution) and creating open spaces for action that are as much as possible untroubled by the state and modern bureaucratic institutions. While at the same time they may have expectations towards the state and other patrons, they are not focusing on the reform of institutions – basing their relationships on reciprocity, trust and negotiation rather than on the modern notions

[138] A good example for the reception of this 'narrative of the middle class' for the Philippine case is Tony Lopez' column *The Filipino is middle class* (MT, 14.4.2009).

of individual self-interest, fixed rules and contracts.[139] These 'modest' expectations resembles the "habitus of necessity" Pierre Bourdieu (1979), described as typical for the French lower classes. Here, the focus is rather on resistance than on liberation – which gave them the notion to be conservative, or even reactionary, than progressive.[140] This subsistence orientation (economy of enough) goes along with the principle of "live and let live," as they do not (longer) want 'the whole cake' or even 'the whole fucking bakery,' as a political graffiti goes, but only a 'fair' share. Even when focusing on institutions and redistribution, a reformism evolves that the classical Left has regularly dismissed as "petty bourgeois," "counterrevolutionary" or even as "domesticated" [*verhausschweint*], like Robert Kurz (in *Schwarzbuch Kapitalismus,* Frankfurt a.M, 1999, p. 133).[141]

The worker unrests Silver (2005) describes and analyzes on the other hand (see above) mainly happened in times of growing opportunities so that these unrests "push(ed) for higher wages, better working conditions and more comprehensive worker rights"(ibid.: 212). While self-protection movements of the poor and proactive protests of the workers are both a kind of protest against proletarization and commodification, the self-protection movements, formed by farmers as well as craftspeople or professionals of all kinds, resist their displacement (i.e. precarization); workers on the other hand have already been "freed" (Marx) from their means of subsistence. Thus, self-protection movements fight primarily against social insecurity, and less against 'exploitation' i.e. for an appropriate share of the surplus value, which again is common for worker unrests. The crucial problem of the precarious poor is uncertainty or rather the right to the necessities of life, but neither equality nor independence. "The test for the peasant is more likely to be 'What is left?' than 'How much is taken'," says Scott (1976: 7), adding that "the stabilization of real income for those close to subsistence may be a more powerful goal than achieving a higher average income" (In more detail Reese 2008a.).

Why should we then expect middle class(es) in general, and specifically, the marginal and precarized middle class, to get politically active? Picking up from the discussion about the difference between hunters and agriculturists presented earlier, we may single out three features that make middle class members likely to politically

---

[139] Scott clarifies that the right to sufficient means enough for living (subsistence), which is "the first and primary criterion of justice"(1976: 33) in traditional social contracts, does not necessarily go along with complete adversity to the state. Scott distinguishes two versions of such a contract: "The minimal formulation was that elites must not invade the subsistence reserve of poor people; its maximal formulation was that elites had a positive moral obligation to provide for the maintenance needs of their subjects in time of dearth" (ibid.). Nevertheless, even such a "positive moral obligation" does not surpass much more than what a neoliberal minimal state would provide for.

[140] In terms of precarity, Bourdieu writes about 20 years later that it would already be a form of resistance "when all the currently or potentially precarized (...) join forces against the destructive forces of precarity" which would help them "to live, to endure, preserve an upright walk and their dignity and to resist the decomposition and decay of their self-image and resist alienation" (Bourdieu 1998).

[141] Here again Scott (1985: 247) counters: "Dissident intellectuals from the middle or upper classes may occasionally have the luxury of focusing exclusively on the prospects for long-term structural change, but the peasantry or the working class are granted no holiday from the mundane pressures of making a living."

react to their precarization: partly based on the objective resources they can mobilize (resource mobilization approach) and partly based on their middle class mindset (framing):

1. As far as resources facilitating political action of middle classes are concerned, the one mentioned here first and foremost is their **higher level of education**. Education enhances nearly every other participatory factor (Schmitt 2007, Böhnke /Dathe 2010, Claußen/Wasmund 1982, Rucht 2013). Not only are the more educated considered to be in command of higher cognitive and political skills, they are also viewed to be politically better informed, and more aware of their influence and the effects politics have on the individual. But it is also believed that they show a higher sense of their political efficacy, appraise higher the opportunities of influence citizens have, have more confidence in the political elite and are more likely asked to join a political activity.[142]

Society rather entitles (and expects, but fears as well) the more educated to get active on political issues than the lower classes, who in turn, feel less entitled to interfere in what is considered as not their business. It is not only because of their skills but also as the middle classes are better in performing the legitimate Habitus and have a higher command of the elaborate code, so that their way of expressing themselves is more accepted. The educated therefore possess a "right given by their status to expression and political action," says Bourdieu (1982: 639). Last but not least, their professional occupation gives them the chance to increase their competence and gain confidence based on their knowledge and its acknowledgement (Vester 2002: 97). Thus Burns et al. (2001: 366) state that, "the non-political institutions of adult life grant a significant advantage to the well educated with respect both to institutional access and to the acquisition of participatory factors within institutions." No wonder that they are more politically interested and knowledgeable, this being further facilitated by the economic resources they control, as well as, the more influential positions and networks they occupy and are part of.

Much of these favorable conditions for political action are heightened whenever primary socialization has already laid the seeds for a sense of citizenship. The more socialization agents convey political experience, the greater the politicization effect, observes Schulze (1976: 112). Socialization theories therefore assume that children and adolescents learn skills needed for citizenship especially in middle class environments. This may be middle class families or middle class-biased peer groups (*barkada*). Communication for instance is considered a central feature of the middle-class lifestyle (bolstered up by the feeling of being part of the new middle class when considering themselves to belong to the "communication people" [Reese 2008c] as ICCAs do). "From didactic matters (how to educate children) to personal affairs (how

[142] While the empirical part will show that there is little significant difference between middle class and lower class members when it comes to citizenship attitudes, indeed this higher self-confidence among the middle class(es) sticks out. Cf. *Conclusion* of the chapter 4.15. *Are the respondents representative for the Philippines?*

to solve conflicts with your partners), this culture of communication has started to serve as an integrating code of middle-class culture," says Eder (1989: 38).

Karaos (1997) discovered in her research on middle class families in the Philippines, that their children are more allowed to question rules or decisions (although they usually do not participate in the decision making). Speaking out one's mind seems to be encouraged, parents make decisions jointly and there was little delineation in the formulation of rights and responsibilities between male and female children. This happens amidst the background of an educational culture which still considers it "*bastos*" (rude) for children to "talk back" (*hirit*). Karaos thus comes to the conclusion that "socialization, decision-making and social control processes within the urban middle class family possess certain characteristic features that can support the formation of democratic values. Among these are decision-making processes that allow for negotiation and bargaining, the exercise of decision-making roles by women within the family, the weak emphasis placed on the unquestioned authority of elders, the regard for reasonableness as an element of legitimacy, and a certain degree of appreciation for rules and discipline" (Karaos 1997: 128).

However, in order not to fall victim to the "obsession of a class-specific reductionism" (Schulze 1976: 126), one must bear in mind that class-specific differences are only of statistical nature (as most sociological "facts"). Hopf and Hopf (1986: 182, 186) for instance, can show in analyzing quantitative data that while there is a positive correlation between readiness to political action and the father's occupation, children of executives are only slightly more ready to political action than children of workers (2.9 to 3.3 in a scale of 5). The other items surveyed by Hopf and Hopf confirm this slight margin as well. Statements built on such numbers are only »more or less« to the point. Within a middle-class environment, chances are higher for one to develop a sense of possibility and self-determination, while in more lower class families, rules are strictly enforced and an orientation towards the now and here is practiced. Divergent socialization conditions only make the formation of divergent resources for action more likely, but this is not automatic. Unlike what the culture of poverty-approach suggests, unequal political participation of men and women or of people from different classes and education degrees cannot merely be explained by the political socialization they went through. Direct or masked processes of social exclusion play a significant role as well. Political socialization simply contributes to such disparity *as well* by developing (or not) the personal requirements for political participation.

Education even seems to be closer connected to an inclination to protest than economic capital, as Schmitt (2007: 41) believes. And Böhnke/Dathe (2010: 17) observed that "those among the poor with higher education and good qualifications are most often the ones active on a voluntary basis. ... People who consider themselves to be imaginative, inventive and creative and believe that they can influence the circumstances are committed despite being poor."

2. As middle class members have achieved something and are not situated at the lower end of social structure, they still have something to lose. Even if exactly such "fear of falling" (Ehrenreich 1989) is often held liable when explaining reluctance to fight for what one considers right (Rescher in Reese 2008b), it is a well-established finding in history, that groups from whom something was taken away are more prone to protest than those who never had anything in their possession, as Bourdieu (1998) and Vester (in Schultheis 2005) confirm for present days. Silver shows for the 19th century that strikes have often been sparked by attacks on customary rights of skilled workers (Silver 2005: 171) and trade unionism originated from brotherhoods of impoverished craftsmen (cf. Vester 2002: 97). Mollat (1984: 190) showed for the Middle Ages that it was "not the poor in the traditional sense, constantly suffering distress, humiliation, powerlessness and disease" who agitated the poor man riots in the 14th century, but the "new poor ... fit workers, receiving meager, barely sufficient wages, but being self-confident in spite of all that was lacking" (ibid.). Roose asserts that protest movements are mostly peopled by urban dwellers of young age and with higher education (2011: 10). Their deprivation is still »fresh« and they have not yet been demobilized by a "*pragmatismo resignado*" (pragmatism of resignation), as a Nicaraguan activist once described a mindset they encounter among the long-term marginalized (Überlebenswelten 2005).

The mobilizing effect of being about to lose something can also make middle class members participate in protests against precarization induced by neoliberal structural adjustment measures. The educated middle class (or their children) has actually been significantly affected by such measures. This is very obvious for the cases of Spain, Greece and Chile (as well as of India after 1991), where structural adjustment programs indeed cut down state expenses for the education, the health and the administrative sector, as well as for infrastructure, and have deregulated these sectors, which were offering a stable employment and source of income especially for the educated middle class. (Other factions of the middle class though have profited from structural adjustment, i.e. liberalization, deregulation and world market orientation, namely the ones active in the financial sector, technical professionals hired by the private sector or the ones involved into export production.[143]) Furthermore, the middle class was strongly affected by the cutting down of public social security nets and publicly subsidized benefits. Protectionist welfare regimes like in Latin America have been strongly biased towards the [politically active] urban and the middle and upper class and not towards the bottom strata of the population (Rudra 2008, Walton/Seddon 1994), which also holds true for a European welfare state like Germany.

Dagmar Hilpert describes in her PhD *Wohlfahrtsstaat der Mittelschichten? Sozialpolitik und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Welfare state of the middle classes? Social policies and societal change in the Federal Republic of Germa-

---

[143] In the case of India, Sarkar (2008) believes that herein lies an important reason why young call center agents as a "burgeoning middle class" hardly organize, while professionals belonging to the old middle class, dependent on the public sector did.

ny, Göttingen, 2013), how the middle classes were not only beneficiaries but also service providers of the welfare state. Thus they benefited in two ways from its expansion, on the one hand by higher benefits, on the other hand by their professional involvement, especially the professionalization and the expansion of social, therapeutic and administrative work that has, to a great extent been under state auspices (public service) or has at least been mostly funded by public money. This effected the development of "typical safety orientations among the middle class" (ibid: 329). Since it have been especially university graduates who benefited from this expansion, the particular closeness to the state which has already characterized the educated middle class in the 19th Century, continued into the 20th Century (ibid.: 327f.).

Here, the neo-liberal transformation of the welfare state, from status securitization towards basic security or "from entitlement to obligation" (Yvonne Hartmann), spells a threat to middle class status. It is less the poor (who are anyway already barely covered by the public social nets), but rather the middle classes who are mainly affected by the austerity measures. "The race to the bottom," thus concludes Rudra (2008: 15), "is largely affecting the middle class and bypassing the poor." The poor, even in a certain way, profit from the "stepping stone" and basic needs-approach of neoliberal social policy, while the middle classes are now more expected than before to care for themselves as they are considered to have the means to »go private«.[144]

We can also see that such downsizing of the state contributed to the Arabellion, where long time positions in the state sector were guaranteed to university graduates (see below). Such though is less obvious in the Philippines, as structural adjustment programs here contributed less to the "downsizing" of a welfare state, but rather it put a silent end to the developmental state. Only 7.9% of the labor force work for government or a government cooperation as of January 2014 (Source: census.gov.ph/sites/default/files/attachments/hsd/pressrelease/Table%201%20-%20January%202014%20LFS.pdf). But then again, there has been a strong connection between middle class and public service, if Kimura (2003: 274) is right that 53.8% of the new middle class and 33.5% of the marginal middle class are employed in the public sector; half of them as teachers.[145] Nevertheless, clamors for an extension of the public health and education sector cannot fall back on a historical experience of groups "grown accustomed to these basic amenities" (Almeida 2007: 125 for the case of the middle class in Latin America), now being deprived of such opportunities. The deregulation of the oil and electricity sectors or the selected reduction of food subsidies are the only experiences of cutting back required by structural adjustment programs

[144] An interesting expression of such negligence of the (marginal) middle classes in neoliberal policies is, as discovered by Virola et al., in the fact that "the Millennium Development Goals do not include an indicator on the middle class" (2013:4).

[145] According to Virola (2013: 29), only 19.2% of those he considers middle class worked for the government in 2009. As Virola's "middle class" though is merely an income bracket (see below), its explanatory power is considered less significant than the "middle class" Kimura is speaking of, which is at least occupation-based. Furthermore in Virola's computation there are many more public servants among the middle class than among the lower class (5.2%) or the upper class (6.2%).

in the Philippines, so these might (and do) spark protests. (More on the relationship of the middle classes and the state in part II and the post-script.)

3. Looking back to history, it is not only the fear of falling, but as well a »hope of rising« has activated the middle strata. This again already holds true for the situation Mollat described for the Middle Ages[146], but likewise for the "Third-World" settings, as Owensby describes in his work on the Brazilian middle class. "More than in other social sectors," says Owensby (1999: 72), "their [i.e. middle-class people] aspirations and anxieties appear to have been rooted in the hope of rising and the fear of falling and in an unresolved tension between merit and patronage." It is again the situation of limbo that makes the precarized middle class members to be "»border crossers« [*Grenzgänger*] with a life characterized by the attempt to stay »in business« under difficult conditions and with high activity: In the intermediate layer of the border crossers, the fear of descent is as present as the hope for stability and advancement" (Michael Behr in Dörre/Castel 2008: 172).

These three features, i.e. high level education and its relevance for political action; the fear of falling; as well as, the sense of aspiration, leads to "punchy, tenacious, consistent and targeted protest that can usually be expected from people with high qualifications, strong identities, grand skills of articulation and superior organizational skills," as Vester believes (in Schultheis 2005: 22). "It is the blockages by the current establishment which lead resourceful groups, who have been betrayed of their own future, to revoke loyalty to the economic and political leaders and motivate them to form, at least tactical alliances, with the lower classes," so says Vester (ibid.). He considers such social status inconsistency, a "discrepancy between high performance potential and a low social position" that leads to the revocation of loyalty to the system: "Hardly anything rocks a political system more than a profound disagreement between established elites on one hand and the rejected representatives of new claims on the other hand" (ibid.).

Additionally, we can derive from the myth(s) of modernity (autonomy, do-ability, progress), closely linked with the myth of the middle class (middle class concepts as point of reference for modern societies), as well as, from the prime importance education and expertise has in modern societies, that political consciousness and involvement are to a certain extent part of the identity, at least, of the educated middle class (Weidner 2007). This connects them more with an upper class growing up in the consciousness to be the societal steersmen, rather than with the lower classes who often are explicitly told that politics is not their business. Reading the newspaper,

---

[146] "The relaxed situation after the Great Plague has aroused the greed; the hard-working poor started to make demands" (Mollat 1984: 190f.).

speaking up for a class-biased idea of social development, being an advocate for the downtrodden - all these are part of a middle class socialization.

Taking the promises and myths encoded in the social contract of modernity at face value, adds to the likeliness of activism among the middle class. Democratization theory, but also the self-narrative of the middle class, considers the presence of a viable middle class a pre-requirement (and a guarantee!) for (liberal) democracy and also for modernization in general, an assumption especially connected to the name of Seymour Lipset[147]. I will elaborate on this myth (i.e. the middle class as prime mover in democracy) in the postscript of this writing. For now, the indication shall suffice that the political involvement of middle class(es) is not necessarily of democratic color; in contrast, the educated have, since the times of Plato's philosophers' state, showed an ambivalent relationship to letting political matters decided by the majority and not by knowledge. Developmental dictatorships, from which Marcos tried to frame his "new society," with their built in technocracies, are evidences of this.

But the ideology of achievement also has its downside. It includes what Wahl (1989) calls the "modernization trap," snapping when the promises of enlightenment, i.e. autonomy, a life on my own, success and wealth for all[148], meet a reality of exclusion: "Blocked desires of advancement, experiences of social decline, being relegated to the social offside or the experience to be a 'loser', shake the self-confidence and the feeling of self-worth of the ones affected with a lasting effect" (Wahl 1989: 97). Thus, Alain Ehrenberg and Bröckling consider depression as the "inverse insistence on the promises of happiness the prophets of entrepreneurship lure, and at the same time, deceive their audience with" (Bröckling 2007: 289).

Scott considers the internalization of such sense of aspiration, achievement and doability as typical middle-class: "Compared to middle-class families which emphasize feeling, guilt, and attitude, working-class parents, it is claimed, stress outward conformity and compliance with far less concern for the motives that lie behind it" (Scott 1990:24).

3.12. (Marginal) Middle class in the Philippines

After outlining in general what one may understand when speaking of "middle class" and of what relevance this class position might be for taking political action, I want to describe the kind of "the middle class" there is in the Philippines.

In the Philippine everyday world, roughly a "two class concept" prevails of 'big people' (*malakas* or *may kaya* or literally with ability) vs. 'little people' (*mahina*), as

---

[147] Cf. Seymour Lipset (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. *The American Political Science Review* 53 (1), 69-105.

[148] *Wohlstand für alle* was an electoral slogan in Germany in the 1960s and is often equated with the promise affluent society held for its citizens.

Turner (1995) observed. Such two-tiered model holds true in popular imagination up to these days. Take the example of the urban worker community in the Manila squatter settlement of Tatalon where Pinches researched in the late 1980s and where he observed a "dichotomic conception" of *masa* vs. *mayaman* (rich) "which dominates as they reflect upon themselves and others around them" (Pinches 1991: 166). Turner states that even if "the term middle class regularly features in the everyday speech of that class, in the media and in academia, this is a relatively recent phenomenon. ... The middle class has been mentioned much, but often in passing or with little or no attention to theorizing" (Turner 1995: 97, likewise Bautista 2001: 267).

Casually though, we find the idea of a strata/class in between the »*may kaya*« and the »*mahina*«: William Henry Scott (1997) has described multi-class systems already for the pre-Hispanic Philippines. Others see middle class evolving in the 19th century along with a economic liberalization or point at the lower middle class composition of (leadership of) the *Katipunan*, the liberation movement against Spanish colonialism (cf. Turner 1995 for an overview). In the present (rural) Philippines, Kerkvliet distinguishes in his research on *Class and Status Relations in a Central Luzon Village* (1991: 65ff.) four status groups: not only the very poor (which include two sub-groups), the less poor and the rich (again with two sub-groups), but another status group he calls "adequate," which possesses features of middle-classness.[149] These Kerkvliet matches (but does not equate) with four "classes" – a term merely based on the means of livelihood (*hanapbuhay*): workers, peasants, small business people, and capitalists.

Despite such differentiations, a more or less dichotomic stratification model contrasting poor/weak and non-poor/rich/powerful dominates in the Philippines, which is in line with how class analysis is usually done when it comes to "developing societies." Wherever a tripartition is undertaken, it rather focuses on a cleavage within the upper(-middle) class instead of singling out a middle class: Next to the old elite, including the ruling class, i.e. the landed class and its political dynasties, a globally connected "new" bourgeoisie is identified. The latter faction of the upper class developed in the course of globalization, industrialization and democratization/state building and mainly forms the "new rich," described for instance in the compilation *Culture And Privilege In Capitalist Asia* (Pinches 1999a).

This group also comprises the more traditional comprador class (not a new group in the Philippines as it already developed in the mid of the 19th century), which performs the function assistants to the ruling class. The existence of this group is an expression of the fact that many societies in development are postcolonial and their economies are characterized by capitalism, but by capitalism specific in several features. On one hand, their economies are linked to a highly dependent way with the developed capitalist economies and the helm of the economy is normally heavily in-

---

[149] This is similar to what Gerke (2000) observed in Indonesia, as such considering "the most common stratification model for contemporary Indonesian society, ... the differentiation between those who can 'barely make it', those who 'have enough' (cukupan) and those who are 'rich people' (orang kava), which include high office holders" (Gerke 2000:142f.).

fluenced by foreign capital. “Old” and “new” elite thus don’t necessarily have a similar class interest: the first has strongly nationalist, and preserving, feudal interests; the latter’s interests are globally oriented and it is more capitalist in its outlook.[150]

But systematic overviews and analyses of social structures of developmental societies are rare, so that Krumwiede in his article on “social inequality and class structure in Latin America“ (Krumwiede 2002) asserts that “through a social structural analysis ... of Latin American societies, one is compelled to enter unexplored new ground” (p. 63). A desideratum for research which even extends more to the middle classes as Krumwiede notices: “Today, (one knows) more about the poor and the marginalized than about the lower layer employed in the ‘formal sector’ and the middle classes“(ibid.). Likewise, Virola et al. (2013: 4) says that in relation to the Philippines, “numerous studies have been done and indicators/statistics developed with primary focus on the poor, and very little focus on the vulnerable sectors of society including the middle-income class.“

Likewise, middle classes hardly are recognized in the theory of social stratification of “global society.” Neither the approach completely sealing out social inequality by focusing merely on the global executive class, nor the competing approach highlighting the globally deprived and merely focusing on the rich-poor gap (cf. *Rich-poor gap in PHL could be worse–WB*, The Manila Times, 15.9.2013), busy themselves with the middle classes - and the lower/marginal middle class here is nearly completely out of sight (in detail: Reese 2008c: 42-44).

This oversimplification is further exacerbated by the fact that theories of social inequality still usually refer to container societies as their space of reference. “International inequality is perceived as a comparison of [national] mean values between nation states, not as relations of inequality between people or positions,” comments Anja Weiß (2008: 225), a sociologist working for years on the issue of a transnationalism of social inequality. But as Weiß notes, “many people only partly fit into the inner room of a national positional structure. For majority of the migrants, the value of their capital in the country of origin differs considerably from the value in the country of destination, [especially if] people live in several national positional structures at the same and for a longer time like in the case of circular or transmigrants” (ibid: 226).

Such theories are even made less suited when applied to migration societies such as the Philippines, where 10% of the citizens live and work outside the country and a growing number works for foreign employers and clients. Such globalized (or better

[150] In a nutshell, the main conflict of interests between these two fractions lies in how they profit from integration into the neocolonial global economy. While the stewardship of the comprador class derives its profit from a continuing role of foreign capital in production for export, the national capitalist fraction represents elements of the bourgeoisie that profit from import-substitution and a nationally confined economic development that is not accompanied by redistributive measures but by protectionist policies restricting the dominance of foreign capital.

glocalized – see below) position aggravates the contradictory class location middle classes »reside« in.

"Many have been asking about the middle class in the Philippines, but literature on this has been scarce," notes former director at the National Statistics Office, Tomas Africa (Africa 2011: 39). As middle class theory is (still) in a fledgling stage, it is not surprising that generally, a predominance of economic and political analyses of societal processes can be observed: 'Middle class' even in scientific publications is usually defined in the socioeconomic way, which falls back on features like income, occupation, educational attainment, housing and/or facilities, as is done in the FIES or in the statistical data presented by the National Statistical Coordination Board (e.g. Virola et al. 2013). Here, the term 'middle class' is associated with income and consumption practices. Due to such a basic definition, the columnist Tony Lopez can even claim that "the entire Filipino nation is middle class" (The Manila Times, 14.4.2009), as he takes off from the fact that "the World Bank believes having a daily income of $2 to $10 is middle class" and as he then uses the average per capita income (not even the median income!), which is 5.64$ a day. This resonates with the often stressed conclusion that the "Philippines is a middle-income country" (e.g. Michael Tan, PDI 22.5.2008 pas.), an assumption which again would require at least additional specifications on the distribution of income (like the Gini coefficient or the indication of a standard deviation).

This predominant way of defining middle class leads to the most common method used to sketch the Philippine social structure, i.e. the categorization to A to E classes based on purchasing power socioeconomic classifications. While the National Statistical Coordinating Board in 2012 suggested a "New Philippine Socioeconomic Classification System," which replaced the five clusters by nine, the A-E system still prevails. Here, the A bracket is the one with the highest income, while the E class can be equated with dire poverty (although half of the E class is placed above the – restrictively defined – official poverty threshold, cf. Africa 2011: 41). Usually, the C class (at times differentiated into C1 and C2) is defined as middle class, while at times, the B and the D1 classes are included as well into what is considered middle class.[151]

The FIES (cf. for the following: *census.gov.ph/content/2012-fies-statistical-tables*) does not operate with the term "middle class" at all (with a search on the NSO-website for "middle class" yielding no results) and uses as highest bracket of its income and expenditure class an annual income of "250,000 pesos and over," which amounts to a monthly household income of merely 20,000 pesos and above. This offers no way to distinguish middle class from upper class or a marginal from an upper middle class. According to the Social Weather Stations (SWS), the most renowned private survey institution in the country, most Filipin@s even consider a monthly income of more than 20,000 Pesos as already constituting *mayaman* (rich), while they set the border of

---

[151] A useful overview on the Filipino middle classes can be found in Reckordt 2008: 55-65.

affluence at an even smaller monthly budget for their own families (Source: Mahar Mangahas: *Where does 'mayaman' begin?*, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14.6.2008).[152]

Romulo Virola, himself Secretary General of the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB), decries that "the systematic generation of data on the middle class has not been institutionalized in the Philippine Statistical System" (2013: 4) and tries to bridge this gap by defining the middle class as the lowest part of highest FIES-bracket including those families who (in 2007) have a total annual income ranging from P251,283 to P2,045,280 (Virola 2007: 16). This definition of the middle class is so broad that its upper boundary in terms of income is over eight times higher than the lower boundary.[153]

The only way to define a middle class based on the FIES would be to resort to its computation of income deciles, which again are not connected to income brackets. Based on the FIES 2012, the middle class would comprise 29.5% when we define it as the brackets 4-7. Including bracket 8 into this would make it 42.2% (making the Philippines indeed nearly a middle class society). Focusing again on the expenditure classes, the brackets 4-7 comprise 32.1%, while the brackets 4-8 comprise 44.3%. This though is merely a relative approach and does not say much about the extent of income and expenditure in general.

Even when restricting the definition of middle class to socioeconomic data, one meets divergent estimations on how big the Philippine middle class is considered to be: While an AC Nielsen study estimated the Philippine middle class (Class C) between 1993 and 1998 to be a fifth of the country's household population, the market research agency Sofres, estimated the middle class to be no more than 9% between 1993 and 1998 (Virola 2007: 4; 8).[154] Likewise Africa (2011), considers the C segment to comprise only about 9% of the population, thereby making it to start de facto within the highest decile the FIES provides and making the fourth decile already a part of the lower/middle class income (class D), which again comprises 60-68% of the population.[155] René Azurin (Business World, 3.2.2010) states that "using recent demographic data, only 9% of voters belong to the combined A, B, and C income classes" (by this not distinguishing between A,B and C classes, just like Africa did in

---

[152] Most people set an affluence threshold only about three times higher than their own poverty line. The affluence threshold is highest in Metro Manila, where the median is usually at P30, 000 and lowest is in Mindanao, usually at P15, 000. The answers again have to be differentiated by actual household income: The median affluence-line is usually set at P50,000 by households in the middle-to-upper ABC classes; at P20, 000 by the *masa* or D class; and, at P15, 000 by the very poor or E class. And again the thresholds range up to P82,700 for families headed by someone who has post-collegiate training. This is another evidence that most people equate middle class nearly with their own situation, even when it cannot be backed by a "hard" criterion like income. In contrast, in any income group, the 'rich' seem to be considered as mostly the others and the threshold from where rich is considered to start is, in most cases, above one's own household income.

[153] On a personal basis, Virola defines the middle class as those having an annual per capita income of P 65,787 (± 4 US-Dollar a day) to P 805,582 in 2013 (Virola et al. 2013: 8), escalating the 8 to a 12-times gap.

[154] The middle classes are primarily located in the large cities, particularly in Metro Manila. Virola (2013: 10) considers that "more than 50% of the families (in the National Capital region) belong to the middle income class," while only 1% of the Sulu population can be considered middle class when basing such definition merely on the parameter of income.

[155] Although later in his presentation (p. 45), he speaks of 15% and even 25% belonging to the "middle class (C).[sic!]"

2011). A 2012 SWS-project again determined 11% as AB; and, 7% as "middle-income class" C; it located 62% in the poor class D; and, 20% in the extremely poor class E (Source: Business World, 23.3.2013).[156]

In 2009, Virola considered the middle class to have shrunk from 23% in 2000 to 19.1% in 2006 (Manila Times, 10.6.2009), but in 2013 considered it to have grown all the way to 25.2% in 2009 (Virola 2013: 9). The reason for such divergences: He based his definition merely on socio-economic characteristics, making the middle class a mere statistical construction. Despite being a mere construct, the media discourse covers such up and downs with much anxiety. This is due to the middle class myth, which assumes that it needs a sizeable middle class to spur development and democratization (likewise Virola 2013).

Due to the inconsistencies on how middle class is defined in a socio-economic sense and in relation to the fact that class concept, and not statistical classifications, are socially prevalent, Africa "urge(s) the NSCB to come up with an official definition of the often-used ABCDE socio-economic classification and the 'generic' low-middle-high income classes in cooperation with academe and private sector. Many policy and decision-makers and the general public have accepted and used these, rather than deciles, quintiles and percentiles" (Africa 2011: 55).

The blurry definition of who is considered "middle class" in the Philippines and how it is distinguish from the other classes is further complicated when surveys differentiating by (income) classes (Bautista 2001) reveal that the variations between the attitudes and positions of the different (constructed) classes are only of statistic nature (frequently with almost marginal differences). Bautista ,who accomplished the most sophisticated research about Filipino middle classes I have encountered, thus comes to the conclusion that "the middle classes … are a heterogeneous group and it is difficult to talk about a common lifestyle or shared perspectives on social issues" (Bautista 2001: 92).

Furthermore: No matter how broadly defined, socio-economic classifications seem to not meet with the extent to which Filipin@s rate themselves as middle class: The annual surveys of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), to which the SWS belong, include a question on self-reported economic status, in which Filipinos overwhelmingly declare themselves middle class (see above).

This correlates with the strong sense of aspiration and sense of eventuality many Filipin@s show despite being in the condition of poverty and precarity (Reese 2008b). The utmost importance given to education in any social stratum (which was also confirmed in more recent surveys; cf. chapter 4.19.: *It's still hard work*), is one indicator of this desire to attain stable perspectives in life. The high number of outward migrati-

[156] Virola et al. (2013: 18) again do not consider the D-class as poor even if they belong to the lower class. According to them, in 2009, 53.8% of the population belongs to this non-poor low-income class and only 20.9% to the poor, low-income class. (25.2% was counted as middle class and only 0.1% was counted as high-income class.)

on is another expression of people actively challenging their precarious living situations. The middle class mindset seems to be far more prevalent than socioeconomic indicators would suggest.

All this makes it difficult to establish the size of this middle class. On the other hand, as there is nevertheless a strong sense of belonging to the middle class, it might be useful to only focus on symbols of middle-classness when referring to socio-economic indicators, and to draw on self-rating ("virtual middle class") when it comes to political action, and giving less importance on how "virtual" and "imagined" this belonging is - just as the SWS does in its quarterly surveys on "felt poverty" (asking *Do you feel poor?*).

Bautista (and following him Kimura), similarly chose the (reduced) third approach when defining middle classes not only in terms of occupation, but also in terms of prestige and identifies three classes within the middle stratum: a) the "new middle class," consisting of higher professionals and technical workers, on one hand, and wage- and salary-earning administrators, executives, and managers on the other hand; b) the "marginal middle class" occupying the lower segment of the new middle classes, referring to wage- and salary-earning clerical workers; and finally, c) the "old middle class" composed of nonprofessionals, nontechnical self-employed workers other than those in the informal sector and the primary industries, as well as employers outside the primary industries, except for those holding administrative, executive, and managerial positions (Bautista 2001: 97, Kimura 2003: 265). As the call center industry was still in its infancy at the time these articles were published, this now very relevant occupational group has not been included yet. Bautista estimates the size of the middle classes at around 22% and counts 45% of the middle stratum to the "new middle class" and 20.7% to the "marginal middle class," while he considers 34.3% as the "old middle class"(ibid.).[157]

In political terms, other distinctions are important, which differentiates whether the middle class member is a public servant or privately employed; if s/he is rather self-employed; or, if s/he is a labor migrant not permanently residing in the Philippines.

Despite all these big disparities in defining the middle class, "middle class" is nevertheless used as a standard and largely unquestioned category in the SWS and other political surveys (cf. among others: *www.sws.org.ph/pr20120404.htm*), which claim to give valid answers on what makes "the" middle class politically tick.

---

[157] Following data from Bautista, Kimura identifies a high level of middle-class reproduction (based on the socio-economic definition of middle class): "While there has been a relatively high social mobility among the different subcategories, the middle classes as a whole have become fairly distinct from the working class and agrarian population (Kimura 2003: 274). The higher the position within the middle class, the less people have a lower class background. According to Kimura, only one quarter of the marginal middle class and 22.3% of the old middle class moved up from the underclass; among the leading employees it have been 16.7% and among the professionals even only 6.5%.

3.12.1. OCWs as the new middle class?

An issue discussed with great commitment is how far migrants (officially termed: Overseas Filipino Workers or OFWs and formerly Overseas Contract Workers or OCWs) constitute the new middle class in the Philippines (this is whenever they are included into the Filipino social structure at all[158]). The often used basis for discussion is mainly the common but simplified categorization of class based income. The mushrooming of shopping malls and subdivisions are seen as visible expressions of this new middle class. (According to a survey by the mall chain SM, 9 out of 10 mall goers have relatives working abroad; Source: MT, 4.6.2014.)

But even if other middle class markers identified before (like education, self-understanding, habitus and reputation) are included here, due to their comparably high income and their global connectedness, OCWs may be considered middle class. This depends though on where they migrate. When earning hardly more than what they could earn in the Philippines (like when migrating as domestic worker to Singapore or Hong Kong), they can less be considered middle class than professionals migrating to the USA or Europe.[159]

The question is how far migration allows persons to cross the border from lower class to middle class – not only in financial terms but also in terms of a) self-identification; and, b) classification – must be left to further researches, as the data gathered within this study did not focus on such questions and secondary data are not reliable enough to answer it in the passing. Although for identifying the Philippine middle class, it is relevant that there is a significant correlation between migration experience in the family and middle-classness in income terms. Here, we can see that while in 2003, 52.2% of all families had an income below 100,000 pesos per annum, only 17.9% of them got their main income from abroad. Of the 33.6% of families with a family income of 100,000 to 249,000, 47.2% had their main income from abro-

---

[158] Following a transnational approach of defining the scope of society, i.e. considering people living transnational lives as being member resp. being rooted in two societies at the same time, I consider the Overseas Filipino (sic!) Workers to be part of the Filipino social structure (as well). Virola on the other hand seems to not include them into the Filipino middle class when temporarily considering the Filipino middle-income class as shrinking also due to migration of Filipinos to other countries (Virola 2007:4).

[159] Identifying them as members of the 'new middle class' is also due to the fact that the government migration regime picks up and fosters the close connection between overseas migration and middle-classness. The current paradigm of "Global Filipino" not only highlights and encourages white collar-jobs (although white collar jobs are the minority of the overall jobs migrants take up), but beyond that "jobs in the service sector that are traditionally viewed by host countries as »non-professional« jobs are also given a professional 'spin' ... [which] reinforces the notion that it is only when one goes abroad that Filipinos can truly shine as global citizens," as Benjamin San Jose shared at the 8th International Conference on Philippine Studies (Quezon City, Philippines, 23-26 July 2008) in his presentation *From Bagong Bayani to Global Filipino: Legitimizing the Intensification of Philippine Migration*.

At the same time OCWs are considered "social climbers" by the established middle class: As Filomeno Aguilar elucidates, there is a stigma attached to migrants working in the low and unskilled sectors which makes their fellow citizens in highly skilled sectors feel their status to be compromised and evoking in them a "transnational shame" (cf. Filomeno Aguilar Jr.: The dialectics of transnational shame and national identity, *Philippine Sociological Review 44 (1996)*: 101-36.). In a similar way, the commotion that arose within the Philippine middle-class media when a Greek(!) dictionary equated "Filipina" with "domestic helper" in August 1998 can be interpreted using this frame.

ad; and, among the 14.2% with 250,000 annual family income, again 34.9% had their main income from abroad (source: FIES 2003). The middle income stratum significantly gets chunks of its income from abroad. If the income by other GICs (call center agents and employees of foreign companies) is added, this number might even be more significant.

Furthermore, such data reveals how much a social position needs to be defined within a household approach (and not on an individual basis). For the Philippines, what Lakha (1999: 258) states for India can be adapted: "In a culture where family bonds are still strong, those who have acquired foreign residency and an overseas job (especially in the USA or elsewhere in the West) are engaged in a process of economic and social mobility not only for themselves but also for their families in India."

This again makes one aware of another 'construction site' when dealing with a middle-class-theory relevant for development societies: to verify how far middle classes in development societies (can afford to) break with "relations even to the family if they get in the way of individual advancement." Bourdieu (1982: 528) considers this typical for middle class individuals in France, stating that "advancement always requires a breach in which the denial of the former represents one aspect "(ibid.). Such a behavior though seems only affordable in "welfare state regimes" (Wood 2004). In contrast, in "informal security regimes" (ibid.) relationships and connections are (still) an essential part of the social security mix for members of the middle classes as well (cf. Lomnitz 1971), although middle class members have apprehensions on using connections instead of their own merit for achievements too (ibid.). [See part II for a confirmation of this assumption for the Philippine context.]

3.12.2. Of "Burgis" and other socio-cultural approaches

Competing with the statistical approach to middle class merely based on socio-economic parameters, socio-cultural concepts are widespread, which are in contrast hardly quantified. The (upper) middle and the upper class or simply the "privileged class" (Mariel/Arriola 1987: 9) are often termed as "sosyal" or "burgis." The term is easy to associate with Bourdieu's habitus-concept as it is less used as socio-economic term but rather as socio-cultural term, and largely coincides with Bourdieu's "bourgeoisie": the upper class, 'owning' the legitimate culture which the petite bourgeoisie generally aspires for.

The poor again are often considered, in a distinctive manner, by these burgis (and other middle class aspirants) to be "*bakya,*" "*taga-bukid,*" or *walang* (without) *breeding* or *batasan* (good behaviour) or *pinag-aralan* (education) - expressions which bleeding hearts counter with terms such as "*maralita*" or "*kabus*" (indigent).

The first communist party of the Philippines, the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), equated the term "burgis" with Marxist terms and concepts in the 1930s: It distinguished between the "*burges*" or "*burgesya*" consisting of the "*mga asendero at capitalista*" (landlords and capitalists) and the "*anakpawis*" (literally: children of

sweat) consisting of the "*manggagawa at magbubukid*" (workers and peasants) (Mariel/Arriola 1987: 9). [Again a dichotomic approach, this time of Marxist origin!] The leader of the new Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), Jose Maria Sison, later described Philippine society as being composed of four classes: landlords, bourgeoisie, peasantry, and proletariat, but usually the first two were simply referred to as "burgis," while the remaining two were lumped as the (two factions of the) "masa" (ibid.: 10).

As *burgis* is a term describing a habitus, "it is possible for a rich person who is not hung up on social status to be considered »*hindi burgis*« [not burgis] while a farmer's son from Bulacan or a struggling scholar from Tondo [the proverbial urban district of Manila, NR] may be burgis in his heart of hearts" (Mariel/Arriola 1987: 10). Although as mentioned, cultural orientation and socioeconomic condition are both referred to in the term *burgis,* the term nevertheless hints at the imaginative dimension of 'middle class' (middle class orientation or middle class mindset) and also considers the possible (at least partly) de-classment in attitude of people with a middle-class background.

Defining social groups (at least as partly decoupled from socio-economic causation) is of high(er) relevance for a "semi-feudal, semi-capitalist" society in transition, such as the Philippines, where concepts such as "class"- which implies that positions in society and self-concepts are brokered mainly by one's position in the economic (sub)system (cf. Thompson 1999: 21f) – only partly hold true. Just like Gerke (2000: 145) states for the Indonesian case, "a clear-cut differentiation of who was already in and who was still out of the middle class [is] hard to draw with parameters used for developed economies. The classical variables of research on the American and European middle class (SES = occupation, income, education) [does] not apply here."[160]

Kerkvliet, while concentrating on the term "status" (*kalagayan*), only includes consumption and standard of living (along with a rich to poor stratification) in his definition of status and leaves dimensions like respect and esteem aside. He so limits the relevance of *kalagayan*, observing that in rural Philippines "prestige is often associated with a high standard of living ... but … is different from respect and esteem [as] those who are wealthy, and thus have high status, are not necessarily held in high esteem; and some of the villagers from poorer, lower-status households enjoy considerable respect, sometimes even from people of higher status. ... The rich cannot de-

[160] This again holds true for affluent societies like Germany as a concept like Gerhard Schulze's "event society" (*Erlebnisgesellschaft*) in the 1990s shows. Here the term "social inequality" is substituted by the term "social differentiation" as pivotal concept for social structures. Lifestyle struggles are considered to have replaced class struggles. Instead of semantics of vertical inequality, increasingly, lifestyle semantics dominate the everyday life of members of societies which have surpassed in total the threshold of necessity as far as self-location and the location by others is concerned. This assumption again has been heavily disputed - of which the discourse of precarization is but one example. It would however lead too far to further elaborate on this at this particular place.

pend on wealth to earn the poor's respect. It depends rather on how they treat the poor" (Ibid.: 61f.).

3.13.3. Can the respondents to the study be considered "middle class"?

After making the remarks and extrapolations on the middle classes in general and specifically in the Philippines, it needs to be shortly outlined why the respondents to this study and the samples of the secondary data consulted can be considered "middle class" and of what specific kind of middle-classness they are.

As far as their income, their educational attainment and their consumption patterns are concerned, there can be no doubt to consider ICCAs to belong to the (marginal) middle class, at least when choosing the Philippines as space of reference. As I have further outlined in Reese 2008c, ICCAs exhibit numerous characteristics marked as typically 'middle class': Knowledge and skill (or at least the credentials imputing skill and knowledge) are the most significant "capital" they have command over, while they lack supervisory or decision-making power – which together makes them part of the marginal middle class. Furthermore, they have an income beyond the threshold of necessity (i.e. a disposable income) - but only when spent in the Philippines. Furthermore, they show a sense of aspiration (orientation of advancement) and believe in the validity of the principle of achievement – making them willing to follow the mobilization command. Additionally, many of them exhibit a distinctive behavior towards those below and an orientation towards the "global middle class." Likewise, job offerings *address* them in a middle class way – as professionals.[161]

But their position is precarious, they often have a lower class family background and many of them only have a lower tertiary degree (e.g. bachelor degree in lesser prestigious subjects acquired in mainstream colleges), although as Philippine economy can lesser provide decent jobs for college graduates, the line between excellent and average tertiary educational background loses relevance.[162]

Furthermore, the income of ICCAs as floor agents is still often lower than that of the established middle class in the Philippines (depending on the location of the call center they work in). All these situate most of them a little above the margin of middle and lower stratum - the social position Bautista calls "marginal middle class."

---

[161] An image analysis of the advertisements luring young urban professionals to get hired in a call center easily shows how the industry banks on this sense of aspiration: Self-fulfillment, creativity, "aiming high" or "rising above the rest" are highlighted there. "While jobs are designed like a production line," says Fabros (2007: 249), "the image projected by the call center, with its global accounts, high-tech work places, posh work environments and cosmopolitan clienteles, coincides with signs and symbols that relate with agents' middle class [and Western oriented N.R.] identities."

[162] It is difficult to make a clear statement if the respondents have experienced social descent as expected of the marginal middle class. If just aggregating the data we can speak of slight social mobility the respondents experienced (median of 5 in regard to the social location of the family and 6 when assessing their own social location). A disaggregation of this data to the individual level as undertaken in the introduction of the sample further up though shows that we are here dealing with a jumble of (experienced /assessed) social ascent and descent.

All these also hold true more or less for the participants to this study like by singling out the sense of aspiration highlighted above: with 17 of 28 believing that the poor could rise from poverty; five saying it depends; and, only six believing they cannot. In the words of one respondent: "Everybody has a chance to be a star, we all have the equal opportunity to succeed, *kahit* (even if) children in the streets, you don't know what will happen to them." While another says, "we have all the opportunities given to us, it's just how you are going to take that opportunity and how you are going to nurture your job for you to have that opportunity." And a third one believes, "it doesn't matter where you're from, poor or rich...you both have the same opportunity...it actually depends on your drive, your views what success is... the quality of life you give yourself, depends on the amount of effort you put in improving your life."

When asked what are the important resources for "getting ahead in life," the respondents considered hard work to be the most important resource (PI= .91); followed by having ambition (PI= . 87); and, education (PI= . 85).[163] "Knowing the right people" (PI = .71) is considered less important than these individual resources, but is slightly more important than having well educated parents (PI = .65). Having political connections (PI = . 43) is still considered relevant, but not decisive, just like coming from a wealthy family (PI = .38).[164] They considered as quite irrelevant: giving bribes (PI = .21), even more so gender (PI = .14), and religion and race (both a PI = .13).[165] This ranking very well proves how much the respondents show a sense of aspiration and believe in education and achievement. These attitudes are considered more important than resources incongruent with the meritocracy such as personal backing (*palakasan*), politicking, ancestry, gender, religion or race – which more or less are given a high relevance in the Philippine setting by social analysts (but not by most Filipin@s themselves as the ISSP data show, cf. chapter 4.19.: *It's still hard work*).

These responses though have to be disaggregated further by gender, and especially, in relation to a (Left) activist background, to give a precise picture. Such is done further down.

---

[163] The priority given to hard work, even more than education, is reflected in this statement by a respondent: "It's not what you graduated…it's how strong you are in the employment competition…*ano ba talaga ang diskarte mo* [how strong is really your diskarte), how you are dealing with people…you're diploma will gonna give you employment, but definitely it's the attitude that's gonna put you there."

[164] This overall opinion was confirmed by the responses to the statement asking if they believe that their children or nieces/nephews (*pamangkin*) have the same chance to enter college as the offspring of rich families do. The overall prevalence index was .60: among the 17 responses, 7 totally agreeing; 5 agreeing; and, 5 not agreeing at all. Again here, the disagreement stems mainly from Left activists (.29), while the non-Left activists (.85) and the non-activists (.78) broadly agree. (On this classification, cf. chapter 3.18.: *Are activists more prone to unionizing?*) Those who consider themselves from a lower class (3-5) just agree a little less than those from a higher-class background (9 agree, four even totally, while four disagree and two are undecided). As the Left activists tend to downscale their class belonging (ibid.), class and upcoming can be ignored as determinants for this item.

[165] While the little importance given to religion might be explained with the fact that the respondents (all Christians) have probably never experienced religious discrimination, the negligence of race is surprising, as most of them complain about racist callers. This though might be a hint for the lack of orientating oneself in a setting of global inequality that is heavily colored by a race-based privilege system. This latter point was confirmed by the lack of feeling discriminated for being located at the outsourced end of global economy (cf. subchapter 3.17.8.: *Downward comparison*).

While located in the middle of a vertically highly differentiated (class) society within a post-and neo-colonial world order, ICCAs social location is that of being a transnational class with a double position in a society of the Global North and additionally in a society within the Global South. This is twice a contradictory class location: As service workers, they are part of the (white collar) proletariat of the North, but at the same time as consumers, they are part of the middle class in the Philippines. This often includes" contradictory class mobility," just as Rhacel Parreñas (2001) has observed for migrant workers. While taking up a job with a low social and occupational profile in the 'host' country, their economic status back in the Philippines is enhanced, as well as their social status, as they can step in as providers for their extended family. The same can be said at least, about graduates of schools of excellence or valedictorians of other institutions of tertiary education joining the call centers, who at times are asked by professors or parents which are part of the established middle class, why they join the "no-brainer" call center, when it is assumed that they are able to settle for a higher social position.

Likewise, the typical experience of being dismissed as "local" by customers and clients or whenever they try to pass the Northern border regimes, makes them global second-class citizens. This simultaneity of globalized workplace and localized or regionalized life made me consider them a "glocalized intermediary class" [GIC] (Reese 2008c).[166]

The ICCAs can also be considered glocalized as they also live in between the Global North and the Global South in terms of prestige. ICCAs, just like OCWs, are considered (except by the upper classes) as something special in the society of origin, but located to the lower edge of society in the societies they serve – a fate they also share with marriage migrants from South to North (Lauser 2004: 269; 293 and Beer 1996: 243). This contradictory class location resembles the position of a socially relegated middle class member, expressing the gap between objective and subjective class position: "Hanging between two worlds is a distressing state of existence, for the downwardly mobile individual has to juggle two incompatible senses of personhood. On the one hand, he or she is a well-educated, skilled professional, accustomed to power, to deference, to middle-class norms of consumption. Yet … adults are venturing out to work at low-level white- or blue-collar jobs which afford no authority, no autonomy, no sense of self-importance" (Newman 1996: 10).

Call center agents in international call centers are in fact usually overqualified for their job, just like OCWs with professional educational backgrounds (teachers, doctors and nurses) are working as domestic workers, caretakers, and janitors, among

---

[166] Anja Weiß (who came up with a grouping similar to the GICs called "global mobile underclass") considers glocalization "the chance to transnational mobility or the constriction to disadvantaged social spaces" which got "a central aspect of inequality on the global scale" (Weiß 2008: 244). This again resonates the way Zygmunt Bauman defined "glocalization" and from whom I have adapted the term (cf. Reese 2008c).

others, i.e. not in the field they have been trained for. While the Labor Force Survey shows that in 2012, 19.6% among the unemployed in the Philippines were college graduates, while 15% had attained at least some level of tertiary education, it is almost impossible to spot numbers on the extent of "downward mobility," i.e. college graduates working as blue-collar workers. The Labor Force Survey does not include the correlation of educational attainment and occupational group, and other data by the Department of Labor and Employment is only concerned with occupational and skills shortages, i.e. the lack of qualified applicants (cf. *www.bles.dole.gov.ph/SURVEY%20RESULTS/BITS/shortages.html*), but not with the lack of quality work. Likewise, the state run Philippine Institute for Development Studies only discusses "de-skilling" with regards to migrant labor.[167] This comes along with a widespread blaming of college graduates for having taken up the "wrong course," being "too choosy," or according to Labor Secretary Baldoz, as exhibiting a "lack of drive to find work" (All quotes from *americanenglish.ph/featured/job-mismatch-dilemma-communicating-the-solution*). Senator Edgardo Angara (PS, 17.3.2014) likewise believes: "The main cause of the educated-unemployed problem is the proliferation of low-quality and irrelevant academic programs. A huge knowledge and skills gap exists between what our graduates possess and what employers need." Such approach relates well to the neoliberal employability-paradigm putting the responsibility on the individual job seeker instead of claiming for an economic policy creating decent jobs in the Philippines.[168] The only number I found was in a study commissioned by the National Youth Commission in 2009, revealing that 86% of the (5000) respondents held jobs unrelated to their college degrees. 95% said they only had temporary employment ranging from three to five months and 37% were working two jobs. 60% said they would like to work abroad (*Work here, Pinoy youths told*, Newsbreak, 15.8 2011).

Despite exhibiting several »hard« middle-class criteria, it is especially their glocalization that makes the GICs partly also an example for class imagination. The contradiction between the (proletarian) class position they are placed in the global economy and the (middle class) position they place themselves needs to be bridged. They (and others) found ways of managing the contradiction of their objectively working class-like occupational position and their self-understanding as middle class through symbolic consumption and a discourse of professionalization - done by themselves and even more so by the industry (see below) – which reconstructs a work situation which is apparently factory-like but is done in a professional manner and by professionally educated people (Reese 2008c).

---

[167] Sheila V. Siar (2013): *From Highly Skilled to Low Skilled: Revisiting the Deskilling of Migrant Labor*, Discussion Paper Series, No. 2013-30, retrieved 20.3.2014 <www.pids.gov.ph/dp.php?id=5176>.

[168] In contrast my internet research produced as find an article on Solar News (Motto: We tell the story of the Filipino) with an article on *Europeans in crisis: Educated with dead-beat jobs* dated July 2, 2013, <www.solarnews.ph/news/business/2013/07/02/europeans-in-crisis-educated-with-dead-beat-jobs#.Uygg4lw2EaA>

This again brings us to a point discussed at the beginning of this chapter: The fuzziness of the "middle class." As the term is not only vague, but is at the same time normatively loaded (myth of the middle class), so some Othering is to be expected, where a distinction from the lower classes is aimed at. Even the limited sample of this study showed that differences between those who are classified as middle-class or as lower class respondents is significantly of statistical nature only, especially when it comes to middle class attitudes. If it is considered as middle-class-mindset to price autonomy and self–reliance, to have a sense of responsibility, to believe in do-ability depending on hard work (*maningkamot*) and show a sense of aspiration/wish to get ahead, then it needs to be highlighted that all these concepts are also to be found among the ones considered lower class, as the control interviews conducted within this study with people classified as lower class have demonstrated (see above) and even more, the only slight correlations regarding class position in the ISSP data (cf. the chapter 4.21.: *Is there a specific middle–cla ss profile on political participation to be discovered in the ISSP surveys?*) This was confirmed in an interview with the health activist Camilo "Jun" Naraval, who affirms that even the very poor have plans and dreams, but just lacks the necessary resources to realize them: "If you provide them the opportunity, they come up with an idea quickly or take on the proposal" (Naraval in Reese 2013b: 373). A classification of responses as "middle class-specific" must therefore be done very carefully, especially, when no parallel research is done with lower- class respondents.[169]

---

[169] That self-reliance is by no means a prerogative of the middle classes is confirmed by research from other developmental societies: Kabeer (2005: 5) reports that "there was often a stigma of shame or defeat about .. dependence for the people we talked to who contrasted it with the respectable ideal of self-sufficiency and being able to support one's own household. Several informants mentioned the importance to them of being »*tira dehu*« (good poor or proud poor) meaning independent of other people's help, and not indebted." Likewise Paul Harvey and Jeremy Lind observed in their study on *Dependency and Humanitarian relief - A critical analysis* that "a sense of shame about having to depend on others seems to be a common feature in many societies" (2005: 40). This is less interpreted as rejection of interdependency (as an individualist approach would suggest), but rather an expression of the lack of reciprocity. The latter is a reason why relief may sometimes be particularly shameful. "Depending on the goodwill of others – whether 'begging' neighbours for various types of help or receiving food aid from government and other organisations was widely recognised as a defining feature of extreme poverty," reports Stephen Devereux (in Harvey/Lind 2005: 20).

Going back to the Philippines, the urban poor in Tatalon feel humiliated by the fact that they cannot provide for and protect their families in the same way those among the burgis can (Pinches 1991: 178). Jose Jowel Canuday made such observations even among the most destituted, internally displaced person (*bakwits*) in Mindanao: "Samira Usman, a twenty-seven year old evacuee …, said never had she felt so humiliated as when she lined up for food from aid agencies. Though life was more difficult in their evacuation sites in the Liguasan Marsh and other safer fields in Pikit and Pagalungan towns, they were not made to line up for relief goods." (Canuday 2009: 68f.). Kabeer therefore considers self-determination, i.e. "people's ability to exercise some degree of control over their lives" (2005: 5) to be a value connected to citizenship, as this desire fuels the struggle for rights which are considered as prerequisite of self-determination.

3.13. They did it: Uprising around the world

Protest mobilization is unlikely as we learnt from Hellmann. And yet, in the Arab world, in Israel, and as far away as Spain, Portugal, Greece, Chile and Brazil (one could add the 2006 mobilizations in France and the 2001 *Cacerolazos* in Argentina) and worldwide (in the form of the Occupy movement)[170], "protest turned into resistance, resistance into uprising and this again in some cases resulted in a outright revolt against those in power" (Kraushaar 2012: 13).

This proves that there are particular times of social change when social movements arise, in this case, the activists were and are in the vast majority between 18 and 29 years old and are commanding over tertiary education degrees, but their educational certificates turned out to be without value to their owners (cf. Kraushaar 2012: 104ff.). The unemployment rate among people below 25 in the respective societies reaches as high as 40 to 50%. Another 25% are only precariously employed (IPS, 4.4.2012).

Many of these young people, counted as middle class in Europe, in Israel, Brazil und the Arab world, feel therefore cheated. They have acquired an excellent education but are nevertheless now stranded with no (or only precarious) jobs and no perspectives for life - a fate, that (in the case of the North African societies) has been further aggravated by the fact that the chances to find employment in Europe or the Golf states, has decreased.

It was *not* an increase in poverty or deepening social inequality that triggered the protests; unemployment and inequality have even rather declined (Roose 2011: 10). Sparking off more protests was a deterioration of prospects (fear of falling) and disappointed expectations for improvement, i.e. a dampened sense of aspiration (Roose 2011: 12), expressed within circumstances not adverse to mobilization and triggered by various events (for instance the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia or cheating in the parliamentary elections in Egypt).

But more than only complaining about the little chances for themselves to get ahead, the protest movements were also motivated by a disappointment with government performance and service, which falls below what the protesters expected – especially in Brazil and Turkey.[171] For many, the public protests were a means of last resort as they could no longer "work the system" (Scott, 1985: xv) and make the most of it. The protesters started to doubt the problem-solving potential of traditional democratic mechanisms: "The fact that most of the decisions of their own government were predetermined by the austerity measures of the International Monetary Fund obviously

---

[170] In Metro Manila, political groups also aligned themselves to the Occupy movement, although they were not newly activated but members of established political groupings 'updating' their appearance.

[171] On these protests cf. among others: *Proteste Brasilien*, Deutschlandradio 23.6.2013, *Lehrerproteste in Brasilien*, Deutschlandradio, 17.10.2013; *Gezi-Spirit in der Türkei*, Deutschlandradio, 30.09.2013.

made them doubt the meaning of elections and their chances of democratic influence" (Kraushaar 2012: 49).[172]

Perspectives that got lost - this had a mobilizing effect in the case of those who went to the streets. For among those who did, this did not lead to despair, demoralization, loss of self-esteem and depression, or to right-wing reactions, as feared by Bourdieu or Castel (see above). Despite a different class background and the divergent protest methods used, the protests of this (would-be) young urban professionals were triggered by similar features as the protests in the French banlieues (cf. Mario Candeias' article in Castel/Dörre 2008) and in the London of summer 2012: the gradual denouncement of a basic compromise in their societies. Both groups "clamored for decent jobs, affordable housing and fair treatment by representatives of state authorities" (Busch et al 2010: 12). Both groups as well consider their misery a generational fate, i.e. they discovered a common concern among them.

Nevertheless, there is no common fate the whole generation shares. We can instead observe a "strongly divided generation" (Dörre 2013) as far as life chances are concerned: Just as the "Generation Y" in Germany, "which can pick the job and still pay attention to the work-life balance" (Dörre ibid.), several from the young generation in the societies of protest got part of the establishment and belong to the »winners of modernization« (better: beneficiaries of neoliberalism), or are at least, »connivers of modernization«, like those who have become officers and secret service agents in Egypt; exactly those whom the »losers« from their generation protest against on the streets.[173]

While the middle class members protest by rallying, formulating visions, making demands and occupying the public space, lower class members 'bargain by riots', confirming the insight established by Piven and Cloward's analysis critical of organizing, which assumes that the only effective political asset of the decoupled is to disturb, disrupt and to paralyze the city. (A form of strategic power following the systematization of Silver 2005.)[174] While the former claim something from state and society (and consider these as potential ally against unfair companies), the latter fight for area, left clear by a state perceived as ally of the ruling classes (Busch et al 2010: 23). While the middle class' offspring fight against (their) social decline and are fueled by a sense of entitlement to advancement, the underclass riots are directed

[172] Likewise in Latin America, one of the major triggers of the surge of social movements in the 1990s was dissatisfaction of the precarized with the political system, considering it merely a formal democracy by which they no longer feel represented (cf. Boris 2004).

[173] Dörre (ibid.) so concludes: "There is a significant social polarization. On one side, we have well-qualified young people who make it actually relatively quickly to better conditions. And we have the losing side of the generation, less well qualified, for whom insecure employment turns into a steady state, interrupted by periods of unemployment."

[174] Even looting might be counted among such actions, even if it is without leadership and not vying for change of structures ("apolitical"), but according to Sergio Serulnikov (When Looting Becomes a Right: Urban Poverty and Food Riots in Argentina, *Latin American Perspectives*, 1994; 69), nevertheless, it is potentially rights based.

against their exclusion from society. Again, agriculturists have different perspectives and strategies than hunters.

Furthermore, public protest was not the only reaction by young people around the world towards precarization. Others mentioned in media reports were: eking out a living (such as academics walking out dogs), recourse to familial resources (support by family members), migration (massive departure from Greece or Spain)[175], and not to forget: desperation and depression - reactions that have little to do with the public, as these are accompanied by withdrawal, and therefore, often disappearing from sight.

3.14. Why Eastwood (Manila) and San Pedro St. (Davao City) are not (yet) the Tahrir Square

"Naa may nagahitabo nga ingon ana pero dili pud tanan...naa may nibarug pero dili tanan...kung kanus-a mahitabo na mahiusa na silang tanan...wala pud ko kabalo. (There are incidents which are like that, but not all the time... there were those who stood up, but not all...when the time will come when they will all be united, that is what I do not know.)"

Response to the question to a respondent to this study if an Arabellion could also happen in the Philippines.

The young urban professionals around the Mediterranean and in Brazil (in 2013) show that precarity can lead to public protest (meanwhile, the workplace is no longer the place where they protest for their rights). Can we expect this from their Filipino counterparts as well?

What Perthes (2011: 17) writes about the societal circumstances of the Arabian protests could also be partly stated about the Philippines: "The political and social conditions in the region were ready for change for some time. Almost everywhere … they were characterized by an extremely poor governance, meaning to say by flagrant violations of human rights and human dignity, by corruption and a growing inequality and the deprivation especially of young people." Many Filipin@s even approve of the statement that elections "are a part of the political interior, one likes to adorn oneself with," but which do not bring about policy change (ibid.: 17). (Such appraisal is reflected in the high approval [PI = .84] of an item like "parties give voters no real policy choices" by respondents to this study.)

Other factors identified as relevant for the protest are also applicable to the Philippines: A youth bulge, i.e. "a disproportionate bulge of younger people in the age pyramid" (Kraushaar 2012: 168); growth without redistribution, i.e. growing social ine-

---

[175] At least people still consider it a mental blackout when the Portuguese Prime Minister asks the young unemployed to migrate (which is a daily occurrence in the Philippines for more than 30 years now). An unemployed youth protested by saying "We've got the right to stay here" (Source: Deutschlandfunk, 22.05.2012).

quality despite an increase of the gross domestic product (cf. Reese 2013c; 2013e); unemployment above average among graduates of tertiary education, as in the case of Egypt (Kraushaar 2012: 169); and alternatively, either non-course related jobs or even internships (volunteer nurses, on-the-job training) serving as a cover for unpaid or underpaid labor without security of tenure (PDI, 30.8.2012). That tertiary education is largely privatized and tuition fees permanently increase are the main reasons fueling protests in Chile, which also holds true for the Philippines. Additionally, nepotism and corruption, and the unwillingness or inability of government to economic and political reforms, are no strange words in the Philippines. Social networking is also widely used among the Filipino youth (although the importance of Facebook and Twitter for the protests in the Arab world and elsewhere may be overestimated – cf. Kraushaar 2012: 133ff.).

So why are no such protests going on in the Philippines? First of all, we have to distinguish between 'objective' conditions and 'subjective' suffering as already mentioned, and not underestimate favorable situational contexts (political opportunities), that actors perceive as promising for a successful development of action (as in the case of Tunisia triggering a domino effect in the Arab world, cf. Kraushaar 2012: 17-27).

There are also important 'objective' differences between the situation in the Philippines to that of the societies of protest: In the Philippines state repression 'only' hits politically antagonizing actors (radical Left, investigative journalists, leaders of social movements). The Philippine state has to a far lesser extent promised social equality and guaranteed employment; the chances of migration have only been reduced in specific sectors (primarily for nurses taking up their courses with the North American market in mind) - and: with the call centers, alternative employment opportunities have been created for the higher educated (like the nurses now populating the call centers).

Despite disillusionment not unknown among young professionals in the Philippines (cf. Guia Ty in: *Disillusioned*; PDI, 2.9.2011), one cannot (yet) speak of a massive lack of prospects as in the case of Spain (where the protesters call themselves *juventud sin futuro*). The item "*I look optimistic into the future*" got a nearly unanimous high support in this qualitative study; activists with a Left background are the only ones who worry about the future at all: All respondents sans the Left activists nearly totally agreed to the statement (.96).

After listening to the lyrics of "*Parva que sou*," a song that developed into the hymn of the precarious Portuguese youth[176], and our subsequent question if protests like in Portugal and elsewhere may also develop in the Philippines, many respondents were able to relate to their case and the Philippine situation, saying, "I'm also affected with

[176] The song "*Parva que sou*" (www.youtube.com/watch?v=BOaHxiaJ8Vc&feature=related) complains: "What a stupid world where you study to be a slave" and "I am from the generation *No complain*, but my generation is fed up with this stuff. This situation's gone long enough. And I am not stupid."

that kind of scenario." But most also answered like this respondent "It's okay for now, we still have jobs; that's why I'd say, take the call center job away, then you would say complain…they would think that life is still okay." Or one encounters reactions like Guia Ty's who, instead of holding the government responsible, reminds her fellow youth: "We should never lose hope. We should just keep trying to find a job. And we should strive to improve ourselves in the meantime."(Ibid.)

3.15. Subjectivities: Motivation to join the call center

Nearly all employees in international call centers finished at least a few years of college, several even finished a course (with some being post-graduates). They studied to become nurses, journalists, engineers, anthropologists, political scientists or lawyers and many more. They are professionals who are now mostly employed in working places following the mass-servicing model.

Figure 7: Job advertisement, Davao City, 2008.

This also holds true for the respondents to this study: many are overqualified for their jobs and they are often less smarter than their customers (and even their bosses?). But just like other college graduates, they settled into jobs below their qualification due to the lack of decent job opportunities in their chosen profession - be it tourism, food science, media, nursing or others.

This disappoints them and hurts their sense of professionalism. As in the case of this respondent: "I will just grab this although it's not what I have invested from when I was in college. … I have to change career …the field that we studied in college is not really that (in demand), not high-paying; it's promising abroad but it's not promising here; they'd just offer you a small amount of salary; unlike the call center, you don't have to give your best effort just to comply with what's needed and you get double…but still there is this, it's *sayang* (a waste/a pity), like you have invested a lot in college."

Many respondents to this study still believe they can do and contribute more in their chosen course. The more the work in the call center dissembles their chosen course (and the less autonomous and challenging the position is), the more they feel they are

wasting their talents and the less they see call center work as a career, reflected by this question: "Do I really want to touch the lives of North American people? Na-ah." Respondents who graduated with a degree in AB English or IT, regard the call center work as somehow related to their course, but even one respondent who has a Mass Communication degree (from a reputable university) states that "call center was really just out of the circle, out of the criteria."

So what makes them join the call centers? Most agents enter the industry basically because it provides much better employment perks over other jobs in the locality (cf. Reese 2008c). Given the scarcity of better paying opportunities in their chosen courses and professions and given the limited employment opportunities and skewed hiring practices for those with a liberal arts/science degree, high pay and easy entry in call centers enticed mostly young individuals to join the workforce.

It is mainly the high pay; the incentives and medical coverage from call center work which came out as the prime motivation for most of the research respondents to choose it over other local employment.[177] Whether it is in Manila, Dumaguete, or Davao, the wage rate provided by the industry is generally not only above the minimum set forth by the Philippine labor authorities, it is usually also above what they could earn when taking up an employment that is related to their course. So even if the respondent who finished Mass Communication was able to land a job at the major media network ABS-CBN, "upon learning, upon hearing the benefits and stuff, I decided to stay here [i.e. in the call center]. What they can offer don't really match what call center companies can provide."

For several single respondents, the relatively high salary endowed them with certain luxury and modest prosperity. But for most of our respondents, the principal consideration of remuneration is rather that it enables them to fulfill the cultural and social obligations towards their parents and siblings or towards their own children. A Dumaguete respondent (stating that every pay goes "*70% kay Mama, 30% sa akoa* [70% to Mama, 30% to me]") confirms, "My family is one of the reasons why after I graduated from school, I really worked, why I entered the call center…I'm really thankful that this job came." In an informal welfare regime (Wood 2004), social networks and family relationships turn into the main remedy against social insecurity.[178] Parents expect to be "paid back" and being able to share one's 'blessings' also earns symbolical capital and is rewarded with influence and respect.

---

[177] Nevertheless, 8 of 28 respondents consider the denial of benefits a (major) problem, and, 9 of 24 say that social security is lacking, with four considering both a "*pinakagrabe*" problem.

[178] However, a survey of the SWS in 2008 states that of those who received help in the past three months (only every third anyway), 43% were helped by relatives and only slightly less (37%) by the government; 12% got support from friends; 13% from other persons (neither relatives nor friends); 8% from private companies; and, 4% from non-government organizations (the total exceeds 100% due to multiple sources of help [source: PDI: 27.9.2008]). This resonates with the findings of this study where only 12 out of 28 turn to their family first when looking for help in case of illness; 8 to their networks; 4 help themselves; 3 turn to the employer; and, only one to the government. Even when it comes to business plans, only 6 out of 28 turn to their family first for help, but when thinking about needing support in their aging days 21(!) look towards their family first. 17 even say they don't *expect* their family to help them (but ten do.).

This is also not only a source of pride, but also a good “*hirit*” (retort, rejoinder) to those who question their professionalism: “At least I am supporting my family. How about you?” was what a respondent said to critics who viewed her work as a no-brainer, has no dignity or that call center agents are “*luoy*“(to be pitied) (FGD Davao 2012b).

Thus, unsurprisingly, there were also agents who felt “forced to work” (*napilitan*), as this is the only job that can relatively take care of their financial woes brought about by the death of a father, poor health of a mother, or even the need to provide for their own medicines and school fees.

Indeed the Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) sector is one of the few, if not the only, domestic sector with growing employment numbers and is the fastest growing provider of jobs for Filipino college graduates. While the country complains for years about jobless growth, according to a investment primer prepared by the Business Processing Association of the Philippines (BPAP), in 2011, the entire BPO industry had a business volume of 11 billion US dollars (24% more than 2010) and employed about 638,000 people directly or 22% more than in the previous year (with around 400,000 of them call center agents), and 1.6 million indirectly.[179] The industry even expects, in its wildest dreams, to employ 1.3 million Filipinos directly and 3.2 million indirectly by 2016 (Source: Sun Star Davao, May 11 2012).

While Japan is the number one market for software development, animation and other IT-related Business Process Outsourcing, the voice-based call centers are mainly focused on the English-speaking societies of the Global North, foremost the USA, and also Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. According to the 2010 Survey of Information Technology-Business Process Outsourcing Services by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the US remained the top market in 2010, accounting for 80% of total call center export receipts (but only for 68% of the BPO receipts).

Figure 8: Bolton Bridge, Davao City, 2013

Next to the pay, the call center industry requires no stringent qualifications for entry. There is no need for a college degree (usually only two years of college will do[180]) and as an agent in a long-term

[179] Source: www.bpap.org/publications/research/investorprimer2012%3Fdownload%3D65%253Ainvestorprimer2012

[180] Javier Infante, TELUS International Philippines president and chief executive officer (CEO), said about 40% of the company’s employees have yet to complete their college education (Manila Times, 7.10.2010).

relationship shared, the industry, unlike other daytime office jobs, did not ask her to present a marriage certificate (as part of employment requirements), as some employers would do.

Fabros (2007: 251) further observed that agents are attracted by the industries' projection of "the professional and efficient work climate, 'cosmopolitan' global nature of the work, interaction with foreign customers and association with globally renowned ... corporations." This was confirmed by responses to this research underlining that they like the professional setting of the call centers where performance (allegedly) counts, while favoritism and mere seniority, don't. During one of the Focus Group discussions (FGD Davao 2012b), a respondent shared that this is the reason "why I got attracted to the industry. What I want in a work is that I am able to engage with a lot of people with different backgrounds."(The respondent though left the call centers only after one month and his curiosity was satisfied.)

Respondents were further highlighting the first-name principle, 'flat' internal hierarchies and the 'partnership atmosphere' within enterprises, promising direct communication between management and employees – which is quite contrary to the mainly hierarchical and status-conscious social relations in the Philippines (Bernardo 2013). Respondents also expressed their pride in being able to handle 'foreign' callers (actually Caucasian callers) as Nigerian callers scamming the lines, were to the contrary, bestowed with denigrating remarks such as "they're so stupid…Nigerians… OMG [oh my God], these Nigerians."

Cohen and El Sawad (2007: 1954) report from India that among ICCAs, "although not expected to deny that they are Indian, a sure sign of success is when customers do not recognise agents as such, and employees are willing to undergo extra training to achieve this." The same was expressed by our respondents and other ICCAs interviewed (Fabros 2007 e.g.).

For some respondents, compounding the push to enter the industry is the "curiosity" behind the "trend." "It's like you want to see the trend for young professionals, so it came to the point *na gusto mo siyang i*-try (So it came to a point that you wanted to try it)," says one respondent. For others, it's the longing for independence from family, to see the world outside of the province, and change their current environment. "*Para mabag-o ang climate sa akong world* (To change the climate of my world)," tells a respondent who describes his "new" world as "toxic." In describing also his previous work, another respondent shares, "*Halo-halo ang* burnout (Burnout is all mixed up)…frustrations…so I decided that I would try a job that's so totally different from what I have been doing."[181] Anecdotal evidence also tells of some people joining the call centers due to the attraction to the proverbial call center culture, although such

[181] There are also a number of respondents who cite the role of friends/peers in their call centre venture. It is not clear if this is so to justify the "trend," but what is evident is the presence of network influence that is significant in their call center application.

yearning for some post-adolescence did not appear as a major reason for taking up this job among our respondents.[182]

Lesbian/gay respondents are also attracted to these workplaces as they feel there is tolerance regarding their gender in the so-called liberated atmosphere in the call centers. One respondent had her coming-out while working in the call center, and her former girlfriend compares this atmosphere in the call center against the feeling of restraint she felt while still working in a local church-based NGO. Another respondent, who is a mother of three, compared how it was like to be gossiped about her relationship status in her previous office job, unlike in the call center, where it is the least in her colleagues' concerns.[183]

Many respondents though start in the industry with the intention to not stay long. The younger respondents especially perceived the job as temporary, a fallback, a sideline, and a transitional juncture to enhance marketability and expand career horizons (whether domestic or overseas), while those who seem to have fewer opportunities because of educational qualifications or are constrained by family responsibilities or those who are contented with the work environment regard it as their comfort employment. Among those who planned the call center work only as stint or experience, we could observe that some agents left after some months or a few years and cut the cord with the industry. Although some did return to the call center as they could not find other jobs with similar benefits.

As long as qualification-adequate jobs are not available for them, due to barriers for professionals set by developed countries or due to the lack of a self-reliant domestic economy in the Philippines offering extensive social and public services which could absorb the graduates in the line of their course, many professional college graduates (even from elite universities) think along the same lines as this 20-year old agent who considers call centers "the most rewarding career that we have nowadays" (Source: EzineArticles.com/?expert=Roberto_Bacasong).

Looking back to the manifold problems ICCAs identified (as outlined above), we may say this as a first conclusion: Agents seem to tolerate bad and precarious working conditions – but this is not the same as accepting them.

---

[182] We can not confirm the existence of a "call center culture" significantly distinct from the youth culture of today in the Philippines - just like a 2010 research by the University of the Philippines Population Institute (UPPI) on Youth culture (cf. AFP, 8.8.2010) could not. Most of our respondents paint themselves not only as pious and hardworking partners or children but as well as responsible spenders. We believe that the construction of a call center culture often depicted in an »immoral« way (including not only irresponsible spending as well as casual sex and a high prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS - cf. *Call-center boom breeds new culture– and risky behavior*, IPS, 2.10.2010) can rather be traced to the discomfort with which usually new and therefore unfamiliar industries and cultures are perceived. Concerns about immoral lifestyles were raised in 19th Century Europe as well in regard to the newly created factories in Europe - at times embedded in romantically inspired doomsday scenarios.

[183] Some respondents again exactly consider this liberal atmosphere a challenge to their more conservative mindset. They belong to the agents who claim to keep distance and stay unaffected by the prevailing US culture inside the call center, which they consider "un-Filipino." However, three respondents in Dumaguete assert that the "liberated" environment, i.e. adultery, etc. is only very seldom. This seems to show that the call center culture is more urban (and young) than really transnational.

As responses to some items raised in the interviews reveal, they are able to detach their self-esteem from unfavorable working conditions as reflected in the very high prevalence index received by the item "What I do in my life is useful and valuable," namely .91, which is the highest PI for all. 27 of 28 respondents agree or totally agree with this statement, no matter how much disaffection they expressed with the call center work.[184] This is further confirmed by the low approval received for the items "In my life I seldom have the chance to do the things that make me happy"(P=.16) and "In my daily life, I seldom have the chance to show how competent I am" (P=.15).

But beyond this, they also find several of the call center features desirable, mainly because they believe this is the best they can get. As I will demonstrate below, they do not necessarily feel relatively deprived, but even relatively privileged. Such contradictions demonstrate why precarious conditions do not necessarily encounter greater resistance, but are reproduced from below as well.

3.16. Individual action

Even when focusing on possible avenues of protest, first of all, it has to be acknowledged that for quite some agents there is nothing (much) to complain about. Not only are certain problems hardly felt (based on the respective gravity indices), but moreover, several respondents consider many problems not as (*pinaka*)*grabe*. 11 respondents consider four or less problems "*pinakagrabe*" (but every respondent has at least one problem s/he considers *pinakagrabe*), and even if the "*grabe*" problems are included, they still do not have more than five significant problems. But: on the average (median), respondents consider at least six problems "*pinakagrabe*" (but only three respondents consider ten problems or more as *pinakagrabe*); and, five problems as "*grabe.*" 20 out of 28 respondents consider ten or more problems (out of an average 32 problems mentioned), as *grabe* or *pinakagrabe*. On the average, six problems are considered "OK lang;" seven as "*walang problema;*" and, on average, only 5.5 problems they "never heard about." (The sum does not add up to 32 as not all problems have been chosen in every case, some problems only have five or less responses.)

We may conclude: they are not the happy people the call center industry projects, but they are coping with the situation. Despite the pressures of mass servicing, call center work delivers real benefits and increased autonomy outside of production which agents prize quite highly (just like workers in export processing zones - cf. McKay 2006). Many agents thus do not consider themselves oppressed, but rather "stressed out" (Fabros 2007:250, for India: Noronha/D'Cruz 2009: 78).

---

[184] I would assume that in a work society such as Germany, this would look slightly different as several studies show the close connection of job satisfaction, life happiness and self-confidence. (For but one reference to that cf. Wahl 1989.)

The gloomy view of precarity leading to despair and lack of biographical perspectives could not be confirmed in the context in which this research is located. Rather, we could observe a sense of aspiration and of a 'sense of eventualities' among the (mainly young) urban professionals we interviewed: 19 out of 28 respondents "totally agree" that they are "optimistic thinking about their future" (6 don't agree); 21 consider what they do in their life as "totally" useful and valuable; and, 20 think they freely decide about how to live and plan their life (10 even strongly believe so). At the same time, 24 of 28 strongly disagree with the statement that "when a person is born, how things are going to work out for him/her is already decided."

A survey released by the SWS in December 2013 (source: PDI; 8.3.2014) found out that 86% of Filipino adults are happy with life in general (*masaya sa buhay sa kabuuan*) and 83% of them said they are even satisfied with their lives (*nasisiyahan sa buhay na inyong nararanasan*). The way ICCAs deal with their problems and with which mental attitudes they voice their views also reflect such traits, which are often attributed to Philippine culture and society (and named above average by our respondents when asked what they like about the Philippines): Filipin@s are considered to be optimistic, flexible, enduring (*matiisin*) and adaptive, masters in "organizing" and in beating a path (*diskarte*) [cf. Reese 2008a]. According to the anthropologist Alberto Alejo, *bangon* (to rise up) and *bawi* (recover) are common descriptions of how individuals cope with calamities (ibid.). Such combination of aspiration and endurance is also reflected in the utmost importance given to education in all layers of Philippine society and the high numbers of outward migration.[185]

It should however not to be overlooked that such attitudes are also connected to a high social expectation: As a positive outlook on life is considered "typically Filipino," people who have difficulties in coping with life are easily overlooked (and/or admonished). "Suicide is not perceived as a problem," says the psychiatrist Dinah Nadera (PDI, 17.7.2012), believing that there is a massive underreporting due to the stigma connected to suicide and related mental health problems. And indeed according to the WHO, the Philippines has the highest incidence of depression in Southeast Asia. In 2004, over 4.5 million cases of depression were reported in the Philippines, with 3% of the Filipin@s clinically diagnosed as depressed (Source: Rina Jimenez David: *Lifting the stigma*, PDI, 5.9.2010). The Philippine Psychiatric Association expects 3 out of 10 government employees to have mental health problems, especially depression and anxiety disorder (PDI, 12.1.2010).

[185] A survey by the Social Weather Stations came to the conclusion that optimism is much more pronounced among the middle-to-upper class (+48) than among the poor (+36) and the very poor (+32) [Source: PDI, 28.8.2010]. Another survey though finds no significant correlation between poverty and unhappiness, with 77% of the poor almost as happy as the average (81%) and concludes that good relationships - more than income - have the strongest correlation with happiness (PDI, 7.7.2008).

3.16.1. Adaptation

How do ICCAs then get along with the problems they encounter and perceive in the industry? Consistent with the assumption that protest is a means of last resort (especially for those who are not yet experienced in protesting), we can observe that call center agents construct the workplace in a way of making it acceptable to them and by learning ways of coping in order to deal with the problems. (That most agents exercise several of these strategies is also expressed in the fact that some of the statements quoted below cannot be clearly attributed to one of the idealtypical strategies, but might rather express attitudes mixed out of several of such approaches.)

One of these ways is **internalization.** This facet of coping presents how agents comprehend and accept the nature of the work and imbibe in their system this kind of perception. One respondent claims, "I do believe in the products which I am troubleshooting or handling. So it's not that difficult to sell, not difficult to love the products, so it's not difficult to love the job." Another respondent explains: "For me personally, it's not an issue…I don't care if they give me overtime. *Basta matapos ko siya (*As long as I would be able to finish the task*). Parang it's* self-fulfillment for you to do your job *(*It's like self-fulfillment for you to be able to do your job*)*. How I work*, okay lang sa akoa walay reklamo (*How I work, it's fine with me, I don't have any complaints*)*." Finally another call center agent expresses it this way: "It's a wrong mindset that when you work in a call center, it's stressful. It's only you who makes it stressful" (Source: Sun Star Davao, 5.10.2012).

Other agents associate themselves with the company and its policies. Regarding overtime, a respondent has this to say: "If they do ask you for overtime, they already tell us like a day ahead or a couple of hours ahead… you would understand because you would know. We have monitors; we have volumes of callers coming in. So, we have to extend our time as well so that we could cater for that… if we are going to lose half of those 200 calls, that would be a loss for the company…if it's a loss to the company, it's our loss as well 'cause it's the company's who is paying us."

This is an attitude Voß and Pongratz termed as "labor entrepreneur" (*Arbeitskraftunternehmer*), an attitude which also has implications for the form of representation of interests, as Voß and Pongratz (1998: 152) outlines: "As the labor contractor mainly takes on the interests of the enterprise and systematically supervises the transformation of his labor force, he also internalizes the conflict of interest. Increasingly, he now feels two souls in his breast: he is a dependent laborer and at the same time has learned more than any other worker type to act, to think and to feel in terms of an alien enterprise. The industrial conflict of interest is consequently less and less one between work person and work organization, but between two sides of the same person - the class struggle shifted into the souls and minds of the workers."

Labor entrepreneurism is also reflected in this response to this study by a QA turned agent: "Most of the workers are *reklamador* (always complaining). *Mapansin na nimo* (you can observe) they can't get enough, *kanang* (that) they would really ask for some

more *ba*. *Unya lami kaayo ingnon na..tama lang man siguro na sa atong gipangtrabahuan* (And then, you want to tell them that.. I think what we get is just enough for the work that we do). *Kasi* (Because) I don't react if what I'm getting is just enough for me. *Parang* (It's just) fair *bah*, let's be fair also to the company also. *Kay kadtong* (Back then when I was an) agent *ko*, I really don't *reklamo* (complain). *Kay kapoyan ko mag reklamo; reklamo ko na kabalo ko na tama lang sa akoa (*It tires me to complain when I know that what I get is just right for me*)*."

Many others resort to **accommodation and submission**, not by identifying with the work, but by absorbing the idea of and embodying the necessary sacrifice – that is, accepting the conditions of the workplace.[186] Complaining is considered as whining. On the number of calls taken by the agents, a respondent has this to say, "Sometimes, it hurts, like you're so tired, your throat is so dry…but you could not really complain about it, about changing the way things are." Another says, "*wa man kay* (you don't really have a) choice…*ang* option *nimo* (your option is either) you can resign and get more time for yourself or *dawaton nimo nga wa jud kay* (you accept that you don't have) time for yourself, then you only have to work, you only have to take up calls." In this spirit, 13 out of 28 respondents said the monotonous and routinary work is *OK lang*; seven don't even an issue with it at all and only consider it a significant problem.

Another (f, 26) explains, "*Wala na lang siya. Normal na lang siya although magyawyaw gud ang kalag*" (Eventually you'll just get used to it. You'll feel that it is normal already, although you know your soul is complaining*)*. A former activist (f, 27) expresses the same: "*Hangtud sa sige nimo og kuan nga used to na jud ka sa imong routine, naanad nalang ka ba, nga murag nihinay to imohang force nga mu-rebel ani nga kahimtang, murag pa-ana-ana nalang ka.* (After some time of doing the same thing, you get used to the routine, you get used to it that the force [urge] to rebel against the situation is weakening and you end up going with the flow.)"

An agent (m, 29) who claims he has not even finished high school (but took up some college courses) explains: "It's a very difficult time right now to look for a job. I'm very much grateful, I'm very much blessed that even if I'm an undergraduate, I don't have a degree but I have a job, a very good job. I'm grateful for what I have. So, sometimes I always think that 'enough complaining, you're old, you know what to do, just you know, swallow it.'"

---

[186] According to the ISSP of 2005 on Work Attitudes, 67% of the Filipino respondents (strongly) agree that "a job is just a way of earning money-no more" (with class having no specific effect, i.e. no lower outcome among the professional middle class). In Germany, only 30% agree and this is accompanied with a very strong class effect: the higher the education, the lesser the agreement. In the Philippines, 35% could imagine to be without a job if they didn't need the money; in Germany, it is only 15% agreeing to this. While job security is an important issue in both countries (with 95% in the Philippine and 90% in Germany), income is more important in the Philippines (97%) than in (West) Germany (75%). Extrinsic job motivation therefore seems to be more prevalent in the Philippines than in Germany.

Somewhere in the context of submission, we also need to note the strong belief in God's providence which many agents expressed: "I believe that there's always a hand that guides us, that no matter how much you want to, it will always guide you to something else… I believe in fate… I believe that there is always a purpose"(male agent, 35)[187].

Finally, a middle-aged agent states that call center work has become his comfort. He says, "The routine at the workplace, I already have my own workarounds for it…I already know how to go about, like if I want to have more time for myself, I would know how to get it *na*. If I don't want to be so pressured with my job, I know how to get it, to go about it *na*."

The latter example is indeed rather a sign of resilience than submission, and in this sense, the respondent also objected during one of the validation workshops (FGD Davao 2012a) to the term "submission" and explained that accommodation might rather be the expression of the development of "resilience," i.e. having developed strategies of how to not be affected by inimical settings and happenings.

This kind of coping also translates into the way agents deal with irate callers which most agents find disrespectful and which they need getting used to until it no longer harms their self-esteem.[188] A respondent expresses, "I'm disgusted because they are being racists, but I guess that's just a part of being an American…most of them are really like that…I guess that's part of their culture, being racist."

Believing that nothing can be done to alter the work conditions in the industry because doing so would mean "making it not a call center anymore," they decide to 'join it' instead of 'beating it': "In the first place, it's your fault," one respondent believes. "You're just making your life miserable *kung ganun lang ang gagawin mo* (if you'd do that, i.e. blaming the company)…*nagkakaroon ng* (there will be) discontentment *kasi* (because) in the first place *kasi kagagawan din ng* agents (it's the agents own doing) agents…" Consequently, he believes that the main thing he can do is to adapt (like six other respondents), he did not undertake any other action and does not even believe that unionizing is a promising action.

Such stance also leads to **resignation** among some of the young professionals: A 24-year old IT-professional and graduate from a university of excellence explains (quoting John Mayer's song *Waiting on the World to Change*): "It's not that we don't care.

---

[187] Call center agents even invoke the concept of "*kapalaran*" (fate) at times: Says a female agent of 24: "My high salary here is more than enough inspiration to continue my job despite that info [i.e. that night work might cause cancer]. It's also a matter of genes. If you're destined to have cancer, you're going to get it" (PDI, 27.5.2007). Locating one's situation within the concept of '*swerte*," is also known from migration studies, i.e. when migrants often enter a risky setting with open eyes, believing that they will have *swerte* (i.e. good luck).

[188] The term though "irate caller" is not a general description fitting all Western callers. A Manila respondent reports that Australians are "really nice" and are only a little irate; another one regards European callers positively. Since most of the research respondents cater to calls from North America, most of the narratives of discriminating and racist interactions are typical of the exchange with US Americans.

We just know the fight ain't fair" (*Waiting for change*, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10.1.2009). In this way, seven of 27 respondents believe that they can do nothing.

Another way of coping can be to resort to **split-off** from the "real life," a term we often heard as a form of labeling the life outside of the call center. This kind of coping we could especially identify among former activists who struggle with the fact that "before we were fighting the imperialists and now we are serving them,"[189] as well as artists (singers and writers) who especially suffer under the lowbrowness of their work. They live out about two different lives and shed off their agent persona once they leave their workplace (and their activist persona once they enter it!). "I am a really confrontative person *sa gawas, pero sa call center kinahanglan magfit sa* being a service provider, *tudloan man ka ana sa training*, so in a way *mahimo na lahi ng image diri, lahi ko person* (I am really a confrontative person outside the call center, but once inside, I need to fit in being a service provider, they teach you this in the training, so in a way you show a different image here, I am a different person)," says a former activist (FGD Davao 2012a).

Another respondent expresses splitting-off like this: "When you commit mistakes it wouldn't be taken against (me); it would be taken against River [his call center alias]. That's not me; that's River…nothing is connected to the real you. Unlike *sa akoang* work *karon* (with my work now), when I write something and that is wrong, that's my name [being a journalist now]. I find it a privilege…(though) not really good when you talk about being human. It's really un-you. It's not good to be working as someone that is not you; you cannot take it." He elaborates, "you're using another name, you're working for another time from another space, *pero* generally if you think of it, it's not you anymore…you think American."

At the same time such attitude also serves as shield against dissatisfaction (and finally depression the way Ehrenberg considers it typical for a neoliberal setting). The response by a former activist (female, 24, by now an NGO worker) is an evidence for this: "I would not take (problems) personally…I know that even if I'm not doing good in that, I know I'm still an intelligent person; I know I'm capable of other things…I can write, I can speak to other people…*dili man na mao ang basehan sa akong pagkatao* (it's not the basis of my person); it's just my job."

Such split-off also involves a self-construction that distantiates and differentiates oneself from the rest of the call center crop: As in the case of a more conservative respondent: "The way I manage my life is entirely different. Yes, I'm working in the

---

[189] "It's a 360 degree turn," says this activist-respondent, "because way back during my youthful days, I really discourage (others) from working in a call center because it's like working in a different world. It's like serving the imperialist---the capitalist. You would just strengthen their money. It's a cheap labor practice. You get cheap payment. They're getting too much money out of it. Because the cost of living here is so low, so they'll just pay you a bit from their pocket… It's a 360 degrees turn because you imagine yourself having a very wide horizon dealing with people, tackling their social and political consciousness. Right now, you are just like imprisoned in a cubicle and suddenly… your consciousness suddenly narrows down…it's like finding yourself there, talking to the country you actually condemn."

call center, but you could not see that I'm working in a call center. ... I'm not projecting it in a way other people would see it. When they would know I'm working in a call center, they would have an entirely different picture."

But accommodation or split-off do not simply mean adjustment and work-to-rule. Instead, agents condition themselves for work to be able to handle the demands of the job, they '**self- manage'** (*Selbstführung*) themselves, which the governementality studies consider the main means of neoliberal governementality (Bröckling 2000). Not only do respondents value the need for rest and recreation and make sure that on their days off, they catch up on sleep or take time to travel outside of the city. Explicitly they do so (also) to "refresh" and reinvigorate their physical self for another taxing work phase. Several times they even explicitly use the term "managing" in regard to their strategies. Such as a respondent saying, "the moment you step inside the company, you have to totally log out yourself from (your) problems…it's a matter of how you manage your emotions, yourself."

For a significant number of agents, relating with irate callers requires a lot of self-control as well. Practice is important to be able to master the English language and acquire a neutral accent (see in detail on the strategies of manufacturing proximity and managing contradiction: Reese 2008c). Often, they say, they can't do anything when callers accuse them of stealing jobs from Americans.[190] An agent also shares that she avoids sitting next to irate agents so as not to absorb the negative energy in her own calls. The following is a typical – and learned – way to deal with irate callers: "I just tell them to relax and of course, be as friendly as you can be…just think of them as if you're talking with your friend; they are people like us. They're customers, we are customers as well. What they need is what we need as well. It's just that they're in a different part of the (world) and with different cultures" (male agent, 29).

Others again say that "most of us, we're still like, 'Oh my God. I'm sorry, sir.' We just still humble ourselves because we're not allowed to shout at them. We just go out and then 'Shit, the customer, shit.' And you have to let it out in the CR" (female agent, 30).

While at work, ICCAs tend to do things to relax and maximize the short breaks. Yet, performance metrics and adjusting to night shifts are other sources of stress for several respondents. This is why a respondent (m, 29) has this to say: "I don't work hard,

[190] According to the Unemployment Survey report by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in 2004, offshoring is the second-highest cause of unemployment among US technical professionals. Until then, call centers were a major source of employment in the United States, accounting for about three million jobs (CWA et al 2006: 17). The economic implications of such a process though are much more complex and ambivalent than Filipinos stealing the jobs of US-Americans as the often heard accusation of US callers goes (cf. CWA 2006: 19). Organized call center agents from India reject the idea that they are the ones "stealing" the jobs: "The Indians seem to be the villains in the entire piece, but it's not the Indians taking away jobs from Australia and England and the US. It is their own industrialists and multinationals which will decide where will be the cheapest labour available," says Vinod Shetty, secretary of the Young Professionals Collective (ibid.).

I work smart…it lessens your stress when it comes to work…because if you are working hard, it means you're having hardships to the job itself. If you are working smart then you can have your work around. If you have a difficulty with this particular task, you will look for a way to solve that."

Eventually, the adoption of the work scheme makes it easier for some: "When you're there I realized *na* all you need to is *parang i*-adopt *mo lang siya, i*-adopt *mo ang* changes (And when you are there, all you need to do is to like adopt to it, you should adopt the changes), *i*-adopt *mo ang* pressure and eventually you will love the job (You should adopt the pressure and eventually you will love the job)." This 26-year old female agent goes on by stating, "You feel proud with yourself *na* (Then you'd feel proud of yourself). Hey, *kaya nako momata tibuok gabii* (Hey, I can stay awake the whole night), although *kapoy paghirapan ang* eyebags (it's tiring to acquire eyebags)."

In so doing effectively, says a male agent (26), "I'm getting to love it because I have conditioned myself, my mind, that I have to wake up to eat breakfast at about 7 or 8 in the evening…I don't have to eat in the morning 'til afternoon 'cause I'm sleeping…it's just the thinking that you have to wake up in the evening…it's part of a new day."

As relations with family and other networks are in a way expected to align to the work scheme, it is also part of the self-management (and a source of pride) to successfully keep in touch with them. In spite of the migrational experience, many respondents typically claim to retain the value for family. They ensure to open and maintain lines of communications with parents and siblings. Female respondents who have children tend to stretch themselves to still be able to perform parental functions amidst the rigors of working nights. For those who look forward to a life overseas, the stability of family is top priority.

Not every coping though should be understood as adaptation and self-aligning: Indeed, there are at least traits in call center work that agents consider **fulfilling.** Aiming to be helpful, they believe that they are able to be of help by assisting customers (e.g. old people, disaster victims), and so giving customers satisfaction - a notion fed by the management side: "Agents are advisers helping people fix their problems" (CCAP executive director Jogo Uligan in Ermitanio 2012). One respondent (m, 29) considers being helpful a significant uplift: "I felt I was belonging to some organization besides my family and my wife…like a self-esteem."

At the same time, the ambition for self-fulfillment potentially also serves as entry point for dissent. The delivery of the so-called 'good work' is systematically obstructed by the mode of production, which hurts the employees' pride on the use value (*Gebrauchswert*) of their work. Like in the case of an agent who is troubleshooting cell phones but never saw these models for real, only in the computer. "It's like drea-

ming, there are almost 20 [models]."[191] 17 of 28 respondents to this qualitative study find the service to the clients "*kulang*" (lacking), 11 even consider this a significant/very significant problem. Here Candeias (2006: 9) concludes that, "mismatches between the actual job requirements … and the limited possibilities of realizing them due to the demands of management (i.e. a mismatch between the productive forces and the relations of production) produce tensions that are critical to the development of resistiveness."

3.16.2. Professionalization

The reactions or strategies listed so far are strongly connected to the agents' understanding of themselves as "professional." Professionalism includes a sense of responsibility and commitment to work. This means prioritizing work over personal needs and pleasure, behaving in a dignified and restrained manner and performing optimally and rationally while on the job (Noronha/D'Cruz 2009: x).



Figure 9: Find in a Philippine book store, 2012.

"The professional agent never ever talks back. Never screams nor shouts. She never oversteps her boundaries" (Fabros 2007: 165). And so one respondent (m, 29), elaborates, "There's no such thing as irate customers, but, there is an irate agent…if you are like an emotional person, and you can't control your emotions and you can't be professional enough, you won't be handling those types of customers; you can cry, or you can also be irate." Agents who complain about schedules or workload are told to »be professional«" (Fabros 2007: 192).

The repetitive and standardized nature of work in mass servicing gets 'professionalized' by many agents: they emphasize that doing such work demands a certain set of

[191] The same respondent considered "one month of training for me is really not enough; it would be better if it would be six weeks that I'm going to attend." So, "the really difficult calls I have, I record it in my notebook [back home as she is not allowed to bring a notebook to the working place] and if I was not able to resolve it I would go to the supervisor and ask because if you're not going to…if you are not able to resolve it right away, then it's going to be in another department and if you call the other department they will ask you 'are you already trained and this and this and blah blah blah like that' they will ask."

skills and competencies, especially expertise in handling customers efficiently and under strict time pressures without disregarding the necessary service orientation. “Call center work is not easy, in a sense that, though the work may look easy, there are so many hidden challenges to overcome,” says a female agent (22 years old – in Reese 2008c). Others upgrade the work to make it seem more professional: A respondent who has to sell sex toys says “those callers will really tell you what their problems…You’re a psychologist, you’re a listener, you are like everything, you’re a teacher, you’re like a pacifier.” Another respondent when asked what her occupation is does not say ‘call center agent’, but calls herself a “market researcher,” here resonating the molding by the call center industry to understand themselves as professionals and specialists (customer representatives et al.). ”It is a question of packaging,“ says another respondent in reaction to this (FGD Davao 2012a).

Professionalism has already been identified in an earlier work (Reese 2008c) as one element of managing the contradiction between having undergone a professional education and exercising a manual job, “a reconstruction of the work situation which apparently is factory-like to be well done only in a professional manner and by professionally educated people“ (ibid.: 54). Or as Fabros observed: “Being ‘professional’ strikes deeply into the heart of agents as it allows them to reconcile the conditions of repetitive, routinary, ‘no brainer’ work with their skills and educational background” (Fabros 2007: 192). “It comes with the construction of a work ethic, standards, commitment, competence, efficiency and »getting the job done«” (ibid.: 239).

Feelings of fulfillment are thus oftentimes present when agents are able to hit performance metrics or resolve issues especially with irate callers. It is understood that the circumstances of the production is outside the performer's control. Therefore s/he is professional who best knows how to deal with the circumstances: “It will make you feel better that even if the person is on the other side of the world, you’re able to please them,” as an agent stated in Fabros (2007: 222). “So it's really a challenging job, we get a lot of irate customers everyday. It's really a pleasure if you’re able to calm a very disgruntled customer. That’s not easy” (ibid.).

This goes along with accepting the competitive setting put up by the call center management, as a respondent to this study aired: “You have to be a player in the competition…your approach should be healthy…you think that your colleagues are performing well, you have to perform better or equally better to them…you do really have to be rational…it’s more of controlling your emotion, and if you learn to control your emotion, you will learn how to work professionally.”

Such professionalism is then also employed to vindicate call center work against the occupation professionals usually enter: “What they do ... I can do better than them [referring to people in the government] because actually there are things you learn in the call center that other people do not know. You are put into extreme conditions, you have to analyze things, you need to make a report... if it’s perfect, it is fulfilling” (m, 38; FGD Davao 2012b).

Part of being professional is also to imbibe the rationality of the job within the economic subsystem (which is selling products or selling service) and to detach it from life world values. As one respondent posits, "I'm here for work…if you don't believe what I'm saying…it's okay…you're here for work as well, you're not here to be my friend; I'm not here to be your friend either." This also includes separating private from professional life which includes not taking things personally and "smiling down the telephone" (Noronha/ D'Cruz 2009: 8) or even taking an occupational persona by using a pseudonym and taking the identity of a Western agent. [More on the issue of emotional labor involved here: Reese 2008c.]

In this sense, being able to adapt is considered to be »professional« as well, as a respondent to the study shared: "When we're taking calls, we have to transform… You have to completely change identity… You'll not be able to please them if you stay with your own cultural background. *Masasabayan mo na lang sila* (You can eventually go along with them). But right after you log-out or when you go back to your own life, *babalik at babalik naman kami* (we are really able to back again and again) to who we are."

All in all, "call center work is hard, but with the right attitude one can adapt to it. Self management is important here," as an agent quoted by Ermitanio (2012) says. And another states, "succeeding in the job depends on one's perseverance and determination" (ibid.).

Professionalism finally, also includes looking for the mistake from one's self: "*Di man siguro ka isyuhan og* termination *kung wala kay gihimo sa trabaho"* (You wouldn't be issued a termination order if you didn't do something [wrong] in your job). This includes keeping up a notion of agency even in difficult situations and criticizing colleagues who complain for being *reklamador* (habitual complainants), says one agent: "There are others who always blame the company, company, company…You have the will to change your life so why rely on the hands of other people. ... *Ambisyoso talaga* (quite demanding)…you have the will of improving your life no matter how humble your work is, not only in the call center."

This sense of professionalism "capturing the essence of agents' lived experience" (Noronha/D'Cruz 2009: 72) is cultivated by management in a way that Noronha and D'Cruz consider professionalism to be as "a form of identity regulation, used by employer organizations to ensure organizational effectiveness and competitive advantage" (Noronha/D'Cruz 2009: xi). It makes agents accept stringent work systems and job design elements, techno-bureaucratic controls and the primacy of the customer in return for the privileges bestowed upon them for being professionals.[192]

---

[192] These monitoring tools then get professionalized by some agents. Noronha and D'Cruz (2009) observed in the Indian context that statistics are often welcomed by the agents as providing an evaluation of performance, recording calls as an opportunity to get constructive feedback contributing to their personal development, as well as, improving their employability. Monitoring may even be considered as a means of protecting themselves from potential customer and/or client allegations which may eventually develop into lawsuits. Here agents blind out the fact that performance charts are not only used to project high achie-

Such "governing from a distance" (Wolfgang Fach in Bröckling et al. 2000: 110) though, can only be effective when it is coupled with a long-term socialization to professionalization in college or (when coming from a family of professionals) at home. One might even assume that agents stick to this notion of professionalism despite knowing that their "sense of professionalism" is at best a corrupted and/or a reduced one compared to the 'real' professions (which many have studied for), as 'real' professionalism goes along with, among other things, the command of exclusive knowledge, with high reputation and general trust clients have on the judgment of a professional (cf. Noronha/ D'Cruz 2009: 131-144).

But where professionalism is a tool of governementality, it can also be a form of resistance, to fend off such strategies. People are not just easy prey to hegemonial strategies. Such governementality strategies harbor the danger of producing resistiveness, namely, where features like favoritism violate the concept of a professional and 'international' workplace (Noronha / D'Cruz 2009: 54), and lead to disappointment and disillusionment about international call centers. ("There's also politics inside especially with promotion... because, there are still the ways of Filipinos there, like if you're a friend of mine, it would be easier for you, if you're a friend of the manager, it would be easier for you to get promoted," as a female respondent, 30, complained.)

The same can be said about the little interest a de facto Fordist set-up shows for the will of professionals to participate in the improvement of the work. Frustration that management is not listening to ideas of agents on how the service can be improved is expressed by three out of four trade unionists interviewed by Taylor et al. (2007: 36). 68% complain that they are not involved in target setting; and, 65% that they are not involved in decisions that affect them.[193] Similarly one of the respondents in this research thinks that the growth of agents could be further enhanced if agents are regarded as an important sector in decision-making. For this, she laments, "(I)t's always the manager and the supervisor talking about the client…why not 3-way?"

"Managerial data leave no doubt that employee well-being, packaged in the garb of workplace ambience, occupies a secondary position, being completely overshadowed by the organization's preoccupation with competitive advantage. Indeed, workplace ambience is a mere means to this end. ... A hard HRM model is being couched in soft terms," analyze Noronha and D'Cruz (2009: 154). The tension between professional self-identity and career aspiration, on one hand, and the performance of what for most is routinized interactive service or business process work, on the other hand,

---

vers as benchmarks and low achievers as to be "advised," but also that it is used as basis to dismiss those constantly failing the benchmarks.

[193] Dissatisfaction with a factory-like setting is also expressed in the high return three items get which are connected to practices perceived to squeeze the maximum out of the agents (71%). Items considering monotony, lack of fair treatment also get responses above 60%. Respondents from domestic call centers score high in each item. Nearly all (97%) agree with the statement that "management is only interested in statistics and efficiency; and, 78% believe that "employees like me are not treated with the respect they deserve," while only 28% believe that "management and employees have common aims;" and, that "management has the welfare of their employees at heart" (ibid.: 38); agents from domestic call centers showed an even lower agreement.

therefore, cannot be endlessly 'professionalized'. Just as the "discrepancy between the conceptualization of professionalism, as communicated to employees, and the enactment of professionalism within the employer organization" (Noronha/ D'Cruz 2009: 144) and the tightly controlled, heavily monitored and scripted work "in which the essential message is about meeting the required statistics" (Noronha/ D'Cruz 2009: 19) can only insufficiently be juxtaposed with high commitment practices and open management styles. [See in more detail the subchapter 3.17.3. on *token participation* below.]

When analyzing the data in relation to how the respondents have imbibed the performance imperative, we can at first observe that they don't entirely blame themselves for a wanting performance: 19 out of 28 can still see room for improvement in their performance (the need to "meet up with the demands of the job" as the problem card framed it with gravity index: .42), which can be considered as an indication for their sense of professionalism; this is consistent with the 19 of 28 who consider their service to their clients as "*kulang*" (wanting) with an all in all gravity index of .41. (14 respondents considered both problems relevant, but *d* is only .24.). Meanwhile, only four out of 28 are considerably dissatisfied with their performance; while, 16 say it is not a problem at all for them (Gravity index: .25). (All the 28 respondents provided information on every item so that the gravity index is identical with the weighted gravity index.) This confirms the previous (high) numbers on life satisfaction despite an unsatisfactory work. The respondents to this study are not likely to step into the work-related depression trap neoliberalism has set up, as described by Alain Ehrenberg. The correlation between feeling dissatisfied with their performance and the perceived need for personal improvement though is significant with d=.47.

Although when embedding the data into the main question in this part of the writing, i.e. the readiness to collective action and representation, we discover a significant *negative* correlation between items about individual performance and the dissatisfaction with the no-union policy. While they are only slim (d=-.09 to still having to meet up with the demands of the job and d= -.20 with not being satisfied with their performance, but d=-.29 with problematizing performance demands), these are the only problem items with a negative correlation to considering the no-union policy a problem.

Correlating the performance items with the problem "no grievance mechanism," the negative correlation is nearly non-existent: in the case of correlating the problem "no grievance mechanism," to not meeting the demands (d is -.02); with performance demands being considered a problem, it is -.18. The negative correlation with being dissatisfied with one's own performance though is a little more pronounced (-.28). In this case again, the performance items are the only negatively correlating ones.

The correlation between the problem "no-union-policy" and "no grievance mechanism" again is only *medyo* (with d= .32). Only seven respondents find both problems

(*pinaka*)*grabe*, while seven other respondents find only either the one or the other problem (*pinaka*)*grabe*. 11 find neither an issue; while, three consider at least one of the two problem as "ok lang." Only one respondent finds all three issues (no-union policy, no grievance mechanism and performance demands) *pinakagrabe* and one considers all of them *grabe*. Two respondents consider all three problems "ok lang." Again there are only two cases in which respondents considered all three problems as *walang problema* (or they even have never heard about them). Otherwise, there is a remarkable accumulation of cases which consider either the performance demands as (*pinaka*)*grabe* ***or*** the no-union policy *and/or* the lack of grievance mechanisms. Those who consider high performance demands as "significant" (grabe) also believe least in unionizing as an option – considering that 16 out of 28 consider unionizing a promising option and 20 out of 28 believe that a union could solve their problems! I interpret this negative correlation as an indication that imbibing the responsibilization imperative weakens the inclination to voice out one's dissatisfaction in a collective manner.

Nevertheless, self-management does not make external management (*Fremdführung*) dispensable and people do not always "want what they should" (*wollen, was sie sollen*). Therefore, the strategy of instilling a self-construction as professionals (beginning with the way the job openings are framed), are complemented by surveillance and monitoring techniques, which at times, reminds one of Bentham's panoptical.

3.16.3. Everyday resistance

Problems like "performance demands" (weighted gravity index: .57); "excessive and tedious workload" (weighted gravity index: .53); "monotony" (weighted gravity index: .40); but, also the issue of harassment from irate clients/callers (mentioned by 24 out of 27), show that there is quite some psychological strain for ICCAs to be dealt with. The narratives of several research participants showed that adaptation and (self)managing their work and life, are thus, not the only ways of dealing with working conditions, which are at times too hard to take.

In contrast, we could identify significant everyday resistance in 16 of 40 cases, "small, seemingly trivial daily acts through which subordinate individuals or groups undermine—rather than overthrow—oppressive relations of power" (Groves/Chang 2002: 316), *as well as* individual protest - be it in form of »voice« with the HR department or by »exit«, in the form call center hopping or even leaving the industry.

Individual struggles against the »system« are evident among call center workers who have familiarized the insides and who have evolved ways of challenging the status within the bounds of strict rules of operations - for as long as these do not threaten their employment. A respondent phrases it this way, "There are lots of things you cannot do, especially on a call…there are lots of crimes you can do, until you get caught." 21 out of 28 respondents consider control by supervisors kind of a problem,

with three consider it pressing; nine as significant; and, nine as minor (the weighted gravity index is .45). But agents found ways of subverting the control of the panopticon, which is also a source of pride for them. In seemingly trivial matters, some tend to bend certain floor policies.

Respondents also share a variety of ways in asserting themselves to irate callers. Since there is a strong policy over call-releasing, putting up with callers typically means cursing at them while the phone is on-mute, making the customer wait on the line for a long time until they hang up, or getting back at them in ways within the agents' leeway. A respondent recalls that because the customer was so irate, she did not tell her that she has a refund for free subscription; instead she made her pay for the product. Another remembers, "I would always say, »I'm so sorry.« I apologize, but, you know, once I go mute, »*Putang ina! Yawa ka! Bwisit ka!*« (Different curses). Something like that… And that's a relief… »Fuck you! Fuck you! Fuck you!« Even one of our agents told our customer (who was already saying »fuck you«), »I'm sorry, sir. We are not allowed to say fuck you, too.«"[194] (For other forms of everyday resistance cf. Fabros 2007.)

Social networking sites have also become a tool for some agents. This way, they can disguise, hide behind anonymity, while attacking certain practices in their company. An example was given by a respondent when someone named *Hamak na Agent* (Lowly Agent) criticized on Facebook and Multiply, a manager's favoritism in promotion processes.[195]

Bayat (2013) calls this kind of action "non-movements," as "the actors do not act as part of a group, but individually... trying in very different ways to improve their life. … These are all individual acts, but each act broadens the leeway and makes it easier for others to do the same. And by that, they alter the leeway and move the limits set for them. Without making a fuss about it, without shouting slogans. That is why I speak of »quiet encroachment.« The ... »quiet encroachment« is a practice. And that means, it changes people."

But while everyday resistance of subalterns shows that they have not consented to dominance (in detail Scott 1990:66ff.) and are resistant to being totally converted into a docile body (Foucault), many of these actions might also be classified as coping and adaptation strategies, which makes work rather easier to bear than effectively disturbing the process of accumulation. That agents rather call these actions "stress-out"

---

[194] The same agent shares about this one instance: "The customer said, »I don't want you to transfer me to the same…I want you to transfer me to the highest individual whatever.« Then the agent said, »Okay, wait for a while. I'll transfer you to God.« You will be famous on the floor if you have a witty mistake…that you could, you know, make the customer feel bad." This episode seems to have turned into a urban legend as it is reported from other sides as well (*Call center agents fight stress with humor, lots of patience*, Vera Files, 9.4.2012).

[195] Because of this the Cybercrime Prevention Bill of 2012 found much opposition among call center agents: "That's why we don't want the bill that would stop us from to say something, it's your space, it's really your space, so you can say something" (FGD Davao 2012b).

than “resistance” might be a hint of that. Says Fabros (2007: 170; 273): “These forms of resistance have been practiced within spaces available, without considerably altering relations and conditions in this global enterprise [and] interventions do not result in any considerable improvements in work conditions or bargaining capacities of call center workers.” This is confirmed by Bayat who considers the “quiet encroachment“ of “non-movements“ as a mere “politics of redress“ (2000: 548) – where “redress“ could be ‘translated’ to a politics of *diskarte* for the Philippine context - and believes that “the disenfranchised are unlikely to become a more effective player in a larger sense unless they become mobilized on a collective basis, and their struggles are linked to broader social movements and civil society organizations” (ibid.: 79).

‘Everyday resistance’ is not necessarily a detriment to the interest of their employers and may even be a form of governance to leave marginal arenas for alternative practices to the subalterns (here: to stress out), thus serving the reproduction of the agents’ performance and letting them to believe that they can exert some agency and resistance. In this sense, McKay states that “workers necessarily help constitute the labor regimes they consent to or resist. In spite of the benefits of high-tech work to workers' personal lives, without collective organization, such individualized or »asymmetric agency« does not challenge management authority in production, thus demonstrating how workers' actions and discourses can simultaneously challenge and reproduce their own subordination and capital's flexible accumulation strategies” (McKay 2006: 179).

Such everyday resistance even helps to develop the government of the call center regime: "Only in the confrontation with his opposing forces, the force field of the entrepreneurial invocation assumes shape," says Bröckling (2007: 284). "Therefore, that programs fall short of meeting their own targets is not necessarily a sign of weakness, but a constitutive moment of their operation. … Governing is not the realization of a programmers dream. … The world of a programmer is one of continuous experimentation, invention, failure, critique and correction. The programs of the entrepreneurial management of people and the self do not follow the principle of rule and application, but the cybernetic model of process monitoring, using disturbances as signals to regulate their interventions." And elsewhere Bröckling writes: "Programs never translate seamlessly into individual behavior; to appropriate their rules always means to modify them. The obstinacy of human action insists in form of counter-movements, moments of inertia and techniques of neutralization. The regime of self- and external formation provide no blueprint that merely needs to be implemented, but requires a steady experimenting, inventing, correcting, criticizing and adapting" (Bröckling 2007: 40). “It’s like a game inside,” a female agent (30) expressed it to us. “Agents play with the management, the management will play with the agents as well.”

Bröckling (2007: 288) considers everyday resistance to be one of several "exemplary attitudes of distancing oneself from the impositions of a generalized entrepreneurship.” The other attitudes he names are depression and irony, as its "compensatory

counterpart."[196] "The regime of entrepreneurial self produces next to the type of the smart self-optimizer at the same time its counterpart: the deficient individual" (p. 289).[197] However it is an open question, if they really function as "irritation of the entrepreneurial field of forces" (p. 288) as Bröckling assumes. Everyday resistance and irony may serve as "building blocks for more manifest resistance against structures and apparatuses to control" (Scott 1990: 57), but they might as well serve as a valve that helps to make the pressure bearable.

Finally, there are instances where individual agents enter the "**open transcript**," depending on their personal limits of what they consider as just and reasonable (*sobra na*), the resources s/he commands over and on how promising they consider it to tear down "the political cordon sanitaria between the hidden and the public transcript"(Scott 1990: 19).

Some agents put up with supervisors or account managers when they are humiliated on the floor or are shouted at during calls. Some even publicly defy the company like to refuse overtime work, especially if unpaid. Describing herself as a disobedient "rep" (short for customer representative) and as "*pasaway*" (stubborn), an agent relates, "if they broadcast that the over time is offset, *maski harangan pa ako sa* guard *kay mogawas jud ko* (even if the guard bars my way, I would really go out). And if they would threaten me that they will sanction me or give me a memo, I will answer that 'it's okay I will just sign.' If I feel it's really abusive, offset, offset, that's illegal."

---

[196] "The ironist (...) knows what is imposed on him, and he expresses it well. He pushes things to the limit, puts the absurdities free - and ridicules what he cannot change. (...) With a wink, he assures himself to see through those very rituals that he performs in the next moment again" (ibid.: 290). Irony also acts as a outlet: "The grinning »exactly that's the way it is« when we look at the cartoon hanging over the desk helps us bearing with it staying that way" (ibid.).

[197] We could add here the "trickster figure, who manages to outwit his adversary and escape unscathed [and] has historically been the more common folk hero of subordinate groups," Scott (1990:41) explains. This figure also personalizes diskarte, and when successfully applied in one's own life, can be the source of some pride. "Being able to deceive or annoy the rich without being caught, is often a matter of some enjoyment," observed Pinches (1991: 182).

3.17. Why is collective protest so few? And the unions even less?

"Forms of resistance have yet to take on a more organized and collective character to substantially transform bargaining power of workers in order to establish a level of control over the pace, content, direction, context and over-all conditions of their day-to-day work" (Fabros 2007: 270).

There have been collective protests staged in call center settings in the Philippines. In 23 of 40 cases, respondents of this research acted in a collective way, although it was only in seven cases where issues were raised with the management. In Davao, agents filed a case against undue termination, and in Cebu, 664 agents filed a case against a US-based call center company due to alleged non-payment of salaries, incentives, overtime pay and other cash benefits, including the non-remittance of social security benefits, altogether amounting to 9.2 million pesos (Sun Star Cebu, 3.8.2012). The latter group was assisted by an established labor party. (Fur further examples on sporadic collective action see EILER 2008: 25f.)

But these legal actions are singular and were initiated only after the employees left the call center they stood up against.[198] These actions might as well turn out to be mere "subsistence mobilizations" (Velasco 2006), just like what organizers *initially* experienced in the case of factory workers in Cavite: "The big problem was that we only had a minority of [union] members that really wanted the union. The majority just wanted the issue solved. But if that issue did get solved, then there was no more base to be unified" (McKay 2006: 209). On the other hand, subsistence mobilizations also hold the potential for broader politicization: During subsistence mobilizations, rights are discovered, political latitude is realized, a sense of eventuality develops, forms of resistance are given a try, and by that, conflict readiness is created. Fields of possibilities develop which overcome the limitations of the think- and the say-able and trigger an inflation of demands. Concrete struggles can so contribute to the development of conflict skills (cf. Reese 2008b).

Union building again, in fact, shows more or less nil return. In Manila, youth activists started the organizing of call center workers from different companies. The Kabataan Partylist, a party list for advocacy for the issues of the youth (*Kabataan* mea-

[198] A typical phenomenon especially for precarized employments not only in the Philippines. So says Peter Schüren (2013), labor lawyer at the University of Münster that, "labor disputes usually happen when an employment ends, not while it still exists. People defend themselves to a maximum when the relationship is already over." (Likewise Raiser 2013: 328.) The law sociologist Susanne Baer confirms this, saying that, employees only go to court after they have been terminated and many women only bring to trial abuses when the marriage can no longer be saved. In both situations, the law is the last resort, the last chance to save one's own claims" (Baer 2011: 219). The rule observed is "the shorter, the more impersonal and the more existential a relationship is, the more likely a conflict can be clarified in court, and the longer and more personal the bond, the more difficult is the mobilization of law. … Individualization thus is a mobilization barrier [sic!]" (ibid.).
Thus it is also the order of the day in Germany, says Schüren (ibid.), that unlawful clauses are included into employment contracts (especially in the case of precarious employment). Employers bank on employees not filing cases at a labor court, despite "very good prospects that the court decides in their favor." Schüren concludes that the consequences regarding these are to impose fines on employers gaining benefits from illegal practices (just as it is done in the anti-trust legislation), including sequestering the profit that has been made in this way.

ning- children/youth), for instance initiated political education sessions and invited through activists-turned-agents; and, the Sanlakas Youth did the same and establis-hed E-LITES or Elite Employees League in ICT-Enable Services which aimed at be-coming a national association of BPO workers. But neither action was very sustaina-ble. According to two of its founders, ELITES was only able to organize some events in Manila (like fora on labor rights, concerts to kick off networking, or a two-day se-minar), and above this, filed some individual court cases (FGD Manila 2012). "There is not much to share about E-LITES" as one of them deplored (ibid.). At the time of writing BIEN (BPO Industry Employees' Network), a group composed of call center agents and connected to EILER.

The labor federation TUCP again, which is the most active union in this field, set up an association called VOICE, which had 200 members as of October 2012 (TUCP 2012). VOICE mainly provides paralegal support, but it is not a union as its officers are not agents themselves (a requirement for registering as a union).[199]

An organizing project initiated in 2007 by the ILO, which involved the major trade union federations turned out to be a flop. And the organizing projects undertaken around 2008 and mentioned by EILER (2008: 29f.), seem to have likewise been merely ningas cogon (grassfire to mean: short-lived), as they were not heard of anymore. [200]

What can thus be mainly observed is that different organizations (especially TUCP) have set up help-lines and online-portals for call center employees, which includes trade union education into their preparatory courses for aspiring call center agents ("call center academies") and even offering job placement to them - hoping that this way workers, can be convinced to form their own organization. But according to TUCP (2012), the graduates of these academies don't come back to TUCP after finis-hing the courses and "there are [even] not many call center agents accessing our site" (ibid.).

The absence of unions is despite the fact that according to the few known researches done on organizing potential in call centers, there is a quest for organizing among

---

[199] At the time of the interview, VOICE supported a network of online tutors teaching English to Koreans which set up fora and blogs where agents can share their strategies and complaints. This group approached VOICE to ask for assistance, although they did not want to directly link up with the trade unions. The spokesperson and driving force of the group, a young woman, is depicted as having some former understanding about unions, perhaps a former student activist. It remains to be seen if they end up like the two other comparable groups TUCP assisted in previously, of which they heard no more after a certain time (TUCP 2012).

[200] The case of the call center agents who joined the union at Standard Chartered Bank is a special case. As in-house agents, they were automatically covered by the union once they got permanent [employment] (Business World, 13.1.2006). The same holds true for the staff of the Reservation and Ticketing Department of the Philippine Airlines, wherein their 300 call center workers joined the Philippine Airlines Employees Association (EILER 2008: 24). Although organized, and at least so enjoying various benefits and more job security, "the issues and grievances they face are similar to ... call centre workers in outsourced compa-nies. Issues such as occupational health and safety, graveyard shifts, period of break times, security problems in the area, and income abound [in] their everyday lives" (ibid.).

call center agents.[201] A slight majority (52 over 45) of the 100 call center employees interviewed by Sale and Bool (2005) were open to joining a union. The ones willing to join said above all (62%) it was for the sake of salary negotiations; much less (13%) to ensure that the company complies with the internal procedure; or, to get support in grievance procedures (12%).[202] A majority of the respondents to Sale and Bolo's research had general knowledge about trade unions, despite their young age, and notwithstanding that almost all were non-members. EILER indicates that in their initial research, 78% answered that an employees' association may help in relation to call center work problems, with 45% even saying they would be willing to take the lead (EILER 2008: 23). In this own research, we identified a gravity index of .40 with regards to the no-union policy, with 9 out of 28 responses considering it "*pinakagrabe*" and four considering it at least "*grabe*." (Two again said it is no problem for them, while 12 even said they were not aware that there is a no-union policy.) 13 out of 28 said they would be willing to join a union (46%), and a further 25% (7), said at least "it depends."[203]

So how can we explain that hardly any unions develop, and generally, collective actions of interest representation come up so seldom?

3.17.1. The no-union-policy discourage some agent as they fear to get terminated or discriminated against

Some reasons that no unions develop can be attributed to a lack of resources and unfavorable political opportunities. One of them is the no-union policy implemented by the industry. During their trainings BPO employees are usually being discouraged by the management from joining or forming unions. In some companies, a no-union provision is even clearly stipulated in pre-employment contracts. (The study by EILER confirms the information the respondents in this study gave, cf. EILER 2008: 22.) In other companies it is "not a written policy… but an accepted policy among workers" (TUCP 2012).[204] An agent informs us that instigating the formation of a union

---

[201] This wide gap between the importance given to trade unions and the low membership they have reflects a similar phenomenon in society. According to the 2005 ISSP on Work Attitudes (ISSP 2005) 50% of the Filipino respondents believe that trade unions are important for job security (in Germany it are 65%) -with no significant class factor if very and important are lumped together (more people with high educational attainment believe that they are very important). Among the 25-34 old it are even 58% who believe that trade unions are important for job security. And 45% of the Pin@ys believe that "without trade unions the working conditions of employees would be much worse than they are" (but 73% of the Germans). This again is neither class nor age specific.

[202] Sale and Bool (2005) came to the conclusion that 51% would be interested to join an affordable, principled and efficient unions, Bool (2007 following Sale 2012) even pegs the number at 62%.

[203] Among this high agreement to unionizing as promising option, we could observe nearly all those who considered "no orientation on rights" a problem would consider setting up a union as a promising option to counter the problems they encounter (8 of 9 considering it a [*pinaka*]*grabe* problem). Among does regarding the absence of a grievance mechanism a (*pinaka*)*grabe* problem it are 9 out of 11. And when it comes to the no-union policy it are 10 out of 10.

[204] Setting up a union though is not only hampered by a low propensity to form a union. To register a union, including the right to negotiate Collective Bargaining Agreements and the exercise of other rights as a labor organization, at least 20% of the em-

spells a threat to their employment. She reveals, "They are not allowing it. Once they will hear *na* (that) you're provoking *na ing-ana, kuwan ka, diretso ka kuwan sa* company, or shall say *na*, 'you know *naman* the outcome diba?' *Syempre,* if you're against the company, *syempre asa imong padulngan. Kawalan.* (Once they will hear that you are provoking or doing things like that, the company would directly, or would say, "You already know the outcome, right?" Of course, if you're against the company, where would you end up? Nowhere.)"

An agent in Manila conveys her apprehension: "(T)here's this cloud hanging over our head *na if masyado kang ano sa kompanya baka palitan ka nang iba* (that if you're too much to the company they might replace you with someone else), then you have to pay for your bills…in the end…*mapipilitan kang mag*compromise (you will be forced to compromise)…*ang hirap pala; nung estudyante ako* (I realize it's difficult; when I was a student), it can be right, wrong…here comes *ako* (me), I have to pay for my apartment, I have to pay for my brother's enrollment."

Others feel they might be at least discriminated against by the management: "You're contradicting the management, you won't be prioritized for work…you will have that special treatment…it's just a very small company; if ever you go against the management, the termination…is just easy."[205]

Such apprehensions are probably also one reason why even agents, who set up online portals which serve agents to connect and complain, react hostile when approached by unions as they do not want to be associated with them. This is what TUCP (TUCP 2012) experienced.

Such fears are aggravated by the fact that in Filipino culture the ones speaking out are immediately considered as "*disturbo*," "*reklamador*" or "troublemaker"(unless they belong to a higher rank in society!) and that "*hirit*" (talking back, i.e. openly disagreeing) is frowned upon while *pakikisama* (getting along) is valued (cf. also Franco 2011: 43f. who considers this a reason for people not to pursue a case). One respondent shared that (during an apprenticeship in Dunkin Donuts), "my co-trainee told me that the management said that I was an activist. What?! Just because you speak your mind, just because you raised a question, they tagged you as an activist." This relates to an observation made by a study by the University of the Philippines (Aganon et al. 2008) that employees are wary of being branded as unionists or "activists"

ployees need to join (Sale 2012). This impediment though was hardly mentioned in our expert interviews with trade unionists. Can we from there conclude that these legal impediments do not figure the major stumbling block to unionization as for now?

[205] It is interesting though to see that Filipino employers in general seem to make much less use of union avoidance tactics as usually feared. According to a survey in Aganon et al. (2008: 72f.) only 27% of the unionists experienced that workers were laid off during a campaign "always or often," in only 26% of the cases workers were discharged for union activity and in only every fourth case social events with a anti-union message were hold while a campaign went on. Furthermore there is an array of measures unions may employ to thwart management's union avoidance activities, among others drawing the support of the surrounding community, home visits to target members or holding meetings outside of the workplace (cf. ibid.: 77). And even where union avoidance tactics were implemented only one in five union leaders said they failed to set up an union (ibid.: 75).

by the management, fearing reprisals and dismissals, a fear not totally unfounded (cf. Bulatlat.Com, 21.5.2012).[206]

The lawmaker Luz Ilagan (2012) furthermore shared that a "take it or leave it"-option is often brought up in everyday situations when people complain, the same is the case of management's reactions to agents' complaints. As Rucht (2013: 67) considers "the de-stigmatization and »normalization« of protest« one (of several) "favorable factors to protest," we can expect the cultural wariness to speak out to be a further impediment to political action.[207]

A former agent shares that because of wage issues, discussions among agents came to the point of exploring union-organizing to push for a collective bargaining agreement with the management, but the presence of guards and cameras provided an intimidating effect over the agents. A student activist who joined the call center after college, says, "(W)hen you're an activist, it is okay to express to them but it's better to play safe because you could be a danger to the company."

Such fears resemble those of ordinary workers among whom the fear to get terminated is pronounced (as well), as the anecdotal evidence from our control interviews with a 24-year old salesperson shows (confirmed by similar expressions in other control interviews undertaken with ordinary workers). Even if he agreed to the statement *Manalo man o matalo, ipaglalaban natin ito* he did not see the possibility that contractual workers will complain because "*trabahante lang man ka*" (you are just a worker). "*Ikaw man ang nangita ug trabaho. So syempre mo-follow ka sa policy kay gisweldohan man kag tarong*." (You are the one who is looking for a job. So of course, you follow the policy because you get the right salary.) "*Siguro ang mga regulars*" (maybe the regulars) he observes, might be able to complain. But he himself, "*maulaw man ko mag-complain"* (I am ashamed to complain). Asked what he thinks, what would happen "if you had the guts to complain to a supervisor about the policies?" he answered "*matanggal siguro* (probably get dismissed)." So the only chance he sees for himself is to "*istorya na lang nako sa akong mga friends*" (just tell it to my friends). And: "*pag over na pud kaayo ang policy mo-resign nalang pud ko* (And if the policy is really too much, I will just resign)." As he furthermore has not yet (*"wala pa"*) heard of the Labor Code,

---

[206] Karl Ombon speaks in an article with the telling title *Left have rights, too* (Sun Star Bacolod, 4.5.2013) of a "society where its political system has low tolerance for Left or radical or even revolutionary ideas; where Left is always associated with organized violence." He traces this attitude "to our colonial rulers who have brainwashed our people to believing that the non-disturbance and non-alteration of the existing ruling order is the most decent and civilized thing to do."

[207] Again we should not lose sight of the fact that 17 of 28 respondents in this qualitative research agreed strongly, with another nine agreeing, to the saying "*Kapag nasa katwiran, laban* (if you are right, fight)," leaving only two out of 28 not agreeing to it (PI = .86). According to Franco (2011: 46) this saying "has been popularized in Filipino film and television programs and is closely associated with conflict situations between persons of different social class and status… It conveys the idea that there are times when it is but proper to hold and defend one's position (against an opponent) despite the general imperative of maintaining social harmony."

this probably further aggravates his perception that the company rules are the overriding ones.

Losing his job though is a bigger problem for him as he simply has less confidence than the call center agents to just "hop" on: Asked what he fears most, he answers: "*Wala koy trabaho. Dili ko madawat sa trabaho kay naay age limit. Kahadlukan nako dili nako ma-achieve akong goals. Basin matiguwang ka, pobre gihapon ka.* (Having no work. Not finding a [new] job as there is an age limit. I am scared that I cannot achieve my goals. That when I get old, I might still be poor)." Nevertheless, his answer to the question "What will you do if you are suddenly jobless now?" was "*Mang-apply og laing trabaho* (Apply for another job)."

3.17.2. It is not clear whom the agents should turn to

As Schmitt outlined (see above), one of the prerequisites for protest is that the reasons for a situation must be attributed externally, i.e. the responsibility has to be given to someone else instead of blaming oneself. Furthermore, personal domination is more tangible than impersonal rule. "People experience deprivation and oppression within a concrete setting, not as the end product of large and abstract processes, and it is the concrete experience that moulds their discontent into specific grievances against specific targets," as Piven/Cloward (1986: 20) observes. Walton and Seddon (1994: 52) underline this assumption, saying that "a clear perception of responsible agents" is more likely to trigger resistance – just as relative deprivation in comparison to another concrete (group of) person(s) does.[208] Here seems to lie a problem for ICCAs: While a respondent underscores the idea that "*malaki talaga 'yung violation nila sa* (they, i.e. the call centers, really have a huge violation against the) labor policy," but she stresses at that same time that "(In the) outsourcing industry…you don't know who to blame…whom to talk…that's the problem, *parang* (it's like) you don't really know whom to talk and bargain with."

The rapid changes of clients at times, make it difficult to have a clear counterpart to turn to or mobilize against. Furthermore, these clients who should be held accountable are abroad and not visible in the tripartite container society and so cannot be caught as a respondent (f, 20) believes: "You can't work if there's no project, and the company can't force the clients."

Others even say that nobody is to be held responsible in particular: "You could not help it; it's the system… You could not really complain about it, about changing the way things are. The supervisors don't have control over it" (f, 30).

---

[208] Here Scott raises the interesting question in how far the forms of impersonal domination or scientific techniques governementality studies mainly focus on can trigger protest. "While I believe many apparently impersonal forms of control are mediated by a personal domination that is, and is experienced as, more arbitrary than Foucault would allow," says Scott (1990:21), "I take his point that there is something qualitatively different about claims to authority based on impersonal, technical, scientific rules."

When focusing on the client abroad as the scapegoat, it is blinded out that it was one's own employer who negotiated the contract with the clients and accepted their conditions. At times, even the national card is played (mainly by the management): We Filipinos (whether agent or employer) must stick (it out) together – confirming again that nationalism is often instrumentalized to defuse class conflict.[209]

Nevertheless, these answers are exceptional: 15 out of 27 still consider the call centers to be "mainly responsible for the problem." Only five think it is the government that is in charge; five think they have to blame themselves; and, only one considers the system, and another one, the foreign client to be the main culprit.[210]

But even when seemingly the agents are well aware of whom to blame for the situation, it still remains vague to them which set of laws is to apply: that of the Philippines or the laws of the client's country, as TUCP explains (TUCP 2012). This relates to another indication of "being in between the worlds" and is also expressed by the application of US working hours and holidays to the call center schedules (see in detail Reese 2008c).

3.17.3. Individual compensation and grievance procedures (Token participation)

"Human resource management is established by firms as the sole means of resolving problems for individual workers, rather than as a means of enabling legitimate responses by workers collectively" (Stevens / Mosco 2010: 43).

In almost all call centers, workers are encouraged to approach and settle issues with the human resource department (HRD) individually or raise them on an individual basis during so called town hall sessions. Open forum meetings and intranet discussion fora are likewise established in some centers. The imagination is thus created that it is easy to approach the HR department whenever one has a grievance (open door policy). The HRD is framed as a 'substitute' for the development of forms of collective organization and representation. The image constructed by the management is this: There is no need for unions as the HRD takes up individual complaints, employers take care of needs of employees, and the interests of employers and employees go into the same direction.

This is further fostered by an atmosphere of congeniality and camaraderie created by fun initiatives or the first-name principle and the perception that employers value their professional employees. "Under such circumstances, not only ... agents feel va-

---

[209] We can also detect such a governmental strategy in overseas migration policy. Here the national card is often played by the government beautifying service work by labeling it as a way of showing the world how good Filipin@s can speak English, how patient and kind they are, in one word: that Filipin@s are the world caretaker champions.

[210] Here we can detect a negative correlation between considering the government the main reason for the problems and in the items related to one's own performance, as well as a positive correlation between these items and the ones' considering oneself to be the main agent to blame (though the latter is not a perfect correlation as one could assume). Although both answers only comprise five answers each, such correlations are not very meaningful.

lued and empowered, considering employers in a positive light and displaying greater commitment to them, but also any third-party intervention including legal protection and collectivist groups (are) seen as redundant“ (Noronha/D'Cruz 2009: 105).

Most of our research participants attest to the policy of call centers offering space and fora for agents' issues. Quoting the open door policy, some agents believe that they can easily approach management personnel for concerns. As such, there is a company in Manila that explicitly "encourages" agents to resolve/settle issues individually with the management, knowing probably well that it takes more courage to face the management on one's own than to being accompanied by supportive others.[211] Surveys and evaluations are also conducted to generally feel the pulse of the workforce. This impresses an agent in Dumaguete, as he says, "they are really serious in making the best."

Such approach also accommodates the fact that confrontation is not what precarized are searching for in the first place, according to Scott. "Public representations of claims by subordinate groups, even in situations of conflict, nearly always have a strategic or dialogic dimension that influences the form they take," explains (Scott 1990: 92). The precarized middle class shows this dialogue orientation, although for different reasons. While the former precarized poor hardly believed that they will be able to "beat the system"(and also in other situations, might make use of riots to get their share), the latter usually wish to "join the system" and therefore, not rock the boat (Cf. Jung 1982).

Apart from this, a number of respondents confirm the occurrence of town hall meetings. During these gatherings, local and foreign big bosses of the company meet with agents from different accounts. In one call center in Dumaguete, agents are given incentives for questions/concerns raised during these meetings. For one respondent from Dumaguete, "that would really make you think that they are open to changes, suggestions." Another Dumaguete agent appreciates by saying, "(T)hat's the good thing about (town hall meetings); there's no need to make a union, to shout these things out because the clients are responsible enough to visit us once a year, and know the problems of the company." A former agent in Davao concedes, "We do see results *naman* (indeed). They work on it, of course, they don't promise that they would be able to give everything that we requested or demanded."

But most respondents doubt that their opinions are of great value to the company. Only three of 13 respondents mentioning the issue said that suggestions of agents on how to improve work are considered. A Davao agent who opts the individual approach, still doubts: "(Y)ou can tell your supervisors but they can't do anything much," as complaints may go unnoticed if supervisors are busy with an account. He elaborates, "(A)ll you can do is tell your concerns, but it's up to the management to

---

[211] This hesitance to speak out might be further aggravated by the fact that many of the BPO managers are of foreign descent. "If the ordinary worker already has difficulty talking to a Filipino boss," believes Ilagan (2012), "that problem is made more difficult when talking to a foreign person."

act on it…so basically I guess it all depends on the management; you do have a say, but that's just it…you can say your concern but I don't know if the management will act on it." Echoes a Manila respondent: "(W)e don't have a say…they'd say that you are the company, we'd listen to you…I've never saw the vice president in my whole three years there…nobody talked to me…we had a grievance mechanism where you can rant but nothing happened…we had a pie chart (to show the company's earnings and losses)…the pie chart would be so complex you couldn't read it anymore…you don't know if you're earning or losing money."

As to the surveys, an agent believes she would lose nothing if she truthfully answers them, but also thinks it would not do anything to alter the current situation. Confers an agent from a different company, "(H)ow many times *nag*survey *pero wa may nahitabo* (did they do surveys and still nothing happened); there's no improvement, *nihawa na lang ko* (even after I left), it's still the same."

The town hall meetings are the most contentious. Management's responses to some issues, e.g. office facilities, are written in tarpaulins and publicly displayed in office premises. Yet, for several agents, major issues that are deemed pressing by agents are often unclearly answered or neglected at all. One agent shares that she feels that action plans are never implemented. Another agent says she never felt she was being listened to: "They listened to some, but as to the workload and performance demands, they just made it a lot worse."

An agent observes a scheme in town hall meetings: "(S)hift-shift *man gud na siya, dili ka kabalo unsay na*discuss *nila didto* (Meetings are scheduled per shift, and you wouldn't know what they discussed there)…*usahay naa kay work ana, mag-*work *pa jud ka, dili ka kaapil* (at times you have work, you have to work, thus you couldn't join)…so selected *lang na* agents *ang naa didto* (so only selected agents were there)…*murag naay* questions *gihapon nga dili makaabot didto* (it's like there are still questions that cannot be raised there)…so *wala gihapon siyay* answer (so there's still no answer)." In effect, issues are fizzled out. This agent also believes that turnover of account managers also affects response to agents' issues. She adds, "*(A)mbot ginatuyo ba na nila anaon ang* style *para dili gyud makuan ang mga* agents (I don't know if they really intentionally do that in that style, so as not to [unify] the agents)…*kung naay* complaint *karon, kung mabag-o na sad ang* (account manager), *mag-*start all over again (if there are complaints now and the account manager would be changed, it would start all over again)…*hangtud mawala na ang* agent, *mawala na lang ang* issue, *bag-o na pud* (until such time that the agent would resign, the issue fizzles out, and there's another new issue again)."

Noronha and D'Cruz consider the participation mechanisms as a "false claim, concerned only with impressing and misleading agents"(2009: 165). This is a notion shared by some of our respondents. Contends an activist-agent: "I considered it as *sarsuela* – it's a game by the management; it's a spectacle just to show that they have a grievance process…that's actually (the management's) hobby…(agents) just argue and they just would be humiliated because all they say is about the grievance and

they do not know anything about the numbers…(the management) know(s) all the arguments; they look very intelligent…the management can tell them everything that would not happen…they're not in the company anymore when that's supposed to happen."

As such, these avenues are perceived superficial for a grievance mechanism. Individual approach, surveys and evaluation, and the bosses-agents meet up in town hall meetings can be considered as a de facto futile exercise going along with token and ineffective participation mechanism in the workplace. Says an agent: "*Sa* call centers *kasi* (It is because in the call centers), they want to prevent union…they don't do union busting, they do union-avoidance…you have to give the democratic space so that (agents) would not think that they are being oppressed." In this spirit, 11 of 28 find it a significant/very significant problem that no grievance mechanisms exist (while nine don't find it a problem and six are not even aware of this as a problem). There is a high correlation between the two problems of the lack of consideration for agents' suggestions and the absence of a genuine grievance mechanism (d= .79), while a union seems to be of no importance in this regard (d=-.28).

As to the second point, several agents are impressed about the seemingly symmetrical relationship practiced between a boss and a worker in call centers. They label it as an "open relationship" or "open door policy." In such arrangement, one agent relates: "*Usahay ang* senior manager…approachable *siya nga di ka kabantay nga mao diay na siya ang* manager *kay yagit man kaayo'g porma, naka*-shorts *lang, ana-ana lang gud* (Sometimes, the senior manager is very approachable to a point that you wouldn't know he's the manager because he just dresses ordinarily; he just wears shorts). *Mag-yosi-yosi'g apil didto* (He would smoke with us). *Magchika-chika ra pud siya sa mga* agents (He would also chat with the agents)." Another agent professes the openness: "You can pick up a fight with your boss."

However, from the narratives of the research participants, most of them, if not all, recognize that this kind of relational symmetry limits itself to the interpersonal surface which does not necessarily manifest in work nature and dynamics that are essential to a worker's wellbeing. In the over-all structure of authority, this emphasizes the agents' position who cannot negotiate with management over matters of utmost concern for them, i.e. job security, account selection, work schedules and rational work tasks, contract terms, and not even in the implementation of trainings.

Based on the information from research participants, agents possess little or no negotiating or decision-making power. One agent describes her former managers: "*(P)arang meron silang sariling mundo…parang* (it's like they have their own world…it's like) they really impose their power." And this is manifested in how they run the workplace. A Manila agent complains, "they have a stipulation (in fine print) that they can change the rules whenever they want to (in my contract)." Another feels discriminated in the hierarchy: "*(K)apag* agent *ka* (if you are an agent), *wala kang karapatan* (you don't have rights)*…pero pag may* position *ka* (but if you have a position), you have all the right to do whatever you wanna do." An agent who requested

for a transfer to another account and keeping in mind what he learned from the orientation, imparts, "(T)hey don't allow (the transfer)…it's not your choice…I actually asked them two weeks ago…»no, you don't have a choice; it's either that or you resign«." A quality analyst (QA) though was still hopeful after bargaining with the management regarding the number of audits: "(W)e're trying to bargain if he can lower down the number of audits that we have so that we can also take calls. But then, we just had a meeting…that they don't want to lower down the number of audits and then we'll have another meeting…which I hope they will listen to us…because it's not really feasible."

Another agent thinks that the growth of agents can be further enhanced if they were regarded as an important sector in decision-making. For this, she laments, "(I)t's always the manager and the supervisor talking about the client…why not 3-way?" The existing work environment, however, does not encourage such way in managing the workplace, as shared by another agent: "(W)e have suggestions…they don't know the real issue at work…there are things we are aware of that supervisors are not aware of…so we are suggesting *pero sila pa rin ang masusunod* (but they are still the ones that will be followed) because they know what should be done *pero* (but) sometimes, you can't deny it that common agents encounter problems, but they (supervisors) do not entertain because they're just minor or they're just nuisance…so you just keep quiet." Supports another, "(Y)ou're not given a chance to explain," an issue "ordinary workers" like those working as salespersons in a shopping mall also complain about.[212]

The issue of non-transparency (15 of 21 find this a problem, eight even a grave problem, with a gravity index of .54, but a weighted one of only .41, as the item was not present in seven interviews), evokes the perception of exploitation and marginalization among some agents. Those who consider it a non-issue believe that certain processes are well established. "You can ask HR or the account office (if there are questions)." A majority of our respondents though see it otherwise. They do not know the basis for commission arrangements or wage computation and several agents were not given exactly what they were offered or promised. To this, says an agent, "It [the work] is like a credit card *na may* (with) hidden charges." Some were not even handed out their contract.

---

[212] Comparing these responses with the ones from the respondents in our control study with ordinary workers, we observed that their mindset is not so different. Take as an example the responses by a 24-year old respondent working as a salesperson in a shopping mall, responses typical for the ones from 'ordinary jobs' to the longitudinal research. He mentions as one of the three things he wants to change at work is that he likes to improve the policies, saying" *makatuok ang ilang policies*" (their policies are strangulating) and that the management should consult with the employees regarding the policies: "*Kailangan pud ang company maminaw pud sa side namo*" (the company must also listen to our side.) But unlike the call center management, the mall management does not even pretend to put value to that, so that this respondent believes the company does not care about its employees' opinions. "No employer will ever give huge pays because it will dry up the company's resources," as another ordinary worker respondent supported this view, who also complained about the non-consideration of the company for the employees' suggestions. He adds that he thinks that these problems will always exist no matter how many the benefits are, as "there will be employees who will find things lacking." He believes that if one wants these problems to disappear, one must find his/her own means to earn money like from one's own business.

A number say that they were not able to see their company's handbook or manual of operations, which is often referred to in emails and memos. Regardless of this, the workforce is expected to follow rules and policies. A QA divulged that these policies, though not always effectively enforced, are used to threaten agents.

Agents narrated the HR's unresponsiveness and insensitivity to their issues. An activist who worked as an agent and QA for more than two years gives his political impression: "(A) lot of things happening are very confidential and only top management knows it: the finances, official policy, top level policy, we don't know about it." He perceives that critical analysis of the work condition ends when the management starts to tell its workers how it should go with no more whys. He further says, "(T)hey don't want the agents to analyze; they just want the agents to obey, so that's the reason why they're not transparent…they tend to prejudge that agents would speculate…if agents speculate, the chances of agents' flight is around the corner." And a female agent (22) believes that "the answer (the company) already knows, and they're being deaf about it …unless if all the workers will gonna have a boycott." But with a lot of projects, "that won't get into their (agents) minds…and the contract…there's the feeling of contentment and getting used to it."

Tactics devised by management to give call center employees a voice are generally not utilized to their full potential. By and large, these mechanisms which include employee meetings, team briefings, etc., often operate as one way processes to communicate management views and expectations and emphasize productivity and are allocated limited time due to work-related demands. "Top-down methods and employee involvement practices" say Taylor et al. (2007: 10) "are task-based, geared to increasing productivity and quality, and not intended to give employees a voice, let alone any real participation in decision-making." In this sense Sale and Bool (2005) found out that communication tools are only used in 54% of the cases to merely inform, not to consult.

Some agents do not fall for the "illusions of class compromise" (Aganon et al. 2008: 159). Agents are also fully aware of the production imperative when they say that "*hanggang mapipiga ka nila, pipigain ka nila* (As long as they can squeeze out more from you, they will)" (in Fabros 2007: 211). Concludes an agent, "You might be performing in other fields, but you'd be summed up in one system." We don't care how you manage your personal life; we just want this and this alone.'"[213]

---

[213] Likewise, it is partly deceiving when health and wellness programs are passed off as an expression of agent-friendliness, while Benedict Hernandez, president of the BPAP, admits that "we pay huge attention to the health of our workers, [as] we must continue on attracting and maintaining a performing workforce" (Manila Times, 5.8.2012), i.e. in the sense of Foucault keeping the bodies of the »human resources« productive. This goes along with what Noronha and D'Cruz (2009: 158) call "identity regulation whereby organizations seek to shape the subjectivity of their employees." Once again Hernandez (ibid.): "We make sure that our employees are briefed and educated on the proper lifestyle when you work at night." But when health issues clash with profit expectations, the former take the backseat: Agents complained during our interviews that requests for leave even during instances of sickness were examined in the light of expected and/or on-going call volume and targets, and accordingly, were granted or denied. When the call volume and targets were high, agents were expected to report to duty no matter how sick they were.

Table 4: Correlation (d) with problems considered significantly more than "OK lang" (≥ .45) and other selected problems (with grievance mechanism missing /no union policy as mentioned problem as dependent)	Gravity index	Correlation with considering it a problem that a grievance mechanism is missing	Correlation with considering it a problem that a no union policy is in place.
Performance demands	.59	- .14	-.29
High deduction (taxes, SSS)	.57	.41	.24
Excessive and tedious workload	.55	.18	.20
Transparency (contracts, profit)	.55	.51	.48
Vacation and sick leaves are denied	.55	.29	.13
Forced leave, lack of security of tenure, easy termination	.53	.38	.18
Burnout	.49	.12	-.02
Low/minimum wage	.48	.15	.23
Overtime	.46	.15	.25
Due process in cases of termination	.45	.48	.17
Control by supervisors and QAs	.45	.28	-.02
No union policy (dependent)	.40	.30	-
No say in computation of wage	.40	.28	.35
No orientation on rights	.38	.33	.59
No say in working conditions	.36	.24	.23
Regular night shift work	.31	-.01	-.13
Denial of benefits	.31	.35	.24
Suggestions of agents on how to improve work are not considered	.24	.81	-.28

Despite all these complaints, only three of 13 agents mentioning the problem that their suggestions are not duly considered, view this as a significant problem. There are in general, only few problems which show a significant correlation (d with the lack of a proper grievance mechanism as dependent) with the complaint about a lacking proper grievance mechanism, among them the lack of transparency (.51); due process in cases of termination (.48); the high deductions (.41); forced leave, lack of security of tenure and easy termination (.38); the denial of benefits (.35); and, as mentioned before, the feeling that suggestions of agents on how to improve work are not considered (.81). These might be the only problems the agents believe can be lessened if a genuine grievance mechanism would be in place (cf. table 4).[214] While a grievance mechanism might lessen a bit the problem of the denial of vacation and sick leaves or control by supervisors, the same can hardly be said about those who complain about excessive and tedious workload, burnout, regular night shifts or overtime or those complaining that they have no say in the working conditions. Here, the setting up of a proper grievance mechanism is not considered a promising way of resolving these problems. (But as the table shows, in most cases, the respondents do not believe that a union would be a better means to resolve these issues.)[215]

Union-substitution tactics by the management, mainly in form of townhouse meetings and team consolidation efforts, may be frowned upon by the agents, but this does not spark organizing alternatives – for instance in form of company independent redressal systems, as in the case of India where UNITES, a union more closely described further below, pursued the establishment of a legal sexual harassment redressal system in the IT-BPO sector, as they came to the conclusion that human resource management practices do not sufficiently address the grievances presented by workers (Stevens /Mosco 2010).[216]

3.17.4. Exit instead of voice: leave and join other call center

---

[214] Here a proper grievance mechanism is considered the more pertinent solution as compared to setting up a union. In all cases except 'transparency' the correlation between these problems and the quest for a grievance mechanism is significantly higher compared to the correlation with complaining about a no union policy.

[215] When it comes to those considering performance demands, the correlation even turns negative. This though should not be interpreted in a way that unions or grievance mechanism could not be a redress here, it is more sound to interpret it in a way that those leaning towards such mechanisms do not consider performance demands as a main problem (as outlined later). It is more appropriate to rather choose considering the performance demand as the dependent. (But as the values between choosing a symmetric relationship between the two variables and choosing one as the explanatory and the other as dependent variable are nearly identical, the distortion here is minimal.) Although, high correlations between problems and complaints about a no-union policy can also be random, as in the case of the correlation to considering irate callers a problem (d_{sym}= .47). It is simply that those leaning towards collective problem solving (which are significantly higher among those with an organizational background, above all, with a Left background) are also less tolerating to the problem of irate callers. I similarly consider this in the case of complaining about a lack of transparency in profit making (d=.50)

[216] Member of UNITES here claimed that "in the early days [i.e. before UNITES was active] there was nowhere for an employee to go in terms of whatever issues – claims, insurance – they might have" (Taylor 2007: 26). The HRD is thus not considered as an address to turn to in case of grievances. It is not surprising that hardly anyone of the interviewed members (16%) believes that the presence of the HR department removes the need for trade unions (although the number among the international call center agents is much higher, i.e. between 28 and 44%).

"»Avoidance protest« has always proved more attractive than the risk of open confrontation," says Scott (1990: p. 136f.). Exit, ergo, seems to be another coping mechanism for agents. With the mushrooming of the call centers and a lack of qualified personnel, choosing a call center company one after the other (more appropriately referred to as "call center hopping"), provides an easy option; all of our respondents who were in the industry for more than a year thus have already worked in more than one call center. In the past five years, the array of choices has widened, and packages to lure potential candidates now vary. When asked what the respondents would do if they lose the job, finding another job is easily articulated.[217] The Business Processing Association Philippines (BPAP) cited an attrition rate of 18% for the call-center sector, a turnover rate four times higher than the national average among employees (Business Mirror 2.4.2012).[218] Fehrmann and Metzner already spoke in 1984 in the German context of "a strong sense of job-consciousness not experiencing the loss of a job as a loss of social vested rights, but as a call to look for another job somewhere else. These moments have made the insight into the necessity of protection by a union more difficult" (1984: 167).

When already disgruntled in a company, the option is to resign and "jump to somewhere else that pays them higher" (male agent, 38). But: data from the Indian context suggests that exiting the industry may serve less "as an implicit form of resistance to the work conditions that the call center engenders" (Fabros 2007: 246) more than as personal improvement.[219] Our qualitative data supports this view for the Philippines: Only six of 27 respondents considered "exit" as the preferred way to do something about the problems they encounter. And when asked why they changed call centers, agents did not so much name the dismal working conditions, but rather the belief that by changing the call center they cannot only earn better money (which keeps most agents attached to the industry), but also improve their skills in conversational English, their IT competence and boost their confidence. This may eventually

---

[217] Indeed demand for quality personnel is outstripping supply: Haidee Enriquez from Sitel, a business process outsourcing provider, said that in 2011 for example, only 38,000 applicants met their criteria, even as the number of vacancies was nearly 100,000 (Newsbreak, 15. 8. 2011). And the Commission on Information and Communications Technology (CICT) even concluded for the same year that only seven out of every 100 graduates had the skills required by BPOs (Asia Times, 7.3.2011).

[218] In the US, the turnover though is between 26% in large business in house centers (with relatively better working conditions) and up to 51% in outsourced call centers (CWA 2005: 39). Fabros again puts the attrition rate in call centers in the Philippines at 30% (Fabros 2007: 1)

[219] Taylor et al. (2007: 13) observed in the case of India a positive correlation between attrition rate on one hand, and the extent of routinization/repetitiveness of processes, on the other hand, especially if they involve calls. Taylor and his colleagues however consider it more to be the pull factors (better pay, better job prospects et al.) than the push factors (dissatisfaction with working conditions) triggering attrition.

Responses by the interviewed agents support the view that exit is not in the first place a mechanism to cope with job-related problems: 43% of their respondents said they did nothing about problems they face and 12% said they tried to ignore the problems or think differently about them. While at least 23% said they sought the help of friends and colleagues, only 12% said they quit the job. CWA et al. (2005: 58) comes to similar results: Self- initiated turnover, the researchers say, is in 65% of the cases caused by pull factors, and in only 35% of the cases, by push factors. Among the push factors though, "family problems/personal reasons," are among the prominent reasons to quit (10%). Company-related problems however did not figure significantly in a decision to quit.

qualify them for other good paying jobs or for an employment abroad – missing the fact that qualifications gathered in the call centers, are often hardly convertible to outside job opportunities, and despite the well shared notion on how low the appreciation of call centers and call center agents is, among the executive echelons of society.[220]

Although many respondents to the study of Taylor et al. (2007) with union members do see that changing their workplace and their employer is a way to improve pay and conditions, equally many do express the wish to stay with their current employer in order to develop a career (2007: 21). Respondents to this study clarified that they consider it more common that agents try to and develop resilience (*tiis*) and not just jump to the next center if not totally satisfied - especially as they guess or even have already experienced that other call centers are "the same banana" (FGD Davao 2012a).

All in all though, it is a bit academic to separate push and pull factors. Perceived better opportunities accompany experienced frustration and dissatisfaction, as respondents clarified during validation workshops (FGD Davao 2012a; Manila 2012). And as one respondent (m, 38) further clarified: "Without an organized way of dealing with it, your only option is find a new industry or find a better opportunity in the call centers... How would you survive otherwise?" In most cases, there are push *and* pull factors involved.

What can be considered as an expression of "flight" from the working conditions is when agents leave the industry for good, although also in these cases, the responses we got do not support the view that they were pushed out by dissatisfaction with the working conditions, but again rather that they were more pulled by job opportunities in a sector which they were trained for - be it as nurses, as activists now working for politically oriented NGOs or as a political scientist who first worked with a cooperative and then took up law school.

But even then, they are not necessarily "closing doors on call centers" as a respondent with a long activist track record, currently working as a (measly paid) organizer in a banana plantation and expressing how happy he is to no longer work in a call center, stated during the validation workshop (FGD Davao 2012b): "You don't have any choice. If you want a job that is paying more than the regular (salary), a high paying [sic!] job you will have at the call center. In addition, it is a job that does not require any license. That is why I am not closing any doors. But hopefully I will not go back."

---

[220] This resonates with how many members of the middle and upper classes regard the low-status jobs of labor migrants as a source of national shame and dishonor. "These comfortable classes feel demeaned that the Philippines has gained a worldwide reputation as a provider of low-status workers, a status that by association, debases them as well because of shared nationality" (Filimeno Aguilar [2003]. Global Migrations, Old Forms of Labor, and New Transborder Class Relations. *Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2*, 137-161: 140).

3.17.5. Transient character of the workforce

From the above-mentioned reasons, one can also conclude another problem coming up: The transient character of the workforce (and the accounts!). When people engage in networks and forms associations, they develop a framework of common values and beliefs that can become a "moral resource" or a "glue that holds a community together," as Robert Putnam summed up in the communitarian classic *Bowling alone* (1993, p. 136). "People that are in regular relationships with other people with similar problems, are often much more willing to hold those in power responsible for their situation and not blame themselves and to organize themselves into collective protest," say Piven and Cloward (1986: 43). This is also because networking leads to a widening of perspectives and to look beyond the rim of their teacup. Scott calls this a "Trade Unionism without Trade Unions" (Scott 1985: 258). Frequent changes of employment therefore, are believed to hinder the deeper understanding of shared affectedness, the development of solidarity and of common interest patterns, all prerequisites for association organization (Dörre/Schmalz 2013 among others).

Next to the high turnover or attrition rate in the call center industry[221], the intensive, individualistic nature of task performance and the variable shift patterns, further contribute to constraining the employees' ability to interact with colleagues.

Isolation, often considered typical for precarious employment, is not the problem. Only four out of 27 respondents feel isolated at work (GI = .19). Interaction spaces exist, like the "*yosi* (smoking) breaks" or the teams, even if these have set up by the management primarily to aid and pressure agents' performance[222]. However, potentially any place outside of the call center, no longer under surveillance of the management might figure, could be such a space. These spaces at times, serve as a vehicle for discussion of work-related issues aside from account updates. However, their mere existence seems insufficient to trigger organizing.

The utmost we were able to find out during this research were instances wherein teams became a collective voice in approaching the HR department and in bargaining with the management or during company consultations, such as town hall meetings. In other cases, some respondents knew of a couple of agents who wrote a collective petition letter to the management regarding concerns that may range from facilities improvement to the expulsion of a supervisor or trainer. Other agents again consider "most of the team members *traydor* (traitors)" (male agent, 35).

Experiences of successful organizing among precariously employed show that those who are active (the few mobilizing the 'rank and file') have been permanent at one

---

[221] Nevertheless the CCAP says that Filipino call center workers stay an average of 22 months on the job, compared to around ten months for Americans (Source: Ermitanio 2012).

[222] "These groups serve as a curious mixture of consent and resistance to work," say Noronha and D'Cruz (2009: 11). "By helping agents to survive the tensions of their work, these communities preserve the social order of the workplace and reduce employee turnover, facilitating management requirements. At the same time, they can develop into strong informal subcultures that provide resistance and make workplace relations difficult for management to control."

location or even with one company over several years (cf. Girndt 1997), while campaigns like the Justice for Janitors campaign in the USA which are famous for its successes have been planned and carried out over several years. “Organizing takes time!” (Ilagan 2012).[223]

In the case of India, one can also detect a positive correlation between length of tenure and the willingness to join a union: In a study among call center agents in India (Sarkar 2008), participants with longer job tenure have more favorable union attitudes (73% within the group of 121 with a tenure above one year), compared to those who were more recent in the enterprise. In this study though, there seems no correlation between the length of stay in call center and viewing as problems the no-union policy (d=-.03) or the lack of an appropriate grievance mechanism (d= .01). Only when it comes to the question if putting up a union is a promising option, we see that the longer people are in the call center industry, the more they agree to this statement: All eight respondents ruling out that a union is a promising option were employed for less than 17 months in the industry, while 14 of the remaining 21 of those who have agreed to the statement were in the industry for 18 months or longer. But then again, there is an observable negative correlation between work experience gathered in jobs outside the call center industry and seeing the no-union policy a problem. Thus, there seems no clear connection between length of job experience and proneness to organizing (just like there is none between age and organizing features, as I will outline below).

Young agents especially, do not consider the industry as their lifetime career and do not intend to stay long-time. They view their call center job as transitory, some as a stepping-stone to more permanent IT and other jobs. They work as call center agents to gain job experience. College graduates work at call centers while waiting for an employment in their course (like nurses after the board exam) or while looking for better employment opportunities outside the industry.

Most agents do not consider the call center a real job, “(I) think of it as a transitional job,” as a political analyst respondent shared (FGD Manila 2012), “but due to the economical difficulties in the Philippines, they will not find another regular job as a long-term profession” (ibid.). Even if "*marami sa simula, gusto nilang dito* (many when they start they want to leave here)” they “stay on“(ibid.). There were several respondents in this study who stated in the first interview that they would soon be out of the call center, constructed themselves as “on the go,” but were still (or again) in the call center when we had focus group discussions two years later. But even if many at the end stay longer, without the perspective that it may pay off to get active due to a

[223] Additionally the lack of resources, e.g. funds for activities and fulltime organizer, might be a problem for organizing not taking off the ground. One respondent, who was one of the E-LITES founders, says this was one of the reasons why the E-LITES project folded up in the Metro Manila region. (The members of the national organizing committee either Left the industry and/or went abroad). And “the workers won’t organize themselves. You have to inject the idea.” Though only mentioned by one respondent this resonates to the observation by Rucht (2013: 267) that the “professionalization of protest mobilization“ is one favorable factor to protest.

mere passing employment status, active participation in a contentious organization is not very likely. It is more the expected rather than the actual duration of the call center stint that seem to play a role here.

Some agents also explain non-organization with the fact that they would be just too tired after the exhausting work, especially if they work on night shift: "It's hard to form a union; you could have a sleepy union…because we're all sleepy after work…it's hard to fight for your own rights when you're tired from work" (m, 23). Ilagan though, who encountered the same argument during consultations held by the GABRIELA party list with call center agents, considers this "just a convenient excuse," as the same condition holds true for workers in other industries who nevertheless find time for union building (Ilagan 2012).

EILER rather traces the difficulties in organizing to the flexible work schedules (even erratic, with schedules being changed at the last minute), so that "they [i.e. members of BIEN] have the problem of getting the same schedules to have their meetings"(EILER 2012, similar: Binghay 2012).

The reasons for non-unionization outlined above though are insufficient to explain the absence of unions in the call center sector. Considering that the problems in US- or in European call centers are quite similar to the ones mentioned for Philippine or Indian call centers (Noronha/D'Cruz 2009, CWA et al 2005, Kahmann 2003: 24, Girndt 1997), many of the structural and external reasons for non-unionization mentioned so far, though, also apply to these call center settings as well.[224] However, in these societies, unions have been set up for call center agents; this may be also due to the fact that the no-union policy is not so strictly pursued there and these societies are relatively-densely unionized - even if they were not able to penetrate the sector, which is still mainly unorganized.[225] External reasons alone thus cannot comprehensively explain non-unionization.[226] Some reasons which can be classified as issues of "framing" also need to be considered, just like Noronha and D'Cruz do for the Indian context, who warn not to underestimate the identity dimensions of unionization: "Viewing unionization simply as a response to dissatisfaction and adversity masks the complexities of both the effect of identity on the propensity of employees to unionize and the role that unionization plays in employee identity" (2009: 162).

---

[224] Even the schooling time is similar, except that US-American agents are, on the average, five years older than their Filipino counterparts (CWA 2005).

[225] In their survey of 108 Scottish call centers in the late 1990s, researchers found out that more than half of them had a trade union or staff association (Noronha/D'Cruz 2009: 18). On the other hand, even companies like HSBC or Siemens, which have negotiated collective bargaining agreements with trade unions in their home countries in Europe and entered framework agreements with the global service union federation UNI, disallow them in the Third World country to which they have outsourced (ibid.).

[226] Likewise, Fabros and Pascual (2007: 40): "Experience in other countries has increasingly showed that indeed it is possible to organize temporary and transient workers. (...) It may be argued that conditions in those countries differ from those obtaining in the Philippines, but that only means that it is not the temporary nature of employment that presents an obstacle to organizing but some other factor or factors."

3.17.6. Individualism

People with considerable resources tend to rely on their individual capabilities (Ehrenreich 1989: 240). Making use of these capabilities also has a performative component: the proofing and showing off of the ability of being independent. This applies especially for resources like educational capital relying on performance as they are only valued by social recognition. For the German case, Schultheis/Schulz have documented among the precarized in Germany that the "ethic of achievement is very pronounced among those who believe to be able to make it" (2005: 539). This is why they are less inclined to organize themselves collectively at least in socio-economic matters. This is unlike workers who lack realistic opportunities for occupational mobility and individual social advancement, who has favored the idea of a collective life, as fate (Neckel 2008). Workers who have less *market power* (in the form of being scarce labor on demand in the labor market, like the call center agents), their value lies is *organizational power* (in form of negotiating power, unions, political parties or cross-class alliances with nationalist movements), which in turn strengthens their *production power*, i.e. they can easily disturb the production process (terms after Silver 2005: 30-44, on which again the »Jenaese power resource approach« by Klaus Dörre et al. draws from, cf. Dörre/Schmalz 2013, Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 2013). At the same time, it does not force them to draw on *strategic power*, i.e. the "power to disrupt" (Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 2013: 347) the societal flow of work, a source of power which is controversial in society and usually evokes violence from the side of security forces. Among such workers, success depends less on individual accomplishments, but mainly on collective action.[227]

In contrary, Binghay (2012) considers communication and education skills as "bargaining chip" which allows Philippine call center agents to "shift" from collective bargaining to individual bargaining. Agents are further induced by management to follow a work arrangement of corporate culture that encourages competitiveness and individualism. The display of performance statistics for instance, is such a tool used by management to promote competition (in terms of productivity) among the workers, which effects individualization. Such competition of teams over handling performance and sales and an environment of competitive spirit among the employees, is not conducive for forging strong bonds of collectivity and cooperation.

Additionally, an agent's call is considered his/her call and is dependent on individual communication skills; the only help they can get from other agents is encouragement. "It's like you're programmed…you don't really work for the team; you're working for yourself. You're just contributing something to the team" (male respon-

[227] The Jenaese power resource approach further identifies a power which they call institutional power, as a "result of struggles and negotiation processes ... a congealed form of the other forms of power" (2013: 356). This form of power (not only) workers can draw on, includes codified labor rights and generally all kind of elements within the formal and informal order of law and norms. They are "social basic compromises" that are "fixed beyond economic conjunctures and short term changes in societal power relations" (p. 358) and in so far more inert than the loss of organizational, production or market power.

dent, 25). As a result, an agent's scores are his/her own, and how s/he fares in the competition and mechanical dynamics of the workplace is his/her struggle to wage.

Finally, wage fixation and dispute settlement are individually based. Employees are further encouraged not to discuss salaries with each other and to think of salary figures as a purely personal issue. This not only prevents people developing notions of relative deprivation (which would have a mobilizing effect), but also feeds to the idea of personal performance.

Such constructions are also evident in most of the agents' personal perspectives. Every agent said it is important or very important to earn their own money, 18 out of 28 respondents find it hard to ask help from others and 19 out of 28 consider their own self to be the main source of confidence (but 19 say their main source of strength and energy are others).

This specific individualism of the educated, further fosters the individualization of social problems typical in the Philippines - either in the form of minimally connecting their personal situation to the general social structures or of a "blaming the victim"-approach in general. Even the lower class respondents in the small control study in November 2011 nearly unanimously highlighted the dire overriding importance of *maningkamot* (self-effort or striving) for getting ahead in life. This is aggravated by the fact that individual, and even hidden initiatives, can also at times be more promising - and thus more rational - than collective resistance (Scott 1990: 199). While individualism often is broadened by taking one's household /family into account (i.e. displaying a sense of entitlement towards family members), it seldom is escalated to the level of social groupings (like classes) at large. Economic difficulties are mainly understood as individual problems, and thus, individual survival strategies are pursued, and/or the surrounding conditions are declared to be inalterable by opinion makers (There is no alternative!). This view seems to be shared by most people (Reese 2008a).[228]

Instead of solving social problems, the core question is how to successfully manage personal problems and make productive use of them. An attitude that "personally can help you, but at the macro level it has bad implications," as a precarious NGO staff shared in a personal interview (Reese 2008a). Such a "daily transformation of collective experiences in individual life which each and everyone has to take responsibility for by themselves is one of the central, yet at the same time, most reliable factors in the perpetuation of existing social relations," say Schultheis/Schulz (2005: 273).

---

[228] This again is not merely an expression of an informal welfare regime like in the Philippines, but can be observed as well in so called welfare societies: Kinder and Mebane observed for the US-context that considering oneself as responsible for one's own situation is usual: "Government customarily escapes accountability also in the reasons people give for their general personal economic achievements and failures. (...) Moral accountability for solving personal economic problems rests mainly with individuals, not government" (p. 148f.). "Failing to understand their own predicament as tied to others, as produced by collective forces, the unemployed are likely to treat their own experience as irrelevant to societal economics or to government performance" (p. 148).

3.17.7. Violations of rights and the lack of humane working conditions is considered "normal"

Contractualization, like in the form of workers being terminated after a five-month probationary period, is a standard operating procedure in many parts of the Philippine service sector and has increased by about 20% in the past few years (Manila Times, 1.5.2012). According to a 2010 survey by the National Youth Commission, 95% of the 5,000 respondents said that they hold contractual jobs, where they work for three to five months and are then forced to find another job (Source: Newsbreak, 15.8.2011). All of the lower class respondents to the qualitative research sans the domestic workers, for instance, experienced being laid off after five months. Thus, the impression is created that such is "normal," which lessens the probability that it evokes protest. The same applies to the explicit ban on unionizing, a policy many other companies have imposed as well (Reese 2013f), even if this is illegal as articles 234 to 240 of the Philippine Labor Code stipulate the rights of workers to associations or unions.

This is reinforced by a "take it or leave it"-attitude, used by the management who expects a complainant to move out instead of asking (*hingi*) for improvements. As in the case of a team-leader cited by EILER (2008: 23) who says that "the agents are always free to leave our company if she feels that her rights are being violated." This resonates with some agents explaining that they cannot see the viability of a workers' organization "because one has a choice to resign if he/she does not like the work" (ibid.).

As the theoretical part above frequently outlined, the concept of what is "normal" is crucial for the question of evoking protest– so that "normalization" can be considered as a strategy of governementality. That non-regular work is more the norm rather than the exception has also been observed in the ISSP 2005 Survey on Work Orientations, where 7 out of 10 Filipino hired workers say they are worried about the possibility of losing their current job. Four of the seven say they are worried a great deal ("talagang nababahala") about it. 48% of hired workers in the Philippines said that they are "always or often exhausted when coming home from work." (55% of the respondents from lower classes said so, only 45% of the second to the highest educational class, but none of the respondents in the highest educational class answered so, although 68.8% answered "sometimes"). Likewise, the *Gruppe Blauer Montag* bemoans for the German context (where according to the 2005 ISSP, 42% come home always or often exhausted) that "the awareness that wage earners could be entitled to mold their work (humanization of work/decent work), has diminished. There is no awareness among the workers that the claim to not go home exhausted is

justified" (In: Idem: *Überlegungen zu Prekarisierung, Existenzgeld und Arbeitszeitverkürzung*, August 1998).[229]

This reminds us of the traits the "habitus of necessity" expresses: The necessity of finding a living (*hanapbuhay*) forces "beggars who cannot be choosers" (as a common saying in the Philippines goes), to accept nearly any working condition. "It is OK. I am getting paid for it," as a respondent reacted to this in one of the Focus Group discussions (FGD Davao 2012b). Or as another respondent (m, 38) stated during another FGD (FGD Davao 2012a): "When this bread comes with a punch in the face, it is still bread, honey!" In an economic setting where workers are set free twice (*doppelte Freisetzung*) – 'freed' from means of subsistence and 'free' to offer their labor on the market – they need to sell their labor for survival, so that there is something worse than being exploited: Not even being exploited. In a highly commodified setting in which the means of subsistence are lost and the priority is to "at least have work" (*Hauptsache Arbeit!),* the demand for humane work takes a backseat. In the words of a female respondent (30): "If you're helping your family, you have something like [this, then] it is okay for you if you work in a call center. You won't think of the hardships or the exhausting work inside; just think of the money that you can get."

But as some of the adaptation strategies outlined above show, even under such necessity orientation, self-fulfillment issues are not absent among agents.

We also observed that the agents do not find it unjust to earn around 5-10 times less than their American counterparts.[230] The variations in the cost/standard of living are here quickly regarded as a convenient justification, even if the comparison of purchasing power only explains a difference of 200-300%.[231] It can therefore be assumed that the acceptance of these wage differentials can be traced to the habitualization of one's position in the current world order, i.e. of coming to terms with the fact that one belongs to a country who is supplying the rich countries with cheap or sought-after manpower as "servants of globalization," as Rhacel Parreñas (2002) calls them in her

---

[229] Fabros and Pascual (2007: 29-37) describe how decent work in a call center could look like, as one that is not only providing adequately paid work, but dignified, secure and productive work as well.

[230] Filipino call center agents earn around $3,600 annually, considerably less than the $30,000 excluding fringe benefits required to hire an average US worker for a low end "mass market" call center (Asia Times, 7.3.2011). The (Philippine) Department for Science and Technology (DOST) considers the cost for a "Full-Time-equivalent" (FTE) in the Philippines at 15-16,000 USD, while a FTE in the USA costs 70-72.000 USD (Delhi again has a FTE of 12-14.000 USD). The DOST primer thus concludes that "Philippines is one of the lowest cost destinations for English voice work and comparable to India" (DOST 2012: 15).

[231] Though the Manila price level (albeit based on reference basket of goods based on European consumer habits) is still about 1/3 of the one in New York, according to a annual study by the Swiss bank UBS (Cf. Idem.: *A comparison of purchasing power around the globe 2012,* retrieved January 5, 2013 from www.ubs.com/research); a bit more than 50% of that in Berlin and Los Angeles; and, 1.2 of the that in Delhi, while the average wage earner only gets 8.1% of his/her counterpart in New York; 10.0% of the one in Los Angeles; 11.5% of the one in Berlin; and, 97.5% of his Delhi counterpart. A Manileña has to work four times as long to buy one kilo of rice as her counterparts in New York or Los Angeles, and more than seven times as long than for them to buy a Big Mac. According to the CIA Factbook, the estimated purchasing power parity of the peso was only 1.85 in 2011, meaning that the price level is more than half of the American market.

book on massive outward migration in the Philippines; or a "naturalization" of social inequality in the words of Bourdieu.[232]

Such analysis should not be misunderstood as personal blame game: Picking up Bourdieu, it is much easier to explain it through the concept of the habitus, which makes most people only desire what they can reasonably expect, making a virtue out of necessity. As outlined above: "People unconsciously only want what they can get" (Bourdieu 1982: 189). Cultural-historical given inequalities, which developed in a history of colonialism, feudalism and social inequality, have been internalized and are now reproducing the structures of society. In the terms of Foucault, we can say that power relations, which are in fact flexible (and therefore alterable), have solidified to an extent that the "government," seems set and the microphysics of power seem to be fairly stable. Most people accept reality as the "government" has defined it and its limits of problematization (what is thinkable and sayable and what's not). Injustice works best when the disadvantaged consider it to be "natural." Considering something as "unjust" though is a matter of framing as well, even if done by researchers.

And even if some respondents sense injustice in the setup, like this respondent who says, "they are receiving dollars in payment, and they're paying us in peso...it's actually unfair...the money that enters is way bigger than the money they are giving back to us." The same respondent also concedes that "that's the main reason why they have business here." Another respondent frames it this way: "You have to accept the fate of the world… It's life; it's not fair," but right after claims that "it's kind of a blessing in disguise actually, here in the Philippines. Because it's generating a lot of jobs. Generating a lot of jobs." "It is the main reason why they outsource *di ba* [right?] Less *ang gihapos* (strikes were less)," as another respondent states as a matter of fact. The latter resonates with responses in an earlier study (Reese 2008c), where respondents see themselves at the winning end of the global race to the bottom: "They're losing their jobs; we don't."

If there are feelings of relative deprivation, it is among agents in Davao and Dumaguete, who regard it as "unfair" that Manila or Cebu agents receive more than they do. This issue of injustice even links with feelings that one's dignity is violated: "*Mura ba'g nakaloko man siguro ning mga kompanyaha ni nanganhi diri'g Davao para mangita'g*

---

[232] One Left activist respondent explains it like this (in reaction to the video clip Parva que sou): "Naa koy duha ka teory. Una kay ang history sa Filipino people puno siya sa pakigbisog, sa kalisud…at some point parang we got used to it na gud, we have been very tolerant sa kalisud, tapos namamaluktot ta ba, tapos nahimo siyang embedded sa atong kultura na okay lang. Tapos sa Christian values nato na dapat mo-sacrifice jud ta para makuan nato ang kaayo mao nang…gidawat nato ang kalisud ba, mosugot ta…ikaduha…kung dili nato dawaton ang kalisud we opt for greener pasture, so we go outside of the Philippines, mao nang mang-abroad (I have two theories; first, the history of the Filipin@ people is full of struggles, of poverty/oppression... at some point, it seemed that we got used to it, we got tolerant towards it [poverty/oppression], we got corrupted, but it got embedded into our culture: that this [poverty/oppression] is acceptable, then add this to our Christian value that sacrificing/sacrifice is a positive trait to show our goodness, that's why...we accepted poverty/oppression, we allow it...Second, if we don't accept poverty/oppression, we opt for the greener pasture, so we leave the Philippines, that's why people go abroad.)"

baratuhon…unsa bay tan-aw nila sa mga taga-Davao (It seems that these companies are making a fool out of us, they come to Davao looking for something cheap…what do they think about people in Davao)?"

While working in a global industry, the frame of reference for questions of social comparison and inequality is still the national container state. Just as in the case of migrants who possess college degrees but work as janitors, domestic workers or in other jobs they are overqualified for; living in two different social stratification systems at once gives them the opportunity to opt for the more favorable frame of reference.[233]

An interesting discussion with our respondents on this issue spinned off during one of the Focus Group Discussions (FGD Davao 2012b), specifically on how to explain this phenomenon: One respondent believes that what they [agents] cannot accept is "the fact that they live in the same country and have the same citizenship, but agents in Manila get higher rates. ... What we cannot accept is that we are all Filipinos, we have the same currency, we have the same citizenship, but why is it that in one country agents are paid differently?" The situation in the US is again considered "too far, too different," as another respondent says. "It is actually more on the control. You as person decide on how you react on things. On things you control and on things you cannot. *Bakit sa Manila ganito? Bakit sa Cebu ganito, mas malaki? Dapat sa Davao lang tayo* (Why is it like this in Manila? Why is it that in Cebu it is much more? We should just stick to [the context in] Davao)... It is because we are in the same jurisdiction, you can just control it (sic!)." "But *sa* (in) America you cannot control it, it is out of your jurisdiction," adds a third respondent. A fourth respondent agrees: "You react because you believe you can do something about it." Says another respondent: "It is so tiring to react on things ... you cannot change." "I think it reflects on how Filipinos react. They react because they can react and they can be responsible to go after the reaction. They will not react if their reaction will take (a) toll on their job," says the first respondent again.

So we see that the issue of (readiness to) political action, i.e. citizenship, is closely related to space, here a space within reach of influence and self-efficacy. An insight which questions the idea of a global citizenship, making the world a village (Marshall McLuhan), as political decisions and holding power holders accountable follows a different logic of space than a globalized economy does (as well as global communication, the subsystem for which McLuhan originally created the term for).

3.17.8. Downward comparison

---

[233] One statement by Sale (2012) might confirm this. He states that "looking at data across regions, you clearly see the disparities between all the regions and the official policy itself [on minimum wages which are more or less equivalent to the average wage] recognize these disparities" (Sale 2012). The crucial word here is probably "clearly"; a comparison with other societies seems more difficult than that.

The phenomenon of "normalization" is closely connected to the strategies of downward comparison. Agents consider themselves to still be in a better situation than other workers (relative privilege instead of relative deprivation). The jobs in the BPO industry in developing countries are of comparably »good« quality by local standards in terms of working and employment conditions (wages, hours of work and non-wage benefits, etc.).[234] Relatively seen, these jobs are less precarious in comparison to other jobs college graduates can avail of and which are easy to get (cf. Reese 2008: 37). Besides the social security benefits and the higher pay, the work is deemed as "less hard" than other work in the Philippine labor market. A respondent therefore explains: "Because of the benefits and salaries, one cannot even think anymore of unionizing. What more could you ask for? You already have health benefits and the like." (Then again even lower class respondents similarly expressed that they are "grateful" to have a job, "while some graduates didn't have any").[235]

Nevertheless 9 out of 26 respondents consider "low wage" a pressing problem and it is only for every second "no problem" or "no issue," creating a weighted gravity index of after all .43.

Such perspective on ones' own precarious position was also observed by Shinozaki (2005) among Filipina migrants to Germany in possession of college degrees but working as janitors, domestic workers or in other jobs they are overqualified for. They settle with this "contradictory class mobility" (Parreñas) says Shinozaki by comparing themselves with their compatriots in the Philippines who are worse off than them - and with Germans – whom they considered as less friendly and happy than them; do not get along well with their fellow human beings; and, as stinking and dirty. Beer (1996: 243) as well observed such attitude of still considering oneself as a member of the society of origin and not as part of the society of destination among marriage migrants.[236]

While Lauser assumes that this contradictory class location leads to "contradictory positions of the subject," where a person merges experiences of domination as well

---

[234] While salaries in call centers ranged from P12,000 to P25,000 a month in 2011, according to the Department of Labor and Employment (Ermitanio 2012), the minimum wage in the Philippines ranges from daily wages of 204 pesos in the rural parts of the Bicol Region to 404 pesos in Metro Manila. In most industries, these minimum wages actually represent the upper limit. The reality is that a daily wage earner brings home less than what is officially prescribed (Cf. Reese 2013d).

[235] Veronika Deffner who wrote her Ph.D. on the habitus of favela residents (Habitus der Scham – die soziale Grammatik ungleicher Raumproduktion. Eine sozialgeographische Untersuchung der Alltagswelt Favela in Salvador da Bahia (Brasilien), Passau: Passauer Schriften zur Geographie, 2010) observed that even many favela residents consider themselves as part of the middle class, as there are people who are still more in need; a phenomenon she explains as "relativization of one's own misery to safeguard the personal integrity" (p. 89) as "the articulation of the own, socially inferior situation often causes shame."

[236] Bettina Beer observed that: "Due to the simultaneousness of two value systems, a marriage migrant may have increased her status in the Philippine context, because she has married a »rich« foreigner, lives abroad and has a high income compared to the Philippines etc., in the area of destination her status however may be low, since her educational credentials don't correspond to German standards, her husband has a low social status and her income is low according to German standards. In this paradox situation many migrants help themselves by continuing to apply Philippine standards even in Germany and stressing for instance that they earn twice as much as a Filipino teacher working as janitor."(Beer 1996: 243)

as of subordination (Lauser 2004: 27), Shinozaki considers this kind of downward comparison as a cognitive method of coping with stress. Return visits or vacations, but also virtual realities like all nightly Skyping allow OFWs to reclaim status denied to them abroad. In this sense, one may also interpret what a migrant worker told Christ (2008) that she considers Dubai solely as a place to work as it is too expensive for living. "It's only for work, not for living. You go home to your place and live" (Valerie in Christ 2008: 88).

Living in two different social stratification systems at the same time gives them the opportunity to opt for the one more favorable to them as frame of reference. We already encountered this mechanism when describing the way agents deal with earning, so much less than their American counterparts.

3.17.9. Distinction

Ehrenreich/Ehrenreich (2013: 120) are calling for a "new alliance of the middle and the low," based on the "awareness that everything befalling the professional middle class, has happened much earlier to the class of the industrial workers." Such might also include the insight that the way the workers are treated nowadays can eventually be the way the professional middle class is treated in the future. Several researchers in contrast, have observed that despite the fact that many of the issues faced by agents in mass service call centers are even no different from those faced by their blue-collar counterparts, trade unions are considered by them as something for workers (Fabros 2007, Noronha/D'Cruz 2009).

Experiences of mass servicing are sidelined by highlighting academic backgrounds, the well equipped working places (including gyms) and the above-average salaries employees receive. Mentioning the characterization of call centers as "air-conditioned hubs for exploiting workers" by the Leftist labor center KMU was received by most agents with mere smiles (Reese 2008c). They are "communication people" and their direct contact in service work should not be confused with the physical and menial work of blue-collar workers (Fabros 2007:248).

For the Indian context, Noronha/D'Cruz (2009: 107) specify this attitude in the following: "In their view, intelligent, qualified, motivated, responsible and upwardly mobile professionals like themselves whose jobs involved skill and challenge and provided good returns; whose work environments were modern and chic and whose employers looked after their wellbeing were not in the same category as factory workers. It was this latter group which lacked abilities, skills, motivation and responsibility, performed unchallenging tasks in dilapidated environments and experienced exploitation that required union protection."

Even after leaving the call center, former agents keep up with this self-understanding: Ilagan (2012) who also runs a review center reports that former agents who refresh their English "have the feeling they are a notch above the others who are struggling with their English skills," believing that one speaks English better

than the crowd (only to be informed by the instructor that the way they learnt to speak English in the call center "is not the way to speak," as Ilagan outlines). Such pride in speaking English well has been observed in an earlier research (Reese 2008c). There I explained that "one reason for that is to meet up with their own self-image of a middle class using their main asset, their credentials, for achievement. The possession of credentials serves as the key distinction marking the »boundary« between themselves and »deskilled workers«."

Such need to perform distinction from workers is especially spelled out by members of the precarious middle class, who are chronically in danger to fall (back) into the lower classes, Owensby (1999: 176) observed. Especially where working conditions are similar to the ones in the factory, a strategy of dissimilarity is essential to keep this self-concept (cf. Dörre/Schmalz 2013: 33f.; more in detail: Reese 2008c: 43f.), just like the precarized need to make themselves dissimilar to the unemployed to ban the fear of falling.[237] And as it is hard to completely ignore that the repetitive, even robotic mode of work which makes call centers appear like factories, agents can take pride in at least "doing something out of it," as a respondent explained – which meets with their notion of professionalism.

Fabros calls this one of the "countless symbolic constructions that ... reinforce call center selves, [based on] paradoxical confluence of middle class identities, blue-collar conditions and white-collar constructions"(Fabros 2007: 251). Management supports such strategy of dissimilarity by giving call center employees catchy designations such as Customer Care Agent, Customer Support Agent or Customer Support Executive. [238]

Distinction has been ever since a typical attitude of (real or imagined) middle-class, "white-collared" employees (*Angestellte*) towards manual "blue-collared" workers (in detail: Owensby 1999: 65f. and 175f., Fehrmann/Metzner 1984). One area where such distinction has been performed is in the way of interest representation. "For an employee... belonging to a trade union as a protectional association was hardly compatible with his trust in the punch of individual skills" (Fehrmann/Metzner 1984: 167).

Taking pride in their individual abilities and above average effort, may even hamper association as Noronha/D'Cruz (2009: 118) observed in the Indian case: "Believing in the relevance of merit as the means of career progress, agents feared that the presen-

---

[237] Cf. Thomas Kieselbach (1994). Arbeitslosigkeit als psychologisches Problem - auf individueller und gesellschaftlicher Ebene. In Leo Montada (Ed.). *Arbeitslosigkeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit*, Frankfurt, 233-263.

[238] Employers have long time banked on the strategy of dissimilarity to preclude collective action. Owensby reports that "many employers hoped that white-collar employees who felt themselves a cut above manual workers would forgo collective action. As early as 1925 a banker's journal stated hopefully that surely its employees would not form a union, given that their manners and education put them at a »higher social level« than factory workers" (1999: 25).

Likewise in the German context the "new middle class" has been granted a series of highly symbolic concessions from the very beginning, which should delineate employees from the proletariat and prevent them from becoming part of the labor movement. "The employees should consider themselves ... members of the middle class - and not as proletarians depending on wages" (Schäfer 2009: 106f.).

ce of unions would reverse these trends by introducing a leveling effect through attempts to protect the less capable, compress salary differentials and equalize pay. Agents clearly harbored the view that in shielding poor performers, unions discriminated against good performers." Likewise, respondents to this study think that unions are but based only on the inadequacy of certain individuals and that such formations tend to complicate matters more. Unionists are viewed to miss the side of business "because all they do is complain, complain, complain. Why then try to change the condition when, in the first place, it is what you have signed for?" as a respondent to this study explained.

Employees in general, also have a preference for cooperative relationships with the employers, instead of being confrontative, "wanting to be their "friend(s) and assistant(s) ... rooted in a relationship of rough moral equality with those above them" and "reconciling the tensions inherent in the economic dependence and subservience of employment situations" (all: Owensby 1999: 67). "They are made to believe that they are a class apart from the working population and see no reason for forming a union," observed EILER (2008:22) in the case of transport-related call centers in the Philippines. (Sandhu 2006 has observed the same for India.) Furthermore, sloganeering, picketing and striking are considered as unworthy of professional demeanor.[239]

Participation in unions among workers considering themselves rather as professionals or artists than as laborers, is low all over the world; anti-union sentiments among professionals and freelancers is a typical obstacle to organizing these sectors worldwide.[240] "Professional identity precludes engagement with collectivization attempts which are seen both as inconsistent with the essential features of professionalism and as redundant in instances where employers protect employee interests" (Noronha/D'Cruz 2009: x).

Professions as lawyers, doctors or engineers nevertheless have established organizations representing their collective interests. But they usually call these collective forms of representation not "unions," but "associations." Likewise, respondents interviewed by EILER (2008:23) show reluctance to call the association they opt for, a "union." This resonates with experiences organizers made in the Indian call centers. The Young Professionals Collective (YPC) in India did not describe themselves as "trade union" because the agents "do not consider themselves to be part of the wor-

---

[239] Kahmann (2003) describes similar objections towards trade unions among German call center agents: They consider unions to be made up of functionaries; disturbing work peace; merely dividing the workforce and organizing strikes; too politicized; and, using organization on the shop level for their political ends (manipulation) so that "unions offer nothing that could make membership worth considering" (p.13). For some random examples of anti-unionism among call center agents, see the comments on the article: Do you think IT employees need unions? - *CIOL News Reports, 8.5.2012*, www.ciol.com/News/News-Reports/Do-you-think-IT-employees-need-unions/162772/0

[240] For the case of Taiwan see: Chang-de Liu (2010). Social movement unionism or professionalism? The union movement of Taiwanese documentary makers. *Work organisation, labour & globalisation Volume 4, Number 2*, 142-159. In the case of the documentary makers described here, organization though was facilitated by the proximity of the documentary feature to the concerns of progressive social movements, so organizing could draw on certain politicization among the target group, i.e. by accepting a self-understanding as "workers."

king class, and traditional trade unions were foreign to them" as a YPC leader explained (People's Weekly World, 26.10.2006). US unions trying to organize professional workers encountered the same attitudes there (CWA 2005).[241]

A special challenge for this (re)construction of the work in an international call center as prestigious and professional are the manifold cases in which ICCAs are confronted with irate callers defining them as mere drop outs or as Third-world "monkeys"[242], and thus, considering them as unqualified, like in the often heard clamor going like this: "You don't have the right to help us if you're not from the US. How would you know our problem? I want to talk to an American!"[243]

On such customers, the strategies of distinction are applied as well. They in return are marked as "*bobo*" (dumb), "*tanga*" (stupid), "*tarantado*" (crazy), and "white trash" or as in the case of an Afro-American caller who complained "I can't understand you! Get me somebody who speak English" are told that, "Ma'am, I'm already speaking in English," as respondent (f, 35) to this study proudly reported. They thus believe that their English is not only better than the rest in the Philippines, but even better than that of the everyday man of the North, reflected in the statement by the said respondent that "if you enunciate the words clearly, Americans (sic!) will not be able to understand it." "Speaking with the proper accent becomes a measure of skills and status which Filipino agents claim they possess more than their counterparts," as Fabros (2007: 233) likewise observed.Or as a respondent in an earlier research explained (Reese 2008c): "To speak English is equated with being intelligent."

Then some statements sound no less racist than what people might say about "monkeys" a Northern setting. Shares one respondent: "Because it's a given already that most American people have low IQ and low EQ; we have come to understand …that

---

[241] Nevertheless, Left leaning associations of professionals in Germany call themselves unions (as in the case of the teachers' association GEW) and the same holds true in former times in India, where already at the end of the 1980s, "militant unionisation among engineers, doctors, bank officials, lawyers and teachers in India became a regular form of middle class politicisation" (Srinivasan 1989: M169), albeit these unions are militant only in their methods (aware of the market power), but "not fighting for either a new political or social order" (ibid.).

[242] A respondent in Davao shares, "they will yell at you, shout at you, *i*-curse *ka nila* (they will curse you), they call you names like you're a bitch, you're a whore, you're stupid, you're idiot." One in Manila was called a "rat eater," and another one was told by a caller from Singapore, "a brown man speaking English. Ah, you're good. Monkeys are good."

[243] Derogatory behavior by customers seems to be even more pronounced when it comes to Fil-American callers, who display "a haughty and arrogant manner," just as Noronha and D'Cruz (2009: 93) report about callers to India with Indian decent. "According to agents, the … responses emerged from customers' sense of superiority at being based overseas in contrast to the agents who, being located in India, were perceived as inferior."

While Noronha and D'Cruz also report about "a warm and sentimental way" some of such callers act, stemm(ing) from customers' feelings of homesickness and subsequent happiness at being linked to someone Indian," in this research we especially encountered the former attitude; an expression of downward distinction. An agent in Davao tells of one Fil-Am caller: "She said she would order a pest repellant (because) there is a lot of cockroach (sic!) in the Philippines." To this, the agent reacts but only to herself: "Hello, Ma'am, you're from the Philippines and you're disgracing your own country *ha*. It's ok *lang* if she's American *talaga*. She's talking to a Filipino."

But while the racial bias was mentioned by each respondent, it should not be overseen that there are also callers showing a keen interest in and appreciation towards the Philippines.

their sense of humor is misplaced, that their intellect has been so badly affected by their diet. But sometimes you couldn't help to get angry with it."[244]

While this downgrading of customers can also be understood as keeping one's dignity (and therefore as a form of everyday resistance), similar distinction strategies are also played towards their main competitors, the Indians: Indian agents are mocked for their thick accents and their "formal" (British) English, characteristics that are then played up as signs of 'incompetence' or 'ineptitude' in doing the job. As a respondent to the study explained, "If you're gonna put this Indian agent in front of me, basically I have an edge on the way I speak, the grammar. I don't have an accent. I have a neutral accent which is understandable. Sometimes, it's difficult for Indian agents to remove that accent. They will always have this accent."[245] Because of this, another agent confesses, "I'm really upset when they compare me to Indians, as in I really hate it. *Punyeta kaayo jud ang mga Indians kay mga panget ang kanilang mga Ingles* (Damn the Indians as their English is ugly)."

This could also be understood as a way of defusing possible class solidarity (here from below), found as well among British call center agents. Cohen and El-Sawad (2007) located an attitude among them to look down on their counterparts in India, considering them fit for the more menial jobs and lacking competence despite the British agents being "broadly characterized by lower levels of educational attainment and concomitant differences in perceptions of opportunity and aspiration" (p. 1951). "The Mumbai representatives are described rather like children" (p. 1954) and "whereas it would not have been appropriate to complain about their Northern Irish or English colleagues, it was perfectly acceptable to criticise Mumbai"(p. 1955). Such attitudes have even been picked up by British trade unions who stuffed their protectionist attitudes with images of "UK being in charge, with Mumbai depicted as a bright and friendly, yet somewhat muddled and childlike subordinate, in need of close monitoring and on-going control" (ibid.). And at times, unions even resorted to xenophobic elements in their union campaigns against outsourcing (cf. Bain/Taylor 2008: 14f.).

Cohen and El-Sawad consider as one of the rationales of constructing such cultural difference to serve as "a justification for seemingly unfair working arrangements" and when employed by the management as a "safety valve ... to reduce tension among the UK employees, and make them feel more positive about their own abili-

---

[244] At times they are even accusing their customer of a lack of ‚professionalism': "If I am at Jolibee and they are so *tanga* [stupid] and can't provide me with what I need, I don't yell. So why...." (FGD Davao 2012b)

[245] English is similarly used as distinction marker and as instrument of respect by Filipinas working as domestic workers in Taiwan in a "counterpointing … two kinds of symbolic capitals: ... They [Taiwanese employers] have more money but I speak better English," as Epifanio San Juan reports in his article *The Field of English in the Cartography of Globalization* (Philippine Studies 52:1 [2004], 94-118, 108).

ties and status" (p. 1955).[246] Such binaries, also drawing on cultural mythologies (Roland Barthes) of orientalist opposites of »East«/»South« and »West«, serve to "naturalise these patterns of thought and action such that they assumed a kind of inevitability, and thus were accepted without question ... sustain(ing) existing arrangements, foreclosing discussion that could potentially disturb this (precarious) status quo" (p. 1956).

Such strategy connects with an inferiority complex several people in post-colonial societies exhibit: Having American callers ask for help was a notable experience in the first place for one of our respondents too: "The first time, overwhelming pa. … They are always calling you as they have problems with the merchandise… Wow, you Americans are asking for help!" And another respondent of this study shared the experience of the management making use of the claim of superiority by the West. "It was injected to us: Every time you would ask about your counterpart in the US, why they are getting higher pay you would be answered immediately, it is because they are the Americans, they own the language and you need to train just to speak" (FGD Davao 2012b).

Finally, though agents might realize the emptiness of such claim like the one made by this respondent, who was first awed by being asked by Americans for help: "Actually we find Americans very idiot. Could you imagine they will call you how to install the battery, triple A, double A? My God! ...They have to read it *na lang* (only), they have to call you *pa* (still) for you to read it to them."

Others rather draw on the idea of being more competent than their Western counterparts when fighting back: "I'm not taking away your job. You don't know how to do customer care," as one respondent retorts. And another respondent believes, "the client itself prefers to have Filipinos work for them because we are actually customer service-oriented, unlike Americans wherein they don't have enough patience in handling customers."

Nevertheless, agents from the Global South rather seem to feel the need "to prove themselves to their UK counterparts," as Cohen and El Sawad (2007: 1956) observed in the case of the Indian ICCAs, despite them considering themselves as more competent than their British counterparts (just like the Filipino examples just quoted in comparison to their American counterparts). One reason why they were "much keener to identify similarities with their UK counterparts than differences... highlighting the extensive training they received which enabled them to come up to the expectati-

[246] This view though is contested by the findings of Bain and Taylor when outlining that the outsourcing of jobs from Great Britain to India was justified by the management exactly with the opposite argument which is "that in all cases the performance of the UK [workers] is inferior to Indians"(cited in Bain/Taylor 2008: 12). Then again the strategies of dissimilarization by the UK call center agents can be understood as countering such vindication of outsourcing and addressing the "ghost at the bargaining table" (Bain/Taylor 2008: 7).

ons of counterparts and colleagues in the UK in order to bridge the credibility gap" (ibid.: 1954).

3.17.10. Unions are stigmatized

That unions do not have much appeal to agents is aggravated by the "stigma" (Aganon et al. 2008: 124) attached to unions in the Philippines in general. The negative reputation is also due to the fact that trade unionism here has been confined to a relatively small, formal or organized segment and a significant characteristic of the Philippine trade union movement has been differentiation, if not fragmentation, along political lines. Practically every party has its own trade union wing which manifests itself in trade union rivalry. Self-interested patron-based unionism led to further disillusionment with the union movement and gave it a "trapo"-flavor (cf. Aganon et al. 2008). Binghay (2012) - who anyway questions that one can talk of "injustice," when it comes to working conditions in call centers – blames the stigma also to the "bad image" radical unions have created over the last decades.

Furthermore, unions in the Philippines are dominated by "veterans" (Sale 2012) – elder and long-term unionists with an explicit hierarchical culture which in the experience of Sale (2012) further deters young people like the ICCAs to join such organizations. This is why TUCP picked up a peer-to peer approach encouraging and supporting unionization efforts from among the call center agents rather than organizing pro-actively (TUCP 2012).[247]

Not only has a no-union-policy got more and more normal, membership in trade unions also reached new lows. In 2012 only 1.8 million workers, i.e. 8.5% of the total wage and salary workers were organized into trade unions, while only 220,000 workers (i.e. 1% of all workers) were covered by collective bargaining agreements, which are not even deemed universally binding (Source: *www.bles.dole.gov.ph*). Together with the rapid and steady decline of the number of organized workers, strikes also dramatically dropped. The Department of Labor reckoned only three (!) strikes for the whole of 2012 involving 209 workers. Even if this is an incredibly low number (the Center for Trade Union and Human Rights counted at least 21 cases of strikes and picket protests of workers in 2012 and 2013, cf. *Group says gov't blocks workers'*

[247] It may be that organizing only works on a peer to peer basis. Middle class people – unlike lower class people – do not turn to outsiders to help them organize; they organize themselves by associating. The nearly sneering reaction most young professionals showed in the case of a member of *Kabataan*, a radical youth-oriented party list who tried to organize in Manila call centers, is an example for this.

This peer-to-peer approach though does not forbid "birthing" assistance by trade unions: Taylor et al (2008: 5) drawing on "recent evidence" points to "weaknesses among workplace activists in terms of their skills or confidence to represent members (individually or collectively) without considerable support from full-time officers and/or organizers and the commitment of substantial resources."

right to strike, Manila Times, 1.5.2014), the DOLE numbers are still hundredfold for the 1980s and 20-30 fold for the 1990s.[248]

But it is important to note that the respondents do not rule out strikes all together: 20 of 24 respondents to this study believe that sales personnel have the right to strike; 13 of the 20 also consider such strike promising (6 do not). Meanwhile, 14 of 19 think jeepney drivers have the right to strike; ten of them think that such a strike would be promising. Three respondents think it would be promising, but do not consider such strikes legitimate. (Both items were chosen as examples, as such strikes would personally affect the respondents in a negative way.)

In the 18 cases where answers to both items were recorded, 14 think in both cases they are promising, while three consider it legitimate for sales personnel to strike, but not for jeepney drivers. Only one respondent does not find either strike legitimate. The assessment if a strike would be promising is highly consistent: 12 think in both cases yes, four do not believe so in both cases, while only one respondent thinks a strike of sales personnel is promising, while one by jeepney drivers is not.[249]

3.17.11. Underestimating their market power

Finally we have observed that ICCAs believe that what happens to factory workers in export processing zones may likewise easily happen to them, which is that workers are simply replaced or call centers may simply relocate when the workforce gets recalcitrant. “It’s useless…they can always hire more agents if you strike,” says one respondent (m, 30). In this sense, 12 respondents answered, they are considerably “worried that the economic situation may affect my job/income.”

It is not even as simple as that in the case of factories (as investments need to be recouped and labor costs are only part of the overall costs), but in the case of the call center industry this threat seems quite empty to me. As outlined above the industry lacks qualified personnel and it can be considered unlikely that the call industry would really leave the Philippines once the workforce would demand for more. Call center work demands very specific skills that are neither easy to find nor can be quickly developed, namely, the ability to speak the customer’s language in an acceptable manner and to be familiar with the culture the callers come from. The call center industry has made the Philippines the world champion as far as voice-based operations are concerned. Call centers relocated from India because North American customers complained that they have difficulties in understanding the British accent of Indian agents and there are not much other societies in the World who offer good

[248] It should be underlined though that the process of trade unions getting less appealing is not irreversible. For the German case, Dörre and Schmalz (2013: 13) state in the introduction to a compilation with the telling title “Comeback der Gewerkschaften (*Comeback of the trade unions*)?“ that “often declared dead as dinosaurs of the industrial age, the German trade unions are looking good again after a long time” (in more detail ibid.).

[249] Similar responses were given to a third item, a strike by employees of Philippine Airlines going on at that time. Even if the media covered the strike, many respondents had not heard of it or had not made up their mind about the case. Therefore, the number of responses was low and thus not included into the analysis.

English language skills packaged with comparably low wages. "It is difficult to imagine US accounts, for example, to move to China or Vietnam in a big way despite lower wages there because of lack of facility with English and familiarity with American concepts," as already Fabros and Pascual (2007: 36) explained. One respondent who is in call center work for over six years now, thus answered dryly "I have been told this [that the call centers could easily leave the country] a long time ago and they are still here" (FGD Davao 2012a).

Nevertheless, the FGDs showed how surprised the interviewed agents were about the argument that the call centers have actually no other place to go when they wish to have agents who speak English the way their customers expect it from them – except insourcing the services again to the US, Canada, Australia et al. (which would be much more expensive to them). Nevertheless, this scare is so prevalent that it is even taken into consideration by the union-supportive EILER research on the potential of organizing in Filipino call centers (cf. EILER 2008: 32).

All in all, we may conclude that it is not the high sense of satisfaction and the little to complain about which are the reasons for the lack of individual or collective action in general and unions in particular. It is the confluence of situation-bound and perception-bound reasons which keep ICCAs largely inactive *despite* facing considerable problems within their work setting. These reasons though are not insurmountable obstacles to union-organizing as the examples of the Indian union UNITES shows which will be outlined below. (After completing the fieldwork in the late 2013, a union-like structure likewise came into existence in Cebu, which originated from the collective law suit mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter. This work though could no longer include research on this case anymore.)

3.17.12. Youth? – Not a reason!

"It's your turn, guys!"

(A 38-year old ex-activist who participated in the research, when asked what he thinks when seeing rallies in the street)

Often their comparably young age is also considered as reason for non-action among ICCAs. The veteran unionist Ernesto Herrera for instance believes that the ICCAs are "first-time employees and young professionals who are hesitant to complain or are unaware of labor rights" (PDI, 13.11.2010). A similar assumption was also uttered twice in the expert interviews we conducted (TUCP 2012 and EILER 2012).

First, we can state that this sample does not support this assumption. 11 of those who were 25 years old and below participated in some collective resistance within the working place, while only four did not. Among the 26-30 year old, the ratio is 8 to 8 and among the ones above 30, it is also even (4 to 4). When choosing age as explana-

tory value regarding unionizing as promising option, the correlation is only d=.10; the absence of the grievance mechanism a problem by only d=.07; and, the correlation to complaining about the no-union policy is even very slightly negative (d=-.07). Based on these three indicators, we can certainly rule out age as a reason for non-unionization.

Despite all this, the assumption might be true that newbies have not yet accumulated so many negative experiences making them lose their patience and endurance (CWA 2005: 91).[250] They might also be more impressed by the salary which is generous, compared to their former status as dependents when they had a mere allowance, and affirms their new status as bread winner indicating a big leap in prestige. They are proud of being able to "settle" the social debts with parents and siblings, but do not need an income which can feed a family completely. The biographical interviews and explanations accompanying their answers to items asked on the problem centered interviews drew out such responses. Comparing the different age groups of workers, it also holds true that the lives of the young allow for more flexibility, considering "diversification" in terms of changing job and of finding relocation rather pleasant, compared to older age cohorts. All these might make their condition in the workplace perhaps more bearable.

Nevertheless, some of the respondents who are most outspoken about their rights were respondents in their early 20s. The younger ones have no less organizational experiences than the older ones: Ten of the seventeen respondents with organizational experience were between 22 and 27. Especially young respondents also found the idea of a union attractive (same Sale/Bool 2005 and literature on India, see below), so it could also be the other way round: Young people are not yet that "realistic" to not "ask for more." (I will though later argue that it is mainly their political socialization in the militant Left which is more likely the explanation for such attitudes rather than their age.)

Tracing the assumptions on youth and civic engagement through history, we would see that there are two competing narratives which are told up to today. On one hand, Socrates already complained about an "apolitical" self-indulgent youth. On the other hand, young age was ever since also considered a potential catalyst of protest. The argument goes like this: Young people still want and have to achieve something in life and have made less experience in failing and being pushed out. As they just entered the stage of life "which after completing the phase of education and formation should lead into a regular employment" (Busch et al. 2010: 13), they might still feel disappointed that the promises made by the social narrative of modern societies (you can do it, if you really want to) stay unfulfilled (modernization trap). A British socialist writer and activist therefore pins his hope on the youth stating that "young peo-

[250] In the case of organizing German call center agents, the members of the workers council report: "In the beginning, the student workers really love it, after half a year they realize the stresses and strains and after another six months, they were approachable for occupational safety and other union issues" (Girndt 1997: 94).

ple, students especially, are very sensitive to the outbreak of social crisis. They often react to the crisis before other groups in society" (Chris Harman in *Students and revolt*, Socialist Worker (UK), 23.1.2009). The youth, believes Harman, tends to be less beaten down by the system, less fettered by the past, and thus quicker to action. "Students can show a level of verve, imagination and fighting spirit that has often been knocked out of their elders by the daily grind of the existing system."

Definitely, the anti-Marcos dictatorship movement is an example for this. Next to the (educational) middle class and the religious sector, it was the youth sector who joined the liberation movement in big numbers (and many of them were young, religious and from a middle class background all at the same time).

This is why young activists nowadays also heavily complain about exactly these activists, who after growing old, joined Socrates in lamenting about them. Like CJ Chanco, a student at the elite De La Salle University in his article *Is our generation anti-political?* (Rappler, 5.3.2014): "A shared disregard for politics and collective struggle which has drifted into irrelevance like the trade unions of yesteryear, … that's the view shared by those who mourn our »lost generation,« reared as we were on the eve of an apolitical age. … It's the final nail in the coffin, our elders warn, of a society running itself to the ground." Chanco admits that "it's easy to agree with these depressing assumptions," but claims that there are "signs that the tide is reversing" (especially hinting at student protests against tuition increases which are manifold in the Philippines) and talks of "small victories that go unnoticed but ease the burdens on our families" and places such struggles within the global protests after the 2008 financial crash. "We live in different countries, speak different languages, but the demands of young people everywhere echo on in the words of Tahrir Square – Bread, Freedom and Social Justice! Their local equivalent: Lupa, Sahod, Trabaho, Edukasyon at Karapatan! Ipaglaban! (Land, income, work, education and rights. Let's fight for them!)"

3.18. Are activists more prone to unionizing?

Despite all these impediments, several respondents to this study (just like in the study on unionizing done by EILER 2008) believe that agents need to be represented by a union or a formal organization. They think that if there was a union in the company or in the industry, agents could have a more solid voice. This holds true even if the correlations between problems and problem-solving mechanisms (see table in subchapter 3.17.3. *Token participation*) show that a union seems to be, only in a few cases, considered the better mechanism of problem resolution, compared to the setting up of a proper grievance mechanism; very slightly when it comes to overtime and issues of remuneration; but, significant when it comes to the orientation of rights, in this case (naturally) a union is considered by far the better mechanism. "It could break chains," thinks a respondent.

But does the openness for unions hold true for the whole sample or can we detect a correlation between organizational experience and the openness to join a union? For this I took a closer look at the correlation between organization-sensitive items and "activism," defined earlier as membership in a political organization of whatever leaning, but not including any other kind of social involvement. This definition applies to 16 participants of the all together 28 who participated in all three phases of the study ('survivors'), but excludes the five out of the remaining 12 with no involvement in a political or community organization, who had nevertheless, been at one time in their life involved in church work.

And indeed, we could detect that these 16 (ten of them females, six males) also show higher propensity for action, compared to the 12 survivors without organizational experience (5 females, 7 males).

First of all, when asked if they can do something with regards to the problems they identified, the most chosen option for those with an organizational background is to voice out their problem (6 of 16), rather than to exit or to adapt, as those without organizational experience would rather do (4 of them exit and four adapt; altogether, 8 of 12). But at the same time, those with organizational experience over average say, they cannot do anything about the problem (5 out of 16 compared to only 2 out of 12 among without organizational experience). This may be a sign of desperation resulting from bad experiences they made with futile organizational experiences. The ones without organizational experiences again believe more in the chance of doing something on one's own initiative (as said earlier, 8 out of 12 would either adapt or exit; but, only five out of 16 of those with organizational experience).

Of the 8 (of 28) who actually also did something, four had chosen the option to voice out their problem. Another two of them opted for exit to resolve their problems; while two others said, they did something (despite saying before they cannot do anything!). Of these eight who did something, three of them had no organizational experience, while four out of eight who said voicing out is a possible way of doing something, did *not* speak out.[251] Consequently, were the six who before said the only thing one could do is to adapt. None of them took any action.

When it comes to the belief that a union could be a remedy for solving the problems at work ("Is a union a promising option?"), the responses indicated that there is again a margin with regards to the respondents with organizational experience; 14 of 16 hold this belief, but only 6 out of 12 without organizational experience. The contingency (ϕ) between organizational experience and considering unions in the call center a promising option is thus .41. The contingency between organizational expe-

[251] Again this is a case where definition of one's own action comes in: six of those who showed significant everyday resistance seemingly do not consider this as "trying to do something," as they declared they did nothing, which even holds true for ten (out of 11) who raised issues at the team level. The only consistent items is that all six who said they raised an issue with the management, also later declared that they did something.

rience and the belief in unionism in general (Is organizing in trade unions promising?), is even slightly more significant (ϕ= .46).[252]

Some other features are more or less significant when it comes to activism: Those with organizational experience (chosen as explanatory variable) complain less about: performance demands (GI=. 51 to .68 among non-activists); high demands of the job (.37 to .49): the wanting service to the clients (.35 to .48); or, that their performance is not satisfying .17 to .35) – all of these items are linked to responsibilization, i.e. considering oneself the cause of a problem.[253] 'Activists' thus find the demands of the job a little less problematic than non-activists, which might be interpreted as: they do not let themselves be pressured so much by the responsibilization imperative. But the correlation(η for correlating ordinal and nominal values) is never more than .25. Likewise, activists also care less about a wanting service to the clients (η= -.19), which likewise probably expresses that they have less adapted the role model of the entrepreneurial self. [254]

On the other hand activists, consider it a greater problem: that sick and vacation leaves are denied than non-activists (GI=.70 to .34); the no-union-policy (.60 to .20)[255]; a lack on orientation of rights (.50 to .19); denial of benefits (.40 to .15); or, the lack of transparency with regards to the profit and the contracts of the call center (.67 to .34).

They also consider it slightly a bigger problem that there is no (proper) grievance mechanism (.44 to .26); no due process of termination (.54 to .41); or, high deductions (.63 to .48).

Activists finally accept less irate callers, showing a GI of .46 (non-activists: .22) and the monotony of the work (.47 to .30). There is though no significant difference in relation to computation of wages (η=.01); overtime (η=.10); forced leave (η=.14); low wage (η=.15); or, excessive workload (η=.15).[256]

When it comes to attitudes favorable for political activism, we also see some margin: the contingency organizational experience (as explanatory value) to everyday resistance is quite significant λ= .38 (ϕ is even .51), while it is weaker regarding collective

---

[252] Here I chose ϕ instead of λ due to a high probability of error indicated for λ.

[253] I have here resorted to using the non-weighted gravity indices, i.e. I have not taken account of the number of respondents of a certain group which did not even consider the respective problem card when rating the problems. I thus simply compare those respondents who consider something a problem (or explicitly not).

[254] The information on a positive or negative contingency is read out from the frequency table as the contingency coefficient (η) does not give any information on this.

[255] 9 of the 12 without organizational experience were not even aware of the no-union policy, which only holds true for 3 out of 16 with organizational experience!

[256] The other problems as well, have no significant deviances, and/or the number of responses is too small and the issue in general too little considered a problem, so that I have not covered them here.

action/collective strategies within the call center (λ=.13/ϕ= .25) and collective action/collective strategies outside the call center (ϕ= .22, λ not available).

When it comes to political consciousness of respondents with organizational experience, it is noticeable, that all six respondents who clearly rule out that the poor merely need to work hard to rise from poverty ("The poor could rise from poverty if they tried hard enough") have organizational experience; while 10 out of 12 of the ones without organizational experience, believe so. (The remaining answered, "it depends."), ϕ here is .47 (while λ is unavailable).

While the respondents with organizational experience also have a slightly higher approval rate of the statements expressing determination to fight (*Kapag nasa katwiran, laban;* and *Manalo man o matalo, ipaglalaban namin ito*), its explanatory power is limited as the agreement with theses statement are very high within in the whole sample (PI=.85 and .81).[257]

While there is absolutely no connection between expressing clear life plans (biographical sovereignity) and organizational experience (λ is plain 0), it is striking that activists believe much less than non-activists that they can freely decide about how to live and plan their life (PI=.48 compared to PI=.77 among those without organizational experience). While 5 of 16 do not believe so at all, three do not really believe it, while only four believe it, and four, totally believe so. 5 of 12 non-activists again totally believe so; five believe so more or less; two do not really believe it, but none totally rules it out! (η is so .37). Nevertheless, participants with organizational experience also rely more in themselves (13 of 16); while, among those without organizational experience, only 6 out of 12 (ϕ=.33) do so. Activists also source their strength a little more from themselves (ϕ=.25) than non-activists, i.e. they are slightly more individualists.[258] Here, it is consistent that activists do not believe at all that "when a person is born, how things are going to work out for him/her is already decided" (PI=.01), while non-activists doubt this a little more (.22).

But there are no significant differences between activists and non-activists when it comes to asking help from others (and finding this easy); in *both* groups, a large majority (2 out of 3 among those without organizational experience, even 4 out of 5 with organizational experience) turned to "others" for help.

While it seems easy to explain many of the differences between activists and non-activists by tracing a higher appreciation for the use of collective means for resolving problems – and this is at the same time accompanied by less blaming themselves (individualization), there are items which are hard to explain just by having experience

---

[257] D though only expresses a correlation of .06, even if 22 of 27 responses express a (high) approval to *both* items. D so expresses hardly more that respondents who express high approval in one case rather express normal approval in the other case. And in deciding for either option, this is probably again connected to so much randomness that the nearly non-existent correlation should not be over-interpreted.

[258] In both cases λ was unavailable, when choosing organizational experience as explanatory variable.

in collective interest representation. Why for instance should activism in itself lead to the belief that one cannot freely decide about how to live and plan one's life? And does organizational experience by itself already lead to the appreciation of unionism? Or, is shunning the belief that *maningkamot* (hard work) alone is sufficient to escape poverty? It thus turned out to be expedient to look out for other characteristics that better explain certain divergences, i.e. that result in higher contingencies and correlations.

Looking at age, its explanatory value at least with regards to the sample analyzed can be ruled out. This is for the simple fact that there is no distinct difference in the age between activists and non-activists: The average age of activists is 28 with a standard deviance of 5.8; the average age of non-activists is 27, with a standard deviance of 5.4. Age thus cannot be an explanation for attitudinal differences between both groups.

But differences were noted when the subgroup of 'activists' were divided into two, i.e. activists who explicitly have an organizational background within the (militant) Left (no matter if within its orthodox or its non-Maoist stream) and those who either explicitly mentioned that their organization did not belong to the Left or those who did not emphasize such experience within the (militant) Left. In the following discussion, the first group will be called "Left activist" (or LA for short), the latter will be called "non-Left activist" (NLA). Both groups have eight members. And indeed, it is such experience (socialization) within the Left as feature which explains most differences between the sample of activists and non-activists outlined above or that explain for the impression that there is no difference between both groups.

Here, I further set aside dividing the group of Left activists to the four who made their experiences within groups with an orthodox (Maoist) background and the four who made them in a non-Maoist surrounding. This difference is still the main cleavage within the Philippine Left (cf. Niklas Reese and Rainer Werning. Off Track? The (Radical) Left. In *Reese/Werning 2013*: 389-396), there seemed no relevant difference in their answers when checking on some items. Furthermore, conclusions based on groups of four respondents cannot claim much explanatory power beyond the tiny sample itself.

I also have not further divided the NLAs into a group of known and of presumed non-Left activists. Again, the resulting sub-groups of each four respondents have little explanatory power, especially as the breakdown is even only based on an assumption. The very significant differences between the LAs and the NLAs suggest that the characteristics of the LAs, as outlined below, go along with a clear self-identification as "Left." Those who did *not* point out that their organizational experiences were made in a (militant) Left background, seem to resemble largely in their attitudes to the NLAs, no matter whether one has made an experience in a "Left-wing" organization or not. A certain distortion of the conclusions thus has to be ta-

ken into account due to misplacing activists in the "non-(militant)-Left" group (which might be especially the case in two of the eight respondents categorized as "non-Left activists" who made a short experience in a Left organizational background, but without identifying themselves with it).[259] Nevertheless, since the sense in drawing conclusions from a small sample can only be to identify trends and facilitate the development of hypotheses for studies with a bigger sample, the correlation between militant Left activism and a greater tendency to citizenship-relevant attitudes is already very significant, even if some activists with a not so obvious Left background might distort the proneness to citizenship attitudes among the NLA-group. The conclusion I draw from this still appears to be sufficiently resilient: Left activism matters for the development of a sense of citizenship, at least in the Philippines.

Comparing LAs, NLAs and non-activists (NAs), we see that the relevance of collective interest issues among LAs is extremely more pronounced. Considering the no-union policy as a problem shoots up to a GI of .83; while the lack of orientation of rights is considered a problem by .80; and, the absence of proper grievance mechanism by .55. That collective interest representation and rights-based procedures are (not) in place within the working sphere, thus seems to be a specific issue for LAs. This also holds true for the issue of just distribution of profits. LAs (nearly) unanimously consider this a pressing problem (GI=.94); while NLAs only show a GI of .44; and, non-activists even only .34, when it comes to lack of transparency. One could speak of a general suspicion of exploitation and unfair distribution of wealth among the LA respondents, leading to the suspicion that profits are hidden.

Furthermore, they show much higher gravity indices when it comes to the monotony of one's work (.65) or no say in computation of wages (.56). In all these cases, the eight NLAs mostly show only slightly higher GIs than the non-activists; or, at times even lower GIs.

The NLAs show only slightly higher GIs in comparison to non-activists when it comes to the lack of a due process of termination (LAs: .60, NLAs: .48, non-activists .41), and when complaining about high deductions (LAs: .58, NLAs: .49, non-activists: .48).

Likewise, the lesser importance activists give to performance demands is only based on a more pronounced attitude among LAs (PI=.45), while there is no difference between NLAs and NAs (.65/.68).

---

[259] One of them even explicitly narrates that this exposure to the militant Left was unpleasant for her: "Later on *sa akong pakighimamat sa ila, aktibista nama'g dating, i-negate na tanan, murag di naman ni mao akong gina-expect...tanan na lang pansinon, murag di naman ni siya tama, mao tong naglie low ko...mura na ta nila'g gina-brainwash...gina-empower nila ang imong pagka-aktibista...although dili kaayo siya nagarally-rally.* (Later on as I continued to join them, they turned into activists: they negate everything. This was not what I expected… they complain about everything, I thought this was not right anymore so I laid low... It seemed like they were brainwashing me... they were empowering the activist in me... although they were not so much into joining rallies.)"

In the case of the denial of vacation and sick leave (where LAs show a GI of .79), the NLAs show a result of .60; this is considerably lower than the LAs, but again much higher than that of the non-activists (.32).

Likewise, NLAs less accept irate callers (.36) than non-activists (.22), but acquiesce more to them than LAs (.51).

Table 5: Gravity indices of considering work issues as problem in relation to organizational experience

	Left activists	Non-Left activists	Non-activists
Performance demands	.45	.65	.68
Own performance not satisfying	.20	.14	.35
Sick and vacation leaves are denied	.79	.60	.32
No-union policy	.83	.27	.20
Lack of orientation on rights	.80	.25	.19
No grievance mechanism	.55	.32	.26
Due process of termination	.60	.48	.41
No say of computation of wages	.56	.13	.38
Overtime	.63	.31	.44
Low wage	.54	.45	.53
Forced leave	.48	.63	.46
Excessive workload	.60	.36	.60
Irate callers	.51	.36	.22
Denial of benefits	.46	.47	.15
High deductions	.58	.49	.48
High demands of job	.44	.29	.49
Service to clients is kulang	.39	.30	.48

Lack of transparency	.94	.44	.34
Monotony	.65	.30	.30
Burnout	.55	.37	.52

Some items though prove that the main cleavage still stays between activists and non-activists. While the NLAs have an even lower GI with regards to dissatisfaction with their own performance compared to LAs (.14 to .20), both values are much lower than that of the NAs (.35). It seems to be part of the curriculum within the organized Left not to blame oneself if service stays inadequate. The same applies in the case of denial of benefits. The values for LAs and NLAs are nearly identical (.46/.47), while NAs do not consider this a problem at all (.15).

Likewise, a Left organizational background only explains a slightly more practice of everyday resistance amongst LAs in comparison to NLA (λ=.13), but as mentioned activists in general (LAs and NLAs) practice much more everyday resistance than non-activists (λ=.38). In this regard, it is more telling when differentiating the two sub-groups of activists that six of the NLAs (but only one LA) raised issues only at the team level, while none of the NLAs has raised issues with the management, but four of eight LAs. Left activists do not seem to have much confidence in the team as the appropriate level of raising issues and rather raise an issue immediately to the managerial level. Two NLAs and three LAs though did neither nor. Very significant as well is the much higher action of LAs outside of the working spaces: six of them did, while only two NLA did (λ=.50).

And for some items, again the NLAs are the runaway scorers, while the LAs and the NAs have similar values. This applies to the problems of excessive workload; forced leave; high demands of the job; burnout; and, in a slighter manner, to low wages and wanting service to the clients. All of them are considered less a problem by NLAs than by the other two groups.

Likewise (and telling), is that no NLA holds the government responsible for the problems they identify in the call centers, while three LA and two NA do so. But in all groups, it is mainly the call centers they consider as source of the problem (6 NAs, 5 NLAs and 4 LAs think so). This also modifies the extent in which responsibilization has taken effect among the agents. Nevertheless, three NAs and two NLAs blame their problems to themselves (while none of the LAs does so).

A disaggregation of the data on the activists thus shows that it is pertinent to not mistake attitudes as typical for people with organizational experience in general, which are simply specific for Left activists (or in the latter case for non-Left activists). (Militant) Left activism matters, just as a disaggregation by sex reveals (in the next subchapter) that gender matters.

In general, we can assume that Left activists have a higher problem-awareness and a bigger sense of entitlement (or are more *reklamador*, depending on how one appreciates it). For now, we would have to conclude that the rights-based approach (usually advanced as a universal claim), has mainly taken root among the Left.

Interesting enough, while having a higher sense of entitlement, 4 of 8 LAs at the same time believe they cannot do anything about their problems (while three say they can voice it out and one says she can exit). Among the NLAs, only one thinks so; three say they can adapt; three say that they can voice out; and, one can exit. These numbers again resemble much more those of the NAs (exit: 4; adapt 3; voice out: 2; can't do anything: 2).[260]

4 of the 8 LAs said unionizing is no promising strategy in general, and three of them as well said, there is nothing they could do! Only one of eight NLAs said unionizing is no promising option (and also does not believe anything can be done). But the other four LAs said, unionizing is definitely a promising strategy in general; while of the remaining seven NLAs, only two said definitely; while four said "it depends." (Of the 12 NAs, six said "no," and six "it depends"; while, none of them was certain that it is a promising option).

Then again, 6 of the 8 LAs said a union would definitely solve problems at the workplace; and, two said it depends; but, none of them rejected the idea - even those who said there is nothing one could do, did not! NLAs here are more undecided: three say "definitely;" three say "it depends," and, two say "it would not help." The NAs again are even more pessimistic: four say it would "definitely" help; two say it "depends;" but, six definitely "do not think so."

In general, NAs especially doubt the legitimacy of strikes in general. While all LAs think that strikes are legitimate, especially among the NAs, it is only a slight majority thinking so. When it comes though to its prospects being promising, there are no significant differences on the views among the sub-groups. Using the terms from social movement unionism introduced before, while all groups assess the opportunity structure in a similar way, it is the framing among the Left activists, which is (much) more in favor of strikes.

Overwhelming is also the support for legal action among LAs (which is surprising in itself, considering how ambivalent the Left's position on "legalism," is as the second part of this study will reveal): seven say "yes;" only one says "no." But of the seven NLAs, six also say "yes," and only one says "no." It is the NAs (with 9 "yes" and 3 "no"), who are most skeptical about it.

The second part of this writing will then further investigate if higher rights awareness – combined with a lesser belief that anything can be done - persists among LAs as well, when it comes to societal arenas outside of the working sphere.

---

[260] Five of the LAs said, they tried to do something, three said no. While *all* NLAs said, they did not try to do anything; at least 3 (of 12) of the NAs, said they tried something.

As mentioned before, activists - be they LAs or NLAs - are more individualists as they rely more on themselves than on others. When it comes to fears about the future, the NAs again are the strongest individualists: 6 of 12 are in the first place worried about self-fulfillment; while only four are mainly worried about social, and two mainly about economic, issues. Not a single LA, in contrast, is afraid of not attaining self-fulfillment (four are afraid of economic outlook, four of social developments), while the NLAs are not worried at all about the economic outlook (6 worry about social issues, two about self-fulfillment issues).

NLAs and NAs though are actually not worried about the future at all, they have a nearly completely high optimistic outlook (PI among NLAs: .97; among NAs: .95). LAs are also, in most other cases, more pessimistic than the other respondents as a comparison of the respective prevalence indices show. The same holds true for other statements on mental resources as well: LAs hardly believe that they can "freely decide about how to live and plan my life;" while, they only agree by a PI of .28; among NLAs (.69); and, NAs (.77), more or less believe so.

LAs find it much harder "to be hopeful for this world" (.38, NLAs: .09, NA .02) and to be optimistic thinking about their future; unlike the non-Left respondents who show a significant worry (PI of only .50). They also trust others less with .22 (NLAs: .38, NAs: .42); and, while they are far away from having an existential crisis, they still do less believe that what they do in life is "useful and valuable"(PI among LAs: .82, among NAs .93 and among NLAs: .96). When it comes to other statements connected to perspectives in life – such as happiness in life, competence in life – or of social integration – like feeling connected or having a supportive environment, the LAs though do not think more negative than the other sub-groups.

There are only two statements on mental resources where they are *not* the most skeptical about: just like the NLAs they do not believe at all, that "when a person is born, how things are going to work out for him/her is already decided" and they are more ready than the NLAs to fight ("*manalo man o matalo, ipaglalaban namin ito*") no matter the prospects (.81 to .75); but then again, the NAs (.86) are even more ready to do so (sic!). Only when it comes to the statement "*Kapag nasa katwiran, laban*"(when you are in the right, fight), they come first with .91 (NLAs: .84, NAs .86). But on one hand, all of these statements received high approval or disapproval rates across the board. Here it is more striking that the agreement, such seemingly radical statements received among non-Left respondents, are much higher than one could expect from, non-radicals.

Taking social restrictions into consideration and not believing that anything goes is a characteristic for sociologists (as the subchapter 3.6.1.: *Some sociological reasoning ahead* outlined). But it also part of a Left curriculum, here especially emphasizing unequal distribution of resources and power as main causes of social inequality. The more

skeptical answers given by LAs with regards to outlook on the future; their taking economic factors more than the other sub-groups into consideration; and, their lesser belief that they can do something about the problems they encounter, may already be interpreted in this way. This is further confirmed when looking at what the different sub-groups consider to be main factors of getting ahead in life.

LAs consider coming from a wealthy family as highly relevant (.70); while NLAs (.17) and NAs (.20) find it negligible; with, 4 of 10 NAs even considering it completely irrelevant!

LAs are also the only ones who take into consideration what political analysts call a captured state, bossism, nepotism et al. (in more detail see the chapter 5.1.: *Starting point: The "negative narrative"* in the postscript). Political connections are considered by them as highly relevant (.75); while NLAs (.25), as well as, NAs (.33) do not give much importance to them. Likewise, only LAs consider bribing as important to get ahead in life (.63), while NLAs (.13) and NAs (. 08) find this nearly completely irrelevant for success in life. 11 of 16 non-Left (NLAs and NAs) respondents say bribes are not important at all, while only one out of seven Leftists says so. (This little importance the non-Left respondents give to political factors though does not keep them from considering corruption and »traditional politics« as major issues when asked what they do not like about the Philippines (cf. chapter 4.11.: *Active citizenship* in the second part of this study).

LAs are also the only ones taking gender discrimination into account (GI: .32), while NLAs (.13), and especially NAs (.03), consider sexism a non-issue. (But as the disaggregation of the data by gender in the next subchapter will show, it is more or less only left and heterosexual men who consider sexism [still] of relevance.)

Only of consequence here is that LAs consider hard work not the sole key to success, even if it is still highly valued (.79). NLAs with .95 and NAs with .98 though do not have a single doubt in its essentiality. LAs also consider education a little less relevant for getting ahead in life (LAs .79; NAs and NLAs each .88).

Other factors for success are similarly assessed by the different sub-groups, be it well educated parents (LAs: .68 NLAs: .67, NAs: .63); ambition (LAs: .89, NLAs: .88, NAs .85); or, knowing the right people (LAs .78, NLAs: .67, NAs .7).

Based on their answers, we can say that a) LAs are more or less the only ones who do not completely believe in meritocracy rooted in what Klaus Wahl calls the myths of modernity, but also the only ones taking issues of political and socio-economic inequality into consideration. Only when it comes to knowing the right people, this belief is also constricted among the non-Left respondents. LAs nevertheless do *not* reject the idea of meritocracy, as their responses with regards to hard work, education or ambition show.

Meritocracy, just like individualism, is often linked to a high educational attainment, as outlined several times before. So, it is pertinent to rule out if the lesser relevance

Left activists give to it should rather be linked to a possible lesser educational attainment than to their background in the Left movement.

Indeed on first sight, we can observe that 80% of the LAs are college undergraduates; while 65% of NAs and even 80% of the NLAs are college graduates; but, only the remaining 20% of the LAs. Then again there is an approximate equipartition between schools of excellence (which are known more as hotbeds of activism) and "the rest" (λ sym = 0.07), when it comes to political affiliation.

As there is a significant correlation between higher educational attainment and *not* having a Left background (λ=.38, Cramers V even .50; which can be traced to not being aware of this unfortunate consequences for the analysis such a combination may have when doing the theoretical sampling), it is difficult to decide if the educational attainment *or* the (non-) Left background are the main explanations. And as the sample is too small, there is little reason to compare the answers of the ones with a higher and a lower educational attainment within the three sub-groups.

So we can only base the decision to focus on (Left) organizational experience on arguments beyond the mere statistical evidence. One way of trying to prove the correctness of such assumption could be by correlating educational attainment with the belief how essential education is considered for getting ahead in life. There is a slightly negative correlation (d=-.20), meaning those with higher educational attainment, believe less in education, as criteria success. But what statistics suggest do not always bear up against reason. Indeed, there could also be odd explanations here, like: who »enjoyed« more education believes less in it, but is this a realistic assumption especially early in life when one has not made yet (that many) experiences that education does not open all doors? This seems to be only a make-believe negative correlation, based on the high appreciation education got within all sub-groups by over-interpreting the difference between those considering education "essential" or merely "very important" for getting ahead in life. Only 1 in 22 college graduates and undergraduates consider education less important.

It would need a much more contorted movement to explain why much more among those who finished college reject the idea of free college education (d=-.55) than those who visited college without graduating (the so called undergraduates)? But certainly there could be an explanation for that as well: "I was able to pay for my college education, why shouldn't others as well?" But this is not a very reasonable explanation for such very significant negative correlation.

I therefore assume that even apparent significant correlations between educational attainment and political items like in the case of optimism about a future (with d =.30) or the mentioned support for free college education, can be better explained by the political orientation of the respondents than by their educational attainment.

Likewise, the significant negative correlation between educational attainment and considering oneself poor (d=-.49) might be explained with the assumption that hig-

her educational attainment leads to a lesser self-rating as poor. Here again, I find Leftism as explanation more convincing.

Analyzing the self-location in the social hierarchy and comparing it to assessment by the researcher(s) based on 'objective' criteria such as educational attainment, the visit to a school of excellence, OFWs in the family, the ability to travel and other traits mentioned within the biographical interviews, support this view.

NLAs rank themselves on average at ∅= 6.5 in a social ladder from 1 to 10. The standard deviance here is 1.05. They at least rank themselves at 5, and at most at 8. Their family background is ranked slightly higher (∅= 6.14 with $\sigma = 1.57$). The researcher(s) assessed them by a weighted average of .94 (with 1 being "middle middle class").

The LAs again only rated themselves at ∅= 4.57 with a standard deviance of 1.13. At least they ranked themselves on rung 3, at most at 6. The LAs likewise ranked their family background slightly lower (∅= 4.1 with $\sigma = 1.46$). This led the researchers to assess them no different from the NLAs (.95).

It was the NAs who were assessed lowest with .89. Though they show a self-rating of ∅= 5.6, with $\sigma = 1.07$. At least they consider themselves on rung 4 and up to rung 7. They even rate their family background with ∅= 6 ($\sigma = 1.7$).

(The arithmetic middle was chosen merely for illustrative purposes; indicating the modal value would less serve this purpose.)

So while the external assessment leads to averages, more or less, locating the subgroups in total in the middle class, their self-assessment deviates more strongly from each other. This could partly be due to the slightly better educational attainment of non-Left respondents. 5 of the 7 LAs though, for whom data is available on self-assessment and also for external assessment, have visited schools of excellence; which applies only to 4 of the 10 NAs and even to 2 of 6 NLAs.

Despite the sample being small and the differences with regards to objective class belonging between the different political milieu of the study marginal, these correlations nevertheless underline the deviation between subjective and objective class membership. While the Leftists talk down their class membership, the others seem to upgrade it a little bit. Most telling is the example of a non-activist, whose father works as a municipal janitor, but who nevertheless rated his family background at 7!

But besides such statistical maneuvers, there might be an even more reasonable argument for not focusing on education attainment as explanation. With regards to educational attainment the only difference we can draw on based on our sample is that between college graduates (= bachelor degree) and undergraduates. This difference though should not be overemphasized as it plays no role for getting hired at a call center. For other grades of attainment (postgraduate and no college education), we only sampled very few respondents, mainly because these groups are underrepresented in the call centers. This means: for checking the correlation of educational attainment and readiness to political action, this sample is not suitable.

3.19. Women: "*matiisin*," martyr and apolitical?

There is a long-standing assumption in mainstream (better: malestream) political science considering women as more privatistic and less political (see chapter 4.3.: *Spaces of the political* in the second part and Reese 2010b for the case study Philippines). Can the limited sample of this study confirm such assumptions – or does it rather underline the most optimistic outlook Reese (2010b) offered? Selected items were therefore checked for having any gender-specific stamping.

At first sight, in most cases there is no gender-specific stamping to talk of. Correlations (η with gender as explanatory variable) are usually between -.20 and +.20. While the female respondents complain a little less about performance demands, excessive workload or a low wage, they identify overtime a bit more as a problem. The problems *no orientation on rights* or the *no-union policy* seem to have no gender bias at all. (Sexual harassment is even only named as problem by two [straight] men [with an organizational background in the political Left].)

This might be surprising as such items would be expected to be either more a woman problem, or, as in the case of the no-union policy being less considered a problem by women (as the construct of apolitical women in trade unionism presumes, cf. Reese 2010b!). My explanation here: The gender dimension is counterweighed by the fact that more female participants than male participants (10 to 6) had organizational experience (i.e. were politically conscientized). These females probably learned through this way to depart more from the patriarchal expectation towards women of sacrificing themselves (called *Marianismo* or *Martyr* in the Philippines).

This assumption is backed by a look at the correlations between the items mentioned and "activism" (here activists, both the sub-group of LAs and NLAs, are considered as one as breaking them down twice would create too small samples): Largely the η for both determinants (sex/organizational experience) are congruent: While activists consider low wages slightly a lesser problem (η = - .15), female respondents likewise have the same view (η= – .19). The same holds true for performance demands: Activists consider it by -.22 a lesser problem; female respondents do so by -.18. Other more or less congruencies were discovered when looking at the problems such as "demands of the job" (here female respondents show lesser importance by -.26; same as activists, as well by -.26), or, "reconciling family life and job" (here, neither sex nor organizational experience matters here; η=.06 and .07.[261] (Contingencies/correlations below .10 should be considered of statistical value only, mainly arising from fuzzi-

---

[261] Organizational experience though does only not matter when lumping together Left and non-Left activists. If this difference considered, we see that LAs consider it by a GI of .49 as problematic to reconcile family and job, while NLAs even consider it only by .30 and NAs still by .36. The same holds true for the issue of staying in touch with family and friends: While LAs show a GI of .49, NLAs show one of .30 (NAs with .36).

ness in the calculation. Taking a look at the frequency distribution in such cases confirms this, as no differences can be discovered then.)

Differences are slight, but not considerable when it comes to the point if wanting (*kulang*) service to clients is considered a problem: Female respondents consider this not so much a problem (η= -.08); activists even a little less (η= -.19); staying in touch with family and friends (a problem with a gravity index of anyway only .27): (Left) activists find this a slighter bigger problem (LAs: .4, but NLAs .19 and NAs .24), but there is no difference between female and male respondents in general. This is also true for the question "who makes them confident." The information who gives them strength and energy come to nearly exactly the same results (activists ϕ=.25, female ϕ=.19), even if the contingency between both items (confident/strength and energy) is only very weak (in absence of λ: ϕ=.24). Finally: While again there is no difference between activists and non-activists in their statement that people in their environment help each other (PI=.81), female respondents even slightly agree more (η= .16).

Congruence also seems to be more or less given when it comes to some of the resources considered relevant for success in life: No difference can be detected with regards to activism or to sex in the importance of having well-educated parents (PI=.65); or, the importance of ambition, which activists (with η= .10) and women (with η=.15) even consider still a bit more important than the anyway already very high PI of .87.[262] In this regard, it might be consistent that activists, as well as female respondents, consider political connections by η=.30/.28 less important than the remaining respondents (PI=.35 compared to PI=.52 among men and non-activists, but see above on the fact that the higher PI among activists is merely reflecting the very high importance Left activists give to it).[263]

Of mentionable, but not considerable difference at the first look, are the answers of all activists/female respondents when it comes to the role of good education: While there is hardly any difference between men and women, activists believe with a PI of .83 that good education is essential for success; while non-activists show a slightly higher PI of .88. On the other hand, activists believe very slightly more that knowing the right people is more important (η=.06); women on the other hand even think this is less important (η=-.21). (This makes women activists end up with a PI of .69; less

---

[262] Here though, male activists are slightly more ambitious with a PI of .90 (like women in general, while male in general "only" show a PI of .84). Female activists again show a PI of .88. While these differences cannot be called much more than statistical and the small sample size anyway asks for very much caution in making general statements, it is nevertheless interesting to see that stronger congruent (dis)approval rates between activism and sex do not always have a cumulative effect. It is the activist men *and* the non-activist women who effect the slightly higher approval rates.

[263] Among the activist respondents this amounts to a nearly unbelievable discrepancy: While 4 out 5 males who answered the item consider connections (very) important, no woman does so. This points to gender as a determinant with η = .67 explanatory power – or translated into prevalence indices: Male activists give connections a PI of .80, while female activists give it a PI of only .35! Even in such items, which at first glance do not appear very gender-specific, we thus discover a strong gender bias.

than the whole sample with PI =.72, but more than all women with PI=.66, and definitely more than the non-activist women with a PI of .63).[264]

Likewise, the divergence between activists considering race and religion (both of them of perfect correlation, i.e. all respondents answered both items exactly the same) as more discriminating than the non-activists (η=.3) and female respondents doing so (η=.15) can also be neglected, especially as this item only got ten responses.

There are nevertheless some obvious aberrations from this congruence: While female respondents find the no-union policy by η= .11 a slightly bigger problem; activists do by a stunning .45 (but LAs do by .83, i.e. they are the sole reason for this discrepancy). Looking at the data of activists, we see that while 4 of 6 male activists consider the no-union policy as a *grabe* problem, only 3 of 10 female activists do. Sex thus explains here the problem gravity by η = .28, so indeed we can concede that female respondents find the absence of unions a bit less disturbing than men.

On the other hand, we see that female respondents believe significantly more that they can freely decide on their life: While the female respondents in general slightly believe so (η=.12); activists significantly believe otherwise (η= -.37). In numbers: While 11 of 15 female respondents believe they can totally or more or less freely decide on their life, only 8 of 16 activists believe so. The same holds true only for 7 out of 13 men; but of 10 out of 12 non-activists. Looking only at the activist responses, a stunning 7 of 10 female respondents say they can (more or less) freely decide on their life, but only one male does so. The remaining five male Left activists say they (more or less) cannot freely decide, while only three women say so. This leads to η of .45, when considering sex as explanatory variable among activists. The gender dimension, after cleared of activists' skepticism towards the myth of individual freedom, is thus considerable.[265]

Likewise, male respondents feel much more burned out than female respondents (η=.49), while there is no correlation between organizational experience and burnout (η=.06). Spelling this out in gravity indices: Female consider burnout as "ok lang" (GI=.33); while it is "significant" (*grabe*) for male respondents (GI=.67); in consistence with the aggregated η, there is no difference between female activists and female non-activists. Such significant gender-specific difference hides behind an aggregated gravity index of .49 for the whole sample!

And finally when it comes to mental resources, while female respondents believe a little more than males that they can trust people (η=.22), activists again believe less so (η=-.15). There is no difference between male and female activists, as they distrust most people equally (PI= .29). For the difference between trust and distrusting (most) people, the non-activist women are alone responsible for the responses. They have a

---

[264] Such so detailed splitting cannot be considered though more than gaming around. The number of non-activist women who answered this item is no more than 4!

[265] Interesting is that *bakla* (gay) [3 of 6 "males"] answer by trend in a typical male way, when gender-disaggregated data is being looked at.

significantly positive PI (.70), while male non-activists even distrust most people more than the activists (PI=.21). Only a disaggregation of this data prevents us from thinking that it is simply a female trait to be more trustful of other people.

When it comes to resources of success, three major divergences can be detected as well: Men consider giving bribes considerably more important than women (η=.30); which is in the same way true for activists (η=.30). And indeed, when combining both determinants, we detect no female activist considering this a relevant problem at all, while more activist men than not, find it a serious problem (with an overall PI of .60, compared to the overall PI of .21). The gender specific η here is .63, as activist women (PI=.25) do not consider bribing more a resource of success than the average respondent.

A second abnormality among the estimated sources of success is that while there is no obvious difference between males and females when it comes to the importance of hard work, activists find it less relevant (η=-.29). The PI of activists (.86) is nevertheless significantly lower than that of non-activists (.98). 9 of 10 non-activists find hard work essential, with one remaining respondent finding it "very important." The lower PI though is only due to a much lower PI of male activists (.80), while female activists have the same PI as the average (.91). Here though, it is the male non-activists who have a PI of 1 (=all say it is essential).

Third: Activists find coming from a wealthy family significantly more important for getting ahead in life than non-activists. A η of .43 equates to a PI among activists of .52 compared to one among non-activists of .20. Women find it very slightly more important (PI=.41) compared to the whole sample (PI=.38). Again female activists only find it slightly more important (PI=.47) than the average, while male activists find it considerably more important (PI=.63). Splitting the non-activists, female consider it "not very important" (PI=.31), while male do not find it important at all (PI=.13). Such divergent prevalence indices show up when the data is just disaggregated by sex and activism.

Finally, when it comes to being male or female as reason for (not) getting ahead, we stumble over the well-documented fact that young women of today do not consider themselves being discriminated.[266] By η= .16 they give their sex lesser importance as reason for not getting ahead in life, giving it a PI=.10 which can justifiably be called "negligible." The male respondents consider the problem twice as significant (PI=.18), if such a scale term may be allowed with merely ordinal values. It is not surprising that activists consider this problem much bigger, to be exact by η=.43, which amounts to a PI of .23. As compared to the 1980s and 1990s this is probably still an incredibly low value, but for non-activists sexism is simply non-existent (PI=

[266] Although it smacks a bit of the false consciousness allegation, which I have marked as patronizing before, at least one should think about it partly also as an expression that those discriminated do not like to agree to their discrimination, at least when they do not believe that there is any remedy. In the same way one could interpret that sexual harassment was only named as problem by two men, straight men to be exact.

.02). Among the activists it is the men who think gender is still a reason for (not) getting ahead, albeit a less relevant one (PI=.35). The activist women - many of them also active in the radical women's organization GABRIELA – on the other hand, do not give much importance to gender discrimination (PI=.16).

Would the other seemingly gender-neutral responses undergo such "clearance" as well by correlating all of them in their values among activist/non-activist male/female, further gender bias would probably be detected. For the purpose of this study the analysis of the most stunning discrepancies shall suffice to make the point: Gender matters!

3.20. What to do to create trade unions in the call centers?

This study concludes that the prospects for unions in the Philippine call center industry for now are rather dim. Not even yellow unions or "pro-industrial peace" Labor Management Committees have yet to be set up by the employers. "As for now, *hindi pa kami ganun siguro ka agrabyado* (we're not that aggravated yet). *Sige na lang, siguro pag sobra na talaga* (Let's leave it for now, maybe when it get's too much). I don't know what is *sobra na talaga* (too much) for us," a respondent sighs.[267]

As a result of the combination of external and internal reasons, there are indications that it is even more difficult to establish unions in the high-end service sector than in the production sector. In the case of export processing zones in the Philippines, repressive regulation policies are resorted to at times to prevent unionizing (McKay 2006). In contrast there seems to be no need for open repression in Philippine call centers. Formative power and the internalization of discourses of rule within individual life strategies seem to prevent the establishment of unions and other collective action structures in the call centers. This would prove right the assumption of the governementality studies that the "microphysics of power" (Foucault) in a neoliberal regime takes effect less by the means of repression or restrictions, but above all by a 'productive' way, i.e. by inducing subjects to certain actions and providing them with a self-understanding that makes them available (cf. Foucault 1978, Bröckling et al. 2000).

Having said this, collective action offers considerable advantages to agents. Call center agents do not only have market power, they also have productive power (terms

---

[267] However we must here concede that we have rather told a "tale of control" than a "tale of resistance," uncertain about the political implications of this writing, but aware that "writing resistance or control is a political act"(Groves/Chang 2002). Considering that everyday resistance seems to be the most prevalent way of protest, we also have to concede that we might underestimate resistance. Private and informal talks and statements are of far greater importance to measure everyday resistance than (semi-) publically confessed acts like in the interviews we conducted. Due to specific reasons we were not able to perform a participant observation as Fabros (2007) which for this purpose might serve as the most suitable tool. However even when including such research tool, Fabros did not come to significantly different conclusions than we did.

following Silver 2005), as the industry is very vulnerable to production slowdown and needs a high level of flexibility. What they lack is organizational power which would give them even more leeway to push their interests, considering that their counterpart, the call centers, themselves are well organized.[268]

As mentioned above, call center agents are not close to the idea of joining a union, most even consider it a better grievance mechanism in lieu of token spaces such as town hall meetings and individual complaints. Unions are also considered as superior mechanisms compared to political intervention as this respondent explained during one of the FGDs: "I am sure they can go to the church or the barangay captain, still they should have someone to go to who knows what they are going through" (m, 38, FGD Davao 2012a).

For some agents, the potential for organizing among call center workers is far from nil: One of our respondents (a Left activist) believes (I)CCAs are "deviant *sa katilingban* (social deviants)…they don't really fit in to the standards…*kung ma-organisa lang jud na sila, pwede man jud ba* (if only they are organized, it's really possible)…*ang ilahang hunahuna ba, mas* (their minds are more) open…though constraining *ang* office, *ang trabaho, wala siya nakahon, walay* convention…*sa panamit, sa kultura* (though the office is constraining, one is not boxed in the work; there is no convention, in the way we dress, in the culture)…we can talk about sex more maturely, *mas open sa mga* (we are more open to) gays…*naa man jud pud silay* (they really have the) potential." Even if at times regarded as "shallow" by Leftists, their "liberal" exposure is considered a prospective matter for entry – also as this might give them less qualms about being confrontative, at least compared to other industries. (This though is a mere assumption, as the study has not been expanded to control interviews in a horizontal manner to other worksites employing urban professionals.)

According to said respondent, it seems to all boil down to strategy. "*Kung maghunahuna ka'g unyonista, ang dating kay kanang yagit jud kaayo nga mamumuo*…and then you're this *naka*high heels, super attire (If you think about a unionist, the image that comes to mind is that of a poorly dressed laborer… and then you're this someone with high heels, super attire)." It could become an "English-speaking union, *pero siguro lahi ang* approach, *dili kanang militante kaayo'g dating…syempre ma*-antagonize *man pud ang mga kuan* (agents) *ana…hinay-hinay, depende sa kapasidad sa imong masa* (but it should have a different approach, it should not be the militant type that could antagonize the agents. It should be done gradually, depending on the capacity of your mass base)." These are assumptions that resonate very well with the successful experiences on organizing in India, Europe and North America. (For the Indian experiences see the excursion on UNITES in India below).

---

[268] Picking up a statement by Fr. Jose Dizon who has pushed for organizing in the export process zones of Cavite: "Our main goal is to organize workers, since everyone else they face is organized: the [zone authority], the local government, the personnel managers, all of them. It's only the workers who aren't organized" (in McKay 2006: 49).

Despite the rather lukewarm response by agents to unions reported from all over the world, trade unions have been set up in call centers across different countries (CWU in Great Britain, ver.di in Germany, CWA in the USA, UNITES in India et al.). These unions though have a different profile from traditional unions, partly due to the fact that this is the only way to overcome the stigma trade unions have among young professionals. Union organizing here has been built around a positive image of enhanced voice, taking a preference for cooperation and responsibility by focusing on the identification of mutual gains rather than a negative image of militancy and waging conflict. "Accordingly, productivity was emphasized and extreme Leftist leanings were denounced [in order to] rebuild the credibility of Indian unions as respectable, credible, dignified and responsible groups which ITES– BPO employees would be proud to be a part of" (Noronha/ D'Cruz 2009: 126).[269]

Such approaches follow more the model of trade unions being service providers for individual employees (cf. Aganon et al. 2008: 38ff.) and thus appearing more as associations than as unions. By supplying professional advice, the employability of the individual member is hold dear here (Kahmann 2003). In the words of a trade union leader from Scandinavia, this approach can be summed up like this: "In the old days unions tried to change society, today we try to insure against its risks" (Kahmann 2003: 15).

3.20.1. What could serve as a point of contact?

Despite the complain about low wages by some agents (mainly from outside of Manila) and the high significance this reason got among Indian trade unionists (see below) pundits question that job security or wages would be an issue call center agents could be organized on. So believes the Secretary General of UNI Philippines Jose Umali (Umali 2006) that the tight labor market gives (I)CCAs enough market power to secure higher wages and the professional culture encourages job diversification once in a while.[270] And indeed, our research confirms that in the eyes of the agents, most problems could already be resolved properly by setting up a genuine grievance mechanism (see above), making unions a non-necessity.

But at least Umali believes that next to health and safety issues, stress, boredom and professional growth could be issues upon which organizing and collective action could start from. "The need of call center employees at present may be for an organization that provides mutual help and peer support, assistance for career advance-

---

[269] Trade unions in Italy successfully organized precarized workers by offering specific services, i.e. legal support, social security, credits, as Choi (2004) outlined. Here, the trade union federation had more success in organizing than a concurrent trade union also focusing on a perspective of class struggle by acting "less »radical«, meaning less political and militant" (ibid.: 435) and "more cooperative and moderate " (p. 436), which made them "appear more attractive and competent" (p. 436).

[270] Findings from India support that view: According to Stevens/Mosco (2010: 54), wages and financial benefits have not been the leading cause for IT/ITES workers to seek assistance from the union UNITES.

ment, counseling for job-related problems and opportunity to unwind after a stressful or boring working day" (Umali 2006: 5).[271]

Such a union/association may not only pick up the complaint about high performance demands and issues of occupational health but also the deskilling experience of serial service production work, which insults the self-understanding of agents as being professional and educated. More autonomy, authority and control in the workplace (from restroom breaks to determining the work quotas, length of working hours, computation of wage, overtime pay and vacation and emergency leaves) and more respect for their achievements would be something welcomed by ICCAs and what they believe they deserve.

Likewise, agents would welcome to be more acknowledged as colleagues and cooperators: "White collar workers often want to have a voice in decision-making at the workplace " says the labor sociologist Melissa Serrano of the School of Labor and Industrial relations at the University of the Philippines (2005: 12). "In this regard, for white-collar workers, the union can be a vehicle to gain an effective voice in decision-making and governance at the workplace (ibid.).

Umali likewise hopes that out of a non-confrontational support and mutual help association trade unions with a focus on more traditional tasks such as collective bargaining, representation, and grievance services could evolve. "Call center workers would ... need these services, ... but they might not realize it now" (Umali 2005). Even awareness building and more radicalism in terms of an alternative framing and other subjective ways of dealing with precarity, excessive demands/exploitation and disenfranchisement, concerns trade unionists often carry, could in this way be made part of the process.

On the other hand, a cooperatively styled union could also be in the interest of management as the concept resonates well with a focus on employability which neoliberal governance has 'suggested'. Likewise workers representation, upgrading working conditions and guaranteeing labor rights is not necessarily to the detriment of employers interest as it may have a pacifying effect on workers' disappointment and unrest and even attract quality workers (MacKay 2006: 56). Increasing the satisfaction of agents with their working conditions might be an essential factor also in service industry to hit higher profits.

Research in American call centers found out that unionization in call centers reduced labor turnover, increased labor productivity and can save the cost of recruitment and training. The study done by CWA et al. (2005: 88) also found out that overall labor turnover is twice as high in non-unionized call centers compared to unionized call centers. Moreover, labor absenteeism is also significantly less in unionized call cen-

---

[271] Bool again (2007) - using logistic regression - found that call center employees are predisposed to join a trade union if (1) they have lower monthly income, (2) the purpose of communication mechanisms at work is to merely inform, (3) availability of company rules and regulations is lesser, (4) they are younger, and (5) they have greater knowledge about trade union.

ters than in non-unionized call centers. Collective organization could so be offered to a large extent by the employers themselves as it perfectly fits into a win-win-situation.[272] In this spirit Raffy David, director of the Call Center Association of the Philippines (PDI, 30.6.2006) states: "Unionization can help stem attrition and job-hopping since members are given a bargaining power and are provided a forum to resolve work-related issues."

But a look at the organizing outcome of the TUCP shows it has been of little effect, even if it follows an approach similar to those suggested by Umali and others, by starting off with skills training – in cooperation with the state run TESDA! – and here integrating union awareness building into the curriculum, and by offering services (like placing service or setting up websites, where grievances can be aired and advice sought) and eyeing mutual aid elements (TUCP 2012)

In political movement theory and practice, there is a considerable consensus that the presence of "organic intellectuals," "leaders" and however else the few individuals who get active first are called, largely broaden the opportunity of a (more) political resolution of problems and pull the others into activism, meaning to say "play the role of embryonic workplace representatives" (Taylor et al. 2009: 21).[273] When throwing into question who should be ones initiating such trade unions, we showed how striking the correlation between problem awareness and organizational experience is. And this means: the traces of the formation of respondents' political consciousness direct us more to sources and places outside of the workplace, an apparently significant but often undervalued insight, which is even overseen in other research (i.e. Noronha/D'Cruz 2009).

As far as this research is concerned, most of the agents' politicization could be located during their college years or in their involvement in NGOs and politics: Apart from those who have a deep engagement in social movements, there are several respondents who were also mobilized during rallies opposing Charter Change and during the Oust Erap campaign. Or, who even developed a sense of entitlement and a readiness to speak out before, during their personality formation: Shares a NLA (f,

---

[272] Here employers might as well have to overcome a habitualized anti-union sentiment which has been 'embodied' into them via "social reproduction of anti-union attitudes and the philosophy of managerialism developed in the elite institutions and social networks that have helped to shape a large segment of corporate managers" (Stevens and Mosco 2010: 44).

[273] Matuschek (2011: 232) counts such individuals as "water gates,"" which he considers relevant to get politically active. "The barriers for a self-initiated involvement into political organizations are generally relatively high. (...) The more common way into an organized political context ... is one chosen by oneself or direct, but a mediated approach (...) via facilitating and motivating others."

Likewise, such leaders are relevant in offering "new interpretations of union goals and strategies" and so belong to "the major sources of union transformation or union revitalization" (Aganon et al. 2008: 31), especially when these individuals have an activist experience which according to Aganon et al. is "often gained outside the labor movement." Being "embryonic" though means for such leaders not to get entrenched, quasi-monarchs or even setting up dynasties which is not uncommon in the Philippine labor movement (ibid.), as this does not foster but kill politicization and organization.

23) that – despite the fact that she once joined rallies "for the sake of experience … *dili man ko aktibista* (I'm not an activist), I just want to know my rights, and I want to practice my rights…*kung ikaw ginatamakan na ka, dili pa ka moreklamo* (if you have been oppressed, why do you still not complain)? ... that's my personality." And another NLA (f, 28) says "*Reklamador man jud ko* if there is something *ikareklamo* (I am really someone who complains, if there is something to complain about)."

All of this political formation happened before joining the call center.[274] I therefore doubt that the belief recognizing collective representation organ independent from management (even more: to put up such) develops in a call center setting. The politicizing effect of poor working conditions (often a common sense assumption) should be taken with a pinch of salt - politicization does not happen in the centers itself, so goes my hypothesis, but is based on experiences that have taken place elsewhere in one's biography. Those without such experiences frame the same working environment and the chances to change it in a different way as this study showed.

Being exposed to exploitative work conditions then does not develop, but simply, deepens a sense of (in)justice among workers and encourages them to "fight for their rights." To mobilize and organize them, pre-workplace frames need to be tapped and picked up – as done in this research by measuring mental resources and experiences outside of the workplace.

3.20.2. Excursion: Lessons to be learned from the experience of organizing Indian call center agents (UNITES)

Taylor et al. conducted in 2007 a study on the motivation of agents in India to join the Union for Information Technology and Enabled Services (UNITES), one of India's few labor unions in the IT-BPO sector (Taylor 2007). The survey is based on 879 completed questionnaires. It is the only inquiry I know which has done research on this topic.

Unfortunately, the questionnaire is rather rational choice–oriented and does not employ biographical methods. Therefore, it is hard to extract information about potential political biographies or political mindsets of agents leading to the readiness to join or even to initiate a union. What can be extracted though from the survey are the following significant information: The UNITES members are not older than the average agent (mean age: 24), which puts into question youth as reason for non-organizing. Moreover, the average tenure of most agents was no more than a year. While every second of the union member wishes to stay in the company they are working right

[274] Likewise, Girndt states that organizing a German call center happened where "excess political and intellectual energies and German rights of workers participation came together" (1997: 95). The (organic) organizers took pride in annoying a global player like Citibank, defining themselves as "grains of sand making a lot of trouble," and as ""Gallic village" (i.e. the village of Asterix defying the Roman Empire), and showed cultural distinctiveness towards the American "goon drinkers." All this shows that they considered their struggle as a kind of challenging adventure as well (terming it as "social laboratory"). At the same time, they were willing to take risks: "We felt also free as none of us was planning a career in this bank" (ibid.).

now, a slight majority working in the domestic call centers (the vast majority of the respondents) plan to move on to an international call center. Only 11% said they are planning to pursue their career outside of the call center industry. This questions short stints and the lack of enterprise loyalty as a cause of non-organizing, but suggests that there is some correlation between career perspectives in the industry (creating an identity as call center agent) and readiness to join a union.

Most members have not been members of a union before (it is not mentioned if they have ever been a member of any other political or social organization) and three out of four got aware about UNITES via peers (colleagues, friends, relatives) and far beyond 80% have been recruited by such. Snowballing and face to face interaction – and not public relations – have so been the main avenue of joining the union – though media work is described as paving the way for the decision to join.

The reasons to join UNITES were multifold. There are instrumental reasons like improving pay and working conditions (75%), going along with UNITES' perceived ability to represent individuals with grievances over pay and conditions (as proven in some prominent cases); the quest for information and advice about ones rights (65%); or, the training offered by UNITES for enhancing ones' employability and career development (only 29%). One can also glean social reasons like finding like-minded people (30%); joining colleagues already a member (33%); or, UNITES social activities (around 20%). Finally, there were political reasons like the "belief (sic!) in trade unions" (38%), the perceived need of agents to have an organization on their own to represent their interests (27%) or the wish to improve the conditions in the industry (22%).

The social and political reasons are much more prominent among agents working in international call centers (especially captive centers of multinational companies) than in domestic call centers (and among agents with a tenure beyond one year, while the instrumental reasons lose significance with longer tenure). 62% of the agents working in captive centers for instance, state that they "believe in trade unions" and 53% want to help to improve the conditions in the industry. The way the statements are framed by such respondents suggests that they have enjoyed a socialization linking political involvement with one's own identity prior to the work in a call center. Furthermore, two out of three respondents state their quest for information and advice about ones' rights and that when asked to expand the given reasons why they joined UNITES, the most common theme to emerge was the question of rights (e.g. "For more rights," "Obtain more rights," "For more concrete rights"). Therefore Taylor et al. are probably right when considering such responses as an expression of "the fundamental importance that many attached to issues of rights and representation" (2007: 25).

Looking at the **work of UNITES in the seven years of its existence** since 2005 (on the history of UNITES in detail Noronha/ D'Cruz 2009: 113ff. and Stevens/Mosco

2010), my desk research comes to the following picture: Unlike the organization UNITES has evolved from (the Information Technology Professionals Forum), UNITES does not only serve the professional and careerist aspirations of its constituency, but tried itself in organizing and took up several high profile disputes between management and employees. When for instance top IT companies were laying off employees in the midst of the 2008 recession, UNITES was actively involved in taking up the cause of the employees and helped in the settlement of dues of agents of some call centers which shut down overnight without paying the remaining wages. Furthermore, UNITES campaigned for employee safety despite encountering resistance of employers (Taylor et. al 2007: 6) or claimed pay for overtime. UNITES was also able to negotiate collective agreements on health and safety issues with five small call centers serving the domestic market (but did not penetrate international centers considerably). UNITES also took action against the assault of women by Hindu fundamentalists opposed to women adopting lifestyles considered Western (Stevens/Mosco 2010: 52). UNITES even joined a global virtual strike supporting an Italian cyber trade union in its struggle against IBM in 2007 (Stevens /Mosco 2010: 50) and is currently involved into exposing misbehaving companies online.

Nevertheless, UNITES president Shekar made clear that "we do not stand for confrontation. We want to solve employer-employee issues amicably, through dialogue" (in Sarkar 2008) – possibly a strategic statement considering the conflict avoidance attitude among his constituency. The global trade union federation Union Network International (UNI) though believes that such consensual approach led to the instrumentalization of UNITES to "bridge the [communication] gap" between the company (here: Excell) and its employees to counter a high attrition rate" (Asia Times, 21.11.2006).[275]

3.20.3. Are unions really the solution?

Beyond the fact that unions have little appeal to ICCAs, there are other caveats raised against setting up unions in the call centers:

First, is the simple fact that the fluid character of employment (attrition, project-based employment) and business (accounts) puts into question whether the enterprise level is the adequate one to resolve labor issues. Kahmann (2003: 16) argues in this regard that, "the question remains whether approaches favoring the individual employment relationship by enhancing individual competitiveness will prove effective in protecting or advancing the individual employment situation if they are not linked

---

[275] In a CBA UNITES was able to score (cf. *apirnet.ilo.org/resources/cba-between-unites-india-and-infopoint-bangalore-karnataka/at_download/file1*), the union assured it members that its activities will be secondary to their employment and will normally take place outside working hours, as well as, declaring the informal settlement of grievance as prior-ranking before an agent may secure the support of the union. UNITES agreed that "there shall be no stoppage of work either of a partial or general character such as a strike, locking out, go slow, work to rule and overtime ban or any other restriction until the procedure mentioned above has been exhausted." So, the union agreed to assist in policing potential labor unrest.

to broader employment-generating labor market policies, collective bargaining and legal regulation.“

This would also demand at least for an industry-wide union and for industry-wide bargaining (like suggested by Sale and Bool 2005). The latter though would be novel to the Philippines where industry-wide collective bargaining agreements are not found anywhere and the enterprise-based, plant-level collective bargaining model of unionism are, prevalent. "If successfully established, it could be at par with the various associations of call centre companies in the Philippines such as the CCAP and BPAP which plays an active role in pushing BPO companies' interests in government policy-making" (EILER 2008: 34).

Such approach is facilitated by the fact that the workforce, as well as the companies, are more bound to stay than often asserted as argued above: Even if most ICCAs do not see the call centers as career option, the retention rate in the industry is quite high due to the scarcity of alternative employment options. There is a core and stable workforce within the BPO-industry, which might be mobile across companies, but then could still be represented by an industry-wide union.[276]

More additionally than alternatively, is the suggestion brought up by EILER and ITS (2008: 34) to organize account-based interest representation bodies due to the strong dependence of job tenure on outsourced accounts, thereby "gain(ing) greater organizing leverage with the help of international corporate social responsibility organizations" (ibid.).[277]

---

[276] Of the interviewed UNITES members, 69% wanted to make a career in the BPO industry, 36% of them (25% in total) even in the company where they are working at the moment. They were a not older than average (24.3 years) and had a tenure of 17.4 months already; within the international call centers their average staying time is even 26.8 months (Taylor et al. 2008: 31).

[277] The potential for international solidarity in the specific case of international call centers in this regard is a different story and might be less promising than hoped for by EILER: Since the relations of exploitation in the call centers are embedded into a neocolonial and capitalist normality, I rather consider it unlikely that "ethical sourcing" (ILO 2005) or the "Boomerang-Strategy," which has proven successful in the case of precarious working conditions cum union busting settings (McKay 2006) are strategies applicable in the case of the call centers as well as such strategies heavily rely on the tool of scandalization (cf. McKay 2006: 50). Probably only the denial of unionization could serve as such a scandal for customers and clients from developed countries (but not the mere underpayment above the existence level, as different levels of remuneration for different countries despite similar work are considered "normal" by most people in the Global North). By making the no-union policy an issue, the principal agent could be made accountable for ensuring labor standards along the global supply chain and pressured by Northern unions and other worker rights activists to ensure working conditions comparable to the best practice working conditions in their country of origin. But as the no-union policy is hardly contested by the agents themselves, an essential ingredient of the "scandal" is missing.

Likewise, I consider for the meantime the emergence of a new international unionism in the form of "labor internationalism" (Aganon et al. 2008: 33) or a "transnational coordinative unionism" (Serrano 2005: 6), including cross-border bargaining strategies and/or global framework agreements (Taylor et al. 2008: 25), rather unlikely at least in the case of call centers. Next to the missing unions within the centers, there are also only few sparse contacts between service sector unions in the Philippines and elsewhere. The agents and their potential organizers have little knowledge about the situation of agents outside of the country. Such contacts can mainly be found in the more classical factory settings (Serrano 2005). There are only few exceptions in the service industry like the joint report on Conditions for Call Center Workers in India and the US, prepared by the largest union of telecommunication workers in the United States, the Communications Workers of America, several Indian worker organizations like the Young Professionals Collective (Stevens/Mosco 2010: 46f.) and the Jobs with Justice campaign in 2006. But such solidarity has strong limitations: THE CWA pushed strongly for the passage of a bill protecting jobs in US-call centers by "punishing companies that send our call center jobs abroad" (www.cwa-union.org, 18.9.2012).

Successful organizing would thus also necessitate another paradigm shift for unions, as Jonathan Sale, the dean of the leading college of labor and industrial relations in the Philippines, UP-SOLAIR, believes. “Considering that over the years their typical organizational base has been regular employment, but the employment type prevalent in call centers is project- or account-based, they have to start organizing the so called temps [temporals]” (Sale 2012).

But beyond industry-wide unionism, the precarity of organizational resources may also call for state regulation: The Young Professional Collective - an emic (!) organization of call center agents in India - has so focused its work away from the enterprise towards the public arena, lobbying with the government, confronting it with the deficiencies of oversight from the side of government and industry bodies ill-equipped to effectively address problems throughout the sector. “This would be [the YPC’s] main work, [which] would be to provide information to society at large about this industry, work out best practices and codes for the industry so that they would self-regulate“ (a YPC founding member – in Stevens/Mosco 2010: 48).

The YPC is further calling for state interventions in the countries where the callers come from – for instance in form of a ban on known troublemakers among racist callers (The Age, 20.3.2006): “"We can't go to a police station and say someone from San Francisco or Melbourne keeps making an obscene call and it is coming from these numbers. But Indian-based employers can easily take this matter up with their foreign clients and ask them to register a complaint with the local police station." Furthermore, the YPC suggested a fund, fed by 2% of corporate profits and replenished by government and companies, serving as a Contingency Provident Fund for retraining and retrenchment compensation in case call centers shut down over night (Stevens/Mosco 2010: 48).

All in all though, it is questionable how happy activists would be with such moderate unions, as the potential for selective association and »reasonable« interest representation is considerable. “As far as the overall result for the workers at the beginning of the 21st Century is concerned, it will be one of the key issues, how those who have a lot of bargaining power, will use it - in form of struggles, of which all workers will benefit (the ones with little power as well) or in form of struggles with more limited goals,” as Silver (2005: 133) points out the problem.

Here, it remains to be seen in how far Kim Moody, one of the leading theorist of social movement unionism, will be proven right after all about his belief that "the strongest of society's oppressed and exploited, generally organized workers, (will)

Unlike textile factory workers e.g. call center agents in the Global South are perceived as potential competitors that make protectionist campaigns as the Pink Elephant-campaign of the English CWO (Communication Workers’ Union) more likely. Irate callers from the USA are another expression of such reaction.

mobilize those who are less able to sustain self-mobilization: the poor, the unemployed, the casualised workers, the neighborhood organizations" (in Aganon et al. 2008: 25). Here, the Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism (2013) is more balanced. On one hand, it warns of exclusive solidarity which would worsen the segregation of the labor market and exacerbate secondary relations of exploitation," (p. 365), but at least the group members also sees the potential that "individual groups with a distinctive structural power function as avant-garde within an organization and … as a group especially capable to strike will improve the living conditions for broad sections of the population" (ibid.).

Nevertheless, the history of trade unionism shows that inclusive solidarity is not the rule. Instead, classism and exclusion were a key moment in the evolution of the global labor movement resulting in the marginalization of the "lumpen (proletariat)," precarized workers, migrants and women workers within the trade union movement, as much as in uniting (only) workers who were considered "reputable" workers (Silver 2005: 41). A problem as well reflected in the history of rights and citizenship in general (for more details see the chapter 4.1.: *What is citizenship* in the second part of this work).

Similar things are also reported from the formation of UNITES: When UNITES was set up, agents joining showed "professional chauvinism" (Noronha/ D'Cruz 2009: 123) and decided not to include employees engaged in allied/support services such as transport, cafeteria, etc. within the sector into their union as they "believed that these groups were not professionals like themselves and hence should not be included' (ibid.: 122). They were practicing what Dörre and Schmalz (2013:32) call "exclusive … [and] excluding solidarity," invoking the "separation line of respectability" (Vester 2002) and merely willing to "help" (Stevens/Mosco 2010: 54) workers at the lower end of the wage scale and supporting community activities such as blood drives. By such kind of philanthropism they were performing class distinction - just like the guardian of the poor in the 19th century, for whom charity had been an expression (and social duty) of belonging to a privileged social position. No wonder that UNITES is not considered a union by more radical sectors of the workers (cf. Jeyan: *Life in the Indian IT industry: High life for the bosses, low life for the workers*, socialism.in, 22.12.2011).[278]

Where European trade unions opened up for an inclusive option of interest representation and started to advocate the rights of precarized and informally employed, this came from the learning that such is within the interests of their traditional members, i.e. fully, formally and permanently employed workers. "Apparently this was the price the interest groups were willing to pay to avoid layoffs of permanent employ-

[278] Dörre and Schmalz nevertheless do not see "the tendency to exclusive solidarity ... fatefully mapped out," but instead believe that " how permanent staff and precarious groups relate to each other essentially depends on the offers made to them by the work councils and trade unions" (p. 31, in more detail: ibid. 34-38).

ees" (Dörre/Schmalz 2013: 30). Nevertheless, a bit more than one half of those workers interviewed by Dörre agreed with the statement that "a society in which everyone is absorbed cannot survive in the long run" (ibid.).

Kahmann warns that "there is the danger that such an approach [i.e. union building in the relatively privileged IT sector] would increase the segmentation of the labor market along the lines of race, gender or age by excluding those who continue to be in need of collectively agreed social protection due to lack of resources, discrimination or their type of employment (Kahmann 2003: 16). Rights are so only enforced selectively, which can also be the case, if the focus is solely on protest and social movements (active citizenship) or solely on readiness to fight as a means of enforcement of needs and rights. When blinding out that it is easier for some to claim their rights as they have command over more cultural, social and economic capital, such a (individual or collective) "Do it yourself" approach creates new inequalities, wherein those having the edge are those who dare to fight and have learned to fight.

3.21. Transcending the workplace as arena of struggle

As outlined, collective representation bodies came into existence outside of the Philippines; although we should not overestimate their scope. In India, only a few unions developed; the membership of UNITES is said to have never been more than 22,000,[279] and this is despite the fact that nearly 2/3 of the respondents in a survey by CWA et al (2005: 85) said a union is required at their workplace.

Furthermore, unionization has largely not been a project from within the call center workforce, but triggered from outside by the global union federation UNI Global and former trade unionists - meaning it originated from the idea that "they need a union" (which also makes organizational self- and survival interests of trade unions and networks advocating social change come into view).[280] While UNITES staff are from the rank of the agents and it is "therefore mistaken to claim, as several opponents of trade unions have, that UNITES and the collective organization of employees is somehow an alien import in the Indian BPO industry" (Taylor et al 2007: 24), UNITES nevertheless suffers from a disengaged membership base, so that it seems to still be an organization for workers run by leaders and not an organizations of workers, con-

---

[279] Taylor et al. [2008: 12] even expect that only 10% of them were fully paid members while the others had only initially "signed up," and only 1,300 of UNITES members are covered by CBAs (Stevens/Mosco 2010: 53).

[280] The report done by EILER for the International Transport Workers Federation (EILER 2008: 32f.) outlines in its conclusion several reasons why union organizing in transport-related call centers is strategic to the Philippine union movement like gaining a foothold in this "fastest growing industry in the Philippines," being an "investment in the future of unionism in the Philippines [as] building unions among these age range [i.e. the 18 to 30 year old] would also mean training the next generation of unionists," making progress in unionizing women workers, building organic linkages with unions from other parts of the global production chain, and in this way, building international solidarity and more active participation in global union actions. Certainly very valid organizational motivations to set up unions – but hardly reasons that would make the agents join a union.

trolled by an active rank-and-file.[281] Up to today, UNITES still depends on foreign funds for its survival (Stevens/Mosco 2010: 55).

This also raises the question, why there is such an obsession with whether and at what point unions arise. My assumption here: It looms large that unions are considered as sign of Fordist normality. In this way Craig Batty, vice president of the global consultancy firm Garter, considers the BPO-sector only mature when it has unions: "Union formation occurs when any industry reaches its peak," says Garter and is certain that "the Indian BPO sector is heading that way and this will bring more advantages to the sector" (Asia Times, 25.10.2005). W. R. Varadarajan, National Secretary of the Center for Indian Trade Unions (affiliated to the Communist Party of India) likewise states: "Unionization is a global practice. No industrial sector can be union-free in the era of globalization and the BPO industry is no exception" (United Press International, 8.11.2005). And finally the former representative of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung to the Philippines, Mirko Herberg (in the introduction to Aganon et al. 2008) declared that "trade unions are an essential part of any democracy. Without the representation of interest of working people both at the workplace and in societal debates and decision-making, democracy remains incomplete."[282]

But does one really have to impose the idea of a union on agents like a lemon, if they do not set up one by themselves? The ILO itself seems to have given up on hoping for employees to widely organize and push for their interests in the centers. It focuses instead on governments and companies as agents to improve working conditions and ensure social standards, including measures to protect workers' health and safety at night. Instead of promoting trade unions, ILO merely recommends policies and practices aimed at improving workers' dialog with management (Messenger/Ghosheh 2010).

The obsessive focus on unions as expression of collective interest representation seems to be a remnant from the Fordist Age and it might be time to "move on" as they say in the Philippines and look for other arenas in which young urban professionals like the ICCAs can represent their interests as well – and this may be even in a more promising way. It seems to be premature to conclude that ICCAs (or GICs in general) are apolitical just because they are not into unionizing in the call center setting. It is necessary to look at other arenas in which the respondents to this study might get politically active to prove or disprove such assumption.

---

[281] The general secretary of UNITES in this way complained that "once the problem gets solved, or the problem doesn't get solved, they [the employees looking to UNITES for advice] just disappear … They say, »okay fine, you guys are doing a good job so please continue doing a good job, in case there's a problem I'll come to you«. Active involvement is not what we are seeing" (in Stevens/Mosco 2010: 50).

[282] In a similar way, there is the belief that there is the need for trade unions to serving as a "foundation" of a Left of the center workers party just like in the case of Great Britain or Japan [and we could add Germany] as Elfren Cruz expresses in his column *How the Left must evolve* (PS, 27.3.2014). "One of the basic weaknesses," says Cruz, "that will have to be overcome is that the Philippines has a very weak labor sector in terms of political base."

The research on political actions by people in precarious working conditions and on poor people's movements (which in many cases is intersected), suggests that it is rather sites and spaces outside of the working environment where their political struggles are mainly fought. This is because the working sphere does not provide enough collectivizing effect. In the case of Bangladesh, Kabeer and Haq Kabir (2009) have noted that contractual laborers were inexperienced in relation to both factory work and industrial action and "there was thus little scope for developing forms of solidarity with fellow workers that could lead to sustained forms of collective action" (p. 18). Protests about wages and working conditions within the industry have therefore tended to be sporadic and highly localized in nature.

Where life turns into a project (Bröckling 2007), we can probably no longer expect the development of strong ties the way the workers movement has been portrayed for the 20th century (with a considerable element of romanticism).[283] This by no means rules out that (thinner) "networks of understanding and practice" (Scott, 1985: 300) develop, strong enough for getting active due to empathy with the plight of co-workers (*awa or luoy*) and maybe even for standing up for each other in the long term (solidarity). Like two workers interviewed by Paguntalan who said they joined the union "*dahil kay* Charlotte (because of Charlotte)" (2002: 158). But empathy alone is usually not a sufficient base for sustainable and reliable collective action.[284] Without a certain length of shared life and work, people hardly develop shared notions of a situation and it is more difficult to "recognize that in future they could be in a similar situation [as the one in need of support right now] and would be grateful for the help of others" (Piven /Cloward 1986: 327). Isolated collective actions might evolve but they are probably based on weak ties and evolve from "the individualistic calculus to be stronger together and might be given up "once the personal objectives have been met" (ibid.). What creates though a sense of »community,« creating strong ties and making collective action sustainable and effective, say Piven and Cloward (ibid.), is "the decision to remain and fight for others, even if their own problems were solved," a sense which "was created by [repeated] common action." "Networks need to be renewed time and again" (Beck /Beck-Gernsheim 1994: 57).

But within such networks of understanding and practice, in which rights are not mainly understood as *my* rights, but also as *our* rights (Castel speaks of "collective legal claims" [2000: 410]) violating rights is not considered merely as an offense against an individual but against a community, might even rather exist or develop

---

[283] The idea of *the* worker class as a political movement is to a considerable extent a historical construction, says Vester (2002: 90): Even during the supposedly all unifying industrial revolution, the "unity of workers' and popular movements was never given automatically by uniform features, but always developed through specific power constellations and active struggles in the field of societal policy, in which milieu fractions with disparate interests and mentalities discovered their common interests within conflict and coalesced to warring camps. As soon as we look closer, likewise, other class movements were never a given, but always, coalitions of struggle whose coherence could decompose under changed field constellations again."

[284] Pangatulan though describes that in the case study she undertook "unionism, though it blossomed out of personal empathy to the plight of Charlotte, resulted in a transformation of consciousness from that of a friend to that of a co-worker and eventually led to a questioning of capitalist worker relations" (2002: 164).

outside of the enterprise level. The shared affectedness and frames and common goals would then rather to be spotted here, with pre-existing informal social networks and cultural symbols serving as a base for organizing.

Precarious working conditions also do not seem to trigger significant politicization, as Choi (2004) describes for the case of Italy. "In general, especially among young people, the awareness of the need for trade union action is less pronounced. For certain groups a typical employment relationships are just a part-time job they anyway do not practice for a long time. Which is why many say, that the »effort« of organizing is too big or that their distress is not big enough" (Choi 2004: 434). The young precarized Choi describes, were politicized by events outside of the working environment, namely the violent protests against the G8 summit in Genua in 2001 and protests against the right-wing populist Berlusconi. This eventually triggered off organizing efforts within precarious employment conditions. Another evidence that at least as far as precariously employed are concerned, we might not expect the "objective" problematic working conditions to be the ones politicizing the people and activate them.

Even if not following the radical approach of André Gorz, who predicted an irreversible decomposition of workers' power, and therefore pushed for replacing the centuries-old project of a "liberation within employment" towards a "project of liberation from employment" (cf. Dörre/Schmalz 2013: 18), precarization means that for more and more people, the working sphere can no longer act integrative. And because of the normalization of disruptions and gaps in the employment history, it can no longer be taken for granted that employment acts as the main organizing center of life and as point of reference for how to place oneself in life and of ones' position in society. (As outlined above, the vast majority of our respondents do not link their self-awareness to their work, but despite all the problems and frustrations they encounter in call center work for instance, they believe that they often have the chance to show how competent they are. 26 of 28 believe so, 19 even strongly.)

For post-Fordist labor relations, Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (the guiding spirits of the individualization discourse in the German setting and beyond), predicted in 1992 that "the enterprise level and workplace will lose importance as a place of conflict and identity formation, and a new place will emerge where social ties and conflicts develop" (Beck /Beck-Gernsheim 1994: 152; similar Böhnisch et. al 2009: 71).

Instead of the productive sphere as in the Fordist era, it might rather be the community serving as the main arena of political action and organizing, an assumption suggested for instance by researches on poor peoples' movements (Walton /Seddon 1994, Velasco 2006, Reese 2008a and many more). The issues raised here are more about social services and other consumptive issues, which is why movements that developed here are also called consumer movements. Likewise, many social strug-

gles in Europe nowadays revolve around defending public services, the commons and social rights. Such movements rather focus on state regulation and little on collective bargaining.

Rina Agarwala and Ronald Hering also believe that the political space outside of the enterprise, gains greater importance in times of precarity after labor studies mainly focused on the enterprise as space of conflict [as in the case of SILVER 2005 who nearly completely focuses on unrests taking place in the "primary sectors of the labor market" (formal sector)]. "Because capital takes the form of constantly changing employers ... worker organizations take their demands to the state, rather than to capital," as Agarwala and Hering (2008: 20) have observed for the case of India. And "because neither employers nor workplaces remain constant, informal workers organize around the neighbourhood, rather than on the shop floor" (ibid.).

It is though not likely to identify one "common politicizing place and subject" as the editors of a special edition of the magazine *arranca* on precarization believe. "Struggles and social organization must take the daily diversities (the world of work included) and the fragmented local realities as starting point. They must happen at the same time in a lot of different places where precarity is enforced: In the universities, the neighborhoods, the housing communities, in offices, and at heterogeneous workplaces…." (arranca 31 [2005]: 8).

Focusing on community organizing might also be a way to revitalize trade unions (which are not inutile even within a »cocktail« of strategies). "Prerequisites of successfully organizing the supposedly unorganizable," say Dörre and Fuchs (2005), "were local alliances with social movements, churches and self-help organizations that have significantly contributed to the revitalization of trade union structures." Involving so-called "bridge builders" here, i.e. "activists, (coming) »from the outside« and experienced with social movements, grassroots initiatives and local community work." Dörre and Schmalz (2013: 26) consider these local coalitions as one of three factors that led to a comeback of unions.[285]

Such social movement unionism (SMU) serves as a kind of panacea for union revitalization nowadays (cf. Aganon et al. 2008). SMU entails establishing community-labor coalitions, creating broad social coalitions, addressing social needs both within and beyond the workplace, linking struggles for better working conditions and higher pay with struggles for a better social infrastructure, combining economic struggles with (political) struggles for democracy or (socio-cultural) struggles against gender and racial discrimination. This approach is recognizing the multiple roles actors have which they can be mobilized on – not only as a worker, but as well as a consumer, a parent, a woman, a tenant, a relative of a migrant or a human rights vic-

[285] For the case study of Ghana, see the article of Frauke Banse "*Kampagnenorientierung und Organisierung informell Beschäftigter als Krisenreaktionen in Ghana*," the sole article on SMU in a "Third-World"-setting in the compendium edited by Dörre and Schmalz (2013).

tim, a diabetic, a son of a farmer, a biker or pedestrian or even as a lover of Filipino Indie movies.

In the US, the Living Wage and the Justice for Janitors campaigns aimed to anchor workers' organizing this way in the community, as not to be dependent on stable employment in any company or group of companies. Just as in the textile industry in the 19th century, these workers cannot succeed by relying on their autonomous structural power, but they need alliances with (and the support of) groups from the total community.

SMU recognizes that struggles for control over workers' daily work life, pay and conditions are intimately connected so they should not be separated from the national socio-political-economic situation and from struggles claiming state responsibilities. Such approaches have been tried worldwide, in the Philippines, not only in the *welgang bayan* (peoples' strikes) against martial law or the worker centers set up by unions in Cavite (cf. McKay 2006), but as far back as the Katipunan and the Hukbalahap are examples for such approach. The Katipunan for instance was "multipurpose organization(s) being simultaneously a mutual assistance association, a religious brotherhood, and a political grouping," says Bankoff (2003: 4). Even if SMU is quite the opposite to the service model followed by UNITES and characteristic of most present unions in the Philippines (Aganon et al. 2008), Kahmann might nevertheless be right when saying that: "The service orientation may become a self-fulfilling prophecy: if unions only offer services, they shouldn't be surprised if people only ask for services [and not solidarity and association with a broader political movement]" (2003: 17).[286]

The second part of this study therefore aims to identify other arenas in which young urban professionals might claim their rights or even get active themselves (exert passive and active citizenship). Here the state above all has been identified as anchor especially when rights are difficult to enforce in working space as Agarwala outlines: "Holding an employer responsible for workers' benefits is difficult," she says (2008: 101). " The state is viewed as a target that workers can share. By making demands on the state, informal workers' unions draws on [the state's] responsibilities to *citizens'* rather than to *workers'* rights."

The state has been awarded the role of the main rights guarantor in modern political theory (and draws much of its legitimacy from such claim); the main focus on the second part will therefore be on identifying how developed the sense of citizenship among the focus group of this study is towards the state. Here, I will focus on how

---

[286] Community organizing though does not necessarily lead to overcoming particularistic interest representation. Although, as Karaos (in 2006: 50) outlines "although there have been a number of cases of collective action staged by the urban poor around supra-local concerns and numerous attempts at coalition-building, these have not led to greater unity. In fact, urban poor communities have been competing with or even fighting against each other in trying to maneuver within the spaces provided by political conjunctures."

the state is made part of the welfare mix of the participants, as Agarwala (among many others) sees the precarized "mak(ing) demands on welfare benefits (such as health and education) rather than workers' rights (such as minimum wage and job security)" (Agarwala 2008: 101) – an attitude that is well in line with the focus of "self-protection movements" primarily fighting social insecurity. To keep the study workable, other arenas have just been glanced at – above all family and community.

4. Case study – part II: Citizenship beyond work in the Philippine context

"We are in this stage, as I can see it, in a revolutionary stage that Filipinos are capable of deciding *na*, of saying yes and no, of choosing, insisting their right, unlike before (during) the Marcos regime." (LA, m, 24).

Figure 10: "The citizen first, not let's do it later." Slogan by the Civil Service Commission,. Picture taken in the Land Transportation Office, Davao City, 2013.

None of the 25 participants believe that the political system in the Philippines works totally well (which also holds true for the seven common *tao* we interviewed). Eight said it has to be changed totally; seven said it needs major changes; and, 10 said it works well more or less. When asked about the economic system, at least two said it works totally well; six answered that it has to be changed totally; eight, that it needs major changes; and nine at least said, it works well more or less well and only needs some changes. Even if the participants are a bit more content with the economic system (PI=.42 compared to a PI of .36 when it comes to the political system), both indicators are in general below .50, i.e. dissatisfaction prevails.

Looking at the different subgroups developed above, we can observe that the LAs (unsurprisingly) show the most dissatisfaction with the system, rating the political system with only .12 and the economic with .17. But neither are the remaining respondents really happy with the system: for the NAs, political system: .51; even less with the economic system: .44; while the NLAs at least consider the economic system more or less acceptable (.61), though they are undecided about the political system (.47).[287]

Several questions arise here:

1. Of what kind is their dissatisfaction, i.e. what do they expect from the system (sense of entitlement)?

2. What kind of actions have they taken so far to make a change happen (active citizenship)?

---

[287] There is a very high correlation between both answers (d_{sym}=0,70): Five who say the economic system does not work well, also say so about the political system, and only 2 of 11 who say that the economic system works well (more or less), say that the political system does not work well. There is actually only one respondent, whose judgment differs by more than one step (f.i. economic system does not really work well, but the political system works well).

3. Do the respondents (being more or less inactive in the work sphere) rather consider the public sphere to be the arena in which they could exert their social rights? Would they (to quote Agarwala again) rather focus on welfare benefits such as health and education rather than workers' rights (such as minimum wage and job security) when taking political action? Or can we observe what we already observed in the call center setting: That despite considerable dissatisfaction, the call center agents cannot be expected to make a change?

4. In the course of such analysis, this work also wants to answer the fundamental question if it is appropriate to apply a concept developed within and out of Western history, such as citizenship, to a social context outside of Europe and America.

Due to the limited space provided for in this study, the second part of this work cannot develop a baseline study on the practice of citizenship among young urban professionals, let alone the Filipino middle class or even Filipin@s in general. For now, it has to focus on selected details. The main purpose of this second part is to:

a) introduce a set of questions and items, which could serve as tools for a more comprehensive baseline study of citizenship in the Philippines, and to try to develop a method through which a *sense of citizenship* could be measured;

b) test these questions and items with respondents who have already been interviewed for the first part of this study, i.e. the research focusing on precarity and collective action among agents in international call centers;

c) contextualize their answers (which have been mainly quantitatively surveyed, but verified in selected cases by qualitative explanations of the choices made) within an established international survey based on quantitative methods (ISSP); and,

d) finally, take the chance to undertake an analysis of the empirical findings by embedding them into an analysis of the state of citizenship in the Philippines from theoretical literature.

Drawing on the three-foldness of the social movement theory, I will constrain myself mainly to the first dimension, i.e. “framing,” which includes some hints on how respondents assess the political opportunity structures to get politically active. As I will focus on measuring elements of mindsets (which the qualitative method predominately used during this research suggests), the third dimension, i.e. how resourceful are the respondents to really get active and to act successfully, is mainly factored out.

Thus, to spell it: Should the findings show a considerable sense of citizenship, we cannot conclude that they indeed get active – and if this turns out to be fruitful. Here I agree with Schulze (1976: 13), who warns that “readiness to political action and actual political activity (have to) be distinguished. … The readiness to political action is a factor relevant for determining behavior, but it is not the only one (in particular, the current situational conditions have a role as well: time available, occasions for political action, expected reactions by the current interaction partners, institutional fra-

mework etc.).” But at least I would claim that a sense of citizenship could be considered a requirement when practicing citizenship – even if this not explicitly understood and defined as such.[288] Despite factors such as good governance or a working economy being very relevant for the practice of citizenship, without a sense of citizenship, even the most favorable political opportunity structures and the command over many resources useful for political action, would be in vain. “Interest in politics precedes readiness to protest. Interest in politics can be seen as a prerequisite for political participation,” as Roose (2011: 12) assumes in his article on the Arab Spring.

A question that has guided this study, and which was further inspired by the Arab Spring and the youth mobilizations taking place elsewhere during the course of the study, has thus been the following: Can we expect the young, urban and educated in the Philippines to similarly be “a generation ready to protest” to develop a social movement, similar to what Roose (2011) observed for the Arabian world in the 2000s? Or does empirical evidence rather support the widespread assumption that this group is largely “apathetic” as the Kabataan Party List assumed when filing the BPO Workers' Welfare and Protection Act in 2008.[289]

The second part of this thesis will therefore be structured as follows:

After deepening the concept of citizenship developed in the first part, especially by putting on class-sensitive glasses and expanding the space of citizenship beyond what is traditionally considered “political” (step 1), I will introduce the empirical findings of an interview series on citizenship beyond the working sphere (step 2). These findings will be embedded into a class-differentiated analysis of secondary data on citizenship in the Philippines (step 3). While step 2 will refer to the results of the second problem-centered interview conducted with the respondents of the longitudinal study, step 3 will be mainly based on the annual surveys by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), especially the ISSP-surveys on government, social inequality and citizenship. In both steps, I will have a look at active citizenship (taking political action), as well as passive citizenship (sense of entitlement). Later on, I will be mainly concentrating on social rights as these have been identified as highly relevant for precarized people.

Following step (2) and (3), I will discuss the results (step 4). Here I will try to embed them into a larger picture.

---

[288] The phenomenon that behavior has a political impact, though without political claim, is tackled especially in literature on lower class involvement (e.g. Bayat 1997). In this regard, it is often underestimated that it may be of strategic importance for such dominated groups to de-politicize a de facto political action (Reese 2010b).

[289] In the filing of the bill, KABATAAN Party-list Rep. Raymond Palatino asks “Anong klaseng mga mamamayan ang mahuhubog ng sistemang ito? … Paano nila paglilingkuran ang bayan kung ang tangi nilang alam ay tumugon sa daing ng mga dayuhan? (What kind of citizens does this system mold? … How can they serve the country if the only thing they know is to serve the demands of the foreigners?)” And later on, Palatino quotes “a worker who has been working for three years in a call center.” According to this worker “a plague is raging among the youth working in the call center industry” which he said is “apathy.”
(Source: kabataanpartylist.com/files/2009/10/hb-6921-bpo-workers-welfare-protection-act.pdf)

Not claiming any comprehensiveness, step (4) will be followed by a postscript with a more essayistic character on prospects of citizenship in the Philippines. This postscript shall especially serve as an outlook on the desiderata for research for a (more) comprehensive study on practice and history of citizenship in the Philippines.

4.1. What is citizenship?

"Ang mga mamamayan, hindi ang mga bagay, ang magpapasya" (The citizens, not the situation, will decide).

An activist saying during the anti-Marcos-dictatorship struggle.

In teaching civics (*Politikdidaktik*), models of the (ideal) citizen vary: Buchstein (in Breit/Massing 2002:16) mentions, among others as model the citizen complying to rules; the acquiescent and restrained citizen; the informed citizen; the dutiful citizen; the responsible citizen; the trusting citizen; the tolerant citizen; the citizen willing to participate; the loyal citizen; the citizen showing solidarity; the reflective citizen; and, also the civilly disobedient or resistant citizen. This diversity is partially due to the fact that the semantic field of "citizen" is iridescent; centuries, even millennia of determining the relationship between individual, kin group and community are reflected here. Even by just looking at the above list, it can also be reckoned that there is the need to distinguish between citizens as members of a commonwealth – which includes being a mere subject to a political power (the passive dimension of citizenship) and citizens as political agents (the active side of citizenship).

Depending on which understanding of citizenship the concept of a citizen is based on, expectations and ideals also vary. Ideally (*idealtypisch*) they can be attached to one of the two "legacies," which according to Weintraub have guided the emergence of the various concepts of citizenship: on one hand the »republic«, which emerged within the ancient Greek republics and the »empire« on the other hand, a legacy marked by the Roman Empire (cf. Weintraub 1997: 11f.). While the "republic" is based on discourse among equals, deliberation and conscious collective self-determination (only) by those recognized as citizens; the imperial one can be traced back to the tradition of the Roman Empire. It is shaped by a vertical, i.e. unequal relationship (rule in the sense of *auctoritas* or *potestas*) between ruler and subordinate (*Untertan*), master and slave, parent and child, husband and wife – and one might add: the impersonal rule of the relationships (e.g. impersonal market imperatives) over people.

Subordination has often been naturalized, whether in relation to women and children, by declaring 'natural inequalities' between races or ontologizing what has hi-

storically developed- and has so been divested from deliberation (cf. Pateman 1983). Modern citizenship is therefore very much linked to politicizing the circumstances, i.e. declaring nothing as given and everything as contingent and "arbitrable" (Greven 2009: 9); a trait of modernization, which Wahl (1989) calls the "myth of autonomy."

This counts for what was defined earlier as active citizenship. In history people have been passive citizens (had certain entitlements) before being recognized as active citizens, i.e. having formally the right to participate in decision-making. In a certain way, every patron-client relationship is built on a kind of entitlement to certain services and goods. Rule without entitlements for subordinates can only be sustained by violence and fear. Nevertheless, passive citizenship has also developed in a distinct way with modernity. The development of the concept of modern citizenship is strongly linked to the development of the nation state and of a welfare state first connected to the cameralism of the absolute state in the 17th century and then to the Fordist production regime from the 19th century on. While cameralism and then Fordism expanded the state duties on the provision of welfare, the nation state broadened the number of those entitled to such public service (and even made these rights formally enforceable by the rule of law).

Even in societies where neither a welfare state, nor a nation state, nor a Fordist production regime have fully developed, these served as model for aspiring development states. This also holds true for the Philippines as outlined later.

The nation-state of the "first modernity" (Beck) was built on disciplined citizen-workers as rights bearers, exercising political and social rights. This concept of citizenship in a nation-state is more or less restricted to the enjoyment of legal rights and the election of representatives. It is closely linked to the *state of citizenship (Staatsbürgerschaft),* [290] which Mackert, in one of the many compendiums on citizenship differentiates from the *practice of citizenship (*Mackert 2006: 68ff.). Literature on citizenship mainly focuses on this state of citizenship and dwells on rights that are – or should be - granted and formalized (legalized) by the (nation-) state. This form of citizenship is also at the centre of discussions about migration/immigrants and citizenship rights in the country of destination (cf. Castels/Davidson 2000). Bayat calls state of citizenship "de-jure citizenship" and distinguishes it from "de-facto-citizenship," which applies to situations where individuals and social [non-] movements make gains without being legally entitled to them (cf. Bayat 2012: 44).

---

[290] The German term "(*Staats*)*bürger*" is not equivalent to the English term "citizen" (cf. Meyer 2009: 61). "Citizen" is a more dynamic term encompassing the aspect of practice more than the German term "Bürger" and relying less on the state in the achievement of citizens' rights. This might be an expression of different political histories, considering the long tradition of political subjects (*Untertan*) in German history, where the focus was more on duties and entitlements and less on active rights. When relating to "participation in the cultural, societal and political life in form of voluntary memberships in intermediary organizations" (Brömme/Strasser 2001: 7), the German discourse rather draws on terms like "participation" (*Partizipation*) and "involvement" (*Engagement*), actions which are considered as part of citizenship in this work. But as this work draws not only on English (especially Filipino-English) sources, but considerably on German sources as well, these conceptual alterations should be kept in mind by the reader during his or her lecture.

With the advent of neoliberal governementality (or better to say: the renaissance of liberal concepts in governementality), the governementality of disciplining (typical for Fordism), has been (partly) supplanted by the governementality of responsibilization which went along with placing more emphasis on citizen obligations/duties and commitments (active citizenship) and delegitimizing citizen rights (passive citizenship), as "entitlement mentality" (*Anspruchsmentalität*).

Rediscovering active citizenship though is not only a project of power promoting a model of citizenship that is readily compatible with the new circumstances in production and society (In this way: Reese 2004b). It has always been a concept *as well* that oppositional movements have drawn on and critically used to turn against the authoritarian state.

A living democracy requires active citizens, able and willing to participate in the exercise of political power. Using development speak we could say: Active citizens are a sign of ownership of democracy and an expression that people identify with the modern project of democracy, which is just like ownership in specific development projects; it is a prerequisite for sustainability, success and efficiency of the project.

Dagnino considers the practice of citizenship - in her words: "the constitution of active social subjects [and] the ability to become political agents" (Dagnino 2005: 155) - the crucial dimension of citizenship - and not the mere state of citizenship, as usually assumed. "In some definitions, citizenship is even thought of as consisting of this very process. Thus consciousness, agency and the capacity to struggle are seen by them as evidence of their citizenship, even if other rights are absent" (ibid.).[291]

In the case of fragile states or emerging democracies, say Coelho/von Lieres (2010: 2), "the most important outcomes of engagement are the construction of democratic citizenship, the capacity to press for rights, and the deepening and expansion of the practices of democratic participation." (Here the authors assume that it needs a longer history of citizen mobilization to realize "larger-scale gains – such as the crafting of new agendas for citizen participation or sustained access to economic resources, rights and accountable institutions [ibid.].)[292]

---

[291] Here she considers a class-specific dimension. She cites a study in which middle class and lower class respondents were asked why they consider themselves to be citizens. While middle class respondents emphasized the fact that they '"fulfill their duties" and "have rights" and middle class activists stressed their "position in society" derived from their professional activities, the large majority of participants of social movements and workers' unions' members did not consider themselves to be treated as citizens, but nevertheless considered themselves to be citizens, primarily because they struggled for their rights.

Kabeer again observed in Bangladesh that lower-class respondents "were aware not only of their rights as citizens, but also of their contributions as citizens," i.e. that they paid taxes and fees which served as basis for them to "demand their entitlements, as well as greater accountability on the part of government servants" (Kabeer 2005: 193).

[292] A research by Simeen Mahmud and Celestine Nyamu Musembi in Kenya and Bangladesh shows that political skills, awareness of rights and political participation, beyond mere voting, as well as the predisposition to challenge abuse of power and injustices and to engage state institutions, increases significantly the longer people are involved into programs gearing towards political empowerment and social mobilization. These programs enhance knowledge as well as confidence among the participants. (Mahmud/Nyamu Musembi 2010)

Such “citizenship from below“ (*ciudadania desde abajo* in the Latin American context from where the term originates) expresses itself in fighting for rights, and less on enjoying (already) granted and codified (formal) rights. Formal rights are even suspected to arise from a »citizenship from above«, “in an attempt to defuse the (potentially system-busting) potential of negation, protests and disaffection. Free, spontaneous protest shall be »fenced« and »channeled« [to make it] »productive« in a way compatible to the system” (Himmelmann 2002: 43).

Looking back in history, we can discover that rights are often an outcome of struggles;[293] struggles for inclusion and the right to participation, which in many cases have been the crucial reason that formal rights were finally granted – like in the case of the Levellers and Diggers (True Levellers) in the 17th century; or, the workers ‘movement and the suffragists in the 19 and 20th century; the “Third Estate” in the French Revolution; the Ilustrados and the Katipuneros in the First Philippine Revolution; and, the people of color in the Anti-Apartheid struggle. The project by the Development Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation and Accountability (DRC) in the University of Sussex observed in the field that “the right to citizenship was not regarded in the classic liberal sense as something bestowed by a benevolent nation-state, together with a bundle of entitlements to which individuals could lay claim. It was seen as something that needed to be fought for and won, on the basis of prejudice against and the exclusion of the majority of the population from participation in the decisions that affect their lives and on the basis of the lack of obligation on the part of the state to guarantee certain basic rights” (Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi 2005: 11). In the European context, the struggle of undocumented and illegalized migrants is a place where such “citizenship from below” can be witnessed. Undocumented migrants like informal settlers do not accept their illegalization, a framing which fuels their struggles and might lead to the granting of formal rights - to land, to stay or even to gain comprehensive citizenship. But struggles are also necessary to sustain rights: “Every human right is only as strong as the movement behind it,” as the scholar activist Christoph Butterwege (viva voce, 2010) assumes.

And when rights eventually become codified, it needs citizens’ action to make them substantive and worth the paper they are written on. Citizenship rights, says Mackert (2006: 62), are merely “possibility horizons within which citizens become active and may use opportunities for participation, without guaranteeing a specific result - a specific college degree, a state-guaranteed total care or the full realization of one's own political ideas.” The extensive socio-economic rights codified in the Philippine constitution are a good example for this. Like in many other post-colonial countries, constitutional norm and constitutional reality are far apart, which even makes acti-

[293] Likewise in law studies, the school of " interest jurisprudence” (distinguished form the dominant school of “conceptual jurisprudence”) considers "law as a reflection of interests and power relations in society" and assumes that “every law/right [*Recht*] in the world has been fought for" (Baer 2011: 36). "The validity of international human rights treaties is then a result of political conflict, a result as well of strategic battles, but not an automatic progress or knowledge gain of an abstract modernity and neither expression of a specific culture, of the will of the people or of local tradition" (ibid.).

vists to speak of an "*ampaw* republic," comparing the Philippine political system to the rice crispies, "tasty but all it has inside is air" (Katrina Santiago: Ampaw republic, The Manila Times, 19.3.2014). A case of "decorative constitutionalism… which can be observed in states, keeping a constitutional façade upright, but where law is not an integral part of the social order" (Baer 2011: 93).

Despite such limitations within »real-life democracy«, constitutional codification of citizenship rights may contribute to its enforcement. So says Aguilar that "struggles [mentioning explicitly struggles for democratization, redistributive justice and respect for human rights] are possible because citizenship as a formal concept does exist"(1999: 307). And in his "historical re-evaluation" of the emergence of human rights in the Global North, Neil Stammers (in Kabeer 2005: 50ff.) pointed out that while historically, the attainment of rights in the North was the outcome of sustained social movement activity, many social movements in the South have arisen as a consequence of the opportunities presented by rights entrenched in relatively recently instated constitutional democracies. In such contexts, social mobilization is, in many respects, aimed at achieving substantive citizenship that yields material gains.

In such contexts, political struggles cannot only make it more likely that "having rights" is translated into "being put into right," they have in many cases also been a space where a sense of entitlement develops. It is this practice of citizenship and not merely the state of citizenship that creates a sense of citizenship, i.e. not being merely aware that a right/a law exists, but that it is considered 'redeemable' and thus claimed.[294] Even learning about rights (human rights education) is thus not enough to claim them; citizens do not get involved simply because there are fully knowledgeable and aware of their rights and responsibilities (or of skills important for more effective engagement). "We did not learn human rights from the books," as the title of a compendium on human rights in the Philippines has been titled (Boer 1996).

This resonates to the often-observed fact that during mobilizations, rights are realized (in its two-fold meaning). This holds true especially for groups distant to involvement (*engagementsfern*) as Munsch (2003) calls groups primarily made up of lower class people. Here, fields of possibilities might develop, overcoming the limitations of the think- and the say-able and triggering an 'inflation of demands' as already outlined for the case of subsistence mobilizations above (cf. as well Reese 20008: 16; Kabeer 2005). The framing changes, next to fact that especially in poor-people-movements, as it is only in the course of the protest that these groups get access to

[294] A research by Kabeer and Haq Kabir (2009) on the rights awareness of members of different NGOs in Bangladesh came to the conclusion that political awareness does not only depend on involvement per se but also the kind of NGOs people are involved in. Members trained by and organized in an NGO focusing on social mobilization and with a rights-based approach were far more knowledgeable about their constitutional rights than non-members or members of microfinance NGOs (like e.g. Grameen). The authors attribute this to the training, as well as concrete struggles the members experienced and they come to the conclusion that "associations are more likely to promote critical consciousness and democratic practice when they are inclusive rather than exclusionary in their membership; when they draw on horizontal solidarities rather than vertical loyalties; when they embody democratic rather than autocratic principles in their own operations; and when they seek to challenge the arbitrary exercise of power rather than to bolster the status quo" (Kabeer/Haq Kabir 2009: 9).

resources like money, connections to supportive individuals and organizations or individual recognition (cf. Roth 1997: 41).[295]

These insights are the reason why the DRC-project has chosen an "actor-oriented perspective on human rights," based on the assumption that "rights are shaped through actual struggles informed by people's own understandings of what they are justly entitled to" (DRC 2011: 9). And a meta-study of the over 100 case studies in 20 countries done by the DRC over a span of ten years came to the conclusion that "citizenship is learned through action" (ibid.: 9). In essence, the meta-study concludes that it requires time and experience to develop an active citizenry, as it is often gained through action and not simply through training or membership in a civil society organization. "The benefits of citizen action accumulate over time. With action, citizens learn skills and build alliances: assets that come back into play in the next meeting, campaign or policy debate" (ibid.).

Throughout the DRC papers and beyond (e.g. Munsch 2003 for the German context), one can sense that "invited spaces" (Cornwall et al. 2011: 8), i.e. participatory structures offered from above by government or by donor organizations, for instance, are rather made use of by the already empowered (i.e. especially middle class people), while the marginalized have to gain citizenship practice first – be it in 'claimed' spaces of mobilizations or in 'invited' spaces of formal participatory governance.

To understand under which circumstances people consider themselves as citizens (sense of citizenship), the DRC project followed what they termed a **'seeing like a citizen'- approach**, which "starts with the perceptions of citizens themselves how they interact and view the institutions from which they are expected to benefit" (Gaventa 2010: 63). Denis Merklen (2005: 151) again links citizenship with rights consciousness: "From the moment in which political activity is observed based on the right or appealing to it, the presence of forms of citizenship must be recognized."

When trying to identify a sense of citizenship among the respondents to this study and beyond, this work followed this approach - it took the perceptions of citizens themselves as starting point and noted especially where they express their relationship to concrete others, society and state in terms of rights.

[295] Crossley explains this process by looking at the psychological side of it: "Ways of thinking, feeling, perceiving and acting that are repeated often enough will assume a habitual form," and so, too, a "disposition towards critique and protest," a "radical habitus," is "generated through involvement in critique and protest." Thus, the activism of those participating in movements "entails an ongoing attempt to change their habitual ways of being-in-the-world: that is, 'habit-busting habits'" (Crossley following Rutten 2006: 369). Here, Crossley meets with the significance Bourdieu gives to habitualization and of removing' habits carved onto our skin is a painful and tedious affair – just like removing tattoos.

4.1.1. Communitarian, republican and (neo)liberal concepts of citizenship

Contested in political philosophy is the question of how far a sense of citizenship also includes a sense of commitment/duty to 'contribute' to the commonwealth. The Philippine social scientist Anna Karaos (1997: 118) defines sense of citizenship in this way: Citizens to her are those who consider themselves to belong to a) a "larger community ... from which they expect [b)] certain entitlements," but also that they believe to c) "owe certain obligations" to. In the human rights discourse, again we encounter a strong tendency to clearly insist on entitlements/rights without insisting on corresponding obligations of a person/citizen, as such is considered to be compromising the unconditionality of human rights.

Terms like "belonging" [to "something bigger than oneself"; Karaos, ibid.] and "community" [of 'anonymous strangers' or 'generalized others' (Mead)] are rooted in a **particular political tradition**, which refers to Aristotle and is based on the anthropology of the human as an essentially socio-political being (*zoon politico*) and spells out a concept of human development as a relational process (*Menschwerdung in Beziehung*) as in the theory of social interactionism. The individual and his/her sense of identity here are considered an outcome of relations with others embedded within communities of which one is a part. It is in the way of how Norbert Elias described society as »interwoven« (*Verflechtungszusammenhang*). Identity is therefore not a state, but a process, the "self continually being created and recreated in interaction with others" (Fay 1997: 39). Everything social, believes Elias, is a relation between people and no independent entity beyond the people, but it is at the same time more than the sum of a certain group of people. Elias therefore speaks basically only of people (*Menschen*) not of individuals (*Mensch*). Such concept is linked to the idea of *pakikipagkapwa-tao* in the Philippine context which also does not fully differentiate between the other and me, just like concepts such as *kita* (I-you) or *mag-ina* (mother and child) do not.[296] *Pakikipagkapwa-tao* is a concept Virgilio Enriquez (1992), the spiritus rector of the Sikolohiyang Pilipino, explains as a kind of a shared identity transcending the self, based on the term "*kapwa*" which may be translated as *fellow human being* but as well as "*both*" (English 1986: 303).[297] While *Pakikipagkapwa-tao* can express itself within a more superficial interaction as *pakikisama* (getting along with each other), located by Enriquez still in the category of dealing with someone not belonging to us

---

[296] We can also detect such a relational approach in Bourdieu, breaking with both subjectivism (primacy of actors) as well as with objectivism (primacy of structures) and turning to the relations between the elements (the observed phenomena, social positions, social fields and individuals).

[297] A research conducted by Monika Keller and Chinese counterparts came to the conclusion that the desire for self-consistency comes up later among European children than among Chinese, which seek consistency between practical decisions and moral judgment at any time of their development. Furthermore, in their practical development their decisions and moral judgments were less hedonistically self-oriented, in particular they stressed altruistic commitments and reacted to a lack of self-consistency with shame. The researchers concluded that "people from Asian societies are more related to the interests of others and have a stronger orientation of care" (Keller 2007: 38).

(*ibang tao*), in intensive relationships (*hindi ibang tao* – one of us), *pakikipagkapwa-tao* can reach up to *pakikiisa* – being one with another (Enriquez 1992: 49ff.). Both require a special empathy (*damay*) and 'feeling' (*pakikiramdam*, in German*: Einfühlungsvermögen*) in one's the relationship with others – without putting much into words. The latter keeps one receptive for *awa* (pity) and cautious not to do something considered *pahiya* (shameful). (See in detail to the anthropology: Macapagal et al. 2013: 10-16; 29-37.)

Such anthropology is contested from the liberal concept of society as a "cold project" (Ralf Dahrendorf), which has very much given distinction to modern anthropology and is reflected in the social contract theories of Hobbes or Locke, and nowadays, in the theories of neocontractualists like James Buchanan, but also of John Rawls. These approaches are based on methodological individualism, i.e. the fiction of an unbound self with a pre-social identity, stable preferences and in control of his/her life (a sovereign actor). Society is simply based on a contract and its members know of no common interest (*volonté general*) beyond the interest of the members of a polity. Such thing as "common" good (common in the sense of shared – for Aristotle: *koinonia*) is considered unrealistic, the common good is considered nothing more than the sum of what each individual considers as »good« (*volonté de tous*). In a favorable case, these individual preferences match in the form of a win-win solution, in the unfavorable case, they clash. For the economic men, social life thus consists of regulating conflicting interests, as "there are no permanent friends, only permanent interests," as the saying goes. A main task of a social organization is to *divide* the treasured and scarce resources in a *fair* way between individuals who are disinterested in each other as fellow beings but who just have a strategic (and not a communicative) interest in each other. (In detail on this approach: Reese 2004a).

Public choice theory has transferred such considerations to actor groups as "collective individuals," while the paradigm of realism (*Realpolitik*) has even transferred them from the relations between sovereign individuals to the relations between sovereign states (cf. Ataç et al. 2011). At the same time, the emergence of the idea that political authority must be derived from the consent of the governed or the idea of unalienable human rights is also based on such separation of the individual good from the common good.

For the interactional approach, again society is not (merely) a restriction to freedom, as in the liberal tradition and merely a concession to the human deficiency (Helmut Plessner), but it enables freedom and self-realization (as well). Here, people do not only rely on community for self-realization, but they perfect themselves by designing this community, with the polis being the highest association and the citoyen being a more perfect form of existence than the economist as mere head of a household (οικος). The *koinonia* does not merely serve the purpose "to struggle evil (*dem Bösen zu wehren*)"(Martin Luther) but is designed to achieve a "good," i.e. a virtuous and happy life (ευ ζην). The economical man thus is literally considered an "idiot" (ιδιοτες meaning selfish). The *koinonia*-approach does not agree with the liberal restriction to

the 'right' (on which members of society can agree) and sticks to the idea of a "common good" transcending the 'right' and making and allowing society to 'bloom', "imagin(ing) our society as a collective work in progress" (Randy David, PDI, 3.8.2013).[298] While the liberal »bourgeois« considers politics mainly as a form of *dividing* (commutative or distributive justice), the Aristotelian citoyen considers it mainly as *sharing* (connective justice) (cf. Saunders 2006).

Tuning the levels and modes of social interaction introduced by Enriquez with the mentioned "western" traditions, the liberal social treaty as a cold project usually stays in the state of *pakikitungo* (transaction/civility with others) and *pakikilahok* (joining/participating with others), but would hardly cross the line of the *ibang tao* for instance by reaching a level of mutual trust and empathy (*pakikipalagayang loob*). The republican tradition again would often reach this state and even the one of *pakikisangkot* (being involved together in something), just one stage before becoming *pakiisa*. Only communitarism again could include the state of *pakikiisa* as it is only here that the boundaries of each person are transcended and persons (at least partly) fuse. At this stage, persons are definitely no longer in the state of *Gesellschaft,* but in *Gemeinschaft*.[299] *Pakikiisa* may serve as the way how closely-knit communities work, but not in an anonymous large-scale society where being an *ibang tao* to most people is the norm (in detail cf. the chapter 5.10.: *Moralism* in the post-script). And *pakikiisa* requires that the involved are "nearly equal in social status, i.e. in money, power, and influence," says Enriquez (1992: 66). "*Pagkakaisa* [being in unity with others] then remains an ideal objective [in a non-western society as the Philippines as well]. The lower levels of interaction, *pakikisama* and *pakikibagay* [level of conforming] (both still located by Enriquez on the level of dealing with an *ibang tao*, NR) become the compromise norm" (ibid.).[300]

Identity is inseparable from membership in the community – which is why the communitarian approach has the tendency to let collective needs and communal solidarities prevail over individual rights, ranking obligation towards the community higher than the individual right.

---

[298] Fulfillment equates liberation: The biblical tradition as well as Marxism can be understood as fulfilled »conversation« - when the wolf lies next to the sheep (Jesaja 65,25) and when" in place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all," as it says in the second chapter of the Communist Manifesto.

[299] Macapagal et al. (2013) consider Gemeinschaft as a form of "familialism" (p. 42), as well as an orientation towards closely knit friendship circles (barkada) typical for the Philippines (and other non-western cultures, including here even Eastern and Southern European cultures). According to Macapagal et al., the main expectation here is to be able to go along (*pakikisama*) and be empathetic (*pakiramdam*), which also leads to conformity, obedience and role-taking (ibid.: 44ff. & 57-62).

[300] Here we might also locate the indecisiveness many Filipin@s often display especially towards *ibang tao*: "Can you imagine to ask a Filipino what they want to drink," asks Hernandez (2014). "*Kahit ano* (whatever)" would be a common answer. While Hernandez traces this to the assumption that "we are not a decisive culture, we cannot say what we want" (ibid.), it might also be read as an expression of not wanting to embarrass (*ikog*) which is similar but not congruent with the sense of hiya.

Overlooking the individual and instead focusing on community (families or households) as smallest unit, also makes communitarism prone to idealize communities and neglect inequalities and power asymmetries within a community. Jones and Gaventa (2002: 23), as well as Berner and Philipps (2004), thus criticize the high appreciation of communities in development practice, depicted as groups of people with common interests and a strong sense of solidarity, and are even so considered to be able to absorb the lack of governmental or individual social security. "The idyllic image of the poor community," say Berner and Phillips (2004), "is the result of a romanticizing by outsiders. Ostensible homogeneity, cooperation, harmony and solidarity obscure complexity, conflicts of interest and conflicts. Developmental work 'from below' has to face up to the fact that marginalization and exploitation take place within slums as well." (On the critique of the community concept cf. Reese 2005.)

The Aristotelian tradition though has not only formed out from what is nowadays called communitarism; there is another socio-philosophical paradigm originating from the Aristotelian tradition as well. It can be called "republicanism" and constitutes the intent to synthesize communitarian and liberal elements, by that being their triple dialectical "*Aufhebung*" the way Hegel defined it, i.e. suspending, preserving and transcending communitarism and liberalism at the same time.

Often though political theory sticks only to "liberalism" and "communitarism." It seems to me that the dichotomization of "the West" and "the Rest" happening in political and developmental theory is also due to such oversimplification, reducing the basic images of society theory of citizenship could draw on to only two – the liberal and the "other." The next subchapter on citizenship as a western concept offers some illustrative material for this hypothesis.

I consider the dialectic approach of "republicanism" indispensable to refute the strong argument by liberalism that in pluralist societies, concepts based on common canon of values can no longer serve as base for citizenship: Republicanism can 'tell' a counter-narrative to the "pragmatic" and "skeptical" liberal approach by saying that modern societies can only be based on a "thin" value basis (on egoism and strategic rationality) and keeps up the Aristotelian dictum of the irreducibility of the common good to the sum of individual welfare. But republicanism does so without putting up with the pitfalls (or trade offs) communitarism leads to - such as the "thousand petty fortresses" (Michael Walzer) or "tribalism in the global village" (Elmar Altvater), leading to compartmentalization, selective association and parochialism ending at the town gate (or that of the gated community). Or in Filipino terms: it is a mere *tayo-tayo* or *barrio-barrio* or looking out for those perceived to belong to one's group, a manner similar to extending the me/we (*kami*) to an inclusive "we" (*tayo*), which includes those who are identified as part of the group. This is similar to using a German word without a clear equivalent in English *Heimat* (homeland), of which Kumar says that

"the public realm, when conceived as the homeland, is explicitly modeled on an idealized version of the private realm of the household or family. This reflects a longing for the qualities of community, security, and sense of belonging that we traditionally associate with private family life" (Kumar 1997: 208). It is a space where we are not alone, but at the same time can just stay ourselves.

This is more than the "liberal" *kanya-kanya* (everyone for themselves or for their loved ones), but is not as universal and inclusive in its recognition as the republican approach. There is, to take up Rodriguez's differentiation, tolerance but not hospitality towards the "Other" (*ibang tao*).

In two of the four key debates within the human rights community identified by Nyamu-Musembi (2002), republicanism and communitarism give similar answers (but different to liberalism): both do not split civil-political from economic-social rights and both accord human rights obligations also to non-state actors. But in the case of the two others their answers differ: Like liberalism, republicanism sticks to the idea of universal understanding of rights and follows liberalism in situating the human rights conceptually and ontologically prior to society and so does not compromise individual for group rights.

One could also say republicanism is a liberal communitarism. Or as Jones and Gaventa (2002: 4) say: "Civic republican thought attempts to incorporate the liberal notion of the self-interested individual within the communitarian framework of egalitarianism and community belonging."[301] While republicanism considers individualization as constitutive for modern societies, it is based on what has been introduced earlier as "individualism in solidarity," transcending the classical juxtaposition of altruism and selfishness. Society is conceptualized as "a conversation rather than contract; a dialogue among actual, encumbered situated selves" (Fay 1996: 123).

Republicanism neither relies on pure system integration (regulated through market or rules; *Gesellschaft*) nor on pure social integration through a common life world (regulated by norms, personal ties, loyalties and face-to-face solidarity; *Gemeinschaft*). In republicanism, state and society is more than an economic calculation (as in neoliberalism), but it is also not a mere revival of community, disregarding the functional requirements of modern society.

Republican theory considers it to be the main challenge to establish an institutional setup that enables the *sharing* (and not only dividing) of goods, ideas and visions. In this, it differs from liberalism. Justice is more than fairness (*distributional justice*) and

---

[301] It is a dilemma for republicans who have the strongest link to the idea of human rights that at the same time - according to Gaventa (2002: 6) - likewise stress collective action and responsibility and "in doing so, aim to bridge the gap between citizen and state by recasting citizenship as practiced rather than as given" (ibid.). Such again clashes with the reservation to mention obligations of a person/citizen in the human rights discourse as outlined above.

human rights are not simply rights of an individual (to be enforced against others) but in especially rights of others to be heard, respected and involved (participatory justice). Or, as the Zapatistas coined their motto: "A world where all worlds fit."

While the liberal bourgeois bargains at the agora (market) and exchanges goods (which may also be immaterial), the republican citoyen uses the agora as a place to listen to others, exchange ideas and develop commonalities.[302] In this focus on deliberation, again republicanism differs from communitarism. Here objections (*hirit*) are considered as "troublemakers" (while in economic liberalism those raising objections are easily regarded as "worrywart" [*Bedenkenträger*]).

The liberal approach considers democracy usually as a means, the republican-communitarian as purpose; while communitarism is skeptical of extensive democracy all together, considering it potentially divisive: »Empirically-realistic« theories usually measure success with output-oriented criteria (leadership, decision-making ability, efficiency), while »appellative-normative« theories usually measure it with input-oriented criteria (type of decision-making, level of participation, legitimacy), so that citizen rights here are above all, rights of participation and communication rights (Cf. Massing in Breit/Massing 2002: 96-103[303]).

All three paradigms are integrated into a model of civil society, here understood as societal self-organization (cf. Kocka 2002: 16) transcending (but not excluding!) the state and are in their molding a result of the emancipation from the (absolutist) authoritarian state in the course of modernity. They focus on people as political actors (sovereignity of the people) or at least as addressees of political communication, to which the rulers have to convey policy decisions, no longer able to simply consider their "subjects" as flock.[304]

I will leave the discussion on these paradigms at this point (in more detail cf. Jones and Gaventa 2002 and for the anthropologies both paradigms are based on cf. Reese 2004a). This work does not intend to enter into deeper into such a socio-philosophical foundational work (ventured in detail in Reese 2004a), but nevertheless these three idealtypes had to be introduced as they can to be helpful for analyzing citizenship attitudes in a "semi-traditional, semi-modern" society such as the Philippines. Nevertheless, these societal paradigms are simply "categorizations," i.e. "groups of

---

[302] The major cleavage between the two factions of the middle class Kocka (2002: 15) identifies as *Wirtschafts*- and as *Bildungsbürger* (business and educational middle classes, respectively) resonates much with the one between the "bourgeois" and the "citoyen."

[303] The self-description of liberal political science as "empirically-realistic," is already a judgmental (normative) categorization, especially as it distinguishes itself at the same time from communitarian-republican approaches, labeling them as "appellative-normative," i.e. "unrealistic" (says Himmelmann 2002: 36). This is already a reflection of the "confessional battle" between the different paradigms, I can only scantly hint at this point (in more detail Reese 2004a).

[304] Greven (2009: 68) considers this one of the major qualitative innovations of the French State after 1789. Though it granted active citizenship only to a vanishing minority, it 'elated' those who were still considered mere mob in the Ancien regime, to be "people" and so granted them symbolic presence (not least because the men were targeted to go to war in a "citizen army").

ideas with common structuring dimensions, rather than categories into which particular ideas around citizenship can be slotted neatly" (Jones and Gaventa 2002: 2). Every society seems to (have) solve(d) some issues in a "liberal," some in a "communitarian" and some in a "republican" way. The American society of the 19th century has never been an imprint of the Lockian social contract theory (though his work "two Treatises of Government" from 1689/90 paved the way for the American constitution); Jacobinism not the realization of Rousseau's volonté general and European medieval society never simply the implementation of the Paul's "Corpus Christi"-model. There were concessions made to individualism in 'socialist' societies, just like there are shared values in 'liberal' societies. Societies are neither purely liberal or communitarian, but mainly it is a question of the specific mix.

A more detailed elaboration on these paradigms, their historical becoming and for an analysis of current political discourse in the Philippines (like the heated societal discourse on the Reproductive Health Law) is planned for a post-doc research project (in detail see *postscript*).

4.1.2. Duties and/or rights?

As will be outlined several times ahead, there is a long-standing controversy if duties should be made part of a theory of citizenship. Jones and Gaventa think so, saying that "rights and obligations lie at the heart of the language of citizenship" (2002: 8), further observing that "at the centre of much contemporary debate is the balance and nature of each" (ibid.). Thereby it seems to go without saying: Rights are of no avail if there is no corresponding actor who enforces or guarantees them, i.e. if they do not go along with a corresponding obligation by another actor. "If claims exist," Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi argue, "methods for holding those who violate claims accountable must exist as well. If not, the claims lose meaning. ... Rights imply duties, and duties demand accountability" (2005: 9f.). And Howe and Covell (2010: 91) outline that "inherent in the concept of rights is responsibility on the part of others to respect and uphold the rights of others," strongly pleading at the same time against "giving undue attention to responsibilities" (p. 92) when informing about one's rights.[305]

In whichever of the three modern paradigms, the state is considered as main carrier of obligations. For the liberal theory, these obligations are limited; in its most minimal version, the state is mainly obliged to secure property rights and the fulfillment of contracts, as well as to guarantee (negative) peace, i.e. the absence of private vio-

---

[305] Empirical evidence from school based rights-centered education that Hove and Covell draw from shows that students learning about the unconditionality of their rights (i.e. not dependent on fulfilling duties) usually don't turn selfish, but have an even deeper understanding of their responsibilities "to make sure everyone has their rights" as one interviewed student said (p. 99). But just like rights are discovered in practice (as outlined in this work above), "children learn the link between rights and responsibilities most effectively through observation, cognitive exploration (adult example) and discovery"(p. 101).

lence, a concept the German labor leader Ferdinand Lassalle polemically called "night-watchman state." A state concerned about the welfare of its members and acting as a developmental state is considered by those promoting the laissez-faire state as overstepping and exuberant. Those promoting a more active state (like done in the previous subchapter), again argue that such is required to assure "real freedom."

But even so, it might not be sufficient to only consider the state as the obliged, as "a democratic society cannot be sustained simply through police forces and coercion by the state. It requires citizens who appreciate that they have responsibilities – not only rights –and who act accordingly. ... A democratic society requires that citizens have a sense of obligation and a willingness to exercise their responsibilities," as Howe and Covell (2010: 94) believe. Jones and Gaventa (2010) further assume that "embracing the concept of rights promotes the idea that individuals are active agents rather than simply having needs that require satisfaction" (ibid.).

And so dignity and recognition are elements of "horizontal citizenship… stress(ing) that the relationship between citizens is at least as important as the more traditional 'vertical' view of citizenship as the relationship between the state and the individual" (Kabeer 2005: 23). An idea already outlined in the first part of this work. For the communitarian-republican approach, such horizontal citizenship is essential. Not only states (or in general: rulers) as in the liberal paradigm, but also other citizens (including corporative citizens) have to respect and even protect and guarantee rights. In consequence, not only governments then may be held accountable for accumulating a "social debt" (Marvie Hinsoy, women's committee team leader of the Freedom from Debt Coalition – South Mindanao, in: Mindanao Times, 8.3.2012*)*, but the *kapwa* as well. Or following Levinas' ethics of the Other, it is the recognition that the Other is entitled to demand from me and has to be taken into account.

Such philosophy of being one's "Brother's Keeper" (Gen 4:9) can also be observed "in late twentieth-century popular politics ... accumulating duty discourses [and] a certain popular recognition in the West ... that rich nations have duties to poor ones, and that all nations and individuals have duties to nature and the environment, as well as to future generations regarding the conservation and transmission of humankind's environmental and socio-historical heritage" (Roche 1995: 205).

Following the findings of Kabeer and Haq Kabir (2009: 61), recognition though has two directions: not only towards other members of society (horizontal citizenship), but also towards oneself, meaning the recognition (insight) that one's self is a bearer of rights as well (the right to be recognized as a full human), leading to a sense of accountability towards concrete others and also the state (vertical citizenship).

This discovery of one's self as rights bearer is the essence of Carol Gilligan's "different voice." In such moral orientation, the highest stage of moral development, which Gilligan has observed especially among female respondents to her study (cf. Ibid.: *In A Different Voice*, Harvard University Press, 1982), is achieved when one realizes to have the same right as the other, unlike in duty ethics where one should treat

others the way one would like others to treat oneself. Thinking of oneself *as well* is not an expression of more selfishness in Gilligan's care approach, but of transcending being self-oblivious (*Selbstvergessenheit*).

Then again, exactly such a self-recognition can lead to the development or the strengthening of a sense of horizontal responsibility (for others) as Kabeer and Haq Kabir have observed in the case of Bangladeshi CSOs and "their obligation to stand up for the rights of other poor and disenfranchised sections of the population"(2009: 61).

When detailing the rights and duties citizens are ascribed, one can generally distinguish between defensive rights and participatory rights, which acquire a different emphasis depending on the respective socio-philosophical background conviction. As far as civic duties within modern states are concerned, paying taxes is often considered as such (with a big variance as far as the amount is concerned). Modern citizenship has very much been built on conscription with several countries still considering this a civic duty, while others have made voting compulsory. Furthermore, it is an open question whether participation should be classified as right or as obligation. By some beneficiaries of development projects "*partisipasi*" is considered rather as a duty, as Berner and Philipps (2004) outline, just like "participating in city affairs seems to have been regarded [by the German bourgeoisie of the 19th century] rather as a burden than a privilege (Schäfer 2009: 58), so that "many public officers, university professors and other members of educated classes (*Bildungsbürger*) close to the state even did not acquire urban citizenship even if they were entitled to do so" (ibid.: 57).[306]

Without further going into details, it turns out to be incorrect to say that liberal conceptions consider citizenship merely as a status or a right, while the communitarian-republican notion of citizenship considers it mainly a duty (so among many Mahmud/Nyamu Musembi 2011: 4 or Gaventa 2002: 6). We can observe that the liberal paradigm has a strong idea of duties, while the communitarian concept knows many rights (though less towards the state and more towards family and community.

Though it is clear that the liberal tradition is strongly linked to a rights-based approach by considering citizenship a status which entitles individuals to a specific set of universal (political and civil) rights granted by the state, I consider it incorrect to consider the liberal notion of citizenship as merely rights-based. In contrary: The bestowal of citizenship rights throughout history was tied to the fulfillment of certain duties like paying taxes, taking up arms or serving as supervisor of the poor (*Armenpfleger*) in the 19th century. Fulfilling such obligations then is considered a requirement for the exertion of citizen rights as the equation of being a taxpayer with being

[306] The reasons, however, are more diverse than this, as the educated classes often changed their place, so that no feeling of connectivity developed. In addition the educated middle class was disadvantaged by a class-based franchise (Schäfer 2009: 135).

a citizen shows up to today, exemplified by a "young professor" mentioned in a column by Mabel Villarcia in the Manila Times (March 20, 2012) who "said he pays 32% of his compensation as income tax and therefore, he has a stake in the impeachment [of then Chief Supreme Court Justice Corona] and what goes on during the hearing."[307]

The elaboration on responsibilization as heart piece of (neo)liberal governementality has clarified how much obligations are part of the liberal theory of citizenship nowadays as well. Likewise, Thatcher's quotes exemplified in the respective chapter illustrated that it is considered a major duty of individuals (and communities) to take care of themselves in the first place, going along with the obligation of not being a burden to others and discrediting the alleged dependency the welfare state has bred in the citizens as "entitlement inflation." As Castles and Davidson (2000: 205; 207) point out, "in the 1980s and 1990s in the US, Britain and elsewhere, interest groups, parties movements and governments on the Right have developed and deployed a duty discourse, a repertoire of rhetorical and policy strategies focusing on individuals' personal responsibility for themselves and their (as against the community's, the public's, the state's) dependents (children, aged parents, unwaged partners etc.), and generally, upon the social obligations of citizenship. This discourse has been developed and deployed in particular with respect to the underclass, and more generally with respect to the poor and those dependent for some or all of their income and/or welfare services on the state, and thus indirectly on the employed and taxpaying sectors of any society's population." Critics of neoliberalism here speak of a concept of "low intensity human rights as the other side of low intensity democracy"(Santos 1997: 8), manifested in an "often voiced cautionary comment against overloading human rights politics with new, more advanced rights or with different and broader conceptions of human rights" (ibid.).

Castles and Davidson (2000: 104) note that "the »active citizen« of new right theorists ... is the person who fulfils his or her obligations to the community (by having a job, paying taxes and obeying the laws), rather than making demands on the state." Being able to fend for oneself (going private) and not being in need to claim rights from the state, is thus even considered an expression of independence, which for a long time has also been a requirement for availing of citizenship as mentioned above.

Likewise, the assumption falls short that the communitarian tradition is oblivious of rights and focuses on duties, especially when recognizing the strong customary rights within moral economy. "Kin dimensions of community," says Wood (2004: 75) "also offer a key basis of 'membership', and with membership go rights which are connected to prevailing presumptions about needs and entitlements. To lose 'mem-

---

[307] In a different context but finally amounting to the same is Roberto Alabado's question, "why respect [cyclists]? They are taxpayers who also helped build the road. With this perspective, I gladly share the road with them" (Sun Star Davao, 19.3.2014).

bership' is to be excluded." I believe such misconception arises from a (liberal) focus on the state as duty bearer. Indeed, just like in liberalism (but less in republicanism), the state plays a smaller role in the communitarian tradition, which as far as rights and claims are concerned considers the community to be the primary address for claims to be made, which also holds true for the subsidiarity principle within Catholic social thought.

We can thus conclude: Both (or all three) basic traditions of citizenship know about rights *and* duties; but while the liberal tradition considers duties rather as obligations, the republican (and even more the communitarian) tradition consider duties rather as commitment arising from people being a embedded self and a social being (*zoon politikon*).

There are several other contentiously discussed issues in citizenship discourse which can only be scantly touched in this work. One of them is the normative question, if more exercise of citizenship is necessarily desirable. While participation has developed into one of the mantras of most newer development and political theories (cf. Gaventa 2010: 12ff.; Gaventa et al. 2002: 5) and human rights theory nowadays considers participation as a supervening right resonating in about every area of individual and social life – be it the right to be involved in decisions which affect one's own life (right to self-determination) or be it as right to participate in the public discourse (social participation), conservative forces warn of too much participation. Peter Essaison for example asks (in the tradition of Joseph Schumpeter), "Is Citizen Political Involvement Always a Plus?" (2010: 15).[308] Other thinkers as well (see Julius Lambi, Annika Agger and Karl Lofgren in the same volume as Essaison) dampen the participation and citizenship euphoria by believing that citizenship can serve the main motor of change and progress. Some even go that far to call participation "the new tyranny."[309]

This work has to restrict itself so as to stay on focus, hence another reason for not delving deeper into the issue as the focus of the work is to identify sense of citizenship – no matter which kind this sense is spelled out. This study though does not presume that citizenship is always used for emancipatory and progressive ends. 'Ugly citizenship', i.e. the exercise of political agency for reactionary ends is an undeniable fact. Neo-Nazis in Germany, 'yellow' citizens calling for the restriction of suffrage in

---

[308] The DRC believes that citizenship is more or less always a plus, but pointing out that in 25% of the case studies in their ten-year project, citizen engagement has had negative outcomes. Positive outcomes like a greater sense of empowerment and agency, greater access to state services and resources or the deepening of networks and solidarities were matched by negative outcomes like that new capacities may be also used for negative purposes like enforcing partial and exclusive interests or that a sense of disempowerment comes up where state services are denied, state actors responding in a violent or coercive manner or where social hierarchies are reinforced (DRC 2011: 8).

[309] Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari (2001): Participation: The New Tyranny, Zed Books Ltd: London. In a similar way, Berner and Philipps (2004) mirror a participation fatigue among project participants in Indonesia who, due to time constraints and lack of satisfying outcomes "understanding *partisipasi* generally as a burden in terms of forced labor mandated by government."

Thailand, 'minutemen' at the US-Mexican border, Hindu nationalists in India or vigilantes in Mindanao might be examples for this. Solidarity among citizens is often spelled out as exclusion of others – a phenomenon which has haunted trade unionism ever since (as outlined above).

4.2. Citizenship - a western concept?

"The history of democracy in the Philippines began with an invasion, a bloody pacification or subjugation of natives by American forces. It is no wonder that democracy is difficult to really understand if one is Filipino." (Jose Ma. Montelibano, PDI, January 20, 2012)

As the short overview on the three basic concepts of citizenship in modern social philosophy has shown, citizenship is much connected to the idea of the individual as rights bearer and the idea of the malleability of social circumstances – prerequisites closely connected to European enlightenment and the "Great Transformation" (Polanyi) in what is considered the era of "modern times."

One of the foremost characteristics of this time was the politicization of society, i.e. the assumption establishing itself "that the supposedly stable normative and structural basis of social reproduction is contingent, i.e. not inevitable or predetermined, but decidable, already decided or in need of decision"(Greven 2009: 9).[310] Although social realities in "non-political" societies are also shaped or influenced by human action, Greven does not consider an action "political," if like in the case of the mediaeval world of Europe, epidemics or wars were mainly attributed to moral transgressions (sin), so that true virtue and penance (i.e. repentance and remorse) were considered the proper remedy. Such approach of individual ethics lacks the political dimension structure ethics (rectifying the conditions) have.

Another characteristic of modern Europe that became integral to the discourse of citizenship is the idea that a) all people are equipped equally with inalienable and inborn rights and b) all may be masters of their life no matter of which background and social status. Enlightenment advocated equality for all people; inequality now requires justification, leading to the fact that "traditional power relations were less automatically perpetuated than in previous eras" (Osterhammel 2010: 1298).

While during most of previous European history, power was understood as descending from God or bestowed due to noble descent, now the idea took root that political authority must be derived from the consent of the governed. Such social contract was also no longer understood as a bequeathed relationship between rulers and ruled (as in patron-client relations), but as a contract between free and equal citizens (who then install a government). This was the grand innovation of the citizenship

---

[310] Anthony Giddens (1988) speaks of *life politics*, i.e. a politicization of life, as many affairs of life were now considered influencable and consequence of (right or wrong) decisions of one's own, but also lead back to the decisions of others.

concept: whoever was recognized as citizen was recognized as rights holder.[311] In the course of the French and American revolutions, says Osterhammel, it led to a "continuing politicization of a wider population. Everywhere politics ceased to be merely elite politics. ... Even new authoritarian systems [as for instance Bonapartism - NR] could not do without a certain, at least acclamatory, legitimation by the »people«" (Osterhammel 2010: 769).

Can it thus be appropriate to identify a sense of citizenship in an (allegedly) non-western context? Or is it simply another exercise of "a pattern in colonial science, carried forward to the postcolonial world, where data gathering and application happen in the colony, while theorising happens in the metropole," as Cornell (2007: ix) - herself a social scientist from the »West« - laments? This is a pattern which "formed itself on ethnocentric assumptions that amounted to a gigantic lie - that modernity created itself within the North Atlantic world, independent of the rest of humanity"(p. x).

Indeed the "conception of the citizen as an atomised and autonomous rights-bearing subject is at odds with reality in many post-colonial contexts, where a communal sense of belonging, intersubjectivity and interconnectedness are highly valued," as Cornwall, Robins and von Lieres (2011: 12) have pointed out. Is setting the individual as a basic entity of rights thus specific western, making the idea of citizenship therefore eventually another kind of communitarian particularism – just as the controversy about the "Asian Values" suggested?[312]

---

[311] In detail cf. David Boucher / Paul Kelly (Ed., 1994): *The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls*, Routledge: London.

[312] In a certain way the modernism Randy David, one of the country's leading sociologists, pushes for in his columns in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, is similar to this approach. His thesis (here from the column *Why political families are more brazen today*, PDI, 10.4.2013): "Our modern political system did not evolve from the pre-modern conditions of our society. Instead, we took all the formal institutions of modern politics from the United States, and grafted them onto our basically feudal society. The lack of fit between the modernity of these borrowed institutions and the traditional structures of Philippine society has been the major cause of the dysfunctions of our political system," he further on writes, "the rule of law and institutional governance associated with modern society (have not) fully taken root in our society. We are in transition." He clearly insists on "the ways of traditional society, minus the ethical restraints that used to regulate rule by the few … will lead us to more patronage and populism, both of which require the concentration of public resources in the hands of persons rather than in institutions." In one phrase, he sums up that institutions in the Philippines are "out of sync with the conventions of the modern world economy." Nevertheless, unlike the proponents of the Asian Values, David does not consider these institutions worthy to be protected, but rather as impediments to development.

Before entering into a discussion on this topic, three preliminary remarks should be made:

a. A research by a western trained social scientist on resources for citizenship is in itself a minefield. Should such research come to the conclusion that there is no sense of citizenship to speak of, this would feed the assumption of underdevelopment which colonialism and developmental intervention ever since drew on – like in the project of "benevolent assimilation" the American colonial administration undertook.

Wouldn't it be more advisable for Western scientists, out of *delicadeza* (propriety), to rather turn to the silenced elements within their "own" history instead of further examining the social bodies of the colonized world? This might not only be ethically, but also scientifically the better option considering that the caveats, alternatives and homoemorphologies originate from a related historic complex, not pitting homogenously constructed political cultures against each other.

b. Insisting on the other hand on the incomprehensibility of culture by anyone not organically part of this culture, totalizes cultural relativism and leads to Othering, assuming that social theories developed in the North cannot be applied to Southern realities, even not after dialoguing with realities and (everyday and oral) theories in specific societies. Especially area studies on non-western societies and cultures might be prone to such approach.



Figure 11: Editorial Cartoon, Manila Times, 14.3.2012

A recent example from the Philippines for the "Asian Values" approach is the controversy about the Juvenile Justice Law (Republic Act 9344) which "raised the age of individuals who could be charged in court to above 15 (if acting with discernment). The law also mandated the establishment of diversion programs and reintegration interventions as alternatives to criminal justice proceedings" (Pilgrim Bliss Gayo in Reese/Werning 2013: 186).
Its opponents consider it "a reproduction of Western juvenile laws" and Davao mayor Duterte blames the law for the rise in crimes committed by the young "saying over and over again that the law is suitable only to the United States and similarly developed countries, but never in the Philippine setting. What is more appropriate for the Philippine setting is for those below nine (sic) to be automatically assumed as having acted without discernment."
(Antonio Colina and Ivy Tejano: *Lost Boys: A life of crime, a life on the streets*, SunStar Davao, 18.4.2012)

Reflecting on the European perception of the Ottoman Empire, Almut Höfert warns of such "primacy of otherness, obscuring joint developments and structures" (2010: 36), which "may lead to a substantiation of the boundaries between Europe and non-European cultures"(ibid: 22). Höfert then hints at an aspect which mutatis mutandis, most probably is valid for Southeast Asian Studies as well: that it is part of a special discipline (in her case Islamic Studies) to construct otherness, i.e. "to remove the study of the Islamic-Middle Eastern history from the so-called general history and refer

it to the special discipline of Islamic Studies. This leads to the fact that we have been trained solely by our academic training to rather deal with the exploration of constructions of otherness, being less able to see linkages, interactions, common structures and other phenomena, which undermine the dichotomy of European-Christian versus Islamic- Near Eastern history and put them in question in various areas" (ibid.).

Rejecting theories and ideas just because they are associated with the West is also a favorite of groups interested in holding up the Status Quo (be it the propagators of Asian Values or be it the opponents of Reproductive Health measures considering them a ploy by western pharmaceutical companies[313]).

c. Finally, by following a historical approach as this work does, one should be able to reveal that pivotal issues of the citizenship discourse have a tradition of several thousand years; they are less associated with eternally cultural (racial?) than with socio-historical characteristics. An essentially »Filipino theory of citizenship« thus would be a questionable construct.

A convenient way of ending the question raised would be to simply point to the fact that also 'local' researchers dealing with citizenship in 'southern' contexts draw on Western concepts. The DRC-project bases its analysis on the citizenship paradigms (liberal, communitarian, republican) elaborated on earlier, which are derived from the western tradition. The few published Filipino theories on citizenship - above all the trilogy of the Third World Center on citizenship in the Philippine context (Zialcita 1997, Diokno 1997, Canieso-Doronila 1997 et al.); or Rodriguez (2009), one of the few works that was published after the trilogy – as well overwhelmingly drew on Western concepts.[314] Furthermore, the discourse within political movements resorts to concepts such as (neo)liberalism or postmodernism to understand societal developments in the Philippines and uses concepts such as democracy and development as benchmarks for societal progress (One among many: CJ Chanco: *Is our generation anti-political?*, Rappler, 5.3.2014). Even one of the main liberation theologians of the Philippines, Karl Gaspar, has written his PhD titled *Contestations, Negotiations and*

---

[313] Catholic fundamentalists, such as the columnist Jose Sison (Philippine Star, 3.9.2012), consider the Reproductive Health Bill as "undoubtedly the most controversial and divisive bill ever introduced in Congress" that created a "paralyzing disunity among us … due to the machinations of international organizations and foreign entities which are trying to impose on us their own agenda of population control by means of a law. … The meddling foreign groups with their sinister agenda have apparently created a deep wedge among the Filipino people and their leaders, using media and poll surveys to show that more than a majority of Catholics support the bill though it runs counter to the teachings of their Church. … Unity in our country can be restored only if we junk this foreign sponsored RH bill once and for all."

[314] In this sense, the textbook "Social Psychology in the Philippine context" (Macapagal et al. 2013) is termed as a "courageous" and "provocative" book and its authors are considered as "acting as non-conformists… daring readers to think differently" in the Foreword, simply because it includes the "rich histories and distinct normative societies of Non-Western societies, with their own indigenous social issues and patterns of social life" (ibid.) - and not just replicating the US-American textbooks usually used in undergraduate studies of psychology in the Philippines.

Common Action: A Study of the Arakan Manobos' Struggle for Self-Determination, by drawing on Habermas as theoretical basis.[315]

Finally, in his Inaugural Address on June 30, 2010, President Aquino drew on the idea of the social contract in the form of elections as the basis for his rule: "You are the boss, so I cannot ignore your orders," Aquino said. "We are here to serve and not to lord over you. The mandate given to me was one of change. ... This mandate is the social contract that we agreed upon. It is the promise I made during the campaign, which you accepted on Election Day." (Source: Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 1, 2010). And the dominant theme of his 2013 State of the Nation Address was social transformation for the better by following the "right way" or *doing matuwid* (as his most prominent principle goes) in his remaining three years. "Making the world a better place" and this is in a systematic way, i.e. in a political manner and by especially singling out an inclusive, rapid and sustained economic growth, as Aquino also did, is a very typical ingredient of the modern political narrative based on the myths of progress and do-ability, which is "kindly(ing) the hope that this time, the country may indeed be on its way to a more modern, enlightened era of governance and civic order … [and] mark(ing) the Philippines' biggest break from its old, rotten ways," as the editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer on 8.1.2013 exclaims nearly historical-philosophically.

In the many other cases where Filipino writers touch citizenship issues and draw on historical developments, they mostly refer to European and US-American history. They for example take European kings and not 'Filipino' datus as examples for traditional rule, thereby drawing on concepts taken from Western sociological theory of traditional vs. modern rule when defining dynasties as "entitlement that comes not from ability but from kinship, not from qualification but from relation" (Conrado de Quiros in his column *Dynasties*, PDI, 17.2.2013). Filipin@s also do not fall short of calling traditional and conservative positions "medieval" (Sun Star Davao, 13.3.2013, Rina Jimenez in PDI, 29.6.2013 pas.), hence placing Filipino contemporary history into a European timeline.[316] All these show how basic theoretical concepts, classified as western, are visible in contemporary Philippine society. Seldom are historical events in the Philippines taking place before the "intrusion" of western tradition by the Ilustrados after 1871/2 (one of the few exemptions: Isleton 1979) are mentioned in literature.

---

[316] The former Chief Justice of the Philippines Artemio Panganiban places the Philippines in the history of the modern western state when writing, "free expression originated during the Middle Ages when people began speaking against their kings and emperors. Free speech was naturally followed by the right to peaceful assembly to redress grievances. When the printing press was invented, freedom of expression was expanded to include freedom of the press. And when the Industrial Age dawned, labor's right to strike and to picket also became modes of protected speech. Thereafter, radio, television and cinema came up and were likewise given constitutional mantle" (PDI, 31.8.2013).

Finally, the western concept of citizenship (and the concept of good governance which is closely patterned after the Euro-American ideal state) serves as a benchmark, when proving the 'negative narrative', e.g. analyzing the political present in the Philippines with a failing mark (in more detail see the postscript).[317] The educational elite considers western citizenship as part of the myth of modernity which has ever since fascinated elites in the Non-West (cf. Owensby 1999)[318] and was institutionalized by a long tradition of the Ilustrados getting 'enlightened' in Motherland Spain and in the course of 'benevolent assimilation' by the Americans and by historical entanglement with the west (Rafael 2000, Go 2008). In this way nowadays, the western educated –and significantly western-financed - carriers of civil society draw on the concept of citizenship and refer to human rights and international law documents. The identification of concepts in Filipino culture backing up these ideas of citizenship though shows basically nil results. While Othering serves as a legitimation strategy for Non-European Studies (as such disciplines rely on unique features), Philippine (political) scientists might resort to be a Western-inspired citizenship discourse to prove connectivity to the myth of modernity.[319]

Aren't these reasons enough to simply draw on western tradition as well? I doubt so, especially as its allegedly western character leads not only traditional elites (be it local strongmen, traditional patrons or religious traditionalists) but also the *common tao* (such as parents and teachers resisting the concept of children rights) to reject citizenship ideas and individual rights as "un-Asian" or "un-Filipino," as the quote of Montelibano at the beginning of the chapter suggests.

---

[317] Often in relation to Europe though (at least in the public discourse), the regulative principles of representative democracy, of a rational state and popular sovereignity - the "nice idea" in the words of Gandhi or the 'promissory notes' in the words of Björn Wittrock (in Schmidt 2006: 79) - are mistaken as a description of reality. In development studies, "dialectics of modernization" (Münch 1994: 32), meaning to say the tension between good guiding principles and a reality falling short of them, which according to Münch keeps modernization in motion, are often only taken into consideration when applied to non-western societies.

[318] The non-European middle classes, says Osterhammel, understood modernization not simply as imitating Europe; but "were confident enough to regard (modernization) as general tendency of the time in which they themselves intended to take actively part of. (...) All over the world, members of the middle classes recognized each other by wanting to be »modern«" (Osterhammel 2010: 1094). Modernity was - in the sense of Eisenstadt's dictum of the multiple modernities "a unified symbolic language with local dialects" (ibid.).

[319] Of other quality again can be Othering towards historical stages in the West prior to the modern times: Von Moos (1998: 5) concedes a "widespread belief in the radical alterity of structures of personal domination and association, of holistic community ideas, strictly ritualized forms of behavior and other archaic phenomena that have been passed from a (by the way largely hypothetical) Germanic background and from early medieval key witness to the entire Middle Ages."
Constructing the European Middle Ages as the »completely other« to European modernity, is also functional. It serves as a negative contrast foil for proving the uniqueness of modern times or serves as positively connoted counterpart, where the Middle Ages are romanticized in order of criticizing modernity. Historical continuities and path dependencies are sidelined – such as those Michael Mitterauer points out when speaking of "roots of the development of political entitlement in modern times reaching far into the Middle Ages "(ibid.: *Warum Europa? Mittelalterliche Grundlagen eines Sonderweg*s, München: Beck, 2004). Likewise, Otto Gerhard Oexle points out many examples of how much modernization - from state formation over commercialization and scientification up to voluntary association - were already a phenomenon of the High Middle Ages [Ibid. (1985). Alteuropäische Voraussetzungen des Bildungsbürgertums. In Werner Conze and Jürgen Kocka (Ed.). *Bildungssystem und Professionalisierung in internationalen Vergleichen*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 29-78).

Next to the need to identify emic resources for the idea of citizenship and a rights-based approach, I see the need to argue why, even if of western origin, the concept of citizenship is not automatically "cultural imperialism."

As a historical approach shows, cultural and social homogeneity is a construct. Cultural bricolage is rather the historical normal. Manifold is the evidence how modern civilization has developed in exchange - be it in form of a discourse or of piracy and imposition. Concepts might have been "freely shopped" (Osterhammel 2010: 352) or rather "contracted" (Vicente Rafael) like an ailment. So or so, these concepts have been culturally incorporated or as Pramoedya Ananta Toer - quoted in Cornell [2007: 211] – says: "I am a child of all nations, of all ages, past and present." Is algebra Arabic simply because it originated there? Why then should citizenship be and stay "European" and alien to the Non-West?

Even if there might have been no prior tradition of individualism in the non-Western world (an assumption I will question further below), these traditions have been picked up and 'domesticated' in the last 200 years. Who would say the spaghetti is not Italian, the potato not German and the Europeans unable to use gunpowder just because they originate from areas outside of Europe and maybe drawing further on the fact that there are Europeans who keep disliking these imports - just like Asian autocrats dislike human rights. Michael Pinches thus rejects "the argument that literature which was written with a European historical background is inappropriate for Asia because it is Eurocentric. There are a number of difficulties with this argument: one is that the literature and the realities to which it refers are themselves highly variable over space and time; another is that much of this literature has been fruitfully adapted by intellectuals in Asia to the study of their own societies!" (Pinches 1999a: 7)

Postcolonial theory speaks of "interwoven modernity" and "shared stories." As Bayly (2004) outlines, innovations in global history were neither excessively 'Oriental' nor 'European' in origin, but were an exchange into both directions. Comaroff/Comaroff thus believe that European modernity is not "homemade" but instead "has emerged out of encounters and mixture with significant, usually colonized others" (2012: 78).

The hybrid history of the Philippines proves its characterization as simply "non-western' is falling short. There have been 400 years of interaction (not just colonial submission and brainwashing!) between the West and the island group called the Philippines since 1565 – and even many more years of interaction with the Chinese, Malayan and Indian world. Nadeau (2004), Ileto (1979), Cannell (1999) and many others have worked out that the localization of Christianity in the Philippines "occurred in relation to pre-colonial Southeast Asian history in a process multi-sided and complex. ... The indigenous Filipinos interpreted Christianity in terms of traditional Southeast Asian cultural practices and beliefs"(Nadeau 2004: 14). And Nadeau (ibid.: 15) continues by stating that "many articulated the language of Christianity as a means for expressing their own values, ideals, and hopes for liberation from their

colonial oppressors. In effect Filipinos developed their own version of folk Catholicism to contest and eventually transform Spanish rule."

Furthermore, (western) modernity is not that exceptional and novel as it often depicted. Bayly (2004: 64ff.) outlines that seeds for citizenship can be discovered looking at social history outside of Europe, such as questioning of hierarchies, the idea of equality, ideas of agency and aspiration, sense of an open future, discourse orientation and openness to scientific and empirical argumentation. And it is precisely such thinking that colonial governments were selectively tapping on; had there been no connecting factors at all, the colonial project would have been doomed to fail. Furthermore, both in Europe and in the colonial state formations like the Philippines, administration and decision-making resorted to traditional structures of decision-making and administration, whereby traditional concepts of government were absorbed. In both cases, the nobility (*principalia*) were turned into public officials, thereby further employing their traditional authority.

Osterhammel states that ideas of social equality "are common in »seminary« societies and in many other places within utopias of ousting, leveling and brotherhood" (Osterhammel 2010: 1295). The anthology *Die Autonome Person – eine europäische Erfindung?* by Klaus Köpping et al. (München: Fink, 2002) reconstructs resources for personal autonomy present in the other areas outside of Europe. The autonomous person was simply put most into practice within the specific European context of reformation, enlightenment and capitalism, but several articles in the anthology show that the idea of human dignity may be derived from ideas of Confucian philosophers as well. (Similar Heiner Roitz in *Menschenrechte und Konfuzius*, DIE ZEIT, 9.6.1994.) And isn't Buddhist renouncement a thoroughly individualizing concept?

Likewise, individual rights are not alien to the biblical tradition, which picked up many bodies of thought from surrounding cultures as proven by historical-critical analysis.

The claim by Habermas that the existence of a public sphere (as pre-requirement for deliberative citizenship) in western-liberal societies is "unique and without historical precedent" (Habermas 1974: 52) has been heavily contested by historians (cf. Moos 1998, Hölscher 1978, Osterhammel 2010: 854 par.), by critical theory (Spehr 2002), and by Islamic studies (see the compilation *Islam and Public Sphere*, e.g. Ammann 2006: 80ff.).

Even if studies for now cannot disprove that civil society has taken shape in its purest form in Europe (especially when taking Europe as a benchmark), they can neither rule out that a further rereading of history or the discovery of new sources might show that historical communities outside Europe need to be reclassified as democracies.

The Great Transformation in Europe was the result of historical contingencies as well: the roots of social change have been present long before; under very specific

circumstances they finally triggered social change. It is questionable if any characteristics of (western) modernity are categorically novel or if modernization is rather a process of standardization, homogenization, of structuring and rationalization of elements present before – and consequently, also: coverage, submission, expansion and exclusion (de-finition). Aspiration as well as the profit motive, the idea of equality of all people, individualism, as well as mundane orientation, have existed long before – that such elements got prevalent (hegemonic), were universalized and democratizised (i.e. made available to a broader number of people) is rather what makes the process "modern."[320]

In the wake of the Arabian Spring, Osler and Zhu state that "the right and desire of people to participate in decisions about their own lives and futures and to have a say in the policies of their government is not the exclusive prerogative of those living in Western democracies, as the events unfolding in Egypt and across North Africa and the Middle East at the time of writing illustrate" (2011: 226). The development of citizenship rights should not be understood as an exclusive innovation of western modernities. Rather, they have been systematized and codified here (though the biblical tradition has codified rights early – also rights towards the ruler and mechanisms of accountability). And especially, citizenship has been mainstreamed here – just like this happens in many "modernizing" societies nowadays, with elements of human rights and citizenship that have been present in such "pre-modern" societies for a long time already, as indicated above. For instance, social contracts have always been the basis of patron-client relationships and its moral economy - with the clients revolting when the patrons did not meet their obligations (cf. Kerkvliet 1977 and Ileto 1979 for the Philippines).

Adhering to the rule of law was not specific to Europe (and here developed very differently as well) as Osterhammel underlines, it could also be "discovered very early in China and the Islamic world" (Osterhammel 2010: 850). The idea of an Asian despotism from the Tsarist empire all the way to Imperial China and Japan, as brought forward by Hegel, Marx and even Weber, is a strong historical simplification. Checks and balances have developed here as well – within clans and performance-based patronage relationships, with dynasties forfeiting their »heavenly mandate« out of inefficacy or in the case of China, in the form of a strong-willed bureaucracy - even if these checks and balances differ from the formal separation of powers which slowly took shape in Europe (cf. Osterhammel 2010: 834).[321]

---

[320] In trying to identify what is so special about European modernity, Michael Welker concludes in the compilation *The autonomous person – an European invention?*, that it is not the autonomous person in itself which is a European particularity, but (merely) the integration of existent traditions (such as Plato, Stoa and the Bible) leading to a "typification, standardization and flexibilization of the autonomous person" (Welker 2002: 11).

[321] Likewise, the »absolute« monarchies of Europe, had to consider the church and the landowning nobility even after they centralized power from the 16th century on and "established legal concepts could not be completely wiped off the table" (Osterhammel 2010: 838).

Historical evidence rebuts the claim that the building blocks of citizenship are but of European origin, and wherever they are to be found outside of Europe, these are due to »benevolent assimilation« and other forms of Euro-American export of thoughts and concepts. Such assumption is nothing but a philosophy of history, basically even historical theology due to its eschatological underpinnings; historical science but deconstructs such an approach. At the same time, sociology of domination reveals how much political practice in nowadays Europe is based on elements of 'pre-modern' rule, i.e. it follows the logic of subordination and not of citizenship.

Even if Bayly assumes that for non- Western societies "the notion of generalizable individual rights ... seems indeed to presage something strikingly new" (2003: 290), it cannot be ruled out that such statement is made due to lack of sources. It sounds too much in the tradition of Eurocentrism (from which Bayly likes to distinguish himself) and its positivism, claiming that having found no other proof yet suffices as proof that the prevailing opinion is right. In consideration that the elements of modernity in medieval society Mitterauer identified [cf. footnote 319) have been 'overlooked' following Christian Morgenstern's verdict that "what may not be, can not be" (*daß nicht sein kann, was nicht sein darf*), it is not unlikely that further studies will lead to considerable modifications, when it comes to the lack of citizenship elements outside of Europe (for instance in Philippine history).

An Italian author in the 16th century, who lived for many years in the Ottoman Empire, eventually declared "As the Turks are mortal like us, created by the same flesh and by God, so they live from the same things created just as we do" (in Höfert 2010: 40). In the spirit of Höfert's comments, it can be assumed that people, cultures and histories face common challenges all over the world: non-European societies have been experiencing throughout history similar developments as European societies, like the formation of anonymous societies, the development of market based economies or the emergence of an educated middle class. Why should the institutions and rules that societies find to deal with these developments be so different from each other, as "structurally similar forms of domination will bear a family resemblance to one another" (Scott 1990: x)? Following Scott in this assumption, what needs to be explained are rather differences than commonalities.

Antweiler differentiates Scott's assumption further in believing that "it is more than mere coincidence" that traits of highly similar social and cultural concepts can be found in that many societies (Antweiler 2009 [10]) and thus assumes that "cultures do not differ by specific features or feature bundles exclusively their own"(ibid. [9]). According to Antweiler, cultures rather differ "in the rank or importance given by them to certain characteristics" (ibid.). Spelling it out in terms of power, he states that: the difference is mostly in features which are hegemonic and which are dominated and marginalized. This may also explain why variations within the same culture may be "as strong-... yes in some areas even greater"(Antweiler 2009: [9]) than between cultures.

Such approach suggests the inclusion of functionalist and materialist analysis and makes the delineation of societies simply following political, national or ethnic boundaries questionable. Just as one can distinguish between occidental and oriental cultures (already a very rough distinction), one could also distinguish between urban and rural cultures or between upper class and lower class cultures. As Osterhammel observed, the global nodes were ever since been having more exchange with nodes in other countries than with the hinterland in the same "nation" (cf. Osterhammel 2010: 381-386; 404). In addition, the "grammar of urban life was comprehensible across cultures" (Osterhammel 2010: 370), a grammar that included the Othering of rural population as lowbrow and ignorant or "*promdi*" (for: from the province), as it is happening up to now in the Philippines. Such structural heterogeneity of societies has only partially been changed by nation-building; the transport and communication revolution (railway, steam boats and the telegraph in the 19th century, aircraft and Internet in the 20th century) have rather perpetuated it part and created a kind of global off-shore society in which the receiver of an e-mail address in Tokyo and the chat partner in Sydney are closer to a person than the unemployed mother next door (cf. Reese 2008c: 43, Osterhammel 2010: 386f.).

Being aware and critical of "Othering" though should not keep one from being sensitive to differences: To perceive "the Other" in his or her alterity, which needs to be understood (and can never be fully understood) to use the terms of Levinas, is something else than Othering, where "the Other" is simply the non-A, the mere contrast foil of A. Sensitivity for differences includes sensitivity for regional, religious and cultural idiosyncrasies, which might have emerged in the realm of political concepts despite 'objectively' comparable circumstances they have developed in (an idea which has been already argued for in the first part, where the determinism of 'objective' class locations has been questioned).

Ludwig Ammann thus warns in relation to the concept of public in Islam, "not to expect matching terms and concepts" (2006: 85).[322] With regards to the political concept emanating from the European discourse of citizenship, it needs to be realized that they are "thoroughly impregnated by two thousand years of a distinctly European process of civilization" (Ammann 2006: 77). As example Ammann points to the discourse model of the public sphere, for which Habermas' *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* (Habermas 1962, engl.: The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society) serves as the dominant point of reference. Here Ammann concludes that "the Habermasian concept is too logo-centric ... deliberately typical of an epoch only, and in fact so normative and idealizing that it hardly fits anywhere at all. When applied to non-Western societies and pre-Enlightenment Western societies, all it can do is find them lacking" (ibid.: 79f.).

[322] Likewise, Garcelon (1997: 304f.) concedes "cultural-linguistic translation problems" and "problems of conceptual translation" when analyzing the public/private-complex in the Russian/Soviet-context.

When turning to the Philippine context, Vicente Rafael considers in his seminal work on *Contracting Colonialism - Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society Under Early Spanish Rule* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1988), an "inadequacy of Spanish political terminology, rooted in Roman law and European feudalism, to comprehend Tagalog social structure. There appears to be a lack of fit between Spanish descriptions and the Tagalog reality they seek to convey. Perhaps the difficulty may be attributed to the overdetermined nature of both Spanish political terminology and Tagalog designations of social status: the one is the product of a complex history of patronage and a century of imperial expansion, while the other is shaped by the vicissitudes of relationships of reciprocity and indebtedness carried out on a highly local level" (p. 138).

Diversity is (but not only) an affair between cultural areas and civilizations, but also within them: European history of thought cannot simply be equated with a homogenous "West." Taking a look at anti-Westernism, be it by Islamism, be it by the proponents of "Asian Values" or by catholic traditionalists in the Philippines, »the West« is mostly equated with the liberal tradition - with individualism, materialism and sexual libertinage - coming under fire. (We could here speak of 'Occidentalism' contributing to nation building just like oriental's did in Europe.) Outlining that solipsism does not fit to a Philippine tradition with its *kapwa*-anthropology and its high importance of relationships (cf. Macapagal et al. 2013) is then considered to be sufficient a reason to reject political and social concepts coming from the West. Such a "binary opposition" (Kabeer 2005: 1) overlooks that there is a strong western tradition built on embedded individuals (be it the Aristotelian, be it the biblical tradition), which shows many parallels to 'Filipino' concepts. "When that complexity is appreciated," James believes, "the imagined gulf between long-standing religious and secular traditions in Western and non-Western civilizations is narrowed substantially" (2007: 7). Therefore, I believe that instead of juxtaposing Europe and Asia, it is rather advisable, to distinguish liberalism from communitarism and republicanism, paradigms of which traits can be found in both cultural areas.[323] That human rights are not solely individual rights, but should been embedded in relation to other humans (human identity in form of a net), is an idea that one can come across in European history of thought as well, just like the idea that not only humans have rights or that rights go along with obligations towards the community and that civil and social rights are indivisible. Rather these ideas, which Pannikkar 1982 and Enriquez 1992 consider

---

[323] Macapagal et al. differentiate a "North American tradition" considered highly individualistic from an "European social psychology.. known for focusing on intergroup relations" and further states that "the focus on social groups is lacking in many North American texts" (2013: 6). In the further course of the textbook, Macapagal et al. though neglect this differentiation and constantly juxtapose simply "Western" and "Asian" tradition. Such confrontation they explain themselves as outcome of "questions of Filipino national identity and nationhood. »Who is the Filipino?« »What is the Filipino national character?« What are genuine Filipino values?«," i.e. "fundamentally an issue of cultural specificity" (and) "a protest against colonialization" (ibid.: 9).

"non-western" by equating western with liberal, are pillars to the republican and especially the communitarian concept of citizenship. On the other hand, the concept of autonomy and autarky is by no means exclusively western (for manifold outer-western examples cf. Welker 2002 or Comaroff/Comaroff 2012: 77-94).

Drawing on Kabeer's understanding of universalism and particularism as dialectical, and not as dichotomy (Kabeer 2005: 9f.), the concept of citizenship (just like the concept of human rights) can be considered universal with its concrete operationalization done within particular cultural and material contexts and within specific struggles highlighting certain features (and neglecting others which play bigger roles in other concrete contexts). Kabeer calls this an "embodied view of citizenship" (ibid.: 11). This is more than merely a "legal vernacularization" of western ideas Nyamu-Musembi (2005: 36) speaks of, but indeed a "plural moral order" (ibid.: 40) of ideas with many different independent roots. This way the Philippine Human rights organization Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (Boer 1996) considers human rights not as a western import or an achievement merely by the West, but as "common heritage of mankind." Recognizing plural moral orders and "multiple modernities" (Shmuel Eisenstadt) allows for the conclusion that human rights can be rooted in local contexts and these can be used as sources, and by that, attempts to delegitimize right claims by labeling them as "western" can be countered. [324]

Based on a framework which considers rights and citizenship as outcome of struggles, Nyamu-Musembi states that "human rights are both universal and particular: universal because the experience of resistance to oppression is shared among subjugated group the world over, but also particular, because resistance is shaped in response to the peculiarities of the relevant social context" (in Kabeer 2005: 9).

The concept of citizenship has been employed in social struggles in the Global North *and* South and struggles for more inclusive rights and citizenship cut across both North and South (cf. Kabeer 2005: xiii). In Latin America for instance, the notion of citizenship has been increasingly adopted by popular movements, excluded sectors, trade unions and Left parties since the late 1980s and 1990s as a central element in their political strategies (cf. Dagnino 2005). Movements, "organized around different demands, found in the reference to citizenship not only a useful tool in their specific struggles but also a powerful articulating link among them" (ibid.: 149).[325]

---

[324] Nyamu-Musembi cites the example of a group of women's human rights activists from various Islamic backgrounds which developed a Manual for Women's Human Rights Education in Muslim Societies. "What makes the manual different from conventional human rights education manuals is that its interactive and interpretive exercises interweave excerpts from international human rights agreements with verses from the Qur'an, Shari'a rules, stories, idioms and personal experiences" (ibid.: 45).

[325] In this way, even the Philippine radical left, often considered to be "anti-American," refers in a positive way to the Western discourse of citizenship: "I believe in America whose Declaration of Independence inspired countless anti-colonial movements in the world," says Mong Palatino, former member of parliament for the (militant left) Kabataan Party List (Bulatlat.com, 18.9.2013). "Our so-called anti-Americanism is not a rejection of »truth, justice, and the American way of life« but a celebration of these principles. … It is inaccurate and unfair to claim that 'anti-American' protests in the world are fueled only by hate. Every protest is also an act of solidarity for all Americans who are working very hard to make the American Dream a genuine democratic reality."

Juxtaposing "western" and non-western" culture is mostly done by forces of persistence. To freeze cultural states as fundamental and insuperable and deny that "in actual fact each kind of law [and we could add: political culture] is subject to continuous change," as the legal pluralist Benda-Beckmann (2001: 20) states. Denying the historical genesis (*Gewordenheit*) and thus fluidity of culture and institutions is done with the purpose of shielding oneself and the society one lives in from outside influence and to conserve the status quo, be it Mahatir Mohhamad in his attempt to reject human rights as "un-Asian" or be it the neighbor who tells you that "this is just how we Filipinos are." It makes them uncomfortable to realize that what is (yet) not, can still become.

Nevertheless, this does not require restriction to European concepts and terms, which may be adapted to Philippine society. When drawing on everyday culture and everyday conversations - like the interviews I have done for this work or other interactions in the past – bits and pieces of an emic concept of citizenship could be discovered and concepts such as *hirit*, *reklamo* or *dangal* offered themselves as elements of a theory of citizenship derived from Filipino cultural concepts. Drawing on such conversations suggests that Filipino historio 'graphy' is still, until today, an oral rather than a written culture, that it is more fluid than haptic, and that it has a public sphere in which hearsay ("*tsismis*") is no less influential than the written word.[326] To distinguish Filipino traditions therefore rather requires the use of ethnographic methods and listening to everyday discourse than studying written documents, which most of the time are anyway written in a foreign language (Spanish in former times and nowadays in English) and which rather display the official discourse, and reflecting little of everyday cultural concepts (cf. *English: A divider or equalizer?*, Editorial, The Business Mirror, 9.4.2014).[327]

Ethnologically oriented newspaper columns like the ones by Michael Tan or Randy David are a big help in making visible reflections on Filipino everyday concepts. Reflections by David are done in discussion with and differentiation from Western concepts – thereby affirming the formative function of "western" theories and concepts, but at the same time testing their universality by letting them meet with "Southern" realities and adapting them in a dialectical manner.

Traveling the Philippines for more than a decade and being a resident for four years, I do not consider myself to be the type of researcher the Philippine scientist Castillo once called "data exporter": "He takes everything he can by way of data and leaves nothing of value to the country of his study. Sometimes, he is called the »hit and

---

[326] A history of social democracy in the Philippines (Tolosa 2011), in this sense, describes the "first generation (coming) from an NGO tradition (as) priz(ing) qualitative over quantitative data, the anecdotal over the statistical; and its social scientists disdained number-crunching in favor of grand narratives of ideology and social theory" (p. 100).

[327] The ISSP 2009 surveyed that 73.5% of the Filipinos respondents had less than ten books at home, 32.4% even less than three. In Germany only 6.5% have less than three books at home and 18.4% less than ten.

run« researcher, with more runs than hits" (in Enriquez 1992: 107). Nevertheless, it is a fact that I was educated and socialized on the basis of European political theory and history and in the context of western-molded development theory. And as Kaelin (2012: xviii), a Swiss visiting professor at a Philippine university in a comparable situation states, "the foreigner writing about the [Philippine] society is constantly referred back to his own cultural embeddedness and to the inescapability of his own historical context." All I can do is to be aware of the fact that even if my data is *mainly* from the global periphery, it is still *mainly* framed by concepts, debates and research strategies from the global metropolis. Which includes the "risk, to intellectually align other cultures to one's own culture" (Antweiler 2009: [18]). And it might be too weak a *lusot* (excuse) in countering the critique of Cornell, to point out that also most of the literature emanating from "Filipino pens" likewise is *mainly* framed by concepts, debates and research strategies from the global metropolis. These concepts have influenced my scientific thinking, these research strategies are the ones I was taught – and the debates are the ones I am involved in as well, though I might say that here, I am the least "northern" as Philippine Studies are the main focus of my professional work for over 15 years now. (But then again, the discourses in the Philippines are middle class-discourses heavily coined by 'northern' concepts and research strategies as well!) In the spirit of Bourdieu, all this has embodied itself into my habitus, which are enabling, but also limiting. It is a challenge, especially for a work that places *Sinnverstehen* methodically in the center, as the process of understanding always goes along with "translating" what we see into concepts and languages we know.

I am drawing on bits and pieces of emic political theory wherever it fits and whenever I can grasp it; a theory of citizenship drawing on Filipino culture though must remain a research desideratum for this reason and cannot be accomplished by this work (for preliminary suggestions cf. the postscript). It would need more than a "sojourner" as me to do that. The development of such a theory of Philippine citizenship without collaboration with Filipino anthropologists and cultural scientists would remain highly speculative.

All I can do for now is to at least work with "categories produced in the metropole [that] dialogue with the ideas produced by the colonised world," as Cornell (2007: xi) suggests. Out of that, I try to sketch, share observations and make suggestions on which terms and what phenomena might lend itself to be "flashlights" and assist in the development of a theory of Filipino citizenship. I would be happy, if the initial reflections done in this work – which rather wishes to bridge the world of European social thought and Filipino realities as far as I can grasp them - would be considered as helpful for such an undertaking. If not already, the insistence on concepts and clear terms is an expression of a western approach, done in the systematizing tradition of Roman law and its penchant for abstraction (cf. Raiser [2013]: 333) and exacerbated by the strong impact of idealism on German academic culture, the quest for totalization, where »nothing may remain outside« (Horkheimer and Adorno).

To summarize the considerations, it can be considered a heuristic rule of this work to start off with similarities (universals) until they are disproved instead of acting on the assumption of differences. It tries to evade a "difference mania" and "obsession of otherness" (Antweiler, 2009: [6]) which easily leads to Othering. Differences are considered to be in need of explanation (materialistic approach, considering similarities to be the usual outcome whenever similar social situations are on hand[328]) instead of similarities (a culturalist approach, which considers differences to be the normal). Furthermore, I follow here a sociological heuristic which considers human and social characteristics as socially constructed within a historical development - knowing that biological factors ("nature") are not irrelevant as explanations (cf. Antweiler, 2009: [21 -23]).

I assume that such an approach does not only fit when remaining on a low level of abstraction, so that only "trivial similarities" (Antweiler, 2009: [1]) might be discovered. That every society is political as contingent decisions are organized in one kind or that people have a specific way of advocating for their needs, should be considered as such triviality.

My argument is rather that cultures change and new relations of production, and from there new ways of living and thinking in different societies develop, not in a deterministic, but a dialectical way. These new relations of production and lifestyles put existing social relations under "pressure to novel articulation" (Joas 2013: 16), triggering a "creative reinterpretation" (ibid.) of cultural traditions and political universals.

These novel articulations are even while complex, similar to each other, as Pannikkar (1982: 77f .) speaks here of "homeomorphic equivalents ... satisfy(ing) the equivalent need." Such an assumption of similarity (but not sameness) is also basic to assuming "multiple modernities" (Eisenstadt) with their special focus on institutions. While questioning “that modernization is a homogenizing process, ultimately leading to the convergence of the societies undergoing it [and the] alleged proclivity to equate one particular variant of modernity – that of ‘the’ West or, narrower still, North America – with modernity itself by elevating it, to the status of a world historical yardstick“ (Schmidt 2006: 77), this approach considers “several paths to modernity, but different historical trajectories and socio-cultural backgrounds giv(ing) rise to ... distinct forms of modernity“ (ibid.) and considers “seemingly irreconcilable cultural differences .. (to be) more a product of different rates of modernization than of permanent cultural divisions“ (Daniel Chirot in Schmidt 2006: 92).

By the hypothesis of a creative reinterpretation of cultural traditions, Joas explains the "origin of Human Rights, but even more their further dispersal and the intensified bond to them" (2013: 19). He considers a) as "fruitless" (p. 16) to debate whether human rights rather have religious (i.e. Judeo-Christian) or secular-humanist roots

---

[328] Usually, an "ultra- sociality develops responding to universal functional requirements," says Antweiler (2009: [22]).

(i.e. Enlightenment) and b) affirms explicitly the possibility that non-occidental traditions serve as "seeds or roots of human rights" (p. 23). In this sense James (2007: 7f.) extensively argues that the idea of human rights is universal and can at least draw on "conceptions of human dignity elaborated in Hinduism, Buddhism Confucianism, Islam and Christianity. Notions of universal or common humanity, the worth of the person, the sanctity of human life, justice, equality, compassion, kindness, love, and various other virtues and moral stipulations are to be found in all of these traditions." (For more details see James 2007, esp. 8f.[329]) This observation makes Santos assume that "all cultures have conceptions of human dignity but not all of them conceive of it as human rights. … Different names, concepts and Weltanschauungen may convey similar or mutually intelligible concerns or aspirations" (1997: 8).

"Under new conditions," says Joas (2013: 21), a "pressure of articulation" develops, as in the case of the emerging *bürgerlichen* society in modern Europe; under these new conditions, a tradition which remained in the shadows in the pre-modern Christian context or was then an antagonized and silenced position of a minority, now was capable of gaining hegemony (in its secularized form), also as this approach fitted well with the new relations of production.[330]

The validity assumption, which is often assumed for Western societies, when it comes to human rights and concepts of citizenship and democracy, is questioned by Joas who speaks of "the Two Americas," claiming that "not even in the core areas of the West the sacralization of the person is consolidated. … As the twentieth century has ended, it is clear to us that the sacralization of the person is always and everywhere at risk" (Ibid.: 104f.). Likewise, James states that "the nobility of these philosophies [i.e. the different religions quoted above] was often distorted by an unfulfilled universalism both in theory and in practice" (2007: 14). Human rights are thus an idea that is at best a regulative principle, at worst an illusion with ideological function.

The forming of citizenship in any case cannot be merely attributed to the diffusion of values, so that it is incorrect to assume that human rights, democracy and citizenship *spread* over the world - from the west to the 'rest'. (For a detailed critique of the "northernness" of globalization theory in specific and sociological theory in general:

---

[329] James refers to Samuel Murumba, whose work focuses on civilizational contributions to international human rights law, and who spotted a "commitment to freedom for all humans from violence, want, exploitation, intolerance and fear" in Hinduism, traces accounts of "early social welfare provisions" in Buddhism and points to "rights to life, respect, freedom, privacy, to a home, to a means of living, to knowledge, freedom of movement, to equality, to freedom of conviction and expression" in Islam. Murumba also identified notions of freedom, the rule of law, procedural justice, workers' rights, representative democracy, egalitarianism, political accountability of rulers, social welfare rights et al. from his survey of Sumerian, Babylonian, Egyptian, Indian, Chinese, Pacific (Oceanic), African, Islamic, Graeco-Roman, Judeo-Christian and European civilizations (All quotes from James 2007: 8)

[330] Joas (ibid.: 20) also identifies as further "conditions" which had a major influence on the intensified importance of human rights "negative, shocking, traumatizing experiences of own and suffering of others" (here exemplarily torture and slavery; certainly to be added: World Wars, modern despotism and genocide).

Cornell 2007). According to Comaroff/Comaroff (2012: 23), there might rather exist good reasons to challenge the "outdated Euro-modern narrative of the last two hundred years according to which the South runs after universal history, always stays behind and tries to keep up … to assume the opposite: that in view of the unpredictable, underdetermined dialectic of capitalism and modernity it is in fact the South getting to feel the effects of the world-historical forces first and that it is the south, where the radically new assemblages of capital and labor shape out, i.e. which prefigures the future of the North."

Though this paper is not able to already submit the proposed genealogy of citizenship in the Philippine context at this point, studies on adaptation of Christianity in the Philippines confirm that numerous pre-colonial socio-cultural concepts were resorted to, which were "aufgehoben" in the Hegelian sense (see especially Ileto 1979, Nadeau 2004 and Wendt 1997), which also holds true for the adjustment of the ideas that the Ilustrados absorbed in Europe, with the emic tradition, as happened in the context of the Katipunan movement (cf. Reynaldo Ileto: *Filipinos and Their Revolution*, Quezon City, 1999; Teodoro Agoncillo: *The Revolt of the Masses*, Quezon City, 2002 and John Schumacher: *The Propaganda Movement*, Quezon City, 1973) or the "politics of meaning" in which Filipino elites adapted to the attempt to transplant American-style democracy to the newly conquered colony (cf. Go 2008).

Such a genealogy of citizenship in the Philippine context though would most probably come to the conclusion that citizenship in the Philippine context is spelled out in a different way than let's say in Germany or in the United States (which in itself is already so diverse that this proves that there is no such thing as a homogenous western political culture), maybe less »individualistic« (analytical-separating) and more »collective« (holistic-connecting) (terms according to R.E. Nisbett in Antweiler 2009: [9]) based less on a independent and more on a interdependent construal of the self (cf. *dannonl.wordpress.com/2011/09/26/independent-vs-interdependent* for more details). This is also because especially for societies affected by capitalist logic and with formal welfare systems (which have individualizing effects), it holds true that "modern people need to develop that much personality that they can stand their ground outside of any primordial group formation, absolute free to assert themselves against competition, to participate in decisions, to unite and communicate" (Münch 1994: 32), while within societies without sufficient social protection and with maintained structures of patronage, people cannot completely individualize themselves.

But rather than pitting "oriental" vs. "occidental" thought, a look at the Philippines might as well unearth that citizenship theory in the West also needs some more differentiation. The bandwagon effect, the phenomenon of social desirability and many more are evidence that the idea of individuals deciding on their actions unentangled into networks and "*kapwa*" is a liberal fiction.

What I nevertheless assume in this work is that that no matter how "multiple" it is spelled out, citizenship is necessarily based on certain core features – and one of them would be a sense of entitlement and a readiness to political action, preferably

based on emic concepts of human agency. Just like Schmidt rejects speaking of "(multiple) modernities" in the plural and considers it rather apt to speak of "varieties of modernity" in the singular, I would also suggest to speak of "varieties of citizenship" (just like the guiding spirit of the individualization theory, Ulrich Beck speaks of "varieties of individualization," when reflecting on "Chinese individualization" [2010:202]).

Ontological individualism or "the claim that a society is made up of atomised individuals and is no more than the sum of these individuals" (Kabeer/Haq Kabir 2009: 7) is an assumption typical for liberalism, but it seems *not* to be a core feature that is indispensable for citizenship. As Kabeer and Haq Kabir have outlined for the case of Bangladesh, ethical individualism, i.e. "the idea of the equal moral worth of all individuals and hence their equality in relation to certain basic rights and responsibilities" (Kabeer/Haq Kabir ibid.) is not necessarily based on ontological individualism: "A commitment to the equal rights of individuals is perfectly compatible with an ontological worldview that recognises the connections between people and the socially embedded nature of their values and experiences. The challenge that such societies face therefore is not greater individualism per se but the democratisation of state–society relations to allow recognition of the basic rights of all individuals, regardless of their place in society" (ibid.). Such ethical individualism based on ontological interconnectivity is exactly what has been outlined as republicanism above.

One example for such interconnectedness of rights from the Philippine context is what a report on women rights from 1998 called "negotiated entitlement." Here it is described how mothers entitle themselves not for themselves but always in relation to someone else, usually their offspring (*Women saying No*, PDI, 31.3.1998). This may be considered as putting forward their child as pretext to secure one's own right (for instance to make their partner agree to contraceptives), but also as a sign of the interrelatedness of the wellbeing of mother and child (*mag-ina*).

Such cultural preference of claiming rights for others is also confirmed by Yacat (2014) – and might be further made acceptable by the idea of sacrifice in the Christian tradition (Borchgrevink 2014: 127). Borchgrevink has in this sense even identified "the field of sacrifice" as "evidently one in which self- promotion is allowed" (ibid.: 129), an attitude usually considered as "boasting" and thus "bastos," at least when done among status-equal.

The culturalist argument that some political cultures are not only less conducive to the concept of citizenship, but are even an insurmountable obstacle to it, can easily be refuted. Both the militarist-hierarchical ("Prussian") political culture of Germany and that of its Asian counterpart, Japan, have been eventually transformed to democracies and its subjects to citizens. Which also holds true for the former colonial master of Las Filipinas, Spain (though we see up to today more than e.g. in Germany politically two nations, the conservative-catholic and the progressive-secular one). And in all of these examples such transformation has not happened by "diffusion," simply

wiping out pre-modern authoritarism by modern democracy, but in a dialectical way suspending, preserving and transcending (*aufheben*) traditions of political culture.

More helpful than contradicting »modern« and »pre-modern« concepts of citizenship is to draw on the apperception of pluralism of political cultures and this not merely in an inter-national approach (Santos [1997] bases his argumentation - possibly to simplify it - on the ideal type of homogeneous cultural areas – above others: *the* Western concept of Human Rights, equated with liberalism) but of pluralism within one "container" society/culture area.

One area in which such approach of "intra-national" pluralism has been developed in more detail is the sphere of law, termed "legal pluralism."

In the Philippine case such legal pluralism is exactly less of an inter-national quality as the political and legal institutions of the Philippines are patterned after those of the US, but rather of an intra-national quality: Next to the laws set by the state 'from above,' partly conflicting concepts of social justice and social rules prevail (whether with religious or with traditional roots), private law 'from below' (self-regulation in form of company or house rules or codes of conduct), partially valid norms, conventions or social practices, but as well law from 'locally above' as the cacique law by land and warlords (see in detail to legal pluralism in the Philippines: Franco 2011).[331]

Sociology of law assumes that such legal pluralism is the socially normal "to be found anywhere" (Baer, 2011: 71; also in Germany, cf. ibid., especially pp. 50-81). Legal pluralism is no longer considered a mere "transitional phenomenon between archaic societies and modern rule of law" (Baer 2011: 71); an idea which according to Baer emanates from the "colonial idea of »modern« societies with »clear« rules and »traditional« that is backward societies" (ibid.). (Likewise Benda-Beckmann 2001: 28). Here applies: "People often have ideas of several legal orders, they orientate themselves subjectively in legal pluralism. They follow certain rules, but possibly not every rule, and they follow different rules in different contexts. People ... have ... a pluralistic legal consciousness" (Baer 2011: 212).[332] Likewise Benda-Beckmann states that "in their behaviour people do not always make a sharp distinction, but often simultaneously base their claims and behaviour on elements of different kinds of law" (2001: 20). The case of Southern Africa is but one illustration for such; Comaroff/Comaroff come to the conclusion that here "life as a citizen and life as an ethnic entity run contrary to each other and often contradict each other, which made political individuality to a fractured and fractal experience" (2012: 97).

---

[331] Just like in the Bukovina, from which the guiding spirit of legal pluralism, Eugen Ehrlich, hails: The Bukovina was ruled by Austria-Hungary then, where a "multitude of rules applied next to each other" (Baer 2011: 32) and "statutory law and the rules by which people actually live, often did not match" (Raiser 2013: 72). Ehrlich thus got interested in this »law in action«, the starting point of the scientific study of legal pluralism and of socio-legal issues (cf. Baer, 2011: 85-102; Raiser 2013: 71-85, on the relationship between law from above and law from below: Baer, 2011: 187-193).

[332] The main culprit in the Pork Barrel Scam, Janet Napoles, tried to bank on such legal pluralism when bringing forward her defense that she is merely "the victim of a wrong system in society that I thought was normal and legal because this became the practice for a long time." (Source: PDI, 7.6.2014).

Same holds true for the Philippines, a context the political scientist Jennifer Franco describes like this: “Several different kinds of social-regulatory systems coexist in variable combinations. Several different systems may coexist in either complementary or competitive ways. Or, one particular system of social regulation may have become predominant and relatively uncontested within a particular space over time, as is often the case in big landholdings owned or claimed by powerful families. In such cases, the local population living and working inside such landholdings may be quite literally »fenced-off« from the rest of the polity and society, including whatever laws might be operative therein“ (Franco 2011: xiii). This is exacerbated when the state is not only “experienced as a distant abstraction“ (p. xv) but when present, perceived as “two-faced“ with (poor) people believing (framing) that “*may batas para sa mayayaman, may batas para sa mahihirap* (there is one law for the rich, there is one law for the poor)" (p. 1) or even that “state law does not seem to be a remedy or means of all citizens, ... to seek justice, but rather a powerful weapon serving the already powerful“ (p. xvi). Franco’s conclusion (in relation to rural Philippines!) is that “between the image of »legal harmony« on one hand, and the myth of pure lawlessness on the other, there is a plural-legal field heavily weighted in favor of the powerful, non-state elites“ (p. 20).

4.3. Spaces of the political

Political participation (citizenship) is not only linked to a definition of *who* are considered to be citizens (men, white, with property, of noble descent…), but also about *which space* is defined as “political,” i.e. following Greven’s definition as “arbitrable” and which spaces are considered as “off-limits” to political participation. These two kinds of spaces are usually codified as “public” and “private.”

Defining “public” is “the crucial subject of democracy” (Craig Calhoun in Weintraub 1997: 81), and can be done in a two-fold way: “the public” may be defined as the community of citizens (in the sense of: decision makers) and/or as the object of political decisions, i.e. the public good and the public interest. Public space then can be defined as the space, over which people are entitled or feel entitled to take decisions. By defining something as “private,” it is declared off limits to public *access,* to public *agency* and to public *interest*.

Interest, access and agency are “dimensions“ of public and private, as distinguished by Benn and Gaus (1983). Something may be in the *interest* of all (commonwealth) or only in self-interest; a place may be *accessible*, visible and open (public) to all or exclusive (and then hidden/secret to the others), and finally, decisions are made by all (or in the name of all) or only in “my name.”[333] Moos added to these dimensions [he-

[333] Benn and Gaus consider these dimensions to be “probably universal categories, though not necessarily in the form of a public/private distinction. For even a culture without that distinction would still require some way of so ordering its relations and

re: visible (*erfahrbar*), accessible (*zugänglich*), useful (*nützlich*) in the sense of interest and authority (agency)] the dimension of bindingness (*Verbindlichkeit*), delineating the coverage (*Geltungsbereich*) of decisions (cf. von Moss 1998: 23ff.). All of these dimensions, "can, but not necessarily overlap" (Moos 1998: 24).

Weintraub (1997: 5f.) delineates, in particular, four broad fields of discourse in which different notions of "public" and "private" prevail:

(1) the distinction of public and private as the distinction between the state and the market (which he calls the liberal-economist model).

(2) the civic perspective, which defines the public realm in terms of political community and citizenship, distinguishing it from both the market and the administrative state. It is the realm of the civil society Habermas examined in *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* and Weintraub calls the "republican-virtue approach."

(3) the public as a sphere of extra-domestic sociability and visibility of neighbors and friends, but as well "the sphere of broad and largely unplanned encounters of fluid sociability among strangers and near-strangers" (Weintraub 1997: 17). This public is not considered in a strict sense as "political«: "The wealth of the public life to which it contributes lies not in self-determination or collective action, but in the multistranded liveliness and spontaneity arising from the ongoing intercourse of heterogeneous individuals and groups that can maintain a civilized coexistence." (ibid.)

Spaces occidental eyes would consider public may be considered private in other societies. In the Philippines, with its strong morals of decency with the strict norm especially for women to hide their "private parts," one nevertheless might encounter women only wrapped into a towel walking in their yard (with several "kapit-bahay" literally meaning those sticking to the house, i.e. neighbors) or crossing a street (which then would rather be a blind alley and seldom a thoroughfare). These spaces serve as an extension of the home for those who are too poor to afford a private house with enough space – bearing in mind that bathrooms are often shared by several families and households live in a single room. But if private is the "secret," then there is less secrecy in a closely-knit neighborhood than in "anonymous" modern cities.

Amman observed something similar in Muslim societies wherein these spaces are called (just like [re-]privatized alleys turned into a kind of front garden) "intermediary semi-private/semi-public spaces" (2006: 108). While there is a lack of sphere that is clearly public, privacy is again a scarce commodity. Philippine social life likewise mainly happens in the social, an intermediate space that is more than private (individual) but less than public (encompassing). Privacy is not as cherished as in Europe; here, those looking for privacy are often pitied (*kawawa*) and when they are out alone, are often asked: "Why are you so lonely?"

---

activities that it could recognize, discuss, explain or justify the allocation of access to information, resources etc., the capacities in which agents enjoyed that access, and in whose interest it was used" (Benn/Gaus 1983: 7).

These are a mixture of the (2) and the (3) type, embracing the realm of communal sociability and informal interaction, including informal employment, religious institutions or informally organized community-based groups. (This broader understanding of "intermediate spaces" is found in Mahmud and Nyamu-Musembi [2011: 5ff.].)

This intermediate space has often been a specific affair of the women: Be it by keeping in touch and nourishing networks and caring for the needy, be it as wives running the social affairs of a politician, be it in the form of activities within the Church, which are mainly run by women (even if the priests may be exclusively male) or be it the strong women's presence in civil society organizations (Cf. Reese 2010b for the Philippine case). These spaces have long been considered non-political or at least less political, which again allowed women (especially those from the middle class) to be accepted and even expected in this informal public life, even if they were kept out from formal public life (i.e. formal politics, political associations and formal employment) as Karen Hansen (in Weintraub/Kumar 1997) e.g. shows for the case of 19th century New England.

Finally (4) there is a the distinction between "private" and "public" in terms of the distinction between the family and household from the out-of-house economic and political order and by that excluding the "personal" from being "political" (cf. Amna/Ekman 2009: 15). The sharp distinction of the (nuclear) family, constructed as haven from the outer world (perceived as strange and dangerous) is considered as a specific result of bourgeois modernization by Philipp Aries (*Centuries of Childhood*. A Social History of Family Life, New York, 1962) and others (cf. Schäfer 2009: 116). Philip Slater (in Weintraub 1997: 22) identifies the domain of intimate relations to be emotionally "overloaded," going along with an increasing emotional emptiness and isolation of an inhospitable public domain. And Allen Silver (in Weintraub 1997: 44) likewise believes that "the private sphere understood as the ideal arena of love, tenderness, and »kindly services« requires the very impersonality of the public world of bureaucratic administration, contractualism and monetized exchange against which it is culturally distinguished."

The way public and private have been distinguished has been questioned especially by feminist scholarship. Feminists have emphasized how much personal circumstances are structured by public factors: by laws about rape and abortion, by legally fixing the minor status of a wife or by the sexual division of labor in home and workplace. Furthermore, the domestic sphere serves as 'catch basin,' i.e. substitute for a wanting state. Regulations at the workplace fall back on the »her« (the wife, the sister, the daughter, the aunt, the mother…), backing »him« up by being in charge of reproductive work. Such work in the "private" sphere say Mahmud and Nyamu-

Musembi (2011:4), therefore "should count as 'citizen action'; as a valid contribution to the polity - the construction of citizenship."[334]

In the second discourse developed by Weintraub, the political and the public are nearly congruent. (At the same time this approach excludes everything non-political from the public as Habermas does when restricting the meaning of *Öffentlichkeit* only to discourse and neither to the state, the market, nor the family space, cf. Habermas 1962 + 1974.) Equating in such way political space (public interest) with a space of deliberation and collective self-determination (public agency) is considered as (ideal) element of democracy (Weintraub calls it the republican legacy of European political history).

The third of these discourses again is considered the least political by Weintraub, but even if such understanding of public may not be not focused on solidarity, obligation or collective decision making (so Weintraub 1997: 18), one should not discount the effects of such face-to-face encounters in making strangers »concrete others« (Mead) and thus fostering solidarity. A culture of encounters (*Begegnungskultur*) mitigates the often-lamented anonymity, impersonality and instrumentalism of *Gesellschaft*. Though *urbs*, a shared space in the city, does not necessarily lead to *civitas*, a city as political community, *civitas* relies on the provision of *urbs*. Public sphere (*Öffentlichkeit*) relies on public space (*öffentlichem Raum*). It is telling that the public sphere was first a cultural phenomenon (processions, restaurants, cafes, literature, public concerts and exhibitions) before it developed in the form of a secular political discourse transcending the exchange of thoughts and perspective among religious scholars (cf. Habermas 1962, Hölscher 1978). Retreating to family homes, closed social circles – as *barkada* or as romantic twosomeness (*Zweierkisten*), specialized websites and exclusive clubs and subdivisions may strengthen particularistic bonds (*Gemeinschaften*), identities and actions, but at the same time probably weakens citizenship for the *Gesellschaft*. "The emotional »overloading« of the domain of intimate relations in the course of bourgeois society – having to satisfy all the aspirations of its members for love, care, companionship, consolation, nurture and protection - developed in tandem with the increasing emotional emptiness and isolation of an inhospitable public domain," as Weintraub (1997: 22) believes.

In Bayat's concept of "social non-movements," intermediate spaces of public interaction play a pivotal role: "Solidarities develop primarily in public spaces, in neighborhoods, at street corners, in mosques, at work, at bus stops, in food distribution, in prisons, migrant camps, public parks, universities and sports stadiums - by passive networks, as I called them. These passive networks play an important role in the

---

[334] Not every feminist scholar shares though the equation of politics with exercising citizenship: Ruth Lister (cited in Jones /Gaventa 2002: 21) distinguishes between what she considers "political citizenship" from what she terms "personal politics." She argues that although the two are dialectically interrelated, "not all politics necessarily counts as citizenship." Lister distinguishes campaigning in public for men to do their share of housework and simply sorting out the division of labor in one's own home and considers the first case citizen action, while the latter case is not. This distinction touches the general definitory decision whether to restrict action to intention and whether to include non-intended effects or not.

formation of non-movements. They are caused by the direct communication between atomized individuals, through the silent recognition of similarities, directly mediated in public places or through the mass media" (Bayat 2012: 41).

Coming back to the concept of "strategic power" (power to disrupt) pointed out in the first part of this work, also make obvious how important the street is for marginalized and the informalized as the only remaining place for political action, a phenomenon Bayat calls "street politics"(2012: 74ff.).

Furthermore, considering the effect this has on politics, i.e. by making the hidden and excluded visible (gay parades in Moscow, women no longer confining themselves to the house, poor people showing up in events of the rich like in the beggar parade in the Three Penny Opera of Brecht) and the strong reactions it elicits, it can be considered an important expression of citizenship to (re)claim access and representation in the public sphere.

The dichotomy of public and private in whatever way is an oversimplification, or in the words of Max Weber an "ideal type." That something is accessible and visible to all, in all's interest and done in the name of everyone (or even by everyone) is a strong democratic norm, but as real type, it is an exception. Several spaces are rather of semi-public or communal quality; characterized by partial access, agency and interest for a limited group, but also including spaces undisturbed by dominating powers [open space], which may serve as counter space, where hidden transcripts are practiced and interventions into the open transcript (acts of citizenship) are prepared. All-women organizations in the Philippines, for example, can be considered as such a counter space (Reese 2010b: 147). There is thus an ambivalent relationship between power and space. On one hand, power excludes from relevant spaces, on the other hand, the spaces neglected by power are where counter force develops.

»Public« and »private« can be regarded as matters of degree; things are 'more or less' public or private. But at the same time they are normative terms, defining the limits of social invention (cf. Benn/Gaus 1983: 13). Defining what is public and what is private is also a question of power. No wonder that the course the boundary (definition) between private and public takes is heavily contested and the authority to define the course of the boundary is sought after. The radical redefinition of this border by the feminist movement claiming that "the private is political," thereby declaring household and family to be issues for political deliberation and intervention, can be considered as a powerful intervention into a power-laden discourse. The same is valid for the Marxist inclusion of the economic sphere into the political ("political economy") - which the liberals consider(ed) 'private.'

Feminists, as well as workers movements, here tried to erode the construction of the public space as one inhabited only by "*Bürger*" (in its double sense of bourgeois and citizen), which allowed for a "double social contract." All areas not defined as "civil society" or "state" could be governed in an "imperial" way as defined by Weintraub,

i.e. divested of deliberation and participation. »Imperial« domination of those not recognized as "citizens" within a master-subordinate relationship here is considered legitimate.

Citizens deliberating among equals on the agora or in Habermas' newspapers or coffee shops were usually *despotes*, i.e. authoritarian rulers towards the members of their household (wives, children and servants) or their business (journeymen, workers, slaves), as long as these other individuals had not been conferred with the status of citizenship. The bourgeois revolution so only partly emancipated people from being subordinates of a ruler and went along with the consolidation of the line between public and private.

Restricting "politics" to a public defined as state we find today in what Amna/Ekman consider as a too narrow a definition of participation: "refer(ing) to those legal acts by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions that they take" (2009: 6). Such a definition does not only reduce the space over which citizens may decide to the state, it as well limits democracy to representative democracy with electoral participation as the main or even only mode of political participation.

Power relations and spaces to be designed (*Gestaltungsspielräume*) though are not only to be found in relations to and between states. They are also found in society, economy and the private spheres of 'personal life' (cf. Garcelon 1997:308).[335] Therefore, political participation should also include the liquidation (in the sense of *Verflüssigung*) of naturalized social relations, i.e. the right to design any societal and human relations (be it in social, economical or cultural spaces) of influence to structures, rules, approaches and habits and the implementation of policies.

The issue of rights then cannot solely be restricted to the individual-state relation (citizen's rights only towards the state), especially where a "weak" state is not (or as consequence of neoliberal structural adjustment programs no longer) the prime actor of governance. Non-state spaces in such instances play a greater role in defining access to rights, benefits and entitlements and the state may play a negligible part in shaping entitlements in everyday life (Cornwall et al. 2011: 22).

Neoliberal governementality goes along with a redefinition of the state: The state distances itself from a position of governing directly, but assumes the role of a facilitator, instructor, activator and is merely willing to create a (business-) friendly setting (favorable investment climate) while action is left to the citizens (responsibilization). Subjects are guided to govern and help themselves and instructed to develop into a

---

[335] In this sense, Petra Purkarthofer considers separating the private from the public as an outflow of patriarchy: "Freedom rights offered protection against interference of the state into the privacy of a male head of a household. Human rights violations thus are not avenged [as in the classical liberal conception, the state's obligation to uphold the citizen's rights is largely confined to the public sphere – NR]. … For women, the private sphere is often a place of insecurity, where they are largely at the mercy of male control over their bodies, their sexuality and their labor" (Petra Purkarthofer in Ataç et al. 2011: 65+287).

certain direction. Instead of directing members of society, government is expected to animate and mobilize people to take charge of one's own fate (indirect government).

The responsibility for making decisions is transferred from formal state-based government to informal, self- or collaborative governance and is based on the readiness of individuals or communities as sort of collective individuals (families, neighborhoods, etc.) to take over responsibility. "In the context of neoliberal governementality, self-determination, responsibility and freedom of choice do not signal the limits of government action, but are themselves an instrument and vehicle to change the relation of subjects to themselves and to the others" (Bröckling et al. 2000: 30). Wolfgang Foch (following ibid.: 110) calls this "governing from a distance," in which the state "limits itself to call for public spirit, which gets the counterpoint of a centralist and patronizing government of the social allegedly paralyzing individuals." [In more detail on the role of the state in neoliberal governementality cf. Opitz 2004 and Reese 2004a]

Absenteeism from formal politics and family orientation are then not per se a sign of lack of citizenship and cannot automatically be equated with a private existence as also the "intermediate spaces" demonstrate (see above). Regarding the little leeway politics offer in times of neoliberal hegemony or elite democracy, absenteeism from formal politics might even be considered a political decision!

It might be to the point that women (just like people from the underclass) follow lesser a general approach in politics and are more into concrete politics (like stressing the choice of candidates instead of political programs); this though could also be an expression of a higher, instead of a lower political sense, considering the few political choices "low-intensity democracy" (Tony Evans) offers. Then a male (or middle-class) approach of simulating political choice would less be a sign of political maturity and realism but rather a expression of performing maleness and middle-classness, as to both of them, performing autonomy and mastery is a crucial part of their habitus.

Reductionist constructions of the political nevertheless made the struggles especially of poor women invisible as their struggles focus more on everyday struggles, on concrete and more immediate objectives than men's struggles do (Daines/Seddon 1994). Such struggles are usually not considered to be political, even if women are "often the first to protest"(ibid: 77). But 'overseeing' social movements mainly made up by women like the food riots Daines and Seddon focus on, has been effective not only of reducing the »political« to the state, but also on focusing on conflicts over the means of production, which has for long dominated the research on social movements. Such focus on the struggles of production workers (preferably male workers in car factories as symbol of modernity) gets even more problematic when a) flexibilization and informalization run rampant and b) it can no longer be regarded as self-evident that "employment serves as the sole, organizing center of life and as reference point of self-presentation (*Selbstthematisierung*) and social positioning in society," as Karl

Hörning and Matthias Michailow (in Berger/Hradil 1990: 505) believe (Cf. the chapter 3.21.: Transc*ending the workplace as arena of struggle).*

In (so-called) Third World settings, it is even more pertinent to broaden the terrain of citizenship. With welfare state structures largely absent (Wood [2004] speaks of "informal security regimes"), social conflicts in cities rather erupt over the allocation and the control of means of consumption. In Third World cities, the most intense social conflicts occurred over issues of land rights, housing, eviction and access to water and basic services, all of which are consumption issues. Collective identities underlying social mobilization of the poor in Third World cities have typically revolved around these issues rather than around class-based issues of jobs, labor rights and union organizing (Karaos, 2006: 94).

Such "subsistence mobilizations" (Velasco 2006) are often classified solely as coping strategies which 'only' intend to ensure 'basic needs.' But they may be considered political as well. Here I agree with Daines and Seddon who assert that "the sharp distinction between 'defensive' survival struggles, which focus on 'adaptation' and 'coping' ... and 'offensive' strategies, which aim at extending the room for maneuver and enhance livelihood security through development of social networks and mutual empowerment, is somewhat misleading" (Daines/Seddon 1994: 63f.). The tapping of water and electric current - a widespread practice in squatter settlements in Third World cities - are coping mechanisms, and at the same time, they can be a sign of protest and everyday resistance as the tappers believe that they only take what they are entitled to, not accepting the concept of absolute property pivotal to bourgeois society. Disrespecting this concept in situations of need and destitution is not considered to be thievery following traces the pre-capitalistic concept of the "commons" left in the political mindset of the common people (likewise Tadiar 2004). The Filipina political scientist Frances Lo refers to this as "pockets of resistance" (personal interview, January 2007).

Likewise, the immediate vicinity is not only a space where women especially are active, but which is the preferred space of action for poor people as well: Studies have observed in Germany that among the activities in the lowest quintile of society, "friendly turns" for neighbors, friends or relatives dominate (Klatt/Walter 2011; Munsch 2003). Excluding these activities from forms of engagement creates an "observational problem," as Klatt/Walter (2011: 39) carefully term this class-bias. This "problem" is aggravated by the fact that lower class people often do not mention such friendly turns when asked about their involvement as they consider it "for granted," "a daily affair" and "not worth mentioning" and as it lacks formality (Klatt/Walter 2011: 106). "Some respondents only realized when deliberately asked, that their actions are a kind of (civil) involvement, but that they themselves would never call it as such" (Klatt/Walter 2011: 129).

Having made perennially negative experiences in occupational life or in dealing with government bureaucracy, only friends, neighbors, and last but not least, the family still offer some kind of reliability, say Klatt and Walter (2011: 31). This is why responsibility is first assumed within the vicinity (usually consuming all activity). This way, quarters "facilitate inclusion, especially where neighborhoods have developed and friendship ties exist. The spatial proximity allows for a simpler organization of community life. The higher the distances to be covered, the less often community activities take place" (Klatt/Walter 2011: 96).

The space outside of one's own community is furthermore considered to be terra incognita, in general: foreign territory: There, others have the say, make the rules and decide how these are to be interpreted – and where a language is dominant which is highly incomprehensible for them, like for instance legal language (or English in the case of the Philippines).[336] Lower class people do not feel comfortable to move around in these spaces as they are prone to getting into trouble and ordinary people expect to be treated in a derogatory way at work, in public offices or by people of higher ranking; which is why "you stay where you know the ropes“ (Klatt/Walter 2011: 98, 101).[337]

Not only is the vicinity a familiar space, it is also where everyone knows everyone well, especially if there is little fluctuation in population, while in the world of work, precarious employment relationships allow much less for building sustainable and resilient relationships. Politics is not only "up there" but also "out there."

Here also lies a reason for the heavy reactions whenever the life world gets "colonialized" (Habermas) by »public« (i.e. middle-class) interventions and "freedoms" like smoking, playing music loud or wearing a hijab, are fiercely defended.

The observations Klatt, Walter and others made in German lower class quarters relate to many observations that can be made among ordinary people in the Philippines and in other "societies in development" as well. For the Brazilian context, Wheeler (2005) and Kühn (2006) state that the subaltern tend to define their obligations far more narrowly in terms of looking after themselves or their immediate families. This coincides with a statement an unemployed respondent made in Klatt/Walter (2011: 129): "I cannot be responsible for society, [because] I actually do not participate in society" and also corresponds with a study on "status fatalism" in the German lower class: "The majority of the bottom 20% openly (sic!) admit to hardly concern themselves with social and political developments, but exclusively with their own vicinity,

---

[336] For the Egyptian context, Bayat observed something similar: the conditions for formal political involvement are (considered) as biased towards middle-class habitus. Commoners consider it as foreign territory showing "distrust of modern state and institutions" (1997: 60).

[337] This though should not neglect the importance of public space of leisure for lower class people. Public places, playing grounds or public parks (like the Peoples' Park in Davao City) are places lower-class people hang out due to the lack of purchasing power to enter private leisure institutions like restaurants, cinemas or the like (similar for the German context: Klatt/Walter 2011: 160; 211f.).

[also because] a large majority of the lower classes believe they cannot do anything anyway"(Köcher 2009).

Following a broader understanding of "political" in the tradition of the feminist theory, as well as of James Scott or Michael Foucault, would also mean to locate the beginning of 'political activity,' 'protest' and 'resistance' before they get visible in public and performed in a collective manner (rallies, strikes, uprisings, revolutions). This is what James Scott calls for when he complains that "much of the active political life of subordinate groups has been ignored because it takes place at a level we rarely recognize as political" (Scott 1990: 198). Using Scott's terms: There is a hidden transcript before the open transcript.

Many studies on women empowerment furthermore observed interactions between the experiences of agency in either sphere, the public arena or in other dimensions of their lives and changes could be observed in both directions (cf. Jones /Gaventa 2002: 28).[338] Activities in intermediary spaces do not only play an important role for service delivery or community cohesion but (in the case of associations active here) also serve as "building blocks of democracy," where "members learn about their rights, and develop more effective citizenship skills and practices [and serve as] schools of citizenship transforming the outlook of their members and in doing so, helping to reconfigure social relations" (DRC 2011: 21).[339]

All these show how arbitrary the delineation of the public from the private is – and that fuzziness is rather the norm than the exception. Therefore, feminist citizenship theory (Yuval-Davis 1997) does not only question the relegation of women to the private sphere, but also pleads for a re-conceptualization of the boundaries between the public and the private, traversing the conceptual boundaries which separate issues of nation and state from those of family, community or identity. The DRC's work likewise argues for understanding citizenship in a more multidimensional way, in which citizens may express their voice and demands and exert agency not only in the realm defined as political, but also in relationship to other social, ethnic and religious identities and in other social, economic, household, global, or local spheres. While "peo-

[338] Likewise Hansen (in Weintraub/Kumar 1997: 293) who observed that "because the realm of the social constituted a meeting ground where interactions were rooted in everyday contacts and broadly shared assumptions, it also proved a fertile ground for politicization."

[339] The same holds true in a historical view on the forms of social self-organization such as clubs, purpose-driven citizen's initiatives, religious communities and foundations, as well as philanthropic projects – which could be found in Europe and America, but also in China or the Muslim societies: "From organizing such seemingly apolitical projects, often it was only a small step to get involved in other matters of personal interest and general importance " (Osterhammel 2010: 856). And Osterhammel adds, "not only in the US and in the UK, political movements and civil associations could serve as schools of democratization especially as far as their manners were concerned; spaces of learning a way of relating to one another not determined by status. Demands for equality were often first articulated in milieus, groups and organizations, where objectively equal gathered, and practiced in social intercourse with each other. They could then more successfully be accentuated in larger and more conflictual political arenas" (Osterhammel 2010: 864). Social democracy, starting off as an associational movement, is but one example mentioned by Osterhammel (ibid.). The same can be said about self-help groups and citizen action groups in Germany (Claussen/Geissler 1996: 291; 459-466).

ple can act as citizens in one context and subjects in another ... non-participation may be an appropriate political strategy in some circumstances" (Cornwall 2011: 22). The frame of reference in which the claiming of rights happens is not only socially diverse, it is also of different geographical scope and may be as small as the family or a relationship and as big as the "global community."

4.4. The (nation) state: is it still *the* space of agency and entitlement?

During the past decades, (nation-)states have been greatly transformed by a "triple squeeze" (Gaventa and Tandon 2010): a) 'from above' through globalization, with several regulatory powers being ceded to international regulatory institutions; b) 'from below' through the partial decentralization of political, fiscal and administrative powers to local counterparts; and c) 'from the sides' through the privatization of some functions. "Interrelationships of levels of authority along a scale running from local to global" (ibid.: 5) have developed, going along with a multiplicity of memberships, of governance arenas and of duty holders, including governments, regional and intergovernmental organizations and multinational corporations.

Neoliberally inspired policies have furthermore thinned out public service in the North and "squeezed" the developmental state in the Global South by structurally (re)adjusting it and bringing its expansion to a halt. Brühl et al. (2001) speak of a "privatization of world politics." The developmental state as mission statement with its promise of 'catch-up development' was cancelled; it anyway only remained more or less a promise unlike the welfare state in the Global North. With the debt crisis in the early 1980s, the target was no longer the development of these societies, but their ability to service their debts. Trade and financial markets were liberalized, social and environmental protection deregulated and several (in most cases often only rudimentary) public institutions privatized - all in the service of a radical "consolidation" of public finances, of opening up to the world market for the sake of export promotion and the creation of a favorable investment climate. Private initiative and the market were credited with (almost) anything, the state with nearly nothing. The state more and more turned away from providing services of general interest, i.e. comprehensively providing social infrastructure, and withdrew from societally vital areas - in the form of privatization of public goods and services, by slashing subsidies, correcting the market and promoting the weaker sectors. "Rolling back the state and unleashing the markets" was now the marching order.

The Philippines has submitted to countless structural adjustment programs (SAPs) showing such impact – and has at the same time, devolved some of the state functions to the local level via the Local Government Code of 1991. The SAPs deepened the social divide into beneficiaries and losers of modernization and made the satisfaction of basic needs more dependent on purchasing power as the Structural Adjustment Review Initiative (SAPRI) documented in 2001 (cf. www.saprin.org) - and as the recent developments in Greece show. The imposed export orientation had the effect

that the production of cash crops and luxury goods like flowers or bananas took precedence over the satisfying basic needs or auto-centered development, as it was now the purchasing power of the consumer in the north deciding on the direction of production. Next to the migration of doctors (who became nurses) and other professionals to the West, in the Philippine case, cash crops (tropical fruits and agro-fuels) were grown where rice and other basic food items for the country's own population used to be grown.

In 1987 the Philippines passed an "Automatic Appropriation Law" as part of a loan conditionality. This automatically gives priority to debt servicing before spending a single centavo on rights-based state obligations (education or health among others). Likewise, vital services were devolved to the market, such as the water service and the power utilities in Manila and other cities, subsidies were cut and strategic sectors deregulated such as the power sector in 2001 and the oil market in 1998. Since then, prices for electricity, water and power have at least doubled (cf. *Bearing the brunt of neoliberal policies,* Bulatlat.com, 13.12.2013 and Manila Times, 11.12.2013*).*

To fulfill its state obligations, the Philippine government needs to seek other avenues for the financing of infrastructure, such as public-private partnerships (PPPs) entered between the government and business entities. The government's medium-term development plan declared the private sector to be the "main engine of national development." This logic of service delivery does not rely on need but on purchasing power and this point was directly articulated by President Aquino when declaring at the Mindanao Power Summit in April 2012: "Everything has its price and people have to pay a real price for a real service. There are only two choices: pay a little more for energy, or live with the rotating brownouts" (Sun Star Davao, April 13, 2012). [In more detail on privatization in the Philippines: Reese 2013g.]

By unleashing the markets, reducing social policies to the "essential" and bringing the people to take responsibility, neoliberal inspired politics reduced the state (or in the case of developmental states, its mission statement) nearer to the liberal vision of a minimal state (see the subchapters 4.1.1. on neoliberal citizenship and 3. 8. on responsibilization above) – a vision, which includes the provision of capital-friendly environment (cf. Reese 2013g). The basic task of such a (neo-) liberal minimal state remains to be protecting existing property rights and thus uses the state's monopoly of force for this purpose. In line with this, the President Arroyo in 2008 set up an "investment defense force" in 2008 for the protection of mines, power lines and other infrastructure (Philippine Daily Inquirer. 8.2.2008).

Social programs implemented by the government, such as the *Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program* (4Ps), a conditional cash transfer program in the Philippines, target the "extreme poor" who can still be put to use, hence its focus on education and health of children and young people. This program is also mainly financed by loans. Rudimentary social safety nets in education and health (like the basic universal health insurance), are supposed to contain extreme poverty, and at the same time function as "investments in people," so that they may become "productive partici-

pants in the economy" (Secretary of Finance Cesar Purisima, Philippine Star, 22.7. 2011). In the meantime, budgets for other social expenditure and agrarian reform were stunted, and public spending for rural infrastructure remains low, while public service is further privatized, as what ongoing in the case of several public hospitals.

Here, the neoliberal lean state shows interesting parallels to the "productivist welfare regimes" (Ian Gough in Wood 2004) the East Asian Tigers followed long before. Social obligations here are also considered mainly as a task for communities and families, another expression of the responsibilization paradigm.[340]

However the state has not been, since time immemorial, the way to mainly regulate the public sphere. Only when the absolutist and cameralist state consolidated (with the claim to be the overarching public and overriding allegiances to clerical as well as feudal rulers) and state structures were expanded and intensified, did the "public" get slowly equated with "state" (cf. Hölscher 1978: 421). The absolutist state no longer intended to only be an "outer state" (*res bellicae*), but aimed to be an "inner state" (*res pacis*) as well, incorporating the care for its subjects into its raison d'etre.[341]

At the same time, society was politicized in the course of state formation from the top as Greven (2009: 54) points out. The subjects were disciplined and turned at the minimum into passive citizens. All areas were brought under control by extending administration and jurisdiction, education got compulsory, the domain was converted into the fiscal state, welfare state institutions were expanded, and suffrage was universalized, also to gain through elections comprehensive acceptance of rule. The state covered everyone and everything, technically there was no escape from the state anymore. All this brought people's daily lives more and more in contact with "politics," which got pervasive.

Unlike what the myth of the bourgeois society narrates, it has not been citizenship from below, but citizenship from above, which was the more dominant way of how rights and entitlements were institutionalized (which again holds especially true for states such as Prussia and Austria-Hungary, but probably also for the colonies wherever colonial subjects were endowed with rights). Even today, this phase of nation building might be for most Filipin@s the predominant experience, while "citizenship from below" is still an experience for them to make.[342]

---

[340] Next to prohibiting strikes, developmental authoritarism also prescribed wage and social dumping; at the same time, this welfare regime implemented agrarian reform, undertook infrastructure development and the training of human resources, so that such mixture of selective opening and protectionism created after all wealth.

[341] In detail cf. Rainer Gömmel (1998): Die Entwicklung der Wirtschaft im Zeitalter des Merkantilismus 1620-1800, München: Oldenbourg.

[342] Greven even considers protest based on a moral economy once the "limits of acceptability" have been transgressed (i.e *sobra na*), as an expression of the protesters mainly considering themselves merely passive citizens (bearer of entitlements), as long as they exhaust themselves in pure protest. But the "*sobra na*" may also have a politicizing effect, namely when the subjects draw the conclusion to now take things into their own hands and no longer leave them to the rulers. As the editorial in the May 11, 2014 edition of the Sun Star on the ongoing power crisis in Mindanao with the telling headline *Power in our hands* exclaims: "We can't expect much from the National Government. … Forget it. This administration doesn't get it. We are to blame, ergo, let's simply all go off-grid. Why should we do that and allow the national government to sleep on its job to provide basic facilities

Slowly, the (nation) state turned into the classical locus of rights, guaranteeing and protecting them; the "etatisation" (*Durchstaatlichung*, Osterhammel 2010: 880) of duties and rights and the control by the state apparatus over its own population increased, albeit slowly (cf. Osterhammel 2010: 1288).

Before - and alongside – of the court-state, several political orders outside its realm existed (cf. Osterhammel 2010: 821-825). For South-East Asia, Scott (2009: 36) points out that "depending on the location and date, such units might range from nuclear families to segmentary lineages, bilateral kindreds, hamlets, larger villages, towns and their immediate hinterlands, and confederations of such towns." In the long run, "living in the absence of state structures has been the standard human condition" (ibid: 3).[343]

Certain characteristics of the modern state, such as the professionalization of public service, the monopoly of force and the rule of law (which pushed aside personal rule and violence), are hardly openly questioned nowadays (which does not mean that they are fully realized). Despite its revolution against absolutism, liberal tradition did not throw overboard the assumption that even pluralist and modern societies need an overarching, ultimate authority (a Leviathan in the words of Thomas Hobbes), a role increasingly taken over by the supra-confessional "civil religion" of liberalism. Especially since the economic middle class (*Wirtschaftsbürgertum*) had an interest in ensuring that an efficient state apparatus was developed, acting in a rational manner creates larger markets (Osterhammel 2010: 572).

The principle of people's sovereignity (be it in form of liberal representation or of republican deliberation) is also hardly contested nowadays. Instead of simply basing rule on the grace of God, a more intimate relationship between populations and their rulers was considered necessary to integrate modern societies - being complex, pluralist and differentiated, individualistic and secularized "*Gesellschaften*" (Tönnies).

Even dictatorships nowadays base themselves on a given or asserted will of the people - and usually go about the conduct of voting and elections to document such will. Ferdinand Marcos for instance, who declared martial law and abolished Congress in 1972, held numerous plebiscites to legitimize his continuation in power and assumption of extraordinary powers and even called local (1980), parliamentary (1978 and 1984), and presidential elections (1981 and 1986) in the course of his dictatorial rule.

---

for all? Simply because we know, the national government will just charge us higher anyway for the same lousy services we are getting, and by going off-grid, we deny them (sic!) of our precious pesos." Such is what the Third Estate did in 1789, finally forming new power relations, in which they now dominated others.

[343] In the course of the development of state structures in South East Asia, such social and political orders were considered "uncivilized," just like in 19th century Europe. "Civilized" now got equated with being an obedient and tax paying subject as Scott (2009: 99f.) points out: "Much of the actual content of what it means to be »civilized,« to be »Han«, to be a proper »Thai« or «Burman« is exhausted by being a fully incorporated, registered, taxpaying subject of the state. Being »uncivilized« is, by contrast, often the converse: to live outside the ambit of the state. … Major elements representing a »civilized« existence happen to coincide with life in the padi state: … recognizing a social hierarchy with kings and clerics at its apex and professing a major salvation religion - Buddhism, Islam, or, in the case of the Philippines, Christianity."

Instead of considering the people as a bunch of uncivilized and philistine subjects, and mere addressees of acts by the ruler, the people were now thought of as sovereign political community, whose members ideally share a common history and culture (Hölscher 1978: 433).

They were thus not only considered citizens, but a nation. That this "modern functional equivalent of a formerly religiously based normative integration" (Greven 2009: 36) is often to a large extent an "imagined community" (Benedict Anderson) that fell into oblivion the more people made the "national" culture and especially the "national" language" part of their identity; considered the "national" territory as their homeland; and, the "national" government the institution to whose services they are entitled (Osterhammel 2010: 176ff.). Needless to say that nation building – which nowadays is considered an essential part of modern statehood – often went along with violence, exclusion and the masking of class and cultural divisions.

While in the Middle Ages, people living in the mingle-mangle of territories of a certain ruler did not consider themselves being part of a common people simply because they had the same overlord (Ansary 2010: 213); it was first rulers who identified themselves with the nation before finally it was no longer a person the people owed loyalty to, but an abstract nation. Now "people endured a flood of regulations by the authorities in the name of national uniformity, national interest and national honor they would have rather resisted in earlier times" (Osterhammel 2010: 1289). The enforcement of citizenship so therefore went hand in hand with the creation of disciplined, (more) uniform subjects. The container state as a model was born, despite the fact that nation-states continued to be integrated into translocal and transnational socio-economic, cultural, but also political contexts. (Europe by the way made significant use of achievements for instance from China or the Islamic world and imitated these when modernizing its technological, scientific, but also its political sphere [cf. Osterhammel 2010: 871f., Comaroff/Comaroff 2012: 23ff.].)

Only in the 20th century did the state reach the peak of its expansion after democratization, permanent militarization and the establishment of welfare state structures (development of an education system, public utilities and the professionalization and expansion of social and administrative services) had taken place - without all elements existing at the same time and to an equal extent. The development and expansion of the welfare states did not begin until the end of the 19th century, marginalizing for political reasons as in the German case cooperative solidarity (which was a stronghold of the workers' movement). The development of the welfare state can more likely be explained as a response to structural challenges rather than for cultural reasons (e.g. as realization of western civilization). In the 19th century, it was not only in continental Europe but also in the Muslim world when private charity (whether individually or via monasteries and foundations) was replaced by state social policy (Osterhammel 2010: 334); meanwhile, at the same time, the Chinese central government ran out of means to *continue* its welfare policy (Osterhammel 2010: 312f).

In the 1970s, the state reigned like never before (cf. Osterhammel 2010: 892f.). This expansion of public service went along with a growing codification of social rights as well as a stronger sense of entitlement to state service (Hilpert 2013: 325).

Thomas Marshall distinguishes in the sequence of the implementation of rights three generations of rights as explicated in his lecture *Citizenship and social class* (Marshall 1950): civil rights in the 18th century were amended by political rights in the 19th century and finally by social rights in the 20th century. Now welfare benefits were no longer based on grace (typical for feudalism), but on a legal claim (typical for bourgeois societies); the implicit rights within patron-client relationships were formalized and made enforceable.

The codification of these three types of rights was followed by the set-up of corresponding state institutions for the servicing and enforcing the rights claims - respectively the rule of law and interest representations, such as parliaments and the welfare bureaucracy. In the course of time, guaranteeing social rights including the rights to welfare, work and income, to health and education got part of the raison d'être of the state – through its codification in UN declarations of human rights which are legally binding by any signatory state.

Social rights and the setup of (extensive) services for the public (*Daseinsvorsorge*) though were the most controversial. What is undisputed in continental and Northern Europe is considered "socialism" by American conservatives. This was one reason why nation-state in the West took different shapes – boiling down to either a Rhinish-encompassing or an insular-minimalist state. In this variance, the Western state served as model and benchmark for statehood and good governance in the context of decolonization, globalization and the emergence of new states around the globe.

"After the second World War, the standardization of the world became the declared program of world politics and was accelerated on an unprecedented scale under the guiding principle of 'development'," says Wolfgang Sachs (1997: d1). The economic and social model of western industrial nations was declared a universal goal and a universally valid path of development, exemplified by the USA as premier model (same model was also used for the rebuilding of European societies after the war). Instead of considering 'many paths to modernity' possible, those states not corresponding to the Western model were considered 'underdeveloped'. »Development« with the promise to create "prosperity for all," as a election slogan in 1960s Germany went, was the dominant rhetoric of world politics - as reflected in its most influential model, i.e. Rostow's *stages of economic growth* (cf. in more detail: Reese 2006a).

In the meantime, "the nation-state had become the global norm for political advancement and citizenship was seen as integral aspect of prosperity and modernization" (Castles/Davidson 2000: 1). Along with market economy, civil rights, public service and economic growth, citizenship got an element of the dominant development paradigm, equating development with westernization. But before considering this pro-

cess merely a neo-colonial ploy, the appeal of the Euro-American development path should not be underestimated, as the historian Clive Ponting explains: "The fact that one part of the world has moved from a state of poverty to a state of affluence through industrialisation has, despite all problems of affluence, encouraged the rest of the world to try to follow suit" (In: ibid.: *A Green History of the World*, London, 1991, p. 340). Likewise, Osterhammel explains that Japanese modernization in the Meiji era took place in a "triangle between traditional requirements, emulation of western models and indigenous will to modernize" (2010: 876). But modernization was also 'helped along' by (neo-) colonial structural adjustments in the context of colonial regimes and by imposing principles of good governance as requirements for aid and loans (for the Philippine case study cf. Christina Evangelista Torres: *The Americanization of Manila 1898-1921*, Quezon City, 2010). And the development discourse assumingly also deepened and strengthened the "colonial mindset." Individuals and societies now perceived themselves widely (even more) as poor, deficient, underdeveloped, inferior and truly in need of support.

This development of the state – as Osterhammel points out in contrast to evolutionary theories of history - was not an automatic process, as if driven by an invisible hand, but controlled by social developments and political decisions (Osterhammel 2010: 821). This also means to consider the Western European state conception as historically contingent: the principle of territoriality only made sense as land as a resource got more important than the control over people; the need for overriding allegiance (to the nation) only when religions, communities and cultures could not (longer) coexist; citizenship rights were granted, where masses needed to comply; and, the welfare state established where traditional protection mechanisms crumbled.

It is one thing to consider a state as desirable and another to consider a certain specification of state as inevitable: "Considering the European state as »normal« would mean to let history in those parts of the world [which were colonized] taper with inevitability towards colonial conquest and reorganization. In fact colonialism was not the gentle *telos* of historical development, but from the perspective of those affected, an often brutal intervention" (Osterhammel 2010: 821).

Considering the development of the state as contingent, but not teleological, also implies that historical 'adjustments' can be made any time, as the transition from Fordist to neoliberal governementality since the 1970s demonstrates. Why then insist on the state as enforcer of social security and provider of public service(s) - and not return to its liberal version as mere guarantor of political and civil rights?

For formal freedoms to get real, civil liberties and political rights (ensuring formal self-determination) need to be backed up by enforceable cultural, economic and social rights such as adequate social security and sufficient access to resources, so they can »really« be made use of (material self-determination). Political freedom draws on

economical sovereignty, or as the professor for economic ethics Peter Ulrich points out: "If political liberalism is serious about its own claim of universal legitimacy and neutrality in relation to conceptions of the good, it must also be serious about the socio-economic conditions of *real* freedom and *livable* equality of opportunities among people - both is inseparable" (Ulrich 1997: 265). In order to guarantee such "real freedom," circumstances need to be guaranteed that protect from "being forced to stand one's ground under market conditions" (Ulrich 1997: 375) - or using the terms of welfare theory: there is a need for decommodification.

Protection from governmental and societal paternalism, control and violence - main concerns for the liberal promoters of human rights – is worthless without adequate social protection (economic independence). When people are forced, out of the need to survive, to accept inhumane working conditions, i.e. sell their human dignity on the market, or as in the case of the Filipino large-scale mining, to 'swap' the destruction of their environment for the construction of a school and other benefits, human rights and self-determination remain a privilege of the wealthy.

Social rights are thereby not only a prerequisite for the right to be the subject of one own's life, but also for the right to participate in the design of and decision about society (right to participation). Interviews with marginalized in Germany have yielded that security of tenure and material safeguards are considered a constitutive basis for public involvement (Klatt/Walter 2011: 204). Munsch came to similar conclusions in her research, stating that commitment is based not only on the possibility of deciding on one's life and social recognition, but also on material security (Munsch 2003: 10). In the case of favela dwellers in Rio de Janeiro, Wheeler (2005) observed that even with an increased awareness of rights, marginalized and excluded groups are unlikely to consider themselves true citizens as long as they have no access to adequate housing, health care, clean water or unpolluted living areas. And Böhnke/Dathe (2010) observed that the higher the income, the level of education and the security of tenure, the higher the political and social activity. Their conclusion: "You must be able to afford commitment in the first place" (ibid.: 15). While the reasons for political (non-) involvement of the subaltern and the precarious are more diverse and not simply traceable to economic precarity and social insecurity – as pointed out in the first part - at least they are one of the causes for political inaction. The Philippine Human Rights organization *Task Force Detainees of the Philippines* (Boer 1996) therefore assumes, "the problem of human rights, in situations of mass poverty, is one of redistribution, of access and of needs."

It though falls short in considering eligibility to social rights as a necessity to facilitating political action; it might even be the other way round: Welfare entitlements may impede at least collective action due to their individualizing effects, as Armin Naaschi explains in his contribution on *inclusion* to the compendium *Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Grundbegriffe* (ed. by Stephan Lessenich, Frankfurt, 2003): The welfare state, points out Naaschi, is not based on mass mobilization and a framing which creates solidarity, but on individual entitlements. "It is of considerable symbolic value that the ser-

vices of the welfare state do not address collectives, but eligible individuals. Rights in the Western sense are primarily individual rights for which - sans citizenship (*Staatsangehörigkeit*) - rather attributions of individual status than group affiliations are relevant. It is this individualization of social problems that characterizes the entire arrangement of individualized help - from the apportionment of individual risks through insurance to the individual supply of medicine and the individual treatment of mental problems up to individual processing of labor market risks. One should not underestimate the individualizing effect created especially by the eligibility of individuals towards the state" (p. 350).

The connection between political participation and material foundation has not been overlooked by liberal thinkers; they though drew a different consequence: Only those economically independent should be able to obtain citizen rights as dependents cannot freely express their will (if they are considered to have a will of their own at all). Dependence thus is in itself undignifying, and already for the Ancient Greek philosophy- only those are human in the true sense a who can freely choose, as this requires independence from the necessities of life and from coercion by others (cf. Riedel 1975: 723).

Citizenship was built on independence from economic need and from being "owned" (dominium) in modern times as well: Thomas Jefferson assumes in the Notes on the State of Virginia that "dependence begets subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition" (following Rieger 2003: 229). "According to this thinking," says Rieger, "only economic independence and owning property that guarantees security allows the personal autonomy required for subordinating self-interest to the common good under the conditions of democratic self-rule" (ibid.). And Riedel concludes, "the legal capacity of a person does not follow from being a human being, but from being an owner (of rights, acts, things)" (1975: 741). Once persons applied for poor relief, they were disenfranchised of their civil rights and their right to vote not only in England but also in bourgeois France of the 19th century.

Hardly any 'enlightened' thinker drew the same conclusion as Marx did. While Marx just like them considered self-determination, i.e. freedom from servitude and alienation, to be a requirement for political and personal freedom (cf. Kamenka 1983), he for this reason demanded for social rights. [344]

---

[344] Next to the lack of economic independence, it was also illiteracy that disqualified the subaltern as citizens. In liberal thought, freedom can only be granted to those who know how to make use of it in a reasonable and responsible way. "The poor were though considered as unreasonable and as immature as children, lacking in the capacity for self-governance and interested in national wealth as little as foreigners." (Castel 2000: 208) Literacy has therefore long been a pre-requirement for citizenship rights - during American colonial rule in the Philippines, citizenship was first restricted to propertied and literate males. And even today, some Filipinos suggest to disenfranchise those who do not file income tax returns or to require voters to pass a competency test to limit the franchise to the better educated (Schaffer 2009: 135, cf. also the chapter 5.9.: *Middle class self-understanding* in the postscript).

Thomas Marshall underlines the interdependence of the different generation of rights as well: Full civil and political rights depend on a certain standard of social rights; "social rights may be just as important as political rights as an indicator of citizenship" (Castles/Davidson: 105). Mackert Marshall even "does not consider political participation of citizens the crucial integration mechanism, but the participation of all citizens in the material culture of a society" (2006: 38). And such "social citizenship"(Jones/Gaventa 2002: 9) includes not only the rights to education, health and well-being, but also "social property" like social services and public goods, i.e. social infrastructure in general (cf. Castel 2005). However, it should not be overlooked that social citizenship can go along with weak civil and political citizenship. Citizens either retire to claim social rights as provision rights (passive citizenship) or social rights go along with little democratic rights (as in socialism or corporatism).

Social security, says Castel (2005: 132) "is required for a society of the alike to develop: a kind of social structure, from which nobody is excluded as everyone has the necessary resources and rights to live with all the others in independence (and not only as dependent). This is one possible definition of social citizenship. It is also a sociological formulation of what in political terms is called democracy."

Even when one subscribes to the approach of strengthening and empowering the single individual and even if one is skeptical about how states function in a region like South East Asia, where state authoritarianism, favoritism, nepotism and development authoritarism have a long and ill-fated tradition, it is impossible to ensure public service (*Daseinsvorsorge*) and sufficient social security for all people without a supportive framework guaranteed by state institutions.

The state therefore, does not only have a crucial role to establish sustainable economic structures allowing for a national income sufficient to finance the expansion of public infrastructures and comprehensive social security for everyone. By legislation and regulation, the state should distribute the national income with equity and it also plays a crucial role even for non-state security systems: The performance of all security systems depends heavily on their economic, social, political and cultural environment. This environment is influenced for the better or for the worse by the state - either directly by actions of state organizations, or indirectly through the impact of policy and regulation of structural factors.

With this pivotal role of the state in mind, the UN human rights pact for economic, social and cultural rights of 1966, mandates all signatory states not only to *respect* such rights, but also to *protect* them where third parties do not respect these rights and finally to *guarantee* them by its own action. It is for the same reason social rights have also found their way into the Philippine Constitution of 1987: Sections 9 and 10 of article II for instance provides that "the State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ... free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all;" sections 1 and 2 of article XIII guarantees that "the Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect

and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good."[345]

The urgency of the social question has revived the argument "that society is in need of the state (*Staatsbedürftigkeit der Gesellschaft*)," as Berthold Vogel (after Dörre/Castel 2008: 384) believes. Of course, the state does not automatically act in the interest of social and universal rights and a strong state (*matatag na republika* as ex-President Arroyo called her vision) does not automatically imply the enforcement of social rights. This holds true, especially when the understanding of the state is not as an Uncle Sam (*Vater Staat*) who is "above it all," representing the collective interest, but rather when following the way Nicos Poulantzas (and also Antonio Gramsci) understands the state, which is as a "material condensation of power relationships in society" (Poulantzas following Ataç et. al. 2011: 123). For Poulantzas, the capitalist state is not a subject on its own or a neutral instrument, but neither is it something that can just be used at will by ruling groups in the way it was famously characterized in the Communist manifesto being "nothing but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie." The state here is more of a "conflict field, in which the ruling classes and its factions fight for power and domination, [but where as well] the dominated classes and social movements are present with their demands and their resistance" (Alex Demirovic following Ataç et al. 2011: 123).

In such an approach, citizenship is not considered in a voluntarist manner as *the* engine of democracy and social progress but as *one* factor of social change. Rightly Aganon et al. (2008: 17) state that "constitutions, industrial relations systems, justice systems, and economic development policies may expand or limit labor action;" nevertheless, they consider the state as essential for "providing the political opportunity for the expression of labor actions" (ibid.).

From a normative perspective, there is the need for a public structure with a claim to universal validity guaranteeing social rights – transcending solidarity and charity among people and within a social/grassroots economy. The state is not everything, but without state structures guaranteeing social rights these are highly precarious and largely a privilege of the "haves" and the "assertive. "

Compassion and moral discernment alone are too unreliable, too selective and they overwhelm resources of solidarity. The privatization of politics replacing coercion and binding forces with volunteerism (like in the context of public-private partnerships or the provision of social services by service NGOs and foundations as the Melinda and Bill Gates Foundation, which in the meantime has more money to spend

[345] Explaining the emergence of welfare and developmental states merely out of normative reasons does not go far enough. More conclusive it is to explain it a) functional (from a certain social level of development on the expansion of social security was 'reasonable'); b) with conflict theory (social interest groups such as the labor movement had gained enough power and interference potential) or c) from the angle of political power (gaining mass loyalty in a democracy). (In detail: Carsten Ullrich: *Soziologie des Wohlfahrtsstaates*, Frankfurt am Main, Campus, 2005.) The normative approach, however, is of some significance in explaining why people demand social rights, which is the topic of this work.

than the World Health Organization), weakens the legal nature of social needs, says Hartwig Hummel (in Brühl et al. 2001).

Commercialization of public services makes the satisfaction of basic needs dependent on purchasing power. This is why Hummel believes that there is a need for a legal order people can rely on and which they can enforce by legal action if necessary. "Covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all," as already Hobbes remarked. There is also a need for institutions that are providing public services and acting as duty bearer for social rights; this must not necessarily be a government-run corporation in any case, but it however requires functioning authorities regulating the market. The (individual or collective) "Do it yourself" does not only reinforce and reproduce an unequal distribution of "primary goods" (John Rawls) needed to achieve life goals of whatever sort, but furthermore leads to new inequalities to the advantage of those who can fight and have learned to fight.

There is another caveat when reflecting on the nation-state as provider of social security and as primary arena of political activity. This is not only because neoliberalism entails rolling back the state, but also because in the course of globalization, the nation state is no longer a given as the appropriate entity to solve public problems: It is too small to resolve global problems, too big to be efficient in reflecting the political will and too far from the targeted population to pinpoint the delivery of services.

Furthermore, the transnational belonging of migrants questions the nexus between citizenship and belonging to a nation. As in a migration culture like the Philippines people are globally exposed, connected and shaped, it is no longer a given that these develop a sense of nationalism, pledging their loyalty to their "motherland," just as Filipino school children do every morning all over the country.

Meaning to say: National citizenship (*Staatsbürgerschaft*) and stakeholdership are less connected than before. Stakeholdership takes into consideration that political entitlement and activity happen within actual locations. Political, economic and social institutions have to be within reach, if their direction are to be collectively decided upon, if these decisions are to be implementable and their effects controllable, so that political actors can be made accountable. The less a space seems tangible, the less people might also feel responsible for it (Sale 2014).

Institutions thus need a territorial reach in which their decisions take effect (en vigor). Even if a "post-national citizenship," anchored in "deterritorialized notions of personal rights," as Yasemin Soysal suggests (following Castles/Davidson 2000: 18 and Mackert 2006: 115f.) will be achieved, it is questionable if a post-nation in the form of a virtual commonwealth detached from space and beyond *enforcing* state structures can provide such scope. (For the class-specific dimension of the local-global continuum between "global citizens" and "local villagers," cf. Reese 2008c: 42-44 and Gaventa and Tandon 2010: 4). Approaches searching for alternatives to neoliberalism as well keep coming back to the conclusion that the nation-state must re-

main the reference point for the redemption of concrete demands, even when it comes to international legal obligations.

Sosyal as well considers universal entitlements to basically rely on a nation-state to deliver them, even if they are no longer limited by formal citizenship (*Staatsbürgerschaft*). Likewise Castles and Davidson: "The nation-state is still the key reference point for citizenship, and is likely to remain so. Global citizenship has to be built around the reality of a world of nation-states, despite the globalization of economy and culture. ... The nation-state is still the only conceivable unit for democratic citizenship, even though it is under pressure through global change" (2000: 19). Finally, Gaventa and Tandon expect that "the nation-state further on plays a critical role in opening or closing the possibilities of effective linking of rights and claims, upwards and downwards, from local to global" (2010: 26).

The state has never been the only actor of legislation (Baer 2011: 90f.), especially when not restricting the term "law" only to regulations set by the government and other formal organizations but including norms, rules and »right practices« (legal pluralism). But even if »soft law« (codes of conducts, hybrid law et al.) once again gains in importance and "the - historically not very long - period of monopolization of the law by the state now seems to reach its end" (Gessner 2002: 298), the state serves at least as a moderator, even if no longer as implementer, and also as a referee whenever needed, clears legal conflicts and legal pluralism by codifying »hard«, i.e. universally valid law. "While global communication, global trade, international scientific cooperation, multi-cultural family relationships are readily treated as an early stage of an emerging global society, the control, order and steering of such exchange relationships is still a government task in a conventional point of view" (Gessner 2002: 293).

"Nowadays there is often the need to bind private entities to the principles that were traditionally only for the state and demand from them predictability and transparency (rule of law), legitimacy and respect of others (democracy, protection of fundamental rights), because not only the state endangers freedom and equality of human beings, but private actors as well," says the law sociologist and Supreme Court justice Baer (2011: 181).

"Global citizens" (such as the notorious NGO-jet set) are additionally often confronted with the reproach that they are no longer "grounded" and get unaccountable and disconnected from the grassroots when going global. While a mobilization for rights and accountability must look beyond the national and the local to the global arena to be effective, it is the 'local' where democracy is built and where citizens participate. "This is where people usually come into contact with politicians or public officials, receive services and benefits from the state, and organize together in communities" (Jones/Gaventa 2002: 20). Furthermore, local governance provides a learning ground

for broader understanding and forms of citizenship (cf. Reese 2012b). “Hybrid citizenship” (Gaventa/Tandon 2010) - maintaining deep rootedness to the local, even while moving within and across global arenas –is not easy to achieve and to maintain.

In times of globalization, political struggles still continue to take place mainly on the level of nation-states at the most; collective political actors are therefore primarily constituted from the local to the national. Even in the case of global struggles, these consist of numerous nationally rooted actors either cooperating (global civil society) or referring to each other (as in the case of the manifold global mobilizations in the wake of the Arabian spring).

However, several of these actors belong to the “variety of new social movements,” which “radically broke with the national model of citizenship: The state is now only considered an institution that claims can be made on; the idea of a common national identity is rejected. National citizenship (*Staatsbürgerschaft*) [is here] no longer seen as a legal status, but as a social process in which individuals or social groups try to enforce rights, expand existing rights or defend threatened rights” (Mackert 2006: 19).

In this sense, we can also witness the revival of identities aside from the national belonging: While state nationalism aimed at homogeneity and tried to push aside alternative and competing forms of belonging to other groups, nowadays, identity below and beyond the nation state has gained ground again. Next to the redistribution movements based on class affiliations that were long in the limelight, movements based on identities (women's movements, indigenous movements, LGBT- or religious movements) and who were still struggling for recognition (of their dignity, but also of difference) - the so-called new social movements - gained more attention. Among these newly ‘discovered’ identities, national identity is but one and not necessarily the most important. What has been said with regards to the rigid boundary drawn between the public and private can be picked up when conceptualizing citizenship in the wane of the nation-state. Conceptual boundaries, which separate issues of nation and state from those of family, community or other belongings, call for a concept of citizenship as a “multi-tier construct” (Yuval-Davis 1997), recognizing people’s membership in a variety of collectivities and communities of belonging. Some of these belongings are multi-sited and deterritorialized - which could even include cultural elective affinities (*Wahlverwandtschaften*) and political communities like “the Left.”

What conclusions for the analysis of the empirical data can be drawn from the theoretical reflections undertaken above?

Even if citizenship is a concept which historically developed mainly in the context of European modernity, this does not make it a "non-Filipino“ concept. We could rather establish that “non-Western” societies as well own several resources and practices of citizenship. Additionally, it is rather historical circumstances and struggles that realize citizenship than cultural essentials fostering or impeding it. It is furthermore im-

portant to note that there is not one western idea of (modern) society, but there are ideally at least three typical approaches. Next to a liberal approach (which in non-Western societies is often equated with the West) ideally also a communitarian and a republican approach can be identified. These approaches differ both in their anthropology as well as in the role they accord to the state, followed by the relevance they give to rights and obligations. Communitarism and republicanism prove to be able to relate to Filipino social philosophy where intersubjective personhood (*kapwa*) stands in the center. Regarding the often heard assumption that modern society and with it a sense of citizenship are merely Western imports, it needs to be stressed that the Philippines cannot simply be described as a genuinely non-Western society, but is rather determined by cultural bricolage - as typical for postcolonial societies.

Furthermore, the question of what can be considered political reminds us not to equate being inactive in the space traditionally considered to be political (and/or not to act in the way a model citizen should act there) with being apolitical. “Proactive citizenship” exerted by “professional citizens,” as these concepts will be termed later in this work, is not the only way of how citizenship may be spelled out. Nevertheless, the nation state remains a significant space of active as well as passive citizenship which cannot easily be replaced by more “private” spaces or more local/more global spaces. I conclude from this that focusing on citizenship in the public, mainly national space as done below is thus not an anachronistic procedure.

4.5. Sense of citizenship among selected young urban professionals in the Philippines

After this second round of clarification on fundamental theoretical challenges to citizenship, the following part will introduce another round of findings within the qualitative research this work is based on and which is later embedded into general findings from Philippine society. The central question for this part is to identify what sense of entitlement (passive citizenship) we can expect especially among the precarized marginal middle class in the Philippines and what kind of action they have taken or would be willing to take to fight for their rights (active citizenship). What do they especially consider as (their) social rights? And whom do they hold as accountable for the realization of these rights? Do they expect the state to guarantee them? Do they address their political demands to state institutions in order to overcome “the informal security regime” (Wood 2004)? Do they conceive poverty and social insecurity a problem created by society and could it therefore be the starting point for collective action?

4.5.1. How to measure sense of citizenship?

Based on the theoretical framework on citizenship developed for this study, interviews with 29 respondents (who were also participants in a problem-centered inter-

view on the scope of asserting citizenship attitudes in the call center workplace), were asked to identify their profile of citizenship outside of work. Since the findings of the first research phase showed that action within the call center setting was rather meager, this raised the question of how far this reflects a generally low sense of entitlement and low profile of political action (low intensity citizenship)– or if rather, there are alternative sites for mobilization to detect citizenship qualities among the respondents. Citizenship here is defined in the two-foldness of citizenship, as follows: a) entitlement (passive citizenship) and b) agency (active citizenship).

It should not be thereby assumed that individual (but also collective) awareness of rights refers to the legal system as a whole, expressing a "general system of trust" as Raiser [2013]: 261) terms it, but it might be restricted to specific legal provisions only, and furthermore, acceptance might again be restricted to only a number of these provisions (Raiser 2011: 64). Therefore, Raiser assumes, one should not "ask comprehensively about the overall structure of the legal consciousness of individuals but about how they assess certain isolated cases" (2011: 59). The interviews were thus structured in the following way:

4.5.2. STEP ONE: profiles of citizenship

Specific items were chosen and created to identify **profiles of citizenship** capturing the following dimensions:

- Which is the respondent's preferred **space of political awareness?** This was done by identifying which space they consider "community." Here, the respondents were asked to indicate which space (like village, city, religious community or political network) they feel the most a "sense of belonging" to—in the sense of "being there for each other," "helping each other" or "feeling responsible for each other." The depth of such belonging is measured by a) the kind and number of concerns in their "community" they identify as problems and b) the urge they feel to change these problems. Meanwhile, to measure how far they feel connected to the national issues, respondents were also asked about problems facing the Philippines and where they consider change most urgent.

- After identifying the areas where change is needed, we were interested to know who they believe should be the **actors of change**: whether among these are the barangay officials, the city government or other levels of government and if they or people they know ever held any duty bearer/s accountable ("Whom would you turn to – did you do this once – do you know people who did/do that? Do you expect support or help from government institutions? Did you ever approach government institutions for help?")

- A further step was to locate their **own agency**: What kind of political activities have they been into? This included defining "political" influencing and shaping "public" in a broader sense of civil society up to intermediary spaces. Here, we also included

extending help to neighbors, friends and relatives as a way of showing public involvement following the statement of Klatt and Walter that "friendly turns" are the most common form of social activity among impoverished people, but on the other hand are usually overlooked by common political theory (cf. chapter 4.2. *spaces of the political*).

As Klatt/Walter (2011: 213) observed, lower class people do not »participate,« they »help (out)« (just like women: Reese 2010b: 138). These spaces of political action gain a greater meaning in a context wherein existing political parties are weak and other institutions such as family networks, the church, mass media, NGOs and peoples' organizations oftentimes played more visible roles for political organizing and mobilizing and serve as pre-political (counter) spaces, where citizenship skills and courage can be acquired.

How sustainable has their political involvement been? And what role does the formal political sphere play here? Can we confirm the assumption by the Pinay Voters Academy: that "many Filipinos understand political participation... only through voting, … disconnected with the greater need for and deeper understanding of democratic governance" (Trainers Manual 2010)? Do they not even engage into this minimal participation or are they beyond voting and are involved in political parties, social movements and other ways of influencing formal politics?

Taking note of the pivotal role *Öffentlichkeit* (public sphere) plays in the Habermasian theory of communicative action, acknowledged by most other theories of citizenship, this research tried to identify the *Öffentlichkeit* of our respondents: Whom do they discuss politics with (if at all)? Are such discussions part of their everyday life and where do they get their information to conduct such discussions?

Some theories of political participation extend the scope of what is considered as political participation beyond the conventional forms like accessing political information, discussing politics, voting and party or associational membership, and incumbency. While Ekman and Amna (2009) consider personal interest in politics and societal issues a form of "individual latent political participation," and lifestyle politics like wearing certain clothes as a form of "collective latent political participation," Ekman and Amna include "unconventional" forms such as boycotts, strikes or civil disobedience into their broad definition of manifest participation as well. We asked the respondents to complete their participation profile by not only eliciting modes of conventional participation (voting, reading the news…), but also including unconventional forms. Furthermore, we picked two forms of political intervention into public space that are common in the Philippines and asked the respondents their stand regarding these: political rallies (a common sight in Filipino streets) and taking up arms (a form of making political change happen especially resorted to by young people in the past decades). Do they agree to such forms and would they even do so themselves?

Finally, we took into consideration the importance specific events have for getting politicized or getting politically involved (see theoretical elaborations on political mobilization in part I): So we asked about the importance of the change in presidency in 2010 which was constructed as a turning moment in Philippine history by the media (cf. Reese 2010a). Did it have any influence on their relation to politics and/or have there been other events triggering or frustrating their taking political action?

4.5.3. STEP TWO: On political and social rights and the political system

In the second step, we were interested to get an idea on how our respondents conceive the current political system in the Philippines. Do their views mirror the negative narrative in the media and the academe (weak state, captured state, elite democracy...) or do they rather validate the nevertheless high approval ratings the democratic institutions in principle (approval of a democratic system) and the actual performance get in public surveys?[346] Should this be the case, the further question arising is: can the gap between negative discourse and positive survey results be traced to low expectations from the side of the respondents towards the outcome of the political system (low intensity citizenship)? To measure this dimension, we first asked the respondents in an open question to explain to us how in their view the political system in the Philippines works and then asked them to react to selected items from the 2004, 2006 and 2009 ISSP surveys, so we can compare their answers with the ones collected by the ISSP questionnaires.

Two items focused on acceptance of state-distant beliefs cherished in communitarian and liberal approaches: on one hand, that a working political order relies on moral virtue; and, on the other that concrete others (family and parents) are mainly responsible for the advancement of an individual. The more they agree to these statements the more they can be considered receptive to the neoliberal concept considering that the state is not (any longer) considered as universal provider of public service to which citizens are entitled to, but merely (if at all) as facilitator. The less the respondents agree to these items the more they can be considered to expect an active and developmental state involved in creating a framework for individual progress. Finally in an open question, we asked the respondents to share what they expect from government (what is the job of a government?). Views regarding this could either be further reinforced and validated by subsequent items asked about focusing on the responsibility of the government to reduce income inequalities, provide for a decent

[346] In a 2010 survey by the Social Weather Stations, 69% of Filipinos expressed satisfaction with the way democracy works in the Philippines, while 56% said democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government (PS, 22.12.2010). Likewise in the Social Weather Stations 2012 Survey on Good Local Governance, 73% of the respondents were satisfied with the performance of their local government offices and only 14% were dissatisfied (Source: PDI, 6.11.2012).

standard of living for the unemployed or the scope of guaranteeing the right to education (only up to secondary education or also beyond?).

We then added a block of discussion on social and economic rights and obligations of the state to fulfill them: Do the respondents consider the economic system to work well and do they consider Philippine society to be just and fair– and on which concept of justice is this based? This item was chosen due to the high relevance of frames for political action (cf. subchapter 3.6.6.: *Frames, opportunities and resources*). How far do they expect government to intervene in correcting inequality? On the other hand, do they consider themselves forging their own destiny? To measure this, we chose a set of questions from the ISSP on social inequality (ISSP 2009) that raised the importance of different determinants of social inequality, especially on: a) social capital, such as family background, social connections; b) ascriptive determinants, such as religion or sex; and, finally c) cultural capital such as education and work ethics. Can we validate the importance respondents gave to mental resources, personal qualification and a sense of "*eigenem Leben*" (biographical authorship) in the first part of the study, which in effect makes them susceptible to the neoliberal governementality of responsibilization? Or, do they rather affirm what analysts of Philippine social structure agree on, i.e. that "social mobility is a rare phenomenon in the Philippines. People are usually born into their respective social positions, with little change from one generation to the next. So-called »self-made men« or rags to riches success stories are few and far between." (Reese 2013c: 68).

To further capture their sense of entitlement and in how far the respondents feel attended to or neglected by the government, we showed them a video clip of the song "Para que sou" (see: www.youtube.com/watch?v=BOaHxiaJ8Vc&feature=related). This song developed into the hymn of the precarious Portuguese youth. The song talks about "What a stupid world where you study to be a slave" and the singers characterize themselves as "I am from the generation »No complain« but my generation is fed up with this stuff. This situation's gone long enough. And I am not stupid."

We already asked in the first set of problem centered-interviews about items subsumed under "latent political socialization," i.e. the development of politically significant social attitudes and cognitive skills as well as personality traits that affect political activity (that support, impede or influence it), without being explicitly (manifestly) political, as there are: self-confidence, extraversion and dominant behavior, self-esteem or sense of community, gender roles ("politics is not for women" or "As a man, you have to stand up for your family"), but also mistrust, feelings of powerlessness, meaninglessness or uselessness, cultural or social isolation or misanthropism (cf. Claußen/Geißler 1996: 61f., Wasmund 1982a: 40).

The questionnaire for this third and final interview cycle thus was composed of structured questions (several of them connected to a scale, while follow-up questions

tried to capture the reasons for ranking made), some semi-structured questions and some open questions.

Ensuring the fulfillment of social and economic needs is based anywhere on a "welfare mix"(Betz/Hein 2000). People try in their social security strategies to combine different sources to which they have access. This "arrangement of welfare production" (Kaufmann 2003: 42), includes as producers of social security—in addition to the state and social institutions (social security systems, voluntary insurance and self-help associations and cooperatives)—community institutions (family/household, village/city district and social networks); individuals (by self-care and the purchase of market products); and finally, altruistic "non-profit" organizations (mostly NGOs).

While state and compulsory social security systems in welfare states serve as pillars of social security, more or less significantly depending on which type (following Esping-Andersen) they belong to: the conservative, the liberal or the social democrat, this not however the case for "informal security regimes"(Wood 2004) such as the Philippines. Here, the family is considered the most important provider of social security (Medina 2001; Reese 2013e). Where state and market do not provide adequate social security, formal systems are insufficient and where people's self-initiative to provide for future needs is stifled, it is believed that social networks and family relationships become the main remedy against social insecurity.

To validate if this also holds true in the case for our respondents, we included several items in which they identify on whom they turn to in cases of need (illness, age, business support). Is it the state (including state run social security systems such as SSS and Philhealth)? Or, do they rather rely on their family, on community institutions or even simply rely on themselves (i.e. which role does job stability play for them)? Do they feel a sense of entitlement to any of these providers or don't they expect help from anyone else other than themselves? It is likely that stable social networks rather serve as root of survival movements (*movimientos de sobrevivencia* as Lomnitz [1975] identified them in Latin America) or other political interventions as they most likely create a sense of belonging and provide for necessary political resources. These items were already raised during the first set of problem-centered interviews.

Already in the first problem-centered interview we also asked the respondents how they think about poverty. Do they consider themselves poor or ever considered themselves to be so? How do they define poverty ("How do you identify that someone is poor or not")? And finally, which responsibility do they give to society or to the state in terms of supporting the poor? ("Is it correct to say "The poor could rise from poverty if they tried hard enough?") We extended this issue of poverty and poor people to the second problem-centered interview, trying to identify how far our respondents also consider poor people (or at least poor people) to be entitled to go-

vernment service and redistributive politics? We therefore picked up one of the most contentious and long standing social problems in the Philippines: the right of the tiller to own their land (in relation to agrarian reform). Likewise, informal settlers and their resistance against demolitions are heavily criticized by many columnists ranting against "squatters," who in turn consider themselves as "the truly marginalized and underrepresented" (Neal Cruz, PDI, 28.4.2013). Even as they themselves do not think of going on strike in the call centers "because of the benefits and salaries, one cannot even think anymore of unionizing" as an agent puts it, respondents were asked: Is going on strike at least considered a legitimate tool of expressing labor grievances for those with lesser benefits?

We also included items on poverty perception and poor peoples' rights to see if we can trace some middle-class features dealing with social (in)security among the respondents. Usually middle class members are considered to rely on their own capital (economic, educational), "the comforts and the privileges and the opportunity we struggled to attain for ourselves" (Johnna Villaviray-Giolagon, Manila Times, 22.9.2010). This often goes along with classism, i.e. believing that the poor are responsible for their miserable situation ("undeserving poor" as they were called in the 18th century England) and shouldn't rely on "dole outs" (like the Conditional Cash Transfer), while the middle class themselves believe "just being an ATM for taxes and other things" (Villaviray-Giolagon, ibid.). Undertaking such an analysis requires evidence that a first respondent considers him- or herself middle class, hence, this is the reason why we asked them to locate themselves and their family of origin in a social ladder.

Furthermore, we picked up the idea of citizenship as a "multi-tier construct" (Yuval-Davis 1997), recognizing people's membership in a variety of collectivities and communities of belonging. We therefore picked up the item on group belonging from the ISSP survey of 2003 on national identity. What role does belonging to the nation play (to which they would feel entitled)? Is this sense of belonging bigger or smaller than in welfare states (like Germany), where we can perceive a significant sense of entitlement to social services and good governance? Does their sense of belonging to a specific group correlate with their answers on whom to turn to in case of need?

Finally, we ask about their own understanding of a "citizen," which rights and duties they assign to a citizen and to which entity they should address these rights to. (This item appears only at this point as the common understanding of a "citizen" is usually closer to the German "Staatsbürgerschaft" and less as being active in influencing public affairs - the way our research defined citizenship). To find out in how far they consider the nation-state to be their most important, second most important or at least third most important space of political action, we asked if "Filipinos do enough ... to help the government in improving the country;" if the Philippines can be the place where they can achieve their life plans; and if, "there is hope for the Philippines"? They were also asked how much do they identify with being Filipino—even putting up with a malfunctioning government ("run like hell by Filipinos")?

As we might encounter elements of the often-bemoaned assumption that migration serves as an outlet for political dissatisfaction (exit instead of voice), we related the respondent's answers to their propensity to migrate (surveyed in the very first set of biographical interviews) and the ever-present discourse on migration and democracy in the Philippines. This item is of special relevance as migration is usually considered to sap the country of its potential middle class actors for social and political change.

Where applicable, in a second step, the qualitative data from the problem-centered interviews will be backed up, embedded and compared to quantitative data which were mainly taken from the mentioned ISSP surveys and completing it with other quantitative data collected in the Philippine context. Of specific importance is the checking of how far answers are class-specific, i.e. if we can discover *significant* difference/s in responses from upper-middle social strata (ABC), the lower middle strata (D) and the lower strata (E). Where applicable, these data will be compared to the ISSP findings from Germany for the sake of identifying which responses are typical for an informal security regime as the Philippines as compared to a welfare regime as Germany. At the same time, this "cross-cultural comparison" (Antweiler 2009: 17]) shall (rudiment ally) examine the assumption if we can consider concepts of citizenship to be universal, i.e. whether similar concepts can be detected in both a "developed" or a "developing" society, and b) whether variations within one of these societies are "as strong ... yes in some areas even greater" (Antweiler 2009: [9]) than between the two societies.

4.6. Perception of the political system

"To reign everything into order and to make sure that whatever would be done would make all of us lead better lives and to make sure we can reach our utmost potentials." (Answer by a respondent to "What do you think is the job of a government?)

"In honoring the financial debt of the country, the government has created a new, less visible debt: a debt to the people. We call this 'Social Debt' – debt to the poor, to the jobless, to the youth, to all marginalized sectors, especially women. Every peso paid to service the country's debt adds to Social Debt." So says Marvie Hinsoy, women's committee team leader of the Freedom from Debt Coalition – South Mindanao (in: Mindanao Times, 8.3.2012). Hinsoy considers this a debt most especially towards the ones who have to often make up for government failure, i.e. particularly the women who "have, for the longest time, taken on the responsibility of the health, well-being and development of their families" and whose "efforts are not matched by ample government service" (ibid.). This is a reminder of the heavy burden the Automatic Appropriation Law puts on the capability of the Philippine state to provide for services (without incurring new debts as in the case of the Conditional Cash Transfers).

In Hinson's statement, we can discover strong expectations towards the state, especially when it comes to providing welfare and economic upliftment. As mentioned above, the prevalent sentiment among the respondents to this study, is likewise one of dissatisfaction with the political, as well as the economic system, specifically pronounced among the Left (ex-)activists (LAs), but also among the non-Left respondents.

(In the following I will mostly just use the term activist to refer to those who were once or are still politically active. Adding an "ex-" every time makes the reading harder; it will be done though from time to time to remind the reader of the fact that not all "activists" are necessarily still active.)

Dissatisfaction implies of expectations that are not met. Which exactly are the expectations the Philippine political and economical system fails to fulfill – completely in the case of the LAs, at least partly in the case of the non-Left respondents?

To find out how their ideal state looks like, we asked the respondents next regarding a) items concerning their evaluation of the political system, b) what they consider the role of the government, c) which they consider as their political and social rights and which role citizenship plays in their being entitled to, but also obligated to the fulfillment of these rights.

The respondents in general agree to the statement "The Philippines is a democratic country." This notion though is not undisputed as the prevalence index of .70 shows. It is again only the Left (ex-)activists (LAs), who are skeptical about the Philippines being a democratic country (PI = .39), while the two other groups (non-Left activists and non-activists) very much agree to the statement (.86 and .80).

When asked to explain their answer in words, most respondents equate democracy with freedom: next to the right to vote, it is free speech (even if as one devout Catholic explains "some abuse it"[347]); where "no one is telling you what to do" (which includes the obligation that "you're not stepping on the shoes of other people") and "people can do whatever they want without even fear of arrest or. "This last statement is again questioned by Left activists referring to the many political killings of activists and journalists in the country, as this respondent does: "*Naay journalist makigbisog para sa atong katungod patyon man nila* (There are journalists who stand up for our rights but 'they' killed them)."

The focus on freedom as main marker of democracy was also reflected in the high prominence it received when asked about what rights a citizen has. Freedom was again underlined by a majority of the respondents: on one hand as freedom of

[347] "We do have freedom of expression, but we do have limitations …there should be a point that if we do something which is beyond the norm, either good or not good [the freedom of expression ends]."

speech, though not only as "right to speak their mind," but also as "right to be heard" and "to share whatever you think that other people should hear."[348]

On the other hand, freedom is also considered as the right to choose (even to choose one's gender preference as a gay respondent stressed). "*Makahimo sa iyang gusto basta dili ni siya batok sa balaud* (To be able to do what one chooses as long as it is not against the law)." The latter also includes a "right to be left alone."

Next to both dimensions of freedom, equally often mentioned was the provision of welfare, "social security and everything," with some respondents specifying it as right to health, to a (decent) job and a livelihood, to education and shelter. Some even consider the right to equality and the right to be supported in life or as one respondent puts it, "the right to be uplifted in the society." On the other hand, the right to be supported was qualified as the "right to ask my government something [only] when I really, really need that."

Of lesser relevance, but still mentioned explicitly by some respondents, was the right to bodily protection, i.e. to "be protected from any disrespectfulness, any threat" or as another named it: to safety. Again and again, it became clear that the respondents do not consider the state the only actor whom they expect to respect, protect and guarantee these rights, but that they expect these likewise from fellow citizens.

Especially for non-activists, the ideal state is a bit like a pater familias: It should lead, and "reign everything into" for peace and order and "make all of us lead better lives and make sure we can reach our utmost potentials." Especially peace and order are points highlighted by about any respondent, mostly right at the beginning of their explanations. "That's why we have so-called government *di ba* (right?), as our provider, to give us security and stability," as a Left activist says.

Several also expect the government to guide the family or the parents by laws and regulations, remind them of values and "educat(e) the people of what a fair and good government is." Furthermore, the government should inform people "what are their rights and what they can do and they cannot do." It should also "*magpromote sa atong country* (promote our country)." Finally, the government should provide opportunities, especially education and assistance to farmers.[349]

When they were then asked to shortly "explain how politics work in the Philippines," hardly any answer was positive, including from those respondents who largely

---

[348] One respondent (NA) confirmed the freedom of speaking out, stating that "one thing that I love about our politics…we can really voice out…there's really that voting system," though the statement is qualified by saying that, "but then the bad side there is, sometimes, these things are just being heard but not being acted upon."

[349] While for the non-Left respondents, education means mainly providing avenues for getting educated, but at times also, educating the people to be good and productive citizens and to be able to help themselves (*Ausbildung*). The LAs often stress as well that the people need education to be enlightened (in a sense of political education - *Bildung*) such as this respondent: "Not the kind of education right now…if you are educated you would see things in the society that you don't like." The latter though is not conceptualized as an education provided by the state, but rather by "us," i.e. activists and civil society.

believe the Philippines to be democratic country. Across the board, politics are considered either as "dirty," a "celebrity thing" or as "one big circus." Most answers turn to money, 'winnability' ("If you have money then you would run for a position then definitely you'd win") and violence ("guns, goons, and gold") - and around nepotism and connections. The government is considered to be "without a plan" or a "full-blown *gulo* (mess)"- all of these responses were coming from respondents agreeing that the Philippines is a democratic country. Such criticism on one hand expresses dissatisfaction, but on the other hand also reveals expectations!

Likewise, when they were asked what they do *not* like about the Philippines, politics, corruption and poverty are mentioned (but also "using poverty to be able to acquire favors"). Some respondents mention these issues again when asked what is/are reason/s for them to be ashamed of the Philippines: politics, politicians, corruption (and the colonial mindset). One LA is even ashamed of the "inability to change the government."

Several non-activists also express discomfort with the contentious and competitive way politics are done in the Philippines: "*Pwede nila i-clash ang both parties* (they can make both parties clash) just to make an issue," says one, while another wishes that "we all have to support their decision instead of bickering or doing things that are completely opposite to their goals."

Not all LAs again express their rejection of the statement "the Philippines is a democratic country" as harsh as this one: ""no, it's not…they say it's democratic, *pero* (but) democracy for the ones who have the money…*di man pud gud ko nagatuo og democracy* (actually, I am not a believer in democracy), so that's a piece of shit." Also a NLA (even if mainly agreeing with the statement), believes: "The Philippines is a democratic country in thought only, maybe for show."

Like in the case of attitudes regarding democracy and participation within the working place, we also discover at times strong divergences between the answers from the three subgroups (Left activists, non-Left activists, non-activists,) when it comes to democracy in general. This is why it makes little sense to operate with the overall prevalence indices of answers among the sample, and so, the findings will mainly be presented immediately according to the three subgroups.

All three subgroups are likewise undecided if democracy is suitable for Philippine development (PI from .50 to .60). And so, it is not amazing that all subgroups are similarly undecided if it matters if the government has been elected democratically or not "as long as the government secures public security, economic prosperity and efficiency" (NLAs with .53, LAs with .56, and non-activists with .58). However, we cannot assume both statements as interrelated as there is only a very weak correlation between the skepticism about democracy in both items (d_{sym}=.10). In this regard, only the non-activists in majority agree that "when the government thinks it is necessa-

ry, it should restrict democratic rights" (PI= .65). Both Left (.32) and non-Left activists (.38) rather don't think so.

The belief that "good governance relies on strong leadership with an iron hand/being a tough guy at times," on the other hand, finds most support among the NLAs (.89), while non-activists agree less (.73) and LAs are (nearly) undecided (.61).[350] We can thus see that top-down approaches resembling the longing for a good prince find considerable support among the respondents. An expression of this might be the high support the mayor of Davao City, Rodrigo Duterte, who is known as "the Punisher" for his hard-fisted approach against crime (cf. Hannah Wolff in Reese/Werning 2013: 410f.), but also for his social policies, gets among most respondents, especially those from Davao, who explicitly and repeatedly exclude him from their negative statements on government – an appreciation shared in the whole country (see figure 12 and e.g. Elias Espinoza: *The Duterte style*, Sun Star Cebu, 6.2.2014).

Figure 12: "They are like this in Davao, it should be like this for the whole Philippines." Cartoon in the Philippine Daily Inquirer in 2010.

Organizational experience again has a significant positive correlation with being critical of developmental authoritarianism. (Ex-)activists agree much less that "government should not be bothered by public opinion as long as it is doing its job" (η=-.40[351]). The LAs were especially nearly in unison in rejecting this idea (.06), while the NLAs largely disagree (.21). The non-activists though are nearly undecided (.40).

In general, as far as the different statements linked to authoritarian attitudes are concerned, we only observe a weak tendency to a closed authoritarian mindset among our respondents, based on the correlations between the different statements.[352] That the LAs as a whole show the least support for authoritarianism is though observable.

---

[350] The study from which this item has been sourced (Matuschek 2011: 137) comes to a similar finding in Germany. The "left-affine" less agree to this statement (the PI is much lower with only 0,27) than those termed as "without tendency" and the one's with a right tendency. But even among the last group the PI is only 0,45!

[351] It may be remembered again that the negative contingency is drawn from the frequency table, as η, λ and ϕ do not provide such information.

[352] Just as there is only weak correlation between the skepticism on democracy in both items, there is also only a weak correlation (d) between not considering democracy suitable for the Philippines and agreeing a) that government should not be bothered by public opinion (0.20); b) that it does not matter if the government has been elected democratically or not if it just secures public security, economic prosperity and efficiency (0.10); or, c) agreeing that good governance relies on strong leadership with an iron hand at times (0.27). The correlation with the opinion that when the government thinks it is necessary, it should restrict democratic rights is even negative (-0.17). (As most respondents agreed or strongly agreed that one cannot trust people in government, this item has been left out of the comparison as a correlation is then of little force of expression.) There is though a more significant correlation between the opinion that it does not matter much if a government has been elected democratically or not, as long as it does its job, *and,* a) the acceptance of restricting rights at times (0.43), *as well as,* b) to the propensity for strong leadership all ranging around 0.44, the correlation between the two latter items again is only 0.17.

The LAs in general again stick out with their responses: They are those, who unlike the other respondents, more or less agree that "people like me don't have any say" (.68), while non-activists and NLAs are undecided (.53 and .48). The LAs also overwhelmingly believe that the government does "not care much what people like me think" (PI= .94). Non-activists only more or less agree (.63), while NLAs are even undecided (.50). Many non-Left respondents even explicitly dispute this statement, as this respondent saying that, "this is a generalization, I do believe they do care," and further explains that ,"it's just that the people handling don't have a strong stand to really fight for what is right…for what the people really need." A non-activist says, "as what I've seen in the television (sic!), if somebody is complaining about this…basically government will do something to solve the problem, so for me it's just a matter of telling what your complaints, saying to them, hearing it out." A NLA says that "of course, they are not *binge* (deaf), they're not *nagbibingi-bingihan lang* (only acting totally deaf) … but of course they know that they have these personal interests, so they have to address first… , so instead of addressing education, they would address other things." And finally, a respondent further explains "*dili tanan na* government agencies *wala nagapaminaw*" (not all government agencies do not listen), while stressing at the same time the need for citizens to speak up as "how will the government know what you like if you don't know how to talk" and finally answering with a "big no" when asked if most of the time we can trust people in government to do what is right.

All in all, while the respondents in general believe in the idea of democracy, they are more or less dissatisfied with the way the system works (which makes them distinct from the general public if we are to trust the 2010 survey by the Social Weather Stations quoted above which came to the result that 69% of Filipinos are satisfied with the way democracy works in the Philippines). German political science here created the mammoth word *Politikinstitutionenverdrossenheit* (disenchantment with political institutions) to differentiate disenchantment with the way democracy works from being politically disinterested in general.

Considering the critical stand Left activists expressed towards people in power already in other items before, it is not surprising that they also show zero trust towards people in government (PI= .04); but this also holds true for the NLAs (with a PI of even exactly 0). The non-activists also trust them very little (.22). Says one non-activist: "Still the biggest problem in the Philippines are the politicians, because most of them are not doing their job… If there are people who are doing the right job, it's just a few."

The politicians are especially highlighted, when asked what is going wrong in the political system of the Philippines. "Whenever people do have this particular authority or power, then they use it to pursue their personal benefit," as one respondent says, "amassing wealth and *lumalaki ang ulo* (becoming bigheaded), once they're given that kind of privilege," as another says. "They spent millions to get to where they

are, so do you really think that they're going to put you first, they're going to put first whoever spent for them," says another.

Such statements also result from a strongly person-centered and morally charged political discourse (which will be discussed more fully below): "It affects me with how I see people with their promises, and how trustworthy a person really is…respect is definitely there especially if people have the authority, but trust is something un-negotiable," as one non-activist explains.

"Moral recovery," so is seen as a remedy by some respondents: "A little change like commitment *sa mga* (among the) higher people and they will be more honest to us, *mao lang man na siya ang kulang sa Pinas* (that is actually what is missing in the Philippines). Filipinos are very committed, it's just that *ang* (the) need to be changed are those people *nga naa sa pinakataas na posisyon* (who are in the highest position)."

The aversion for most politicians comes out when asked if there are political events and figures that have inspired or disgusted them. Good examples and role models are few, with Davao's Mayor Duterte a big exception. "*Dami*"/"*daghan kaayo*" (many indeed), in contrast disgust(ed) them. Several respondents here single out Estrada and most include Arroyo as well (mentioning her type of leadership and the alleged anomalies and corruption during her regime), while the view on Marcos is split: "*Ang Pilipinas boom kaayo adto na time* (The Philippines really boomed at that time)," says one respondent.

Local politicians are not exempted from this wrath: "For me, most politicians in our country are liars and greedy," says one, while another believes that "instead of telling what their platforms are, what they did was they were throwing the bad things of another party." Many respondents also raised their discomfort that boxing hero Manny Pacquiao has turned into a politician, who might even win the next presidential elections. He is framed as the current embodiment of political ineptitude (and his potential voters as "*bobo* [stupid]").

Most also do not share the "yellow fever" (Reese 2010a) about the incumbent president Benigno Aquino (who some consider even a poser (*atik*) and without no clear agenda); some of the respondents thought he would make a change, but now feels otherwise.

But few expressed that such positive or negative experiences had an influence on their political mindset, unlike this respondent who said that "she [Arroyo, whom he "*hates*" as he said] helps me actually, it helped me when she was there, because that was the time that I grew up and be mature politically…because of what she did." The other respondents rather made the impression that especially the negative did not surprise them. "Politics is still politics, you could not change it," as one respondent said. 16 of 25 respondents[353] said the change in presidency in 2010 did not chan-

---

[353] Unfortunately, some survey forms and one recording for the third interview cycle got lost and two further respondents backed out, so the responses recorded for the terms of the last interview cycle only encompass 18 of 25 returns.

ge their view on politics. “No matter who sits there, (it) will always be problematic,” as a general statement from one respondent goes.

Some respondents participated in EDSA 2 (in the year 2001), which due to its outcome (inaugurating a president who turned out to be problematic) is not idealized the way it could be observed with regards to EDSA 1 and Cory Aquino (on whose incumbency a critical histography could be written as well). EDSA 1 was mentioned nearly in the form of a myth, especially among non-activists. It happened at a time when most respondents were not yet even born (it sounded like a long ago happening when they mentioned this event) and due to being removed from the current times, it does not anymore serve as an inspiration for getting politically active nowadays.

One non-activist says, “that’s the only (sic!) rally that I really appreciate because that for me was genuine, everybody really united for one cause and they saw that the cause was good for everyone, good for the country; the kind of unity, the kind of teamwork, the kind of spirit that you see in EDSA is something… that I would always hope to see in the Filipinos today.” Another non-activist says “it’s really an example of how you can resolve the conflict in a very friendly, very educated way.” But all of these respondents explained that nowadays, they stay away from politics as it “sucks.” The only respondent who clearly pointed out how the political activism of her parents at that time influenced her turning political was the 39-year old test interviewee, already a teenager in 1986.

At the same time, the statement that political parties do not give voters real policy choices gets a very high approval rate (PI= .84), among NLAs (.88) and non-activists (.86), a little more than among LAs .79 [as they explicitly exclude the Leftist party lists from this statement]. Seemingly, most respondents do not consider a working party system to be an essential part of a democracy as its absence does not keep the (non-Left) respondents from considering the Philippines on the whole a democratic country.

4.7. Social service

As mentioned above “social security and everything” and “the right to be uplifted in the society” are expectations many respondents have towards the government. In fact, 23 of 25 consider social issues the main responsibility of government (and only the remaining two – both activists - believe it should be law and order). Almost all those who ever approached government did so for social issues, only one also for law and order issues.

When asked to specify what they consider to be the task of the government with regards to social issues, some answered with short political concepts, others mentioned a few concrete areas (basic needs, shelter for the homeless; especially for street children, education, food, job opportunities, clothes), which are a bit reminiscent of the

corporal works of mercy according to Matthew 25: feed the hungry, give drink to the thirsty, clothe the naked, shelter the homeless, care for the sick (next to visiting the imprisoned and burying the dead).

Understanding (basic) health care and education as avenues of providing equal access, many explicitly include both into what they expect government to provide. For health though this expectation is bolstered by the fact that they are paying contributions to Philhealth ("*dapat man gyud kay gibayaran nako sila,* this is just right because I paid for it)." This is underlined by the high relevance lack of education is given for the persistence of poverty and even social inequality. It was although usually only Left (ex-)activists, who explicitly mentioned infrastructure or good economic policies also in this regard. And it was only them who put into perspective the almost magical power allotted to education (and hard work) by most respondents. Like this LA who comments on the precarized Portuguese youth featured in the music clip Parva que sou: "*sakto lang iyang punto…luoy paminawon…maski nakaeskwela naka, wala gihapon kay pulos…kay wala kay masaligan, wala kay mapangayoan og tabang, gipahimuslan ka, ingon ana pud ang kahimtang sa kadaghanan diri sa Pilipinas* (their point is correct... it's pitiful to hear... even if you have gone to school, you are still worthless... because you can't rely on anyone, there is no one you can turn to for help, you are exploited, that is also the situation of many here in the Philippines)."

Nevertheless, 11 out of the 18 answers recorded believe that the government is not fulfilling its job in this regard at all; six at least think, it partly does; while, no one thinks it is fully fulfilling its job (PI = .19). Here again, the non-activists are most lenient with the government: 4 of 6 say it is partly fulfilling its job, while only 2 (of 5) NLAs think so, but only one out of seven LA.

When turning to social rights which are highly controversial in social reality, i.e. land rights and rights to housing, a majority from each subgroup thinks that farmers should own their land (16 out of 25 - but with two in each group saying no[354]), often reasoning that "they worked for it." Even 18 of 25 think government should secure housing for the urban poor (all Left agreeing, while in the other two subgroups two disagree). 14 respondents agree to both items, while (only) two disagree in both cases. In both cases, three do not clearly agree or disagree (in both cases the same respondents). At the same time though, most support demolitions; nevertheless, all but one immediately add that this should not be done without proper relocation when asked "what do you think about urban poor blocking demolition teams when about to be demolished?"

Only few respondents consider those without legal documents as having a misplaced sense of entitlement, like this non-activist: "They [informal settlers] know that they are just settlers, they know they don't own the land; when it's time for the rightful owner to claim the land, they blame a lot of people, they blame the government

---

[354] The LAs are not in support of individual land ownership though as they believe in communal ownership!

…everything starts with yourself…for me, the bigger part of the blame is actually on them, not on anybody else." But only one respondent tows the hard line, resonated often in columns on "squatting" in the national dailies and connected to the proprietor classes, saying that, as the land they squat on is not their property, they should leave ("That's stealing") and blames the urban poor themselves for the situation: "If you have been, *di ba* (isn't it) a little ambitious and go to school, work at a job, you could have bought your own land with Pag-Ibig [the Philippine housing-saving program] because it's so cheap. *Di ba*… You bought your own house…*di ba* and you don't have to rent … live in a shack on land that belongs to some other person." This respondent is a landowner herself and reports of how her family evicted informal settlers from their land: "That's my land. I paid for that… And then now I have to pay them to get out. Hello! No Way!" She was even admitting that "we burned them [houses of the informal settlers] ... province boy, you don't belong here!"

Trying to identify if they are also willing to walk their talk, we then asked the respondents, "when some informal settlers squat on your land, what would you do?" The answers were consistent to their former answer, mostly affirming, "that's my land, they have to find a different place." But the respondents still showed understanding for the plight of the informal settlers, pledging to explain to them (*istoryahan*) and give them time to relocate, willing to submit to a government decision and several respondents declaring to "let them occupy it or let them rent it if possible" as long as they themselves are not using the land. Here, traits of moral economy can be discovered, just like when taking into consideration that they "really gr(e)w up on that land" and stressing, they would only displace the informal settlers whenever "*gamay ra man among yuta* (our land is really only little.)"[355]

Only one of those who rejected demolitions now admitted that "*masuko pud siguro ko* (I'd probably be angry) since I don't have enough." But except this one, nobody got »caught in the act,« admitting that if her own land concerned, she might have a different view on it and would eventually "ask government to relocate them"(and expecting the informal settlers at least to pay for occupying the land.)

When asked if they consider Philippine society "just" and "fair," 21 said no and only four agreed, with no divergence between the three subgroups in this clear statement (η=.09). What was originally considered a motherhood statement (Everyone knows that Philippine society is not fair!) and a non-item (how can I say otherwise?), turned out to be not so: Most non-Left respondents in fact do not define "just" as socially equitable (and even less do they define "fair" this way). In the first place, they come

---

[355] "Kung naa kay five hectares, kana enough mang gud na para imoha siyang idevelop para makapangwarta ka, pero if you have more than that, dili naman ka small farmer ana, so kung naay mga tao, kuhaan pa na nila. (If you have up to five hectares, that is just enough for you to develop to earn from it, but if you have more than that, you are no longer a small farmer; and if there are other people, they will still get some portion from it)," as the quote goes on.

to speak about a slow, biased and corrupt justice system when explaining what they consider unjust and unfair in the Philippines; i.e. (in)justice is less understood as distributive, but rather as procedural (in)justice (which Macapagal et al. 2013: 183 consider as typical for the Philippines). As in the case of this non-activist: "Just and fair for me is … when my right, no matter how poor or little I am probably in the society, I will still be given a chance to be heard, and when I know that I'm on the right side, and I am just there to fight for my right, then I will never be belittled…you are able to speak out, you are able to have a say…you have a part."

And when applying the terms to Philippine society, "justice" is hardly defined as distributional justice, but as equal opportunities. As one respondent explains: "*Siguro fair ang tanan kung ang tanan naay access, dili unreachable ang education…kung provided tanan ang basic needs.* (Fair is probably when all have access, when education is not unreachable... when all the basic needs are provided.)" In this way, highlighting the assistance to local farmers "so that we can produce our own products," as done by several respondents can also be understood as such »start-up-support« for creating equal opportunities.

Being in favor of "helping people to help themselves" (mentioned by several respondents) is also probably the reason why the idea that the government should provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed (comparable to the well established social welfare benefit in welfare societies) only gets a lukewarm support (PI= .55): with the NLAs clearly rejecting it (.38), the non-activists being undecided (.55) and only the LAs partly in favor of it (.68).[356]

Such benefits are not only rejected due to financial constraints ("It [the government] cannot even provide a decent standard of living for employed, what more for the unemployed"), but even more outspoken in the belief that a person who "will not work, neither let him eat" to quote the Apostle Paul.[357] "Benefits should be earned *man* [*man* is a intensifier word]… so long as *naay tarong nga trabaho* (as long as there is proper work)," as a NLA explains. Others consider such a benefit "unfair to those who are employed...they should be employed also by the government or any institution for them to have a decent life, I mean you need to work hard to have a practical living. Everybody will just sit down and wait for the government to provide them food." Therefore "giving appropriate jobs to people" is also considered to be the main way of reducing income differences, as another NLA explains. Even a LA says, (only)"if they can't provide jobs, they should provide support for the unemployed; if they don't want unemployed, they should provide jobs."

---

[356] The ISSP 2006 did not even ask that item in the Philippines, unlike for instance in Germany.

[357] The verse is taken from the second epistle to the Thessalonians where it says "We also gave you the rule that if you don't work, you don't eat. Now we learn that some of you just loaf around and won't do any work, except the work of a busybody. So, for the sake of our Lord Jesus Christ, we ask and beg these people to settle down and start working for a living" (Chapter 3: 10-12).

Such reservation towards non work-based benefits resonates very much with the skepticism middle class people react to the Conditional Cash Transfer Program (4Ps) of the government, considered by several as mere dole-out as several columns in the English dailies reflect (see chapter 5.9.: *Middle class self-understanding* in the posts-cript).

While the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income is backed a little more than the idea of a welfare benefit (PI=.67), it is again not un-disputed: Non-activists are as undecided as in the case of welfare benefits (.58), while the NLAs agree much more to this measure (.63) and the LAs are very much in favor of it (.85). And across the board, such statement is not made unconditionally, but is linked with a responsibility from side of the poor to show effort by themselves. "Yes," says one non-activist (who actually disagrees more or less), "but it is also the responsibility of the people to be qualified to belong to a certain income." Many re-spondents furthermore justify income differences by saying that people got engaged into them whenever they study the job descriptions.

Such sentiments reflect a strong sense of performance fairness (*Leistungsgerechtigkeit*). 9 out of 22 even find it "just" that income decides about the access to quality educati-on and health care (while 13 consider it "unjust"). Even two LAs consider it just, whi-le among the other two subgroups the opinion is balanced. One NLA also finds it to be unfair to pay taxes, but not to get any good service in return. The statement by one LA (who anyway sticks out with very radical views) "*dili lang siguro para i-reduce ang differences kundili tanggalon na jud ang panaglahi* (maybe it is not just to reduce the dif-ferences but really remove them)" is singular among the respondents.

Even 10 out of 25 think college education should *not* be free (while 14 do and one is undecided). All the Left activists support free college education, but only 3 of 6 NLAs and 3 of 10 non-activists. Says one NLA "How will a school progress *kung free lang siya tanan* (if all is just free). ... *dili man kaya sa atong government na i-free jud siya tanan* (It is not possible for our government to simply have education to be totally free)." And a non-activist says, "it's okay to pay for college education … because there are things that are no longer covered by the government."

One non-activist though, who could only go to college through a scholarship, disa-grees with such an opinion, claiming that, the "government can look for ways to make college education free...I do believe they can do something…if they were able to support free elementary and high school education, why not college."

Among those in support for free college education the idea of a 'payback' (which is in a certain way implemented within some scholarship projects) is promoted. So says one respondent in favor of free college education: "*Nurses from UP Manila, doctors, kung mogawas man sila, mag-render sa sila'g service for three years…maayo man jud pud na para makatabang sila sa katilingban …naa man tay pananagutan sa katilingban*. (Nurses from UP Manila, doctors, if they leave for abroad, they are required to render service

for three years ... that is good so they can help society. We have a social responsibility to society.)" And another believes, "serving the community, that's the payment for your college."

In conclusion, we could observe that in general, social rights are put not only under the condition of financial feasibility (*Finanzierungsvorbehalt*), but also linked to a means test (*Bedürftigkeitsprüfung*). The right to be supported by the government is often qualified as a "right to ask my government something [only] when I really, really need that," as one respondent explained.

At the same time we cannot confirm the finding of Agarwala (cf. the chapter 3.21.:*Transcending the workplace as arena of struggle*) that the precarized rather focus on welfare benefits than on work related expectations such as job creation and job security (neither in our sample, nor in the control sample of ordinary workers – but also not among the Filipin@s in general as the general outlook further below will show). What though holds true is that they expect the government to create such jobs and expect less their employers to address these demands.

4.8. "Somehow, gamay, nag-expect ko"

"It depends on the type of person that you are, if you are this type who would really like to complain, or if you are a perfectionist person, then you would really complain about how the government works; for me, right now, they're doing quite a great job in improving."

(A non-activist, who however at another point said, "still the biggest problem in the Philippines are the politicians, because most of them are not doing their job.")

20 of 28 respondents think, it makes sense to turn to the government for services (eight do not) and 20 of 24 think people should demand rights from the government (but five of them don't consider the government a viable alternative). Three expect only from the government to secure their rights, while four do not think they should claim their rights from the government at all (two of them although think it makes sense to turn to government), but rather from other institutions - all of them non-activists. But only 8 of 27 said they expect help from the government, while nineteen don't expect help from the government (7 of 8 LA and 5 of 7 NLA do *not*, while only 5 of 12 non-activists do). Thus, all in all, 14 of the 20 who think they should claim their rights from the government and 12 of the 20 who thinks it makes sense to turn to the government, do not expect help from the government. Holding the government accountable is a feature not well pronounced among the sample group in general – which is consistent for the Philippines in general when following Rodriguez who simply states "the Philippine Republic and its government remain unjustified to its citizenry" (2009: 2), considering this lack of accountability as the key element for

the un(der)developed nation state "bind(ing) us to a 'we' beyond the very real we of family, friends, kin, and town mates" (p. 3).

Accountability is mainly an issue brought up by the LAs; 4 of 8 say it is the obligation of a citizen to hold the government accountable (even if they do not expect help from the [this?] government as mentioned), like this LA: "*Wala man pud ang government kung wala siya gipatapok dira, kinsa may nagbutang sa ilaha sa position, ang mga tao man pud nga dapat alagaran, kang kinsa man gikan ang tax nga ilang ginagamit para mapatuman ang mga balaud, mga nagsweldo sa ilaha…so dapat ilang i-give back kung unsa man ang gihatag sa ilaha, they should take the responsibility*. (There is no government if it had not been appointed; who has put them into office but the people whom they should serve, from whom the taxes come, which they should use to implement the law, from whom their salaries are from… So they should give back whatever has been given to them, they should take the responsibility.)" Or as another LA says, "for people in charge to be accountable for what they do. .. Change *their* attitude."

Just like expecting health service as a contributor to Philhealth (see above), many respondents base their sense of entitlement towards the state less on being a citizen than on being first and foremost a taxpayer. Every second respondent say things like, "we're paying the government, that's why the government should give it back to us." Another respondent expects support from government institutions "because…we are all taxpayers." A third says: "*nagabayad man ta'g tax, dapat ibalik pud nila sa atoa* (We are paying taxes, they have to also give it back to us)."

Finally a fourth says, "we're paying taxes, we're paying it completely every month, but then if we seek help from government, they don't even know what customer service is. …. *nagabayad ta, kumpleto ilang sweldo*, what they return is *dili pantay* (We are paying, their salary is full, what they return is not equivalent)."[358]

Speaking of entitlement, it is also obvious that being entitled is often linked to being "*luoy*" or "*kawawa*" (pitiable), a term of sympathy more closely connected to charity than to analytical terms such as "justice" or "rights," i.e. rather originating from an ethics of compassion than from deontological ethics. Nearly every respondent at one time or the other explained the recognition of the right of others to be supported by terming them as *luoy* – be it informal settlers in need of housing, peasants denied of the right to own the land they till or even the so called "warm bodies" in a rally (considered by some respondents as abused by their organizers, who have to stand out in the sun and summoned to join a rally without even knowing what it is all about). In this way, one of our respondents explained her support for farmers by saying "*malu-*

[358] This respondent further underlines the idea of a market dimension of citizenship and rights fulfillment, not only basing his rights to health care on the contributions made to Philhealth and explaining "the lower your income is, the lower the services that you'd get...fair lang. … the higher the income the higher the taxes you pay," but also asking, how can (the government) provide decent standard of living *na wala man silay ginacontribute* (if they [the unemployed] have not contributed)?"

oy baya ko sa ilaha kay kabalo man gud ko anang issue na land grabbing (I feel really *luoy* with them as I know about this issue of land grabbing is all about)." Or, said things like this: "I think (I would support striking jeepney drivers) because I have a heart for them also. I am thinking that if I were one of them." Even if the statement is followed by a longer analysis in sociopolitical terms, it is appraised with an emotional term. Likewise, a LA who gave a very structural analysis of the situation, nevertheless calls the precarized Portuguese youth in the Video shown "*luoy paminawon* (luoy to listen to)" and the urban squatters "*luoy*" as well.

Again not a single respondent termed their own sense of being entitled as "*luoy*" and we can assume that this would clash with their strong sense of agency and self-reliance (similar to the reason why trade unions are considered for workers only). One respondent (a NLA) even considers it degrading that it is a trait among Filipin@s according to her "to brag that we're poor 'cause we're really not poor; we have all the resources, *kaya lang, dili lang siya* (they are just not) properly managed.…*kanang magpaluoy-luoy gani, maglagot gyud ko ana…I hate it…atik-atik magpaluoy-luoy, Satanas-Hudas man diay kaayo*. (Really, these people who act pitiful, it makes me really mad…. I hate it…. What a drama, this show that they are to be pitied. But in reality, they are evil and traitors.)"

As pointed out above, welfare structures (social security and public services) have stayed piecemeal in the Philippines, due to public poverty, high indebtedness, low tax income and a political oligarchy that does not cater to the interests of common people (cf. Reese 2013c). Only about half of the total working population has a formal pension insurance (SSS or GSIS), while 54% of the health costs have to be paid out of one's own pocket. Less than one in ten employees is adequately covered by social security and of these, most of them are state-employees covered by GSIS benefits. Furthermore, only GSIS members receive the equivalent of unemployment benefits in the form of separation pay (Reese 2013g). Only the upper class and certain segments of the middle class have the means to pay for health and education out of their own pockets.

Under such circumstances it seems a rational reaction that "somehow, *gamay…nag-expect ko* (somehow, a little, I expect something)," as one NLA admitted. Even a LA argues this way: "*Well, dako man gyud ang atong expectations, pero dili pud nila ma-meet atong expectations tanan, so dili na lang kaayo ta mag-expect* (Well, our expectations are really high, but they cannot meet all of our expectations, so let's not expect too much)."

Such an attitude is rationalized by saying, "you should probably not focus on what you want because life cannot just give you the things that you want," which in the case of this non-activist (and similarly for many others) is accompanied by a belief in

her own abilities. “What your plans are, what your dreams are, it will definitely come.”

The expectations towards a welfare state are limited among the respondents, in several cases justifying this with the underdeveloped state the Philippines is in: “What would you expect, Philippines is a 3rd world country, we could not expect more.” This opinion is shared by another respondent saying that, “I don’t even expect anything from the government; I would expect the typical ones, your benefits from work, SSS coverage, Pag-ibig…all those things that are normally given…other than that, I wouldn’t expect anything from the government [more than what] we have right now, [Philippines is] third world country that has a lot of problems on its own, I wouldn’t expect that it would readily give support to me or to anybody in particular.”

Other respondents consider higher expectations, though agreeable, as unreasonable: “If possible that it’s free [referring to college education]... then why not, well .. I think of it this way... based on the current setting of our country... is it feasible that even for college, it is free?” To pay for college education only few respondents out rightly support it, but again they say that “I think that it is just right that there should be a charge. I consider it a little unrealistic to go for free college education.” Just as a respondent says in another context: “How I wish they could, but as of now, they can’t... you can never give something, if you don't have any.”

Only a LA considers arguing with financial incapacity as *lusot* (excuse) and believes the state could provide better, if only it had a different self-conception. “*Sa Canada man gani...kung maayo ang katilingban, maayo ang iyang pagpadagan sa iyahang mga constituents* (in Canada indeed, if a society is good, the way they treat their constituents is good).”

4.9. Dealing with an informal welfare regime

“That’s why we have NGOs because the government is not functioning well. ... I expected before...they’re just giving vaccination, that’s the only support they give... [in the] health center...I don’t expect” (a Left activist respondent).

Along with a certain minimalism regarding what they expect from the government, several (but not all) respondents also expressed that they have come to terms with a “*kulang*” (inadequate) in government service, an attitude the anthropologist Michael Tan (PDI, 16.4.2013) describes this way: “Generally, we Filipinos seem to accept bad service. »Gobyerno kasi« [It’s government, that’s why] is the standard rationalization, which I hear too about the Philippine General Hospital and many other government agencies … and banks.” Nevertheless, he does not give up hope and asks, “might we possibly see the day when people can say »gobyerno kasi« as a compliment?” (ibid.)

As the government and public social security mechanisms do not sufficiently provide for the social needs of the respondents they have to look for other providers. It is especially the family and their own efforts that have a higher prominence in their welfare mix compared to people in a similar occupational situation, but residing in a welfare state like Germany.

Table 6: Whom would turn to in case of…	Illness	Business	Ageing
Family	12	6	21
Friends/networks (barkada)	8	3	0
Neighborhood/NGOs	0	4	0
Rely on themselves	4	6	5
Government	1	3	0
Employer	3	0	0
No plans/don't know	0	6	2

20 of 28 respondents consider government a viable alternative, but hardly anyone chooses them as their first choice for support (see table 6).

Not in a single case do Left activists rely in the first place on the government. They are even more skeptical than the other subgroups when it comes to considering the government a viable alternative in case of need (5 of 8 LAs do, while 6 of 8 NLAs and 9 out of 12 non-activists do). When asked though if they have approached government and if they did so often, the non-activists even did so a little less than the others (6 did, 6 not; while, 4 NLAs did and 2 not; and, 5 LAs did, while 3 did not). But again, whenever they did, non-activists tend to describe it in a patronage language (the mayor being close to the family etc.).[359]

When asked which public actor they ever turned to for help, the local government unit (LGU) sticks out: 11 out of 24 turned to their LGU (only the Left activists predominately did *not* turn to the LGUs, while it is balanced among the others); while, only two ever asked for help from the national government; two did from civil society (both LAs); and, two from the church (one NLA, one non-activist). No respondent ever turned to the media for help. None of the 17 who sought help from socio-political organizations (11 LGUs and two each from national government, NGOs and church), turned to more than one organization, meaning that only eight never turned to any social organization for help. Six have turned to the local government *and* "others" (excluding the actors mentioned before).

[359] This goes along with not necessarily frowning upon 'knowing the right people" (considered with a PI of 0.71 as important for getting ahead of life). What development sociologists call "nepotism," one non-activist appreciates: "The backer-backer system…(I) soo believe in it…the longevity of the attention given to you, it's really definitely longer if you know (somebody)… I'm not really expecting, that's too much, I'm just hoping if ever I need it." And a NLA condones corruption to a certain extent, "because they're helping personally."

Every respondent said it is important or even very important to earn their own money and 19 out of 28 consider themselves to be the main source of reliance. But this does not keep them from asking help from others. Only 9 out of 28 respondents said they find it hard to ask help from others; while, 19 said that their main source of strength and energy are others. 20 out of 28 say that they expect help: only ten expect it from their family; at least eight from the government; but, only four from friends; and, only one from the employer.

The answers to two content-wise identical items (both asked during the first problem centered interview) are quite inconsistent though. Only 6 of the 12 who said they expect help from their family in cases of illness said later in the interview that they generally expect their family to help them. Even 7 of 8 who said they expect help from their friends in cases of illness, later said they don't expect any help from their friends. Similar holds true for the items on support for business ventures and ageing (here even 12 of 21 who expressed their expectation that their family helps them when they grow old, but later said they don't expect help from the family!). This might be a sign that the answers are usually more precise the more concrete they are.

"The family is a pooled pension fund, healthcare provider, dispenser of unemployment benefits and scholarship foundation rolled into one," as I have pointed out before (Reese 2013g: 83). "The parent-child bond is particularly intense and binding. Children are parents' investment in their future, while children are raised to develop a deep sense of indebtedness towards their parents. Once they start earning, they must support their parents and other family members until old age."

Family is thus the overwhelming choice, when it comes to ageing (21 of 28, with five saying they will provide for themselves and two saying they did not think about it yet); and it is the dominant one (12 of 28) when it comes to health issues. (But only nine rely in both cases on the family. Three, who ask their family for help in case of health issues, want to care for themselves when getting old.)

Only with regards to business is family help equivalent to own efforts (each 6). Friends only play a role when it comes to support in case they can't cover health expenses (8). Only the Left activists are quite hesitant to fall back on their family. It is mainly rather themselves or their friends whom they say they rely on in case of need - corresponding with a socially widespread practice to approach friends in such cases. 4 of 8 LAs, while only one NLA and three non-activists do so. NGOs are only thought of when it comes to business and livelihood (4 of 28). Here, six respondents primarily rely on themselves (equal with family), but do so only four in the case of health and five in the case of old age.

The employer is considered by three respondents as the first contact in case of illness, but for retirement or in case of business plans nothing is expected from them.

There is by the way only one respondent who would rely on the same agency (the family) in all cases, i.e. health, business and old age. It is also seldom that respondents say they rely on themselves when it comes to social security challenges (in each

social security challenge 4-6 cases). Relying on oneself in more than one case is even more seldom (no more than one or two cases in each regard) and no respondent relies on him- or herself in all three challenges mentioned.

4.10. *Maningkamot*, moral behavior and communitarianism

Even if respondents do not believe they have to fend for themselves in life, but command over networks they can fall back on in times of need, they nevertheless highlight own effort (*maningkamot*) - as already pointed out in the subchapter 3.13.3.: *Can the respondents to the study be considered middle class?* and the chapter 3.18.: *Are activists more prone to unionizing?*

Therefore, the respondents (sans the Left activists) overwhelmingly believe the poor can escape poverty if they only try hard enough (16 of 20 believe so with only one ruling this out). On the other hand, a majority of the Left activists (5 of 8) does not think that own efforts are adequate for escaping poverty, with only one of them thinking it is possible to pull oneself up by one's own bootstraps. This way, the non-Left respondents (NLAs and NAs) mainly consider themselves to have escaped poverty (14 of 20), which is only the case for (still) 3 of 8 LAs. Only one non-Left respondents still considers himself poor, while 4 of 8 LAs do so.

Another correlation is also interesting: All six who said they were never poor (non-activists 2, NLAs 3, LA 1) believe that the poor can rise from poverty, if they really want to. Of those who (still) consider themselves poor, 4 out of 5 say (4 LAs and one non-activist), it is not possible; one of them (a non-activist), believes otherwise; while none of them believes that it depends. Again all five respondents (non-activists 2, LAs 2, NLAs 1) who are not sure ("it depends") belong to the (by far the largest) group of those who consider themselves as having risen from poverty. And only ten of the all together 17, say it is certainly possible (non-activists 7, NLAs 3, LAs 0); while, two (one LA and one NLA) say no, which means that they must attribute their escape from poverty to something different than *maningkamot*.

A NLA brings this more or less religious belief in *maningkamot* to the point when asked why she believes that social inequality continues to exist: "because of the person itself…*kung dili ka maningkamot, wala jud kay kabag-ohan…mao nang wala tay equality…unsaon na nimo, ang isa naningkamot, ang isa wala naningkamot, dili jud equal ang output*…it depends on the person, you cannot make one society equal because in that society *naay mga extreme low na mga tao ug extreme high na mga tao the way sila maningkamot*. (…because of the person itself ... if you don't make an effort, you will really not change ... that's why we have no equality ... how that be when one strives hard, but the other doesn't; the output is not equal ... it depends on the person, you can not make society equal because in that society there are people who are extreme low and those who are extreme high the way they strive hard.)" And at another point, she adds, "*makita nimo naay growth sa Pilipinas kung ikaw mismo naay growth sa imong sarili* (You can see that there is growth in the Philippines if there is growth within yourself)."

The LAs (but only a few non-Left respondents) again mainly blame poverty on social structures and the people in power - such as this respondent: “Lack of opportunity, lack of good education, of good government, of social, of good society, lack of nationalism, lack of unity.” Very outspoken is this LA who points out: “*Wala pa napalagpot ang nagaharing hut-ong so naa gihapoy dili panag-angay*. (The ruling class has not been kicked out yet, so there is still no equality.)”

The focus on *maningkamot* among the non-Left respondents is often accompanied by another individualist feature: viewing the disregard of moral values (such as an ignorance of the *kapwa* or greed) as main reason for social inequality, and as such individual improvement (moral recovery) is identified as the remedy. Especially non-activists, they believe that “if everybody leads a moral life, the public world of wider society should be in good order” (PI of .85), while NLAs are more skeptical about this (.57) and Left activists largely reject such a communitarian statement (.38). While 8 of 15 of the activists (LAs and NLAs) do *not* agree to this statement (four strongly, two from each activist subgroup), it is only one out of ten non-activists not agreeing to it.

Likewise, respondents with organizational experience overwhelmingly disagree with President Aquino’s statement that “the only advocacy that we have is that the state is obligated to remind parents that you have responsibilities for every child you bring into this world.”[360] 13 of 15 disagree (among them all eight LAs), six even strongly (4 LAs and 2 NLAs), while only 4 out of 10 non-activists disagree. It is again the LAs who nearly totally reject the statement (.13) and the NLAs being less disapproving (.39). The non-activists more or less agree (.63), though not to the extent that they believe in moral recovery as panacea for governing society. (As there is anyway only a very weak correlation between both items of d=.11, both items seem to not simply direct to the same set of opinion.)

The explanations given by the respondents for their answers though show that their orientation is less clear-cut than the mere numbers suggest. While one LA asks “do they think they can give the whole responsibility to the parents? Who will take care of the parents?,” which is in line with her strong disagreement with the statement. She then adds: “Okay for me that the parents are the ones who give shelter, clothes and education if and only if they can really manage. … The parents also need to receive support so they can really provide… “ Another LA likewise explains: “it’s actually a mutual responsibility of the government and the parents, hand-in-hand. …before the parents could be responsible, the government should be there to help the parents.”

A NLA (also among those who more or less disagree with the statement) says, “it’s every parent’s responsibility to take care of their children…in the first place, you

[360] This statement was made when Aquino was still campaigning for presidency and in connection to “responsible parenthood” as the much-disputed legal measure for state-supported Reproductive Health measures was renamed. (Source: Philippine Daily Inquirer, 5.3.2010)

conceive that child…but it's not only the parents' responsibility, it's also the government's responsibility to educate, to provide, so that parents can provide clothing and shelter, how can they provide shelter if they don't have roofs over their house because they're just squatters…of course, it's the parents' responsibility to provide the basic needs of their children…if the parents could not provide these, the government should, as *maging asset or maging liability ng government ang mga bata ngayon* (those children can either be an asset or liability of the government) in the future if we will not provide the basic needs of children." Same respondent considers at another point that the role of government is "to support every Filipino family… if the parents are not able to provide this, *parang maging safety net ang government* (like the government becomes a safety net); if they could not provide this, then the government should be able to."[361] After these explanations (and only after quantitative statements were qualified), we can so conclude that: Even those rejecting Aquino's statement do not expect the state to provide for the needs of the children, but simply to support those whom they consider as primarily responsible. This is a notion very much in line with what has been observed with regards to other social rights earlier: Even the Left activists expect the citizens to do their share and definitely do not advocate "sponging off the state" as neoliberal spurners of the welfare state like to argue.

While we cannot observe a die-hard neoliberal notion among our respondents, i.e. to leave it simply to parents and families to take care of social needs, nevertheless, even among Left activists, the idea is widespread that the government should (only) step in when parents cannot fulfill their obligations.

Other respondents refer more to this subsidiarity principle when saying that while government has social obligations, these are secondary; with some respondents even explicitly calling the government the "last resort." The main role such respondents allot to the government is to "remind of values … because the modern influences these days from the media, internet, or any source of information that can erase the values" and "educate the people or the parents," as one non-activist said pars pro toto.

We can also detect such communitarian approach that advocates the subsidiarity principle in the community orientation of many respondents. Says one non-activist: "I don't think something should be changed up in the government; if there should be anything changed, it should be right at the base, start with the community, with the barangay, with the local government, that's how it starts, the views of the people must be changed…for as long as the views are just the same, it would be the same…same bad banana." And another non-activist says, "basic means starting with the barangays first. Let's start with the barangays first, good people will gonna be

---

[361] The same respondent, who opts for the abolition of tuition fees, though says that: "It's not part of the problem of their parents to shoulder fees for infrastructure development, for professor's fee and everything [in relation to college maintenance] because it should be shouldered by the government whatever will happen."

leading small groups, and these small groups will gonna be grouped together, and will be led by the mayor, and eventually we can form the whole nation." This respondent exemplifies her bottom-up approach by saying, "each one of us has a contribution to what is happening to the entire society…if you eat candy and it's just okay to throw your candy on the road, that's already a speck of contribution to the whole garbage."[362] Likewise this respondent says, "discipline comes from within, it should start from yourself…(no matter) how many rallies we do, how extreme we do hunger strike and everything but if we don't have discipline, then we could not achieve it, like basically following small rules like crossing the street."

All but one respondent (22 of 23) believe they can make some change in the community (but 20 of 23 also believe they can make some change in the Philippines). And as it is especially non-activists promoting such local activism, it might even be wrong to term them as non-activists. They have a good understanding of civil obligations and are willing to perform such, but seem to rather act on a concrete basis, shying away from "big politics" on a national scale and prefer to act as individuals and less by joining organizations; the latter is often considered as the normal way of political activism (as also reflected in the definition chosen for this study).[363]

Here, also the mobilizing effect of concrete others is underlined: "When it comes to support, if it's one of my friends who's gonna be directly affected with it, so I will show support." At the same time though, this respondent is questioning such a purely concrete approach as discriminatory by saying that, "there are some aspects that need to be checked, like what is our intention in doing this, are we doing this for a personal gain, or are we doing this for the benefit of everyone, so if we are doing this for a personal gain…the result will not be beneficial for everyone."

Quite in contrast to such a concrete approach is the answer by a LA who even when asked about the main problem in her *community* answers "*imperyalismo, burukrata kapitalismo, pyudalismo…ugat-hinungdan…at least para sa akoa* (imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism, feudalism … the root of it all … at least for me)."[364] Another LA says

---

[362] The respondent elaborates that "we are so undisciplined that's why Matina Pangi [a barangay in Davao] was flooded, because of garbage…it's from the people from that place…being so irresponsible…they say that it's because of the government, that they were not given enough attention…still, when you go there…they're still doing the same thing…they still throw garbage anywhere…big things like corruption always start with small things; it always starts with the individual…if every individual will not gonna realize things like that…that's the reason why family gets broken, and when the family gets broken, being the basic unit of society, definitely society is not that strong enough to fight challenges that we need to face for us to become a better nation."

[363] Even the five respondents (among them four LAs and one NLA), who stated that they have been active in a community organization have also at one time of their life been with a political organization. So the non-activists not only shy away from joining an explicit political organization, they don't join an organization at all – except the church, in which 5 of 10 "non-activists" have been active in.

[364] Nevertheless, this respondent also has communitarian traits when likening the relation between the government and the people to a being a couple: "*...kung kamo ra na mag-uyab…naay mga butang na para sa inyohang duha ... naa man gud moy pananagutan sa public gihapon kay they're the government…they should care and be bothered if naay mga strong public opinion about sa inyoha…* (If

simply, "it's I still believe in .. a system change." And another LA believes: "Actually all these things (values) doesn't matter anymore if you're in a good government, if you're in a good system…because it follows, everything follows."

Both kinds of approaches though express a strong sense of agency: While the *maningkamot* cum communitarian approach bases everything on individual effort, the focus on structures sees the overriding objective of "kicking out the ruling class." Only a few answers combine both explanations for social inequality to continue, a) moral values, effort and education, meaning individual makers of success *and* b) the unequal distribution of resources and chances. "Social inequality continues to exist," so completes one NLA, "because there are no moral values…importance on moral values… …there is also bias of judgment from one person to another," but she mentions as well "no proper distribution of the resources that we have," as another reason for social inequality to continue. Likewise another non-activist says social inequality continues to exist "because of corrupt government practices and unfair labor practices."

In another way again, a Left activist connects the influence of individual and structural flaws for continuing social inequality: "…because…there are people who exploit others. And there are, on one hand, there are people who are not strong enough or are capable to fight them as well. So there are people or systems that exploit others and there are people who are not strong enough."

4.11. Active citizenship

"I don't rely so much from the government, if there's a way that you can do to help yourself or help the community, do it on your own, instead of waiting for them to do it." (Non-activist)

"I consider that revolting is really a gateway to our dreams and hopes in a really big marquee, but we don't know if we would really get it, or would we be going through that and pick out leaders who would not really take us anywhere at all." (Left activist)

Picking up the two kinds of "activism" as pointed out in the quotes above, we can observe different profiles of being active in society. Next to the activism in a political organization, which has been used as one of the basis for the building of the basic groups for analyzing this study (Left activists, non-Left activists and "non-activists"), and as the study is mainly focused on the public space considered "political," we also captured other arenas of public participation, in line with the broader under-

---

you are a couple ... there are things that are for the two of you [to do]… they still have a responsibility to the public as they're the government ... they should care and be bothered if there is a strong public opinion about you.)"

standing of public (activism) described in the theoretical part above.[365] There, we could observe that 10 of 25 respondents were active in the church and five in a community organization. While 5 among the 10 who were active in the church have never been active in a political organization (and none among the Left activists was ever active in the church), all five among those active in a community organization have additionally been a member of a political organization. Nearly everyone (22 out of 25) has been "helping" neighbors and/or relatives (with one respondent in each of the three subgroups saying the contrary).

It was only though (3 out of 8) Left activists who said that their organizational stint was long-term. In the other two subgroups (sans one respondent in each of these two groups), the remaining 15 respondents were only shortly involved, if at all.

As this study concentrates on activism in the space widely agreed upon as "political," it cannot capture the manifold activities within the community (especially those which are considered informal) or the church – we are well aware that by this way, it excludes a vibrant sector of civil society in the Philippines. But even if it comes to forms of "political" participation, we could observe activities, though these are often sporadic (cf. table 7).

19 of 25 respondents say they joined a political gathering (though several non-activists say, they did it just once out of curiosity); 18 signed a petition; 15 regularly participate in elections (two do so from time to time); 14 exercised consumer democracy (or "piso voting" as Sebastian [2014] terms this activity) by boycotting or buying a certain product for political, ethical, or environmental reasons; 11 joined a political discussion group in the internet; ten are discussing politics regularly (12 do sometimes and only three never discuss politics); nine even exercised forms of "unconventional participation" by joining a strike, a blockade and other forms of civil disobedience. Eight were part of an electoral campaign.

Most respondents said they listen to political news in the radio, the TV and/or read the newspapers. And most were also, at one time, involved in community work (although several state that these community outreach programs were required by their college courses and were their only community involvement so far; they just became involved because "our course demanded us to join...").

---

[365] Two comparable kinds of activism was observed by Evangeline Sucgang in her research on "typology and correlates of political participation among Filipinos" (*Philippine Journal of Psychology, 39/2 [2006*], 31-65). When asking about intensions of citizenship, she detected two types of political involvement: One of them is what she calls "political participation as proactive engagement in the public arena … underscor(ing) the importance of people exercising their voice or power as citizens to express their opinions and even influence others of their own beliefs and aspirations." (ibid.: 46). Examples cited for such kinds of activism are taking part in political campaigns, joining political parties and rallies or writing letters to newspaper editors (or in the Philippine context rather sending text messages or calling radio stations). The other type she identified is "political participation as public problem solving … characterized as a category of participation that is instrumental in nature" (ibid.). This kind of political participation is community-centered, but also contacting public officials on particular problems.

Table 7: Kinds of participation (25 responses)	Yes	No	No answer
Signed a petition	18	3	4
Boycotted or bought a certain product for political, ethical, or environmental reasons	14	6	5
Joined a political forum or discussion group in the Internet	11	9	5
Joined a political gathering or a rally	19	6	0
Participated in electoral campaigns	8	7	25
Participated in actions like strike, blockade or any action of civil disobedience?	9	14	0
	Yes, regularly	Yes, sometimes	No
Voter	15	2	8
Discussing politics	10	12	3

The extent of political activity among the respondents belies the notion of an apolitical Filipino youth. This is backed up by their willingness to "fight for it, no matter if we win or lose (*Manado man o matalo, ipaglalaban natin ito*)" (see the chapter 3.18.: *Are activists more prone to unionizing?*). But it is not surprising that as far as political participation is concerned, it is the activists sticking out. (Ex-)activists have been regular voters nearly thrice as often as non-activists: 11 (of 15) activists are regular voters; while only 4 of 10 non-activists are regular voters; and, two of them said they just vote because close relatives (mother/grandmother) require them to do so. While in each of both groups, there are four who did not vote at all, their reasons for not doing so diverge. Activists say they don't vote because it is useless, while the non-activists say they are not interested in politics. Activists though consider legal action only very slightly a more promising option than non-activists (ϕ=.15) and even don't consider government a more viable alternative than non-activists (ϕ=.0). [Whenever λ is absent, the means of contingency used is ϕ.] While more of the activists have approached government agencies, they only did that "*minsan*" (seldom), while some non-activists did this often. Weighting the answers, activists did not so *show* a stronger sense of entitlement which they have *expressed* stronger than non-activists.

In any item chosen as indicator of profiling political participation, (ex-)activists have a higher fulfillment rate: The contingency of signing petitions with political background is .24; with boycott .36; with acts of civil disobedience .40 (only one of the non-activists has ever participated in such actions; while, 8 out of the 15 activists did); with participation in cyber politics .44; and, finally with participation in political gatherings .50 (14 of 15 activists participated, while only 5 of 10 non-activists did so).

When asked if they would join a political rally they pass on the street, most respondents (17 of 23) played safe and said they would see what is the cause. (Several non-activists have joined a rally once "out of curiosity" and then no more.) The two who would have immediately joined were (ex-)activists, while 3 out of those 4 who said they would never join (thinking rallies are "*sira*"- crazy) were non-activists. η here is .38. But many without the experience of joining a rally said they are afraid of bombs or it is a waste of time, with one non-activist further elaborating that "they can have a formal discussion on the things that they demanded to communicate. … They just vent out the issue; can we just sit down and talk about it. … If *madungog sila, naa silay dungog ba, naa silay na-contribute*… (If they are heard, they could gain credibility, they could contribute)."[366]

Also very obvious is the contingency between (ex-)activists and the support for armed struggle (which can be considered as "unconventional means of participation"). While 8 of 10 non-activists oppose armed struggle (one supports it and one says it depends), 8 of 14 activists support it; three of them say it depends; and, only three oppose it.

Only in the case of electoral campaigns, there is no contingency (λ=.0). What might be surprising in a German context where "volunteering" in electoral campaigns is a highly significant expression of political activism, is not so surprising in the Philippine context. Here, electoral campaigns are mostly personality-driven and considered by most "supporters" as a racket and as a way to "get rewarded with a job and/or government contracts if the candidate wins"(Macapagal et al. 2013: 145) – or, as in the case of two respondents, as support for a relative running for a post.

It is also not surprising that respondents with political experience discuss politics more often than those without. 8 of 15 activists discuss politics often; 6 do sometimes; while only two of 10 non-activists discuss politics often; although, six still discuss politics sometimes, even if they explicitly dislike the "heated arguments" one get's into then or that it is so "negative"(supporting the connectivity of political activism and tolerance for complex, problem-loaded, conflictive and uncertain situations Schulze pointed out – cf. subchapter 3.6.4.: *Political socialization*). Such discussions are usually with like-minded friends, sometimes with relatives or the church community, during parties and drinking sessions or even with a taxi driver. Only three respondents do not discuss politics at all (2 non-activists and one NLA). One of the big surprises of the study for me (as the researcher) was to realize that even those expressing to have no interest in politics were basically well informed about what was going on politically. They might be disappointed about the political institutions (*Politikinstitutionenverdrossenheit*), but they have not turned away from politics and turned totally apolitical.

---

[366] This respondent often repeated statements like "it all boils down to communication… just sit down on their demands" and cited Davao Mayor Duterte as a positive example for this. He even considers lack of communication to be the main reason for why social inequality persists in the Philippines.

It is the Left activists who overwhelmingly discuss politics "often" (6 of 8); while only two in each from other subgroups discuss politics "often."
Just like in the case of assessing the situation within the call centers, when it comes to citizenship attitudes outside of the workspace, it is the Left activists mainly causing the higher outcome of most items among "activists." All the LAs have signed petitions; boycotted or promoted products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons; and, joined political gatherings. They significantly more readily join a rally and all but one were involved in Internet politics and into electoral campaigns. Furthermore, 6 of 8 were involved in civil disobedience – and it is finally, nearly only them supporting armed struggle. Even if again the NLA here have in nearly each item a higher participation rate than the non-activists (sans the electoral campaign, which again proves the livelihood component of this item), such 'advantage' is mostly more or less slight – in contrast to the far above average participation rate of Left activists pulling up the statistics.

Nevertheless, the non-Left respondents showed willingness to engage with the government and act as citizens. A non-activist who disputed the notion that government does not care, cites a TV program (*Bayan Mo, Ipatrol Mo*) as example for his observation that "if somebody complains about this area (community lighting, open canal, etc.)…once that's being aired out, government will then work, but if not, government will just let it. … Government is really open for any ideas from the people, it's just that the people do not complain much." And a NLA explains: "We need to knock the door of the people in the government for them to notice." A stunning 17 (of 24) thus are of the mind that Filipin@s are not doing enough to help the government to improve the country (while only four think, they do enough and three they do too much - with the three options spread equally over all three subgroups).

The sense of duty is well established among the respondents (although the narratives and the numerical answers provided by the respondents show that they don't consequently walk the talk as much, just as in the case of the Philippines in general, see below). Every respondent considers rights to go along with obligations. As this non-activist says: "The sad part is, we don't take the responsibility of the freedom that was given to us, we abuse it, we're demanding, but at the end of the argument, if you gonna be questioned, what about you as a citizen of the Philippines, what (did you do) aside from abusing (sic!) the democracy." And at another point she says, "here in the Philippines, we are so undisciplined, but we do a lot of talking without doing anything." A NLA again says, "*dili nato i-ask sa gobyerno tanan na silay mobuhat, ikaw mismo citizen, naa kay responsibility na himuon pud nimo imohang part para mo-progress pud ang government…kung moreklamo ka, dapat naa kay buhaton to change*. (Let us not ask the government to do everything; You as a citizen yourself, you have the responsibility to also to do your part, so that the government will progress…. If you complain, you must also do something to change.)"

And a non-activist who earlier planned to work abroad as a nurse in the course of the research committed, "if you're really into helping your country, you have to start here, you have to serve your country first for some time, before widening your prospects outside…that's one thing I can help as a citizen."

When asked about the rights and duties of a citizen, the respondents usually even dwelt longer on what they consider obligations than on what they consider rights. (That they also started off with the duties of a citizen though is probably due to the interview's direction.) Most mentioned was the duty to "maintain" and "promote" the country, or as one respondent explained, to "continue and maintain the culture of the country, the race, and to protect of course the country where they [the citizens] belong." Into such duty was included the obligation to protect the welfare of the country and the environment, for instance by "contribute(ing) to society by doing community work," by "support(ing) government programs" or even by "raising a family." Several consider paying taxes as an outstanding civil obligation (which goes along with a special sense of entitlement as outlined above).

To a lesser extent, political participation itself was considered a civil obligation, or as one respondent explained: "responsible siya, naa soya kaakuhan dili lang sa iyahang kaugalingon kundi sa iya pung katilingban, mo-participate siya sa kalambuan sa iyang gobyerno, when I say government dili lang kadtong mga tao nga naa sa posisyon kundili sa katawhan. (A citizen has responsibilities, has obligations not only to herself/himself, but also to her/his society, to participate in the development of her/his government, when I say government, [I mean] not only those people in the position but the population.)" Only the test interviewee expressed the duty to hold the government accountable and "control [it]: a check of how far their government can go." However: political participation, when mentioned, was not mentioned as a right, but as a civic duty!

Several respondents also highlighted that a citizen should be "knowledgeable" and "aware of what's happening," including the expectation to be aware of one's rights. But even more expressed is that they consider themselves to be responsible to educate the common people. "We have the power to hammer down influence to other people, but we don't have the time or the guts, but we have the capacity, the ability to make change, to influence other people, for example the government is not doing good…you can influence other people because you have learned a lot," as a NLA explains. "If you are educated, you would see things in the society that you don't like," says a Left activist. "The first step that we should have is educate people. Education enables people to be more informed and offers them a wide array of options and opportunities - if they're educated they won't even accept the job." But at the same time, respondents often complain that the middle class is complacent, "only devoted to their careers, they don't really care," while the lower classes are often depicted as gullible, uneducated, unreflected and "voting *parang* (like) love at first sight."

When it comes to duties, considering society as a whole and not only the political sphere as space of citizenship is much pronounced. Citizenship then includes the duty to "help each other" and this "starts with your family." But especially non-activists stress that it is "not only [about] helping others but also helping yourself." Or as another non-activist said, "we should be disciplined enough for us to carry our own responsibility." This non-activist also believes in the understanding of "doing not enough as a citizen" in the sense of "not trying your best first before turning to the government." She explains that, "before going out in the streets and shouting and having this strike and things like that … before complaining, they have to make sure that they (have done) anything that they can…that's the time that I can only say they have done enough, but right now…people who keep on complaining are the people who are also breaking the rules…people who are saying that the prices are like this and like that are also the people who have been from one job to another because of attitude problem. … They didn't give value to education when they were still young and right now they have 12 children who they want to have proper education…a lot of funny facts if you go to the details of people who have actually been talking."

Just like what has been outlined when it came to social rights, where fulfillment is considered as a cooperation between state and individual, some respondents also underline the idea of giving a counterpart as a developmental prerequisite as "*sa life wala for free na butang* (in life, nothing is for free);" in the belief that "actually *tamad lang pud ang Pinoy* (Filipinos are just lazy). … You need to work it out and you need to spend something…*kung gusto gyud nimo na magprogress ka* (if you really want to get ahead)." Public services seemingly provided for free (as the German educational system given as example) are so framed as taxes well invested and "we're paying the government that's why the government should give it back to us." In this sense, many qualified their support for free college education by saying "but you have to pay back with service."

Left activists also know much about civic duties, but frame it differently, especially by adding a collective dimension to it with a focus on social change: "There's a lot of things *na pwede natong himuon …magsuporta sa mga grupo nga gusto bag-uhon ang katilingban…imbes na magyawyaw ta nga naay mga tao nibarog alang sa katilingban, alang sa atong mga katungod, sabton nato, tapos i-explain pud nato sa mga wala kasabot*. (There's a lot of things we can do ... supporting groups that want to change society … rather than just talk. There are people who stand up for the community, for our rights. We should understand [society], then explain it to the one's who do not.)"

4.12. Responsibilization and moralism

"*Pinaka-first mag-start kay change yourself*. (First and foremost, start with changing yourself.)" (A non-Left activist)

Even if LAs also stress that for change to take place, there is a need to hold the "people in charge to be accountable for what they do [and] change *their* attitude," such is never mentioned without the need for structural change. Non-activists on the other hand, especially often merely focus on personal change: be it the politicians (who need to change); or, even more pronounced, the people in general who need to improve, be it their culture or simply their individual attitude. "There's a lot of things *na dapat i-change sa perspective sa tao* (needed to be changed in the perspective of the people)," as one non-activist says and suggests to "educate people ... how to value time, or to develop discipline." "It's really more on individual change," says another, "we should be disciplined enough for us to carry our own responsibility." And a third one says, "if there should be anything changed, it's actually the people who should be changing their views."

It is thus not surprising that - next to dissatisfaction with the politicians - cultural impediments to development abound, when it comes to what the respondents (from all three subgroups) dislike about the Philippines. One attitude considered common among Filipinos and disliked by several respondents is the "crab mentality," *i-pull-down ang matag usa instead na mag-suporta-anay* (pulling down each other instead of supporting each other). Superstitions, laziness and complacency are mentioned, as well as, a lack of initiative and of creativity, of perseverance or a lack of reflection among Filipin@s.[367] Often, also a lack of discipline is highlighted as well as a pervasiveness of dirtiness. A Left activist speaks of a "*dekadente na kultura, walay laing nahibal-an ang katilingban kundi magparty-party* (decadent culture … society knows nothing else but to party)." Finally, the pervasive colonial mindset leaves a nasty taste in the mouths of several respondents.[368]

---

[367] Fellow Filipinos are criticized by several respondents for lack of reflection and for not focusing on resolving a problem but instead on just complaining and talking. Like what this respondent explains: "If there's something wrong, the tendency of the Pinoy is they talk about it to others, not focusing on the fact on how to resolve it. Instead of focusing on the issue to resolve it, they just tend to criticize. The people are flawed (*dauton ang tao)*, they talk to others and the problem will not be resolved. … Instead of spreading the troubles, spreading issue, then it is not going to be resolved."

[368] Only a few items mentioned here are not directly development-oriented, like Filipin@s being considered too sensitive or tending to grapevine (*tsismis*). Some Filipino traits are also contested: While many appreciate the endurance (*matiisin*) of Filipin@s, others consider this as "*sobra"* (too much).

Here also fits the panacea status given to education (cf. figure 13) by many respondents such as this NLA: “If people will be well-educated, they will be trained, they will be oriented on what's the proper thing to do, how you are going to behave, how you are going to treat, because it's not only more on the talk, it's more on practicing how you can, how you will interact with people of different status, of different level, of different backgrounds, and before you can practice that, you should learn the scenario first, and that is usually provided for in schools, that it's not only you in that particular color, in the world there is black, white, yellow, there are different background, different religious affiliations, so if a child will be taught properly that there are a lot of different people that live or exist aside from him…that child as he grows old, will be able to accept and respect the differences and embrace it.”

Figure 13: School opening, May 2014, Davao City.

Moral behavior is then considered to be for the benefit of the *kapwa* and society in general (i.e. it is considered as a form of performing active citizenship). “That’s actually one of my principles,” says one non-activist (with a renewed commitment to the church), “when you have that virtues, the values, the moral life…you no longer think of yourself, you also think of other people…in a perfect society wherein when I have too much and then you have little, I’ll share it with you, so that everyone will gonna be equal…what’s happening now with the world is, those who have plenty want to have more, and those who have meager, are being stepped on…disrespected…they’ll be losing it for the sake of people who already have a lot…the real reason why we exist is not because on our own, it’s also because to bring an impact to the place where we are in.”

The same respondent also considers “godlessness” the main reason for problems in community. What she wants to change most is to “go back to the source of everything…forgetting about being selfish …people who steal, they could have asked for it or borrowed money but nobody want to…they were not able to build their selves to have that respect from other people…they have broken other people’s trust.” Here compassion is combined with the call for “self-discipline:” “There are really people who really have a good heart, but it’s really working on who you know, and what’s in your pocket, and how strong or how weak your conscience is.”

Agreeing to the statement “if everybody leads a moral life, the public world of wider society should be in good order,” thus has another shade next to merely being un-

derstood as oblivious to structural determinants. It also reflects that most respondents are willy-nilly shaped by the religious environment prevailing in the Philippines. Respondents so say that Christianity and Islam have much to offer when it comes to a just society - like this respondent saying, “such beliefs, religions, it's really based on a certain kind of justice, and I'm sure most often also depend on equality.” Nevertheless, unlike other respondents stressing moral virtues, he explains that it primarily needs the rules and the system to be set right (and not individual virtue to realize this).

Several respondents do not seem sufficiently aware of the dilemma of pluralism arising when the main focus is on moral values, a dilemma the NLA quoted further above on education as panacea (who nevertheless has totally disagreed with the statement that if everybody leads a moral life, the public world of wider society should be in good order!) describes it this way: “What is moral? This is funny, *napapataas-kilay ako* (I really have to raise my eyebrows) … …you’re asking this question to a non-conformist person…it does not really follow…what’s moral to you could not be moral to people, and moral *kasi* (hence) I don’t know how to define it…. what’s immoral for you can just be okay for me.”[369]

An explicitly Catholic respondent rejects such relativism, saying “just don’t make it [democracy] an alibi for something you do beyond norms,” and later agrees that when the government thinks it is necessary it should restrict democratic rights. “Yes… people tend to abuse it…*kung wala gud tay* (if we have no) restrictions, we tend to abuse it…it should not be beyond the norms, because anything outside the box could cause negative effects.”

Finally, an interesting combination between focus on individual change and socio-cultural issues is expressed by this LA, “I like to change in the thinking of the people the colonial mentality,” but he explains this by starting with himself: “It should start with me. ... It’s hard to change the whole community they have their own mind they have their own will but for me I have to start from myself first.”

---

[369] A LA frames the issue of moral relativism in more political terms, saying that “relative…depende man gud…para sa akoa, life of virtue…I follow the way, the path of Dao, naa puy uban ang life of virtue sa ilaha sa lahi nga panghunahuna usahay maapakan na nila ang katungod sa uban…kanang mga suicide bombers, para sa ilaha life of virtue baya na pero daghan na sila’g napatay kadtong sa September 11 attacks…diri sa Pilipinas kanang magpangayaw, life of virtue man na sa ilaha…patyon nila ang lahi sa ilang kalaban…so dili nimo maingon nga kung nagpuyo sila’g life of virtue, ang society will be in order kasi di man ta pareho tanan og virtue. (It's relative... it depends... for me, life of virtue... I follow the way, the path of Dao, there are others who think differently about their life of virtue, sometimes their understanding violate the rights of others... like the suicide bombers, for them being like that is a life of virtue; they killed so many during the September 11 attacks... here in the Philippines, we have the tribal wars [declared by indigenous peoples], for them that's following a life of virtue... they kill the bloodline of their enemies...so you can't say that society will be in order if people live lives of virtue because people have different [understanding] of virtues.)”

4.13. Disembedded citizens?

In a last subchapter on analyzing the responses by the young urban professionals interviewed within the in-depth-study, the question shall be explored if we may not expect political action from them as they are "disembedded," i.e. they do not consider the Philippines to be the arena in which they should exert citizenship.

Disembeddedness is in the first place a result of their transnational working places. The distinct night shift in call center work is still considered to be societally exceptional. The world around call center agents is still oriented towards daytime. In combination with highly flexible schedules, night shift work marginalizes the agents from mainstream Philippine society, which is considered to be the "normal" or "real" one by the agents themselves as several responses showed. Several respondents explicitly mentioned that they were not home during important activities *because of* their call center jobs and several others say they are no longer in touch with old friends and networks *because of* different time rhythm. This point has been outlined in extent in an earlier publication (Reese 2008c).

Though we could not confirm that changing shifts and night work implies that "agents ... are completely pulled out of the social rhythms of the remaining society" (Reese 2008c; likewise Fabros 2007 2007:262), and furthermore, being uprooted from former networks is a typical experience not only for ICCAS but for anyone moving on from college to a job or from a job to another (as several respondents told us, with even a couple who are both working in a graveyard shift having "a hard time talking to each other,"), transnationality results to one being disconnected from the local. Says one respondent in our research: "*Sa tinuod lang, ang pag-keep track sa outside world or sa community, pag naa na ka sa BPO, mawala jud imong track…di na gani mi nagatan-aw og TV…pag-uli sa balay, tulog, pag-abot sa office, magbasa-basa'g news or mag-search sa internet, CNN…mostly bawal man na siya…trabaho diretso, pag-uli sa balay, mangutana na lang mi unsay balita, unsay isyu karon; usahay wala jud…trabaho, balay…wala kaayo koy idea unsay biggest problem sa community. Ma-outdated jud ka magtrabaho ka sa BPO…it's not gonna be your priority or wala kaayo siya'y value sa imoha kay kapoy…because sa mental stress gikan sa trabaho, I think 95% ang mental stress dira, physically five lang… kapoyan na ka maghunahuna.* (I have to admit, as far as keeping track with the outside world or with the community is concerned, if you are in the BPO, you really lose track ... we cannot even watch TV anymore... when we come home, we sleep; when we arrive in the office, we browse the news or search the internet which is mostly forbidden anyway; we work directly, when we come home we ask about the news, what are current issues; and sometimes nothing, ... it's just work and home…so I don't really have an idea what the biggest problem is in the community. You really get outdated if you work in BPO ... it's not gonna be your priority or it doesn't really have much value for you because you are tired ... because of the mental stress from work; I think it is 95% mental stress there, physically only 5. It is even tiring to think.)" This is con-

firmed by another respondent saying, it is not the lack of time but of energy, why most call center agents do not "keep up with the issues."[370]

One also points out, "…you don't know what's going on to your home country. *Wala na* (no more), you're not updated with the current reality, which I didn't like *kay* (since) I really enjoyed reading the news." Another concludes, "*Kung naa ka sa sulod, mabag-o man gud imohang* life. *Kung manggi-alamon ka kaniadto, posibleng gamay na lang ang imong gustong mahibal-an*. (If you're inside, your life changes. If before you want to be knowledgeable [about issues], it's possible that now you only want to know a little)."

On the other hand, several activists keep up doing political work besides the call center work. One of the respondents explained: "I did not deprive myself from what I really wanted… so I did not get totally detached from the active world… ... I realized that it wouldn't do any good because the call center, it's just temporary. And the struggle is... ... (Researcher:) Eternal. (Respondent:) Yeah, eternal." (Researcher 2 rejoins chuckling: "Oh my God, eternal.")

Displacement, as described above is a fact relevant for citizenship, just like the blurring of the geographical spaces in which one's rights are to be realized (cf. subchapter 3.17.2.: *It is not clear whom the agents should turn to*).

Notably, a life overseas is furthermore part of the biographical plans of a majority of the respondents. A sound 26% have long-term goals of migrating to other global locations, preferably to countries of the west, either for work or study. As expressed by a respondent in Dumaguete: "(I)t doesn't always end in the Philippines…you need to dream bigger, dream higher…" Of this percentage, three explicitly expressed the dream of travelling across countries, which seems to underline travel as a signifier of success for them. One respondent, who has Iranian citizenship, would like to go to Europe because of the belief that it has good pay, good schools, and social welfare, and not to America because, as he says, "I talk to Americans all day…and the government doesn't even take care of you." Likewise, we could observe that ideal citizenry is patterned after those of economically well-off countries with a strong state, where people follow rules. Often Singapore is mentioned, the example of Germany is well received – and of course North America (USA and Canada), as well as Australia, are at times mentioned as positive examples.

At the same time, there are respondents who find it shameful that "people dream to go abroad," "forgetting that we are Filipinos" or "not being proud of being Filipinos." As outlined earlier, there are even respondents who decided postponing their

---

[370] A respondent confesses not being updated on current events because there was a time when many agents of the company in Davao did not know why they were directed to report for work. They later learned that it was because Manila was beaten by a typhoon. Another imparts, "All of the people in the floor don't know about TV…we don't have access actually because all we do is sleep all of the time… The customer asked (an agent), »Hey I heard about that… How was the hostage taking blah blah blah« And the agent answered with, »Is there any hostage taking?«" (It was the hostage-taking incident of Chinese tourists by a former policeman at the Quirino Grandstand in Manila in 2010.)

migration plans as they believe that they are needed as citizens here. (None again speaks about acting as a citizen in possible societies of destination.)

Despite all criticism, it is interesting enough that 17 of 25 respondents declare, they can realize their life plans in the Philippines, while only eight say they can't. It is only among the LAs (sic!) that the ayes and the nays are balanced (4 to 4). And all but one of 24 believe that there is hope for the Philippines. On the one hand, there seems to be a strong social expectation to answer the latter question in a specific manner. Many respondents say things like: "there's always hope! If you tell yourself that there's no hope you are already dead." Some respondents explicitly declare that having hope is part of Filipino culture, "it's actually the Filipino attitude that should be." This again moves other respondents to consider it a motherhood statement and make fun of it by saying "yeah, *habang may buhay, may pag-asa* (as long as there is life, there is hope)."

Nevertheless, what makes the Philippines a place to have "more fun" in, as the current campaign of the Department of Tourism goes, are not the socio-political realities. The concept of the Filipino nation instead is culturalized: When asked what they like about the Philippines, respondents overwhelmingly mentioned the food, the weather, the landscape, happy and friendly people, but also the resilient, adapting and hardworking people and a "family-oriented" culture in general. Only a few also mention societal issues and all four of them are activists: two Left activists mention the history of political struggle, one of them calling it a "source of political growth." One non-Left activist mentions the "macro-economic perspective of the government" and another says as well she is proud of the history. (She also likes especially the Filipinos' skin color, which in view of the omnipresent whitening obsession is a remarkable statement.)

But in contrast, when comes to what they do *not* like about the Philippines, socio-political issues overflow (see above). Especially negative attitudes and character deficiencies among fellow Filipin@s abound as outlined above. The list of the likes and non-likes thus shows very clearly that what respondents like about the Filipin@s are mainly non-societal issues, but what they dislike are nearly invariably societal issues. Be it defects of the political system or be it attitudes considered to be impeding development. Here, it is not only Left activists showing their critical stance as well as expressing dislike in relation to the other items, but also NLAs and non-activists. Unlike the Left activists, this though hardly reflects in a negative evaluation of the Philippine system in general. And a significant number of respondents kept silent when asked what they are ashamed of.

Despite Philippine culture providing a sense of belonging ("*Filipino ako*!" as some respondents exclaimed), sovereignity over Philippine politics is not that guarded. Only 9 of 25 agree to ex-President Manuel Quezon's verdict that "I would rather have a government run like hell by Filipinos than a government run like heaven by Americans." 16 think otherwise. While the activists largely disagree (4 agree and 11 disagree, but there is no positive contingency among those with a Leftist orientation

termed as “national-democratic”); and two activists even express that they don’t like a false alternative (“neither…this is run like hell by Filipinos and I don’t like it”), the non-activists are a little more nationalist (5 of 10 agree, 5 disagree). The main reasoning for rejecting Quezon’s statement is the priority respondents give to efficient governance: “It does not really make sense, if he’s a Filipino or not, and he’s not doing his job or the government does not function well, so why do we have a government for…it does not matter which race or citizen as long as they are doing their jobs,” as a non-activist says, adding that “I prefer Americans…*naa koy nakita sa* (I see the) American management, which is okay.”

Such detachment from the nation as an imagined community also shows the main communities of belonging the respondents indicated: In the first place, it is the family, even to their occupation. Six respondents indicated family as their main community of belonging; five chose it as the second; and finally, two as the third. This makes an importance index of .43.[371] The family is mainly important for non-activists (four consider it their most important community of belonging, three their second most important and one his third most important community of belonging), while it is irrelevant for Left activists (one identified it as second and one as third most important). Among the NLAs, two chose it as the first and one as third.

Likewise, six respondents indicated occupation as their main community of belonging and five chose it as the second; two chose it as the third. The importance index is then so .43. Three LAs chose it as the most important community of belonging, while only one NLA did (but four of them chose it as second belonging and one as third). Among the non-activists, two chose it as the most important community of belonging; there were one each who chose second and third.

Social class is still considered by five respondents as their main community of belonging; by two as the second; and, by one as third (Importance index: .30). It is most important for non-activists (2/1/1), while for NLAs (2/0/0); LAs (1/1/0) don’t put that much emphasis on it.

2 respondents consider their gender as their main of belonging; two as the second; and one as the third (Importance index: .17). Among these five respondents are two women, two gays, and also one straight male (though only identifying it as third).

Finally, age still receives an importance index of .14. For two respondents, it is second; and after all, five as third. There is no contingency with the kind of activism respondents are grouped into.

Despite the high presence of Catholicism in the Philippines and the prevalence of religiously inspired statements by the respondents (presuming that the strong communitarian flavoring of the responses is significantly triggered by Catholic social teaching), only two name religion as their main belonging and one does so as third. This makes an importance index of .11. And three respondents rather have biographical

---

[371] (1*main belonging+2/3*second belonging+1/3*third belonging/22 (number of valid entries).

reasons for giving importance to religion which makes it similar to the single mentioning of race as most important belonging.

Nationality though even has a lesser importance: Only two mark it as second and two as third (Importance index: .09). This is an astonishingly low value considering the fuss that is made about patriotism in the Philippines, especially from among those in the Left (national democrats) and also in the mainstream (as the conflict with China in the "West Philippine Sea" shows).[372] Not a single respondent considers it his or her main community of belonging – and none of the Left activists includes it into his/her three primary communities of belonging.[373] We can so conclude that their comparably strong sense of citizenship (active as well as passive) is not fueled by nationalism (even if the argument of shared ethnicity is often dropped in the public discourse to win support for social issues).

The belonging to the region people come from is much more pronounced: for three it is their second community of belonging; and for six, even their third; the importance index is sort of twice that of the nation: .18 (»sort of«, as one should not compute ordinal values this way). All but one respondent thinking so are from Davao, expressing a special Mindanao identity accompanied with an anti-colonial coloring (against "Manila Imperialism").

Belonging to a political party is only of importance for two Left activists; one places it as his second and one as his third - and then, even one "non-activist" names it as his third most important belonging (leaving the researcher in the dark which party he can have meant by that).

Despite the respondents being partly disembedded; not considering the nation to be a primary community of belonging and at least not ruling out migration; on the other hand, still believing that they can realize their life plans in the Philippines, we were able to present various evidences that the international call center agents (and former agents) we interviewed, practiced various, and in some cases, extensive forms of citizenship. All these suggest the conclusion that working in an international call center does not rule out citizenship and that rootedness is not so much a prerequisite for showing a sense of citizenship (though it is to be assumed that it is relevant for practicing citizenship). For now, we cannot agree mutatis mutandis with Elfren Cruz (in *How the Left must evolve* PS, 27.3.2014), who assumes that "dissatisfied skilled workers do not resort to organizing labor unions [because] they look for better paying jobs outside the country as OFWs." It is not their being a migrant or their plan to migrate

---

[372] "Nationalism" though is not always necessarily linked with ethnicity; it can also be a term describing commitment for the (geographically limited) commonwealth. In this sense, it is often drawn on as antidote for privatism and selfishness, "plac(ing) the nation above class, family and personal interests," as Manuel Almario explains in his column *Why not nationalism?* (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 15.3.2014)

[373] His post-national mindset as a NLA was brought to the point this way: "It's only your birthmark that you're a Filipino, but as a citizen in general, you're not only confined to your own locality or to your country but also with other people in different races," and he further expresses his vision as "maybe the world will be run by one color only, as long as we are well provided for."

which keeps them from organizing trade unions or from practicing citizenship in general.

4.14. Conclusion

"I would say something about politics and they would say 'ah, what?'"

(Activist with a Left background explaining that he doesn't talk politics at the workplace)

Drawing a preliminary conclusion on the basis of the answers regarding citizenship given by the respondents to the qualitative study, we discover on the whole a concept of state and society with strong communitarian and republican shadings prevailing among them. Active citizenship is spelled out with obligations more pronounced than rights. "Democracy is not about politicians, it is about citizens who carry the accountability for governance" with "the accountability of citizens far outweigh(ing) that of the public servants," says Jose Montelibano (PDI, 25.3.2013), while Karaos (1997: 122) believes that "rights are seen as mainly exercised in the pursuit of private ends while obligations are in pursuit of public ends."

Even the non-activists are aware of politics, maybe even with more detailed knowledge than among counterparts in societies considered politically more developed.

I would largely rule out the problem of "non-attitudes," i.e., "asking for opinions that do not actually exist" (Schulze 1976: 145). Schulze considers such "non-attitudes" resulting from "indifference and lack of sensitivity to political-structural problems" as a "major risk" when empirically capturing the political mindset of German adolescents, leading to a "high percentage of »democrats by chance« (*Zufallsdemokraten*) not expressing political opinions, but a simple tendency of affirmation in an imposed situation of decision uncertainty" (ibid). The vast majority of respondents had explicit views when asked to explain their rankings.

And even among the non-activists, political involvement has not been nil (though much less than especially among Left activists). The assumption of Left activists or the general public considering their coworkers or today's youth in general, as apolitical (see the quote above), seems to be in need of reevaluation.

I presume that the influence of social catholic teaching here is of high significance as it has pervaded the public discourse and has heavily influenced the paradigm of parentism and shaped value education (especially in private schools) due to the strong role Catholic educational institutions here play.

The respondents show a considerable sense of political and social rights – with a big But. Their sense of entitlement is rudimentary: Freedom for them is the right to speak out and the right to self-determination as long as it is not at the expense of others. Despite at times a considerable agreement with authoritarian political statements, we could not identify a closed authoritarian mindset among the respondents. Their

sense of entitlement with regards to political rights though is less expanded to a right to decide on the course of society. As political parties are not considered to offer real policy choices and politicians are framed as self-interested, there is little belief in the chance that the political path can take a substantial different direction. "Politics is still politics, you could not change it," as one respondent said. The right to vote is thus rather understood as a right to speak out, as several respondents explained, and less as a right to decide.[374]

Nevertheless, the negative narrative, describing the Philippine political system and culture as "damaged" (Fallows 1987); and, politicians as merely corrupt, selfish and unresponsive, is disputed especially by non-activists as a "generalization" (even if they also hardly trust politicians).

Likewise, social rights - the fulfillment of which is considered by nearly all respondents as the most important role of the government - are more or less restricted to basic needs. Justice is spelled out more as a procedural justice and along the terms of equal opportunities, and hardly as distributional justice or even as social equality surpassing a basic needs approach. Instead, the myth of achievement is put to the center by emphasizing hard work (*maningkamot*) and education. It also serves as justification for social inequality and as argument why needs beyond the basic ones shall not be fulfilled for "free." Karaos considers the "right to the means of social mobility, particularly education and employment, particularly pronounced in middle class notions of citizenship" (1997: 127). I though doubt the extent of how such pronouncement is really middle-class specific. As I pointed out earlier, *maningkamot* and the belief in education also stood out in the few interviews we undertook with »ordinary« people.

On the other hand, the right to get support even in terms of basic needs is qualified as "right to ask my government something [only] when I really, really need that." Civic duties are here outlined as "helping yourself" (which is why most respondents do not favor benefits for the unemployed, but rather call for employment opportunities). Even the Left activists do *not* expect the state to simply provide and thus not propagate a practice of "sponging off the state," as neoliberal critics of the welfare state often claim. Having not asked about their opinion on the idea of a (global) basic income (*bedingungsloses Grundeinkommen*) favored by various groups and individuals not only from the Left in Europe, I presume their rejection would have even been more explicit.

In general, social rights are not put only under the condition of financial feasibility (*Finanzierungsvorbehalt*), but also linked with a means test (*Bedürftigkeitsprüfung*). The

---

[374] In a peculiar way, this framing of freedom as "negative freedom," i.e. the freedom to do what one wants, seems to relate to the low consciousness of a public sphere in the Philippines. The *ibang tao* are most appreciated if they don't thwart the plans of an individual or his collective (*tayo*).

state is understood as an enabler, less as a provider.[375] But it is not limited to a "real liberal" (Ulrich) state only providing equal opportunities and coming to the aid of active citizens (for instance parents) to do what is needed to be done, but indeed more as a state of communitarian shading of "mak(ing) all of us lead better lives."

The sense of entitlement is much stronger where respondents consider public service as a service in return, in return for taxes or contributions paid (one respondent even using the term "customer service").[376] The understanding of state is rather transactional than rights-based (be it based on rights of citizens or as human rights as put down in the Constitution and several international human rights treaties). In how far this transactional understanding of the state relates to the often heard criticism of "transactional justice" and "transactional politics," a *do ut des* or scratching each others back, which is considered one of the main flaws of everyday politics and one of the main reasons for the precarious state of citizenship in the Philippines, remains to be seen. The same accounts for the mercy-based stressing of "*luoy*" and "*awa*" when it comes to the entitlement for people in distress - again this is not a genuinely rights-based approach and rather leads to charity, rather than to rights-based solutions. Nevertheless, this caveat does not rule out that compassion might not even be a necessary requirement for rights to get really respected and granted as outlined in the subchapter 3.6.5.: *Walking the talk: from consciousness to action*. It does not appear though as a sufficient basis for a rights-based approach, also because it builds on and even enforces, social asymmetries.

Such understanding of the state (although only partly [neo]liberal as in the case of a market-like relation to the state as customer), even in its communitarian shape is very adaptable to the state design in neoliberal governementality with its focus on responsibilization (cf. the chapter 5.11.: *Do it yourself: The connivance of communitarism and neoliberalism* in the postscript). It goes beyond the night watcher state (just as neoliberalism does in contrast to a liberal philosophy – not practice! – in the 19th century), and also includes significant traces of a moral economy incompatible to the strict property rights regime in neoliberalism, but in effect does not promote much more than a lean state.

As far as social rights are concerned, such low-intensity expectations are backed up by a realism, boiling down to the argument that the "Philippines is a 3rd world country, we could not expect more," converging with the imperative to stay "reasonable." While 20 respondents explain that such rights are to be claimed from the government, 14 of the 20 do not expect help from the government. Non-activists especially are very lenient with the government, not expecting much and willing to recognize

---

[375] Yacat (2014) traces this attitude also on the assumption that it is common for Filipin@s to "draw parallels between religion and government." And Catholicism, says Yacat, teaches people that "God will provide but you must do your part" or as a Filipino saying goes: *nasa diyos ang awa nasa tao ang gawa* (the mercy is with God, the doing with the people).

[376] Neal Cruz brings this transactional understanding of the state to the point when demanding that "it is the responsibility of the government to protect private property in exchange for the taxes the owners pay. Squatters ... are thieves and robbers stealing somebody else's property." (PDI, 9.9.2010)

its good will, and more than others, at least believe that it is partly fulfilling its job. Only the Left activists considerably think of holding the government accountable, instead of just simply sighing "*government kasi*."

We could also not identify if the knowledge about a more developed welfare regime in other societies that the respondents have acquired by working in a transnational space (one respondent wondered why "some agents are being yelled at… it's really weird because you offer them a free heart scan. Here in the Philippines, if you offer a free heart scan, the Filipinos would right away grab it out…because it's really quite expensive. But there, they just reject it") results to the development of a higher sense of entitlement towards the government in the Philippines. Instead, several respondents explained their desire to migrate on the basis of better social services in welfare societies. As one non-activist respondent said in the very first interview, "I also thought that if you continue to hope, to wait for the society here in the Philippines to change, I don't think that will happen any sooner, (I) might as well go to another place that's already giving good service to the people so that's why I'm more convinced now that I really need to go to another place outside the Philippines." (As outlined earlier, she though reversed her position in the course of the interview series and committed to stay on and exercise citizenship.)

Just like what we have discovered in relation to their (lack of) sense of being entitled to a pay comparable to their American counterparts, it seems that with regards to welfare expectations, the container state approach (with the Philippines considered merely "Third World"), also persists. Take it or leave it - in a very literal sense. And with 17 of 25 saying they can realize their life dreams in the Philippines, it rather seems that the "take it" prevails.

Unfortunately, here a consideration made in an earlier publication (Reese 2008a) seems to be confirmed: "What the people in the North, who are used to the merits of the welfare state, still have to learn the hard way, is already *common sense* in the South: The framework conditions are defined as being constant and are accepted in this way by most of the people. Economical difficulties are acknowledged as individual problems and thus individual survival strategies are pursued. Instead of solving social problems, the core question is how to successfully manage personal problems and make productive use of them."[377]

Where the state remains absent, it is rather one's own efforts than one's family or friends stepping in. The respondents are aware of networks they can fall back on in

---

[377] In the worst case (from the perspective of one who likes to maintain the idea of a welfare state), we can here discover an advance in governementality in the Philippines and other societies with an informal welfare regime. Societies such as the Philippines may be an indication that highly socially unequal societies based on a strong responsibilization imperative at least function (their distribution regime not being threatened by uprisings), all threats of a "Brazilianization ... of the West" (Beck 1999: 7) notwithstanding.

situations of need, but prefer to help themselves. They even frown upon those you don't try hard themselves (first), largely believing that one's own effort (*maningka-mot*) is sufficient to escape poverty. The role of the family – its prominence often blamed for collective egoism (*kanya-kanya* – everyone for himself) and considered one main impediment for 'modern' citizenship – is ambivalent. While family is the overwhelming choice when it comes to support during old age (in the wake of a largely underdeveloped provision for the elderly population) and is, next to occupation, the most important community of belonging, there is hardly an overreliance on family (only one respondent expects help from his family in all of the three cases of need indicated during the interview in the first place). Both features again are differently pronounced among the Left activists, who do not consider *maningkamot* the panacea against poverty (though believing in hard work themselves as well) and are also hesitant to fall back on their family. This is another reason for them to rather put emphasis on structural change.

As far as the disenchantment with the performance of most politicians (and the lack of parties providing policy choices) are concerned, such nevertheless, does not make the respondents reject the system – or politics all together. They are *politikinstitutions-verdrossen*, but not *politikverdrossen* to use the German terms or disenchanted with how the institutions work but are not rejecting the institutions in general. Even those not focused on changing the set-up are split if they should just take such underperformance as given (*government kasi*) or rather believe in the possibility of moral improvement by the politicians (citing Mayor Duterte as a role model). Nevertheless, due to an absence of a well-working government, all groups are not closed to the idea of a government not elected and being "tough" as long as it secures public security, economic prosperity and efficiency (both items show a positive correlation of d_{sym}=.44). Nevertheless, in the eyes of the respondents, even "strong leadership" should respect individual rights as the strong rejection of restricting democratic rights and ignoring public opinion shows.[378]

The Left activists though are not only critical of the way the institutions perform, but they mostly believe that the political as well as the economic system don't work at all and need to be changed totally. At the same time again, they are the respondents with the least authoritarian features. Rather than being "democratic centralists" (though one of them fancies "proletarian democracy") they are rather radical democrats, not satisfied with a low-intensity democracy (»ampaw democracy«). As far as the non-Left respondents on the other hand are concerned, their sober assessment of the performance of the workings of the political and economical system (mainly a

[378] As far as the admiration of Rodrigo Duterte is concerned, none of our respondents explicitly lauded his regular warnings towards crime suspects to "leave the city horizontally" and many more. They either don't agree to the trade-off between a safe city and human rights usually encountered among residents of Davao City and beyond – or they had a guess that both interviewers are connected to the human rights community and would consider such a statement to be socially undesirable and therefore better left unsaid.

failing grade) does not keep them from considering the Philippines a democratic country.

The Left activists likewise also have the most negative assessment of government's ignorance for its "bosses," to quote President Aquino and also much more express the negative narrative about Philippine socio-political realities. (Using the term "narrative" here does not assume that it is only "*istoryahe*" [empty talk], but rather takes into consideration that every assessment of social realities, no matter how to the point, takes the form of a narrative).

About 3 out of 4 respondents (17 of 24) believe Filipin@s should do more to help the government improve the country. The non-activists especially consider it the role of citizens to engage the government ("we need to knock the door of the people in the government for them to notice"). They mainly define citizenship not as taking a share in shaping the country, but as making the system work, manifesting itself in a strong moral orientation and in deep traits of responsibilization (such as highlighting *maningkamot*). Even the persistence of social inequality is partly framed as a lack of moral values and personal misbehavior (greed, lack of honesty and consideration), but less a question of setting the structures and rules right.

This is underlined by the high relevance lack of education is given for the persistence of poverty and even social inequality. "Moral recovery" is seen as a remedy by several of these respondents and a strongly person-centered and morally charged political discourse most often displaces structural analysis. This is accompanied by a tendency to hope for a "good prince," one which, especially for the Davao respondents, seems to have been incarnated in the current Mayor of Davao City, Rodrigo Duterte. This is also reflected in a locally-centered approach of correcting societal ills, from where change on the national scale should take off.

The Left activists rather see "us" (i.e. the organized citizenry) in the role of changing structures on at least a national scale in a way required for good governance (and they have therefore also been much more active when it comes to conventional and even more unconventional forms of participation). While both approaches (individual model behavior and pressing for structural changes) are seldom emphasized at the same time, both approaches more or less express a strong sense of agency. None of the two approaches further merely rest on passive citizenship ("entitlement mentality"), both consider active citizenship as crucial: None of both speaks of rights without obligations and the obligations were usually even more pronounced.[379] Even when rights are supported (such as that to free college education), corresponding duties are called for (like public service after graduation). Both groups also highlight

[379] Hernandez (2014) reflects a widespread caveat towards a rights-based approach when expressing that "we (the Filipinos) have evolved as citizens ... because of Westernization and people get to go to school. We are being taught, it is OK, democracy is to say what you feel and say what you like. Unfortunately when we did that we were not educated to be responsible. That is why we became loose canon."

the special responsibility of the educated (i.e. them) to enlighten the common people to make change possible.[380]

Only among the Left (ex-)activists we can find concepts and cravings going beyond such promotion of a lean state and an over-average sense of active and passive citizenship. They seem to be most influenced by an understanding of the state often taken for granted in the citizenship discourse, especially that coming from European welfare societies: a state which does not reduce itself to providing safety nets and equal opportunities, but also acting as an interventionist state, correcting social inequalities and securing broad social rights. Indeed, there seems to be some sense to the everyday equation of "*makabayan*" (in favor of the country/patriotic) with having Leftist political ideas, as observed by Michael Tan (PDI, 29.11.2012) – and confirmed by Yacat (2014) on the basis of his own researches.[381] (Or as the columnist Boo Chanco called them, "Leftist loudmouths [that] have found good symbolic issues that will paint an image of a government that is unable or unwilling to provide relief to the daily problems of people living on the edge"; PS, 19.1.2011.) A struggle which runs out of time, as one Left activist explains: "We're fighting the system right now, tomorrow we'll be fighting global warming…if we're not gonna hurry, we will lose the Philippines because of global warming."

Under such circumstances, one may not expect the boiling point (*sobra na*) to arrive soon, at least when it comes to precarization and social inequality (also in the global scale).

Nevertheless it does not seem as if notions of impotence are the reason why the boiling point is not reached. The respondents do not believe that the top brass anyway do as they damn well please or that the man on the street can't change it anyway. Both impressions are usually linked to the reasons given about why the lower class is politically disinclined (*politikfern*) [cf. Munsch 2003 and Klatt/Walter 2011 for Germany].

For the Philippine context, Randy David describes this mindset paradigmatically in his column "The middle class and the poor" (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 11.1.2004) wherein he writes that the poor (!) are "less organized and less politicized, ... gripped by ignorance, mesmerized by mass media, and paralyzed by poverty, they are incapable of seeing beyond their personal troubles. They do not make a connection bet-

[380] Regarding how far the respondents also have a pronounced classist mindset as declared as typical for the middle class in the theoretical part or in how far there are chances for a cross class struggle against precarization, cannot be seriously answered on the basis of the study. Even if classist sentiments were to be detected, especially when it comes to describing the lower class as being "*bobo*" (gullible) or "*tamad*" (lazy) and not showing sufficient *maningkamot*, we have simply not included items allowing a valid measurement of such mindset beyond anecdotal evidence.

[381] Yacat explains that his research as well came to the conclusion that "being organized or not made the difference in their behavior and their intentions. If you are organized, then you will have a sense of citizenship that is bigger and then you are more likely to do the things that are part of citizenship. The non-volunteers and non-activists, their idea of citizenship is really very narrow. It is just two: pay taxes and vote. If you do that, you are a good citizen." His conclusion: "If you want to develop ... citizenship, it is really having people organized, having them join groups. Because if they are left to themselves or their families they don't have the same set of values, the same expectations.... not in a particular organization, but in any organization."

ween their personal situations and the social structures that constrain their life chances. They want change, but their individual powerlessness keeps them timid. ... They would rather wait for a messiah than seek strength in collective action."

In general, our respondents showed that they are not "gripped by ignorance" (but are the 'masa' really that ignorant as well? This is an assumption questioned in Reese 2013b) nor are they paralyzed by poverty. It was observed that instead of exhibiting individual powerlessness, they exert considerable self-confidence and sense of agency.

On the other hand, especially the non-Left respondents also showed that at least they don't explicitly make a "connection between their personal situations and the social structures that constrain their life chances," to follow the words of David. The sense of powerlessness is as well not alien for the respondents, as the accumulated prevalence indices for the statements "people like me don't have any say about what the government does" or "I don't think the government cares much what people like me think," show. But: It is those who showed the highest political activism, i.e. the LAs, who also agree most here. Thus, having such opinion seems not to impede political activity, radical at that.

Making sense of the modest demands the respondents show towards the state (which the next chapter will confirm for the Philippines in general), I would assume that there is an "extensive agreement of habitus and habitat, a "happy relationship with the institution," as Margarete Steinrücke (1997: 8) paraphrases Bourdieu. "In this relationship," Steinrücke goes on, "the *doxa* (in old Greek for general opinion and expectation] is carried forward: the universe of self-evident, considered »natural«, … wherein the mystery of how the dominated … contribute to the maintenance of domination lies. Even the most inhuman working and living conditions can be experienced as meaningful and attractive by people tacitly consenting as they have been prepared by the inhuman conditions of existence to accept these conditions. Historical movement and changing behavior can thus be found most likely where there is no fitting between position and disposition, where the actors have an unhappy relationship to the institutions they inhabit."

Such analysis smacks of »false consciousness,« whenever "professional citizenship" (Amna, see below), global social equality and political idealism/maximalism are considered as the benchmarks. Neither Steinrücke nor I (as the author of this study) are free from such assumption. But as researchers, we have to be open to the possibility that it is us who are "stupid" (to quote the video clip *parva que sou)* and are being unrealistic in trying to change the world instead of working the system.

Moore has shown that both an individual and a collective sense of a breach in an 'implicit social contract' is an important and necessary element in riots, revolts and some social movements, as Tomke Bohnisch and Helga Cremer-Schafer point out in their article *Coping with Social Exclusion: From Acceptance to Indignation* (Böh-

nisch/Cremer-Schäfer 2003). "Yet, in his transcendent historical analysis he discovered that moral indignation is not at all a 'natural' response to excessive obligations, unreasonable demands or sufferings caused by social and political orders. There is no evidence of any 'universal features' leading to moral indignation, although there are indications that some relations and types of situations in the sphere of politics, the division of labor and the distribution of goods and services are more likely than others to give rise to a 'sense of injustice' and can lead to 'moral indignation', 'moral anger' or 'moral outrage' on the part of the subordinated subjects or classes."

This includes (1) "the incompetence or refusal of a political authority to provide security, peace, the just mediation of conflicts and sufficient (or governmental) control of staff, and to make reasonable demands (taxes, services) on the ruled," (2) "the application of excessive, inhumane punishment," (3) the denial that "even the most humble members of societies, ought to have enough to do their tasks (or jobs) in the social order" as well as (4) the refusal of "distributive justice, based on a ranking of tasks, according to which an extra investment of effort, skills, or some other quality deserves merit-based rewards" (ibid.).

As outlined in the first part (cf. subchapter 3.6.2.: *Prerequisites for political action*), Reinhard Kreckel recommended to include the analysis of how individuals perceive and interpret their conditions of action and how they put them in relation to other individuals to be one of the central themes in research on inequality as these subjective interpreting of and referring to conditions of inequality is crucial for the reproduction and change of social conditions. Thus much then relies on framing. And besides this, terms like "excessive obligations," "unreasonable demands" or "sufferings caused by social and political orders," are to a certain extent only matters of opinion": but for as long as people do not consider it their right or as proper to claim more of the "whole cake" as a popular term goes in Leftism (apart from the fact that they don't wish to own "the whole fucking bakery"), there is not much to be expected in relation to social transformation.

"Weak interests can be the more readily mobilized and organized, the more open the political institutions are towards new participation requirements, the more influential allies are available, the more discordant political elite appear and the less stability political ties have," say Willems and von Winter (2000: 23). But without an interest, without such a strong sense of entitlement (as it exists in the case of the Left activists, but also partly with the other respondents), (political) opportunities and resources (to which the number of co-citizens willing to join such struggle belongs), are of little relevance.

"What would it take?," asks a Left activist reflects on the outburst of the Portuguese precarized youth. "Kung naay mahitabo nga grabe na jud kaayo… kinahanglan pa pud siguro sa part sa mga nakigbisog karon nga magduso pa sila, more effort…mag effort din ang kadtong mga walang pakialam, sila pud mismo ba they'll open their eyes, dili nila ilimita ang struggle sa pagclick lang sa ilang mouse…feeling nila cool na kaayo sila, siguro kung makita nila na what they're doing is not enough to change

the world…when that's gonna happen, I don't know, pero feel nako inevitable man jud na ba, dili man forever na ingon ani na lang, mangyayari at mangyayari din ang pagbabago. (If something very severe happens... maybe activists should also struggle more, intensify their efforts... those who do not care should also take effort, they should open their eyes, they should not limit their struggle to clicking their mouse... they feel that they are already very cool, maybe if they can see that what they are doing is not enough to change the world... when that's gonna happen, I don't know, but I feel that that is inevitable, this situation can't go on forever, change will take place and it will take place)."

As said before as well, social change is not predictable. And predicting it is not the aim of this work. It rather wishes to point out that protest is full of requirements and it calls for more caution in always calling for another People Power whenever serious deficits are noted.

What though could be ruled out for now - at least in relation to the sample - is the notion that citizenship is lacking merely because the Philippines has a migration culture (which also holds true for the disembedded ICCAs) and a lack of true sense of patriotism. Even if their sense of belonging to the nation is much weaker than to other communities of belonging, they showed a considerable sense of citizenship – be it in a local and individualized version or in a collective fashion which focuses more on the society as a whole as the arena of change.

4.15. Are the respondents representative for the Philippines?

"Survey evidence shows, not for the first time, that to denigrate Filipinos with the term »damaged culture« is to rely on parachute journalism rather than on social science."

(Mahar Mangahas, head of the Social Weather Stations, PDI, 19.4.2008)

In the final chapters of the main body of this work (4.16. to 4.20.), I will turn to embedding the findings among the study sample into secondary data I was able to avail in relation to Philippine society in general. Do the sentiments and conceptions of the respondents to the qualitative study resonate with the larger picture in Philippine society (especially those of the middle class wherever data allows for such specification)?

This part will especially draw on the responses of Filipino participants to several items within the surveys of the International Social Service Program (ISSP), i.e. on Social Inequality (2009), Government (2006), Citizenship (2004) and National Identity (2003). The fact that several interview items (and questions) used in the qualitative study are taken from the ISSP survey items facilitated the comparison of the responses with this research.

In all cases, these (ISSP) survey data are the most up to date results open to the public. Wherever possible, these data will be differentiated according to class, at times also by gender, and are compared with respective data from Germany (the ISSP are surveyed separately for East and West Germany!) for the sake of minimizing the Othering effect.[382] (Here one should not lose sight of the fact that Germany is considered a "special case" as well, with a political profile differing significantly from that of France for example, where in recent years numerous protests against precarization have taken place, while in Germany they were only short-lived in form of the so called Monday protests against the introduction of Harts IV. This has repeatedly led German intellectuals to accuse their compatriots of quietism and an authoritarian mentality.)

As the work has a special focus on detecting if there is a (middle-)class specific sense of citizenship, there was a need to identify the variable which describes class belonging best. Here the most useful indicator turned out to be "years of schooling," i.e. from the three objective class indicators (educational attainment, income, occupation), educational attainment serves as the by far most suitable indicator for class belonging.

Choosing either years of schooling or family income as explaining variable (explanans) shows that most results only differ very marginally. The largest difference detected for the Philippines is that education correlates with the item "likeliness of counter-action against unjust law" by .08, while family income only correlates by .03.[383] But as educational attainment played a major role in the self-description of the respondents to the qualitative study and is considered more than income, as positively correlating with citizenship attitudes (see chapter 3.11.: *The precarized new middle class: resourceful and still longing for something*), I rather chose »years of schooling«.

---

[382] The samples from Germany are indeed mostly people with German origin (93.2%), only 1.2% of the respondents have a Turkish background (and 5.5% do not have the German citizenship). The sample from the Philippines includes only Filipino regional groups (ISSP 2009) and all respondents say they are Filipino citizens, while 11 out of 1,200 respondents have at least a foreign parent (ISSP 2003).

[383] I am using the variable family income, not personal income. The variable personal income has a strong gender bias as among those Filipino respondents without own income are 330 women and only 188 men. As the correlation between family income and personal income is highly significant (d=.54; Pearson's R even .67) and since furthermore the household (*mag-asawa*, *magka-pamilya*) is a highly relevant decision maker in the Philippines. And as finally, the household concept plays a bigger role in a situation of precarity (as outlined in part I), we can expect at least for the Philippines, a further correlation with personal income would not create significant new insights.

BASE=2082		Country			
		Total	DE-W-Germany-West	DE-E-Germany-East	PH-Philippines
R: Occupation ILO,ISCO 1988 4-digit	D:Soldiers	0.3 %	0.6 %	0.2 %	-
	D:Officers	*	0.1 %	-	-
	Armed forces (1,100,110)	0.3 %	-	-	0.8 %
	Legislators, senior officials and managers (1000-1999)	5.2 %	7.5 %	6.1 %	2.6 %
	Professionals (2000-2999)	12.7 %	10.8 %	10.5 %	15.4 %
	Technicians and associate professionals (3000-3999)	13.7 %	19.3 %	18.3 %	6.4 %
	Clerks (4000-4999)	8.8 %	12.5 %	9.5 %	5.1 %
	Service workers and shop and market sales workers (5000-5999)	10.2 %	11.0 %	10.5 %	9.4 %
	Skilled agricultural and fishery workers (6000-6999)	3.5 %	3.1 %	3.7 %	3.8 %
	Craft and related trade workers (7000-7999)	15.5 %	18.7 %	19.8 %	10.5 %
	Plant and machine operators and assemblers (8000-8999)	6.8 %	5.7 %	11.0 %	5.7 %
	Elementary occupations (9000-9995)	21.3 %	7.9 %	7.3 %	40.2 %
	Not classified, inadeq described (9996)	1.7 %	2.7 %	3.2 %	-
	Total	2082 (100%)	802 (100%)	410 (100%)	870 (100%)

Table 8: Source: ISSP 2004

BASE=2532		Country			
		Total	DE-W-Germany-West	DE-E-Germany-East	PH-Philippines
R: Occupation ILO,ISCO 1988 4-digit	D:Soldiers	6	5	1	0
	D:Officers	1	1	0	0
	Armed forces (1,100,110)	7	0	0	7
	Legislators, senior officials and managers (1000-1999)	108	60	25	23
	Professionals (2000-2999)	264	87	43	134
	Technicians and associate professionals (3000-3999)	286	155	75	56
	Clerks (4000-4999)	183	100	39	44
	Service workers and shop and market sales workers (5000-5999)	213	88	43	82
	Skilled agricultural and fishery workers (6000-6999)	73	25	15	33
	Craft and related trade workers (7000-7999)	322	150	81	91
	Plant and machine operators and assemblers (8000-8999)	141	46	45	50
	Elementary occupations (9000-9995)	443	63	30	350
	Not classified, inadeq described (9996)	35	22	13	0
	Refused (9997)	18	0	0	18
	DK (9998)	2	0	0	2
	NA (9999)	43	6	2	35
	Nap;Nav (0)	387	88	24	275
	Total	2532	896	436	1200

When it comes to occupation as determinant, we can observe that none of the occupational items offered in the socioeconomic data collected by the ISSP may be sufficiently interpreted by itself as a class variable, neither the kind of employer (public, private, self-employed) nor the information if someone has a supervising position (cf. table 8). The only probably suitable variable is "occupation ILO …. 4 digit," which allows for a certain societal ranking of the offered occupations - among others: legislators, senior officials and managers; professionals; technicians and associate professionals, clerks; service workers and shop and market sales workers; skilled agricultural and fishery workers; craft and related trade workers; plant and machine operators and assemblers and finally "elementary occupations." The ICCAs here might be classified as service workers or as associate professionals. But as their identification with their occupation is at least ambivalent and they rather identify with their college course, I will use this "class indicator" only at times, as I believe it to be more apt to choose educational attainment as main class indicator. And as we will see later, the differences again are mostly marginal (like in the case of educational attainment and any other determinant as well).

When resorting to "occupation" as class indicator, I chose four occupation groups which may offer the best potential for comparison. These are Professionals (71 respondents in the 2004 ISSP citizenship study); associate professionals (31 respondents); service workers (54 respondents); and finally, elementary occupations as comparison with the lower classes (with 272 respondents, 40% of the 870 respondents out of 1,200 who gave valid answers for occupation). Finally: even if the occupational group "legislators, senior officials and managers" is the only occupational group representing upper (middle)class attitudes, its tiny volume (5 respondents) disqualifies it as a comparison group.[384]

[384] The occupational specification again was not consulted for the ISSP 2006 and 2009, as the data there is no longer presented as aggregated, but dissembled into a myriad of very specific occupations. As occupational differences in most cases were very slight, this is a "kulang" which can be overcome.

Table 9: Self-ranking (computed from ISSP 2004)	No education attainment /incomplete primary education	Elementary school completed	Some secondary years	High school completed	Some college	College completed
1/2	5	77	25	22	18	5
3/4	7	68	38	37	36	18
5	5	96	68	110	105	66
6	1	32	26	30	42	38
7/8	1	26	12	32	36	40
9/10	1	27	22	17	5	10

The specifications about self-placement on a rank between 1 and 10 and about the highest attained educational level again only show a very limited correlation (cf. table 9). The mean value in ISSP 2004 for self-placement among those with no education at all is 4.0; those with incomplete primary education on the average self-locate themselves at 4.4; the mean value then very slowly rises from 4.8 for those who only completed primary education to those with college/university degrees who locate themselves at 5.7. Only the postgraduates (those who have taken up studies after finishing a college undergraduate degree) show a clearly higher self-placement of 6.8. The latter though compose merely nine entries (while the other educational categories include 168 to 248 entries). While there is a certain positive correlation between educational attainment and self-placement as well as family income, self-classification is usually higher than the value of the objective class determinant (leaning to the middle, cf. the remarks in the subchapter 3.10.1.: *Class imagination* on the aspirational middle class). Even if class position is not necessarily tied to objective variables as outlined in the subchapter 3. 10.1. on class imagination, it is also not totally largely disconnected from it as outlined there as well.

I therefore stick to educational attainment as "class variable," refraining from explicitly assigning educational attainment to a specific class, but considering a correlation between educational attainment and attitudes expressed in the surveys as a de facto correlation of class and the respective attitude. This at least promises to be not less to the point than connecting purchasing power and class belonging as done in

the A-E model widely applied in the Philippines (see chapter 3.12.: *[Marginal] Middle class in the Philippines*).

Again, choosing educational attainment as variable has some pitfalls that are not immediately visible. Despite referring to the same terms (no formal qualification, lowest formal qualification, above lowest qualification, higher secondary completed, above higher secondary level, below full university, university degree completed), correlating the data from the Philippines and Germany is still like comparing apples and oranges (cf. table 10). While in the case of Germany, the lowest formal qualification is the *Hauptschule* (comparable to a high school degree) with 43% of the respondents counted as having completed only the lowest formal qualification; in the Philippines, those counted are those who have *tapos ng elementarya* (graduated from elementary school), therefore merely 26.8% are included as attaining the "lowest formal qualification." While those with "higher secondary completed" in the German case again is equated with the *Abitur*, in the Philippines it includes those who have *tapos ng high school* (graduated from high school). Then again the respondents included under the category "university degree completed" from Germany (9.3%) are underrepresented, compared to the actual number of German university graduates in 2004 (18.9% according to *Weltdatenatlas,* source: knoema.de), while those *tapos ng kolehiyo* (college graduates) represented in the Philippine ISSP-survey of 2004 (14.8%) are much less underrepresented (according to the *Weltdatenatlas* there were 19.4% graduates from tertiary education in the Philippines in 2004).

BASE=1332		Country																		
		Total	DE-W-Germany-West									DE-E-Germany-East								
			Total	R's Education I: years of schooling								Total	R's Education I: years of schooling							
				1-7	8-11	12-15	16-20	Still at school,N:+uni	Still at college,uni	No form school	NA, Refused		1-7	8-11	12-15	16-20	Still at school,N:+uni	Still at college,uni	No form school	NA, Refused
R's Education II: highest education level	No formal qualification	39	33	23	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	6	2	0	0	0	4	0	0	0
	Lowest formal qualification	523	379	0	376	0	0	0	3	0	0	144	0	143	0	0	0	1	0	0
	Above lowest qualification	492	295	0	287	0	0	0	8	0	0	197	0	194	0	0	0	3	0	0
	Higher secondary completed	96	62	0	0	40	0	0	22	0	0	34	0	0	24	0	0	10	0	0
	Above higher secondary level, below full university	55	39	0	0	0	38	0	1	0	0	16	0	0	0	16	0	0	0	0
	University degree completed	124	85	0	0	0	79	0	6	0	0	39	0	0	0	38	0	1	0	0
	No answer	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	1332	896	23	663	40	117	10	40	2	1	436	2	337	24	54	4	15	0	0

	Country							
	Total	PH-Philippines						
		Total	R's Education II: highest education level					
			No formal qualification	Lowest formal qualification	Above lowest qualification	Higher secondary completed	Above higher secondary level	University degree completed
1-7	364	364	0	316	44	4	0	0
8-11	467	467	0	4	140	239	84	0
12-15	301	301	0	0	3	5	147	146
16-20	34	34	0	0	0	0	5	29
21 and more	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Still at school,N:+uni	6	6	0	2	3	0	1	0
Still at college,uni	6	6	0	0	0	0	5	1
No form school	20	20	20	0	0	0	0	0
No answer, refused	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Total	1200	1200	20	322	191	248	242	177
Base for mean	1199	1199	20	322	190	248	242	177
Mean	11.7	11.7	97.0	5.4	9.7	10.0	14.0	14.9
Standard Deviation	14.47	14.47	-	7.28	10.89	0.67	13.15	6.26

Table 10: Crosstabling Education variables, Source: ISSP questionnaire 2004

Then again even if most college courses in the Philippines are rather comparable to vocational training or the upper school (*gymnasiale Oberstufe*) in Germany and a mere equation of "university degree completed" therefore is anyway misleading, we can expect a more or less a similar appreciation of such educational attainment in each society. This means to say that when it comes to social ranking, such differences in quality get balanced when it comes to their societal relevance.

To circumvent these problems in comparison, I chose the indicator "years of schooling" as class variable. As indicator of higher education, it allows for the most comparable indicator between Germany and the Philippines. Even if years of schooling are not simply congruent with higher education taken, the correlation between years of schooling and the educational attainment (here the country specific educational attainment variable) is highly significant as the table taken from the ISSP website (ISSP 2004) shows. The correlation values of years of schooling with respective items

thus only differ by .01 to .02 to the η computed when choosing the variable "highest educational attainment" or the very similar variable graduation (Germany) or (Philippines).

Before entering an overview on *Philippine* citizenship attitudes mainly based on the ISSP-surveys, it needs to be clarified that talking of *the* Philippine society is a generalization and a construction in itself. There is not only the need for a differentiation regarding gender (Reese 2010b) and class position (done partly in this work), but also in relation to cultural community, region and locality (as done by Canieso-Doronila 1997). Citizenship attitudes among Moro and IP-respondents might differ from those living in cities, small towns, or the countryside. The latter differentiation cannot be supplied here. The findings here are mainly based on city residents with a Christian background (aside from a check on the relevance of the variable "size of community," which only at times shows significantly different results), especially when it comes to the findings from the qualitative study. All of our respondents there belong to the mainstream Filipin@s (Christian settlers) and while some of them are of rural origin, nevertheless, all of them are urban dwellers by now. This narrows the explanatory value of such data, even if this profile represents the majority within the manifold social settings in the Philippines.

4.16. Perception of the political system



Figure 14: Satisfaction with democracy according to SWS surveys, Source: PS, 22.12.2010

In a 2010 survey by the Social Weather Stations, 69% of Filipinos expressed satisfaction with the way democracy is working in the Philippines; while 56% said democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government (PS, 22.12.2010).[385] Likewise in the Social Weather Stations 2011 Survey on Good Local Governance (SWS 2011), 75% of the respondents were satisfied with the performance of their local government offices and only 11% were dissatisfied. The net satisfaction (satisfaction-dissatisfaction) even grew by 20% from 2009 to 2011, which may have been due to the approval for the highly credible new Secretary

[385] 27% said that "under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable" while 16% said "it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non-democratic regime."

Satisfaction with how democracy works though has fluctuated much in the last 15 years. It was at a 74% high in March 2013 but a 28% low in November 2003 (Source: Mahar Mangahas: *Democracy over authoritarianism*, PDI, 27.9.2013). Mangahas here observed that "satisfaction with how democracy works tends to peak right after what the people see as a successful election—it was at 70% after Fidel Ramos won the presidency in 1992, at 70% again after Joseph Estrada won in 1998, at 69% after Noynoy Aquino won in 2010" (ibid.). But even at the low point of 28% satisfaction- probably in the wake of Arroyo mulling her reelection bid after declaring before she would no longer run - democracy as system was still favored over authoritarianism by 58-20.

for Interior and Local Government, Jesse Robredo and his manifold reform programs.[386] Only for 1% of the surveyed identified democracy as the most important local problem; while 36% indicated the economy (more specifically unemployment), which 22% of the respondents named as most important problem. 72% of household heads in the SWS 2011 considered the procedure in LGU-offices as transparent and/or as understandable. They were also overwhelmingly satisfied with being consulted by the LGU (net satisfaction: +45), especially as the LGUs are considered helpful and approachable.

Some data from the ISSP backs such findings:

In the ISSP of 2003 17.9% of the Filipinos said, they are "very proud" of how democracy works in the Philippines and still 35.8% are somehow proud –those with lesser education being very slightly more proud. (In Germany only 8.1% are very proud and 41.4% are somehow proud, but pride rises with educational attainment by .06.).

14.2% are very proud of the economic achievements of the Philippines; 31.5% at least are somehow proud. And 45.9% are proud of the Philippine history; 38.8% are somehow proud. (That in Germany only 7.8% are very proud is not surprising, however at least 31.8% are somehow proud.)[387]

The satisfaction is nevertheless with reservations, as the ISSP 2004 suggests. Asked on a scale of 1-10 *how* well does democracy work in the Philippines today: at 5.2, the arithmetic mean is only slightly over the break even point between satisfaction and dissatisfaction. It is slightly lower than in West Germany (6.0), but higher than in East Germany (4.9).

Considering the widespread negative narrative about Philippine politics (see subchapter 5.1.: *The "negative narrative"* in the postscript), such (albeit slightly positive evaluation of the political system) is rather surprising. But the ISSP surveys also reveal some "dark spots:" Trust towards members of parliament for instance is low: Only 26.7% of the Filipin@s believe that politicians try to keep their promises; Germans though even trust government less: 23.4% of the West-Germans and even only 17.3% of the East Germans believe politicians try to keep their promises (ISSP

---

[386] The net satisfaction in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao – declared a failed experiment just a year after (2012)– accounts for even 45%. What can be observed here is a replication of the national/international level: People who are not immediately concerned and on the ground have a far worse perception of the situation than the locals themselves. The nationwide net dissatisfaction with the ARMM is -6%, in the Visayas even -33%.

[387] These numbers even grew in the latest ISSP on National Identity in 2013. Now 65% are (very) proud of how democracy works, 86% are (very) proud of their own history, 65% are (very) proud of the fair and equal treatment of all groups, 71% (very) proud of the economic achievements and 61% (very) proud of the social security system. These numbers though are only a preliminary release (Mahar Mangahas: *Ten aspects of national pride*, PDI, 14.6.2014), so that the whole data body is not yet available to the public. This is why I still base the analysis on the 2003 survey results.

2006).[388] The trust on civil servants is not much more pronounced: Only 29.5% of the Filipin@s, 24.2% of the West Germans and 16.0% of the East Germans believe that "*karamihan sa mamataas na empleyado ng gobyerno ay maaring mapagkatiwalaan na gawin ang pinakamabuti para sa mga bansa*"/"*die meisten Regierungsbeamten das Beste für das Land tun* (most civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for the country)" (ibid.). In *all* cases, the number of the undecided is around 30%.

Nevertheless, a majority of the Filipin@s believe that public service is very committed (*talagang seryoso*) to serve the people (ISSP 2006). The PI_{PH} of .61 is higher than the PI_{WG} (.56) and PI_{EG} (.52)[389] The SWS survey on Local Good Governance (SWS 2011) came to similar results: 60% agreed to the statement, that "rich or poor, the citizens generally receive equal treatment with services provided by our city/municipal government employees," leading to a net agreement score of +34. And even if they hardly believe that MPs keep up with their promises, still 46.2% believe that "most of the time we can trust people in government to do what is right (*gawin ang tama*)." Only 9.3% of the Germans think so (PI_{PH} =.54, PI_{WG}=.33 PI_{EG}=.27; source: ISSP 2004). And while 28.0% of the Germans further believe that "to get all the way to the top today, you have to be corrupt" (PI=.38), the Philippine respondents strongly disagree with this statement (PI= .11). Only 3.2% (sic!) believe so, while 92.6% disagree or even strongly disagree (ISSP 2009).

Still according to ISSP 2006, a slight majority among the Filipino respondents (51.4%) say that "public officials (*Beamte*) seldom or never deal fairly with people like me." These are only 9.4% in West Germany and 14.5% in East Germany.[390]

74.2% of the Filipin@s believe that treatment by public officials depends on whom they know, but only 13.7% have experienced in the last five years that public officials wanted a bribe in return for service, still much more than in Germany (4.5%), but

---

[388] In both countries, trusting other people is anyway not very pronounced: In Germany the item "people can be trusted" gets a PI of .46, in the Philippines even only one of 0.29 (ISSP 2004). And in the following ISSP (ISSP 2006), around 70% of participants in both societies think that only a few people can be trusted completely; 79.8% of the Filipinos even think "If you are not careful, people will take advantage (*mapagsasamantalahan/ausnutzen*) of you." In East Germany, it is 75.9%, in West Germany still 70.5%. These figures are lower in countries like Denmark (50.4%) or Taiwan (54.7%), but are even worse in the Dominican Republic (87.2%) or among the Arabs in Israel (86.6%).

[389] The prevalence index is based on the valid percent (=excluding the no answer/don't know), as it would otherwise distort the results. The percentages on the other hand are based on *all* answers.

[390] The former NEDA chief Cielito Habito (PDI, 24.9.2012) here remarks: "For many an ordinary citizen, government is that bureaucrat sitting behind a window or counter, standing in the way of a required document such as a birth certificate, passport, driver's license, or clearance from some agency of government. For others, government is that politician whose likeness or imprint is all over town, in posters greeting us a happy fiesta or whatever occasion, or in public facilities like lampposts bearing his initials. For most Filipinos, dealing with government tends to be an unsavory experience, often marked by inefficiency, incompetence or arrogance. Still, I believe that the vast majority of our civil servants have been true to their calling. Unfortunately, the bad eggs in government also tend to be the loudest and the most conspicuous. The good ones go about their work largely unnoticed and invisible to the public eye."

definitely less than the public perception about corruption in the Philippines would expect.[391]

Here we might also encounter the fact that the corruption is magnified from media and hearsay and that »bureaucrat capitalism,« i.e. "a system of governance where the bureaucrats, politicians coming from the big landed and big business families and clans … are using their positions and discharging the systems as if they were their private enterprises"(Karl Ombion in *Pork barrel and bureaucrat capitalism*, Sun Star Bacolod, 28.8.2013) seems less an empirical reality to them. »Public officials« thought of when answering the item are probably the »small fish« whom they encounter in everyday life.

The returns from the Philippines on public servants are more unfavorable, but they do not confirm the negative narrative (as the case of experienced bribes shows) and are even often more favorable than the German numbers. This at the same time reveal that contacts are considered crucial in Germany as well (58.5% of the West Germans say that treatment by public officials depends on whom they know and even 65.2% of the East Germans[392]). Only the unfair treatment by public officials is quite exceptional for the Philippines; the low numbers for Germany might result from the customer orientation offensive in the context of the new administration approach in the last decade(s) in Germany. But as this item has not been asked for in the three prior ISSP surveys on government, no comparative figures exist so this has to stay a mere assumption.

Just like in the qualitative research, despite the high approval of the political system of the Philippines, a slight majority still believes that political parties do not give voters real policy choices (PI_{PH} = .58). The numbers are higher in Germany, with a PI of .62 in West Germany and of .68 in East Germany (ISSP 2004).

Filipin@s also show considerably less concern about the infringement on civil rights than Germans do. 49.8% agree that "when the government thinks it is necessary, it should restrict democratic rights" and only 35.4% don't agree. In Germany, only 11.6% agree, while 69.6% disagree (ISSP 2006). Also 32.3% of the Filipino respondents do think that organizing public meetings against the government should *not* be allowed and even 37.5% say the same for anti-government strikes (but only 22.5% say that meetings of people who want to overthrow the government should not be allo-

---

[391] Definitely public perception about corruption can not be equated with the real extent of corruption, but following Blaise Bonvin (idem: Vezerrtes Bild. Gängige Daten über das Ausmaß von Korruption sind irreführend - zum Schaden vieler Entwicklungsländer. *Weltsichten*, vol. 1, 2009: 13-15) "corruption is often perceived as more rampant than it actually is" (ibid.: 13).

[392] While only 9.3% though of the West Germans and 6.4% of the East Germans say they have connections, i.e. "some" or even "a lot of people" they could "ask to influence in their favor," 34.3% of the Filipin@s say so (ISSP 2006). 23.8% of the Filipino respondents also say, they were asked to influence decisions "occasionally" or "often" and only 38.2% say, they were never asked. Only 9.3% of the West-Germans and 13.2% of the East Germans say they were asked occasionally or often; 51.7% of the West-Germans and 59.5% of the East Germans say they were never asked.

wed[393]). In West Germany, only 9.9% agree that organizing public meetings against the government should not be allowed, while it is merely 5.5% in East Germany.

At the same time, Filipin@s (mean 5.7 of 7) say slightly more than Germans (5.5 resp. 5.2) that they agree to acts of civil disobedience (*sumuway sa utos* – literally must not follow orders), when they oppose government actions (50.2% of the Filipino respondents, but only 32.1 of the East Germans and even only 21.9 of the West German respondents say they agree strongly). While there are no differences between the educational classes in any of the three societies, also among the Philippine occupational groups there are only slight differences. (Among the Left respondents though there is an agreement of more than 10% in comparison to the more center-right groups and the non-affiliated.)[394]

4.17. Social service



Type A	Type B	Type C	Type D	Type E
A small elite at the top, very few people in the middle and the great mass of people at the bottom.	A society like a pyramid with a small elite at the top, more people in the middle, and most at the bottom.	A pyramid except that just a few people are at the bottom.	A society with most people in the middle.	Many people near the top, and only a few near the bottom.

Table 11: Preferable social structure, source: ISSP questionnaire 2009

Overwhelmingly Filipin@s believe that their society is a society with many poor and few rich; 30.9% believe it is a society with "a small elite at the top, very few people in the middle and the great mass of people at the bottom"(only 16.9% of the Germans think so of German society); while another 40.0% believe that the Philippines is a society like a pyramid, i.e. with a small elite at the top, more people in the middle, and most at the bottom" (which 31.8% of the Germans thinking the same about German society). The idea of being a middle-class society (cf. type D in table 11), is considered

[393] The item was asked as well in 2004 (ISSP 2004) - with completely different results: In the Philippines allegedly only 16.0% wanted to allow public meetings of people who want to overthrow the government; in Western Germany 4.9%, in Eastern Germany 6.2%. On a global scale (i.e. all country survey aggregated), it was as well only 16.1%. I find these numbers unlikely as well as the idea that within two years there was globally a total shift of mind. Therefore, I include the 2006 numbers, which seem to be more credible.

[394] Nevertheless, 60.5% of those considering acts of civil disobedience "very important," "definitely" reject public meetings of government foes. (Among the respondents from West Germany it was even 66.3%.) The number of those wanting to disallow anti-government meetings among those considering civil disobedience as "not important at all," is even less at 54.2%.

the apt way of describing the social structure of the society they live in by merely 9.8% of the Filipinos; those who in all seriousness think that nearly everyone is upper class is nearly as much (6.6% opt for type E in table 15). (But also only 16.7% of the Germans believe they live in such a "*nivellierte Mittelstandsgesellschaft*" [leveled middle class society], as the sociologist Helmut Schelsky once called the general orientation of German society.)

The leveled middle class society though is the most preferable option among Filipin@s (36.3%), even more than a "leveled upper-class society [Type E] (28.4%). (Even majority of the Germans [with 52.1%] prefer the middle class society; but only 11% opt for an upper class society, maybe because they don't consider the latter realistic.][395]

Many Filipin@s are not only proud of how democracy works in the Philippines, they also take pride in the social security system. 13.4% are very proud of the social security system; 31.2% at least somehow proud - although those who visited college are less proud (9.3%/26.9%); and postgraduates are even less proud (0%/22.8%). 17.3% are furthermore very proud of its "fair and equal treatment of all groups in society," while 34.2% are at least somehow proud. (Among college graduates, it is though only 10.8 % who are very proud and 28.9% who are somewhat proud, while in Germany only 3.7% are very proud and 36.0% somewhat proud.)

Taking a look at the general perceptions and expectations, we can very well see that the pillars of a welfare state are very much in place in the Philippines. Items on social equality find a high acceptance, just like the expectation towards the state to provide social safeguards *and* take steps towards social balancing.

According to the ISSP 2004, Filipin@s consider it an important democratic right that all citizens have an adequate standard of living (*ang lahat ng mga mamamayan ay may sapat na antas ng pamumuhay*) – with ∅ of 6.0 (of 7) and a standard deviance (σ) of 1.6 ($\varnothing_{WG}$ =6.1, σ=1.2; $\varnothing_{EG}$=6.4; σ=0.9).

Likewise, 72.1%of the Filipin@s consider it (very) important that government authorities treat everybody equally (*pantay-pantay*) regardless of his or her position in society. (Here though the numbers for Germany are still considerably higher: In West Germany it is 85.3% considering it [very] important, in East Germany even 89.0%. $\varnothing_{PH}$ =6.0 $\varnothing_{WG}$= 6.5, $\varnothing_{EG}$=6.6.)[396]

---

[395] In Germany, those with little education believe a little above average that Germany is a society with a small elite and the rest (type A) with 2-5% above average. Those with university education again believe a little more that they live in a middle class society (8-18% over average). When it comes to what society they would like to live in, no clear class correlation can be detected. In the Philippines, neither in analyzing nor in imagining society can a correlation be found with any determinant (age, education, gender, urban-rural) can be detected.

[396] A high acceptance for egalitarism is also a result observed in Bernardo's study on social dominance orientation - with a mean of 4.96 out of 6 among the higher socioeconomic sample and 5.26 out of 6 among the lower socioeconomic sample. At the same time though, the social dominance orientation among the respondents – measured by the statements "Some people are just more deserving than others" and "It is not a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others" results in 3.45 out of 7 among the higher socioeconomic sample and even 3.67 among the lower socioeconomic sample. Bernardo even assumes that "perceived social desirability of responses might have affected the degree to which negative attitudes were openly expressed" (Bernardo 2013: 62).

But more than providing every citizen with the essentials of life, 69.2% of the Filipino respondents say that it is "definitely" or "probably" the government's responsibility to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor (PI .67). Only 61.2% of the West Germans think so, but 80% of the East Germans (ISSP 2006). Comparing this figure with other selected ISSP countries, we see responses ranging from only 50.2% approval rate in New Zealand and 52.3% in the USA; but also only 55.3% in Denmark and 67.7% in Sweden; but up to 88.9% in Taiwan, 91% in Chile: 91% and even 94% in Portugal (ISSP 2006).

Progressive taxation, the main means by which states can take to ensure such a reduction though finds comparably little appreciation in the Philippines. While 52.8% of the West Germans and 53.1% of the East Germans consider the taxes for high incomes as too *low*, only 8.9% [sic!] of the Filipin@s think so (ISSP 2006). In contrast, 52.1% consider them too high. And this is despite the fact that the top income tax rate is considerably lower in the Philippines than in Germany already (32% to 45%, but higher than the top income tax in other South East Asian countries, cf. *Overtaxed*, PDI; 10.6.2014) and the tax morals is considerably lower as well.[397]

Based on calculations by the United Nations, the Philippines would need 229 billion to 381 billion pesos in public and private investments to attain the MDGs by 2015. This would imply an increase in tax collection efforts by at least 23%. In reality, however, the percentage of the tax revenue in the GDP amounted to only 16.3% in 2009 (*The Manila Times*, May 16, 2010). The top income tax rate barely reaches 20% and revenue from corporate taxes only represents 2% of the GDP (ibid.). This is relatively low when compared to the average 5% among members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean). Tax evasion (and corruption) also presents a drain to the financial resource base, which could otherwise have funded additional economic development measures and social services. It is estimated that 170 billion Pesos are lost to tax evasion annually (Reese 2013c: 71).

Filipin@s also consider taxes for middle incomes (59.5%) and lower incomes (64.6%) as too high. (While only around 35% of the German think likewise about taxes for middle incomes, more Germans than Filipin@s consider taxes for lower incomes as too high: WG: 67.1%; EG: 74.8%.) In conclusion, we can so say that: While majority of Filipin@s consider taxes generally as too high (42.5% find high *as well as* middle incomes overtaxed and 14% find both even "much too high"); 68.1% of the Germans (aggregated) tend to consider high incomes as undertaxed, but the middle incomes

---

[397] According to the Filipino Income and Expenditure Survey, the median amount of direct taxes paid by the richest 0.1% of the population is very low. The amount of monthly taxes paid by the rich amounted to only P1,803 in 2006, P6,269 in 2003 and P4,682 in 2000. (Due to them having much higher expenditures, the amount of indirect taxes though is relatively high: On an annual basis the tax payments amounted to P21,634 in 2006, P75,226 in 2003 and P56,182 in 2000.) (Source PDI, 3.7.2010)

Even professionals seem to heavily underpay their taxes. Citing data from the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Financial Secretary Cesar Purisma said that for 2010, a total of P9.8 billion in income taxes were collected from 1.7 million professionals. This amounts to each of them paying the government an average of only P5,783 in taxes, translating to monthly earnings of just P8,500, or below the minimum wage (PDI, 9.4.2012).

slightly overtaxed or simply right. Only 10% consider taxes to be high as well as middle incomes overtaxed. (Note that the number of undecided/no answer in the tax items is unusually high, between 7 to 12%. This makes the extent of those holding a contrary view thus much lower than simply what is remaining from the 100%.)

This set of questions was raised again in ISSP 2009, with slightly different results, but nevertheless the same tendency. Here only 51.4% of the Filipinos considered it to be the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and low incomes (while 63.3% of the Germans did so). This on the background of (only) 50.9% of the Filipin@s considering differences in income as too large (PI_{PH}=.57). In contrast, 87.4% of the Germans did so (PI_{D}=.84).[398]

Still in 2009, 54.1% of the Germans consider the taxes for high incomes as too *low* (more or less as much as 2006), but now even only 7.8% of the Filipin@s think so. The gap in agreeing to progressive taxation in principle though is less steep (PI_{PH}= .70, PI_{D}=.78). Meanwhile, the "achievement radicals" are an absolute minority. In the Philippines, 10% believe the rich should pay lesser share of their income than the middle class or the poor; in Germany, it is even only 1.7%.

Looking further at what Filipin@s expect from the government (all ISSP 2006), 95.5% expect it to control the prices (actually keep the prices low- *panatilihing mababa ang mga presyo*). This only holds true for 71.6% of the West Germans and 84.0% of the East Germans (here: *Preise unter Kontrolle halten*). The PI_{PH} is .90 (PI_{WG} .66, PI_{EG} .76).

In accordance with considering it an important democratic right that all citizens have an adequate standard of living (*pamumuhay*), more Filipin@s than Germans consider it the government's responsibility to provide a decent living standard (*disenteng pamumuhay*) for the unemployed (77.5%, EG 75.5%, and WG even only 61.7%), but they do not opt more than the Germans for more government spending on unemployment benefits. This means to say that they agree that a benefit for the unemployed should in fact not be introduced to remedy it non-existence.

The Filipino respondents also nearly match the very high acceptance rates for providing a decent living standard for old people among Germans (PH: 89.0%; WG: 89.8%, EG: 94.7%); just as the expectation that the government provides for health care for the sick is nearly universal in all three societies (PH: 93.3%, WG: 93.0%, EG: 96.0%). Providing decent housing for those who cannot afford it (*walang sapat na kita*) likewise finds a high acceptance among Filipin@s (80.9%, PI .75) and East Germans (82.9%, but a PI of only .69), but less among West Germans (68.5%, PI .63).

---

[398] Conflicts between rich and poor by the way are not considered stronger in the Philippines than in Germany (PI of .54 to .55). The conflicts between top and bottom are even considered slightly weaker in the Philippines than in Germany (PI of .53 to .59). Likewise the conflicts between workers and middle class are considered only very slightly stronger in the Philippines than in Germany (PI of .42 to .37), while the conflicts between management and workers are considered slightly weaker in the Philippines than in Germany (PI of .47 to .51).

The Filipin@s seem to generally ask for a more active state as the principally higher outcome for any policy field compared to the German results shows (see table). While the Filipin@s wish for a considerable extension of government spending in at least three of six mentioned fields (health, education, retirement), the Germans only expect such considerable extension of government spending in the field of education. This though probably is related to the fact that the Philippine state is much less developed than the German one.

Table 12: Spending priorities (Government should spend more[1] /less[0] for…) (spend [much] more) Source: ISSP 2006	Philippines	West Germany	East Germany
Environment	.69 (63.9%)	.60 (37.7%)	.58 (32.6%)
Health	.82 (87.0%)	.67 (58.3%)	.75 (75.3%)
Education	.84 (88.4%)	.79 (77.3%)	.83 (86.1%)
Retirement	.81 (82.8%)	.65 (49.6%)	.65 (50.3%)
Culture and Arts	.65 (54.0%)	.42 (13.9%)	.61 (22.6%)
Law Enforcement	.61 (47.9%)	.62 (42.9%)	.61 (42.8%)

Interesting enough here is that the expectation towards the government among Filipin@s goes beyond providing social safeguards, but also includes promotion of economic development. While 79.4% of the Filipin@s expect the government to provide the industry with the help it needs to grow (PI= .75), only 53.7% of the West Germans (PI= .55) and 60.1% of the East Germans (PI=.60) do so.

This comparison shows that when simply comparing general responsibilities, the expectations in the Philippines are higher than in an established welfare state such as Germany. A general sense of entitlement is thus present.

This general statement though calls for several caveats:

(a) While calling for a more active state, an overwhelming number of Filipin@s accept at the same time government cuts (*pagbawas sa mga gastuhing gobyerno*), if this would be beneficial to the economy (PI of .72). The German respondents though even agree more to a *Kürzung der Staatsausgaben* with a PI of .77 and also ask for lesser regulation of business more than the Filipino respondents (PI of .75 to .62). But the Germans also less expect a further state extension as the table shows.

While agreeing to the idea of social safeguards in general, the Filipino respondents nevertheless in majority think that government should spend less on benefits for the poor (60.9% think so, with a PI of .63; while only 7.4% of the Germans think so with a

PI of .27). And while in Germany, the correlation with educational attainment is slightly negative (d=-.07), in the Philippines it is slightly positive (d=.04). But: those who finished college (52.6%) or some college (59.2%) here agree less than those who finished high school (61.6%); some elementary (61.9%) or those who (only) finished elementary (even 67.5% agree, with 38.4% even agreeing strongly; while the five postgraduate respondents *all* agree). These benefits might be considered mere dole-outs (like many middle class columnists nowadays think about the Conditional Cash Transfers, see chapter 5.9.: *Middle class self-understanding* in the postscript), which is much less accepted among Filipin@s than measures helping the needy to help themselves. This is probably why the idea of financial help to university students (*estudyanteng nasa pamantasan*) from low-income families, finds a very high acceptance (90.8% of the Filipino respondents to the ISSP 2006 do so, while it is only 68.5% of the West Germans; but again even 92.5% of the East Germans). Likewise, 90.7% of the Filipino respondents to the ISSP 2006 consider it the government's responsibility to provide a job (*bigyan ng trabaho*) to everyone who wants (*gusto*) one; only 58.7% of the West Germans and 78.2% of the East Germans think so. The PI_{PH} is .85 (PI_{WG} .61, PI_{EG} .74). 77.9% (PI of .76) of the Filipino respondents thus agree when the government creates new jobs for this purpose; in Germany such *Beschäftigungsprogramme* only receive a PI of .69.

Filipin@s also agree much more with social inequality (or have much more come to terms with it) than Germans: 64.3% find it "just" that people with higher incomes can buy better health care (PI_{PH}=.68); but only 12.3% of the Germans seeing it so (PI_{D}=.28). The numbers of those considering it "just" that people with higher incomes can buy better education are nearly identical (PI_{PH}=.68, PI_{D}=.26).[399] While the introduction of (moderate) tuition fees in German universities was so contentious that it was abolished (and reinforced) from time to time, a majority of the Filipin@s seems to agree with the Business Mirror editorial of May 21, 2014 (*Is having a private school education considered a 'right'*?) which rejects the anti-tuition-hike protests of various students' groups. While these groups argue that "»education is a right, not a privilege«", the editorial believes that such argument "doesn't make a lot of sense."

In the Philippines the right to education is restricted to public education, excluding public colleges and universities, wherein tuition fees are also collected. "A right, says the Business World editorial, is defined as "a moral or legal entitlement to have or obtain something to which a person has a just claim" (ibid.). Here it argues that "having an education may be regarded as a right, but attending a privately owned school is considered a privilege," and goes on to say that "privilege is properly defined as something regarded as a rare opportunity or a special advantage granted or available only to a particular group of people. In this case, the privilege of attending

[399] In Germany, the answers to these items in relation to being able to afford better health/better education has a correlation of d=.74; in the Philippines .62.

a private school is given to those who can afford it." Finally, the editorial argues that "education is a commodity because someone must be paid for providing it and someone must pay for it."

At the same time the Filipino respondents to the ISSP 2009 showed themselves convinced that "good education" is not indispensable. The statement that "only students from the best secondary schools have a good chance to obtain a university education" gets a PI of only .47. They also do not believe that only the rich can afford the costs of attending university (PI=0.38); even the Germans believe more so (0.45). Filipin@s rather believe that "people have the same chances to enter university, regardless of their gender, ethnicity or social background" (PI .68), which Germans believe much less (0.50). Actually, only 4.6% Filipin@s do not believe in the equality of chances; they at the same time believe that only the rich can afford university, while 41.3% believe the opposite. 10% agree to both statements.

(b) The ISSP data creates the impression that Filipin@s view redistributive measures (such as progressive taxation) as the lesser way of mainly improving an income, but gives more importance to creating opportunities for a decent income. They believe that lower income groups like shop assistants and unskilled workers earn only half of what they should earn (see table), while high-income groups (chairmen or cabinet minister) are considered earning too much.

Table 13: Think they earn/should earn (modal values), source: ISSP 2009.	*Germany (Euro)*	*Philippines (Peso)*
Doctor	5,000 (5,000)	260,000 (240,000)
Chairman	20,000 (10,000)	240,000 (240,000)
Shop Assistant	1,500 (2,000)	60,000 (120,000)
Unskilled Worker	1,000 (2,000)	60,000 (120,000)
Cabinet Minister	15,000 (10,000)	600,000 (300,000)

Filipinos believe slightly that they earn less than they deserve (PI .63, with 1 = earning much less than they deserve and 0 = earning much more than they deserve), just like the Germans (.60). When asked if they consider their pay just, Filipinos as well as Germans consider it rather unjust (below what they should get). While Germans do so with a PI of .66 (52% consider themselves underpaid), Filipin@s even think more so: 70% consider themselves underpaid (PI=.76). [The correlation between both items is d_{syn}= .71 for Germany, but only .44 for the Philippines.]

(c) When turning to concrete actors of social policy, we can clearly discover that the Filipino respondents put a much bigger emphasis on non-state actors, especially the family, than the Germans do, especially when it comes to personal care. While the ISSP does not offer a comparison regarding the different welfare agents (welfare mix), we can nevertheless conclude that family and friends play bigger roles in the welfare arrangement in the Philippines than in Germany. While the Germans overwhelmingly think that the government should *definitely* or *probably* provide child care for everyone (West Germany: 40.5/47.6 and East Germany 56.1/41.3), it is only 53.0 of the Filipin@s who definitely think so and 26.3 who think that is should probably be so (ISSP 2001); an astoundingly high number nevertheless consider that there is only a very rudimentary government sponsored day care in the Philippines, unlike especially in East Germany. However, numbers from the ISSP 2012 say otherwise. Here, 96.8% of the Filipino respondents said they expect family members to primarily take care of children under school age and also do not expect the government to support them financially in this regard (see below).

Filipin@s also much more agree that adult children should take care of old parents, the PI is .88 (West Germany: .67/ East Germany: .69); although this affirmation declines correspondingly as the level of education of the respondent gets higher. While those who only visited elementary school agree by .92, those who visited college agree by "only" .80 (d= -.12). Likewise, Filipin@s agree much more that one should take care of one's family first, before helping others (PI_{PH} .89; PI_{WG} .51, PI_{EG} .56). The class-specific difference in the Philippines here is slight: While those who only visited elementary school agree by .91, those who visited college agree by .83 (d_{PH}= -.08 while d_{D}= -.16).

Filipin@s also much more agree that "people better off should help friends" (PI_{PH} .85; PI_{D} .60), again with hardly any class specific differences in both countries. While Germans strongly disagree that "it is all right to develop friendships with people just because you know they can be of use to you" (PI .16 with a class-specific d_{D} only -.08), Filipinos even slightly agree (.60). This statement is closely connected to bourgeois culture considering unselfishness an integral part of the myth of the friendship which was popularized with bourgeois culture and developed to a "cult of friendship" (cf. Schäfer 2009); therefore it is not surprising that the higher the educational attainment, the lower the consent is in the Philippines as well (1-7: .65, 8-11: .60, 12-15: .51, 16 and above .44, d= -.16). On the other hand, the higher outcome in the Philippines across all educational levels (classes) shows that networks still have much more the "improper" role of social safeguarding in an informal welfare regime such as the Philippines as compared, for example to Germany - although its being improper arises only from the perspective of the emotional prerogative family and friendships got in the development of "modern" society, in which the state and the working sphere more and more took over the role of social protection from the oikos.

(d) The main caveat though against considering the sense of passive citizenship in the Philippines to be pronounced is that the high acceptance of general statements withers down once respondents are asked about concrete examples of possible government support and on situations involving government they are confronted with on a day-to-day basis. Especially the ISSP 2012 on Family and Gender Roles offers here interesting numbers. Filipin@s expect much less than Germans for the government to mandate for paid parental leave; and 12.3% don't even think there should be something like parental leave at all (WG: 8,0%, EG: 2,7%). Data show that the lower the level of education, the higher the disapproval (completed elementary education: 17.2%, completed college: 8.9%). A remaining 69.7% expect it to be one to two months, with 12.6% expecting it to be three months (again with a slight correlation of level of expectations and level of education, d=.06). The mean value here are 1.96 months.

In West Germany again, only 4.6% expect paternal leave to be three months or less while a majority either expecting it to be 12 months (34.0%); 24 months (16.1%); or even 36 months (13,8%). The mean value here: 16.2 months. In East Germany, it is even only 2.9% expecting it to be three months or less; while a majority either expects 12 months (50.0%), 24 months (14.5%) or even 36 months (7.5%). The mean value here is 15.3. The influence of higher education here is negligible (d_{WG}=.06 d_{EG}=-.04).

While there is a maternity leave in the Philippines that is equivalent to a 60-day salary, the "*Elterngeld*" in Germany is up to 14 months. This is nearly exactly reflected in the expectations reflected in ISSP. In Germany, the benefit is directly paid by the state but in the Philippines, the employer pays in advance it in advance and gets reimbursed by the Social Security System (SSS). The same expectations are reflected in respondents views on who should cover for the paternal leave pay. In the Philippines, only 20.6% expect it from the government; 24.6% expect it both from the government and the employer; while in Germany it is altogether around 95% expecting it from the government or additionally the employer.[400]

When it comes to providing child care, the numbers are even more candid: Here 96.8% of Filipino respondents expect family members to primarily take care of children under school age. This is only the case for 50.2% of the West German respondents, but a mere 21.7% of the East German respondents expect so. While 33.1% of the West Germans expect government agencies to take care of children not yet in school, 64.8% of the East Germans have this expectation. Filipin@s again do not expect any support from the government in covering child care costs (95.7% say it should be the family itself shouldering the costs), unlike the West-Germans (55.1%

---

[400] Despite that the paternal leave is referred to in a gender neutral term in Germany (i.e. *Elterngeld*) and it being gender specific in the Philippines (maternity leave), the number of respondents in favor of including the father into this care instrument is *not* exceptionally higher in Germany. It is even 9.6% of the Filipin@s who expect the father to take most/all of the "maternity leave," but only 0.4%(!) of the West-Germans and 0.9% of the East Germans. The mean value is therefore nearly identical: 2.34 (of 5) in East and West Germany and 2.26 in the Philippines. Both countries in general prefer that the mothers take most of the leave and the fathers some.

expect public funds to cover it), and especially the East Germans (75.6% expect the government to help).

Finally, when it comes to help for elderly people in their everyday lives (help with grocery shopping, cleaning the house, doing the laundry etc.), nearly all Filipin@s think it should primarily be the family doing this (90.3%). Only 58.9% of the West-Germans think so and merely 49.2% of the East Germans. They in contrast expect government agencies (WG: 19.7%, EG: 31.2%) and non-government agencies (WG: 16.5%, EG: 13.9%) to do so – the latter reflects an expression of the fact that charitable organizations indeed are very much involved into this kind of work in Germany.

The parallels between existing arrangements and expectations are very obvious in all three cases; my conclusion here would be: The differences are less based on a general lower sense of entitlement (which is most often equally higher or even higher in the Philippines as we saw above), but rather the imaginative spaces (*Denkbarkeitsräume*) are far narrower in the Philippines than in Germany. The familiar serves as an orientation mark and one does not ask for more (or one only demands for what is familiar, as the high numbers from post-socialist East Germany, with its well developed state child care system, impressively proves). This way even the slightly lower outcome among those with lower education might be explained, they either know less of the possibilities of a paid paternal leave - or they are less eligible to it.

(e) The argument that the more concrete the items polled, the more the answers depart from "socially desirable" answers can also be based on further findings from the 2012 ISSP: While many citizenship-items hardly show any differences between Germany and the Philippines (which is surprising), some differences in the ISSP 2012 on family and gender are very clear. This comes out especially when comparing the Philippines with its tradition of focusing on communitarism (in particular regarding the view that the family is a service provider) and East Germany with its post-socialist history (and the normality of female employment).

Take for example the item asking opinion if a *preschool child is likely to suffer when its mother works.* Here Filipin@s agree with an PI of .68, but West Germans only by .45 and East Germans even just with .27 (meaning to say they strongly disagree). Likewise, Filipin@s believe with a slight majority that the family life suffers when women have a full-time job (PI_{PH} = .58), but not so West Germans (PI_{WG} =.46) and East Germans (PI_{EG} = .28).

Filipin@s highly agree to traditional division of labor with it being the men's job to earn the money, while women's job it is to look after home (*ilaw ng tanahan* – light of the home - as Filipinas are traditionally called, cf. Reese 2013i). The PI_{PH} is .78 while the PI_{WG} is only .32 and the PI_{EG} even just .22.[401]

[401] When it comes though to the actual distribution of household tasks, the German men and women are by no means more emancipated. While in the Philippines the attitude statement does not expect a non-traditional division of labor, in Germany the

These answers from the Philippines also reflect a differing social reality: In the ISSP 2009, 52.4% of Filipin@s said that their mother had never worked outside the home; only 17.2% of the Germans said so.

My assumption here is that such concrete items are of more life-world relevance (just like questions of what concrete experiences they made with politicians and public servants), so that it is easier to relate to these questions. Just like in the case of the survey on Good Local Governance (SWS 2011) with its very high satisfaction rates when general statements were surveyed. The numbers plummet and produce about twice as unfavorable numbers when it comes to concrete issues of transparency. Hence, only 30% agreed that development and land use plans are easy to be found and only 22.6% said this about the local government's budget details.

Such statements seem to be more linked to everyday experiences than for instance the general statements on what good citizenship is about. Here it seems to be easy to agree to most of the suggested citizenship virtues, so that high approval rates are given which are not matched by a corresponding reality of action.

4.17.1. Conclusion

We observed that only every second Filipin@ considers income differences in their country as too large: nevertheless, Abad's conclusion that Filipin@s therefore are "less inclined to support progressive taxation and less likely to favor government action to reduce income differences" (Abad 1997: 454) is disputable as the correlation (d) between considering income differences as too large and opting for government action to reduce income differences only accounts for .25 (unlike in Germany, where d is .51.). And this even turns negative with the notion that the taxes are too low (-.07, Germany: +.25). This means to say that at least, the data do not support the assumption that those considering income differences as too large would support higher taxation. There is only a positive correlation between the idea that income differences are too high and the general agreement to progressive taxation (.12, Germany: .28). When in comes to spending less on benefits for the poor, there is even a (minuscule) positive correlation between considering income differences as too high and being in favor of dole cuts (+.02, Germany: -.18).

It therefore seems that Filipin@s do not expect the government to prioritize the reduction of income differentials. Drawing on the findings from the qualitative study, as well as from selected items from the ISSP (like those considering it more or less just that those with higher income can also get better health care and education or those for whom taxes for whatever income bracket as too high), we can even presu-

---

traditional division of labor prevails as well: German men and women respondents both say in the ISSP of 2012 that it is the women predominantly doing the laundry, the cooking the cleaning, even the grocery. Only when it comes to small repairs that it is the men who do much more, just like their Filipino counterparts.

me that majority of the Filipin@s would consider too much income equalization as unjust.

The findings rather support Abad's second conclusion, i.e. that "the Philippines is a stronger supporter of welfare policies to help the needy and establish a guaranteed income" (ibid.). Here the support among Filipin@s for employment creation or for financial help to indigent university students is far above average (ISSP 2006). When it comes to providing jobs, only Venezuela surpasses the Philippines (1.45 out of 4) with a mean value of 1.13, while most values (also those coming from welfare societies) are between 2.0 and 2.4 (New Zealand and the USA even only with 2.79/2.70). As far as other items are concerned on the creation of equal opportunities (although not redistribution) such as financial help for indigent students, decent housing, keeping prices low), the Filipino respondents are usually much more in favor of this as compared to those from other countries. Abad concludes: "In Philippine society ... income disparities are allowed to remain as long as people's basic needs or rights are met" (Abad 1997: 471).

This resonates well with the notion that in Philippine society, "even the poorest of the poor should not depend too much on the government. Especially those who are able-bodied should seek and find some form of employment. The government can help them by opening the doors, but not by giving outright gifts. ... Only the neediest beneficiaries (should) receive the funds," as the Manila Times on 20.7.2012 opines in its editorial with the telling title "*Government's CCT institutionalizes charity.*" (See Jimmy Gatdula's column *Entitled unemployment* in Business World, 20.2.2014 for a comprehensive example on such warnings regarding the "dangers of an entitlement culture … provid[ing] anything on demand but without any concomitant responsibility required of the citizen.")

Even a sociologist, who would probably be classified as a Left liberal in the political grid such as Randy David, says that (in Europe) "the original idea of compensating those disadvantaged by industrialization evolved into an unwieldy (sic!) welfare state that tried to address every conceivable need and disadvantage. The result was an overextension of politics" (PDI, 7.8.2008). When further elaborating that "we are certainly very far away from such a state. The Philippine government can barely secure for its population the minimum requirements of human survival, let alone a decent existence," then it can be assumed that creating such an "unwieldy welfare state" is not considered as a positive general orientation for a Filipino welfare state anyway.

"The first and primary criterion of justice" in traditional social contracts, says Scott (1976: 33), is the right to sufficient "means, which are enough for living" (subsistence), a principle derived from the agrarian society in which such moral economy developed. Scott distinguishes two versions of such a contract: "The minimal formulation was that elites must not invade the subsistence reserve of poor people; its maximal formulation was that elites had a positive moral obligation to provide for the maintenance needs of their subjects in time of dearth" [ibid.]. One can observe that while the Filipin@s expect more from the government than just to leave citizens to their

own devices, one can observe as well that their expectations beyond "times of dearth" (when "one really, really needs the government"), are limited.

"Instead of giving poor people alms, the government should rather give the funds to schools and health centers," Camille Lopez quotes the far Left congressman Teddy Casiño in another critical article on the CCT-program (*Gov't cash subsidy is no farewell to alms*, The Manila Times, 18.7.2012). As the data shows, such a "right to the means of social mobility, particularly education and employment" is a notion which is by no means particularly pronounced in "middle class notions of citizenship," as Karaos mistakenly believes (Karaos 1997: 127). It is the poor themselves saying, "the best thing the government can do is give us a job." And who tell their children complaining of hunger to "study hard so that when they grow up, they will earn enough to buy food" (*mag-aril na lang nang maigi para pag ·laki may pambili ng pagkain*), as a study by the Urban Poor Associates in 2007 documented (Dennis Murphy: *Hunger in the Eyes of the Poor*, PDI, 1.11.2007).[402]

4.18. Dealing with an informal welfare regime

Taking up a consideration by Agarwala and Herring discussed at the end of part I that the state plays a more crucial role in situations of precarity, as employment cannot fulfill its role of providing social safeguards, "because capital takes the form of constantly changing employers" (Agarwala/Hering 2008: 20). This is why people should "take their demands to the state rather than to capital" (and workers' organizations in India do so according to the authors). "Most of them are too frightened to risk losing their jobs by making demands on their employer," as Agarwala and Hering (ibid.: 101) points out. "Therefore, holding an employer responsible for workers' benefits is difficult. Instead, the new movement directs its demands toward the state. The state, when viewed as a common target, is what workers can share. To make demands on the state, informal workers' unions draw on the state's responsibilities to its citizens rather than to workers' rights." "The government cannot kick us out of the country for making demands," as one respondent to Agarwala and Hering (ibid.: 102) explained.

Indeed we saw that Filipin@s have expectations towards the state. They though seem low, not surpassing what they "really, really need" to quote again one of the respondents to the qualitative research. An expression of such minimalism is also that Filipin@s seem to be more easily satisfied with government performance, than for instance, the Germans. Take the 2011 SWS survey on local governance (SWS 2011): Here, the local government received very good net satisfaction ratings on implementing educational programs (+68); promoting sports programs (+62); helping the poor

---

[402] This also resonates to the preference given to having a job instead of relying on government support Kabeer and Haq Kabir (2009) observed among the Bangladeshi poor as employment allows self-reliance, boosts one's self-respect, dignity and also offers the chance to show that one can excel.

(+38); and, fighting crime (+38).[403] And this is despite the fact that the Philippines is far behind when it comes to social indicators (cf. Reese 2013c) and even when the government confesses to not to being able to meet the Millennium Development Goals in time.

Likewise, the satisfaction rates with government programs on unemployment, providing health care for the sick or providing a decent living standard for the elderly, are not lower, and these are even at times much higher than those among Germans (see table 13). Again, this is in a situation where un(der)employment figures are constantly high and where the state health insurance (Philhealth) only covers in-patient expenses and the out of pocket payments for health are up to 54% (Reese 2013e). In addition, the pension payments from SSS usually do not even secure a basic income (ibid.).

Table 14: Expectations towards and satisfaction with government	Philippines	West Germany	East Germany
Provide a job (*bigyan ng trabaho*) to everyone who wants (*gusto*) one	0.85 (90.7%)	0.61 (58.7%)	0.74 (78.2%)
Government is successfully fighting unemployment ([very] successful)	0.38 (26.8%)	0.24 (6.9%)	0.18 (5.6%)
Provide health care for the sick	0.86 (93.3%)	0.82 (93.0%)	0.86 (96.0%)
Government is successfully providing… ([very] successful)[404]	0.56 (48.8%)	0.53 (41.7%)	0.54 (39.3%)
Provide decent living standard (disenteng pamumuhay) for the old	0.82 (89.0%)	0.79 (89.8%)	0.83 (94.7%)
Government is successfully providing… ([very] successful)	0.50 (36.5%)	0.51 (35.3%)	0.52 (37.6%)
Impose laws to make industry do less damage to the environment	0.79 (85.3%)	0.79 (78.2%)	0.81 (93.4%)
Government is successfully imposing… ([very] successful)	0.50 (38.3%)	0.57 (44.5%)	0.59 (48.8%)
Source: ISSP 2006			

[403] A 2014 SWS survey also resulted in high net satisfaction rates, for instance on providing basic elementary and high school education (+63) or helping the poor (+55). Providing jobs with +30 also showed a considerable net satisfaction rate (Source: PDI, 12.7.2014).

[404] A survey by the SWS in June 2011 came to the result that 77% of the respondents who are aware of the statutory health insurance Philhealth were satisfied with it, while only 11 % were dissatisfied, resulting to a net satisfaction of +66. This is higher compared to a similar survey in May 2005 when the net satisfaction was “only” +57 (Source: PS, 13.8.2011).

It is important to note though that when resorting to the method of the SWS survey on local governance (SWS 2011), i.e. computing net satisfaction rates (except in the case of providing health care), most net satisfaction rates are *negative*, i.e. meaning that at least according to the ISSP data, there are more Filipin@s dissatisfied than satisfied with government service. They can reach up to 38.1% for the more dissatisfied than satisfied about government's performance in fighting unemployment for example in the case college graduates. These data are then in total contrast to what SWS surveyed only five years later in relation to the performance of the local government (SWS 2011).

Despite a dissatisfaction with the economic situation (as the December 2013 Pulse Asia's Ulat ng Bayan survey results showed a worsening perception of quality of life or QOL and on the state of the national economy), the Filipin@s in general seem not make the government responsible for this.[405]

The expectations towards the state are simply different: The expectations of the German respondents rather correspond to what Matuschek calls "social etatism," i.e. the "awareness of the benefits of a providing, paternalistic society with extensive social systems and regulations of economic life (Fordist perspective)" (Matuschek 2011: 145), an attitude that reaches far into the CDU and is sometimes mocked as their "social democratization." The predominant mode of referring to a state order in the Philippines, on the other hand, is rather commensurate with the mode of "subsidiarity." This mode Matuschek defines as "acceptance of the existing social order, while its deficits must be compensated by initiative of members of society" (ibid.). We have seen in the qualitative part that such attitudes are even common among those, whom Matuschek would class into the mode of system change, i.e. those who advocate an "abolition of capitalism and establishment of a socialist societal system," a group Matuschek calls "system-critical traditional Left."

Or, to pick up another systematization, one that Reinhard Zintl (in Claussen/Geißler 1996: 306) has termed as "state responsibility theories as everyday theories." Neither do Filipin@s favor *interventionism* where "the economy only works with constant state intervention," nor a *laissez-faire state* where "the economy operates without single state interventions, [and where] at the most, the state creates an acceptable general set-up" (ibid.). Filipin@s seem to favor most the third everyday theory Zintl suggests (calling it somewhat unfavorably "*patronage*"): Here, "the economy is experienced as a network in which the state appears as one actor among others. While not able to steer it, it is influential enough to favor or limit individual opportunities. One can only watch out how to save one's own skin" (sic!).

---

[405] Every second respondent said that the national economy is worse now than the last 12 months, while 40% said it has remained unchanged and only 11% said that it has improved (Source: *Growth, joblessness and poverty*, PS, 21.1.2014).

As seen above, the expectations towards the state are based of what is familiar and what appears to be realistic. Or, as one respondent of the qualitative study said: "What would you expect, Philippines is a 3rd world country, we could not expect more." Drawing on Bourdieu's concept of embodied and "normalized" expectations, this seems to confirm that "people unconsciously only want what they can get" (Bourdieu 1982: 189).

Under the present circumstances it might be only "reasonable" to not demand too much from the state. "It is discouraging to request something, when you anyway reach nothing or are not even heard," as the project *Überlebenswelten* (survival worlds), which has been dealing especially with precarization and expectations towards the state in Nicaragua (Überlebenswelten 2005), explains as "*pragmatismo resignado*."

What Kühn notes for Brazil could be transferred mutatis mutandis to the Philippines: "The absence of institutions of the vita also influences notions of justice and biographical plans. While in Germany, institutions such as the vocational system and basic social care via social welfare and housing provide a background foil for biographical plans, they play no role for the Brazilians interviewed in shaping their future. They are unknown to the respondents and therefore are not called for. That one has to care for the acquisition of practical vocational skills without any institutional framing is taken for granted, as much as living in poverty in the event of unemployment. This is not taken as the starting point for social criticism - apart from complaining about the corrupt politicians. Instead, the norm to be the architect of one own's fortune is internalized, while the social context and social interdependencies, as well as other, more socially just forms of living together do not come to the fore of everyday reflections." (Kühn 2006: 142)

Unlike for example the respondents from East Germany who repeatedly break ranks with high expectations towards the state, Filipin@s have never experienced a developed welfare state. For the common people, the development of the state was first and foremost connected with the colonial state. And this entered their life primarily as an institution, which did not provide, but took away: their labor (in the *encomiendas* and especially in the form of draft labor [*polos* and *servicios*]) and their resources (through taxes) (cf. Scott, 1976: 91ff). Rebellions (not only) in Southeast Asia were directed against such taxing states. In the Philippines, the most known are the Basi Revolt of 1807 (protesting a tax on the Ilocano's favorite alcoholic drink) and the tearing of the residence tax certificate (*cedula*) in 1896 by the Katipunan which started off the First Philippine revolution.

Taxation, considered as unjust, is accompanied with the view that tax officials waste or steal government revenues. Based on this, Rizal explained "the indolence of the Filipino" (referring to the alleged laziness of the Filipin@s) that this is in fact a reflection of their resentment against indignity and maltreatment. "Laziness wasn't what made Pinoys unwilling to work or to serve the colonials. It was revulsion at the

thought of working for basically nothing," as Manny Valdehusa (Mindanews, 26.4.2014) sums up Rizal's argument.

Of course, we cannot simply draw a line from this colonial state to the present rudimentary welfare state by arguing with the distant past as basis asks for a historical tracing of the development of the Philippine state (which cannot be done here, but is on the agenda of a future research project). Nevertheless, it is likely that the "persistent peasant vision of a reconstituted village world without the state - that is to say, without taxes" (Scott 1976: 91), is not completely buried in oblivion, as what may be hinted at by the categorization of all income taxes as too high by the ISSP-respondents. (On the other hand, we may assume that the readiness to pay taxes would increase once the feeling that one gets in return good public services and when in place safety nets are provided in the case of health problems.)

Luis Teodoro however explains the high approval rates for president Aquino in 2014 (despite surveys in which 50% of the respondents believe that the economy has deteriorated and the quality of life declined) through the view he terms as "government as encumbrance" paradigm (Ibid.: *Government as Encumbrance*, Business World, 23.1.2014). "It is the sense that government not only costs; it is also a burden, an encumbrance and a deadweight irrelevant to people's lives, and for whose non-interference the citizenry should be thankful, because its intervention only makes things worse. … Despite his belief that his administration has made a difference in people's lives, what best distinguishes Mr. Aquino's administration is not what it has done but what it hasn't: compared to past administrations, it hasn't killed as many, for example; been involved in as many scandals; or has been as corrupt." Teodoro further explains that "in accounting for this refusal to link their continuing poverty, hunger, etc. to the failures of the Aquino administration, of even greater moment than the esteem his parents' memory still enjoys among the populace is the latter's low expectations of governance - the mass perception that an administration during which not much may have happened in terms of changing their lives is better than one in which, while much may have happened, has only made their lives even worse: a variation of the »lesser evil« syndrome."

Social scientists and activists therefore doubt whether the call for a strong state resonates with Filipin@s who never have experienced such an entity in their lives, as outlined in Reese 2013b: "An active, socially oriented state has been historically absent. In terms of priorities, people help themselves, their families, their networks and perhaps one's village. They self-identify as sons and daughters of their island or province of origin. There are not many expectations when it comes to an impersonal state. Instead of calling for concerted state action, people and families respond to pover-

ty and crises on an individual *and* collective level simultaneously. Only the Philippine Left has periodically propagated the demand for a strong state" (ibid.: 75).[406]

Abad explains that people have low expectations towards the state as its performance is wanting and combines this with a personalist, but not rights-based, orientation of welfare strategies: "The absence or limited presence of state influence in local life - as well as the state's limited ability to accomplish social reform - [has] prompted citizens to take control of their lives by adopting practices that ensure their survival and well-being. ... This means, by and large, a reliance on the toughness and supportive nature of family and alliance groups, where social relations operate under the rules of patronage. These rules ... permit strong support for welfare policies that enhance, but do not sever, the symbiotic union between leader and follower" (Abad 1997: 473).

The project *Überlebenswelten* (2005) here speaks of a "deficit of *cuidadanía* (citizenship)." "People do not know their rights towards the state. They have no idea of the state as a facilitator and mediator, but rather as somebody who can make a gift. Social security is seen as a gift, not a right. The only ones claiming civil rights and explaining them are the NGOs - the state makes no effort to communicate rights. .. One can vote, but there is no trust [on the government] among the poor . Therefore, the focus is on relying on their own, instead of claiming from the state." The rudimentary presence of a welfare state might explain a lacking sense of citizenship. Meanwhile, such lack of citizenship in turn prolongs the status of a state wanting of a welfare system.

"People's cognitive maps include ideas about rights and entitlements, which reside deeply at different levels of community and kin. The key question for ... people in poor countries is: where do rights and entitlements most securely reside in the institutional landscape," as Geoff Wood writes in his article on *informal security regimes: the strength of relationships* (Wood 2004: 72). He then argues that "in the context of societies with poor governance, non-legitimate states and political insecurity, we have to look for (in shorthand) a *Gemeinschaft* rather than a *Gesellschaft* basis of rights ... [as] the idea of rights enshrined in the state remains a weak and contestable phenomenon in the cognitive maps of social actors (rich and poor alike)" (ibid.: 72.74). Zialcita (1997: 56) calls the family a "refuge in a weak state … because of the incapacity of the state to deliver basic services they [the people] continue to rely on their network of relatives." Thus, Wood identifies it as typical for so called informal welfare regimes that "kin dimensions of community also offer a key basis of 'membership,' and

---

[406] Rodriguez (2009: 2f.) believes that "although Filipinos accept the existence of the nation and the state as a historical fact, although we understand that the state and its government exist to a degree that affects every aspect of our existence and well-being, we have no shared notion of its meaning and its necessity. Most of us just accept the existence of the nation and state as inconvenient realities, or perhaps even necessities for orderly living; we do not, however, collectively understand the good of our citizenship, the necessity of our governmental structures and their processes, and our membership in a greater whole called the nation. For many of us, the government may just exist as a totality unto itself which is only concerned with maintaining its existence…. The government is not owned by us, the people, because it is not our government (sic!). … It exists independently of us or our need for it."

with membership goes rights, which are connected to prevailing presumptions about needs and entitlements. Under such circumstances "to lose 'membership' is to be excluded" (ibid.: 75).

Where the so called communities of birth though "pervade all spheres of society, (they) render irrelevant the liberal idea of an impersonal public sphere which individuals enter as bearers of rights, equal in the eyes of the law. Given the persistence of these »belongings«, individuality as a way of social being is extremely precarious," as Kabeer/ Haq Kabir (2009:7) points out. "To become a citizen in such contexts is to transcend the constraints of birth and ascribed status, to acquire the capacity to question, to challenge and to aspire – as well as the capacity to make changes that reflect these aspirations" (ibid.: 7).

While of among those who answered the item regarding their main source of economic support when not working (an item with a fall-out rate of 53% [PH] up to 62.5%[WG]), 59.4% of the West Germans and 65.5% of the East Germans say "pension, private or state," but only 9.1% of the Filipin@s say so (ISSP 2005). Unemployment benefits show nil returns among the Filipino respondents, while 9.6% among the West Germans and 19.2% of the East Germans name these as the main source of support. In contrast, the spouse/partner pitches in for 48.5% of the Filipin@s, but only for 16.3% of the West Germans and 3.5% of the East Germans. Other family members are the main support for another 36.3% of the Filipin@s, but only for 4.2% of the West Germans and 2.1% of the East Germans.

The importance given to the family by Filipin@s therefore is overwhelming. 98.6% consider family "very important" in life and the remaining 1.3% consider it "rather important" (ISSP 2001). With 44.8%, family is by far considered the most important group Filipin@s identify with (ISSP 2003). A further 18% of the Filipino respondents mention family as the second most important group and another 11.2% as third most important.

The numbers in Germany though are similar. While family is only (or still?) considered as one of three most important places of belonging by 28.4% in East Germany and by 35.6% in West Germany (ISSP 2003), nonetheless 79.9% of the Germans consider the family "very important" and only 2.3% consider it "not very important" or "not important at all" (ISSP 2001). Many Germans thus answer the question "on whom do you rely on in life?" with "family" and "friends," a few answer "on myself" or "garden plot" (*Schrebergarten*)," but no one answers "pension," "social security or even "the state" (Deutschlandfunk 3.4.09; *Die Familie muss es richten*, Frankfurter Rundschau, 14.7.2009).

We have already further presented data underlining the role of (extended) family structures as welfare provider above and indeed this centrality of the family is often considered as a main impediment to the development of a human rights-based concept of citizenship in the Philippines. Again and again, there are loud complaints that putting families and networks in the focus of attention leads to group egoism (*kanya-*

kanya) and nepotism in the Philippines, as strengthening or maintaining existing communities (of fate) such as families, village loyalties, personal networks or the feudal system, does not promote national social relationships desisting from the concrete person. Or as John Carroll (following Abad 1997: 470) puts it: "To a greater degree than in American society predictability of (Filipino) behavior is based not on impersonal rules but on personal ties." As such, Carroll continues, "membership in abstract categories - being a »student«, »taxpayer,« or »citizen« -carries with it fewer enforceable rights and obligations than such membership would in certain other societies."

Unfortunately, the ISSP does not offer an item on from whom the respondents expect help from, unlike our qualitative study which came to the conclusion that while the respondents have the idea that the government should support them in times of need, they consider other welfare providers such as the family or friends to be more reliable and approachable. Even if "people know what is right or wrong, … there is no mechanism by which people can hold the government accountable," as the child rights activist Pilgrim Bliss Gayo (19.12.2013) believes.

Everyday observations on the interaction between people and government (as well as with employers, but also strangers) suggest that Filipin@s see welfare policies less as obligations performed by an impersonal state or a judicial entity such as an employer for its citizens or employees, but rather as a set of rights and duties asked for (*hingi*) and underlined by appealing to pity (*luoy/awa*), often resembling a patron-client discourse. It is considered "*bastos*" (improper) to insist on one's right, but always advisable to appeal to the generosity (*mapagbigay*) and goodness *(mabait*) of a "patron." Such ties heavily build on "*kilala*," i.e. on knowing people and being known by them, which makes ties personal and binding (*utang na loob*). Even government agencies are then approached in a patron-like manner as Abad points out: "As patron, the government is obliged to support her needy clients" (Abad 1997: 470f.).

One expression of such personalization of the welfare system is that according to a Pulse Asia survey in October 2013, 42% of Filipin@s think that having projects and programs should be the priority of legislators, a measure that had just been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the context of the Pork Barrel scandal a few weeks earlier. (Only 32% of the respondents believe that lawmaking should be the senators and congressmen's priority, followed by investigating scandals [14%] and review and passage of the annual national budget [12%]. Source: *SWS: Most Pinoys think they did not benefit from pork barrel*, PS, 22.10.2013.)

Such personalization usually goes along with a service orientation considering politicians as "fathers … look(ing) [at them] as their links to a world inaccessible to the poor" and considered by them as "children who have to be supported," as Rodriguez

(2009: 85.142f.) observed.[407] Or as Karaos (1997: 114) observed, "when ordinary Filipinos are in fact accessing public institutions, social interactions are still framed in familial terms. When approaching politicians for public services… most Filipinos would seek out and relate to the latter more as patrons or *padrinos*, in other words, extensions of their family with whom they have personal ties, rather than as public officials performing their official roles."

Abad even explains the lesser focus on income leveling in such a patronage orientation: "In fact, the European ideology (sic!) with its strong endorsement of income-leveling measures is inconsistent with patronage because income redistribution schemes would blur class distinctions and eventually undermine the system of mutual obligations. The point is to solicit income from the rich, not to even up incomes between rich and the poor" (Abad 1997: 471).

Considering the molding of the interaction with government agencies in a patronage manner, we can consider »going private,« i.e. making little use of social services provided by state-supported institutions, getting homey and rather relying on own resources as a sign of independence (and distinction, cf. Osterhammel 2010: 429, 466, 1100; Owensby 1999: 232). Karaos so observed that especially "urban middle-class families seem to make little use of social services provided by state-supported institutions, which are generally seen to cater more to indigent or lower class families. Health care and education are obtained from private institutions. School age children of the respondent families were attending private schools. Thus, there is little familiarity with and interest in, the quality of public services other than the most basic ones such as water, electricity, and roads" (Karaos 1997: 123).

The attitude of going private is rationalized with the impression that the middle and upper classes do not profit from where the taxes go: "Taxes should go to sustaining, maintaining, and improving public services provided by government to its citizens. Unfortunately, the rich and the middle upper class don't seem to benefit from these services," as Sara Soliven De Guzman (PS, 11.4.2011) believes. "The services are antiquated, tacky, dirty, deficient, substandard and decrepit. For instance, how can you take advantage of the government hospitals when just upon entering the premises you feel you will catch a bad virus that will worsen your condition? How can you send your children to a public school knowing they will not get quality education with the poor environment, incomplete classroom equipment and substandard curriculum that does not meet international standards? When people are in need to improve their quality of life, how can they run to the social welfare department kno-

---

[407] This though does not go along with active citizenship as Rodriguez further laments: "Most of the barangay's citizens have neither the time nor the resources to take part in governance activities; neither do they have the inclination to take part in governance activities. Even if barangay officials are enthusiastic about the implementation of participation mechanisms, they are faced with a relatively indifferent population. Thus they have to think of all sorts of gimmicks to entice the people to take part in the Barangay Assembly" (Rodriguez 2010: 86).

wing that this department cannot even resolve the problem of families seen in the streets; when it can't seem to uplift the lives of abused children/handicapped children/indigent members of society; not to mention the needs of the senior citizens. How can we rely on the Fire and Rescue Service of government when the trucks are rickety and old junk? … There are many more government services that every citizen is entitled to – including safety, national security and protection of life. Unfortunately, they are really in bad shape. Citizens now have to find ways to subsist on their own."

As the author has just recovered from a dengue fever in a government hospital providing excellent service, he cannot go along with this bashing of government services, nevertheless, it is of high relevance that middle class people seem to have such low opinion about government services and tend to opt out of public service and "subsist on their own." The attitude of the better off to go private – which can also be observed in other countries (cf. Ehrenreich 1989: 249) - might lead to the fact that "members of the new middle class show little inclination to use their strengthened influence to pressure national governments into improving public services and institutions," as the World Bank observed in relation to Latin America (IPS, 13.11.2012).

It might lead to a dissociation of the middle and upper classes from the country, in the way one of the richest businessmen of the Philippines, Manny Pangilinan, said in September 2012: "*Kung ako lang*, (if it is only up to me), I'd pack up and go back to Hong Kong. *Ang gulo-gulo n'yo* (You're such a mess)."[408]

Randy David identifies as a consequence of such an attitude the situation wherein "our dwindling public spaces, the fragmentation of our city into gated communities walled off from one another and from the swarm of homeless people, and our descent to an insecure society protected by private security agencies. … We find ourselves adopting a siege mentality that is so contrary to the democratic ideas we espouse in our classrooms." (PDI, 25.4.2012). A form of *diskarte*, pointed out by Zintl (see above) as where "one can only watch out how to save one's own skin."

Going private seems to go along with the selective clean up of the public space –"a classic concern of the middle classes"(Harriss 2008: 450). This is exemplified by what was practiced by the former chairman of the Metro Manila Development Authority Bayani Fernando who poured kerosene over the stalls and huts built by the poor on the pavements and the river banks and setting fire to them to make the city "more

[408] The columnist Conrado de Quiros was very upset by this statement: "The pronoun is dazzling. It's not »*Ang gulo-gulo natin*, we're messing things up, we should get our act together.« It's »*Ang gulo-gulo n'yo*, you're a bunch of anarchists, you don't shape up, I'm outta here.« That's not the attitude of a Filipino businessman, that's the attitude of a foreign investor. Hell, that is not the attitude of a Filipino, that is the attitude of a foreigner (sic!)" (PDI, 25.9.2012).

livable." And this happened with much cheering from the English-speaking public, i.e. the middle classes.[409]

On the other hand, the marginalized cannot afford to be state-oblivious. Already, the social democratic labor leader Ferdinand Lassalle believed that because of its socio-economic situation, the working class must be interested most in political democracy. Due to its weak social and economic position, but nonetheless being the social majority, they can alone expect from a strong state, which they can effectually influence to protect their interests (Mackert 2006: 30; similar Kabeer/Haq Kabir 2009: 7).

In the Philippines, only the middle and upper classes want to be left alone by the government (going private), says the political scientist Francis Lee from the I*nstitute for Popular Democracy* (personal interview, January 2007). In defiance to even the most contradictory reality, the lower classes (the so-called CDE classes) firmly stick to the idea of an ideal state, which is supposed to render public services.[410] Nevertheless, these segments of the population are realistic enough to know that the state fulfils this task rather insufficiently. However, the poor welcome everything offered by the state – even if these mostly done for reasons of patronage, and therefore generally, resulting only to below standard accomplishments.

Likewise, the literature on political involvement of the lower classes in contemporary Germany this work draws on (Klatt/Walter 2011, Köcher 2009, Munsch 2003, Bayat 2013, et al.), confirms that the poor are not "state-oblivious," but include the state very well into their strategies; however, they usually do not believe they can be political actors themselves (as the political space is considered the space of "those up there" and the middle class), so they qualify at best as passive citizens (i.e. as beneficiaries and clients).[411]

Rodriguez notes meanwhile that in the Philippines, "upper class barangay citizens are rather self-sufficient and come to the barangay government for less substantial demands from the government ... concerns that do not affect their survival, people of the depressed areas are more dependent on the barangay" (2009: 84). Even if governance may be lacking in the Philippines, the state is not merely a negative presence in the life of the people. It serves as (another) source of survival, welfare and support.

---

[409] As far as I observed, cars using one side of the road and/or the sidewalks as parking lo (a pervasive normality in the Philippines) have not been included in the criticism and neither was but one car set on fire. An explanation may be that cars are a middle class symbol, so they were exempted from middle class ire about unruliness in the public space.

[410] "There is little evidence to suggest that marginalized people are increasingly reliant upon NGOs to meet their needs. In the final analysis, they consider the state as the final guardians of their basic needs. During periods of economic downturn, social protests are most likely to be against the state rather than against the NGOs" (Jude Fernando: Introduction in: Idem. (ed.*): Microfinance – perils and prospects*, New York, 2006, p. 33).

[411] Asked about rights and duties of citizens, they highlight duties like »not to turn criminal« and »obey laws«," as Klatt and Walter (2011: 134) observed. "The »active« right to stand up against problems or for one's own interests, to have a say in the political, cultural or social developments of society, are only seldom mentioned. In most cases at this point, often only the right to vote is mentioned; in most cases however, it is referred to as a »duty«, in the sense that »one should actually go to the polls«."

May it be legislation recognizing the rights of those who till the land to own it, may it be various poverty reduction programs and more others - the state can also be useful.

Such assessment is backed up by the higher voter turn out in poorer barangays. According to Director James Jimenez of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), "voter turnout in the affluent villages averages from 60 to 70%. But in the poorer barangays as much as 90 to 95% of registered voters take part in the barangay polls" (Source: MT, 25.10.2010).

For Germany, the head of the Allensbach Institute, Renate Kocher states (critically): "The assessment of how much you can move through your own initiative and performance, influences to a large extent the idea of how the tasks should be divided between citizens and the state. The bigger the confidence to be able to influence one's own situation through effort, the more pronounced the preference for civil liberties and a low key state. As the confidence in the one's own abilities and the feeling of being dependent on state support are class-specific, the preferences also differ with respect to the relationship between citizens and the state. Only the upper classes prefer by an absolute majority (the middle class after all at least with a pronounced relative majority) a model, where citizens take as much responsibility as possible for themselves. In the lower classes however, a clear relative majority favors an outreaching state which takes over the responsibility from the citizens" (Source: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15.7.2008). The idea that only the middle and upper classes are dutiful, while the lower classes tend to rely on the state, seems to be disproved by the findings of the ISSP, especially when it comes to the Philippines. Hardly any class specification can be discovered in these items when it comes to taking "as much responsibility as possible for themselves." Nevertheless, the sometimes, the downrightly proud (and defiant) statements of middle class members on not being interested in politics, may be also an expression of distinction: I am not dependent on state support, I can manage without it.

"The fact of being supported is considered by others as a sign of not being able to take care of oneself and be responsible for oneself and one's family," says Merklen (2005: 154), looking at Argentina. "The powerful can »unpin« solidarity from his close relationships and is lucky to be able to set up a »city of affinity (*ciudad de afinidad*)« in which thanks to the developments in technology and transport, he can dream of escaping the weight of the neighborhood and of choosing his neighbors the way we choose our friends. The poor is often forced to live where they can, unlike the rich, who has the money to pay for socializing with one's own kind and keep the poor on distance" (ibid.: 155).

Such going private certainly weakens the prospect for cross-class-alliances for the extension and improvement of public services. On one hand, "the preconditions to build cross-class political coalitions are fatally weakened by the opportunities availa-

ble to Southern elites and middle classes to 'exit' from national social policies and programmes," as Agarwala and Hering (2008: 14) conclude. "Medical care and education can be sought abroad or bought privately; private or company pensions substitute for public; cheap domestic care labour can be purchased on the open market. This undermines the chances that elites will recognise the public goods aspect of social provision and thus add their powerful voices to support universal public alternatives. ... The chances of developing a political settlement on which to base national social citizenship were always restricted in the South and are now vanishingly small."

On the other hand, the poor in such a setting rather serve as objects of charity, which again serves as a distinction marker as the manifold "community extension programs" every upper-end private school provides for their students may illustrate. As Michael Tan writes, "my son's school recently organized an »interaction« day with urban poor children. They sent parents a letter telling us to prepare a standard gift pack consisting of a pencil case with pencils, erasers, soap, toothbrush, toothpaste" (*Charitable harm*, PDI, 7.12.2011). Such approaches certainly do not provide for realizing a common concern, but rather foster entrenched patron-client mindsets, deepen the attitude of the middle class to be "*mata pobre*" (looking down on the poor) – or even perpetuate a "mendicant culture that grew out of well-intentioned charity," as Tan laments. Or as Harriss describes it from an Indian perspective: "The Ladies' Clubs set up by some residents' associations may be eager to help the »poor women« of neighboring slums, but they certainly do not welcome those women as members of their clubs" (Harriss 2006: 459).

4.19. It's still hard work.....

The item about important resources for "getting ahead in life," which was raised with the respondents in the qualitative study, originated from the ISSP on Social Inequality (ISSP 2009). Comparing the findings within the qualitative study with the results of the ISSP 2009, we can see parallels but also distinct differences. With .84, "hard work"[412] figures first in the quantitative survey (just like in the qualitative survey), followed by own education (.83) and ambition (.80) – and this despite the fact that Filipin@s are said to have a *mañana* habit (postponing work just to meet social obligations) and never finishing a project (*ningas cogon*) [Mulder 1997]. Pedigree is given medium importance (i.e. coming from an educated household: .67; and, coming from a wealthy household, even only .49), just as ascriptive determinants of social inequality like religion, race and gender (.47 to .59). Connections are conside-

[412] We have to take into consideration though that the success factor "hard work" in the Filipino questionnaires has been translated into "*ang pagtatrabaho nang masigasig*" (Tagalog, here provided along with the English original "hard work") and "*ang pagtrabaho ug tarong*" (Cebuano, here only provided with the Tagalog translation). Literally this only means "work properly." (In the German questionnaire, it is "*hart arbeiten*" not "*seine Arbeit ordentlich machen.*")

red a little less vital (.55 for knowing the right people and .43 for political connections). Only giving bribes is considered nearly irrelevant (73.6% don't consider this important).

The Germans likewise give high importance to meritocracy (education, ambition, hard work), although slightly less than Filipin@s (Cf. table 20).

. Connections and pedigree are likewise given medium importance, while ascriptive determinants (race, religion, gender) are given less importance.[413] Furthermore, we can observe that among the Filipino respondents, the higher the educational level, the lesser the belief in meritocracy (though this connection is only slight). Education, ambition and hard work all show a slight negative correlation of about .07 with higher education, while ascriptive determinants (and bribing) show a positive correlation of .07 to .11. It seems that those who tested the panacea education et al. came to the insight that meritocratic ingredients alone do not make a summer. The latter is also confirmed by the lower belief (by .06) the higher educated have that "only students from the best secondary schools have a good chance to obtain a university education" (but also the lower belief by .06 ,that only the rich can afford the costs of attending university).

[413] While Germans consider gender explicitly more as an important group they identify with (ISSP 2003) – this only with a slightly higher outcome among women (22% to 15%) – they nevertheless give gender a much lesser importance when it comes to getting ahead in life (PI_D =.30 to PI_{PH}=. 55). 61.2% of the Germans do not consider gender important (at all) for getting ahead in life, while only 3.2% of the Filipino respondents say so (ISSP 2009).

Table 15: Comparison Social inequality	Philippines	Germany	Correlation (η) Philippines/ Germany	Correlation educational attainment (Philippines)
How important for getting ahead in life is... Prevalence index (Percentage of those considering it "**not** very important" or "**not** important at all")				
Coming from a wealthy family	.49 (39.9%)	.48 (35.6%)	+.01	+.08
Well educated parents	.67 (14.3%)	.53 (13.7%)	+.13	-.01
Education (own)	.83 (2.3%)	.81 (1.2%)	+.06	-.07
Ambition	.80 (1.9%)	.74 (3.8%)	+.16	-.08
Hard work	.84 (2.3%)	.71 (4.0%)	+.34	-.06
Knowing the right people	.55 (26.6%)	.69 (6.7%)	-.27	+.04
Political connections	.43 (43.5%)	.37 (54.8%)	+.13	-.01
Bribes	.24 (73.6%)	.12 (82.2%)	+.24	+.11
Race	.47 (39.3%)	.34 (54.2%)[414]	+.21	+.07
Religion	.59 (27.9%)	.21 (77.9%)	+.56	+.11
Gender	.55 (3.2%)	.30 (61.2%)	+.39	+.11
Source: ISSP 2009				

Despite the belief in meritocracy, the respondents to the ISSP 2009 do not consider themselves as having underwent considerable social mobility. This is reflected in the high correlation between self-placement and placement of one's family on a social ladder from 1 to 10 (d=.59, for Germany only d=.35). In the case of Germany, the arithmetic mean improved from 3.10 (σ = 1.44) in case of the family placement up to 5.34, when placing oneself in the ladder. In contrast, in the case of the Philippines, it even fell from 4.80 to 4.49 (modal value in both cases 5). This observation is backed up by the very slight value over the break-even point of .50 when relating one's own social position to that of the father. PI here is only .52, with 33.1% of the Filipino respondents believing the level of their job to be higher than that of their father, but 30.1% believing it to be lower. (For Germany, the PI is only slightly higher with .56, with no difference between West and East Germany.)

[414] Here: "Nationalität oder ethnische Herkunft."

But hard work is not the only factor considered relevant when it comes to issues of moral economy. Issues of social responsibilities are a bit more pronounced in the Philippines, when one looks at the factors which should be considered in a pay: The needs of the family (mean: 1.85 out of 5; with 85% considering it essential [1] or very important [2]) next to child support (1.95/86%), is as much considered as performance (1.82/86%). But "hard work" still tops the list: 90% (mean: 1.74) believe it should be essential/very important for determining the pay, while only 71% of the Germans think so (mean: 2.1). Germans again believe performance (86%) and responsibility (1.91) are the most important criteria (the latter only getting a 2.6 in the Philippines).

Comparing the findings with the qualitative research, we can observe that in the latter, there was even a higher outcome as far as meritocratic items are concerned. Pedigree more or less receives the same appreciation in both surveys, just as connections. In all cases, they are considered less important, but not irrelevant. In both samples, bribes are considered likewise irrelevant (.21 and .24).[415] Eye-catching though is that all three ascriptive determinants (gender, religion, race) are considered not important at all by the respondents to the qualitative study, unlike in the case of the ISSP survey, where these determinants are still considered fairly important.

Figure 15: Means of getting swerte for all situations of life, Quiapo Market, July 2014

We can conclude that the ideology of achievement (pivotal for modern societies as outlined in part I) is well established in the Philippines, and appears in all classes as the incidental qualitative interviews with ordinary people showed; just as the low correlations with educational achievement (even making those with higher educational achievement believe *less* in meritocracy). This is despite the fact that analysis of Philippine society is often based on the attitude of *bahala na* (it's up to God) and the relevance *swerte* (luck) is assigned (cf figure 15) – or in general, the strong religious belief of most people (cf. Reese 2013b) - all considered anathema to the modern myth of do-ability. This is also despi-

---

[415] Likewise, only 3.2%(sic!) of the Filipino respondents believe that "to get all the way to the top today, you have to be corrupt," while 92.6% disagree or even strongly disagree (PI= .11). In contrast, many more (28.0%) of the Germans believe so (PI= .38).

te the complaints about "crab mentality," the deprecation of those acting ambitious as "social climbers" or considering people acting above their social class due to connections as "*langaw sa kalabaw*" (a fly sitting on a carabao). But certainly, attitudes such as diskarte in combination with bahala na, again allow for the integration of one's faith into "working the system." Or as it says in Reese 2013c: "*Bahala na* is often translated as »come what may« and connotes a certain kind of fatalism. Yet *bahala na* can also be understood as a trust in God, in the Almighty's providence or even taking advantage of divine laws. In this sense, *bahala na* can also reflect a more »active« voice rather than passive submission. The belief in one's own *swerte* can also embolden a person to seek new settings and, at a subjective level, expand one's room for maneuver." (p. 77)[416]

In lieu of verbatim explanations on the choices made in the ISSP, we can quote the columnist Ver Pacete to illustrate the concept of life success (not only) in the Philippines, that combines the promise of social ascent, the belief in education as panacea *and* the insistence on hard work, even if one "fails to realize a dream," as this is what at the end provides dignity (*dangal*): Ver Pacete speaks in his column *Materfamilias* in Sun Star Bacolod (12.5.2014) of "mothers who failed to realize a dream [and] have ended as lowly vendors, street cleaners, garbage collectors, laundry women, sugarcane workers, or have lived a »mother chicken's life« (*isang kahig, isang tuka* - one scrape, one peck)." Even if they have not fulfilled the promise of rising from rag to riches, "these mothers could still raise their heads high because they live a hard but regal life. »Hail to labor!« God said that from the sweat coming from the brow, we shall eat bread (rice or corn). It could still be fun in the end if hard-up mothers are able to give proper education to their children."[417]

4.20. Active citizenship

According to the 2004 ISSP Citizenship Survey, Filipin@s have outstandingly high ideals about what one should do to be a good citizen (civil obligations), even relation to other nationalities like the Germans. Some of the ISSP-collected data affirm the qualitative findings of this survey. Some though outrightly contradict them.

In the ISSP 2004, 53.4% [2006: 44.8%] of the Filipino respondents said they have "a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing my country" (whi-

---

[416] Cf. Ma. Ligaya Menguito and Mendiola Teng-Calleja (2010): Bahala Na as an Expression of the Filipino's Courage, Hope, Optimism, Self-efficacy and Search for the Sacred, *Philippine Journal of Psychology 43/1*, 1-26

That although 76.5% of the well educated young people (university students) who were part of the research of Clemente et al. (2008), shunned *bahala na* to (still) be a salient Filipino attitude for them, might be a sign for its lesser acceptance among achievement oriented Filipin@s of today (explained by Clemente et al. mainly with the fact that the negative reading of bahala na as carelessness).

[417]The ever present peril to even lose dignity with such a fate lingers - prostitution is constructed as the dark Other: "There could be so frustrated mothers who do [sic!, probably: don't] know what to do with their fate. They end up as commercial sex workers. They have traded their dignity to earn money to understand survival." (ibid.)

le 58.9% [2006: 42.3%!] of the West Germans and 62.1% [2006: 39.7%!] of the East Germans think so).[418] In the same survey, 58.2% of the Filipino respondents said they are very or fairly interested in politics (PI_{RP} = 0.54) – which is 8-10% less than in Germany, (WG: 68.3%, EG: 66.1%). But only 11% of the Filipino respondents say they often discuss politics, while 36.4% say they only seldom do. In Germany, these numbers are each about 10% higher. In all the three societies, only 10-12% say they never discuss politics. Nevertheless, 52.2% of the Filipin@s believe that "most people are better informed about politics and government" than they are (ISSP 2004).[419] Filipin@s also consider understanding other opinions as more important than the Germans (68.5% to 58.9% in West Germany and 55.8% in East Germany).

87.4% of the Filipino respondents said they voted in the last elections; the same number are saying that it is (very) important to vote (88.0%). Even 89.5% say it is (very) important to watch the government. For 59.2%, it is important to be organized in associations. (Mangahas [PDI, 19.4.2008] observed that "on this, the Philippines—the recognized Asian leader in civil society organizations—is No. 1; it is the only country where a majority give importance to it."[420]); 71.6% want the people to be given more opportunities to participate in public decision-making. Filipin@s (mean 5.7) also say slightly more than Germans (5.5 resp. 5.2) that they agree to acts of civil disobedience (*sumuway sa utos* – literally must not follow orders), when opposing government actions (50.2% of the Filipino respondents agree strongly, but only 32.1% of the East Germans and even only 21.9% of the West German respondents do). The Filipino respondents slightly believe that the average citizen (*karaniwang mamamayan/Durchschnittsbürger*) has considerable influence on politics (PI= .56). In Germany, those agreeing to this statement is much lower. (PI of .28 and .34).

61.3% of the Filipino respondents say it is likely that they would try to do something about a law considered by Congress that they consider as unjust or harmful. (Only every fourth German said they would do so.)[421] The prevalence index is 0.57 (0.68 among postgraduates; 0.61 among those who visited college; and, 0.52 among those

---

[418] The PI among the Philippine post-graduates in 2004 is .72; it is .63 among those who visited college; and, .60 among those who visited secondary school; but only .54 among those who only visited elementary school. No differences can be detected with regards to the four selected occupations (.59 among the professionals, .57 among the assistant professionals and the service workers, but .58 among those with "elementary occupations"). The moderate Left believe with .65 that they have a pretty good understanding, followed by the far Left with .61; the centrists with .60; and, those without party preference with .58.

[419] Considering that "most voters get info on bets from TV ads" (Rappler.com, 1.5.2013), as a Pulse Asia survey states and that 94% of the ABC classes say so, even surpassing the high overall number of voters mainly obtaining their information this way (85%), such an information might not be of supreme value. Posters and other campaign paraphernalia is a far second, with 31% of voters saying it is also a source of information on the candidates. Newspapers don't appear at all (which is surprising, as there is nevertheless a readership of seven million for newspapers, cf. Ledrolen Manriquez: *The Philippine Media Landscape* in Reese/Werning 2013: 419-425).

[420] Indeed, the two runner-ups are Mexico (49.0%) and South Africa (46.5%), both are slightly under 50% [ISSP 2004].

[421] One could observe that the relatively few who opposed the most contentious legal project in the past years, i.e. the RH law (a Pulse Asia survey in 2010 said it was only 7%, cf. *Majority of Filipinos back reproductive health bill – pollster*, Business World, 30.11.2010), were indeed quite present on the streets, in the parishes, and eventually, in the Supreme court. Although whether these were indeed 4.3% of the population (61.3% of 7%) may be doubtful.

who only visited elementary). Again 59.4% believe that "congress would give serious attention to your demands." While only 44% of the Filipin@s believe that the government cares much what people like them think; it is merely 12-17% of the Germans believing so. In all the three societies, the numbers among the higher classes are 4-5% higher than among the lower classes. Likewise, 45% of the Filipino respondents believe that they have an influence on what government does (but 40.9% don't). The contingency between the belief that Congress would give serious attention to their demands and that they have an influence on government though is only d=.06 (and d=.14 on the belief that government cares what people like them think).[422] In numbers: 24.2% agree that they have no influence on what government does, *but* consider it nevertheless (very) likely that the parliament would give serious attention to demands brought up by the citizenry. 15% think just the other way around (they believe they have an influence, but nevertheless don't believe that parliament would react to their protest).

The comparably high belief in political self-efficacy among the Filipin@s is by the way not very class specific. Still 42% within the lowest class believe they have an influence on what government does, but only 50% of those from the highest class do. In contrast, only 27% of the West-Germans believe so (even only 17% of the East Germans) and the number of those believing that they have a say is much higher among the highest educational class (40 and 33%) (ISSP 2004).[423]

Nevertheless, when asked "what would you most likely do in a permanently desperate situation?" during an opinion poll in March 2005 (i.e. near to the time when the data for the ISSP on citizenship were surveyed), 26% of the Filipinos declared that they would work abroad; 25% said they would pray and put themselves in the hands of God; but only 18% said they would think of toppling the government; 15% said they would become criminals and 11% trust their situation on a lottery win. But only 5% considered protests against corruption and anomalies in the government as promising (Source: *How poor Filipinos cope*, Cyberdyaryo, 10.5.2005).

On putting importance to voting, the Philippines rank No. 1 among all the ISSP covered countries; 88% consider it important or even very important. But except for voting, where Filipin@s walk the talk (both items have a high outcome, but η is only .20), the numbers for other forms of political action are far behind when compared to the attitudes expressed earlier: 71.3% said they would never sign a petition (only 9.9% did just recently or in "the distant past"). While 45.5% consider it (very) important to "choose products for political, ethical or environmental reasons, even if they cost a bit more" (∅: 4.9 of 7); only 6.5% did so; while 80% say they would never do so

---

[422] The contingency between the belief that "government does not care what people like me think" and "people like me don't have any say about what the government does" is significant though with ϕ= .46.

[423] The numbers in ISSP 2006 are even lower: only 16.8% of the Germans agree with the statement that they have no say about what government does, while again 45% of the Filipin@s agree.

(ISSP 2004).[424] There is thus no correlation between both statements (d=.01); 78.6% say they would never join a demonstration (while 9.8% would do so). [425]

For Germany, the case is nearly the other way round. Considerably less agree to statements like "It is important to vote;" with 56.3% saying so in West Germany; even only 42.7% in East Germany. The voter turnout though is as high as in the Philippines; 89.6% in West Germany say they voted in the last election; 85.0% said so in East Germany. And while only 29.3% of the West-German respondents and even only 20.4% of the East Germans say they consider it (very) important to "choose products for political, ethical or environmental reasons, even if they cost a bit more" (∅WG: 4.5; ∅EG: 4.0 of 7), 42.2% of the Germans boycotted - or deliberately bought - certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons (d=.22). We thus see that there is even an overshoot of action taking among the German respondents.

Furthermore, only 12.9% of the Filipino respondents said they "contacted, or attempted to contact, a politician or a civil servant to express their views," while 68.1% said they would never do that. (In Germany again 17 to 21% said they did so and at least 32% do not rule it out. Among the German university graduates, even less than 17% rule it out.) While in the Philippines, only 10-16% *across the board* contacted politicians; even 60% of the college graduates said they would never do so (which again is at least 5 to 20% less than among the other classes). Here, it is the assistant professionals who contacted politicians most (25.8%), while only 9.5% of the service workers did so. 39.2% of the Left center respondents did so, while only 10.7% of those without party affiliation did (and hardly more from the other groups did).[426]

Karaos observed that all her respondents "were of the opinion that Filipinos in general are not doing enough to help the government improve conditions in the country. However when asked whether any of their family members are involved in any program that meant relating with the government, the majority answered in the negative" (1997: 123). Amando Doronila as well observed this gap between expressing rea-

---

[424] A 2014 study by the market research organization Nielsen even came to the result that 79% of the Filipino respondents "are willing to pay extra for products and services that come from companies committed to making positive social and environmental impact" (Source: Rappler, 18.6.2014), which made them the "global leader." 76% (sic!) said that in the past six months, they purchased at least one product or service "because it was manufactured by a company committed to positive social and environmental impact." That is surprising considering the large gap between intent and action in the ISSP data – and contradicts the conclusion drawn from the ISSP data here. If the Nielsen numbers apply, this would hint to a considerable blindness on the part of the researcher overlooking during his supermarket visits the 82% claiming "to check product packaging to ensure the brand is committed to positive social and environmental impact." This makes him wonder which information exactly these respondents are checking as very few products in the Philippines provide such information.

[425] Maria Angela Sebastian in her undergraduate thesis, Digital and Analog Citizenship: A Study on the Online and Offline Civic Engagement and Political Participation of the Filipino Youth Living in Metro Manila (cf. Sebastian 2014) though has derived higher numbers on the participation of the youth, although the forms of organizational activity she singles out are not political in the classical sense. 54% were involved in sports organizations, 46% in religious organizations and 37% in academic or pre-professional societies. In terms of socio-civic involvement, ethical consumerism "("piso voting" as she terms it) sticks out: This includes donating to organizations (33%), buying products based on principle (28%) and boycotting products based on principle (21%).

[426] 85.9% of the Filipin@s never joined a political site in the Internet (2.3% did; 2.7% did among those with elementary occupations, 8.8% of the postgraduates and even 33.4% of those still in school). But this was in 2004!

diness to political action and really getting active. He quotes a Pulse Asia survey on the occasion of the 22nd anniversary of the 1986 People Power Revolution in 2008, where 69% of respondents in Metro Manila said they would support protest actions calling for the resignation of government officials. "However, out of the 69% who supported demonstrations, only 16% said they would join the rallies, while 53% said they would not. Asked why they would not join the rallies, 26% said they had »more important things to do,« another 26% said there would be no change in government, 21% said they needed to earn a living, 7% said there was no alternative leader, and 6% said they were »tired« of people power. The [low] turnout at last Friday's rally [in the context of a widespread dissatisfaction with then President Arroyo] underscores the need for caution in relying on expressions of support for political movements. It shows that there's a long way to go before intentions, reported in opinion polls, translate into political action" (Amando Doronila: *Cold statistics and warm bodies*, PDI, 4.3.2008). Just like this work did in the design of the qualitative research, Doronila rather trusts actual actions than mere declarations of intent when adding, "the Pulse Asia survey underlined the importance of crowd turnout as a more sensitive measure of the public mood rather than intentions indicated by the opinion polls."

Certainly, one should bear in mind charity work when sketching the extent of active citizenship. The British Charities Aid Foundation which has established a "World Giving Index," ranking countries based on three "giving behaviors" (i.e. donating money to a charity, volunteering time for an organization, and helping strangers), lists the Philippines as 17th out of 146 nations with the highest World Giving Index scores (Source: PS, 27.12.2012).[427] Although it might not have a changing, but rather a conserving effect, it has nevertheless a political impact.

Karaos though does not consider involvement with civic organizations (i.e. Rotary) or other civil society organizations directed mainly towards disadvantaged groups outside one's immediate community to be an "engagement in organized activities of a political or quasi-political nature." She however observes that it provides "a sufficiently stable organizational infrastructure ... that can support social movements or civil society initiatives" and "facilitate mobilization in moments of political or economic crisis"(1997: 124). EDSA I and EDSA II are mobilizations that more or less proofs for this.

But even beyond such pre-political effects, "charitable involvement" is of political effect as it serves as a state surrogate: According to education secretary Armin Luistro, only 60% of the 43,424 classrooms built during the period of July 2010 to June 2013 were funded by the national government. "The rest were funded by private companies and individuals, volunteer groups, foreign grants and even state-owned corporations like the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp. [Pagcor]," Luistro

[427] I assume that "forced volunteerism" like outreach programs by companies and schools, which are compulsory for its employees and students are included into this "volunteerism," even if it may not count any more (and not less) as citizenship than for instance, conscription-based military service.

added (*'Pork' no good, private funded classrooms better*, The Manila Times, 28.3.2013). This is but one incidence for the fact that just as in the Europe of the 19th century, civil associations (or bourgeois-run companies) exercise many tasks in the course of modernization. Those tasks in Europe were later taken over by the burgeoning welfare states, including welfare tasks then taken over by state-employed social workers, tasks in the area of art and culture, but also infrastructure tasks in the field of electricity and water supply, transport and housing (cf. Schäfer 2009: 58f., 140ff.). The "citoyen" and the "bourgeois" were only split (again) later in the course of welfare state development.

According to the ISSP 2004, 78.8% Filipinos say it is (very) important to help fellow Filipin@s who are worse off (*mas mahirap*) than themselves: (global 62%, WG 59.5%, EG 49.4%). 55.6% even say so about people in other parts of the world (global 44%, WG 25.5%, EG 31.7%). Even if there is no significant class correlation in this item, according to Clarke (2013: 196), it is twice as probable that members of CSOs belong to the upper class than the lower middle class, the working or the lower class. For political parties, Clarke even considers the probability thrice as high, in the field of education, art, music, and other cultural organizations even four times higher (ibid.).[428]

Basing the political action profile on the numbers taken from the ISSP 2004 alone though, overestimates active citizenship as those who were in a specific kind of participation in the last year and those who have done something like that ever since are lumped together. There is much sense in defining participation only as "involvement in at least two activities of [a specific] area in the past 12 months," as Sebastian (2014) suggests. But as the study is on readiness for political action and not political action itself, this aggregation of data nevertheless expresses how many respondents have bridged the mere intention and the actual action.

4.21. Is there a specific middle-class profile on political participation to be discovered in the ISSP surveys?

So far, the data was mainly presented as one country lump (or in the case of Germany often as two lumps). As one of the focus of the work is to identify middle-class specific citizenship attitudes whenever detectable, I decided to correlate the findings systematically with the different specifications of class belonging, i.e. educational attainment, family income and self-classification (cf. table 16). Furthermore, I have taken a look if there is any correlation with age, with sex and with the community of living (urban or rural), as these are often also factored in when arguing about citizenship attitudes, or the lack thereof. Finally, I will also have a look at the determi-

[428] Abinales (2008: 181) again considers the rise of pentecostal groups and movements as an alternative site of social involvement of middle class members; these groups, at times also served as organizations who were part of the political protest movements during EDSA II and III or during several mobilizations for and against presidents Arroyo and Aquino.

nant political affiliation, as this featured as the pivotal determinant in the qualitative study.

Table 16: Correlations of determinants (source: ISSP 2006)	Personal income	Education (years of schooling)	Self-classification	Sex (female)	Age	Urban
Family income	PH: : d_{sym} +.54 (Pearson's R: +.67) *2004:* d_{sym} *+.64* D: +.36 (Pearson's R: +.58)	PH: +.37 D: +.33	PH: +.25 (*2004:+.13*) D: +.33	PH: -.04 D: -.06	PH: -.05 D: -.09	PH: +.32 (*2004:+.47*) D: +.02
Personal income		PH: +.34 D: +.26	PH: +.17 D: +.16	PH: -.13 ([*]) D: -.33	PH: -.03 D: +.09	PH: +.28 D:+.01
Education (years of schooling)			PH:+.23 D: +.31	PH: +.02 D: -.05	PH: -.16 D: -.17	PH: +.21 D: +.05
Self-classification				PH: +.04 D: +.04	PH:-.06 D: -.04	PH: +.10 D: +.02
Gender					PH: +.03 D: +.02	PH: +.01 D: +.01
Age						PH: -.02 D: -.08

[*] While the income of those women earning is only slightly lower than that of the men, data excludes that more women than men are without their own income. In Germany, 115 women and 39 men have no income of their own; in the Philippines, among those without own income are 330 women, but only 188 men (ISSP 2006).

Some of these features have a considerable correlation rate, while others don't (see table). These were already identified for the correlation of educational attainment

(based on years of schooling as explained above) and income[429] and also hold true to a little lesser extent for the correlation of these two items with self-classification. Making statements on educational attainment, thus to a certain extent also means making a statement about income and/or self-classification– and the other way around.

But we will see that the class-specific correlations are anyway surprisingly low, considering how categorically middle-class citizenship is usually differentiated from alleged lower class citizenship attitudes, often insinuating the existence of two nations (more on this in the postscript). And as these correlations are low whichever of the three specification of class belonging is chosen, these inter-correlations can be neglected. The only other correlation between determinants of significance is that between the specifications of class belonging and having an urban residence: +.21 when it comes to education and up to +.32 when it comes to family income. But this only holds true for the Philippines. In Germany, such urban-rural divide cannot be detected. Finally, there is a certain correlation between younger age and higher education; although this is below +.20 and is thus not overly intervening. (As the determinant personal income has been left out due to above stated reasons, the significant correlation at least when it comes to Germany can be neglected here.)

Looking at the net satisfaction rates with the local government (SWS 2011), we see that there is considerably less satisfaction with the local government in the upper income groups (ABC). Here, the net satisfaction rate is only +.56; while it is +.66 among the class D; and, +.64 among the class E. The negative correlation between higher income and satisfaction with government performance is repeated when looking at the correlation between educational attainment and satisfaction rates. While the net satisfaction rate among those with some elementary education is +.69, it is only +.60 among those with college education and college graduates. (While there are no significant differences between the sexes, elder respondents [above 45] have a higher satisfaction rate of +68 compared to the very young [18-24] with only +54.) If the lower satisfaction can be traced to higher expectations or to more knowledge about the shortcomings of government, the numbers do not provide an answer.

As already outlined above, the data from the ISSP 2006 on satisfaction with government performance are totally contrary to those of SWS 2011, except in the case of health care they show nearly consistently *negative* satisfaction rates. But as in the case of SWS 2011, there is a slight rise in dissatisfaction with the government the higher the family income, the self-classification and the educational attainment are. While the correlation is very weak with self-classification (between .00 and -.04) and although never positive, it is a little more pronounced when it comes to family income (between -.04 and -.10). The correlation with educational attainment is not more

---

[429] This significant correlation between educational attainment and income-based class belonging is confirmed by the data Virola et al. (2013: 30) offer: 40.7% of the middle-income bracket as defined by Virola et al. are college graduates and another 19.9% college undergraduates. Meanwhile, only 5% of the lower class bracket finished college and 9.5% attended college for some time.

negative (.00 to -.07), even if the differences between those with only elementary education and college graduates are much higher at times (the elementary graduates still show a net satisfaction rate with how the government cares for the elderly, while the college graduates already show a negative satisfaction rate of -18.9). Often, the biggest divergence though is not between those with least and those with most education, but rather between those with some college education and college graduates (as in the case of health care +36. 3 to only +6.5, respectively) and sometimes the high school graduates show more dissatisfaction than those with some college education, but less than the college graduates. (All groups have at least 138 members, so that such deviations cannot be traced to distortions due to small number.) The palpable positive correlation between age and satisfaction surveyed by SWS 2011 by the way is not supported by the ISSP data. The correlation only moves around +.02 and -.02.

When turning to intentions on citizenship, we can likewise discover a slight positive correlation between class belonging and citizenship attitudes (see table 20)

Table 17: »Family income« and »years of schooling« as middle class marker (Correlation ISSP 2004: PH: +.37 D: +.43 ISSP 2006: PH: +.37 D: +.33)			
Item (ISSP 2004)	Correlation Family income/years of schooling	Item (ISSP 2006)	Correlation Family income/years of schooling
Always vote in elections	PH: +.02/.00 D: +.05/-.01	Government should spend more (negative: less) for health	PH: -.01/-.02 D: -.11/-.11
Keep watch on government	PH: +.05/+.07 D: +.07/+.04	Government should spend more (negative: less) for education	PH: -.02/-.02 D: +.05/+.05
Active in associations	PH: -.03/-.04 D:+.07 /+.11	Government should provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed	PH: -.06/-.06 D: -.12/-.06
Understand other opinions	PH: +.04/+.06 D: +.08/+.20	It is the responsibility of the government to provide a job for everyone	PH: -.03/-.06 D: -.14/-.14
Help the less privileged in the country (world)	PH: -.01/+.00 (-.09/-.10) D: -.01/-.02 (+.01/+.02)	It is the responsibility of the government to control prices/keep prices low	PH: +-01/+.01 D: -.13/-.19
Sign a petition	PH: +.09/+.09 D: +.16/+.30	Reduce income disparities	PH: +.01/-.03 D: -.14/-.16
Take part in demonstration	PH: +.09/+.10 D: +.15/+.33	Taxes for high incomes are too low	PH: -.02/+.02 D: -.08/-.11
Contact a politician or public servant to express your views	PH: +.05/+.08 D: +.19/+.25	Public officials deal fairly with people like me	PH: +.07/+.13 D: +.12/+.08
All citizens should have an adequate standard of living	PH:-.01 /-.01 D: -.08/-.08		
No influence on government (2006)	PH: -.02/-.01(-.10) D: -.18/-.20 (-.22)		
I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues	PH: +.13/+.13 D: +.13/+.19		

Most people are better informed about politics and government than I am	PH: -.01/-.02 D: -.14/-.25
Likeliness of counter-action against unjust law	PH: +.03/+.08 D: +.08/+.15
Level of personal interest in politics	PH: .00/+.03 D: +.14/+.21
People can be trusted	PH: -.01/-.04 D: -.14/-.18
Frequency of political discussion	PH: +.09/+.10 D: +.17/+.23
Political parties give no real policy choices	PH: +.02/+.06 D: +.02/.00
The public service is committed to serve the people.	PH: -.04/-.02 D: -.08/-.01
Democracy works (very) well	PH: -.01/+.02 D: +.12/+.08
When the government thinks it is necessary it should restrict democratic rights.	PH: -.01/-.01 D:+.06 /+.06

Here we discover two things: The differences between choosing family income and years of schooling as classification of class belonging are so minuscule that either can be used as preferential classification for class belonging. Even if the correlation of both items is quite below perfect, the outcome is nevertheless very similar.

Of more importance for our subject is the fact that while there is a positive correlation between class belonging and most (but not all!) citizenship attitudes, it is far from decisive, especially when it comes to the Philippines. If we want to make a class-specific statement at all, we can observe that the higher the educational attainment in the Philippines, the more frequent the respondents are involved into a political discussion, consider themselves more knowledgeable about important political issues, have more often signed a petition and took part in a demonstration. These correlations though move up to +.13 only. On the other hand, those with higher education also feel less obliged to help the needy in the world (-.10). And they agree more that "when the government thinks it is necessary it should restrict democratic rights," than those with lesser education (58.8% to 51.2%) – a readiness to curtail rights we can also observe in Germany (though the numbers here are only 20% among those with higher to 10% among those with lesser education).

Filipino respondents with higher educational attainment also have slightly better experiences with how they are treated by public officials (+.13); this though is less an expression of more sense of citizenship, but rather of the usually quite classist behavior Filipin@s exhibit (*mata pobre*).

We can nevertheless more or less observe that there are hardly any differences between the classes when it comes to citizenship intentions (statements on what a good citizen is, cf. table 17). The same can be said when looking at the differences in percentages between those with low and those with high educational attainment. There is also only a slight positive correlation when it comes to talking about politics and considering oneself knowledgeable – this may be an expression of the self-confidence education gives to deal with political issues rather than a sign of a higher sense of citizenship. (Such assumption is backed by the theoretical assumptions made in the chapter 3.11.: *The precarized new middle class: resourceful and still longing for something*.)

The low correlations with regards to political actions computed, nevertheless tend to obfuscate the at times quite significant differences in percentages between those with less schooling (8-11 years of schooling) and those who attended college (12-15 years schooling) and post-graduates (16 years schooling and above). These are often around 15-20% higher. While for instance, 53% of the Filipinos believe they have a "pretty good understanding of the important political issues in the country," it is only 44% in the lowest class, but 70% in the highest class (with no age specification).

And while we see that those with higher educational attainment have been palpably more politically active, in total, they have been much less active than their German counterparts (and even the German lower classes). But they are not as active as they like to believe; the lower classes on the other hand are not without any idea of citi-

zenship as middle class-columnists and other persons from the social strata often argue. The ISSP rather confirm Karaos' findings that political participation beyond voting is not pronounced in middle class families and usually restricted to «one-shot-actions rather than sustained interaction with government« (Karaos 1997: 123).

Table 18: Political actions (ISSP 2004) Did it last year or in the more distant past (difference between those with most years of schooling to those with least years of schooling / ***In bold italics: in comparison to numbers for the college under/graduates (12 to 15 years schooling)***			
Boycotted of deliberately bought certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons	6.5 (+22.1/**+19.2**)	42.1 (+38.8)	37.9 (+31.0)
Signed a petition	9.9 (+16.7/ **+13.8**)	51.5 (+32.4)	59.2 (+28.2)
Took part in a demonstration	9.8 (+21.1/**+20.8**)	43.3[430] (+35.7)	24.9 (+41.7)
Attend in a political meeting or rally (*pulitikal na miting o rali*] – i.e. election related activity.	24.3 (+20.8/**+14.3**)	41.4 (+36.0)	31.6 (+27.1)

Just as Abad observed, "attitudes toward welfare and inequality do not correlate with socioeconomic status"(1997: 472) and in general, we can say that in relation to passive citizenship (expectations towards the state), there is no significant correlation in the Philippines at all when it comes to educational attainment.[431]

When it comes to active citizenship, differences are only more pronounced in three items – and this again mainly in the German context. Here, the higher the educational attainment, the more is one's interest in politics (West d=.23/East d=.24); believes to have more say in politics (West and East d=.26) and *not* believing that most of the others are better informed than themselves (West d=.26/East d=.22). All these diffe-

[430] This high number is mainly due to the 35.3% who said they took part in a demonstration "in more distant past (than last year) which may be to a big extent probably the forced participation during state socialism. The same holds true for the high number of those who attended a political meeting/rally.

[431] The few I could discover for Germany (and they are really just slight) is that higher educated in West-Germany agree less to price controls (d=-.20) and to reducing the income gap (d=-.17). They also consider taxes for low income classes as too low (d= .20), but slightly agree more to state subsidies for education (d=.17) for arts and culture (d=.16), while in East Germany they believe less it is obligation of the state to care for retirees (d=-.20).

rences can be clearly linked to education. For the Philippines though, only very slight differences can be observed here – the correlation surpasses .10 only when it comes to believing that others are not more informed than oneself.

It is also only in Germany that practices of citizenship like signing a petition, taking part in a demonstration, consumer democracy or contacting a politician, are more pronounced the higher the level of education is. The correlation moves between a d of .22 and .34. Additionally in East Germany, there is a higher inclination to be involved in counteraction against laws considered unjust among the higher educated (d=.22), who also more frequently discuss political issues (d=.26). But again, the correlation is still minor; the numbers do not prove that the educated middle class is altogether highly politically active ("professional citizens" as Amna calls them), while that the lower educated are politically apathetic. And for the Philippines, there is even no palpable difference between these groups.

4.21.1. Do self-placement or occupation matter?

Above, I mainly focused on years of schooling, highest educational attainment and/or family income when looking out for correlations between class belonging and citizenship. I will shortly point out why drawing on occupational groups and on self-classification does not promise additional information to what has been pointed out above.

Just as in the case of educational attainment, there are hardly any differences between the different occupational groups when it comes to intentions of citizenship. The biggest difference I could detect was that between professionals *and* service workers, more are agreeing that a citizen needs to watch the government (mean value: 6.5 of 7) than assistant professionals (5.6). On the other hand, assistant professionals express a higher interest in politics (PI = .63) than professionals (PI= .54). And then again, service workers rate the functioning of democracy in the Philippines lower (4.5 of 10) than assistant professionals (5.4). All the other differences again do not surpass 0.5 value points and are often no more than 0.1 or 0.2. This also holds true for statements such as "people like me don't have any say about what the government does." The (large) group of those with "elementary occupations" here is by no means most often at the taillight, unlike when it comes to political action undertaken where they consistently show lower achievement rates than the professionals and assistant professionals. But the same do not hold true for the service workers who have similarly low political action achievement rates. This supports the observation made above that the turnout rate among those belonging to the middle class is higher than among those with less education.

Taking these only minor variations between the different occupational groups into consideration also made me to not further explore the political profiles of the various subclasses of the middle class, which is are usually highlighted in the literature, like

those between the old middle class, the new middle class, the lower middle class and the upper middle class (cf. subchapter 3.10.5.: *three to four basic middle class fractions* in part I). Though it is probable that the relationship to the state is a different one depending on, for instance, if one is a small businessman or a state employee,[432] the ISSP data do not seem to provide the necessary data to point out this differentiation. It will need another research to identify the specific senses of the citizenship of the different sub-classes of the middle class.

Finally, turning to self-classification, neither in ISSP 2006 nor in ISSP 2004 is there a single correlation of more than .09, when it comes to the Philippines. Usually, the correlations are only .00 up to .04. (While in Germany, correlations between .10 and .20 are more common, it is only [just like in the case of educational degree] the items "interest in politics," "politically well informed" and "government cares what I think" that show a correlation of more than .20.) This fact underlines as well that class belonging nearly has no importance for citizenship attitudes and only some relevance for the practice of citizenship. For the lower classes, we may conclude that they are not politically less conscious in comparison to the middle class, but it could also be rather that they have a lesser belief in their self-efficacy and thus are less politically active.

Qualitative studies (Klatt/Walter 2011, Munsch 2003 et al.) have shown that there is a relationship not only between belonging to the lower class and political abstinence, but also that political consciousness among those belonging to the lower class is significantly lower, i.e. lower than the rather marginal differences between lower and middle classes found in the quantitative ISSP surveys. These studies are not simply disproven by the ISSP surveys, as one has to also assume that in conversational situations, people might think more accurately about their answers and express a more differentiated view than when simply filling out a questionnaire. Quantitative research also has its validity problems (as the considerable diversions in the results at times prove, arising whenever an item is raised in several subsequent ISSP surveys). On the other hand, the qualitative studies should at least scrutinize their categorical either-or statements to which they often tend and allow for more "more or less"-statements, which are rather the usual situation of social realities. This study tried to take a step into this direction by the integration of quantitative and qualitative methods.

---

[432] Bechhofer/Gerry (1981: 191f.) for instance believe that small entrepreneurs are very libertarian and hostile to the state (as it only takes from them), while the civil service classes which have developed in the context of state-building in colonial and post-colonial times are very state-dependent, which is "expressed in a certain fetishization of the state" (ibid.). For them, the survival of the state turns into a "knife and fork question" (*Messer- und Gabelfrage*), as Marx expressed it in the 18th Brumaire.

4.21.2. Do gender, age or location matter?

Just like the determinants illuminated so far, gender also hardly matters for sense of citizenship; at least as provided in the results of the ISSP. In Germany, gender matters when it comes to interest in politics and the belief that most others are politically better informed: In West Germany, each correlation with gender amounts to .23; in East Germany, they amount to .21; and, .17; in the Philippines. Again there is no significant correlation at all.

When it comes to success factors, no significant gender differences can be detected as well: Political connections and knowing the right people are very slightly considered less important for getting ahead in life by women (just as in our qualitative study): German women find them less important by .09/.10; and, Filipinas even only by .05/.03. Gender is also not considered more influential in getting ahead in life by female respondents (in the Philippines η is .04; in Germany .05). While German women consider it slightly more unjust when good health care and education are dependent on a high income (.13/.12), there is no gender difference in the Philippines (.02/.00). Finally, there is also a very slight gender correlation when it comes to believing that everyone has the same chance to visit university (the Filipinas believe *less* by .07, while the German women believe *more* by .07). women are also slightly more in support of reducing income inequalities (Philippines .07; Germany .05). But none of these correlations is really considerable.

Filipinas discuss politics less often than men (the difference is 6%), are less interested in politics, believe less to have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues and also believe they are less well informed than most other Filipinos (all of these items by 5%).

When it comes to the forms of participation, the advantage of Filipino men is more pronounced - they show only a slightly higher participation rate in signing petitions and consumer democracy (1-2%), but a more explicit participation when it comes to public visible participation: 13.4% of all men have already participated in demonstrations, but only 6.4 of all women have done so. Likewise, 29.8% of all men have participated in some election related activity, while only 18.8% of all women have done so. Men also more often contacted politicians or civil servants (17.5%) than women (8.3%). These differences could all be traced to the concept of the public man and the private woman, i.e. that the public space is more considered to be male territory (cf. in detail Reese 2010b).

Summing up the chapters on class dimensions and gender, we can thus only detect slight differences in citizenship attitudes between groups considered to be of higher public stature (be it the middle class, be it the men) and groups considered more apolitical (lower class and women). Meanwhile the differences are more pronounced (but not fundamental) when it comes to citizenship action.

Finally, Filipinas agree slightly more (4%) that when the government thinks it is necessary, it should restrict democratic rights. They also trust others less than Filipino

men do (12.8% to 20.1): Among Filipinas, 4% believe more that government cares, but there is no difference when it comes to believing that they have no say about what the government does. All other items have a difference of less than 3% which falls within the statistical error.

Age even matters less when it comes to the data collected in the ISSP surveys. Again, if at all, it is in Germany where we can detect some slight differences: Here the older the respondent, the more s/he is willing to obey laws (.13), but also to take part in demonstration (.16); while, all other practices of citizenship do not show even a slight correlation. The older the German respondent is, the more like s/he is or was a trade unionist (.13), while in the Philippines, there is even a slight negative correlation (-.02), meaning: the younger the Filipino respondent, the more likely s/he is a trade unionist. It is not surprising that the younger one is, the more likely one is a member of a sports group (Germany: .13, Philippines: .11), but this is also the highest correlation, at least when it comes to the Philippines. The older the German respondent again, the more s/he considers taxes on high incomes as too low (.10); while the younger Germans are more asked for intervention by others but they in turn have also asked others more to intervene on their behalf: (both .14). In the Philippines again, higher age minimally influences the readiness to prohibit protests (.10).

All the other items do not even have a slight correlation in neither country. We can thus see, just like in the qualitative study, that age is not a relevant determinant for citizenship. This does not rule out however that in certain generations, like the Martial Law generation, the youth show higher politization. It seemed for me though to be too speculative to simply identify a certain age bracket with the Martial Law generation, as there were manifold ways of being affected by martial law or the EDSA happenings which are not necessarily tied to being a student in the 1970s for instance. It seems that youth does not at least lessen the sense of citizenship.

Table 19: Further significant correlations	Germany				Philippines			
	Education	age	urban	Self-classification	Education	age	urban	Self-classification
Only best secondary schools…	-.18			-.14	-.06			+.01
Only the rich can obtain tertiary education	-.18			-.17	-.06			-.03
Taxes are too		+.12				+.03		

low								
Placement of family of origin	+.16	-.15		+.35	+.17	-.07		+.59
Status compared to father	+.09	-.13		+.16	+.06	-.09		+.01
Length of education should be considered in pay	-.13			-.01	+.02			+.04
Needs of family should be considered in pay	-.19			-.12	+.05			+.01
Child support should be considered in pay	-.15			-.11	+.05			+.02
Government should reduce income inequalities	-.15			-.19	-.01			-.06
Decent standard of living for the unemployed	-.10			-.17	-.03			-.02
Health dependent on income "just"				+.13	-.03			-.01
Education dependent on education "just"	+.07			+.13	-.03			-.03
Education as factor of success	+.07			+.05	+.08			+.03
Ambition as factor of success	-.02			+.03	+.08			+.04
Bribes as factor of success	+.01		-.02		-.11		-.12	
Gender as factor of success	.00		-.03		-.11		-.10	
Conflict between management and			-.02				+.11	

workers								
Differences in income too large	-.18			-.17	+.04			-.05
Books in the house when 15 (D)/16 (PH) years old	+.44			+.20	+.31			+.15

Finally, when it comes to **origin and location** (regional differences), no clear pattern is discernible. Some citizenship attitudes seem to be a little more expressed in Metro Manila (National Capital Region) than in the rest of Luzon, the Visayas and Mindanao. But then again, other regions appear to be the most "civil." While for instance, only 20% in Metro Manila think it is worse to let a guilty person go free than convict an innocent person, it is already 40% in the rest of Luzon and Mindanao. 10% more respondents within the NCR are in favor of budget cuts than the rest of country. But then, even in highly urban issues (like providing decent housing for instance), hardly can differences be detected – a proof that maybe the "province" is more urban than Metro Manileños think. This is underlined by the fact that with the correlations being only between -.16 and .19[433]), difference between answers of respondents from "urban, big city"(72.7% are from Metro Manila) and "country village" (a specification only included into the 2004 ISSP, but not the 2006 ISSP) is not categorical.

The big apple is not even always the more "civil" as several negative correlations between size of community and citizenship attitude show. Country mice consider themselves to have more influence on what government does (by .11) and people from the countryside have slightly more often (.09) contacted a politician to let him or her know what they think. They also consider slightly more public officials to be committed (.10). People from the "*bukid*"(countryside) also slightly find the respect of rights of minorities (.07) and equal treatment (.11) more important. These non-differences, and their at times, higher sense of citizenship (minor as the differences are[434]), are though another proof for the theory that class is of little relevance for citizenship, as a large part of the middle classes and the elite lives in Metro Manila as the significant correlation between the class determinants and the variable size of community already showed.

[433] People from country villages have by .16/.19 less signed a petition or took part in a demonstration – traits which are not due to a lesser sense of citizenship, but rather due to the distance to the corridors of power.

[434] The only time when η is higher than .20 is when it comes to issues about the United Nations. Considerably less people from the countryside (and generally from outside Metro Manila) know what the UN is or have opinions about questions regarding the UN.

Other correlations than those illustrated so far made little sense: 90.6% of the respondents have never been members of a trade union; only 2.6% are at the moment. 85.5% of the respondents again are Roman Catholics.

4.21.3. Does party matter? Maybe, but the data don't allow clear conclusions

Political affiliation turned out as the main explanatory variable in the qualitative study for citizenship attitudes. Although the grouping there was done by combining political affiliation (Left and non-Left) and political involvement (activist and non-activist). Certainly, the ISSP data should be examined on this determinant as well.

This undertaking already got complicated due to the fact that there is no exact equivalent between both parts of the study. While the ISSP data partly captures if respondents have been involved in a socio-political organization, 125 out of 1,200 respondents are or have been a member of a political party; but 38 of these 125 again say, they have no party preference, with 19 of these 38 even saying they belong to a party and participate in it. Furthermore, parties in the Philippines are not necessarily of ideological orientation (cf. Reese 2013h. Therefore hardly a correlation can be observed between the variables "political affiliation (Left-Right)" and "political affiliation (Philippines)," the former allowing respondents to place themselves in a range from Left to Right, the latter asking them to name the political party they feel aligned to (cf. table 20).

In the case of Germany, the ISSP derives the Left-Right alignment from the party preference (Far Left: *Die Linke*, center-Left: *SPD* and *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*, center liberal: *FDP*, Right, conservative: *CDU*, far Right: *NPD*); this is certainly an oversimplification as shown by voters' migration from the CDU to Die Linke or Die Linke to the AfD.[435] In the Philippines on the other hand, the questionnaire contains two questions (R 26 and R 27): one for the party preference, another for own self-placement between far Left and far right. In the ISSP 2009, 88% chose no party preference, which makes the remaining 12% unsuitable to be the base for a correlation of political alignment and attitude information. 48.7% though also opted for "no party preference" when asked for their political leaning. Additionally, 117 refused an answer and 165 said they don't know where to place themselves (not even among the category "no party preference"). This problem is the same in all major ISSP surveys, I have consulted (ISSP 2004, 2006, 2009). All groups except "no party preference" (477) and "center/liberal"(240) are thus considerably small: "right, conservative" encompasses 55; "Left, center Left" 36; "far right" 28; and, "far Left" 23 (ISSP 2004).[436]

---

[435] This suggests that Left and right need to be oriented at least in a matrix of freedom and equality/participation which usually includes balancing of values as the term real liberalism showed further above – or as the Protestant economy ethician Artur Rich (*Wirtschaftsethik, Grundlagen in theologischer Perspektive*, Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1984) called the criteria "relative reception" and "relationality."

[436] In case of the ISSP 2009, 502 said they have no party preference, while of the remaining 532 grouped themselves as center/liberal (303) and 34 consider themselves far Left, 44 moderate Left, 84 conservative, 57 as far right and 10 as "other."

The self assignment to one of the political affiliation anyway yields puzzling results: In case of the ISSP 2004, 16 respondents placed themselves to the Maoist party lists, but none of these 16 rates themselves as "far Left;" only three say they are Left; two even classify themselves as far right (sic!). If at all, a comparison between those with and without party preference could be made. However, it turned out to be impossible to equate the LAs with the "far Left," the NLAs with the "centrists" and the NAs with those without party preference as originally planned. Because of this, similarly as in the qualitative study, the assignment of respondents to one of the political groupings was done on the basis of the researchers' evaluation of the respondents' life narratives.

R: Party affiliation: Philippines R: Party affiliation: left-right (derived from nat_party affiliation)	Liberal Party-LP	LAKAS NUCD-UMDP Party	Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Laks Ng Bayan-PDP LABAN	Partido Ng Masang Pilipino-PMP	Nacionalista Party	Kabalikat Ng Malayang Pilipino-KAMPI	Citizens Action Party-Akbayan	Bayan Muna	National Alliance for Democracy-NAD	Gabriela	Other party	Would not vote; No party preference	Total
Far left etc	4	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	24	33
Left, center left	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	35	43
Center, liberal	38	8	0	2	6	1	1	1	1	1	5	231	295
Right, conservative	6	4	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	66	79
Far right etc	2	7	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	40	55
Other, no specification	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	10
No party preference	4	3	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	477	488
N=	57	25	1	2	11	1	1	2	1	1	18	883	1,003

Table 20: Source: ISSP 2009

In the case of most citizenship issues, the choices by the respective political affiliations do not correspond with the Left-right-continuum. In contrast, the differences between the "far Left" and the "moderate Left," are often more pronounced that those between "Left" and "Right." High correlations only develop when both factions of the Left make similar choices. In many items, the moderate Left seems a little more citizenship-oriented than the far Left, but not necessarily the center, the conservatives or even those without political affiliation.

Some results agree with common sense. For instance, that 87% of the far Left would allow "revolutionaries to hold public meetings" (ISSP 2006), while the other groups only agree by around 73% (with the far right only with 64.3%).

It might also be explainable that the center-Left are those with the most penchant for signing a petition (only 37.0% would never do it), while among the other groups the differences are slight: 69% of the far Left and the centrists would not, while 77.6% of those without party affiliation would not. The moderate Left (gut feeling-wise equated with the NGO scene) anyway seems to be most citizenship-affine: Only 68.9% of the moderate Left rule out consumer democracy while among the other groups, it is around 80-90%. Moderate Left have also mostly often taken part in a demonstration (21.7%), while only 7.1% of the far Left did (the other groups 10-12%). The far Left again takes little more part in political meetings and rallies than the moderate Left

(32.1 to 29.6); while again, even 43.9% of the far right say they did (but only 19.1 of the politically non-aligned).

Certainly fitting to common sense is also that the far Left are above average involved in discussing politics often (24.1%) or at least seldom (31.0%); while the other political affiliations discuss politics less often (all in all, only 11% often do, while again around 42% discuss it seldom). Among those without political preference and those who don't know where to place themselves, around 9% discuss politics often and around 33% seldom do. Again in no subgroup there are more than 15% who *never* discuss politics.

But it is the conservative, with 829%, who agree most that all citizens should have an adequate standard of living, even more than the Left (73.0%); and, the conservative (like the moderate Left) also expect more than the far Left for the government to reduce income inequalities (80% vs. 73% among the far Left). The conservatives also agree a little more than the Left respondents that government authorities treat everybody equally (*pantay-pantay*) regardless of their position in society (6.3 to 5.8). Only the far right agrees a little less than the Left (5.2). All groups reject (with 20% more than the far Left) that the government should provide decent housing; only 5% of the far Left reject this idea.

It is also the far Left who are least in favor of spending more for health (74%) and consider such (together with the far right) as a least government responsibility (17.4%, while among the moderates only 2.8% disagree). They also find it as “just,” as those who indicated themselves belonging to other political affiliations, that those with higher income can afford better health care. The far Left is also a little less in favor of governmental action to provide jobs (13% disagree, but only 8-10% of those from other political affiliations), and anyway only very slightly, believes more that the income inequalities in the Philippines are too large. Nearly 80% of the far Left think that government should spend less on benefits for the poor, while the non-Left affiliations, as well as the moderate Left, only think so by 60%.

All other political affiliations consider the Philippines to be a society with few rich and many poor than the far Left, who again top the affiliations who consider the Philippines a leveled middle-class society. Only when it comes to the preferred type of society the far Left concurs with common sense. They tend to choose, in all regard, a more leveled society (Model C and D) than the other affiliations.

It is both those with Left affiliations who believe least in the principle of progressive taxation (by about 10% in case of the moderate Left and even 20% in case of the far Left in comparison to the more right affiliations), but who then consider less that the taxes for high incomes are too high than the center-right blocs (by 6-10%).

The conservatives and those with no party preference believe (with around 20% less than the other groups or around 40%) that the government successfully fights unem-

ployment. The far Left also above average believes that MPs hold their promises (only the far right does as well).

The Left, as much as those from other political affiliations (all around 70-75%, but the far right with only 60%), are in favor of cuts in government spending. The Left also favors less government regulation, just like those from any other affiliations (around 60% from any group, only the far right favors such less with only 50%). No clear differences can also be detected when it comes to interest in politics or opinion about whether the ones in power care for what the common people think.

Only the Left considers coming from a wealthy family (by 5-10%) more relevant for getting ahead in life than those from other political affiliations sans the far right. It is also the far right considering political connections most relevant (together with the moderate Left), while the conservatives and the far right consider gender by 10% more relevant for success than the far Left (only slightly surpassed by the moderate Left).

Summing up the findings, the results are a mixed bag. A clear Left-right continuum cannot be detected. Several findings are surprising (for example that those from the Left are as much in favor of budget cuts and are believing least in progressive taxation, but are trusting most the members of parliament). Ergo, common sense is needed to gauge the findings as credible or not and as long as it is that way, they do not have much analytical value.

While the differences between the political affiliations in Germany are also often only slight, at least here a Left-right continuum can be detected more clearly. It is the far Left least believing that people have the same chances to enter university and considering it most unjust that those with higher income can also afford better health care. They are clearly more in favor of progressive taxation (by 10%) and believe most that the income differences are too large.

As mentioned, the data of the ISSP on political affiliations anyway do not sufficiently allow for comparable categories to the ones used in the qualitative study (as they are not self chosen and are based on a mixture of political orientation and activism). We can nevertheless subsume from the data that the categories chosen by the ISSP seldom show such clear differentiations between the different political orientations as the qualitative study did.[437]

Low correlations between political affiliation and citizenship attitudes, as in the case of Germany (cf. table 21), can be defined away by (a) considering making the choice of the electoral decision to a base for lumping all voters into one category as too fuz-

---

[437] A correlation of the Left-right continuum in Germany (with more or less reliable assignments) by the way shows that the correlation between "Left" and "family income" is minuscule (ISSP 2006: +.08). Even if we cannot simply transfer such results to the Philippines, we can at least assume that income is not a major motivation where to place oneself on the right-Left scale. But then again, the correlation with the rural-urban continuum (the more urban, the more Left) is also minuscule (+.05), as well as years of schooling (+.03). Sex has a *d* of +.02, age even none at all (0.0). Self-placement again has a d=-.14.

zy; or by, (b) pointing at the possible influence of excluding one third of the sample (554 of 1643) from these computations as they have not assigned themselves to any of the five political affiliations. We may even resort to the fact that (c) we can generally observe that Somers' d (as in other cases) has usually a little lower outcome than other symmetric measures for ordinal values. But the differences are not significant (see table). At the end, such low contingencies simply force us to be careful with sweeping statements of single determinants being responsible for certain attitude choices.

Table 21: Correlation values for Left to right (Germany) as dependent with A positive correlation of +.05 in the case of "urban" means that the Left live very slightly more in big cities and bigger agglomerations. *Source: ISSP 2006*	Somers's (d)	Spearman correlation (ρ)	Pearson's R	*Correlation ISSP 2004 (d)*
Family income	-.08	-.12	-.12	*-.04*
Own income	-.04	-.07	-.09	*-.02*
Urban	+.05	+.06	+.05	*+.12*
Self-classification *(here the dependent)*	-.08	-.09	-07	*-.10*
Age	.00	.00	.00	*-.06*
Years of schooling	+.05	+.06	+.09	*+.11*
Female	(η): -.01	(ϕ):-.09	Cramers V: -.09	*(η)-.03*

4.22. Does country matter?

The findings taken from the ISSP sufficiently show that in most cases there is either no correlation or an only slight positive correlation between class and political attitudes, i.e. that educational attainment and occupation, but as well gender, age, region and also political affiliation seem to have lesser influence than often expected. There remains one determinant mentioned again and again, but not yet systematically illustrated: being part of a certain society, i.e. being a Filipin@ or being a German. This shall be done now.

The findings are obvious: country matters most (cf. table 22). While the correlation with socioeconomic determinants is weak and contradictory, many correlations with country are significant, even if they do not necessarily all point into one direction. While there is hardly a correlation above .20 as far as the Philippines is concerned, when it comes to socio-economic determinants, there is a manifold of correlations above .30, even .40, when it comes to country.

As “country” turned out to be the most explanatory determinant in the quantitative study (a variable not present in the qualitative study), I have extensively computed contingencies (η) between belonging to one of the three societies - marking where, due to much higher/lower numbers in East Germany, the outcome for Germany is higher/lower than that of the Philippines, even if the West German numbers are lower/higher than the Philippine numbers, meaning the Philippine numbers are in between those for East and West Germany (See table *Does country matter?* below).

When analyzing the data of the 2004 ISSP survey on citizenship, in total we can say: In all items on what constitutes a good citizen, the returns in the Philippines are higher than in Germany, in many considerably higher. Filipin@s consider it by .44 more important to be active in associations; by .43 more important to vote; and, by .32 more important to watch the government. They even consider it more important to choose environmentally friendly products by. 15 .[438] Meanwhile, Filipin@s also much more claim to take counter action against an unjust law (by .31).

When it comes to action though, the Germans claim to be much more active. They have more often signed a petition (by .55), have much more exercise consumer democracy (they bought or boycotted products for political, social or environmental reasons, by .52), have more often taken part in a demonstration (by. 38), more often contacted a politician to express their views (by .25), and especially, have much more often donated money to fund social or political activities (by .65).[439]

The relationship to the government is ambivalent. The Filipino respondents much more believe than the Germans that government cares what people like them think (by .36) and even more think that the parliament would give serious attention to citizen actions (by. 55); although an item from the 2006 ISSP shows that they at the same time believe less that the average citizen has influence in politics (by. 39).

While the Filipino respondents less think that people can be trusted (by .35), they much more believe that they can trust people in government (by .40). They even think more than Germans that parties give people real policy choices (by .20, truly a surprising result).

---

[438] This item is also a good example for putting into perspective parochial views (here not “only in the Philippines, but also “only in Germany”). While from a German inside perspective, one might expect that no one is as crazy about buying environmentally friendly products as we Germans, indeed most countries (except a few Eastern European societies and Venezuela) show higher results than East Germany; even West Germany is just in the mid-level. Societies such as Portugal, Spain or South Korea show much higher returns than West Germany. When it comes to actually having bought or boycotted certain products for social, environmental or political reasons, still several societies show a higher outcome than the two Germanies. Out of 38 countries, only Bulgaria and Chile though show a lower outcome than the Philippines.

[439] Nevertheless, the MasterCard Survey on Ethical Spending identified the Filipin@s with 68% as “No. 1 charity givers in Asia” (PDI, 19.2.2011) in a survey covering 24 countries in Asia and Africa. On the other hand, NGOs complain that most donations locally raised go to direct charitable and emergency aid, fuelled by the feeling of *awa*, while development NGOs have difficulties to raise local money - also because such is expected to be covered by foreign funding (personal information by a NGO worker, 3.2.2011).

Nevertheless, they gauge the dishonesty of the last national elections much higher (by .42) and also think much more that public service is involved in corruption (by .37) – but only 13.5% say that they experienced that public officials occasionally or often ask for bribes (ISSP 2006). Nevertheless, they don't think less than the Germans that public servants are committed to serve (by .03 only), and in general, think only a little less (by .10) than the Germans that democracy works well in their country. (The latter though is an effect of the high dissatisfaction by the East Germans with how democracy works. They only give it a grade of 4.85 on a scale of 10. The West Germans by far, gauge the working of democracy higher than the Filipin@s [5.99 to 5.16]. By the way, all three societies consider the situation of democracy to have worsened "in the last ten years," i.e. from 1994 to 2004. In all three cases, the grades drop by around 0.8.)

Filipino respondents though also less believe that government should treat everybody equally regardless of their position in society (by.19). They also less expect government to take into account the views of citizens before making decisions (by. 20).

Political discussions among Filipin@s are also a little less frequent (by .15). But despite these differences, no differences between the Philippines and Germany can be identified, for instance, when it comes to: understanding other opinions or the support for minority rights.

Filipin@s also do not belong less to a political party, a religious organization (but West Germans belong much more which is surprising, considering the seemingly omnipresent fundamentalist-charismatic religious groupings in the Philippines) or other voluntary associations (while Germans are considerably more involved in trade unions and sport groups). Filipino respondents also agree just as the Germans do that all citizens should have the right to an adequate standard of living; they also believe themselves to have a "pretty good understanding" of the important political issues; *and,* that they show the same level of personal interest in politics. They don't even believe more that most politicians are in politics only for what they can get out of it personally (a truism in the negative narrative about Philippine democracy).

Turning to the 2006 ISSP survey on government, other interesting contingencies between country and citizenship issues, surface. Filipin@s expect the state (more than the Germans) to spend on selected items (+.30 for health; +.35 for retirement; +.40 for culture and arts; and, even +.49 for defense) and are also less in favor of lessening government regulation (by.23). All of these though could be an outcome of a less developed Philippine state. Filipin@s also expect more for the state to keep prices low (by .40), help the industry grow (by .31) and provide a decent living for the unemployed (by .22, although they do not expect the state to spend more on unemployment benefits than now, which is nil).

As mentioned above, Filipin@s are more satisfied with state performance than Germans. Nevertheless the net satisfaction rates in the Philippines are mostly negative.

Taking the case where the satisfaction is positive (health care), there are hardly any other countries more satisfied than the Philippines, with 49% being (very) satisfied in this regard (except Switzerland with a whopping 74%, and Venezuela with still 58%). Most countries even have lower satisfaction rates than Germany (40%), especially in many post-socialist countries – except Slovenia and East Germany, but also Portugal, Chile and the USA - where only 14-24% are (very) satisfied with government performance, when it comes to health care. (I have not computed the net satisfaction rates, but it goes without saying that they are belowground, if already the number of the satisfied is very low.) It is more or less the same countries which are much less satisfied (or much more satisfied) regarding the government caring for the elderly (with 35-37%, Germany and the Philippines have about the same number of satisfied respondents).

It is difficult to be less satisfied than the Germans when it comes to fighting unemployment (6-7% are [very] satisfied), so that even some post-socialist countries show a (slightly) higher number of (very) satisfied. As the number of satisfied in the Philippines is also quite low (26%), there are several countries with considerably higher number of satisfied (like New Zealand, Australia and Switzerland with around 50% and Denmark even with 56%).

We see that a) especially when it comes to societies where public service was curbed after the breakdown of state socialism, the satisfaction rates are very low. This may be explained that based on former experiences their expectations got disappointed. We see b) that in some societies, satisfaction rates are constantly high (Switzerland, but also Venezuela with its Bolivarian socialism constituting a case of state expansion; although satisfaction rates are only partially high in the Nordic countries considered beacons of the welfare state model). We can so conclude that satisfaction rates are less connected to the real extent of public service (which is quite different in countries with comparable satisfaction rates), but more on expectations based on concrete experiences made. This is in line with the explanation mentioned above on how much is expected from the Philippine or the German state in relation to childcare.

Higher expectations towards the state in the Philippines seem to be not backed by the willingness to also financially enable this, as the high numbers of those considering the taxes for any income group as too high show - as it is only 27% in effect who want the government to spend on unemployment benefits at all. This seems to be different in Germany where people at least expect the rich to still pay higher taxes. Even if one does not follow the often encountered equation of citizenship with the obligation to pay taxes and obey laws prevailing in the Philippines (e.g. Olivia Villa-

nueva et al.: *A New Year's Wish List for the Philippines*, Planet Philippines 30.12.13), taxes are nevertheless vital for a functioning state.[440]

When it comes to civil rights (which are less in the focus of this work), we see on one hand that Filipin@s more grant their government the right to curtail such rights (an item from ISSP 2004 shows that Filipin@s find the restriction of democratic rights by .46 more acceptable) and they also much less insist on the right of public assembly (by .22 to .41); but when it comes to state interference into the public sphere (tapping the telephone or stopping and searching people randomly), Germans agree much more (by .30 and .49).[441] This might be in line with the strong emphasis on "freedom" in the sense of non-interference into private business which was revealed in the personal explanations within the qualitative study.

Finally, turning to the 2009 ISSP survey on social inequality, we can observe that the supreme belief in hard work as prime factor of success among Filipin@s is also reflected in a higher appraisal of it compared to the Germans (who are also known to believe in hard work). η here is +.34 (and in line with this, the Filipin@s also think by .24 more that hard work should be considered for the wage level). Education is also considered as important in the Philippines as it is in Germany (PI around .82). In the Philippines, this is supported by the higher belief (by .29) that "people have the same chances to enter university, regardless of their gender, ethnicity or social background." Coming from a wealthy family or being rich as requirement for succeeding in university, thus show no higher outcome than in the German data. Likewise, ambition is considered by .16 more as factor of success, which although also holds true for race (.21), bribes (.24) and especially gender (.39) and religion (.56). Knowing the right people though is considered by .27 *less* as factor of success and even political connections (the infamous *palakasan*), is only considered more important by .13. Much less Filipin@s though think that corruption makes your day: by .45 less they think that "to get all the way to the top today, you have to be corrupt."

Comparing the appraisal of ambition, hard work and gender with the other countries participating in the ISSP, we can observe that a) the Philippines is among those countries who believe most in hard work (only New Zealand, Portugal, Iceland and the United States are with 1.61 or very slightly above the Philippines with 1.64, which is again above China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and other societies considered to be

---

[440] "[In the Philippines] the usual notion of citizenship emphasizes the person's duties as taught at home and in school, and often invoked by government. ... The typical image of a good citizen is the tax-paying citizen, the honest voter, the driver who obeys traffic rules. ... But a good citizen is also one who asserts his or her rights, speaks out in defense of the voiceless, respects the environment, treats women and men equally, and so on." (Diokno 1997: 20)

[441] Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno considers this based on a common sense in the Philippines that only civil and political rights are demandable. Socioeconomic rights on the other hand "are no better than paper rights" (Source: Bulatlat.com, 8.7.2013). "They (the poor) cannot go to any government authority – to the legislature, to the executive, to the Supreme Court – and demand that socio-economic rights be implemented," Puno said. "A right with no remedy is not a right at all."

»industrious«). Likewise, the countries surpassing the Philippines in giving importance to ambition for getting ahead in life (again the USA, New Zealand and Iceland, but this time also Norway and Bulgaria) only do so by a small margin (1.62 in the case of Iceland around 1.7 in the case of the other countries, compared to 1.81 in case of the Philippines). Again the Asian Tigers lag behind the Philippines. (Germany on the other hand is in both cases mid-level.)

While although most societies believing in meritocracy have very low values when it comes to gender (most values are around 3.8 to 4 and even below), i.e. while they consider gender as an irrelevant a factor of success as the Germans, the relative high importance given by the Filipin@s to gender as factor of success in life (2.81) is only surpassed by the South Africans with 2.62.

Despite the Philippines having a considerably higher Gini-Index (0.45 compared to Germany with 0.28; source: data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI), Filipin@s consider the income differences in their country less as "too large" (by even .45) than Germans, even if they consider their society (by .15) as more unequal (based on the different models of social inequality reproduced above) and also place themselves lower on a social ladder of 1-10 (by .33).

The Philippine political scientist Joel Rocamora (1998: 24) thus believes that "in Philippine culture ... social justice does not manifest itself in class struggle, but in a limitation what the upper classes may exert from the poor. Enrichment is considered as 'too much' when one no longer cares only for oneself (a positive act), but when it is considered 'corrupt', a negative act."(In a similar way: Scott 1976: 7.) In such a way, the message given by the then director-general of the National Economic and Development Authority Romulo Neri regarding the then chairman of the Commission on Elections Benjamin Abalos in the context of the 2008 corruption scandal around the national broadband network project asking for a 130 Million US-Dollar "share" was: "I told him the $130 million was too much and too difficult to cover [but not "without legal basis" etc.]. Maybe, if it was only $65 [that would be acceptable]. Moderate your greed!"[442]

This might also be why the Filipino respondents less expect the government to reduce income inequalities (by. 13, though this is an effect of a much higher expectation to do so in East Germany). And while they more expect the government to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed by .24 (however "decent" is defined here), they very much more agree that the government should spend less (sic!) on benefits for the poor, by .52 to be exact. As already pointed out, they also consider

[442] Likewise Conrado de Quiros (PDI, 20.1.2014)points out: "We remain trapped in a view of corruption as something excessive or overboard, sobra na, abuso na. Reyes' [then the highest military] disbelieving lament after he was accused of being corrupt for accumulating a *pabaon* (separation pay) preparatory to retirement remains the classic formulation of it: »Was I greedy?« That is how we generally understand corruption—as being greedy. It is not raking in the »acceptable« due however »acceptable« keeps rising over time—it is going beyond it."

especially taxes for high incomes as much too high compared to Germans (in 2009 by .46), which suggests that their idea of social balancing by the government is quite limited. This is supported by the fact that Filipin@s find it much more "just" that people with higher incomes can buy better health care and better education (by. 58 and .60).

Is this higher tolerance towards social inequality already an impediment to citizenship? From a central-European perspective, where social equality takes a crucial position in the social contract, Castel would say yes, as he believes that maintaining a "society of the similar" is equal with upholding democracy (Castel 2000: 132).

Nevertheless, Filipin@s have just the same idea as Germans regarding a desirable society being one where most incomes are middle (η being even 0). But such balancing seems to be left to the market. Just like benefits for elderly citizens in the Philippines are mainly granted by the market (senior citizens have the right to a 20% discount on many basic, daily goods). The needs of the family and for child support are more left to be considered when fixing the wage level (by .29 and .21). This fits well that the focus of the societal discourse of the Aquino administration is on "inclusive growth" (which goes along with a trickle down effect as well) and not on redistribution.

Table 22: Does country matter?	Philippines /Germany (η) (+ = more Filipinos agree /- =more Germans agree)
2004 ISSP on citizenship	
Important to… vote	+.43
… keep watch on government	+.32
… be active in associations	+.44
… choose environmentally friendly products	+.15
… help the less privileged in the country /the world	+.22/+.09
But when it comes to action, Germans much more active	
Sign a petition	-.55
Consumer democracy (Boycott or buy certain product for political reasons)	-.52
Took part in demonstration	-.38
Contacted a politician to express their views	-.25
Donated money or raised funds for a social or political activity	-.65
Government authorities should treat everybody equally regard-less of their position in society	-.19
Politicians should take into account the views of citizens before making decisions	-.20
Government does not care what people like I think	-.36
Frequency of political discussions	-.15
Likeliness of counter action against unjust law	+.31
Likeliness of serious attention by parliament	+.55
Mostly we can trust people in government	+.40
People can be trusted	-.35
Parties give people real policy choices	+.20
Dishonesty of last national election	+.42

Public service is involved in corruption	+.37
Public servants committed to serve	- .03 (only)
Democracy in my country works well	-.10
Restriction of democratic rights acceptable	+.46
No discernable differences (≤.10) for instance when it comes to: - understand other opinions and government should respect minorities. - belonging to a political party, to a religious organization* or other voluntary associations. - all citizens have the right to an adequate standard of living. - pretty good understanding of the important political issues and level of personal interest in politics. - the belief that most politicians are in politics only for what they can get out of it personally.*	
2006 ISSP on government	
In favor of less government regulation	-.23
Spend more on health	+.30
Spend more on defense	+.49
Spend more on retirement	+.35
Spend more on culture and arts	+.40
Government's responsibility to… provide jobs for everyone	 +.33
… control prices/keep prices low	+.40
… help industry grow	+.31
… provide decent living for the unemployed (spend more on unemployment benefits)	+.22 (+.00)
Success in fighting unemployment	+.28
Allow public meetings /public demonstrations /anti-government strike	-.41 /-.40 /-.22
Should government have the right to tap telephone	-.49
Stop and search people randomly	-.30
Satisfaction with public combat of crime	-.18
People like me have *no* say about what government does	-.42

Average citizen has influence in politics	-.39
Taxes for high/middle/low incomes too high	+.55 /+.20 /+.05
People to ask who could influence decision in my favor	+.32
Public officials deal fairly with me	-.54
Politicians /Public officials involved in corruption	+.38/+.50
Public officials wanted bribe	+.27 (only)

No discernable differences (≤.10) for instance when it comes to:

- agreeing to budget cuts.
- opting for more expenses for law enforcement.
- satisfaction with government performance in the field of health care *and* providing a living standard for the old.
- members of parliament are trying to keep their promises.

2009 ISSP on social inequality

- Hard work as factor of success (Hard work should be considered for the wage level)	- +.34 (+.24)
- Ambition as factor of success	- +.16
- People have the same chances to enter university, regardless of their gender, ethnicity or social background	- +.29
- Knowing the right people as factor of success	- -.27
- Political connections as factor of success	- +.13
- Bribes as factor of success	- +.24
- Race as factor of success	- +.21
- Religion as factor of success	- +.56
- Gender as factor of success	- +.39
- To get all the way to the top today, you have to be corrupt	- -.45
- Income differences are too large (How unequal is society perceived)	- -.45 (+.15)
- Government should reduce income inequalities	- -.13*
- Government should provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed	- +.24
- Government should spend less on benefits for the poor	- +.52
- Taxes for high incomes too low (Higher incomes should pay more)	- -.46 (-.17)
- It is "just" that people with higher incomes can buy better health care/better education	- +.58/+.60
- Needs of family/child support should be considered in wage level	- +.29/+.21
- Books in the house when respondent was a teenager	- -.56
- Self-classification (classification of own family)	- -.33 (-.13)

- No discernable differences (≤.10) for instance when it comes to:
- The influence of good secondary schools*
- -coming from a wealthy family and being rich as requirement for succeeding in university.
- education as factor of success
- perception of conflicts between poor people and rich people in the own country
- What kind of income distribution in society is considered desirable [η=0]

* = due to much higher/lower numbers in East Germany, while West German numbers are lower/higher than the Philippine numbers (= Philippine numbers are in between those for East and West Germany).

In general, we can see that even if there are several items where country plays no decisive role (or even no role at all), it turns out nevertheless to be the most explanatory determinant for many attitudes and actions relevant for citizenship.

I consider this conclusion unfortunate. One can say, it is a conclusion that this work consciously tried to not fall back on (cf. the chapter 4.2. *Citizenship – a western concept?*), as it is so easy to essentialist such data in a politically culturalist way. The study also tried to prove that country as a factor is less important by trying to determine middle class-specific attitudes and behavior beyond state borders.

This study only succeeded in the latter when it comes to middle-class performance.[443] Here, we can conclude that middle class members in both societies are inclined to consider themselves as politically more interested and knowledgeable. And they seem to be more self-confident to deal with public authorities. Middle class members also have more experience in political action (at least if »political« is defined as the classical public space) than lower classes. All these differences though are often only slight – and fade if compared to the differences between the two societies as the much higher contingencies show.[444]

---

[443] The statement that middle-class belonging has a strong bias to identity (class for itself) might also be supported by the fact that identification with social class grows with educational attainment; in the Philippines 36,6% among those who graduated from college, but only 18% among those who have not even finished high school consider class as one of their three most important groups they identify with (ISSP 2003).

Meanwhile considering occupation as an important belonging - getting similar ratings in all three societies with 15,5 to 20,7% naming it as most important, 14 to 20% as second most important and 11 to 14% as third most important, but around 46-50% in all three societies mentioning considering it one of three most important belongings - is not dependent on education (with those in the Philippines with only primary education or incomplete secondary slightly more proud of their occupation than those who visited college (ISSP 2003).

[444] Harriss (2006:451) distinguishes different ways of going about public problem solving, suggesting different forms of citizen-state relationships: a) the direct approach to government, or taking legal action, indicating a direct relationship of citizens to the state; b) taking action through parties or patrons reflecting the fact that citizen-state relationships are brokered; c) action by means of demonstration or petitioning indicating a contentious relationship with the state; while d) problem solving through collective self-help would seem to show a detached relationship between citizens and the state. For the case of India Harriss observed that while those with little or no education are the most disposed to go about problem-solving through brokerage (of political parties or other 'fixers'), also because they feel incompetent to negotiate on their own and are easily not recognized by government officials, middle class people rather rely on their individual capabilities and either go directly to government or to court or engage in self-provisioning.

After correlating citizenship items with society of origin, gender, age and class, only in relation to "country" significant correlations could be observed (and some very considerable at that). Does this affirm political culturalism, essentially Filipino (and/or German) peculiarities (or as they say in the Philippines "only in the Philippines")?

No and yes. Yes, as such findings at least disprove a culturally insensitive class theory, constructing global class-specific attitudes and behavior, which Marxist approaches tend to. Culture, historical experiences and path dependencies seem to matter – and this considerably questions a too action-oriented approach which neglects the caveats the sociological method raises about such approach (cf. subchapter 3.6. on *Political mobilization – ridden with prerequisites*). A merely socio-economic approach to historical change as in historical materialism may be considered inadequate - as much as a purely culturalist approach which believes that new (or renewed) ideas or frames on society, politics and self bring about change as soon as they take root in a critical mass of people. It might need both: new perspectives and desires, but also material conditions which make them "realistic" and allow new social class-based interests to emerge and struggle for realization (Cf. paradigmatic in the case of explaining the French Revolution: Higonnet 1998: 289ff.).

There is therefore no sense in further replicating the divide between the two ways "much of the literature touching on social and political relations between different classes in Philippine society" is based on according to Pinches (1992: 173). This divide "either stresses normative consensus and reciprocity or economic exploitation, political repression and conflicting material interests. What one approach lacks in sensitivity to political economy and social conflict, the other lacks in careful cultural analysis. Both generally suffer in their failure to adequately explore the differences and tensions that are to be found in the attitudes and social practices of dominant and' subordinate groups" (ibid.).

Glassman (1995: 389-395) likewise considers the relationship between culture, class and citizenship to be dialectic. Indeed, "some political cultures are more consonant with legal-representative democracy than others. Where there is consonance, transition will be easier" (p. 389). But a culture not (yet) consonant to citizenship is not an insurmountable obstacle to democratization. Glassman cites Spain, Japan and Germany as examples for although rocky, but finally, successful road to democracy. This he mainly attributes to the change of the class balance and the modernization of classes: "Political culture is carried by certain classes who reflect specific world views such that an alteration in the class structure [Glassman here names the development of a broader middle class and the disappearance of a military aristocracy]…. can and will change the political culture of the nation in question" (ibid.). Culture enables, as well as, obstructs the development of citizenship, but Glassman believes that in the long run it cannot impede it – which does not mean that the culture emanating from that is necessarily homogenous. Democratic cultures can be diverse, but some cultural traits definitely hamper citizenship.

Conceding the high relevance of country-specific dimensions of citizenship does not automatically imply that these differences have never been less and will never be less. To disprove the idea of "only in the Philippines," an expansion of the analysis which in this work was restricted mainly to the Philippines and Germany due to time and space constraints, would probably show that there are less differences between societies with similar social conditions as in the Philippines. Comparisons especially with Latin American societies as were occasionally done in this work, but also the detection of common values among post-socialist societies, render such assumption obvious. Randy David (2014) in this way considers it a result of sociological analysis to "begin to understand that there is nothing special about the Filipino, it is just like any other people in the world that is caught in the same circumstances."

And for countering an Othering between Germany and the Philippines, we can nevertheless concede that several results are not as far apart as one would assume when merely drawing on the modern vs. traditional society paradigm. We were even able to observe that often, the Filipin@s show a more citizenship-prone outcome (especially on the attitudes assigned to a good citizen are concerned).

The ISSP data does not give any information on how these differences came into being – and as long as the intended history of citizenship in the Philippines has not been written, the etiology of this Philippine-specific sense of citizenship remains pretty much in the dark. The differences can still be considered as context-specific reactions that may change once the context changes. There is still hope for the Philippines, also when following an "European ideology [characterized by] its strong endorsement of income-leveling measures," even if Randy David (see above) declares such inconsistent with the present Filipino political culture. Nevertheless, it makes no sense to deny the significant differences between the way citizenship is spelled out in the Philippines in comparison to, for instance, in Germany. They have to be taken into consideration and have to serve as starting point for whatever citizenship project one takes on.

4.23. Only abroad? The little influence migration culture seems to have on citizenship attitudes

OFWs "watch in awe when the inhabitants of these societies [i.e. their 'host societies'], conscious of their civic responsibility to work for the common good, take initiatives to improve their communities rather than wait for their governments to act. Naturally, they begin to ask what it would take for Filipinos to attain the same level of solidarity and political maturity. When they come home or read about happenings at home, they recoil at the incompetence and the privileges of the few who rule us. They become the most impatient constituents of modernity."

(Randy David, PDI, 16.2.2013)

Does migration experience indeed have any favorable (or unfavorable) influence on the sense of citizenship, as Randy David in his quote above insinuates? This is one of questions which hopefully could it be answered with the help of ISSP data.

The Philippines can be considered to have a migration culture as about 10% of the population resides out of the country, but most of them are still Philippine citizens, and most as well, have a significant influence on the country. It would be essential to know more about their sense of citizenship 1) as they sooner or later return to the Philippines, 2) as they have a direct influence by the chance to vote overseas and an indirect influence via their remittance on how their relatives exert their citizenship in the Philippines and as finally 3) their views are very much taken into consideration (which especially might be true for the Fil-Americans). Unfortunately, the demographic variables of the ISSP data do not provide an indicator on migration experience, so that this study could not pursue it as a further possible determinant of the sense of citizenship. One can only assume that several of the ISSP respondents had migrational experience, but as these respondents cannot be identified, any conclusion from the ISSP data in this regard would be a mere *hula-hula* (guessing).

We can make several conclusions from the facts presented in the 2003 ISSP survey on nationality: like, for example, that only 26% of the Filipino respondents name nation as first, second or third most important belonging (just like in average in Germany) and this without clear correlation to education. But 84.6% say they feel (very) close to their country (which is slightly more than the 79.4% feeling [very] close to their province; the 83.4% feeling [very] close to their town and the 84.4% considering it [very] important to be a Catholic, which is again only considered by 11.5% as their most important belonging). The numbers from Germany though are very similar, 74.3% feel [very) close to their federal state; 82.1% to their town; and, 82.4% to Germany (with the numbers from East Germany higher by 5% in relation to home town and federal state, but 2% lower in the case of the nation). Being a Christian though is only considered by 37.1% of the West Germans and 13.3% of the East Germans as (very) important.[445]

All in all, 80.8% are "very proud" to be Filipin@s (even 92.6% of the far Left) and 15.5% are somehow proud (without clear correlation to class). (Only 14.8% of the Germans are very proud and 49.2% are somehow proud to be Germans.) 78% of the Filipino respondents are even (very) proud of the achievements of the Philippines in arts and literature and 85.5% say they would rather be a citizen of the Philippines than of any other country in the world (again no clear correlation to educational attainment), while only 59% of the German respondents say so.

54.5% of the Filipino respondents say they agree (strongly) that the Philippines is a better country than most other countries, while only 16.5% disagree (strongly) with

---

[445] 42.4% feel [very] close to South East Asia, while 60% of the Germans feel [very] close to Europe.

this statement. (But only 24.5% of the Filipino respondents agree [strongly] that "people should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.")

Every second Filipino respondent says "I am often less proud of the Philippines than I would like to be," again without clear correlation to educational attainment, although there are 10% among those who have at least visited college who say that there are some things about the Philippines that make them feel ashamed (around 40% in comparison to 26-30% among those who have not finished high school); while in all educational groups, around 13-15% say they agree strongly to this item.

It is even 96.4% of the Filipino respondents considering it (very) important to "feel being a Filipino (*madama ang pagka-pilipino*)." (73.8% of the Germans consider it important "*sich als ein Deutscher zu fühlen* - to consider oneself as German.") 77.9% of the Filipino respondents consider it *very* important to have been born in the Philippines (only 602% of the Germans say so) and 73.7% consider it very important to have the Philippine citizenship (but 80.6% of the Germans say so). (In the Philippines, both items are without clear correlation to educational attainment; in Germany, the importance wanes with higher education by around .18). 64.1% of the Filipino respondents even consider it very important to have lived in the Philippines for most of their life (while another 26% consider it fairly important).

Newer surveys back such high identification regarding living in the Philippines. As the Philippine Star reported on August 6, 2010, in July 2010, only 9% of the Filipino respondents agreed with the statement "If it were only possible, I would migrate to another country and live there" (with no class specification), while 75% disagreed. (Before the presidential elections in March 2010 it was still 20% agreeing and 56% disagreeing. Previous Pulse Asia surveys showed that the desire to migrate among Filipinos went as high as 29% in 2006.) This is contrary to the "felt" percentage of "anywhere from 98 to 99 percent of young Filipinos [that] want to move out," Marlen Ronquillo speaks of (MT 27.8.2008). "Only the sons and daughters of the rich and the powerful, who do not make up one percent of the young, want to remain here. They will not trade their ruling class status in their wretched country even for a good life overseas" (ibid.).

Germany is certainly no good comparison, when it come to national pride due to its younger history; the point here though, was not to outline how proud Filipinos are about their society, but that they do not lack in pride and identification with their "bayan" and that a lack of sense of citizenship can not be traced to such as is done once in a while.

Nevertheless, we cannot correlate the high outcome from the 2003 ISSP with the items chosen earlier for the description of the sense of citizenship in the Philippines, as most of the latter are taken from the 2004, 2006 and 2009 ISSP surveys, but none from the ISSP survey of 2003.

Due to the lack of segregated data, we cannot for instance prove true or false the widespread assumption that it is those with the highest sense of citizenship leaving the country as migrants, so that "if Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo could keep herself in power for a decade, it was because overseas work provided a safety valve that prevented discontent from boiling over," as Michael Tan (PDI, 27.6.2013) assumes.

This safety valve assumption is very popular, Rivera (just like Tan) considers that "the OFW phenomenon has provided a safety valve that undercuts the social basis for political activism and militancy" (Rivera 2001: 219). Walden Bello (PDI, 8.5.2012) likewise believes by saying that "for the government ... massive labor export has served another function, which is that of serving as a safety valve for the release of social pressures that would otherwise have been channeled into radical movements for political and social change internally. Those who migrate are often among the most intrepid, nimble, and sharp people in the lower and middle classes, the kind of people who would make excellent cadres and members of progressive movements for change."

The former director of the Institute for Popular Democracy Joel Rocamora explicitly links the valve argument with the myth of the middle class as democratic mover, when saying that "the democratic process has been slow because it has been pushed by middle class groups, who are out of the country (personal interview, Quezon City, 29.7.2008) "The problem with the Philippines is the Philippine middle class is in Detroit, in Manchester, in Firenze, and so on"(ibid.).

Likewise, the ISSP data cannot be consulted for (dis)proving another popular belief, which is that migrants are willing to transfer to the Philippines the experiences they made in countries providing a higher level of welfare to their citizens (and inhabitants), i.e. providing a political remittance. Such arguments have often been made in the campaign for the enactment of the Overseas Voting Act in the Early 2000s. Marco Garrido (in: *Philippines: Enfranchising a nation abroad*, Asia Times 20.8.2003) uses this line of argumentation in stating that "arguments have been made that enfranchising overseas Filipinos can lead to the qualitative improvement of politics in the Philippines since overseas Filipinos are said to be insulated from the kind of dirty politics typical in the country. According to former Senate President Franklin Drilon, these overseas voters »cannot be bought, intimidated, or hoodwinked by unscrupulous politicians«." (For similar arguments, believing that "overseas Filipinos might have the tendency to focus on issues than on personalities, and can easily distinguish between sincerity and showmanship" or that "overseas Filipinos tend to be more … issue-oriented owing to their financial security and exposure to other governments [and] will vote not on the basis of popularity or personality, but on the basis of platform and performance," cf. Tigno 2007: 12).

So far these statements must be considered rather as expressions of hope than one backed by fact. We can though observe that the turn out of Overseas Voting is very low and I know of no analysis which would prove that their voting behavior differs substantially from that of the population which "stayed home."

We cannot prove what the editorial of the Manila Times on October 5, 2012 (with the telling title *a potent voting bloc*) assumed, which is that "their [the OFW's] experience in many of the places where they work—those in Europe, the United States, Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, for example—has given them first-hand knowledge that countries can be better-governed, more efficient and less distorted by corruption and red-tape [and we may add: have a more efficient traffic system]. They can be a force in insisting that elected government officials be as disciplined as those in other countries." Or, as Conrado de Quiros (in PDI, 27.3.2014) expresses on a life-world basis "Pinoys who had lived there [in the USA] for some time, some of them for just a few years … now found the idea of a road needing minor repair being repaired in a few hours the most natural thing in the world."

Unfortunately, Randy David does not draw on any numbers or other forms of evidence when stating in one of his columns that he has "previously written of the positive aspects of the Filipino migrant experience, not the least of which is the impact it creates on the migrants' worldview. They see how modern and accountable governments take pains to respond to the needs of their citizens." Here, he also claims that "they begin to ask what it would take for Filipinos to attain the same level of solidarity and political maturity" (Randy David: *Migration as a way of life*, PDI, 16.2.2013).

The little empirical data created so far (e.g. Rother 2010), unfortunately speaks a different language: These findings cannot identify yet the hope for a "new generation of community leaders with political skill, diverse resources, greater receptivity to progressive projects and less tolerance for the traditional ways of doing things" (Rivera 2001: 219). So far, migration changes the yardstick upon which output performance of the Philippine political system is measured as the research project "Democratization through migration?" (Rother 2010) showed. At the same time migration seems to lessen the zeal of OFWs to work for the improvement of their home country. While a number of former OFWs won local administrative positions, so far no »OFW vote« could be observed. Unlike the Ilustrados who channeled their migration experience into the quest for political change, migration today rather seems to serve as a strategy of social security for one's family, a personal realization and (by using their being connected to the West) as distinction marker – by idealizing their Western host country and showing the people left behind how far backward they are (Soco 2008).[446] The hope that the needed change will come from the ones who left the country might be in vain.

---

[446] In this way Cito Beltran depicts that he "recently observed how OFWs who have lived abroad for more than two or three years display a more confident, more aggressive personality. A young lass we once knew as a timid probinsyana left for Germany ten years ago and returned like she owned the company" (PS, 28.9.2011). Further on Beltran's column though deals with an OFW who was "confrontational and adamant about his views and made them known" towards government officials. "The no-name, non-celebrity OFW got what he demanded along with my respect because he was simply asking for government action, service that he pays for yearly as a registered OFW and as a citizen of the republic. He was not interested in »playing nice«; he wanted results and got results."

While the Fil-Ams "by income standards and access to telecommunication technologies … are potentially the »most connected« to the homeland" (Aguilar 2007: 160), "it turns out, they are the least likely to get involved in Philippine elections" (ibid.). Aguilar analyzes that "the disinterest in Philippine politics appears to be the result of a deliberate shunning of the kind of politics that migrants hold in their memory about the homeland, a memory of »dirty« politics and ineffectual governance— even by emigrants who affirm their Filipino identity. … The distrust of Philippine political institutions is most palpable. Thus, although most overseas Filipinos maintain social ties across time and space, the forging and cultivation of transnational social fields do not extend to political transnationalism. Theirs is largely a familial transnationalism, even an ethnic and national one that takes pride in being Filipino, but it is also decidedly anti-Philippine state" (ibid.: 159f.).

While the majority of voters are temporary labor migrants in Hong Kong, Singapore and the Arabian Countries (cf. Aguilar 2007) and their vote does not differ much from how election results are in the Philippines themselves, long-term immigrants have been the least keen to participate in Philippine elections (also because the legal provisions hinder them from doing so). Thus, "only about 10% of eligible overseas Filipinos registered for national elections and of these, in 2010 only 30% actually voted," as Edilberto De Jesus (Newsbreak, 12.7.2011) pointed out. Of the at least nine party-list groups claiming to represent OFWs in the 2010 elections, none got a seat.

It remains an open question, if extending the ISSP surveys to the migrant population would really prove a "decidedly anti-Philippine state"-attitude as Aguilar (2007) believes. It would at least be quite in contrary to the ISSP findings on those left behind. Nevertheless Aguilar's analysis further supports my earlier assumption in analyzing the qualitative findings (cf. the chapter 4.13.: *Disembedded citizens?)* that there is a gap between "cultural citizenship"(i.e. considering oneself strongly as part of the Philippines, just like the data from the 2003 ISSP survey showed) and "political citizenship."[447] In line with this, Epifanio San Juan (in *From Globalization to National Liberation*, University of the Philippines Press 2008: 139) considers the Philippines as "a transnation built with people spread all over the world (still) having a sense of being a *Kulturnation* built on the love for balut, bagoong and Karaoke – but not united in a project of building a commonwealth with a functioning domestically rooted economy and political institutions in place." In the latter, the Philippines seems for most migrants as a lost case, at least if we follow Aguilar (and to a certain extent, Rother as

---

[447] Randy David here states that "we have an underdeveloped concept of citizenship. While we profess a strong attachment to our country, this is mainly emotional. It has not matured into a commitment to abide by the formal institutions of government. Our most basic loyalties and obligations are still reserved to members of our kin group and narrow circle of friends, patrons and dependents." (PDI, 17.4.2013)

And the Swiss exchange professor Lucas Kaelin (*The problem of family politics*, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 22.4.2014) observed that "the discussion about the nation-state always centers on that nation, never on the state. Nation building is what's important, but not state building." Reckoning that "the state is predominantly discussed in negative terms, with its many shortcomings and corruptions, and there is no doubt that this reality exists," Kaelin postulates that "we need also to acknowledge its [the state's] role in providing the basic material and ideal infrastructure to lead our lives."

well). [For one example of such a "turbulent mix of apprehension and amusement" by a *balikbayan* (a foreign based Filipino coming back to the Philippines [cf. Robert Encila: *Heads up, Pinoys*, MT, 26.6.2014.)].

Due to the lack of "political transnationalism," it seems that the complaints by Filipino columnists that "Pinoys are world class [but only] abroad" (Boo Chanco in PS, 8.3.2010), will have to go on. Chanco asks in his column "why is it that Pinoys are constantly proving themselves world class abroad, but the country itself seems unable to extricate itself from the third world" and "how come the disciplined Pinoy who follows the rules abroad reverts to his native anarchic self once back on local soil?"

Likewise, Manny Valdehuesa (who in 2009 published an analysis on the Philippine political system with the title *Nation of Zombies* [Capitol University Press]), complains that about the Pinoys being "service-oriented and orderly abroad," and hopes (*sana*) for such "also at home" (Mindanews, 26.4.2014). He speaks of a "paradox of our split-level behavior: abroad, we are service-oriented, eager to please, and fastidious OFWs (overseas Filipino workers)—but not in our home country. … We neglect the governance and upkeep of our own community/barangay. We leave arrangements to others and don't even bother to supervise the public servants we elect. Thus even where our public servants prove to be unruly, corrupt, or inept, no one takes them to task, no one bothers to have them disciplined, or removed and replaced as the law requires" (ibid.). Finally he asks: "Why is it so impossible to build and maintain the same standard and sense of elegance here at home as abroad?"[448]

Even if there is not necessarily "something in the air we breathe" as Chanco sighs, certainly there is a context-related spelling out of citizenship attitudes (as the analysis of country as determinant quite impressively showed). Based on the findings within the qualitative study, for example like the (missing) feeling of (in)justice when it comes to being paid much less than their American counterparts, I would assume that the feeling of deprivation is relative and bound to the nation/the container state. We might conclude from this that the sense of passive citizenship, i.e. having expectations towards the state, is as well linked to experiences with and expectations towards the state they are addressed to. Even if migrants might have experienced "better practices" in a host country, such practices are not necessarily applied by them to the Philippine context. Without more substantial data, this though has to stay an assumption for now.[449]

---

[448] Randy David sees exactly here a pitfall of the "culture of migration we have unwittingly nurtured in our society. It encourages people, especially the young, to think of personal advancement as something to be pursued separately from the progress of their own society. It makes it easy for them to turn their back on their communities, and sometimes even on their own families, in the vain hope of finding a better life abroad. It fosters the illusion that good societies are places to be found rather than painstakingly built by the collective effort of their citizens" (PDI, 16.2.2013).

[449] Because of the relevance given to the issue of citizenship attitudes of migrants, coexisting with a dearth on empirical research on the matter, the author is planning a research on sense of citizenship among migrant returnees, a research which hopefully will be conducted in 2015.

4.24. Conclusion

"These »good« and »very good« grades of our local government units and the police do not seem to impress the international good-governance monitors."

Editorial of the Manila Times, 6.11.2012 reporting about the SWS Social Weather Stations 2012 Survey on Good Local Governance

***

"I will not lower my expectations of you, Mr. President. I have faith (that) this administration is capable of doing more. I refuse to live in an age of lowered expectations."

Dean Joan Largo of the College of Law of the University of San Carlos, following Manila Times, 18.11.2013

No clear conclusion that can be drawn from the ISSP data analyzed above. The sample shows some inconsistencies, especially when contingencies are analyzed. There are sometimes significant differences between the responses to the same items in the different years a topic was surveyed (like in the case of how many expect income redistribution from government). How was it possible that about 20% Germans lost their confidence that they have a "pretty good understanding of the important political issues," within just two years (from 2004 to 2006). Or, why do 60.5% of those Filipin@s considering acts of civil disobedience "very important," but who "definitely" reject public meetings of government foes (ISSP 2006), which are even more than from those considering civil disobedience "not important at all" (54.2%). Unlike in a qualitative study, the respondents cannot be asked to further explain their choices, leaving the researcher at times in perplexity. The data definitely should not be used selectively just as one feels inclined, but must be correlated in a contextual analysis with other returns, which then again, can turn out to be contradictory. This then calls for caution in drawing conclusions. Statistics are like Bible quotes. Out of context, they may support any conclusion, and eventually, lose all explanatory power.

Furthermore, we have to be aware of the fact that most data in this qualitative study are based on self-reports and have not been counterchecked with other data. As there are always limitations in doing a study, this was done, as the focus of this study is on "sense of citizenship" (which may be tapped for political action), instead of claiming to be an inventory of political action.

Nevertheless, there are some cautious conclusions one may draw from the data. Having looked at the general perceptions and expectations, we can observe that the pillars of a welfare state are very much in place in the Philippines. Items of social equality find a high acceptance, just like the expectation towards the state to provide social safeguards *and* take steps towards social balancing. (At the same time, this high sense of egalitarism coexists with an acceptance of a de facto social inequality and social dominance orientation (Bernardo 2013) which is much higher than, for instance, in Germany (a finding confirmed by the data Jay Yacat has been collecting in his several researches on citizenship [Yacat 2014]).

Another cautious conclusion is that the dissatisfaction with the democratic and social system is not as dramatic as the negative narrative prevalent in the media (or estimates by foreign think tanks) suggests.[450] Filipin@s are in general satisfied with democracy and believe that public service is trying its best. They in general don't have the same negative impression of the performance of the political system as pundits do: neither, do they believe that bribes are necessary for success (and only few say they experienced public officials asking for bribes) nor do they think that corruption paves the way up. The data does not reflect that "the public is ready to believe the worst about the nation's politicians…. [due to a] long history of institutional distrust," as Randy David writes in relation to the Napoles issue (PDI, 21.5.2014).[451] And the findings within this study (which by the means of longitudinal interviews also allowed the hidden and private discourse to emerge), can also not confirm the observation of Sidel who draws on "common knowledge," "widespread convictions" (1995: 148) and "the attitude of much of the population" (p. 149) that for Filipinos the "nation-state by and large appears neither as an agency of public service nor as an arena for patron-client relationships but, rather, as a complex set of predatory mechanisms for the private exploitation and accumulation of resources originally in the public domain." It seems to be not as neat as the public discourse suggests and as Sidel deducts historically in his article on "language of legitimation" (but rather quite classist): Here the "ordinary Filipinos" (144) are stuck in a "collective nostalgia" (167) for patronage politics and charismatic big men,[452] there is an "emerging, largely ur-

---

[450] The Fund for Peace, for instance, gauged the Philippines as a country in 2014 with a "very high warning" for fragility, the second to the worst of five on its Fragile State Index (FSI), based on 12 key political, social and economic indicators. Among the ASEAN economies, the Philippines has the lowest score in public services (6.9 in 2014) and the highest erosion of score (1.9) from 2010 to 2014. (Source: *Fragile: Survey shows how precarious the Philippine state still is*, BW, 2.7.2014.)

[451] Such gap between media discourse and satisfaction rates among the populace also bothered pundits and activists in the context of the Yolanda rehabilitation work. Despite a slow government response (cf. Yen Makabenta: *Six months post Yolanda: The Czar has no clothes*, The Manila Times, 9.5.2014), the satisfaction rates with the government in the Yolanda-divested areas were still "very good."

Foreign aid workers earlier called such "very good" satisfaction ratings "a travesty" (Manila Standard, 24.1.2014) and several clergymen and local councilors put into doubt the credibility and accuracy of the Social Weather Stations surveys as "there was no presence of government in the province of Capiz after the devastation brought by Yolanda" (Father Mark Granflor, director of the Social Action arm of the Archdiocese of Capiz in PS, 24.1.2014). A young media professional from typhoon Yolanda-stricken Tanauan town in Leyte, (mirroring the uproar on the social media sites) believed that the SWS just did a complimentary study: "SWS sells its results to the company that commissions the survey. Ah, *oo nga pala* (that's why), it was also SWS that said President Aquino's rating was not affected by his (non) response to Typhoon Yolanda. ... , they must have interviewed people in the lap of luxury to get such a high 73% approval rating" (Manila Standard, 24.1.2014). The research institute IBON, part of the orthodox Maoist network, even came up with different, much more unfavorable results (cf. *Pinoys think gov't response to Typhoon Yolanda insufficient–survey*, PS, 12.3.2014).

Though it cannot be outruled that the SWS also has its interests, I believe that there are better (although more inconvenient) explanations for such gap. One would be, to also ask why pundits stick to the negative narrative. The former director of the Institute for Popular Democracy, Jude Esguerra, for instance, explains the negative narrative as a result of the quest of its narrators for systemic change which leads them to "describe the present without salvation" (personal interview, July 2008).

[452] Sidel insinuates that the "appeals to the sanctity of »democracy« are in considerable measure geared to foreign (most prominently American) observers, commentators, and critics, while the »developmental« actuations of government technocrats play largely to ... foreign donors and creditors" (p. 144, cf. p. 163). Accountability and ownership cannot be expected from people

ban, middle class" providing a "growing domestic social base" for "the themes of progress, national development, good government, law and order, and reform - idealizing an "impartial, rationalizing, bureaucratic state power, above and outside the predatory game" and "the projection of authority based not on personal power but on the formal institutions of the modern nation-state"(p. 165).

This also might fall short in explaining the high acceptance of democracy in the Philippines simply "with an extremely high number of government positions open to electoral competition, [so that] »democracy« means a great deal to many ordinary Filipinos," as Sidel does (ibid.).

The qualified satisfaction and trust with the system and on politicians though is not an expression that the system works well, but as pointed out in the first part of this work, such an assessment has to go through the eye of the needle of (public) consciousness. And public opinion does not simply award a *kalabasa* to the system and its actors. This is comparable to the constant criticism by the radical Left towards the USA a sentiment not echoed by Filipin@s in general. According to a survey by the SWS in March 2014, Filipin@s have "much trust" in the United States. 85% of respondents said they had confidence in the USA; 43% of whom qualified it as "very much trust;" and, 41% as "somewhat much trust" (Business World, 28.4.2014).

The fly in the ointment seems rather the qualification of the general statements, especially as many Filipin@s are far behind in taking political actions on what they consider important. There is a big gap between what respondents consider to make a "good citizen" and what they have actually done. We do not necessarily resort to the construction of the Filipin@s as "split-level personalities," as the anthropologist Jaime Bulatao did (cf. Mulder 2011; 109), who, "on the one hand, subscribe to the most elevated of Christian norms, and on the other are as opportunistic and materialistic as can be [which] doesn't seem to lead to a personality conflict" (ibid.).

An institutionalist approach would underline in the first place, that it lacks *working* structures in which people can exert citizenship. Even if people are willing to act as citizens, they face considerable impediments to act as such (David 2014).

Secondly, we might explain such a gap with the effect of social desirability. One key informant explained such gap rather with the fact that "people grow up relying on the approval of others, wanting to be good boy/girl" (Davao, 21.5.2014) and thus give socially desirable answers. Likewise Macapagal et al. consider being "a good daughter [or] a loyal friend ... most important in regulating behavior" (2013: 34). For such "interdependent/relational selves… others are important to give meaning to the self in a specific social situation or context. As such, one's own opinions, abilities, and characteristics are secondary. … The focus then is not the inner self but the self's relationships with others" (ibid.: 33f.), later considered by the authors as typical for a

---

who consider "imported Western constructs of nation-state and constitutional democracy" (ibid.) simply as ways to secure employment and social welfare benefits (cf. p. 144).

"separated self," attached by them to the West. To use the model of Kohlberg's moral schemes, most respondents then are to be considered in the stage of a conventional mindset, not (yet) in a post-conventional one. [453]

We might though also consider the high approval rates of general statements as reflecting what Portocarrero (1998: 74) calls a "moralistic" discourse, which seems very much present in the open public discourse in the Philippines. On the other hand what Portocarrero calls "ironical" discourse is considered less appropriate for an official undertaking such as a SWS survey. Such ironical discourse, such as taking the promise of democracy serious but reconciling it with the wanting reality, lightening the contradictions and not considering 'integration' of theory and reality an "absolute value"(ibid.), can often be observed in the private, i.e. is rather a hidden discourse (in the terms of Scott). This also reflects the importance of jokes in Filipino everyday culture with "joke na lang" serving as an important de-escalator.[454]

But beyond that, Filipin@s probably also expect less from the state than what change advocates wish them to expect. This might be because they lack the basis for comparison of how an administrative system could work better; or because they don't consider it "reasonable" to expect from the Philippine state what they observe in their OECD host country as "the Philippines is [only] a 3rd world country, we could not expect more," as one respondent to the qualitative study explained. Besides, it is considered to be "*bastos*" to be a *reklamador*.

But all this is more than just a mere acquiescence with the status quo. How otherwise could a slight majority (53.8%) even be "proud" of how democracy works? Such statements are made despite negative experiences with the system, such as a slight majority (51.4%) saying that "public officials seldom or never deal fairly with people like me." Or, the experience that political parties do not give voters real policy choices, which a slight majority believes (PI_{PH} = .58). Seemingly, these are not issues most respondents connect to their judgment on democracy.

---

[453] Borchgrevink (2014: 26f.) has observed (in an ethnographic study of a rural community in Bohol) the existence of a "strong moral community." As such, "there is a "high premium placed on collectivity and cooperation" and "an individual will meet uniformity in the reactions from others most consistently in a small-scale community with a high intensity of interaction."

[454] Another reason for the morality of the public discourse (the *sala talk*) may be that it has little consequences. It could be a sign for the lesser importance it has compared with the informal, so to speak private, backstage (the *kitchen talk*) – a differentiation made by Joel Rocamora (1995). The "kitchen" is where the decisions are made. Estrada's kitchen cabinet was a prominent example of this. The gap between open and hidden transcript (Scott 1990) is more distinct and to take someone at his or her public word less pronounced. "Even if I say it in public, it doesn't matter if I don't meet it in my everyday life," as one respondent to Reese 2010b told me.

Here though, Portocarrero distinguishes between an ironical discourse (making the realities bearable and a subaltern discourse) from what he calls a "cynical" discourse, which is especially exercised by the powerful. Joel Rocamora calls it a "dichotomy between the language of everyday politics and the language of reform." "When politicians are confident that they can avoid public attribution, they are perfectly happy to talk about hiring relatives and friends, about the money they can make from their elective positions, about the use of violence and threats of violence in their contests. But they have to dissimulate when talking to journalists and academics because, in the language of reform, these everyday acts of politicians translate into nepotism, corruption, and illegality" (Rocamora 1995).

That the number of those not believing that political parties give real policy choices is higher in Germany (with a PI of .62 in West Germany and of .68 in East Germany) might be surprising, but this says as much about a high level of dissatisfaction in Germany, as it says about a probable acquiescence in the Philippines.

"Citizenship outcomes are shaped by contexts of state formation, indigenous values of culture and protest, and by versions of citizenship promoted in political and development processes," say Cornwall et al. (2011: 13). This is the "normative power of the factual," a term coined by the jurist Georg Jellinek, locating the basis for validity of the law not in natural law or in time-transcending reason (and we might say that the modern social justice and participation are invoked as if they were such), but in the habits and realities of the historical-social life.

Existing arrangements or arrangements experienced as normal in earlier times have a heavy influence on current expectations as values and memories disappear slower than times change just as Bourdieu says about the Habitus. This is very obvious in most cases the analysis draws on, be it when it comes to the Philippine and German data or be it where data from other countries have been included. This also confirms the assumption made in the chapter 3.11.: *The precarized new middle class: resourceful and still longing for something* that entitlement is also connected to experiences of deprivation.

Certainly, we also should take into consideration that low expectations are not necessarily path-driven, but that it is typical for struggles of the precarized, especially if they are poor to be more defensive and modest in their demands, as outlined in the first part of this work. Neither do the precarized long in the first place for redistribution nor for reforming institutions. Their main question according to Scott (1976: 7) is rather 'What is left?' than 'How much is taken.' Although, I would be careful in using this argumentation to understand the lesser expectations among Filipin@s towards the state. First and foremost, the expectations are low among all social groups and not just for the poor, the rural and/or the precarized. Second, the international call centers can be considered comparable to the settings Silver describes when describing pro-active movements (cf. the chapter 3.11.: *The precarized new middle class: resourceful and still longing for something*). The logic of self-protection may thus not apply here. Finally, we have detected a high sense of agency among all social groups. This rather proves Samuel Popkin's criticism towards the traditional moral economy approach. He showed that where windows of opportunity open, subsistence oriented peasants turn into small entrepreneurs; not necessarily making them profit-oriented and overcome their risk-averse behavior to a limited extent, but setting free their "capacity to aspire" (Arjun Appadurai[455]).

[455] Cf. Arjun Appadurai (2004). The Capacity to Aspire: Culture and the Terms of Recognition. In Vijayendra Rao and Michael Walton (Ed.). *Culture and Public Action*, Stanford, 59-84.

As said above, I believe that the data shows that a general sense of entitlement is not in short supply (it is most often even equally high or even higher in the Philippines than in Germany or other »developed« societies as we saw above), but rather that imaginative spaces (*Denkbarkeitsräume*) are more narrow in the Philippines than in Germany. " People who do not know what they should be getting are always happy with what they have. Ignorance is bliss, after all," as Carmelle Harrow and Jereco Paloma sigh in relation to the sorry state of public education (Sun Star Davao, 25.6.2011). What is familiar to us serves as benchmark and we do not ask for more.

We could also observe that the Filipin@s portray themselves to be more person-oriented: Not only are Filipin@s considered to "tend to vote of personality and not on issues" (Macapagal 2013: 151); 34.3% of the Filipin@s also say they have "a lot of people" they could "ask to influence in their favor," significantly more than Germans. Filipin@s agree much more that the family should take care of social obligations (old parents or childcare) and that one should take care of one's family first, before helping others. This fairs well with the high importance given especially to the family as surrogate welfare agency.

It might then be not a surprise that an individualist, "moralist" approach is also more present in the Philippine public discourse when it comes to the shortcomings of government activity. Believing that personal integrity and good intentions are a panacea for societal improvement, such discourse revolves around values, lifestyle attitudes and moral restraint (*delicadeza*), individual responsibility and accountability, individual heroism (*bayani*)[456] and martyrdom; and thus, also on personal failures and political malevolence. Even the practice of the radical Left of usually identifying the President along with US-imperialism as the main reason for any structural problem ("US-Estrada, US-Arroyo, US-Aquino regime…"), "ascribing [the president)] the sole authorship of everything that is bad in our government" (Randy David, PDI, 12.9.2009) resorts to such a discourse pattern. (Cf. for another example the article *Progressive groups call for Aquino's ouster, for 'betraying Philippine Independence'* from the orthodox Left website Bulatlat.com, 13.6.2014.)[457] This is fostered by the prevalent understanding incumbents have about their public position: Here David (2014) says that, "I don't think there has ever been a president who thought of his function as ministerial [here in the original Latin origin of servant], whether legally or historically."

---

[456] At the same time though, this goes along with a disdain for (unsuccessful heroes) calling such attitude of futile exemplary action "*magpa-hero*" (personal information, 2013), i.e. "playing/pretending to be a hero," in German probably best translated with "*einen auf Helden machen*."

[457] In so far as the "Million People March" on 26.8.2013 and other activities against the pork barrel system were considered as *Signs of a maturing democracy*, (Carmel Abao et al. in Rappler.com, 4.9.2013) and as "unlike mass mobilizations around the EDSAs (1 and 2) and the impeachment attempts (against Arroyo and Corona), the August 26 mobilization was directed at a system rather than at a particular person or regime. … The protestors did not just demand more from people in government, but also from political institutions. Framing the pork barrel as a system has paved the way for public scrutiny not just of individual culpability but of inherent flaws in current institutional arrangements between the executive and legislative branches, between national and local governments, and, most importantly, between the governing and the governed" (ibid.).

Figure 16: Editorial cartoon, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10.5 2010

Such moralism (cf. figure 16) goes along with putting all hope on families in mending the social ills. In this way, Vice President Binay believes that the fight against human trafficking must begin with strengthening the Filipino family, which he dubbed on a Seminar on Human Trafficking organized by the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines as the »frontline defense mechanism against human trafficking«" (*Stronger families can battle trafficking*, Manila Times, 27.2.2014). Binay declared the parishes and parish priests across the country to be "the natural havens for the Filipino family wherein they may reconnect with God and their basic humanity," and further explaining "that is to provide a bridge for the family between its spiritual and material needs, and to strengthen its resolve to deter its members from taking that perilous leap for material gain at all costs, even at the expense of the member's human rights, his or her honor and dignity. This is where the fundamental and ultimate fight against human trafficking must be fought"(ibid.).[458]

When it comes to the political system, such moralism shows itself by identifying dynasties as culprits, a kind of moralism towards a kinship network. In this case, it is not the Bourbons, the Romanovs or the Wittelsbacher, but the Ayalas, the Arroyos or the Aquinos. This shows how much prevalent it is to link the issue of the Hacienda Luisita (owned by the president's family but without the president having a stake in it) with him. The radical Left here does not only consider it a special responsibility of President Aquino to resolve land reform issues but also because "the historical truth (is) that President Aquino 3rd's uncle plundered the coco levy funds" (Willy Marbella, deputy secretary-general of the orthodox-Left peasant federation KMP in MT, 13.7.2013).

Such moralism also holds true for one of the most recent bones of contention: the rehabilitation work in the areas affected by the Supertyphoon Yolanda (international code name: Haiyan), an approach questioned by the likes of the dean of the Ateneo School of Government, Tony La Viña, who explains: "politics, of course, contributed and continues to affect the recovery in Leyte and Samar but this is secondary, and it would be a serious mistake if we simplify those failures through a distorted analysis based on blame" (*After Yolanda: The straight road to recovery*, Rappler.com, 7.5.2014). Instead he concludes, "the delay in rehabilitation after Yolanda is inevitable because

[458] Only in the latter, did he also mention as further remedy, state measures promoting "inclusive growth … a micro-level, community-based economic growth … encouraged by expanding the choice of people from outside-the-community job opportunities to include community-based livelihood choices, like agriculture processing, and trading" (ibid.).

the system is designed for small, localized disasters but not for massive disasters" (ibid.). Such systemic approaches, nevertheless, usually only abound in the Left-leaning media and in social science publications, but not in the public discourse which very much focuses on personalities (which is also due to the person- and not party-oriented system of political representation in the Philippines).

At the same time, this »moralist» approach comes with a division between a safe private world and an unsafe, unknown public world, as the going private-strategy reveals, but also as the editorial cartoon indicates (cf. figure 17).

Figure 17: Editorial cartoon, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14.9.2009

Finally, we could see that Filipin@s much more expect people to help themselves, focusing on hard work and ambition as the keys to life success, and less expecting the government to iron out social discrepancies. The strong criticism towards the government's flagship program in the field of social policy, the Conditional Cash Transfers, is an indicator for this. It is widely considered to be mere dole-outs.

Such an attitude, which agrees with the neoliberal responsibilization approach (although it is largely not an outcome of neoliberal governementality), also reflects the lack of awareness of the strong influence pedigree and wealth have for getting ahead in the Philippines (cf. Reese 2013c) or the panacea function given to education and hard work to overcome these obstacles (even if an analysis of the little social mobility one has went through is in contradiction to this).

We can further observe that where people set out to question the "minimalist" approach towards the state, they are confronted with responses of "responsibilization." Such was the case of President Aquino criticizing Yolanda survivors who trooped to Manila to protest what they consider an insufficient government response to their plight, by saying that they should be able to help themselves. "To those who are saying that we have been slow in responding... it seems to me that if they are capable of attending to their trip to Manila, perhaps they can also attend to their livelihood," as the President said (*PNoy raps storm victims*, PS, 20.2.2014). "Let us not forget: 1.4 million families were affected; 918,000 will need housing assistance," he added. Not questioning the low government budget (and not making the slow release of international donations an issue), he was also cool to the demand of the survivors that the government release P40,000 in cash assistance per family. "If we have 1.4 million affected families at P40,000 each, that would amount to P56 billion. In our 2014 budget, we have about P600 billion that we can use for expenses outside of the personnel

services and the maintenance and other operating expenses. That P54 billion is already 10% of P600 billion," he said.

Likewise, the Department of Social Welfare and Development Secretary Corazon Soliman said, "Instead of coming here, they could have used the money to help themselves" (ibid.).[459] The head of the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery Panfilo Lacson again said that instead of criticizing the government, the critics should have emulated two US-based siblings aged 10 and 11 with roots in Tanauan, Leyte, who sold bracelets to raise funds for their parents' hometown (PS, 23.5.2014).

Unfortunately, in media reports and scientific articles, the ISSP data (and other SWS data) are seldom disaggregated and correlated with determinants other than income (A to E classes) or region (NCR, Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao). Correlations are hardly undertaken, so that inconsistencies in the answers stay undetected and as the income classes to ABC, D and E are only roughly delineated, the little influence educational attainment usually has on the answers is easily overlooked. A deeper analysis of the ISSP data and correlating it also with other determinant items such as class indicators, but especially country belonging, shows that Mangahas is not wrong to say that "survey evidence shows … that to denigrate Filipinos with the term »damaged culture« [cannot] rely on … social science." However, he himself draws conclusions that are only based on simple and uncorrelated percentages, which therefore end up as more positive about the extent of active and passive citizenship than a more complex analysis of the data unveils.

4.24.1. Comparison between general sample and qualitative sample

Comparing the ISSP data and the findings of the qualitative sample is a challenge. Most data cannot simply be contrasted as the way they were collected lack similarity. In the ISSP, mere questionnaires were used, but with a much higher survey population. In the qualitative study, interviews were done but with a much less representative population, although theoretically sampled.

Furthermore, the determinants which turned out to be most explanatory in one research are not applicable in the other (political affiliation in the qualitative research; class, and especially, country in the secondary analysis of the ISSP's quantitative data). While the main explanations for differences in the qualitative study (a Left orga-

---

[459] Secretary Soliman also discredited typhoon victims (this time from Typhoon Pablo which devastated parts of northeast Mindanao a year before Yolanda) who took political steps when they went to Davao, the »capital« of Mindanao to protest against the non-distribution of relief supplies. She asked, "why do so-called »hungry« and »angry« typhoon victims spend their money going to Davao when they should have fed themselves" (Source: PS, 28.2.2013). The then mayor of Davao Sarah Duterte again called the leaders of these protests "typical specimens of people with nothing to do. They talk and convince themselves they are correct. And talk, and talk, and talk. And dream." (Source: Sun Star, 1.3.2013). Such statements, however, are not "only in the Philippines;" in Germany, terms such as "professional protesters (*Berufsdemonstranten*)" are used to discredit activists.

nizational background) has proven inutile in the quantitative data (Left-right affiliation), the qualitative study could not be examined for class-specific dimensions as the respondents belong more or less to the same educational, occupational and income group. And as the interviews were only conducted in the Philippines, no comparison (except incidental secondary literature) could be made with Germany or with other societies.

The empirical chapters have shown that Filipin@s do have expectations towards the government (sense of entitlement) and are also willing to become involved as citizens (active citizenship). By asking for clarification and further explanations on the choices made, the qualitative study was able to show that both in terms of expectations and commitment, this sense of citizenship is more qualified and limited than the brittle numbers from the ISSP can tell us.

The ISSP surveys unearthed a high sense of citizenship, often even higher than numbers from Germany or other societies represented in the ISSP. However, the major caveat proved to be the gap between judgment and action (cf. the subchapter 3.6.5.: on *Walking the talk: from consciousness to action* in part I).

This weighty limitation gives special importance to the findings of the qualitative study, as the consistency of judgment and action here was more investigated. In addition, the interview situation may have caused more consistency/sincerity among the respondents and also allowed for explanations that can make some questions more understandable, for instance, that high general expectations can very well be articulated by spelling them out in a minimalist way.

Furthermore, we can invoke that secondary data from the Philippines has been used to contextualize the findings in the qualitative (as well as the quantitative) study. Key informant interviews were conducted to provide for communicative validation. But it might also not be advisable to overestimate the validity of quantitative data like the results of the ISSP (or other quantitative research). As mentioned, there is a high fluctuation in returns. Take for instance the example of the item asking if it is considered the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and low incomes. The ISSP 1996 results show that only 39.3% [PI .51] of the Filipino respondents say so; in 2006, it was 69.2% [.72]; but in 2009, again there were only 51.4% [.59]. While the numbers from Germany are more consistent (West Germany 49.4 [.56]-61.2 [.65]-59.3 [.63]; East Germany 75.7 [.75]-80.0 [.80]-78.8 [.76]), these nevertheless disprove the idea of quantitative data objectively and reliably describing social reality.

Key informants (e.g. Quimpo 2014 and Claudio 2014) raise objections to the data on high approval rates by assuming that these may mainly stem from times during which the public sentiments towards the president (here: Aquino) were elated. Such objection though might hold true for the 2010 and 2011 and 2012 data, but high approval rates were also indicated in the ISSP 2004 which was collected during the time

of Arroyo's presumable stealing of the presidency. It was only other data (the quarterly SWS survey) collected by SWS at the same time that resulted to low satisfaction with how democracy works (28%).[460] This even holds truer for the 2006 and 2009 data (still comparably positive) which were collected during periods when the president suffered deteriorating approval rates.

Basing the analysis of citizenship in the Philippines on the outcome of a quantitative study is questioned even more by the objection raised by David in a validating key informant interview (David 2014). David questions the use of quantitative methods for measuring citizenship attitudes in the Philippine context in general. He finds the numbers here presented "incredible, not very convincing" and explains his reservation by explaining that "in many instances, I don't think that respondents understand the questions in the same way they were intended... They [the questions] assume a certain rational deliberation on the part of the respondent and that is too much to assume."[461] David considers the questions asked in the ISSP surveys as "very difficult questions. If I were asked these questions, it would take me awhile to answer them in a very serious way." He therefore declares that he is "partial to ethnography" and that he considers (participant) observation, combined with interviews, the more appropriate way of capturing citizenship attitudes instead of doing a survey. "Observe citizenship in action and ask people why they did this and why they did not do this, to be able to come up with valid explanations for why people behave the way they behave... though in-depth interviews might allow you to explore the meanings" (David 2014). This way "the situation is not contrived and clarifies meanings that are internal to that community." [462]

Such a strong reservation towards quantitative research by one of the leading sociologists of the country (Randy David), suggests that when quantitative data is consulted, it should rather be used to validate (or falsify) the findings from a qualitative research, but not as main or sole data. The results of the qualitative study and the quantitative study should at least be read together to grasp the sense of citizenship in

---

[460] Here, we can also observe a certain inconsistency of data: While in the ISSP 2003, 17.9% of the Filipin@s said, they are "very proud" of how democracy works in the Philippines and still 35.8% are somehow proud (see above), in the quarterly SWS survey conducted around the same time, only 36% were satisfied with how democracy works. It was the same research institute (SWS) which collected the data, with a seemingly identical question. To a certain extent this questions the validity of the data.

[461] Yacat (2014) meanwhile considers the high satisfaction rates to be credible and explicitly disagrees with David's assumption that people don't understood the questionnaires. He though believes that people must have had politicians and public officials in mind which are closer (more *lapit ng loob*) to them, i.e. local government, when giving the high satisfaction ratings. Yacat furthermore considers the question on what are qualities of a citizen as an "artifact," as people were given choices (which leads them to answer these in a socially desirable way). The more promising way would be to ask them open ended questions, as was done in the qualitative research.

[462] In a column, David (PDI, 6.4.2013) advised his readers "not (to) be misled by their vaunted scientific character [here referring to election surveys]. … It is pointless to try to figure out the logic behind the preferences they report. There is none. Indeed, their rational content, if any, would pale in comparison to the opinions of a well-informed taxi driver." He explains this with the assumption that "the personal commitment behind these survey preferences cannot be very high, which is probably why they tend to manifest wide swings over short periods. Survey respondents typically do not get the chance to reflect upon or articulate the reasons for the choices they express. Their responses to questions therefore do not have the saliency that opinions given in the context of a conversation would usually have."

the Philippines, instead of providing a different assignment to the qualitative and quantitative data: the first should be used to develop theories and hypotheses and the latter to test them (this way in a "schematic comparison" in Lamnek 2005: 242). [See the chapter 2.2.: *Integration of quantitative und qualitative evaluation and survey methods* for more details on this.]

The general conclusion that can so be drawn from both researches is that a) while there is a high approval of the idea of democracy and the need of active citizenship in the Philippines, b) the practice of citizenship in general stays far behind. The qualitative study shows that it is especially those who had a former experience in political involvement who show higher returns in active citizenship (a kind of tautology), but also a more critical evaluation of the real existing democracy in the Philippines. This above average response holds true for those who had experiences which "empowered the activist in them," as a non-Left activist critically said about how she perceived her stint in a Left-oriented political organization.

The general conclusion that could be drawn from this study for those interested in deepening the sense of citizenship among Filipin@s, is that, there is no lack of foundations of citizenship. General expectations towards the state and the idea that a modern state should not restrict itself to being a night watcher minimalist state with a low intensity democracy, but that it has various social and participatory obligations as well, are widespread. What could rather be strengthened is raising specific expectations towards how to spell out these state obligations; this could also be done by tapping the experiences made by migrants in other countries, helping to overcome the idea that a sense of citizenship needs to be context-bound, but that it could be 'globalize' in its implementation.

At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that the learning process could also develop into the other direction: People in the North who are still used to the merits of the welfare state, might learn the hard way what seems to be already *common sense* in the South: economic difficulties are acknowledged as individual problems, and thus, individual survival strategies, are pursued. Instead of solving social problems, the core question is how to successfully manage personal problems and make productive use of them. This is definitely a sign that even extremely precarious societies can be easily governed whenever there is such a high level of self-management. "Personally it can help you, but at the macro level it has bad implications," says Rose Chong, a precarious NGO staff member from Davao City, in a personal interview in January 2007.

The constant high ratings "social justice" gets in surveys in Germany and the very concrete experiences towards a providing state in East Germany though show that an "entitlement mentality" seems to be more laggard than the preachers of the Third Way (Blair) and the Agenda 2010 (Schröder) might have expected.

Picking up an argument made in the first part (cf. chapter 3.2.: *Are the unorganized organizable?*), for now, we can at least state that the lament (often heard from former

activists who glorify the 'golden' years of martial law) that you can't expect *this* young generation to revolt, won't bring us far: Political assumptions considering the Islamic world to be fatalistic, the Chilean youth to be disciplined by more than 30 years of neoliberalism and the European youth as self-centered, consumerist and apathetic to act together, were all proven wrong - at least in their totality by the protests going on in these countries since 2011. Even the political scientist Asef Bayat, who is closely monitoring and analyzing everyday resistances in the Arab world for many, many years (calling them "social non-movements"[Bayat 2012: 31] as they do not fit into concept of collective action acting out in an open transcript and with a political claim i.e. clear demands and goals), declares "never have I imagined what happened [i.e. in the Arab societies]. The vehemence of change, the speed with which it spread, and then in such wonderful way!"(Bayat 2013).

But Bayat underlines as well that "these revolts have not developed from a vacuum" (Bayat 2012: 7). "Social groups with demands, wishes and political subjectivities have developed," says Bayat (2012: 9), "which the regime could not handle." A framing favorable to political change developed, which was not sufficient but necessary for protest to emerge - next to favorable settings (political opportunities) but also drawing on practices of "quiet encroachment" (Bayat) and everyday practices, even if these were not considered politically relevant in the first place. 'Non-political' community action or reflecting political issues as traced in the second part of the work might be some of such practices. We could hopefully point out in the course of the previous analysis of data that our respondents in specific and the Filipin@s in general also have quite some of such demands, wishes and political subjectivities.

But I want to refrain in the empirically-based part of this work from giving well-meaning advices, which in a post-colonial context can easily be understood as patronizing (or as *bwisit*) and leave it to political and social activists to draw conclusions for their and for our common political practice towards more citizenship. A postscript will point out some ideas on the challenges that lie ahead in developing a deeper sense of citizenship. But this will be done in an essayistic form, as an offer for common reflection, rather than as a foreign researcher evaluating Filipino fitness for citizenship.

5. Food for thought: Looking out for chances of citizenship

In this postscript, I wish to point out some challenges and prospective construction sites for a further research on the sense of citizenship in the Philippines. The postscript consciously keeps to the form of an essay also in concurrence with Randy David (2014) who has a point when cautioning that the questions raised are "very broad," which should not be generalized "based on nothing." The idea is to sketch some preliminary thoughts on circumstances under which "citizenship" can be realized in the Philippines and on stumbling blocs, but also on emic resources such a citizenship project could draw on. Such endeavor needs to be open to an outcome that such a citizenship project "from below," i.e. starting off from the political culture, might not be built only on liberal ideas, but also include elements such as opting for hierarchies, smooth interpersonal relations and conflict avoidance, traditional (catholic) values and on an attitude not wanting to rock the boat (just to name some of the elements of Filipino culture usually considered as stumbling blocks to democratization).

5.1. Starting point: The "negative narrative"

"One morning in the very near future, we may wake up and find that this nation no longer belongs to us and that it has imploded. All our institutions shall have collapsed; widespread anarchy — the ultimate metastasis — will have destroyed not just our moral fiber but our very lives because there will be impunity everywhere, each man for himself. ... Unlike a revolution which erupts and which everyone becomes acutely conscious of, an implosion is a slow, lingering process that will take years to evolve. In this period, people will adjust to the changes that come slowly then cumulatively destroy the whole of society.

Aside from the physical destruction which occurs, the internal damage is deeper and longer lasting because it cripples the spirit; violence becomes a matter of course, corruption and immorality become habits and people will not only learn how to cope with these, but they will also come to expect it as part of the system. There will be hunger, ethnic strife, rapes, murders — all that occur in a failed state like Somalia and some of the African nations, destroyed first by corruption and dictatorship, their people unable to unite and fight back the fate they themselves created."

(F. Signal Jose, PS, 11.12.2011)

***

For one month, while I was on vacation in the United States, I refused to read or hear any news on the Philippines. I wanted my vacation ... to be as stress-free as possible, and reading or listening to news on the Philippines was one sure way of getting the blood pressure to rise. It was only on the flight home last Wednesday that I read the news—and wham! I plunged right into the world of the Napolist, or should I say Napolists? What a welcome home.

(Solita Collas-Monsod: More trouble than they are worth, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 17.5.2014)

***

"I have asked myself many times: Is the Filipino worth suffering, or even dying, for? Is he not a coward who would readily yield to any colonizer, be he foreign or homegrown? Is a Filipino more comfortable under an authoritarian leader because he does not want to be burdened with the freedom of choice? Is he unprepared, or worse, ill-suited for presidential or parliamentary democracy?" I have carefully weighed the virtues and the faults of the Filipino and I have come to the conclusion that he is worth dying for because he is the nation's greatest untapped resource."

(Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino in a message delivered before the Asia Society on Aug. 4, 1980 in New York City)

As pointed out in the conclusion to the study, the perception of the state's public affairs among political pundits is by far worse than what the ISSP findings show and also what surfaced among the non-Left respondents to the qualitative study. I call this bad and pessimistic perception "negative narrative." Although not necessarily motivated by this, it nevertheless fits to the Othering of Filipin@s, considering them unaware of democratic basics and not appreciative of the gains political modernity has to offer to the country.

While we can observe that foreign researchers easily fall into this narrative (taking Timbermann's "changeless land" or McCoy's "Anarchy of Families" as only two powerful metaphors), it is not only foreigners telling this narrative.[463] Mahar Mangahas, head of the SWS, has this to say: "Survey evidence shows, not for the first time, that to denigrate Filipinos with the term »damaged culture« is to rely on parachute journalism rather than on social science" (Mangahas, PDI, 19.4.2008). He seems to imply that when the Philippines is characterized as having a »damaged culture« this could only be a result of "parachute journalism;" such as the American journalist James Fallows did in an essay published in the November 1987 issue of The Atlantic Monthly (Fallows 1987). He based this statement essentially on observing a disregard for the public good, i.e. an orientation "which allows them (i.e. people) to look beyond themselves rather than pursuing their own interests to the ruination of everyone else." Filipino pundits themselves speak of a "failing state… one that seems to be short of some of the basic conditions and responsibilities of a liberal democracy"(Jose Romero, MT, 12.6.2014).[464] Others speak of a "pretend democracy" (editorial, Manila Times, 22.2.2013); a "banana republic" (Arnold Alamon, Sun Star Cagayan de Oro, 20.6.2014); "rotten to the core" (Neal Cruz, PDI, 14.7.2014); or of the "tragicomedy of

---

[463] Eva-Lotta Hedman discovers even a sequence of narratives by "foreign Philippinists" over the times: "If the studies of 'patron-client' relations in the Philippines of the quiescent late 1950s and early 1960s depicted Filipinos as essentially deferential and obliging family and community members and subsequent work in the turbulent 1970s and early 1980s casted Filipinos as courageous rebels and subversives, the much early post-Marcos scholarship tended to portray Filipinos as cynical wheeler-dealers, crass opportunists, and cunning seekers of power and wealth" (Ibid.: Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth Century, London: Routledge , 2001: 4). A conjuncture paralleled by a similar sequence in the writings of Filipino authors, as Hedmann says.

[464] See also the piece of the national artist F. Sionil José (2006): "Why are Filipinos so poor?" (retrievable under fitzvillafuerte.com/why-are-filipinos-so-poor.html [14.6.2014]).

Philippine democracy" (Yen Makabenta, MT, 9.6.2013).[465] "Pity the Filipinos. The country will never be great," exclaims Toots Jimenez (Sun Star, 31.5.2014). Randy David calls the negative narrative a "moral panic" (PDI, 27.1.2011), observing that "anyone who reads or tunes in regularly to the mass media nowadays cannot fail to be gripped by a sense that Philippine society is headed for a systemic breakdown."[466]

There is no need to outline this negative narrative again in which "culture itself rather than a … political system, is [considered] the main barrier to development" (William Esposo in PS, 25.10.2009). Niels Mulder has especially done so in a nearly ideal-typical way in his work *Inside Philippine Society* (Mulder 2004) or his article *Filipino Images of the Nation* (Mulder 1997).[467] The Philippines here is described as a country in which a 'rational' and 'modern' public sphere has not yet fully developed, but the private sphere (family values) still has the upper hand. The public space is either ignored as such (e.g. by littering it); privatized (e.g. by traditional politicians but also street vendors using public means for private ends); or, conceived as dreaded and chaotic, as the compliance of the others with rules is sketchy (Mulder 1997). Manny Valdehuesa (in: *What's our idea of community?,* Sun Star Cagayan de Oro, 13.4.2014) argues in a similar way: "Too many of us, neighbors included, live as if in isolation, as if alone in the neighborhood, as if the rest of the community doesn't exist—or if it does, it doesn't matter." The people seem to be in a state of "*walang pakialam*" (don't care), an attitude where one shows no consideration and concern, but rather that of carelessness and thoughtlessness, as expressed in Tagalog.

Even if most elements of the negative narrative are not made out of thin air, what makes it a narrative is that multi-causal explanations are reduced to the negative elements (corrupt government, colonial mindset, pretentious behavior by the OFWs) while neglecting the others. Such analysis easily ends up to the conclusion that the country is beyond repair and in a *luoy/awa* image, so heavily despised by one respondent to the qualitative study.[468]

---

[465] Makabenta gives the "tragicomedy" of the pork barrel scam an eschatological role when believing that "the tragicomedy will be a form of catharsis for the Filipino nation and Philippine democracy. It will simultaneously be a great trial of our political system, and a purgation for our democracy, a cleansing of the system of demons and worms that have caused it to falter and fail. This great drama will lead to the sweeping reform of institutions, the revision of the 1987 constitution, and a change of political culture in the country – which are all essential for the nation to move forward. With this catharsis, citizens will become more aware of their sovereign power over the government. Politicians will waken to the real responsibilities of public office. Our elections, which have been irresponsibly administered by the Commission on Elections, will finally be better organized and managed" (ibid.).

[466] In the expert interview, David explains that "it is easy to fall into such an attitude of skepticism and hopelessness and cynicism, if you do not understand the society and its complexity in evolutionary terms... When I am not playing the role of an activist, I play the role of a sociologist, it is more satisfying actually. It's not that you are reconciled to this kind of society but you understand it better, become more tolerant and maybe in a sense more forgiving. You begin to understand that there is nothing special about the Filipino, it is just like any other people in the world that is caught in the same circumstances" (David 2014).

[467] For a summary (in German) of Mulder's arguments see: Niklas Reese (2006): *Private Property Philippines – ein Essay*, retrievable under www.asienhaus.de/publikationen/detail/private-property-philippines-der-oeffentliche-raum-ein-essay (14.6.2014).

[468] Junie del Mundo in her essay *Branding the Philippines* (PDI, 22.10.2012) says, "it is time to reverse the *awa* image. Instead of saying that we are »poor,« we can say that our circumstances have made us resilient and hardworking. Instead of saying that

"Hopeless country, really. The hopelessness mounts because nothing can reverse the trend. No radical/dramatic action is in sight to rein in their influence over the nation's life and at least freeze their money making, opportunity-grabbing machines," writes Marlen Ronquillo in the Manila Times on 24.5.2009. A perspective that has also seeped into everyday consciousness, as the statement by a non-activist in the qualitative study shows, saying that "*lisod naman na i-change murag naa sa atoang mentality or kanang murag naa lang sa kultura... ambot wala siguro koy mabuhat.* (It is difficult to change; it seems like it is now in our mentality and in our culture. ... I don't know, I think I cannot do anything.)"

This negative narrative is reinforced when the state resorts to the good governance paradigm as role model (the narrative the Aquino administration chose for its incumbency), which is very much derived from the European path to democracy, making it more difficult for Outer-European societies to comply with it.

In this regard, it is often not only the state but also other institutions considered as socially relevant which are singled out by change advocates as arena of reform - above all the Catholic Church. Ernesto Pernia (in *Church as leaven of society*, PDI, 10.1.2013) for instance, identifies the Church as a "dysfunctional institution" even defying any step towards modernization (unlike at least the state), but sticking to pre-modern thought and practices and contributing to their persistence in society. And in another article (Business World, 21.2. 2012) Pernia laments that "the [Catholic] Church today remains top-down, authoritarian, and dismissive of the voice of the laity." Benedict Anderson likewise considers the Catholic Church the countries strongest veto power (abs-can, 28.5.2010), acting in an arrogant way towards democratic procedures.

The sociologist Mary Racelis (PDI, 2.7.2012) complains that "adamant over the past few years has been the parish's refusal to hold discussions for information purposes on reproductive health, with speakers representing all sides of the debate. Apparently too threatening is the thought of inviting committed Catholics and experts in the medical, sociological, economic, political and theological fields to discuss RH with parishioners. To such proposals the parish priest and mini-council simply pass the buck: »Talk to the bishop.« The bishop's response? »That will only confuse the people.« ... In our Church, power, obedience, unity, and authoritarian control still rule the day."[469]

---

our country is »politically unstable,« we are resourceful and we are proud to be survivors. Instead of using »Third World« and »underdeveloped« to describe our country, we can own up to being a youthful people who can serve as a test-bed for services and products targeting the next two billion consumers connected to the diaspora of eight million Filipinos in 190 countries. Instead of feeling that we are passing up on opportunities because our labor is more expensive than that of China and Vietnam, we can leverage our professionals' unique traits of being collaborative, English-speaking, and creative. Instead of using the word »unskilled,« we can instead say fast-learning. Lastly, we can proudly say that our "traditional society« is founded on authentic human relations and Filipino values."

[469] While even the Archbishop of Manila Luis Cardinal Tagle speaks of a "culture of silence" preventing people from openly criticizing Church practices and pronouncements (PDI, 7.3.2012), Catholic fundamentalists such as the columnist Jose Sison (PS, 3.9.2012) again defend such behavior by the Church hierarchy for exactly such reasons, believing that "the bishops are opposing

Much of the "*Kulturkampf*" (cultural war) going on between modernists and traditionalists in relation to the controversy about the Reproductive Health Law can be read as a fight over the modernization or non-modernization of Philippine society. In how far the political influence of the Catholic Church reaches is a different kettle of fish. Evidence though doubts it to be still of high societal influence (cf. Niklas Reese: *Catholic Church under the Pressure of Secularization*, in: Reese/Werning 2013: 459ff.).[470]

It might be that the negative narrative is often told in a generalized and one-sided way, mainly because it is based on personal perceptions (termed as "phenomenology") and neglects empirical evidence Rodriguez (2009: 4f.) is but one example from which such an assumption could be attributed to when he states that his essays "do not attempt to reflect on social reality by using the methods of the social sciences [and] do not pretend to make scientific inquiries into the sociopolitical structures of Philippine society. Rather, they aim to apply a philosophical framework for reading the possibilities of building a democratic Philippine nation." He continues by saying that "these essays do not claim empirical rigor, but apply philosophical reflections on praxis and experience as much as it discourses with works of other scholars."

Other Filipin@s agree that empirical methods are not so en vogue in the Philippines, as a social scientist trained in the West is used to. Many contributions in Philippine media elaborate on personal experiences – but what a social scientist may consider mere anecdotal evidence here leads to quite far reaching and generalizing conclusions. Djamyla Millona backs up her position in a contribution to the Philippine Daily Inquirer (29.2.2012) by saying: "Don't ask for the facts. It is women's instinct. This, as any Filipino will tell you, is as accurate as any statistic there ever is." Cito Beltran believes that "Filipinos are rich in opinion but poor on consequence," i.e. he spots a lack of foresightedness among his *kababayan* (PS, 15.3.2013). And during a book launch in February 2013, the chairperson of the research organization Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao (AFRIM) Starjoan Villanueva expressed that "we still have to become a data-conscious society" (vica voce).

This lack of empirical basing – by no means only practiced in the Philippines - and the discursive loops resulting from dealing mainly with works of other scholars and

---

the bill merely because, as good shepherds, they have to protect their flock from going astray or sinning, and from the known evil effects and dire consequences of contraception promoted by the bill."

[470] I not open at this point the Pandora box in how far the development of modern society is connected to the struggle against the traditional Catholic Church and if Protestants (especially Calvinists) are the better citizens and democrats (as Glassman tries to prove, cf. Glassman 1995: 93-100; 130, 194). As the French revolution took place in a nearly purely Catholic country, as well as, the slavish obedience German Protestants showed towards the authorities until the Nazi catastrophe shook the Two-regiment-teaching – are two circumstances that do not allow for such a simple correlation. That the dissenters were the cradle of North American democracy and the Philippine Propaganda movement very much developed its ideas of equality and its quest of inclusion and self-determination against the institutional Catholic Church shows that there is *some* connection between struggles against the *traditional* Church and the development of citizenship. Likewise, the big importance a politicized Church in the wake of the 2nd Vaticanum continues to play for social liberation in Latin America and the Philippines, shows that the Catholic Church *can* also foster democratization.

so getting re-enforced might be one problem for a narrative that leaves little space for differentiation and complexity. Nicole Curacao considers such an approach to be "intellectual monocropping" (Rappler, 30.7.2014).[471]

5.2. Barriers to citizenship

Randy David considers the negative narrative not only as "moral panic" (see above), but also believes its "condemnatory tone.. (is) meant to challenge readers to behave differently rather than [being] a sociological description" (David 2014). But social scientists from the Philippines are likewise skeptical about the potential for citizenship in the way citizenship literature defines it. Maria Elizabeth Macapagal and Cristina Jayme Montiel in their article Political Psychology in the Philippines: An Update (*Philippine Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 33/2 [2000], 1-32: 8), draw the following conclusion: "Research has been carried out on the democratic concepts of Filipinos vis-à-vis their authoritarian culture. (It) points to a mismatch between Philippine culture and the democratic forms inherited from the United States. Firstly, the American style of democracy is adversarial and conflictual, while Filipinos tend to avoid conflict and criticism. Secondly, the American democratic paradigm emphasizes the individual as a rational thinker, yet Filipinos tend to identify themselves in relation to their groups, and are emotionally predisposed. Hence, a democratic form that is rational rather than affective will fail to draw Filipinos into the participatory system. ... Filipinos accept democracy as a theoretical construct and a romantic ideal, but still have a fundamental cultural tendency toward authoritarianism."

Zialcita (1997) tried to find a more balanced view when identifying "barriers and bridges to a democratic culture," although he also eventually mainly identified barriers.[472] As (main) barrier he names poverty, hierarchies relations (leading to a lack of discourse culture), familialism, personalism (with the prevalence of loyalty to persons over the obedience to norms), a weak sense of public good, as well as, a limited discourse on democracy and its meaning in the vernacular.

In relation to **personalism,** Zialcita identifies as "one major problem in the Philippines [that] the rights of the anonymous stranger continue to be disregarded. Although we are extremely helpful towards those whom we have met face-to-face and whom we trust, we tend to ignore the rights of those whom we do not know and will never meet" (Zialcita 1997: 42). This concurs with the identification of several levels and

---

[471] To cite one example: Neglecting the several findings how law-abiding the poor may be and that the big law breakers are rather the ones who can afford to not go by the rules, Rodriguez argues that "perhaps not the Filipino people as whole, perhaps only the poor (are ungovernable). If one looks around the city, the poor are clearly the ungoverned." (p. 9). Here, Rodriguez confuses visibility (phenomenological) with reality (empirical). This gives his argument (despite all his effort to do otherwise), a classist undertone.

[472] The "bridges" Zialcita mentions are self-help at the barangay level (encouraging initiatives and group decisions), multiplicity of NGOs and POs (which should encourage people to posit an abstract trans-kin good), hegemony of liberal democratic ideals and a multitude of centers of power (which should "prevent power from being concentrated in a small group to the exclusion of the majority"). Although, he immediately questions the effectiveness of these bridges.

modes of social interaction by Enriquez (1992), categorized under “*ibang tao*” (stranger) and “*hindi ibang tao*” (one of us) [cf. subchapter 4.1.1.: *Communitarian, republican and (neo)liberal concepts of citizenship*].[473]

One could interpret through this way, the low(er) trust on people the Filipino respondents expressed in ISSP 2004 (PI = .29 with no significant class or gender correlation) compared to, for instance, the German respondents (PI = .45, here with a more considerable higher trust among those with higher education). It might be an expression of the strangeness and peril one feels about the »world out there,« the world of the *ibang tao*, once one leaves the sphere of family and friends. Other ISSP surveys confirm this low trust on the *ibang tao*. In 2006, the item “only a few people can be trusted completely” was affirmed by .71 and 79.8% agreed to the statement “If you are not careful, people will take advantage (*mapagsasamantalahan*) of you.” Although the respondents to the ISSP 2005 agreed with the statement that “I see myself as someone who is generally trusting” by. 68. The responses from Germany in 2005 and 2006 are only slightly more trusting (unlike in 2004 where the difference is considerable), thus it seems to be a too easy interpretation to put the blame to a lack of public awareness in the Philippines (or this could be a sign that the stranger/Other is not considered as less menacing in Germany).

As pointed out in the first part, the absolute claim of “the Other” (Levinas) is an important base for a (human) rights-based mindset. Rodriguez also considers the lack of recognition of “the Other” as a stumbling point to democracy in the Philippines (see in detail subchapter 3.6.5.: *Walking the talk: from consciousness to action*), in the same way the sociologist Randy David believes that a “lack of a sense of belonging to a self-governing nation-state does seem to afflict all strata of the Filipino nation” (PDI, 17.4.2013).[474] Zialcita says, one may only really speak of public service where the “public good becomes real when the government, composed of non-villagers, proceeds to render services equitably to all” (1997: 62).

Picking up many elements of the negative narrative, Rodriguez (2009) also discovers in the lack of a sense of a greater shared good, a pivotal stumbling bloc to citizenship. He considers the people [of the Philippines] as “completely incapable of giving ourselves to the task of nation building and realizing the common good … (and) re-

---

[473] *Ibang tao* is not necessarily an »outsider,« as the Filipino psychologist Yacat (2014) underlines, as »outsiders« (in the sense of the German *Außenseiter*) are often treated negatively. But in relation to the *ibang tao*, “the evaluations are not necessarily negative" (ibid.); *ibang tao* is thus rather a »stranger«. “You can even consider a member of the family as *ibang tao*,” says Yacat, “in the case that you don't act in the way that you are *hindi ibang tao*.” *Ibang tao* thus expresses a form of psychological distance and it is not formal membership that defines *hindi ibang tao*, but emotional closeness (lap*it ng loob*), as Yacat (ibid.) explains.

[474] Kabeer considers a valid connection between defining in- and outsiders and the lack of citizenship for the case of Rio de Janeiro: “Groups who constitute 'outsiders' tend to define their obligations far more narrowly in terms of looking after themselves or their immediate families... In the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, strong feelings of alienation from formal politics and from the idea of 'Brazilian-ness' as the basis of their identity had led residents, who saw themselves as 'lacking citizenship' in the wider society, to define themselves either in relation to their extended family networks or else in terms of their immediate neighbourhood, those who shared the same habitat and experienced the same frustrations” (Kabeer 2005: 7).

sist(ing) the attempts of leaders or institutions to gather us beyond narrow interests for the greater, shared good" (p. 2). "No one can govern the people for concerted action because the people (often the so called uneducated masses) simply do not have a sense of greater good beyond their own interests nor are they disciplined enough to act in concert for the shared good" (p. 2), a view Rodriguez considers to be that of "opinion makers."

Rodriguez more or less agrees with them, but less thinks it is a "flawed national character that makes us ungovernable and unable to act as citizens in a nation-state" (p.2) … he rather believes that nation building has hardly prospered so that the Philippines remained "a multiplicity of communities with competing conceptions of the common good" (p. 1). "We live in a polity of various life worlds and there is no single world view or system of belief that binds us. Our various worlds are separated from each other and the marginalized peoples, like the urban poor and the indigenous people, and even the middle class, tend to look to their immediate community for identity and support. ... We share a geographic location but have our own sense of space and time; our values and lifestyles betray a world between us. ... We are mainly strangers who do not have a reason to care for each other's wellbeing. (Our encounters only) occur within the frame of an administrative state and the economic/market system ... The encounters between the Payatas [a slum] life world and the Ayala Alabang [a high end subdivision] life world occur only in the context of a household where the poor serve as helpers, or in Makati [the Central Business District of the Philippines] buildings where they serve as utility personnel. … One cannot expect a natural affinity between these communities, especially when their only means of interaction are instrumental and often exploitative [in] a nation ... without a single, national culture to bind its peoples" (Rodriguez 2009: 51).[475]

It is especially in the (maligned) traffic situation from which a sort of everyday ethnology on the disregard for the other is pointed out in manifold columns in Philippine dailies. The traffic is considered as a "metaphor for our national troubles" (Randy David: *Gridlock culture*, PDI, 29.2.2012). This is probably due to the fact that participation in traffic is the most obvious and palpable way of experiencing oneself as part of larger society.[476] "The customary modes of cooperation that normally compel us to be mindful of the needs of others have no force in the complex environment

---

[475] Using the semantics of traditional citizenship theory, with its ideal of a homogenous and disciplined nation "gathering its citizenry as a community with one will realizing shared goals ... capable of realizing the national will for the common good" (p.1), Rodriguez develops a concept of a Filipino nation founded on "solidarity in a multiplicity of rationalities and life worlds " built on "systems of discourse that allow all stakeholders to share in the articulation of their shared world and bring the people together in a process of justification before each other. (...) In this process of shared opinion- and will-formation people are allowed to own the systems and laws they articulate, they are forced beyond their particular rationalities to take on a broader we-perspective and (...) drawn to think of their shared reality from the perspective of a broader community." (p. 43)

[476] This resonates with the assumption of law sociologist Thomas Raiser that "how to deal with anonymous people, especially traffic, nowadays offers the opportunity to form a consciousness of rights (*Rechtsbewusstsein*) as it compels us not only to deal with traffic regulations, their necessity and their hypertrophy, but also with the connect between voluntary compliance and enforcement by the police and the prosecuting authorities and the challenge whether or to what extent one abides with the law, which sense law abidance makes and effect fines have" (Raiser 2011: 60f .).

of the city. Such forms of solidarity are rooted in a sense of duty to people with whom we share personal space. … In the anonymous setting of the modern city, we no longer feel so obligated. Civic virtue is not strong enough to counter unrestrained individualism," believes David (ibid.).[477]

Macdonald sees this prevalence of the "private" (or *loob* - inside) over the "public" (or *labas* - outside), in a more positive light, as he considers it the expression of the continuation of "the more ancient, open-aggregated, and anarchic style of life" with "working principles being at complete odds with those that organize society as we understand it ... [being] even in the most democratic regimes, premised on status difference and ranking, strong leadership, debt-generating reciprocity, and the historical creation of transcendent collective entities such as the nation-state" (2013: 414f.). Macdonald believes that such "uncrystallized society," as prevalent in friendship (barkada) or kin relations (although the latter is more hierarchical than the former), is "still alive and relevant to present circumstances and ... helps explain certain important aspects of contemporary social, political, and economic reality" (ibid.: 414). He concludes that "if some social scientists are puzzled over the lack of social consciousness of their respondents, over their weak sense of the public good - and over randomness, chaos, personalistic values, and weak corporation - it may be that these observers are just looking at free libertarian minds who do not want to submit themselves to the tyranny of the collective and who put personal and kin ties over any collective, group, or public interest. Indigenous anarchic people, however, do have a strong sense of the community as long as it rests on personal ties of friendship and fellowship expressed in the idiom of kinship" (Macdonald 2013: 431).

Despite Macdonald seemingly having a rather idealistic concept of community as unhierarchical (for a criticism see Berner/Philipps 2004), he nevertheless finally also agrees to the observation of an underdeveloped societal space.

Under such circumstances, the Philippine nation is considered to remain a mere "official nationalism.... centered on the claims and pretensions of a modern nation state

---

[477] In further elaborations during the expert interview, Randy David (David 2014) explains that Filipin@s are indeed helpful to strangers, but such requires face-to-face interaction. And this does not apply to traffic: "The same traits of tolerance that people accord one another in face to face, does not exist in traffic, where anonymity prevails, especially with those tinted glasses. There is no give and take. … It has not been built into the traffic culture itself. Also because, there is not much penalty, that is forthcoming. In fact, the penalty is if you give way, you are bound to be left behind and people will just take advantage of you." He connects the "Anonymity of the tinted glass and about the instant character situation that people just do not give way," to his recurring estimation of Philippine society as still evolving towards modernity: "Modernity allows you to develop the culture that is appropriate to the modern complexity of traffic which we have not developed for some reason or the other... You are still applying the categories of self and otherness, when that should not be the case. It should be a generalized kind of civility, which what to my mind, characterizes modernity … The civilities that belong to the communal societies do not apply to the complexity of traffic in the city. And yet, the modern rules of traffic that should have come with the arrival of the motor car have not yet taken root after all that years.... You have all the trappings of a modern metropolis but the rules that govern modern life beginning with traffic .. are not a reality." (David 2014)

and constitutional democracy.... (with) the state apparatus justify(ing) its existence as an agent of national development and public administration," as Sidel (195: 140) cries out. This includes the constant performance of nationhood by students singing the national anthem every morning and by playing the national anthem at the start of the cinema or a public event. This performed nationalism lacks corresponding action – as reflected in the gap between intentions of citizenship and actions of citizenship, as concluded especially from the ISSP data. Such nation is considered merely a "theatre state" with "placebo laws, prescribed to give the impression of a civilized, law-abiding society but having no effect because everybody ignores it," as Gary Covington (Sun Star Davao, 27.4.2011) assumes.[478] Such derision reminds one of the term "*Operettenstaat*" (operetta state), which in the 19th century was used to ridicule the manifold German mini states who nevertheless put much emphasis on (re)presentation. 150 years later, referring to a statement by president Aquino, the former congress representative Teddy Casiño speaks of the Philippines as an "*ampaw* republic," *ampaw* being puffed rice or corn crispies, "tasty but all it has inside is air" (Katrina Santiago, Manila Times, 19.3.2014).

However, even if Sidel's analysis of a merely "official nationalism" holds true, this also offers resources for demanding accountability and performance from such a state, despite all its shortcomings by drawing on the claims and pretensions of a modern nation state and constitutional democracy by the state apparatus. "Legality provides a basis for criticizing abuses of power - a language for legitimating protest and resistance," as Sidel (1995: 142) concludes.[479]

Manny Valdehuesa, president and national convener of Gising Barangay [in English: Wake up Barangay] Movement, speaks of a "nominal democracy, democracy in name only but not in reality"(Mindanews, 7.1.2014). Benedict Anderson (1998: 224) compares Philippine democracy with a "well-run casino": "In any well-run casino, the tables are managed in the statistical favour of the house. To keep drawing customers, the owners must provide them with periodic, even spectacular, successes…. At the end of the week or the year, however, the dealer is always in the black. … »Anyone« can get elected … (you too can run). … It is easy to be persuaded to cheer for, as it were, Arsenal or Chelsea, without reflecting too hard on the fact that both are in the First Division, and that one is watching the match from the outer stands, not playing in it." But "by no means everyone enjoys spectator sports," as Anderson concludes. This is reinforced by the fact that Pinoys have a passion for these (specta-

---

[478] One example for such a placebo law could be the market for second-hand garments (*ukay-ukay*) flourishing despite a law ratified in 1966 that prohibits the selling of wholesale second hand clothes. Another was the open disregard for the prohibition of night work for women until it was finally abolished in 2011.

[479] Sidel though see this gap less favorable and considers the Philippines – consistent with the negative narrative - "lost on the road ... dominated neither by personal loyalties nor formal institutions but, rather, by money, violence, and a predatory state" (1995: 146).

cle) politics that is "not unlike their penchant for fiestas [and] telenovelas," as Yoly Villanueva-Ong (PS, 27.3.2012) believes.

Baer speaks of "ornamental constitutionalism" (2011: 93) where states have maintained a constitutional facade, but do not use law as an integral part of a social order system, a phenomenon that can be observed in certain phases of post-colonial developments, as well as, in post-socialist countries. Here, we can encounter "politics as a ritual" (Murray Edelmann following Beer 2011: 207) or "symbolical lawmaking" (intransparent about who really decides in the first case; ineffectual, but appeasing in the second case), which to a certain extent though is constitutive for representative democracies in general.

Greven finally speaks of a "spectacle, an objective fate or destiny… nevertheless, in any case exclusively a matter of the »high lords«" (2009: 64). This he considers typical for pre-modern politics. Indeed, in pre-modern Europe public sphere (*Öffentlichkeit*) was rather a performance (cf. Löther 1998) especially by Church and Court, and not a dispute.[480]

While Randy David also considers the Philippine constitution as "largely symbolic" (David 2014), he nevertheless believes that it is animated whenever "their [the constitutional provisions] meanings become real in the context of negotiations."

While Sale (2014), being a lawyer, believes that "we got to realize that laws are also based on culture," and thus, considers for instance the legal provisions to help complete strangers as proof that the recognition of strangers is "built in" into Filipino culture. David meanwhile, considers the constitutional setup in the Philippines to be ahead of social realities (but not merely as an ornament to an essentially different reality), assuming that "our constitutions have always been historically too far ahead of our people's capacity to enforce them. The doctrine of separation of powers and the principle of checks and balances, for example, mean little in a society whose political system remains a plaything of a few ruling families. The persistence of mass poverty and the sharp disparities in wealth and power among our people have fostered a culture of dependency and patronage that trumps virtually all attempts to professionalize governance"(PDI, 13.7.2014).

In an earlier column (PDI, 3.7.2014), David assumed that "the disparity stems from the fact that while our political reality reflects the exigencies of a largely traditional society, our laws are mostly copied from those found in modern societies." Although these are not alien to Philippine realities, but simply ahead, like clothes, one still has to grow into it, as he explains during the expert interview (David 2014): "The institutional frameworks into which we should be moving are already here. They are legacies of the past. … We already know how to fall in line. We already know the rules,

---

[480] Löther nevertheless calls this "*Öffentlichkeit*," stating that "conflicts in processions show that criticism was also possible within a representative public… Such criticism within a representative public did not express itself in discussion or in »political reasoning«, but found forms like mockery, scuffles, riot or non-participation"(Löther 1998: 459). Using the terms of Scott, such *Öffentlichkeit* makes the hidden transcript and its everyday resistance publically visible.

except that you always jump the line and you find every reason [to justify that] you are exempted from the rules."[481]

Likewise, the empirical findings laid out above suggest that a sizeable majority of Filipin@s consider the state to be not "*palabas*" or "*atik lang*" (only a fake), but perceive of it as a "Öffentlichkeit." This is backed by their interest in politics or their belief that government cares what people like them think. Also, the high importance of understanding other opinions (revealed in the ISSP 2004 data), may be similarly interpreted as such. The latter is not only a feature of the higher educated (possibly more post-conventionally thinking), as the only narrow correlation with educational attainment shows. (Already those with little education rate this item with 5.8 out of 7, while college graduates rate it with 6.3 and post-graduates even with a perfect 7).[482] These numbers are even higher than in Germany. At the same time, Filipino citizens express experiences of non-recognition and actually only take little action in the open and contingent (in the Sense of Greven's "political") public space.

A question then arises as to how far nowadays the state is actually considered by citizens as a political space shapeable by members of society (a critical *Öffentlichkeit* in the Habermasian sense) and not (continues) to be primarily looked at as an "expansion of personally exercised dominion" of a prince, a king or his general governor (or simply by the top brass/*die da oben*), as typical for pre-modern rule (Greven 2009: 93). Such a state, based on the division into rulers and ruled, has "always been clearly distinguished from the real life world of ruled population" (ibid.).

Such notion speaks of the prevalent delineation between the public and the private (or following the Brazilian sociologist Roberto Da Matta between "the street" and "the house"), with the street being the space that is the arena of competition, rivalry and seduction and the world of the undetermined,[483] while the house is the place where everything is in place.[484] Intervention into the latter, like in the case of violent

---

[481] David (2014) expressed that "in the last ten years I see some progress in civility," quoting the observation that "people have learned to line up." He even speaks of "a dawn of a civilization appropriate to a complex metropolis." At the same time though, he does not consider the process a mere evolution, but one going along with setbacks: "What makes it very confusing is that it seemed to work ... four or three decades ago. But now ... the real undercurrents of a feudal and hierarchical culture, they are asserting themselves over and above the modern legal structures and institutional structures" (David 2014). David even shows signs of resignation: "When the Americans left, they left behind also a generation which was trained to make these institutions work, which was very conscious of its responsibilities. ... My generation imbibed part of that when we were students; we were conscious of our responsibilities as a Filipino what we today call today a civic culture, the whole notion of citizenship. Maybe my generation is the last generation which is conscious about these things" (ibid.).

[482] This though could also simply be an expression of *pakiramdam* (empathy), which Enriquez (1992) considers a pivotal feature of interaction in the Philippines. Knowing what the others think is important to be able to go along with them (*pakikisama*), which is another of Enriquez' basic socio-psychological concepts.

[483] According to the nature-culture opposition Borchgrevink detects in the high value given to cleanliness in the Philippine context, the public might also be considered as the dirty, the contaminated, the wild and disorderly, the immoral, the nonhuman and the undomesticated –and thus the dangerous (Borchgrevink 2014: 191). This reminds one of the jungle metaphor central to the social contract theory – and is opposed to the clean, the human, the safe, the good, the beautiful, even the divine – and to work (ibid.).

[484] Pertierra has discovered two different logics ruling the political interaction within the village (which can here be equated with *hindi ibang tao*) and with the political system "outside of the village." While the latter is "oriented towards success" (in-

parents or spouses, is often considered as "trespassing;" or, in the case of a company, it cannot be taken for granted that the Labor Code is considered as the overriding legal principle, as outlined in part I of this work (cf. chapter 3.7.: *Precarity as social condition*).

While in such legal pluralism company policies are considered the overriding set of rules in business, customary law (social norms, individual sense of justice) are applicable in the private sphere. The laws of the Republic of the Philippines in contrast might only be considered applicable in the "public space," which is the space in between and exclusive of all the private spaces (may they be residential or commercial), a territory dotted by tiny kingdoms and millions of kings and queens. Every security guard can then be considered an immigration officer and by entering a private space, it is its specific rules en vigor that are considered as the rules to be applied.[485] (Nevertheless, it might again be an exaggeration to consider the Philippines a "patchwork of sovereignties existing side by side, with narrow corridors in-between and surrounded by zones of ungovernablity," as Comaroff/Comaroff [2012: 137] consider "many nation states nowadays" to be.)

The lack of a public sense has also been confirmed by the key informants. David (2014) for instance believes that "the recognition of public space as part of your responsibility" is not well developed. "We keep our yards clean, our homes clean and our selves clean... but outside of these borders, it is no longer your responsibility, so it is a large garbage dump.... Whose responsibility is that? It is not yours, it's the government's.... And government is not you." (David 2014).[486]

Sale (2014), as well as David (2014), believes that people do not feel responsible for things happening in the public space as they expect the government to take care of it (as in the case of traffic accidents where they remain pure *usisero* or bystanders). Furthermore, Sale considers that "maybe there is the notion that in your own private space you have control over things and can make decisions there, but outside, the public space, that is what we cannot control, but it is controlled by somebody else" (Sale 2014). Such notion would be contradictory to (active) citizenship, which is built on the idea of collective ownership of the public space.

---

strumental or following a diction by Habermas as determined by strategic interests), the former is "oriented towards mutual understanding," i.e. value-oriented or determined by communicative interests (following Borchgrevink 2014: 108). Here, the barangay captain is considered as and "interface between two systems based on different rationalities" (ibid.), a role Borchgrevink later compares to the intermediary function of saints et al. And even if the village does not fully meet up with the ideal of a communicative logic, at least, there is the expectation that it should be ruled by such logic, thinks Borchgrevink. While it seems that politics outside of the village stronger follow a strategic logic, moral evaluations of candidates counted by Borchgrevink as part of the communicative logic are also directed to candidates on the provincial or national level.

[485] In this sense Randy David (PDI, 30,5.2013) expresses after a visit to Singapore that "nothing perhaps more vividly conveys the explicit policy of open access to all public space, including that which is privately owned, than the absence of security guards at the entrances of Singapore's shopping malls."

[486] David (2014) believes that there has been a deterioration of responsibility for the public space "the moment the government came in, basically as an alien entity starting with colonialism" as "in communal times people volunteered to clean their communities."

Yacat (2014) has a similar viewpoint. He states that "we view government as external" and observes a "dichotomization of people and government … [the latter] always the other side, sometimes the enemy." "The only way they see government as helpful is when they personalize it thru their extended kinship system. But when the government is seen as an abstract, depersonalized entity... people won't identify that much" (ibid.).

For feeling responsible for the public, which Yacat identifies for the lack of "accurate terms," as "*labas*" (outside), the dichotomy of *labas* and *loob* (inside) needs to be connected. "If you see that the *labas* is an extension of the *loob* then you will also pay particular attention to the *labas*.... Since you see the appearance as an indication of the *loob*, you also pay particular attention to what is external. But that only happens if you see that there is a connection between the *loob* and the *labas*. What is problematic about cleanliness in the private/public sphere is that people fail to make that connection. ... We just tell people to be clean in the public. I think the more effective messaging would be to have people really see how connected the *loob* and *labas* spheres are. ... for them to see that they are not detached."[487]

It is much agreed upon that in the Philippines **a feudal mindset** persists among rulers (patrons) and subjects ought to be citizens (clients), as "bureaucrats [and] politicians coming from the big landed and big business families and clans are using their positions and discharging the systems as if they were their private enterprises" (Karl Ombion in *Pork barrel and bureaucrat capitalism*, Sun Star Bacolod, 28.8.2013). Being a reflection of the lack of separation between the public and the private (as political ruler and landlord – *Landesherr* and *Grundherr*- are not well distinguished), such feudalism does one more thing to the sidelining of the public.[488] It leads to patronage politics, entrenching a particular set of moral categories and hierarchies, as Herbert Docena (*Fight vs. pork is fight for democracy, dignity*, PDI, 18.10.2013) points out: While "legislators … are elevated as beneficent lords rather than as mere representatives of their constituencies … people internalize these moral categories seeing themselves and acting as mendicants rather than as citizens… believing, for example, that the

---

[487] Here, Yacat quotes a public campaign which was built on the slogan »*Basura itinapon mo babalik sa yo* (The garbage you throw away will come back to you)« which Yacat considered "a very powerful message ... that tries to connect the divide between the *loob* and the *labas*" (Yacat 2014).

[488] It is though an open question how much nowadays relations of patronage in politics still fit to the idea of clientelism or if they have rather morphed into market relations, i.e. short-term, instrumental and impersonal relations based on specific transactions. Here, "the politicians' claim to power is always precarious, for if they fail to deliver and demonstrate weakness in their capacity to deliver resources to their communities, they lose their hold on power" (Rodriguez 2010: 144).

Mariel and Arriola (1987: 35-37) however also explicitly locate this "feudalism" outside the political field (and that of traditional agrarian relations) and in long-term fields of power such as the family. In a chapter titled "Have you run into a feudal lord lately?" they assume that "harder to pinpoint are the lesser, later-generation lords of non-land fiefdoms- the office (where he is called manager, boss, supervisor, or sir) and the home (where he is known as padre de familia, papa, dad, sir or honey). Again, feudal attitudes have become so pervasive that even those who have left the land have retained them." Likewise, these fiefdoms that are not connected to land, impede citizenship in their respective fields, be it in the company or in the family.

only way to make our President respond is by appeasing him instead of by pressuring him, as if he were the »boss« instead of us."

"The notion of »claim-making« by dependents," Rutten (2006: 355) assumes, "is squarely anathema to patrons and may be foreign to the dependents themselves. A redress of grievances is framed by dependents as personal requests, not claims. The requests concern individual favors, not the enforcement of collective rights. These requests, which are made in personal face-to-face interactions with the individual patron or his representative, are couched in the (body) language of deference."

While not agreeing with Rutten's "sweeping statement" (David 2014), Randy David nevertheless observes that "under this system [of patronage], benefits given to the many are represented as acts of benevolence of the rulers, rather than as the legitimate entitlements of the recipients. The ideal leader is kind and generous, rather than knowledgeable and law-abiding. The ideal citizen is loyal and grateful, rather than informed and assertive of his rights" (Source: PDI, 5.9.2009). [489]

In the expert interview, David explains that the "attitude towards the government is not characterized by entitlement as defined by your rights in the constitution but as something you have to thank for. … (It is a) frame of mind where you have to beg for your rights instead of think of these rights as entitlement and duties of the state" (David 2014).

In his column (PDI, 11.4.2012), David expresses that "I have often wondered why our people keep electing politicians who either know little about governance or too much about the private uses of governmental power, or both. The answer that keeps ringing in my ears does not come from some grand political theory but from the people themselves. »Mabait« (generous), »madaling lapitan« (approachable), »malapit sa mahihirap« (pro-poor), »magaling« (intelligent), »matapang« (brave)—these are the most common words one hears when Filipino voters talk about the politicians they like. They all proceed from the standpoint of the subjugated in a sharply hierarchical society."[490]

---

[489] Teresea Sales (following Dagnino 2005) describes Brazil citizenship in a feudal setting as concession (*cuidadania concedida*). "Rights are conceived of as favours, as 'gifts' from the powerful, in what Sales calls 'a culture of gift'. The maxim as put by Sales 'In Brazil either you give orders or you plead,' expresses an authoritarian, oligarchic conception of politics, characterized by favouritism, clientelism and various tutelage mechanisms. In it, the lack of distinction between the private and public realms obstructs the emergence of a notion of rights as rights, and stimulates a conception of rights as favours. ... Rights are not recognized as rights, but rather as gifts, favours from those who have the power to concede them" (Dagnino 2005: 152f.).

[490] Macapagal et al. name about the same traits when lining out what Filipino workers consider as a good supervisor or manager (2013: 101f.). Nevertheless there are more than 40,000 labor disputes filed annually by individual employees with the National Labor Relations Commission (Source: *nlrc.dole.gov.ph/content/2013.Annual.Report.Final.pdf*). [In Germany half a million cases are handled yearly by the labor courts, half of them regarding terminations; source: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23.9.2011.] These are not organized as their complaints would be processed through the grievance mechanisms of the collective bargaining agreements (CBA). And this is just the tip of the iceberg after the preceding steps had been taken, the (few) workers covered by CBAs are excluded and the informal sector is not covered by the NLRC. Despite being "just a small fraction of the violations out there," Sale (2014) considers these numbers an expression of claim-making in the Philippines.

Taking again a rather recent example, we can resort to the case of Romulo Salud, Philippine Labor Attaché in Hong Kong. When a Filipina domestic worker sought his support, she stated that "*hindi ko po alam yung may karapatan ko na mag-file ng labor*. (I did not know that I have a right to file a case at the Labor [Department].)" Salud reacted by admonishing her "*wag mong gagamitin yang karapatan. Dahil karapatan ko rin… kung tatanggapin kita o hindi* (Don't use the word »right«. Because I also have rights .. if I am going to accept you or not)" (Source: ABS-CBN News, 26.10.2010). Like other quotes, this might be a mere "find," making its use no better than the selective Bible exegesis criticized above. Of social significance though was that such a statement got high media attention and triggered criticism (which mutatis mutandis also holds true for other quotes used in this work). I consider this an indicator that such a mindset is not perceived as unusual among public officials in society, but at the same, the negative reaction to it is a sign that not everyone agrees to this kind of attitude.

Nevertheless, it should also not be overlooked that patron-client systems are based on (customary) rights and not (only) on gratitude. Writes James Scott (1985: 190), "the recipients accept the help they give not with gratitude, but as a right, for the rich are their kin, or their neighbors and they are wealthy; a small gift is nothing to them. This one-sided relationship creates resentment, for the rich resent having to give all the time while their good nature is not sufficiently recognized. The recipient of help resents having to ask for it, and not receiving more." A phenomenon reflected in the Philippines in the expectation that people considered rich and full of resources should "share their blessings" and if they don't do so, they are often characterized as "*kuripot*" (stingy).

On the other hand, it is always big news when the »malakas« (or those who are "more equal than others" as Imelda Marcos once framed it) abide to laws and regulations. Like the former city mayor of Davao Sarah Duterte, who insisted on getting a traffic ticket for overspeeding and even told the traffic aide (who "was surprised and shaking when he realized to whom he was issuing a temporary operator's permit") that he might "lose his job for not doing his job" if he refuses to do so (*Ex-mayor caught violating city's speed limit*, Sun Star Davao, 14.1.2014). The powerful are rather considered to be the makers and interpreters of the law (another feudal trait) and not as fellow citizens who have to submit to the law as well. Law provisions are considered as mainly applicable to commoners, just like Friedrich Engels argued when saying that "the juridical argumentation fulfills for the radical republican bourgeois especially the purpose to turn down and silence the proletarian" (Engels 1891: 74).[491] And the law is used as tool of political battles, in the way a phrase attributed to the

[491] Further on he argues: "Civilization illuminates the difference and contrast of both [of rights and of obligations] even to the most imbecile - by assigning one class nearly all rights, the other [class] pretty much all the duties" (1891: 172).

Brazilian dictator-president Getulio Vargas (1930-1954) expressed it: “For my friends, anything - for my enemies, the law.”[492]

This feudalism includes (competing) absolute rulers not only on the local and provincial level (where the incumbents often originate from the regional economic elite), and is structurally secured by a system of dignitary democracy (*Honoratiorendemokratie*). It also includes a presidential office actually more powerful and less checked, at least by the legislative, than in its originating country, the USA – where the President delegates his or her power to special appointees named “czars” (like the “rehabilitation czar” Panfilo Lacson).[493]

Where such feudalism cum patronage politics goes along with collective egoism (*kanya-kanya*) it sounds like this: “What’s wrong with the president addressing the needs of her *cabalens* [town mates]? How can you be a good president if you cannot take care of the needs of even your own district,” as Juan Miguel “Mikey” Arroyo responds in defense of his mother, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who more than average, favored her hometown (and the electoral district of Mikey) with funds and projects. “My mother does not want to go down in history as a President who failed the aspirations of her own town mates” (Source: PDI, 8.1.2010).[494]

Which of these elements really obstructs citizenship? Is the “smooth” way interpersonal relationships are negotiated already an impediment to citizenship (cf. Rodriguez 2009: 75), as SIR is seen mainly as an expression of unequal relationships? How about the attitude of asking (*hingi*) rather than demanding (*reklamo*)? Or, the focus on maintaining and mending personal relationships rather than pressuring and confronting incumbents? Or, is it rather mainly the lack of a rights consciousness and the building of public service on personal favors and well-meaning (*mabait*) service providers? Which of these cultural traits are in the first place inconsistent with a sense of citizenship?

I will only give preliminary answers to some of these questions further down (mainly based on answers given to me in the expert interviews), but for now mainly leave

---

[492] Such divide between “being right“ and “being granted rights“ could also be read in a historical way, hinting at the tension accompanying the formation and implementation of the modern rule of law between "scholarly law" often understood as »dead law« and the »living« customary law or the »good old law« (cf. Von Moos 1998: 6). Here »scholarly law« has not been appropriated, but is (still) alien, while it is the common law characterizing the everyday sense of justice. The rights written down are then not *really* respected as the everyday *reality* is the (oral) customary law, which is ‘embodied.’ Such customary law but is not what is meant by Engels. It is rather being above the law. While the word of a big man is considered as law (or interpretation of the law), he may elude the submission under the (impersonal) law, interpret the law in line with his views and interests and create law (which may be arbitrary or something he will adhere to in future).

[493] Personalistic politics though are not only an element of feudal politics. Nobilities have been the carrier of politics up to the 19th century. Only then did programmatic durable political parties developed into being more than factions (*Parteien* not only *Parteiungen*). The nobility tradition in the Philippines is reflected in the habit to call incumbents “Hon.“ (for Honorable).

[494] It is also the expectation of the constituents for their politicians to be “*mapagbigay*” (generous) which drives patronage politics, and along with it, corruption. “Often enough, it’s the constituents themselves that are forcing us to be corrupt,” complains a mayor (following Conrado de Quiros in PDI, 10.9.2013). “During the last elections, because I wasn’t showering my constituents with token basketball courts, my political rivals thought they could lure them to their side by coming out with posters that said ‘Mayor L, *kuripot* [stingy]!’” According to de Quiros, the mayor nevertheless got reelected.

the questions open. This is because the aim of this essay is mainly to enumerate the factors considered cumbersome (or conducive) for citizenship, leaving answers more to a discourse which will hopefully be triggered by such compilation.

5.3. Educational system

"A good citizen is one who, as our elementary textbooks teach our children, obeys traffic lights." (Maria Serena Diokno, PDI 5.9.2009)

***

"Of the 50 million voters who will troop to the polls in May next year, the greater majority are not intelligent, they are not educated for voting, and the candidates they choose are not educated for serving." (Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, PDI, 27.11.2012)

As already pointed out often, the discourse on citizenship issues in the Philippines is very much focused on individual agency, on obligations, on morals and values. No wonder that the contribution education can make to develop citizenship is another often discussed topic in the public discourse.

Here the outlook of the pundits is rather dim. So writes Cito Beltran (*Social compliance not complacency*, PS, 28.9.2011): "Filipinos are always very patient in the midst of discomfort. … Filipinos have been trained, brainwashed, educated and manipulated to behave in a non-confrontational way from birth to death. … Anyone who acts out of order or character is instantly labeled a "bitch," arrogant or "bastos" … deem(ed) as rebellious behavior."

Haidee Enriquez again, belonging to the BPO provider Sitel, complains that "the skills being developed in education are not attuned to a globalized economy. These skills include communication and critical thinking, as well as having the initiative to do more than what is expected of them" (Newsbreak, 11.8.2011). The Management Association of the Philippines said that in 2010, 4 out of 10 new graduates and young job-seekers were not hired because they lacked "soft" competencies—critical thinking, initiative and effective communication skills (Source: PS, 1.11.2010). Likewise, a World Bank report on Philippine skills in 2009, lists as among the most common complaints of employers are that graduates lack critical skills, such as problem solving, initiative, and creativity (PS, 1.8.2009). [495] In political socialization theory, however, these skills are considered part of the "latent political socialization," meaning they are politically significant social attitudes and cognitive skills that facilitate or impede political activity (cf. subchapter 3.6.4.: on *Political socialization*).

---

[495] "Because there is no critical tradition in this country" the national Artist Sionil Jose even considers the Filipin@s "shallow" (*Why we are shallow*. PS, 12.9.2011) and the editor in chief of Sun Star Davao Stella Estremera states that "it's difficult to plumb the depths of these people's minds. Maybe because there is no depth to plumb" (Sun Star Davao, 28.1.2014).

How for instance, should Filipin@s learn to make *hirit* (literally: talk back, i.e. question and not just give in), if they experience from a very young age that people who are questioning and objecting are labeled as "*disturbo* (troublemaker)"or as "*makulit*" (pushy); and if they are exposed to a disciplinary regime within a "punitive society" (Michael Tan, PDI, 18.7.2013) that considers corporal punishment and scolding normal; and wherein demanding for obedience and acquiescence, instead of encouraging explanations to children and allowing them to argue with their parents and teachers, prevails.[496]

This concerns another barrier to a democratic culture Zialcita points out: **hierarchized relations**. Zialcita explains that "those in roles with low status are expected to defer to the opinions of those above them. ... Questioning by a social inferior is frowned upon in the Philippines. ... Teachers get irritated with students who ask many questions for seeming to question their authority and, as a result, have been known to give them low grades. ... In Filipino homes, children, even adult ones, are expected not to question the opinions of their parents and not to argue with them. To question and to argue are taken as indication of lack of respect" (Zialcita 1997: 44f.). And Diokno (1997: 24) observes an "association of goodness with obedience (*ang mabait na bata ay masunurin* – a good child is an obedient one)."[497]

In this sense, it is news that Rody Duterte declared the clash of opinions between him and his daughter Sarah, who was mayor of Davao at that time, as a "healthy political exercise" and as "good" for the city (*Clash of opinions 'good for city,'* Sun Star Davao, 8.4.2012). "Just because she is my daughter does not mean that I will just sit down and close my mouth. I also expect her to criticize me *pag may mali kami sa City Council* (when we are wrong in the City Council). *Nagtatrabaho kami para sa gobyerno, para sa tao*. (We are working for the government, for the people.) The bottom line here is public interest," he added. "I did not raise my daughter as a robot, eh *naging abugada yan* (she became a lawyer), so expect her to act as a lawyer. If she thinks that she is right, fine. Let's debate on it."

While some believe that a punitive society makes people want to be a good boy or good girl (see above as explanation for the seemingly social compliant answers regarding what a good citizen is), others even think characters develop which are motivated by fear. Regarding the "religious interregnum" (considering God dead bet-

---

[496] Lauser (2004: 201) considers it part of the reason that "parents invest a lot of feeling in their children…, identify with them (*ang anak ay ang katibayan ng pagmamahal at kabutihang-asal ng mga magulang* - a child is proof of love and good morals of the parents) and consider them as an extension of themselves. … The constant caring and meddling (*pakikialam*) the child should understand as an expression of love and acceptance. Parental love and dependence may thus express itself in a possessive, overprotective behavior, especially towards their daughters. This way »lowly individuated mothers« produce »lowly individuated children« (Bulatao)."

[497] Such hierarchical thinking correlates with a Fordist education. It is an educational system that makes people to be machines, memorizing, following orders, being obedient and not thinking out of the box. Which shall ready them for assembly line work – but also qualifies them for the mass servicing model, Noronha and D'Cruz discover in the call centers. Nevertheless, following the governementality model, such an educational approach does not necessarily make people to become docile bodies, even if they intend to do so.

ween Good Friday and Easter Sunday), Michael Tan says that one of two interpretations he encounters is “that because God is dead, no one’s watching so anything goes.” He explains that: “in a way, we can say early religious leaders were too successful with the way they created a morality tied to a fear of God depicted as being everywhere and all-powerful, constantly intervening in human affairs with rewards and punishments. In effect, we are taught that we are under constant surveillance by a God that’s almost tantamount to a celestial closed-circuit TV system” (*CCTV God*, PDI, 3.4.2012). “We see it all the time on the road. Even a functioning traffic light becomes nothing but blinking lights if there are no cops or traffic aides around. Like the Good Friday interregnum, the fear factor is suspended,” Tan adds.

Be it such authoritarian character (pre-conventional) or a compliant person (conventional moral system in the terms of Kohlberg), resulting out of the Philippine mainstream education, for citizens being able to question, to reflect and to respect the Other, post-conventional traits are needed, says Getrud Nunner-Winkler, an important Kohlberg interpretation (following Hopf/Hopf 1997: 21).

Following Piaget and Kohlberg, (political) awareness and action are *also* determined by cognitive competencies - such as the ability to absorb, monitor, analyze, explain and interpret, as well as, the skill to critically assess, attribute to causes and detect interrelations. These skills need to be acquired and trained like any other attitude through socialization, education, breeding, and last but not least, one’s own life experience.

Higher reflectiveness and the ability to reflect and to abstract, to handle complexity and reverse one’s judgments do not necessarily lead to the ability to transcend the perception and analysis of problems beyond the concrete. The ability of abstract judgment can not further be equated with moral judgments, which is illustrated by the fact that - according to Claußen/Wasmund (1982: 409) - while more than 50% of the elder adolescents and adults interviewed by Kohlberg were able to do formal thinking, only 10% of them also displayed a principled moral reasoning.

Nevertheless, the ability for abstract thought is commonly considered as a (necessary, though not sufficient) prerequisite to the ability to process abstract from the concrete, catechetical action rules towards formal problem-solving approaches and to expand social spaces of thinking ideally towards taking a universal perspective.

Lack of reflection and of discourse values (despite the high ranking understanding other opinions got in the ISSP 2004), is what Zialcita considers a further barrier to a democratic culture. [498] Such can also be observed during feedback rounds or in open

[498] Here, again it needs to be stressed that the cultural background of the researcher might lead to overstressing the issue of lack of reflection, with the German culture being exceptionally reflective and critical. The psychologist Stephan Grünewald in this sense concludes from the findings of the regular surveys by his institute "Rheingold" that “self-doubt is a feature of German identity. We are watching ourselves, always driven by the anxious question whether it is right what we're doing" (following Peter Pauls. *Triumph des Selbstzweifels*, Deutschlandfunk, 19.7.2014).

fora after lengthy inputs, which are normally are held as ex cathedra – these feedback rounds are often more formal and don't last for long.[499]

Furthermore, many Filipin@s have difficulties in being criticized. The person who gets criticized often reacts *pikon* (touchy). All key informants confirmed the impression of the author that many Filipin@s take things personally very quickly, even if addressed in their function (e.g. as public official) and not as an individual. Distinguishing role and office selectively from one's own person again is considered as a characteristic of a (ideal) modern society characterized by functional differentiation.

Randy David underlines that the Philippines indeed also have their spaces of discourse, less the cafes and salons highlighted by Habermas (1962), but according to David (2014) more the "*puntahan* ... the corner place where usually just the menfolk gather to talk about everything under the sun, including politics." David explains: "There is a culture of public discourse; the problem is that people very seldom are able to differentiate between personal feelings and their rational, intellectual positions, so everything becomes personal. You assert an intellectual position, you invest in it emotionally. So any criticism of your intellectual position becomes a criticism of your person. ... So it is very difficult to like people whose opinions are different from yours.... That's why it is very difficult even in the context of the academe, which is supposed to be one of the most modern spaces you can find in a transitional society like ours. It is very difficult to disagree with a colleague in a meeting. ... People are not going to talk to you. It is very difficult for the Filipino to take criticisms." David shares that "I have been told several times that it is better to keep your opinions to yourself." He considers learning to take critic as "an evolutionary achievement, it requires a certain civility, a certain distance and certain ability to observe yourself ... which to me is a pre-condition to self-criticism [and] a mark of a modern person" (David 2014).

"Our political culture is not used to frank talk," says the editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer on 13.9.2012. "Between political bombast (or bomba, as a number of Filipinos still say) and political praise or promise (or bola, as everyone still says), there is hardly anything." Especially, if the critic comes from a foreigner it may be understood as "*b(u)wisit*" (nuisance),[500]and if coming from a person of a lower status, as "*bastos.*" In other instances, such behavior may be considered "*metikulosa*" (nitpicking) or "confrontative." Furthermore, there is an unwillingness to confront critics

---

[499] This is confirmed by Borchgrevink, who observed in his ethnographic study of a village that "the mere existence of a forum like the barangay assembly does not guarantee that all interests are heard. Whether or not there had been chances for discussing this issue, the fact remains that most people do not like to speak out at the barangay assembly in particular if it means going against what has been proposed by the barangay captain and his administration. ... Thus, although »objectively« there was a possibility for discussion, most people nevertheless felt (subjectively) that the ordinance had been decided on by the leadership" (Borchgrevink 2014: 92). "Only a limited number of people take part in the discussions; the great majority keep silent." (ibid.: 100)

[500] In the context of an article on the indignation a video by an American with the title "20 reasons why I dislike the Philippines" drew, Conrado de Quiros wonders: "I don't know why we have to show that we love the country by bristling with indignation at everything that shows the other side of Manila Bay sunsets" (PDI, 19.3.2012).

face to face, so that criticism is rather done by *tsismis* (gossip) and murmuring (cf. Borchgrevink 2014: 90-101), hoping that such complaint reaches its addressee through the loop way.

Contrary to the myth of the middle class, as prime democratic mover (see below), such lack of latent and manifest citizenship education within primary education also holds true for middle-class families according to Karaos: "Little in the socialization of children ... directly inculcates in them notions of belonging to a wider community outside the family. Socialization processes emphasize personal obligations to the family and its members in the form of obedience to elders, performing household chores and studying well. Even the emphasis placed on good academic performance is linked more to satisfying family expectations than to the service of a bigger community." (Karaos 1997: 128)

As pointed out in the first part, the role school can play in counteracting primary education, which is unfavorable to citizenship attitudes, is limited. Nevertheless, the discussion about the role formal education can play to foster citizenship is prominent.

The possibilities of civic education in school are estimated as moderate, if it is assigned more than an amplifier effect on citizenship attitudes gained elsewhere (Wasmund 1982b: 66, Hurrelmann/Ulich 2008: 450, Matuschek 2011: 222). It usually only provides information, but does not form citizenship attitudes (which Macapagal et al. confirm for the Philippine context; cf. 2013: 146[501]). Nevertheless, school can have a positive effect in relation to citizenship attitudes for those students who hardly have gotten in touch with politics yet, says Wasmund (1982b) among others, as it opens a new world to them. Political socialization theories consider the possibilities of citizenship education (next to the procurement of political skills) to depend mainly on the model function of the teacher, but even more on in how far participation and criticism are spelled out in the classroom. The latter both influence the formation of democratic skills, as well as, the motivation to learn. In the case of the Philippines, for example, where teaching is still normally done from the pulpit and where it is considered "*bastos*" (rude) to contradict (*hirit*) the teacher, such »clandestine curriculum (*heimlicher Lehrplan*)« most probably overrides the manifest content of political education – if the formal curriculum at all defines "citizenship" as more than just paying taxes and following rules.[502]

---

[501] Likewise Yacat (2014), who used to teach the citizenship course at the University of the Philippines, confirms this for the Philippine context when explaining that the course was "not very encouraging" in its impact on the sense of citizenship.

[502] Yacat (2014) traces the preponderance of responsibilities over rights outlined in the empirical part of this work, exactly to the fact that schoolbooks put more emphasis on responsibilities than on rights. According to Yacat it was "part of the government campaign since martial law to emphasize responsibilities more and also to de-emphazise rights."

When it comes to citizenship attitudes, the assessment of the educational system by Filipino analysts is not any more favorable than what has been said about the family sphere. Michael Tan believes that "in the Philippines, schools still emphasize conformity, obedience and docility, which have greater congruence with the way girls are raised at home. Teachers end up favoring girls, and may end up putting down an assertive or inquisitive boy, who is perceived as being rebellious or disrespectful" (PDI, 29.7.2010). Elmer Ordoñez (Manila Times, 13.3.2010) sings from the same sheet when stating that "in this country school administrators are mortally afraid of their students getting involved in activism. ... »Troublemakers« and dissenters are candidates for expulsion. Academic freedom is heard only in UP-Diliman [the national university]."

The educator Butch Hernandez (PDI, 30.11.2012) complains that "as schoolchildren, we were supposed to know all these so-called historical facts by heart. … But other than serving us well in quizzes, these bits of information carried little personal relevance (sic!) for us during our formative years. … Even in high school, we never really talked about why Aguinaldo believed that Bonifacio's execution had to be carried out, even when he felt that some compassion was warranted. Our class discussions on history—which were few and far between—rarely ventured into controversial territory. … I hold the impression that to this day, many of our schools, whether public or private, teach history and social studies without the creativity, imagination and gravitas that such subjects truly deserve."

According to Canieso-Doronila, such learning merely by heart is compounded by the fact that "the high reported basic literacy rate has no deep roots in terms of the capacity for reflective, creative and abstract thought as long as it ignores the wellspring of our own knowledge and is carried out in a foreign language" (1997: 72). This is what she considers as a main constraint on the development of citizenship values. Using English as the main language of instruction, Canieso-Doronila believes, fosters "a colonial mentality, and an emphasis on form, rhetorics and emotionalism, owing to difficulties in self-analysis and reflection where thinking is carried out in the local language but knowledge encoded in English which is inadequately understood. Thus, traditional knowledge and literate knowledge which are of relatively equivalent »size« are two different but coexisting, unintegrated knowledge systems" (ibid.: 84).[503] In contrary, Canieso-Doronila believes that "the deep roots of Catholicism in the country spring from the fact that Filipinos learned it in their own language, indigenizing it into »folk« Catholicism in the process"(ibid.: 73).

---

[503] The same also holds true for the sphere of law which most Filipin@s also cannot sufficiently take hold of: According to Enriquez, "law in the Philippine case is a foreign body in an indigenous social life. It was a wholesale grafting of norms conceptualized in foreign communities, as exemplified in Philippine private law which was patterned after the Spanish Civil Code and Philippine public law which was copied from the American Constitutional framework. The Philippine system of laws did not grow from the people. Rather, the people were forced to grow into the law. This resulted in the dissonance between the letter of the law and what the people perceive as right or wrong" (Enriquez 1992: 60).

Furthermore, the Basic Education Curriculum of Filipino schools defines the subject *Makabayan* (patriotism) very much in terms of duties like "love of the country" (although with "a global vision"), "do one's duties," care for the environment (and even respect for human rights), but does not mention something like "know one's rights" or even the willingness and ability to participate in politics (Cf. Mendoza/Nakayama 2003).[504]

But it even seems that the wanting citizenship education in school is "*sobra*" (too much) for some parents. Bettina Beer reports that Filipinas she interviewed, "often complain that children are educated in school to be critical and to express their views even towards adults" (Beer 1996: 234).

Figure 18: Rights and responsibilities of a Filipino Child, Batinguel Elementary School, Dumaguete City, 2011.

So far though, the evaluation of citizenship education in the schools I present here is merely preliminary. Neither have I made an impact evaluation of schooling in the Philippines nor a research on family socialization; nor do I know of literature other than the ones I quoted. I can by no means deliver here impact evaluations - for instance on the training of tolerance towards complexity, problem, uncertainty and conflict, which Schulze (1976; 26f.) has identified as conducive for a sense of citizenship. I also do not have a sufficient material to venture on the presence of such tolerances among our respondents. Here, I can simply indicate such interrelations and express the assumption that the directive form of educational facilities and other

[504] Likewise, the Republican Act 1425 (the so called Rizal law) states that it is the duty of schools "to develop moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience, and to teach the duties of citizenship." Rights education is not mentioned here as well.

learning spaces (workshops, lectures ....) being implemented, has a restraining effect on the development of active citizenship.

Before simply following the assumptions on barriers to citizenship outlined above (and blaming a hierarchical educational system for not countering them), three caveats should be made at this point:

(1) Assuming that conflict avoidance and a penchant for smooth interpersonal relations (SIR) as universal in Philippine society may be a distortion. In this way, the anthropologist Felipe Landa Jocano and others have qualified the assumption of the universality of the SIR. Paraphrasing Jocano, Bettina Beer writes, "that for Filipinos SIR are of great importance towards a stranger with a high social status is understandable. In less »official« relations between Filipinos of the same social class however disputes, conflicts and arguments are obvious: Among men as well among women and married couples they are carried out in a loud, often violent manner and even in front of others (who intervene if necessary)" (Beer 1996: 197). Assumptions, such as the SIR have "turned into stereotypes… as they don't consider the gap between ideal and reality and the multitude of social relations" (ibid.). Beer quotes Jocano stating that "our field data from central Panay and from the slum of Sta. Ana in urban Manila do not support this general assumption about Filipino behavior. The reverse of what has been described in the SIR paper [a paper written by the renown anthropologist Frank Lynch] … seems to be what is observable in actual situations. ... ... we have on record eighty-seven cases of quarrels and one hundred and fifty cases of misunderstandings between kindred and neighbors. These are the openly fought and discussed cases" (ibid.).

Furthermore, we should not discount the fact that silence also has a strong power dimension. Staying silent (and being silenced) – giving the impression of 'smoothness' and harmony where there is none - is also an expression of being dependent as pointed extensively in the first part of this work (or in Reese 2010b). Pinches observed likewise in a Manila urban poor neighborhood where "some workers describe the feelings of shame that arise … as a consequence of withholding or concealing their discontent. … Workers speak of having to »sacrifice« themselves for the good of their families. Not only do they have to endure the hardship of working life itself; they also have to learn to live with the practice of repressing their own anger (Pinches 1991: 179). Instead of pleading for circumstances in which such disempowering dependency can be overcome, the bourgeois theory of citizenship though drew the conclusion from such an observation that dependents cannot exert citizenship (cf. chapter 4.4.: *The (nation) state still the space of agency and entitlement*).

(2) Not only do arguments questioning the capability of the current majority of Filipin@s to exert citizenship, feed classism and sexism, they also bear the risk of neocolonialism. Cultural deficiencies in relation to citizenship were exactly the argu-

ments the American colonizers used to justify their benevolent assimilation and for only subsequently granting citizenship rights to Filipin@s (Cf. Go 2008).

(3) Finally, if only a post-conventional cognition allows for citizenship, perspectives for citizenship would be dim. Take note of the fact that Nunner-Winkler (following Hopf/Hopf 1997: 21) speaks of the German population, when stating that only a small part of the people are able to reach the highest stage of moral development – which is why she considers the chances of anchoring democratic attitudes as fairly low.

The researches of Hopf and Hopf (1997), in contrast, come to the conclusion that not only people categorized as post-conventional but as well people categorized as pre-conventional [but not people categorized as conventional!] are "above average activist, ready to protest and politically radical" (p. 113). While however those rated as pre-conventional primarily emphasized individual freedom and were less willing to engage with others, quite the opposite holds true for those rated as post-conventional. [505]

It seems that those interested in citizenship have to come to terms with the fact that most political action is significantly based on judgments not emerging from post-conventional cognition. Otherwise, the need arises to question democracy the way already Plato did, pleading for a government of philosophers, i.e. for a mental aristocracy. This is certainly a vision attractive for the educated middle class (from which most of the citizenship literature derives), as it gives them reason for their rule with their primary cultural capital being here in demand. Such assumption is not far fetched as fantasies about restricting suffrage to the educated and well-to-do pop up from time to time also in Philippine columns. This also resonates in the statement by Senator Santiago, quoted at the beginning of this chapter and by Randy David (*Political wisdom*, PDI, 1.12.2012), asserting that "many educated Filipinos actually agree with her."

---

[505] Whether those rated as conventional are politically inactive or are rather characterized by politically loyal behavior is not explicitly mentioned by Hopf and Hopf. Their statement that "the morally conventional comprehends himself primarily as member of society when discussing moral dilemmata and therefore understands the good within the categories of this society"(p. 130) however suggests that those rated as conventional tend to communitarian ideas and concepts- just like lined out for the non-activists in the qualitative study (cf. *conclusion* to the chapter 4.14.: *Sense of citizenship among selected young urban professionals in the Philippines*).

5.4. Nationalism in the Philippines

"We are a country perennially divided by geography, ideology, politics, religion and economy. Any way we shuffle the deck, it comes out divided: Left or Right; Rich or Poor, Catholic, Muslim, INC or Christian; Ilocano's, Tagalogs, Cebuanos, Bicolanos; anti-GMA or anti-P-Noy; pro-RH or anti-RH — always a losing hand. We can only win if we subjugate self-interest for the greater good."

(Yoly Villanueva-Ong, PS, 27.3.2012)

Lack of patriotism and nationalism is considered a further reason for the lack of citizenship. Based on the empirical findings outlined above, I doubt though that it is the lack of the necessary sense of belonging to the "imagined communit(ies)" (Bendict Anderson) needed for the exertion of citizenship (cf. this way Rigoberto Tiglao: *The 'nation' thing? We have a problem there*, Manila Times, 11.6.2013). (Not only) has this work distinguished between a cultural belonging to the nation (which is well in place) and political belonging to the nation (which those identifying the lack of patriotism finds as lacking). Instead of believing that there is a total lack of identification with the larger community, I rather believe that nationalism in the Philippines is instrumentalized to appropriate land and resources, pushing aside minority rights and diverting attention from issues of social divergences and political power-sharing.

This kind of nationalism stands in a historical tradition, that of the creoles and mestizos yearning for independence from Spain, but immediately settling with the new colonial masters, the Americans, once they [the Americans] assured them of their influence, opened up the Friar Lands for Sale, ensured them preferential import quotas to the US-market and secured the landed interests of the elite by titling the land (cf. Cortes et al. 2000 for more details). The Euro-American colonialism eventually was followed by an internal colonization (Manila imperialism): Filipino First, the "national development interest" and nation-building acted as ideological construct exerting cultural imperialism and economic exploitation and repression on a domestic scale.

Such nationalism also delegitimizes the yearning for self-determination of the Moros and the Indigenous Peoples, allegedly claiming what is considered territory of the Republic of the Philippines. Nationalism likewise takes on a delegitimizing role when the idea is expressed that citizenship rights are only for nationals: Whenever foreigners does undesirable things or utters critique, then the argument "you are just a foreigner," or "*bwisit*" (nuisance)… is quickly used as counterpoint– and this is despite the Philippines bearing a migration culture.

The nationalist card is also played by conservative forces wanting to insulate the Philippines from undesirable "western" influence, thereby essentializing a traditionally Catholic position (such as saying No to reproductive health, to homosexuality, to a departure from the bourgeois family or to divorce) as "Filipino": "Our legislators should reject the RH bill to save face and regain our dignity and sovereignty as a nation," writes for instance the Catholic fundamentalist Jose Sison (MT, 18.6.2012).

Another staunch Anti-RH columnist Bobit Avila meanwhile believes that the "culture of death has been packaged inside this RH Law by foreign liberals and atheists that seeks to destroy human life and the Filipino family unit" (PS, 21.3.2013).[506]

Likewise, Agrobusiness is constructing the campaign of Greenpeace against GMOs as foreign imperialism, a "high-powered pressure group that our (sic!) scientists are up against in their bid to give Filipino farmers more options," as Ed Javier (*Greenpeace's intimidating presence*, Manila Times, 6.8.2013) claims. He goes on by assuming that "Greenpeace sent one of its biggest ships to the country ... and had it dock at Manila Bay. ... It reminded everyone of a strategy used by powerful countries. When smaller countries arouse their ire, powerful nations simply send in their biggest aircraft carriers or warships for »refueling« or «exercises.«" (Nothing though has been heard from Ed Javier about the different treaties with the USA regarding the bringing in again of US forces and warships to the Philippines.)

Above all, there are the calls that "Filipinos must be ready to defend national sovereignty, honor and pride [in the West Philippine Sea] even with our ageing ships, outdated armaments and inferior technology [and] stand up and show ruthless China that even with knives and rusty bolos, the Filipinos will fight for what is theirs," as the former Governor Manny Piñol demands in his column *The Philippines is not Tibet* (MT, 30.4.2012).

Who would really profit from the control over the manifold resources in the West Philippines/South China Sea constructed as "ours" remains to be seen. Examining the "Filipino only"-provisions in the Constitution, Bernando Villegas (himself a free trade proponent and thus not without interest) concludes that "giving preference to Filipinos in the ownership, control and management of natural resources and strategic industries has just worsened the feudal and monopolistic character of our society. Unwittingly, well-intentioned »nationalists« and »activists« have handed the control of the national economy to an elite in whose hands the wealth of the country is concentrated. There has been very little evidence that »Filipinization« has liberated the masses from poverty. There has been very little evidence that the Filipino nationals who have managed to control the economy have a greater interest in the common good, especially of the underprivileged, than individuals who are not Filipino citizens" (PDI, 15.7.2012).

Furthermore intellectuals, also from the Left, seem to summon empathically an abstract, ideal Filipino nation acting as one, but at the same do not think that one could be proud of the Filipin@s nowadays and even consider the Philippines a failed state. "Nation" is considered a cure-all, but at the same time it seems to be forlorn that the Philippine body politic ever gets access to this medicine.

---

[506] Bishop Gilbert Garcera of the Diocese of Daet even sees the Filipin@s as missionaries when arguing against population control by saying that "overpopulation has been advantageous to the Philippines and to the world because it has increased the number of overseas workers and migrants who could send remittances back home while taking care of ageing people abroad and spreading the Christian faith" (PDI, 29.12.2012).

Looking at the historical past and present, and taking the lack of an accepted (!) national language into consideration,[507] Rafael finds the construct of Filipino nationalism even "ironic" (2000: 8): "Given the prevailing ethnolinguistic and religious diversity of the archipelagic nation, an ongoing civil war between the republic and the Communist Party of the Philippines that dates back to the 1960s, separatist wars with Muslim groups in the south from the 1970s, the steady migration since the mid-1960s of its middle-class population to work or live in virtually every part of the world, and the recent resurgence of fundamentalist Christian sects across a wide array of social classes since the 1980s, attempts at establishing a clear and undisputed fit between the Philippines and Filipinos is far from complete, and in fact, may never be realized" (ibid: 7). Rafael therefore considers 'Filipino' to be "the name of a history that, coming from the outside, continues to arrive from the future"(ibid.: 18).

While there is a reason to opt for the "nation" from the point of view that citizenship is in need of spaces appropriate for participation and accountability, the ethnic version of nationalism (one country, one people, one language) seems inappropriate for a multi-sited pluri-national entity like the Philippines.

5.5. Can a positive counter narrative be told?

"Stop feeling helpless that the Philippines is hopeless!"

(Grace Padaca, then governor of Isabela, member of the network *Kaya Natin!*, a movement for good governance and a postergirl of ethical leadership. Source: PDI, 7.1.2009.)

***

"We are finally—albeit slowly—evolving into a nation that takes the democratic ideals of its Constitution seriously" (Randy David, PDI, 13.7.2014).

Considering the extent of opinions following the negative narrative as presented above, in the following I try to spot resources which may be helpful in developing a stronger sense of citizenship in the Philippines. The columnist Rina Jimenez -David (PDI, 22.7.2013) suggests that "maybe the true divide in the Philippines these days (is) between the hopelessly cynical who cannot believe in even the glimmers of prosperity appearing on the horizon; and the willingly optimistic, who believe we are well on our way not just to recovery but to lasting reform that will finally spring us out of the trap of corruption and poverty we have been mired in." Grace Padaca in her appeal to not give up on the Philippine political system believes that "there are many good Filipinos who can serve us best as leaders [i.e. citizenship from above]. Let us just please help them get to office first instead of killing their spirit by asking

---

[507] In public interaction within the Philippines, it is usually up to three languages that are used simultaneously: English, Tagalog or Taglish (a mixture of Tagalog and English) and finally in the respective region (and among the regional communities in Metro Manila), dominantly the regional vernacular.

too much from them" and also called on Filipin@s to "be discerning" of what was being said about government leaders. Conrado de Quiros again considers the development of People Power (i.e. citizenship from below) "unstoppable" (PDI, 25.2.2014).

On one hand, De Quiros points to the movement-based electoral campaign (the so called "Yellow Army") of reform candidate Benigno Aquino III for the presidential election in 2010, as a counterflow to the negative narrative. Second in line, he mentions the protests around the Pork Barrel Scam in 2013 "echoing a key People Power proposition that each one could be a hero, the people themselves could be heroes… not need(ing) a leader, they could be their own leaders. They did not need a messiah, they could be their own saviors." Finally, he mentions the outburst of volunteerism (*bayanihan*) and national compassion (*malasakit*) in the wake of the Supertyphoon Yolanda at end of 2013, with "people not just giving money, but giving of themselves." He considers this a strong form of active citizenship with "people coming together spontaneously, instinctively, heroically to do the right thing without anyone telling them to do it. If that isn't People Power, I don't know what is."

Indeed, there might be several "heroes of good governance," as Harvey Keh, a convener of the network Kaya Natin! (literally: We can do it) believes (Manila Times, 12.4.2012). He especially points to Grace Padaca and Jesse Rob redo (the then Secretary of the Interior who lost his life some months later in a plane accident). When still mayor of Naga, Robredo based his reform program on people's participation. Likewise, Canieso-Doronila (1997: 86-91) identifies several "developmental communities" in the country where "processes of change are more internally generated (with the initial help of catalysts), and people participate more fully in community life" and "whereas before family, the practice of Christianity and elections were separate elements, we now see a more integrated community life where loyalty to family is assumed but also where loyalties move beyond family to include a larger social organization espousing a common social purpose in which both religion and authentic political practice are also implied."

As pointed out in the first part next on the necessary resources, political participation is not only based on believing in windows of opportunity (what Padaca is asking for), but also in a citizenship-friendly cultural frame. The choice given in respective treatises boils down to two options: Either retaining the status quo or "modernizing" it by following the path of modernity.[508] While Randy David is an example of the

---

[508] Sidel observed that there are "two distinct constructions of legitimate governance. First, the modern, Western institutions of the nation-state and constitutional democracy serve as the formal models and goals of »progress« and »national development,« as well as standards by which to evaluate the political realities of today. Second, widespread nostalgia for an idealized golden age of what may loosely be described as paternalism provides another vantage point for evaluating the shortcomings of the contemporary political and social order. And he considers "many Filipinos" as "caught between these two ideals: between a lost past and an as yet unattainable future" (1995: 140). Here, he meets with the political analyst Randy David who sees the Philippines as "trapped between the old and the new" (PDI, 14.12.2013).

Being clients in this setting, for quite some citizens "the legitimacy of the government derives in large part from the legitimacy accorded patrons by clients," believes Sidel (1995: 145). This tension between not (yet) being a full democracy, but no longer

latter – explaining that "what really excites me is to know how society works its way in a non-western context" (David 2014). Meanwhile, Catholic fundamentalism but also a statement by ex-president Estrada can be (partly) seen as example for the former. Under the headline "*Estrada defends political dynasty*" the PDI reports on 3.4.2013 that "for … Joseph Estrada, there is an advantage to dynasty in terms of the continuity of projects… Joseph (sic!) said in Filipino that having another mayor would derail the programs of his family for the city, citing the lack of continuity [and] added his sons JV and Jinggoy were able to continue his plans for San Juan City during their own terms with the establishment of a college, a market, and a hospital."[509] Here, Estrada connects the traditional leader-orientation with a modern idea of public service. In the following chapter I want to suggest a third way: Modernizing by drawing (at least partly) on emic resources.

5.6. Resources of citizenship

"The Filipinos' capacity for empathy and spontaneous action when needed, for voluntarism and selflessness in times of great suffering, and for heroism despite all the disincentives to it, are proof enough the people are not the blind that ought to be led by the seeing or by the equally blind."

(Conrado de Quiros: *People-powered*, PDI, 5.1.2010)

As already pointed out in the subchapter on *citizenship a western concept*, there are emic concepts and social realities a Filipino concept of citizenship may draw on, thereby making it context-sensitive and so probably more suitable to "voic(e) resistance to domination... in its own terms" (Sidel 1995: 139). I will leave it open if this can be done by developing a theory of citizenship out of emic concepts or rather by "fine-tuning … foreign derived institutions," as Jocano proposed (following Kaelin 2012: 150f.). Pivotal here might be the concept of *pakikipagkapwa-tao,* upon which Enriquez (1992) bases his Sikolohiya Filipino on (cf. the subchapter 4.1.1.: *Communitarian, republican and (neo)liberal concepts of citizenship*).[510] Other terms which may serve as a starting point are those mentioned several times in the course of this work such as *bayanihan*, *awa* or *pakiramdan* to name just a few.

Just like *bahala na* (cf. the chapter 4.19.: *It's still hard work*), these concepts are mixed blessings. They *might* result in social relations more aware of the other and less insisting on one's own advantage (*kanya-kanya*), they might also merely result in parochialism, extending recognition and support only to the "loved ones" (*tayo-tayo*).

being in an (idealized) feudal past has been a trigger for a continuous political unrest taking off with the Huk rebellion in the 1930s (cf. Kerkvliet 1979).

[509] He though also "reiterated that in a country running under a democratic form of government, it is still the people who will choose who they want to sit in elective posts. "*Ang masama yung monarchy* [*kasi*] the power is inherited. (Monarchy is no good as the power is inherited.) *Pero dito no* (but here not), it is the people who decides last *di ba* (isn't it)?" (ibid.)

[510] Researchers of the University of the Philippines (Clemente et al. 2008) have put the *kapwa* under empirical scrutiny and came to the conclusion that *pakikipagkapwa* and the other values and attitudes Enriquez bases his theory on (still) have a high validity, at least among the young educated (university students) nowadays.

This ambivalence Michael Tan (*Joke only*, PDI, 6.6.2013) explains in relation to the concept of *pakikisama*. "Pakikisama or trying to maintain smooth interpersonal relationships … can be problematic, especially when it allows unethical behavior to continue, all in the name of getting along," so that Tan believes "what we need is a stronger sense of pakikipagkapwa, a much more difficult term than pakikisama in the way it revolves around a sense of kapwa or mutuality. Pakikisama emphasizes group norms, right or wrong, while kapwa focuses on caring for each other's material and emotional needs" (ibid.). And then again, the *kapwa*-orientation can be misused, as a joke going around in early 2012 showed. When students were asked what they want to be once they grow up, the first says he wants to be a nurse to help the *kapwa*, the next wants to be a doctor to treat the *kapwa*. A third wants to be the president to serve the *kapwa*. Eventually, the fourth says "*Ako gusto ko mahimong kapwa, para hayahay*! (I want to be a kapwa, to have an easy life!)"

Here, it also seems crucial what role *pakikiramdam* (empathy) is allotted. If it is considered as mere acquiescence in sensing the opinions and needs of others to comply with these (*pakikisama*), it may be considered less a resource for citizenship, even if such »taking a social perspective (*soziale Perspektivübernahme*)« is considered crucial by Kohlberg in the process of moral development – less than in the case that *pakikiramdam* is utilized to let the "Other" to come into his or her own (*zu seinem Recht kommen lassen*).

Finally, the value of feeling *awa* can also compromise the becoming of justice as in the case of the impeachment process against then Supreme Justice Corona in 2012. Members of parliament here asked the administration to "be merciful on Corona" (PDI, 6.9.2012) as "the man is professionally dead, why kick a man when he is down." Corona though never showed any remorse for his doings. Cito Beltran criticizes such "»*awa*« (pity)-based sense of justice" (PS, 15.2.2013) as he believes that "to prioritize mercy or awa is to corrupt not only the law but ourselves."

Sketching possible cultural resources in the following can of course be by no means exhaustive. The purpose of this chapter is merely to open the idea of searching for emic resources instead of merely measuring Filipino citizenship against Western benchmarks.

The start could be by looking back and identify specific resources in Philippine history. Here, the classical work of Ileto (1979) outlines how the Christian faith in which concepts such as hope, transcendence and fundamental change (in the figure of the 'kingdom of God') played a central role, administered as resource for coping, but also for mobilization. Gaspar (2010) likewise tries to locate some of the cultural elements in a distinct "Filipino spirituality," which may serve as resources of citizenship. Although I doubt the uniqueness Gaspar repeatedly claims ("only in the Philippines") and considers it of little relevance how special these traits are to Filipin@s (such claims rather show how search for identity is captured in nationalism). Rather

of importance to me, is how typical and how relevant such traits are to Filipin@s (as well).

Beyond theological resources, religious practices may also be tapped: The idea of a "redemptive pain" (Michael Tan, PDI, 16.7.2013) uttering itself in the *panata* (vow), "where we negotiate for a favor (including healing for oneself or a close relative)[and] often involv(ing) an offer of pain, whether through a pilgrimage, participating in some rigorous religious observance such as the Nazarene devotions in January, or something more extreme like self-flagellation, or even crucifixion," (ibid.) might be tapped for long-term political action, which likewise might be tedious and unpleasant, but which can be motivated by the promising outlook such action has. The same counts for the idea of sacrifice which from the Christian tradition took root in Filipino everyday culture (Borchgrevink 2014: 127).

There is definitely no lack in "agency" among Filipin@s (cf. Reese 2008a); the challenge is to tap it for political purposes, as Randy David (PDI, 9.1.2014) hopes: "As a student of society, I have been at pains to understand the core beliefs behind this religious devotion [i.e. Procession of the Black Nazarene]. On one hand, the Nazarene devotion seems to signify the continuing vitality of faith in the life of the Filipino. But, on the other, I cannot help wondering if this tremendous collective power can ever be harnessed as a positive force in the building of a prosperous nation and a decent society."

Furthermore, dissatisfaction is not a trait alien to Filipin@s: "Read the posts in Facebook and in Twitter. Visit the blogs and websites. Read the newspapers. Listen to the radio. Watch television. They're full of angry men, women and others," says Frank Malilong in Sun Star Cebu (18.11.2013), complaining at the same time that these are often mere "bashing orgy. … Anger is a normal human emotion. But must getting mad entail going crazy?"

A further source of citizenship could be the love for communication in the Philippines, though some consider it tainted by talkativeness (*madaldal*) and hearsay (*tsismis*), and characterized by a lack of reflection (cf. Fr. Roy Cimagala: *The colorum mentality*, CBCP Media Office, 24.7.2011, fatherroy.blogspot.com/2011/07/colorum-mentality.html). Even the penchant for SIR can be tapped when trying to exert »constructive« citizenship, for instance when rather seeking for compromises to disputes than going through formal court action. Or, as Cito Beltran (*Social compliance not complacency*, PS, 28.9.2011) points out: "We need to exercise our rights and not just restraint [without needing to] bang our fists or scream in someone's face."

A Filipino concept of citizenship would also need to review the line between "*ibang tao*" and "*hindi ibang tao*" (see subchapter 4.1.1. on *Communitarian, republican and (neo)liberal concepts of citizenship*) often drawn very categorical – and accompanied the belief that there is "*walang pakialam*" (no concern) for those and that beyond the

"loved ones" and with Diokno considering that the "concept of public good tends to be left out of family values" (Diokno 1997: 23). The tendency to "familiarize" the public sphere (by making strangers a older sister [Ate], calling politicians by their nicknames or considering the nation a big family) might be strange to Westerners; it nevertheless does not imply that citizenship – connected with rationality and strongly defined as beyond the family – is a forlorn project in a culture strongly connected to the family.

While the NPA guerrillas considered it necessary to make an extra effort among the peasants it organized to "refocus the object of ... personal responsibilities and loyalties away from the »narrow« circle of household toward the movement and the »oppressed people« at large" (in more detail in Rutten 2000: 223 and in Rutten 2003), the family and concrete others can also have a mobilizing function for transcending the "loved ones." Lanzona (2010) has shown in the case of the Hukbalahap that (extended) family networks and closely-knit neighborhoods are not per se anti-political, but *can* have a mobilizing, encouraging and politically educating function. "Kinship, affectual ties, and even sexual relationships were crucial to female mobilization and participation in the movement, and these personal and familial relationships were structured by notions … deeply rooted in Philippine culture and society" (p.10).[511] Paguntalan concludes from her research on trade unionism among female workers that "maybe union organizers should consider an expanded form of organizing to include the significant others -like parents and friends, since they figure in the decision-making nexus of these women. History has taught us that women will fight a revolution out of a sense of loyalty not only to the inang bayan (mother country) but also to the kamag-anak (relatives)" (Paguntalan 2002: 160).

Likewise, the spontaneous help shown in cases of disasters (nationwide and not only during the supertyphoon Yolanda in 2013), reveals that the capacity for empathy and spontaneous action can well extend beyond the *Gemeinschaft* and can be tapped in times of great suffering for voluntarism and selflessness.

Coming to the concept of human rights, often considered as *kulang* (lacking) among Filipin@s (see below), but as essential as a base for universal citizenship, we can observe that respect, recognition, dignity (*dangal*) and pride (*garbo*) play a central role in Philippine society. They may serve as important "ingredients" for an understanding of citizenship based on an understanding of one's own dignity, in a certain way the consciousness to "have the right to have rights," as Hannah Arendt once put the con-

---

[511] Likewise, Lanzona describes the fact of being "born into the movement," as this respondent explained: "The whole family was always involved. I was born there. … When I was captured and asked, »Why did you join?« I answered, »Actually, I did not join. I was born there«" (p. 45). (Of course, this has also been used to justify continuing a political dynasty (as in the case of the Binays or the Estradas nowadays) or for the family dynasties in Philippine trade union leadership, described by Aganon et al. [2008: 30] - although such political mobilization by virtue of the family is definitely more in the own interest than joining the Huk.)

cept of human rights in a nutshell. Additionally, they can also foster the recognition of the Other as rights bearer based on respecting his or her *dangal*.[512]

Such concept of human dignity might be a preliminary stage to citizenship (demanding the fulfillment as responsibility of the state, the community or the fellow being), but has to surpass the stage in which problems are still rather "frame(d) in terms of the wrongs they [the people] suffered as human beings rather than as violations of their rights," as Kabeer and Haq Kabir (2009: 63) observed in the case of respondents who only had "sporadic encounters" with politically oriented (non-government) organizations [serving de facto as schools of citizenship cf. pp 62-65] in Bangladesh. These respondents explained that they "do not know about the rights that [they] can claim from the government" (p. 25) and consider state action rather as favor and goodness than as something they are entitled to as citizens. "Their benchmark was justice rather than citizenship: how could a society in which some people ate well and regularly and others were routinely hungry be described as just?"(ibid.)[513] This is a typical answer from the perspective of traditional moral economy.

Respect nowadays though is still viewed so much role- and position-based (parents, older sibling, governor, white foreigner...) and is less based on the respect of the dignity of the fellow human (*kapwa*). For the latter, it is rather the concept of pity (*awa*/*luoy*) that takes the centerplace, displaying a relationship of inequality.

For the expression of the right to have rights – or a sense of entitlement – further everyday cultural attitudes might be drawn on. There is being "*kulit*" (persistent), making *reklamo* (to get what one believes to be entitled to) or being *tampo* (when one does not get it).[514]

Probably, even being "*pasaway* (defiant)" can serve as a cultural resource for citizenship. "Sometimes we might want to appreciate the »pasaway« because they can actually be quite creative," says Michael Tan (*Breaking traditions*, PDI, 12.3.2014), continuing that "more than individual creativity, though, the pasaway can be major agents of change, getting other people to think differently, to do things in novel ways." But Tan observes that "pasaway still has largely negative connotations in the Philippines

---

[512] The major role *dangal* still plays in Philippine society might also make public shaming a useful strategy for citizens. Senator Miriam Santiago for instance called on the youth to remove scammers from public office by shaming them: "Take your campaign to Facebook, Twitter or Tumblr. Post your grievances on these politicians' walls. Tweet them your disappointments. Eventually, these politicians will shed their thick hides because of the shame, and reveal themselves to be spineless pathetic creatures" (Santiago following Conrado de Quiros: Postscript to shaming, PDI, 27.1.2014). Public shaming though also relies on common frames of what is shameful, i.e. what is acceptable or not. De Quiros thus points out that "for you to want to shame the scammers, you must first feel scammed. For you to want to get back at those who wronged you, you must first feel wronged. That's the premise of shaming, and that premise is unfortunately not there for us" (ibid.).

[513] But Kabeer and Kabir note that "yet even these groups were able to provide eloquent articulations of their vision of a more just society, a vision that evoked the principles of natural justice and denounced the unfairness of the society in which they lived" (ibid.).

[514] Rodriguez considers the withdrawal of farm workers of their services from the haciendas i.e. by running away from the farms due to labor issues, a "sort of tampo"(Rodriguez 2010: 203) and likewise discovers a "power of tampo, of showing displeasure when they [the people] are offended by the neglect or abuse of their (political) leaders" (ibid.: 204).

because we are a conformist society. It does take courage to break traditions, and then to be creative in proposing alternatives."

In how far being *pasaway* - for which everyday resistance is but one expression - should not only be considered a resource of citizenship, but is already an exercise of citizenship depends on where to draw the line of resistance and from where on to consider it as political (cf. in detail Reese 2008b). Neferti Tadiar (*Fantasy-Production*, Manila, Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2004) locates the beginning of such resistance early and considers it a political act when marginalized people defy disciplinary action by a society in which they do not have a say, and which thus represents to them a form of second nature that they need to manipulate just like the natural environment for their survival. (Tadiar takes as example the case of pedestrians wearing away fences in their insistence on jaywalking or unregulated movements of jeepneys.) [515]

It remains an open question though as to how far such citizenship is a suboptimal one (as it is based on antagonism and disunity), or if, in the sense of Poulantzas' metaphor of the state as "material condensation of power relationships in society;" or Chantal Mouffe's concept of social discourse as quarrel (cf. Idem (2000). *The Democratic Paradox*. New York, NY: Verso), are the more realistic concept of democracy. On the other hand, it is also questionable if descriptions such as Tadiar's, relate with the narrative the poor tell themselves, or if, the latter would rather like to go legal (as the political scientist Djorina Velasco in Reese 2008b claims).

Then again there is the complaint that while Filipin@s are not short on complaining, they often restrict such *reklamo* to the private. Complains Gary Covington (Sun Star Davao, 15.5.2012) that "I found out about this Filipino not wanting to rock the boat attitude when I tried to organize some resistance to the local trisikad [tricycle] hooligans and their 'sounds' disturbing the subdivision's peace. Everyone I approached agreed that they should be off the road or at least quiet about their business but not one was willing to metaphorically shoulder arms and take action." Furthermore, the line when one is frowned upon as "divisive" by being a *reklamador*, is thin.

It generally seems that there is no lack of people feeling entitled and it would thus be "wrong to assume that Filipin@s have no sense of rights," as Sylvia Claudio underlined (Claudio 2014). There are those who feel entitled to get a »share« in corruption, others to a round-the-clock service by domestic workers, to remittances by one's children or the sexual services of one's partner. But also street vendors feel entitled to

---

[515] Likewise, Rodriguez interprets the "unruliness" of the subaltern as a form of everyday resistance: "The elite claim that the dispossessed defecated and littered the streets of EDSA because they lacked proper education. However, these acts seemed like deliberate acts of defiance, acts that turned the universe on its head. There is something empowering in violating the prevailing rationality because for a moment the oppressed rationality is allowed to express itself. Flagrant violations of traffic rules allow for such moments that violate the ruling rationality imposed on the people so they can reassert their suppressed lifeways" (Rodriguez 2010: 205).

block the sideway as they need to make a living, not different from beggars with a "fighting spirit but channeled now into persistence, even arrogance, as they beg, some of them even spitting at you, or cursing, if you refuse to give alms" (Michael Tan, *Begging Karma*, PDI, 10.9.2013). In general, there are several people believing that they have the right to a free ride (*libre*) as the better off are obliged to "share the blessings."

In this sense, Cito Beltran (PS, 15.3.2013) even believes that "Filipinos, regardless of what tribe, religion, province or economic status they come from, have such a sense of entitlement that they think they own the road. … If a group of wise men and women went through the chain of events and process to define and understand our problems in this country, I have no doubt that somewhere along the chain we will find a person or people who think they have the right to do whatever it is they do in spite of the fact that they are causing or creating big problems for the rest of us."

On the other hand, Michael Tan concludes in his column on *Entitlement* (PDI, 21.5.2010) that "entitlement [not only] involves people with an overblown sense of entitlement on one hand, [but also] victims, the poor, who have a weak sense of entitlement." [516]

We may thus conclude that there is no lack of a sense of entitlement, but rather that entitlement (and a sense of it) is very much bound to social status – with different rules (or exemptions) applying to different "estates." The upper classes can take more liberty towards the lower classes (but not necessarily among one's own kind), while the lower class has to follow different rules towards the upper classes than among themselves.

The way of how rights are realized is culture-specific. The prevalent Filipino way is indeed one that is more based on asking (*hingi*) or requesting (*pakiusap*), as several key informants stressed and confirmed (Hernandez 2014, Yacat 2014, Claudio 2014, David 2014) – which was further confirmed in testimonials by participants of the public presentations of this study (three of their kind, two in Quezon City and one in Davao). Such culture-specific exercise of citizenship might also include (strategic) appeals to one's pity (*awa*) and to the moral goodness (*mabait*) of the public official.

---

[516] Such sense of entitlement may be shaken, as in the case of the uproar the simple lifestyle of the new pope Francis I created also among the Philippine clergy. The spokesperson of the Cebu Archdiocese Msgr. Achilles Dakay outrightly declared, "I don't believe that people from Buenos Aires are not embarrassed to let him ride the bus when they already have cars. (...) That's too much if you expect us all to ride passenger buses. To not have someone live in the (bishop's) palace here? That's not correct any more. Let's just say the pope knows how to ride a bus when his vehicle breaks down. He knows how to cook if there is no one else to cook" (Sun Star Davao, 15.3.2013). And the one who interviewed Dakay himself added some days after: "I believe that it is unfair for us to demand that priests be subjected to exacting standards that we are not prepared to submit ourselves to. It is not reasonable for us to demand that they cook their food, wash the dishes and take the *habal-habal* [motortaxi] from the convent to the chapel on the hill while we (sic!) have helpers to do those things and many more for us" (Sun Star Cebu, 18.3.2013). That again the statement by Dakay was so heavily disputed is a sign how contested the traditional-corporatist-organic view of society that the traditionalists like to conserve in the Catholic Church.

Putting one's foot down and demanding for one's right as a citizen here acts counterproductive – as the Europe-socialized author of this study has experienced himself painfully several times. But even such more harmony-oriented way of realizing one's rights does not go without a sense of entitlement.

Especially during the expert interviews, it clearly emerged that the issue might not necessarily be the lack of a sense of entitlement, but at least likewise the manner of how to exert citizenship has to be specific to a culture as that of the Philippines. "I think culture seems to be an important context for shaping citizenship behaviors or even ideas of what citizenship is," says Yacat (2014). Asking "would there be space for the more active citizenship," he answers "I think there is and history has also shown that there were spaces for it. But I think I am looking at it as a continuum of behaviors that people find a repertoire or arranged that they think are warranted for them" (Yacat 2014). Yacat believes that "there is a need to really reframe particular discourses on citizenship that would be really more consistent with the way Filipinos do things. People really do not like overly assertive people... even though the message is good, but the way they communicate the message - people pay more attention to the manner and then everything is lost." When it comes to claiming rights, Yacat assumes that "we are doing it in a particular form that is not that direct or not as loud or not as fervent as others are used to" (ibid.).

David (2014) explains the specific way of exerting citizenship in a context of "people acting as if they own their offices" (which David as well considers an "anathema to civil service culture") like this: "There are ways to make your claims. These claims may not be the open, candid claims that you would find in the West. ... What probably patrons in the Philippines would find anathema would be the kind of active assertion bordering on legal claims that you would find in highly developed democracies. … It is a question of style of presenting your claim. You still need to humble yourself, when you make a claim. But it is a claim nevertheless. … The kind of legalistic assertion that might be assumed by a form of claim making in other countries you would not find it here, that it what would be anathema."

Hernandez (2014) concurs with this assumption: Comparing the Philippines to Germany (where she stayed for several years), she considers Germans very "upright. ... When you say something I do not like, it does not mean you are hitting the person upfront, but you actually saying what you are just feeling, you are not trying to hurt the person. But in the Philippines, we are very emotional people. Everything that you say to us, even if it is not us that you are telling, we take it upon ourselves that it is me the person that you are actually attacking. Even if you are saying that this is your right and you know it is your right, but if it was conveyed to us that it seems that you are attacking my persona already because I am not acting it out immediately, then the reaction would be different. The more they will not give it to you. That is where the *lambing* comes in and the *pakiusap* because you are trying to get your right, but

you don't want to hurt the emotional side of the Filipinos." "It is not *bastos* (to claim your right) but we are not used to it." Here, she further explains, "it is about semantics... Even myself, I always watch out for words. I use a more soft delivery of words. Sometimes I am so irritated already I wanted to punch the guy... but then I say ... I am so sorry ... I was the one even apologetic to him."

This agrees also with what Paguntalan (2002: 140) observed in a Philippine manufacturing company where women workers "used words like 'request' or 'to ask for' (*hingi*) or stated their wishes in a form of suggestion (*mas maganda*) rather than demanding their rights." Paguntalan interprets this as "private, often unarticulated forms of asserting entitlement employed in situations where there is an acceptance of constraints involved," as the workers fear to lose their jobs otherwise (ibid.). (Asking, instead of demanding, though is not a Filipino specific. Women and lower class members often strategically construct their de facto political behavior as less politically confronting - cf. Reese 2010b.)

Such a kind of critic can be a way of reconciling "voice" and smooth interpersonal relationships; just because criticizing is not done in an open, confrontative, "western" way, it is not already an impediment to citizenship. Most often politeness and deferential attitudes promise to be more successful in »Western« cultures, as well. The crucial point though seems to be what to do if this manner of claiming entitlement does not work out. Hernandez (2014) considers it here culturally typical to "work around the system," e.g. turn to the superior "or any influential person for that matter" without the resistive public official knowing it, instead of (further) confronting him or her with a claim.

And David (2014) gives this answer: "They (the people) might first try to do it properly [which according to David includes trying to circumvent the petty bureaucrat and turn to his or her superior to get a more favorable decision,] but if they don't get what they want they can always go to a radio station and complain." David (2014) considers this strategy very effective (just like writing letters to the editor or taking an incident on video and posting it on You Tube, where indeed several scandals where unveiled in the past years).

Another cultural specificity the key informants pointed out was the prevalence to rather demand the rights of others (as already described above when describing "negotiated entitlement" – cf. chapter 4.2.: *Citizenship a Western concept?*). "People associate rights with individualism, and rights claiming as individuals, really smacks of individualism for many people," says Yacat (2014). "One reason why they feel that they don't claim rights is maybe because they feel that they might be perceived as just promoting their own self-interest. … *Pakikibaka* [resisting collectively] is something possible because you don't promote yourself, you're promoting the group

interest. ... Framing rights as an individual property or an individual entitlement is somewhat inappropriate as a call to action" (Yacat 2014).

Like in my own study, Yacat observed that "Filipinos usually have low expectations towards government and are usually *madaling ma-satisfy*, easy to please." He explains this also with the assumption that "people as a way of impression management don't want to be perceived as *mareklamo* and *mahirap na ma-satisfy* (difficult to satisfy), so I don't know if people actively avoid being labeled as such." (The high satisfaction rates could also be partly explained with the consideration that people also do not want to be perceived as *ingrato* – ingrates.) "But if you are doing it not just for yourself, then those labels are avoided."

Yacat adds another condition for "a voice that is more passionate, more assertive (to be) warranted." This is if "you have exhausted all the other ways ... *paghingi* (asking), *pag-ano* [doing whatever else is warranted] or what we call *santong dasalan* [literally the figure of the saint, here in the sense of going to the saint to ask for something]. I think why people frown at marches or demonstrations is that it has become the primary means of registering resistance or protest. ... That's why Marxism and all the radical Left is not popular in the Philippines. ... We [the proponents of *Sikolohiyang Pilipino*] are telling them, the way you do things is kind of foreign to many Filipinos. That is why you don't get the support that you need. ... People would join if they know we have done everything else that they think should have been done first and if those failed then it is ok to shout, it is ok to launch mass mobilization, but if you haven't done these things, they would not accept."

Just as "hingi" (or better "pakiusap"[517]) is not by themselves detrimental to citizenship just because this manner is not the prevalent way of exerting citizenship in the West, we may also state that the significance given to respect in the Philippines does not necessarily contradict the relevance equal recognition has for citizenship. Sylvia Claudio (in *Don't call me Madam*, Rappler.com, 13.1.2014) terms the usual form of class-graded honorific titles as "language of patronage," for instance when people are expected to call their superiors "Ma'am" or "Sir" (omnipresent in Philippine society), and considers such as "counter-productive to critical thinking and collective knowledge creation, which are important to a democracy." Nevertheless, she also outlines that "there are ways to politely refuse honorifics. I call my househelp »Ate« [elder sister] in return, so that every woman in my household is an «Ate.«"

But again all key informants (no matter how much they believed in the possibility of drawing on prevailing cultural traits for deepening attitudes of citizenship) agreed

---

[517] "*Pakiusap* is a more appropriate term than *hingi*," says Yacat (2014), „because *hingi* is like you're begging. *Pakiusap* is really appealing to the person's humanity or appealing for reconsideration."

that feudalism, and hierarchical and authoritarian elements that go along with it, are major stumbling blocs to the development of citizenship as it also based on the idea of the equality among all citizens. "The idea of equality does not match their experience [of the common people] in a society where you see that the rich have certain entitlements that you do not have. It is very hard to really imagine a society where you can have the same entitlements," as Yacat (2014) assumes.

Cultural attitudes and values, although identified earlier as facilitators of an "evolution" (David 2014) of citizenship, such as the crab mentality or *pakikipagkapwa* (and to a certain extant also *pakikisama* or *pakikiramdam*) seem to be more located horizontally among the classes (intra-class) and they rather do not shape class relations (inter-class).[518] A mere focus on Filipino values might neglect the prevalence of power asymmetries, as Claudio (2014) objects. "The entire value system … is meant to create equality but operates in an unequal society," Macdonald (2013: 424) concurs. Taking the example of being *tampo* to express one's dissatisfaction without getting offensive, only makes sense as a strategy where there is *pakikiramdam* and the other is considered a *kapwa*.[519] The latter though can be distorted in a society pervaded by social dominance orientation: "The sense of *kapwa* is distorted in conditions or situations where there is a power hierarchy," says Yacat (2014). "*Hindi ibang tao* means that you are recognizing that you are both people and that's why it is difficult when the relationship is not equal to begin with in the case of a power differential."[520]

Above that, Michael Tan doubts that the idea of human rights has taken root in Philippine society (*K*, PDI, 10.12.2004). "Human rights is still often invoked derisively, best exemplified by the way people spit out the words with sarcasm. ... We often hear sarcastic references to »rights« in the mass media, with claim that government tolerates the informal settlers … in deference to human rights." (For other examples, cf. the chapter 5.9.: *Middle class self-understanding* below.)

---

[518] MacDonald drawing on Mary Racelis considers "one of the defining features of pakikisama is the rule of reciprocal humility that people of the same rank must obey. One who acts big" (*nagmamalaki*), who is arrogant, boastful, and pretends to a status of equality with superiors which he or she does not deserve is brought down to size by public opinion. The pakikisama strategy is then a subtle game of positioning oneself in a strict relation of equality with one's partners, while respecting the overall social hierarchy" (2013: 424). At the same time though pakikisama stabilizes social inequality, says MacDonald. "The entire strategy of pakikisama is geared toward creating equality and a mood of fraternal companionship between social actors. It is also geared towards not going against the basically unequal structure of modern or traditional society, with its landlords, bosses, amo, patrons, padres, and numerous other petty tyrants that fill the life of the common tao."

[519] Furthermore, "*tampo* is only warranted if you are in the *hindi ibang tao*," says Yacat. "It is difficult to make *tampo* to government in general. If you don't consider that person or that agency as part of your loob then that's not the way to do it" (Yacat 2014).

[520] Yacat though believes that "there are times that we can transcend power. For example, by treating the teacher as a HIT [hindi ibang tao] means that to a certain extent you have subverted that teacher's power. In that sense, that teacher's higher status becomes less important. ... There is a balancing of *kapwa* and also managing power differentials among people" (ibid.).

Another area where this can be observed is the public discourse about the rights of crime suspects, which are easily equated with being criminals already. While only 22.2% of the Filipino respondents to the ISSP 2006 said they consider it worse if a guilty person remains free than a innocent person is convicted (though another 33.1% said they can not decide), the mayor of Davao, Rody Duterte, gets much appreciation for statements like “I will leave the Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Watch to their concerns for the rights of the criminals. I have to protect the rights of those who want to live in peace in Davao City” (Sun Star Davao, 24.2.2012). Such support might also be a reaction to the slow grind of justice in the Philippines. Says a certain John Aniñon on such an attitude: “Do it your way ... Rody Duterte! We support you all the way! Don't mind if the CHR [Commission on Human Rights] will again react on this matter... Coz they only mind on applying what human rights are, they don't mind the rights of the people and the whole community against these criminals! They want due process? How long? Years? Century?” (Sun Star Davao, 29.10.2012).

This pitting of one’s own rights against the rights of others is a common occurrence. Teachers are said to ask “how about my rights,” when informed about children’s rights (personal information with a child rights activist, 2013), while middle class columnists from Manila complain that cops who violently disperse unruly lower class traffic participants “get into trouble for human rights violations from bleeding hearts. How about the human rights of law-abiding citizens like us who have to bear the brunt of the heavy traffic in the aftermath of that incident?” (Marichu Villanueva: *Anarchists on the road*, PS, 3.10.2010)

Tan though partly traces the low regard for rights to the associations the English word rights evokes, while when using an emic equivalent – *karapatan* – such rejection might lessen: “Note that while the English »rights» will often be used negatively, the Tagalog »karapatan« is almost always used positively, standing solidly as something that is desirable. The term's root word is »dapat,” or what should be, which is in many ways like the English »right« with its ethical connotations: »right« in the sense of »not wrong« is determined by a society's notions of what should be.” (ibid.)

5.7. Standy-by citizens

The final consideration that will be made in relation to prospects of citizenship is not Philippine specific, but rather an indication to proponents of citizenship not to expect too much. I believe the negative narrative partly also originates from (too much?) high expectations towards citizenship, measured against the benchmark of what Amna (2010) and Munsch (2003) call “professional citizenship,” a benchmark against which most people (not only Filipin@s) miserably fail. As in this consideration by Randy David (PDI, 16.5.2009) who complains that “against the promise of an active citizenry that is fully engaged in the life of their communities, we are shown the desolation of families broken up by migration, of communities that have collapsed due

to lack of local pride and initiative, and of disconnected individuals with no self-esteem or sense of identity. Against the promise of a strong nation held together by symbiotic bonds chosen by a free people, we only see a demoralized mass of individuals ruled by a privileged few, all waiting to leave their dying neighborhoods at the first opportunity. These are problems that are not solved by a mere change in administration. Their roots are deeper than poverty, corruption, or incompetent government." David considers this situation in need of correction: "Our political leaders have disabled our people from participating meaningfully in social life by instilling in them all the contrary predispositions—despair, fear, inferiority, envy, parasitism and dependence. ... Our successive constitutions state that sovereignty resides in the people, but the conditions that make this possible have not been developed."

Expectations towards citizenship are high from the side of the educated middle class who are mostly rooted in the republican narrative and thus wish for professional citizens. They likely belong to those whom Ulrich Beck once baptized "individualists in solidarity" (cf. ibid.: *Kinder der Freiheit*, Frankfurt: 1997 and Breit/Massing 2002: 107f.). Social and political action is a lifestyle issue – it done out of individual fulfillment and out of need for meaningful action – thereby integrating individual fulfillment and being with/for others.[521]

In this way, the SINUS milieu studies (cf. Vester 2002) observed that especially in the post-materialist milieu, solidarity and community are considered as an enrichment of life, meeting with their aims for life integration, appreciation by others, communication, emancipation and individual fulfillment. This milieu though is rather located among the middle to upper classes, where carriers of a republican sense of citizenship are thus would rather be found. This prima facie applies to the representatives of republican ideas like the members of the DRC, Peter Ulrich, Jürgen Habermas, but also to the author of this work (me) himself. However, in the case of German society, this milieu only accounts for 11% of the total population.

Erik Amna, on the other hand, does not pathologize a less than active citizenry as David does. He considers "stand-by citizens" the norm (at least for the Scandinavian countries of which he writes), and neither the "active citizen (implying the ever-vigilant civic individual)" nor the "passive citizen (implying passive people disconnected from civic affairs)" (Amna 2010: 200).[522]

---

[521] This might also explain why for example, activism in civil society is a significant dimension of "being middle class": Harriss (2006: 461) observed in the Indian case that "The word »activist« is used very commonly in conversations with and about middle- class people in India's cities. Someone, for example, who runs a well-endowed organization promoting music, dance, and drama, might well describe herself as a »cultural activist.» … They have increasingly found in civil society the domain for their self-assertion. Activism in civil society is a part of what it means to be »middle class« - or at least in the elite fraction of the middle class … that specializes in the production of ideologies [i.e. the educated middle class]." (ibid.)

[522] What Amna names "stand-by citizens" is called by Matuschek et al. the "opportunity type" or "latent political type" (2011: 246). While the first type gets politically active whenever it serves one's own goals in life, the second type justifies its predominant political inactivity with the "lack of appropriate social situations and the lack of a suitably active political subject." Both types are distinguished from a third type, the "fatalistic type," which is basically inactive and thus is comparable to Amna's "passive citizen."

Characteristic for such "stand-by citizens," says Amna, is a "preparedness to act," which Amna describes as "latent (potential or dormant) political participation" (ibid.: 199).[523] Given favorable opportunity structures, "various manifest (real or active) modes of political participation may evolve" (ibid.).

Amna demands to keep expectations low-key by not "upholding the romantic ideal of a perpetually active citizen" (2010: 199) who resembles the *zoon politikon* considering the formation of the polis as its life task. And Kaspar Maase, a German cultural anthropologist, believes that as long as the political and legal order is perceived as stable and the state as functioning (and development is at the overall believed to be on track), most people will not consider political action as their primary concern. (Ibid.: *Was macht Populärkultur politisch?* [What makes popular culture political], Wiesbaden, 2010: 35). But when the "confidence into the political class and the wisdom of experts lessen," Rucht (2013: 267) further says, this is one (of several) factors which make protest more likely. It seems to me that the information given by most respondents to either the qualitative study (sans some Left activists) or the ISSP surveys proves them to be such "stand-by citizens."

This resonates with the doubts by theorists of political socialization about a republican commonwealth of pure citoyens (as already envisaged by the Jacobins) being realistic, considering the low development of post-conventional orientations in judgment. Eventually, only a small group (often conceived as critical counter-elite to the status quo), might be willing and able to act as professional citizens. While Nunner-Winkler (see above) sounds rather pragmatic about this, Claußen (in the aftermath of the politicized 1970s) on the other hand laments that "only few contemporaries were able in the course of their lives ... to open their everyday mindset within the relatively flexible action scope still existing in spite of all tendencies of totalization (sic!) to be expanded and replaced by less naive, limited and limiting qualities of consciousness" (Claußen 1986: 152).

It was usually only a minority that stood up. Even the one million people on EDSA in 1986 were only 5% of the population of Metro Manila.[524] Michael Tan (PDI, 27.6.2013) likewise counters the construction of a whole generation (the Martial Law generation as mentioned in the introduction to this work) as "politicized." In contrary, he notes that "when I began to teach in 1985. I remember how difficult it was to get students to challenge the status quo."

Several pundits follow the line that a critical mass is enough for change. The social psychologist Harald Welzer believes that 3 to 5% of the people in any area can trig-

---

[523] A similar distinction Paul Ackermann makes (in Breit/Massing 2002) between "active citizens" and "citizens able to intervene."

[524] In surveys conducted by the SWS in the last week of January 2001 and the first week of February 2001, "at least 11 percent of Metro Manila adults" said they had joined the protest rallies that led to the ouster of President Estrada (Source: PDI, 12.4.2008).

ger change.[525] The eco-activist Fe San Juan Hidalgo (Sun Star Davao, 28.8.2012) again believes that, "it would take only 100 concerned people in the municipality, 50 in the barangay level to be able to reject the passage of environmentally harmful legislation." And Mahar Mangahas, head of the Social Weather Stations, while considering the 9% who declared in the ISSP 2004 that they have ever participated in a rally "small, relative to other nationalities, [it is] yet .. sufficient for People Power, as was proven in 1986 and 2001" could awaken "the social volcano" (Ibid.: *The important right of civil disobedience,* PDI, 12.4.2008). Breit and Massing's (2002: 96ff.) excurse on »realistic« models of democracy also eventually culminates in the statement that "political apathy of as many citizens as possible is ultimately the prerequisite for a functioning, decision-oriented democracy (sic!)."

Such considerations shall not be a judgment against the role model of citizenship that especially characterizes republicanism and its professional citizen. All I wish to note is that the model of republicanism is strongly associated with an open society perceived as shapeable and thus as political, and it is the middle class (*Bürgertum*, especially the *Bildungsbürgertum*) that has usurped here the place of the traditional aristocracy as *Trägerschicht* or as the social group supporting the political (cf. chapter 3.11.: *Still longing for something*).

It can be considered as a sign of this "role model citizenship" (citizenship as identity marker of modernity and middle-classness) that hardly any work within the citizenship studies (penned mostly by members of the educated middle class) questions the value of "claiming citizenship." Rather, the research on citizenship and political socialization aims to "promote processes of obtaining, preserving and developing the skill of self-determination (*Selbstverfügungsfähigkeit*) ... amounting to participation in political communication" (Claussen/Geißler 1996: 40f.). This work is no exception.

The myths of modernity transcended the individual biography (and its successful self-disciplining) into the project of civilization, giving especially the bourgeoisie the feeling to be chosen (or "burdened" to quote McKinley's justification to colonize the Philippines) to make the world a better place (following bourgeois values), by civilizing the savage abroad and in one's own society (i.e. the lower classes) through embourgeoisement (cf. Osterhammel 2010: 1172- 1188); if the formability of these underdeveloped was not questioned all together as in the case of "dying races" and "criminal tribes."

As part of the glorification of work (*vita activa*) and replacing the *monasterial vita contemplativa* as *vocatio dei,*[526] citizenship turns into political work. Social engineering is

---

[525] Change, says Welzer, "will be .. effective under the condition that in every social segment, in each class, in every profession, in every function a few percent of the participants start to do things differently. It must be three to five percent" (Harald Welzer: *Selbst denken. Eine Anleitung zum Widerstand*, S. Fischer Verlag, 2012, p. 35).

[526] Cf. in detail Hannah Arendt (1958) *Vita activa oder vom tätigen Leben*, München. *and* Werner Conze (1979). Arbeit. In Otto Brunner et al. (Ed.): *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Band 1*, Stuttgart, 154-215.

built into the project of modernity and can draw on the eschatological promises of religion after being secularized. Now the world is not only considered in need of change, but as well as changeable. Especially the republican tradition picks up the concept of ancient times and installs the gadabout "professional citizen," i.e. "citizens involved in manifold contexts" (Munsch 2003: 21), as implicit role model and universalizes it as behavioral expectation.[527]

Is the Philippine middle class also following such "role model citizenship"? How far does this facilitate or impede cross-class-coalitions between the middle and the lower classes, for a better state service and the guaranteeing of their political and social rights? This shall be the guiding question for the final set of chapters that follow.

5.8. The narrative of the middle class as prime democratic mover

As shortly outlined in the first part, the assumption is widespread that there is a strong correlation between the presence of a sizeable middle class and liberal democracy as ideal-typically outlined in the theory of Seymour Lipset (accompanied with the traditional disgust and ignorance for the underclass "mob"). We can find this attitude in the Asian context (Robinson/Goodman 1996: 7f. and Rüland 1997: 57f.) and among Filipino pundits as well (see among others: Virola 2013).

"The middle class is considered as the cornerstone of the democratic order, the most important carrier of bourgeois values and a guarantee for lasting social peace," Böhnke and Dathe (2010: 14) state quite apodictally. If a society deviates too much from the specifications of a liberal democracy, it is the middle class that initiates political change, Weidner (2007) among others, assumes. He sees democratization movements "driven by the wrath of a usually middle-class based part of the population about electoral fraud." The narrative of the middle class as prime mover of democracy 'tells' that economically saturated segments of society, sooner or later, demand for political participation and turn inevitably into a political force, once they reach a certain critical size (in more detail with several case studies: Becker et al. 1999). This narrative is strongly connected to the myth of the middle class as carrier of modern, bourgeois society (Cf. subchapter 3.10.3.: *Lifestyling as class formation?* in part I).[528]

Pinches believes strongly that the Philippine middle class specifically follows such role model citizenship in specific and the myth of the middle class, in general: "The quest for modernity and national development appears to be a defining (sic!) preoc-

---

[527] Likewise, the workers' movement (which culturally oriented itself towards the bourgeoisie) expected organizational commitment from its members, including "reflecting the issues of the time" (Kramer 1987: 297). And ultimately, its members are expected to get professional citizens. This implied an "ascetic way of living, reminiscent of monastic orders or professional revolutionaries," a lifestyle that could not be followed on a mass base," as Kramer (ibid.: 298) comments.

[528] Even if theories take note of diversity within the middle stratum (which is not the rule), they still stick to the myth of the middle class as prime mover of liberal democracy, assuming a division of labor among the different segments of the middle which almost by an invisible hand, leads to the establishment or the continuity of a liberal democracy (cf. Becker 1999: 10f.).

cupation of the Philippine middle class," he says (Pinches 2010: 288), considering itself as "carrier of a moral, social and political agenda that is independent of and morally superior to that of the political elite" (ibid.: 291).

Empirically, the middle class though turns out to be less the prime democratic mover it is usually constructed to be; already a closer look into European history shows so (cf. Schäfer 2009: 176). Not only in the Philippines, but "in almost all countries of Southeast Asia, especially within the middle class there is a widespread aversion to any form of political chaos and mob rule," says Rüland (1999: 61), "which one already sees coming up when disadvantaged groups such as slum dwellers, industrial workers or farmers organize and go to the streets for their interests." Or as the confessing middle-class member Neal Cruz (PDI, 29.4.2014) cries out: "Squatters have run amuck [sic!]."

Making statements about "the Philippine middle class" though would discount the fact that the middle class(es) in the Philippines have been identified with a wide range of propensities and practices, i.e., from right-wing conservatism and radicalism to liberal and Left-wing political causes, as Rivera (2001) points out. When describing the political mindset of *the* Philippine middle class we have to concede that there is not one Philippine middle class, but at least several (even if they are difficult to distill from the ISSP surveys and other quantitative data bodies as outlined before). Among those working within public administration, we may expect a different sense of citizenship than among the state-far entrepreneurial middle class which might experience the state rather as an institution enforcing and imposing rules than as source of livelihood. While parts of the middle class welcomed Marcos' *Bagong Lipunan* (New Society) (cf. Randy David: *The allure of authoritarianism*, PDI, 21.9.2013), others were in the forefront of "reformist as well as radical political and social movements aimed at challenging the state and led by communists, church-based organizations, NGOs and the private sector" (Shiraishi 2008: 8). This was not different when looking at the example of Latin American dictatorships in the second half of the 20th century (Werz 1999).

Such empirical evidence has lead to the theory of an "extremism of the center" (cf. Thompson 1999: 16), trying to explain why parts of the middle class tend to support authoritarian, technocratic or right-wing governments when seeing their (acquired and therefore precarious) position in society at risk. The middle class is here considered to be a class that subordinates democratization to its desire for modernization and especially to securing its own status - whether as technocrats, as "educated class," or as member of the military. José Nun's 1967 article *The Middle-Class Military Coup* argues that an embattled Latin American middle class abandoned the democratization of their societies as they perceived threats to its well-being largely by a growing democratization of the poorest classes (termed as "dangerous classes" or as

"mob rule") and the latter's demand for distributive economic policies. The middle class then favored the set up of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes.

In principle, this shows that the relationship between the middle class and liberal society is by no means as clear-cut as the common sense of citizenship discourse describes it to be. On one hand, there is its bureaucratic and/or technocratic orientation and its penchant for 'rational' rather than 'popular' politics (Harriss 2006: 461), evoking some skepticism towards (too much) democracy, and on the other, rationality and education also gives it a penchant towards public discourse and the rule of law.[529] "The more accurate ... one looks, the more blurred the contours get, the less congruent the carriers of the public sphere on the one hand and the middle class as a social group on the other appear," as Schäfer (2009: 39) concludes.

For the Philippines, I assume three to four middle class political fractions (Reese 2013f): First, a fraction led by economic interests (conservative and status quo oriented, rather bourgeois in its differentiation from the citoyen), further differentiated into a) the executive middle class, including those co-opted into the system (compradors and technocrats) and b) the old middle class, with its small and middle sized enterprises. The second group is the educated middle class (*Bildungsbürgertum*), which due to their employment opportunities has a higher stake in state and are therefore more citoyen. This includes lawyers and also teachers. Among this group, we can also locate the (rather small) section of the political Left, again differentiated into the moderate Left (sachem) and the radical Left (natdem). And finally, there is the marginal (new) middle class, pretentious to be part of the established middle class, e.g. by performing professional attitudes, but lacks the self-consciousness the established middle class espouses.

Such differentiation though only stays an assumption for now, as at least the data consulted for this work, could not supply such differentiation of citizenship attitudes specific for different fractions of the middle class. The qualitative study had too few respondents and its participants were too alike in their features to make a useful breakdown. The secondary data again did not differentiate in a meaningful way between the subclasses described above. The only possible approach would be to assign the statements of the respondents to the political attitudes generally considered to be typical for the petite bourgeois (Jung 1982), the educated middle class (Kocka 2008) or the (economic) bourgeoisie (Schäfer 2009, Pinches 1999a); or, to loca-

---

[529] Jürgen Kocka (in: *Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart, 1989) considers such "inherent tension between meritocratic stained educated middle-class claims on the one hand and democracy claims on the other hand" as typical for the educated middle class."(p. 20 – in more detail there).

And Tadem in an overview on the Philippine technocracy concludes: "The post-martial law technocrats generally possess the martial law technocrats' distaste for politics, i.e. an anti-democratic bias where they refuse to consult with the public with regards to economic policies. Despite the transition to a democracy, the technocrats maintain the idea that policy is formulated by specialized experts; technical knowledge is more respected than general knowledge; and technical knowledge is »amoral« in character." (Tadem 2010: 230).

te the tendency to authoritarianism among old middle classes, to procedural democracy among the liberal middle class families or to propagating substantive democracy among »middle class radicals« which the authors in Becker et al. 1999 identified. One could also assign answers to the "five basic views concerning the political mission of the new occupations that began to take shape in the late nineteenth century [and] are in contention today" Oppenheimer (1982: 109) differentiates.

As the data itself don't suggest clear differences, such approach though seems to me to be just imposing categories on attitudes too marbled to allow for a differentiation according to sub-classes. Such proceeding would as well only raise an additional issue that would further bloat the scope of this work. I will therefore leave it only at trying to put some order into the political self-understanding of the (educated) middle class, as it comes across in columns from the leading national dailies in the Philippines. At the same time, I will be leave out the intra-class cleavages and conflicts e.g. between the educated middle class and the business middle class which may explain for many conflicts in the public discourse, considering that "conflicts are fought mainly between different factions of the leading milieus" (Vester 2002: 111).[530] The approach of excluding largely political attitudes and action and mainly focusing on self-presentation is also done as the data reflected upon above, showed that there are only slight differences between Philippine middle class and lower class members when it comes to attitudes, and just a little more significant differences, when it comes to action. It is though the self-presentation as political (assumed knowledge about politics, discussing politics…), where we see major differences when it comes to class specification.

5.9. Middle class self-understanding

"The middle classes show a healthy self-image and a very high regard of their contribution to the development of Philippine society, considering themselves as the 'vanguard of democracy'." (Rivera 2006: 198)

While the middle class(es) was considered to be in a state of political fatigue in the late years of Arroyo, under Aquino III they came back to the limelight, with Aquino even building on them as "yellow army" and directing his platform towards middle force-issues such as corruption (*walang corrupt, walang mahirap*), good governance (*matuwid na daan*) and economic liberalism that goes along with installing "social jumping boards," such as the Conditional Cash Transfers.[531] One can still observe up

---

[530] Tadem considers this conflict of "ownership of property versus possession of qualifications" (2008: 198) as decisive in the Philippines. This resonates with Bourdieu stating that "in my eyes, many revolutions are revolutions only in the ruling class, i.e in those circles that have the chips and sometimes rise up in arms, so their chips gain in value. (In: Idem.: *Die verborgenen Mechanismen der Macht*, Hamburg: VSA Verlag, p.38).

[531] A survey by the SWS in June 2010 indeed came to the result that for college graduates in particular, graft and corruption were the top issue the new President should care about, only followed by livelihood, the prices for medicine and jobs *(Source:*

to now, legions of yellow ribbons still sticking to the windows of SUVs cruising the Philippine streets.

While Pinches (2010: 295) believes that the middle class based civil society had some impact on agenda setting: so that "issues like women's rights, environmental sustainability, land reform and political violence - absent from the agenda of traditional politicians - are now matters for serious public debate." Abinales (2008: 180) in contrast, considers the influence of "the middle class" as limited. He concludes that it was only able to influence politics, "when it came to social legislation that did not directly affect the elite's interests (generic drugs, urban land reform, violence against women, were just some of the issues politicians and activists appear to share a common point of view)." The "healthy self-image" Rivera observes within the middle class though seems to neglect this limited political relevance, an observation backed up by expressions of self-confidence in myriad newspaper columns.[532]

We can sum up this self-understanding in several points appearing again and again in these self-expressions of the (educated) middle class:

(1) They consider themselves as carrier of Philippine democracy, going along with a classist deprecation of the political capabilities of the lower classes. Believes a columnist of Business World (in *Reality check: Catholic bishops' political clout*, Business World, 19.11. 2012) that "the concept of public office or national leadership is beyond the voters' comprehension" due to a "narrow range of ... mental capacity."[533] This assumption though is not backed by empirical evidence as the ISSP data introduced above shows. Likewise, it is not appropriate to claim that "squatters vote like herds of cattle. They vote for whoever buys their votes or whomever their leaders tell them to vote for," as Neal Cruz (PDI, 28.4.2013) does (cf. in contrast Reese 2013b).

Finally, this leads them to questioning the extension of suffrage: "How can elected local officials be given control over tricycles or jeepneys when those operators and drivers are voters as well as a source of legal or illegal income for local govern-

---

Mahar Mangahas: *Livelihood tops the people's agenda*, PDI, 6.8.2010). For all those who have not visited college, the top priority was livelihood – with the high school graduates naming jobs, elementary graduates identifying inflation, and non-elementary graduates saying helping farmers as a second priority. The first non-economic issue mentioned which made it under the top three priorities were "women's rights" (by 10%), while altogether 43% opted for livelihood programs and 33% for jobs or for keeping the prices of basic commodities low.

[532] I am aware that the following outline might have turned out differently when taking publications by the "oppositional middle class" (change advocates, the Left) as basis. It might wrong them to be included as middle class members into this sketch, which possibly rather reflects the mindset of those named "middle forces" in the Philippines, i.e. those at the center of the current ideological spectrum in the Philippines, neither parting with the traditional parties nor with the (radical) Left. I chose to do so, as civil society publications are official documents in which everyday perspectives are probably much less represented than in columns having a personal and confessional touch. In several personal interactions, I furthermore have noticed and recorded at least traces of the mindset outlined below also among social movement activists (cf. Reese 2010b: 146). Eventually, only a further research on this specific issue would bring more clarification. For now, I can only apologize to anyone of my readers feeling *pikon*.

[533] This goes along with the experience Rodriguez made, namely that "the officials of the homeowners associations we interviewed feel that the urban poor are consulted too much and have little to contribute to governance. They feel that the people in the subdivisions should be consulted more because they are professionals and have skills" (Rodriguez 2009: 74).

ments," asks Cito Beltran (*The Kuliglig Revolt of 2010*, PS, 3.10.2010). Beltran considers the middle class to be the victim of such inclusive citizenship, claiming that "we (sic!) the taxpayers are the ones who live in fear of violating the law because of fines and inconvenience while […] jeepneys ("kings of the road in [a] nation of anarchy") all over the Philippines have an »untouchable« status." This reflects the close connection of paying taxes with citizenship rights, we could already observe in the empirical part.

And Beting Dolor, who in the course of his column blames the poor for the ills of Philippine democracy, frankly asks, "what if only taxpayers were allowed to vote?" (MT, 12.5.2013) and argues that "who, after all, has a bigger stake on the future of the country than the working men and women who fund the government's day-to-day operations with their taxes? ... The millions of poor Filipinos who cannot pay taxes? All they have to do is to work their way up to taxpayer status, and voila! They can become active participants in all the electoral exercises." Likewise, he demands that "only those who can read and write should have the right to vote ... another sound proposal that deserves serious consideration once the emotional arguments are set aside."

Jose Sison again (Idem: *Squatters and suffrage*, The Philippine Star, 24.6.2013) considers "the squatters' right to vote in the election ... to be the very reason behind the chronic squatter problem in this country, because politicians themselves largely depend on squatters' vote to win elections." He thus demands that "squatters should not be allowed to vote. ... This move may be the more effective way not only in solving the squatter problem, but also in improving the quality of our electorate so that we may elect the right officials and improve our politics."

Even if the ISSP survey could only detect a slightly higher appreciation of authoritarian solutions among the higher educated, William Esposo (PS, 14.4.2012) is just one of several columnists with ideas that "only a ruthless dictator can solve metro flooding …. by depopulating the Metro Manila area and removing obstructive structures to waterways." (Esposo in this context blames the informal settlers of having a "damaged culture and warped values" and then asking: "Is there hope for a country whose people think like this?")

(2) They believe that they mainly carry the tax burden, while the upper and the lower classes hardly pay taxes. "While the rich have ways to avoid or reduce their tax liabilities and the poor's income is hardly taxed [not reckoning the indirect taxes even those without income pay], the predominantly salaried middle-class can't escape the taxman," believes Virola (MT, 18.12.2007).

(3) They believe that the government neglects them and instead either follows the interests of the elite or of the poor. So believes Johanna Villaviray-Giolagon that "the middle class … is largely ignored by society and government. We don't have scanda-

lous or excessive behavior to flaunt before a mesmerized national audience nor heartbreaking personal tragedies that seem ordinary to the poor. … There must be a way for the middle class to step up and reclaim our lives instead of having our future dictated by an impervious elite and a feeble poorer class. There must be more to our fate than just being an ATM for taxes and other things" (MT, 22.9.2010).[534]

In this context they also complain, that government programs just reach out to the poor: "All these policies and programs are meant to lighten the economic burden of the poor, or the poorest of the poor. But the truth is, it is not only the poor who are suffering from the ever-increasing prices of basic commodities and services. … Actually, runaway inflation affects everybody, even the rich, but the rich can fend for themselves. … But what is the government doing to help the middle class who are (sic!) not qualified for the government subsidies and other programs which target only the poorest?" (Ernesto Herrera: *What about the middle class?*, MT, 1.7. 2008)

At the same time, they complain they have to pay for policies that are not to their advantage. As the editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer on April 9, 2012 asks: "Meanwhile, what do the members of the working middle class get for the billions in pesos in taxes they pay? Many of them use private hospitals or medical care services and send their kids to private schools, and for their taxes they want safety in public places, affordable goods and services, and an efficient public transport system. But the government is sadly lacking in these areas, as shown in the horrendous traffic on Edsa and the sardine-packed MRT trains, the daily crime reports in the newspapers, and the costs of consumer goods and services that have been rising along with the prices of oil products."

(5) They consider themselves threatened by poverty and on the brink of extinction. Even if data does not confirm this fear, Ernesto Herrera (MT, 1.7. 2008) speaks of a "vanishing middle class, because a lot of them are also being driven into borderline poverty." Even the Executive Director of the National Statistical Coordination Board Romulo Virola speaks of a "lack of policies aimed at nurturing the middle class [which] may be responsible for their diminishing numbers" (in *The shrinking middle class*, MT, 18.12.2007).

(6) They consider themselves hardworking and abiding by the rules (and believe it is only them doing so). While Neil Cruz characterizes the middle class as "law-abiding, tax-paying property owners" (PDI, 23.5.2013), Villaviray-Giolagon claims that, "what we (sic!) care about is career, how to provide for the family the comforts and the privileges and the opportunity we struggled to attain for ourselves" (MT, 22.9.2010).

---

[534] Some even question the poverty of the poor. Like Neal Cruz (PDI, 27.6.2013) who seems to seriously believe that when you "visit any squatter colony … you will find their vehicles double-parked on the streets. You will also see TV antennas shooting out of the rooftops and hear soap operas blaring out of their stereo sets. These squatters own vehicles, TV and stereo sets, and other costly home appliances, and we call them »poor« and the bleeding hearts bleed for them?"

In this, they consider themselves "victimized by squatters … [such as the] poor teacher, clerk and other lowly employees who paid for their lots in installments, month after month and year after year, only for these to be stolen by squatters," as Neal Cruz (PDI, 27.6.2013) complains, finally asking: "Does this mean that it pays to be a lawbreaker than to be a law-abiding, tax-paying citizen?" Or, they feel fooled as "while we labor hard to earn enough savings to buy our dream house, others just simply become informal settlers and get to have their own house and lot at taxpayers' money" (Marichu Villanueva, PS, 6.7.2011). The conclusion: "The law-abiding, taxpaying property owners are the truly marginalized and underrepresented of our citizens" (Neal Cruz, PDI, 28.4.2013).

(7) Next to considering themselves as necessary requirement for democracy (Virola 2013), they also consider themselves to be the true motor of development in the country, so that Virola can claim that "while the government is focused on lifting »the poorest of the poor, « a strategy that pays attention to the middle class may be more effective in sustaining economic expansion" (MT, 18.12.2007).

(8) They consider the rich and the poor as "lazy" and tend to consider anti-poverty programs such as the CCTs a "dole out… encouraging mendicancy by giving cash gifts to poor families instead of making them work for it" (Neal Cruz, PDI, 9.9.2010) – a reproduction of the "culture of poverty"- paradigm which already forced the "lazy" and "unreasonable" poor in early modernity in Europe into the workhouses.[535] The food for work-programs Cruz and others suggest, thus have a similar intent as these early anti-poverty measures: They shall not only provide some income to the poor, but also keep them in control.

Figure 19: A tweet in 2013 by popular actress and TV host Bianca Gonzalez triggered a seesaw in the social media: It says that „many of us work to be able to save for a prime lot and house and still [pay] taxes. Why are the informal settlers babied?"

Therefore pro-poor legislation is suspected to "merely encourage people's sense of entitlement [and] also ridiculously abandon the idea that rewards should be based on merit," as Jemy Gatdula (Business World, 8.11.2012) claims. Gatdula suspects the

[535] Cruz continues by claiming that, "if you give the men money without them doing anything, then they will just stay home and, having nothing else to do, beget more children. Worse, they may use the money to gamble or to buy drugs. Remember the saying, »The idle mind is the devil's workshop.« Keep the people busy to keep them out of mischief."

Kasambahay [domestic worker] Law of 2012 to have such effect; he fears that "middle class employers practically have no remedy against erring or malicious maids.... Besides, what is the need for a Kasambahay Bill if maids today are practically entitled to get away with any infraction or incompetence simply by uttering "*'sensya na po*? [sorry]."[536] Neal Cruz holds a similar disdain for the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 which is reflected in several of his anti-squatter columns. Pro-poor legislation in general is considered to be merely motivated by populism (i.e. winning the votes of the poor).

The lack of understanding of the middle class towards the lower class reached a maximum in May 2001, when *masa* people went to the streets to protest the imprisonment of Joseph Estrada, who was kicked out of office by a middle class based protest movement (now known as EDSA II) four months earlier.[537] Significant parts of civil society were appalled and disappointed about the poor whose interests they claim to represent, a claim which is crucial to their own self-identity and the legitimation of their political activity. Even Left masterminds such as Walden Bello spoke of "mob rule" (PDI, 1.5.2001). "The leaders of the first two People Power uprisings were shocked. They felt that their People Power was ... desecrated," Rodriguez (2010: 197) observed. Calling it a "bastardization of People Power" (Rodriguez 2010: 200), EDSA III was considered like an illegitimate child of the 'real' civil society. And quite some middle class intellectuals up to now deny "EDSA 3" to be an expression of legitimate political value.[538]

As Garrido writes, "Edsa 2 and Edsa 3 were performances of opposing conceptions of citizenship. Manifested in Edsa 2 was one conception based on normative ideals like good governance, the rule of law, an impersonal bureaucracy, and nationalism. This conception of citizenship was defined implicitly against the *masa*, a distinction Edsa 2 forces made explicit in Edsa 3. Edsa 3 in contrast enacted a counterclaim to citizenship by positing a conception based on the demand for recognition and equal consideration as well as entitlement norms. This counterclaim explicitly rebutted the conceit of Edsa 2 forces that they represented the people" (Garrido 2008: 457f.).[539]

---

[536] This article is a showcase of classism, when talking about stealing, lazy, careless and sexually threatening (sic!) maids.

[537] A Pulse Asia survey taken between February 3 to 5, 2001 among Metro Manila respondents indicates that 18% of those who participated in EDSA II rallies were from the AB classes, 47% were from the C class, 22% from the D class, 9% from the D class with middle class jobs (who share »middle-class values«) and 4% from the E class (MT. 4.3.2001).

[538] Such delegitimation of lower class protests is also expressed in this common joke: "Edsa 1: free the nation from a dictator. Edsa 2: free the nation from a thief. Edsa 3: free lunch, dinner, breakfast and snacks too ... let's go!"

[539] Mistaking their class interests with the general interest is a trait already the German liberal bourgeoisie in the early 19th century (*Vormärz*) exposed, seeing "in public opinion the oppositional voice of the educated middle class pushing for parliamentary representation of their private interest identified with that of the public" (Hölscher 1978: 454).

Marc Thompson (following Manuel Quezon in PDI, 7.6.2010) affirms such attitude for the Philippine context when writing: "Reformism, ... a »bourgeois« political narrative, essentially a promise to govern in the national, not personal interest, has a broad appeal across classes, but is particularly attractive to the clergy, urban reform activists and the middle class and globalized business. In the Philippine context, institutionally, it's represented by technocrats and their approach to governance."

We can here observe that the middle class discourse (with its issues corruption, good governance and economic growth), but also the middle class style of publicity (orderly, transparent, educational) fights for hegemony; in the words of Weintraub (1997: 81), this is an "attempt to render a single public discourse authoritative [and therefore] privilege certain topics, certain forms of speech, and certain speakers." Not only the elaborated code of English and not only the prescribed habitus of a citizen, but as well the issues of the middle class are questing for superiority.

While we find such dichotomic classism which results in more or less overt suggestions to dispossess the lower classes of their (equal) right to vote (though the Thai Yellow shirts have been here more frank than the Philippine middle class), a more sophisticated but nevertheless distinctive classism can be identified among change-advocates from the middle class (Hilhorst 2003). Here the notion is widespread that the poor are dependent and immature (or "dirty," "stupid" and "pitiful"), whose lives need to be modernized as Hilhorst, p. 80ff. describes. This is why they are considered in need of organizers from the educated classes, breaking their short-term orientation, their (alleged) lack of understanding of their situation, their pragmatism and their desperation in general.[540] Denis Murphy, one of the leading researchers on urban poor in the Philippines considers such belief to be an expression of an "reform movement dominated by elites originating from a middle class, considering itself indispensable and believing that they [the poor] neither have political understanding nor are able to organize them self" (personal information, 13.2.2004).

Take as example the assumption of Orlando Carvajal (Sun Star Cebu, 18.5.2013), as one among many similar statements that "the C-D crowd… [is] the least educated and the least financially empowered group of voters, hence the most susceptible to the wiles of bread-and-circus-giving and name-recall-savvy politicians. Yet theirs are the deciding votes in all Philippine elections since they have the numbers." Therefore, Carvajal proposes "programs to bring the D crowd up to C level and the C crowd to B level [that] would enable the vast majority of voters to mature. … Otherwise, the latter will continue to elect our officials for us. And look where we are with the jokers the C-D crowd has been electing for us so far." Either those in the lower segments accept this self-declared mission of the (educated) middle class to level them up (Schaffer [2009] speaks in relation to the Philippines of a "disciplinary project") or they catch the ire of the middle class, as reactions to EDSA 3 showed.

And Pinches (2010: 284) finally considers the civil society as "ostensibly embracing the whole nation of citizenry, but modeled on and in the interests of the growing middle class, in alliance with that section of the business elite which has publicly sought to distance itself from patrimonial politics, advocating instead modernist principles of free market capitalism and legal-bureaucratic order. Among the middle class, these (...) elements combine uneasily with an ethos of paternalism in relation to the disadvantaged. … Differentiated from the political elite identity has also been differentiated from the masa below who needed to be helped, uplifted, organized, led, educated, trained, conscientized and liberated - who, in short, needed to be civilized" (Pinches 2010: 284; 298).

[540] This attitude can also be rooted to Leninism, its despise for "trade unionism" and its advocacy of an avant-garde. See in detail Reese 2008a.

It thus probably applies in general to the educated middle class what Maase in particular remarks about the German educated middle class (*Bildungsbürgertum*): Giving up the claim of high culture does not only endanger its ideal, but "above all, its position. If the claim to educate the common people is abandoned, then there is also no need anymore for the knowledge and the skills of the educated classes - hence the aggressive response" (Maase 1997: 165). The core groups of the labor movement displayed similar needs of demarcation downwards as well: "Party and trade union allowed them to escape the proletarian milieu perceived as crude and depressing" (ibid.: 166). "The enemy we hate the most, that is the ignorance of the masses (*den Feind, den wir am meisten hassen, das ist der Unverstand der Massen*)," the German Social Democrats used to sing.

At the same time the educated middle class was always ambivalent about "substituting votes for brains," as another columnist (Ricardo Saludo, MT, 7.4.2013) quotes the definition of democracy by an "American humorist." The claim to mental aristocracy (*Geistesaristokratie*) was always at odds with the idea of universal suffrage (cf. Maase 1997 and Schäfer 2009 for several examples).[541]

5.9.1. Communitas – a dream in vain?

"Two major forces determine the political life of the country today: the poor and the middle class. One decides the outcome of elections, the other decides the fate of administrations. … United, they can change the system. Divided, they become tools of conservatism." So says Randy David in his article on *the middle class and the poor* (PDI, 10.4.2004). Mutatis mutandis we could likewise say: such a cross-class coalition could further the quest for citizenship, the way it was envisioned in the conclusion to this work.

Such endeavor sounds desirable, but it seems challenging as well. The conclusion Schaffer draws from his research on voter education in the Philippines in this regard is disheartening: Schaffer considers it "a major problem with Philippine democracy that the poor are not shown kindness or respect, that those with power and money act in ways that are rude, hurtful or unlawful" (2009: 137). Classism in the Philippines is pervasive (cf. the subchapter 3.10.3.: *Lifestyling as class formation?* in part I) and hierarchical relations between the middle (and upper) class and lower class are well entrenched, as the latter serves as the middle-upper classes' maids, laundrywomen, drivers, as security guards and sales ladies in the malls or as waiters in the restaurants, the well-off frequent. "Domestic servitude is without a doubt one of the most

---

[541] Even the "masa myth," which the former activist and later spokesperson of President Arroyo Rigoberto Tiglao spots within the Philippine Left (*Rizal, Bonifacio and the 'masa' myth*, PDI, 29.12.2010) , is not necessarily any different here. According to Tiglao this myth considers "the Masses [to be the] Messiah" –picking up the title of a book by the liberation theologian Karl Gaspar (Gaspar 2010). It is still the party leadership – or the Left intellectual – defining which are the "real" needs and aspirations of the masses and which are simply longings resulting from "false consciousness." The declaration of EDSA 3 to be a "Peronist mob rule" by Walden Bello might be example for such divestment of the poor by the educated middle class.

enduring aspects of middle-class life," says the historian Vicente Rafael (*Servants, or the secret of middle-class life*, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 5.4.2014). "The daily work of drivers and maids reproduce and underwrite the quotidian reality of middle-class privilege" (ibid.). It seems thus difficult for the middle and upper class to acknowledge people who stand in a clear hierarchical, even feudal, relationship in relation to them, in the everyday as "*pantay*" (equal) fellow citizens. Or, in the words of Rafael (ibid.): "To the extent that domestic servitude lies at the material and ideological heart of middle-class life is the extent to which efforts at forging a more egalitarian society—efforts led today by the middle class itself—will remain inevitably forestalled."

As outlined above, the poor are blamed for the sorry state of Philippine politics. David as well echoes this perspective in his column *the middle class and the poor* (see above). There he says that the poor are "gripped by ignorance, mesmerized by mass media, and paralyzed by poverty" and he considers thus "a politicized middle class could be the key to the transformation of the poor into a potent force for peaceful and meaningful change … [built on] the patient and sustained effort of middle class activists working hand in hand with organic leaders of the poor to create a solid constituency for reform" (ibid.).

The middle class thus considers itself in possession of the "right path" (*daang matuwid*) to democracy.[542] But cross-class coalitions require respect and recognition – both defined as essentials of an inclusive citizenship attitude as outlined in the subchapter 3.6.5.: *Walking the talk: from consciousness to action*. Nicole Curato (*On poor people's 'poor judgment'*, Rappler.com, 31.5.2013) here speaks of a "clash of multiple moralities. … If a correct vote for some is a vote for clean politics, for others, it is about compassion and dignity. What to some is a »new politics« that prioritizes issues rather than personalities is for others »bad« politics of callousness and insult due to the elite's class ridicule and claims of moral superiority toward the so-called underclass. … It is the poor's moral rationality that is silenced when the concept of the »correct vote« is talked about in the current context. … Perhaps we need to complement voter education campaigns with voter conversation drives – the type that sets up an interclass dialogue about voting ethics, not a univocal perspective on correct voting. Part of our responsibility as democratic citizens is not only to engage in public discourse but also be modest in our claims and acknowledge the partiality of our political truths. There is no benefit to democracy when the meaning of political literacy is held hostage by a moral elite."

If a cross class coalition shall take place, the emphasis on voting based on track record, platform and integrity needs to be amended with issues like compassion, care

---

[542] Cf. an approach longing for a cross-class coalition against corruption – but under the terms that the middle class has "a better appreciation of the political situation because they are more educated and better informed." It therefore suggests "explaining in the language the rural folks understand how the politicians had ripped them off": Oscar Lagman: *Tell the peasants in the rural areas*, Business World, 2.9.2013.

and kindness, which according to Schaffer are elements of "a politics of personal dignity in which the poor is treated as their kapwa or fellow human beings worthy of attention and recognition" (2009: 137). Thereby, Schaffer qualifies that "it is not that issues and policies are irrelevant to poor voters, but ... abstract concerns often get translated into the language of personalized care" (ibid.).

That such cross-class coalition is within reach, shows the description by Pinches of mobilizing for EDSA I within Tatalon, a lower class neighborhood in Manila (Pinches 1991). Here "the emergence of the Aquino-led opposition ... highly unusual ... saw significant short term changes in social relations between burgis and the masa" (ibid.: 184). This "alliance between rich and poor," Pinches further explains (p. 185), "was largely one of mutual convenience. … For the more privileged, an alliance with the poor was a necessity, given the lack of customary patronal resources and an established political organization. Opposition leaders could not appeal to traditional values of patronage; they had to draw instead on popular participation and fraternity, in short, on People Power. … What mattered over the final days especially was not so much one's attire or speech or educational skills', rather it was one's bodily presence and in that, burgis and masa appeared equal. The signs and symbols of hierarchy, inequality, poverty and subordination seemed to have lost their efficacy, and thus so too had shame. … For a historical moment, it seemed the Filipino people were one, the state appeared to be crumbling, and the order and division of civil society seemed to dissolve as rich and poor, burgis and masa, stood together in defiance, in danger, and finally, in victory" (ibid.).

In the narratives by the lower class people Pinches interviewed, it was especially this "spirit of camaraderie" (Pinches) which stuck out. "Although support for Aquino, the desire to remove Marcos, and the call of the Catholic Church were important, what mattered most were these feelings. For a time, the EDSA uprising and the state of communitas that it embodied had enabled the people of Tatalon to command recognition, to stand in the presence of the rich without having to contend with the power of shame" (ibid.: 185). And while "the state of communitas has passed [and] once again, the structures of social inequality govern day-to-day existence," as Pinches already conceded in 1991 (ibid.: 185), nevertheless such experience which certainly gets replicated in other contexts from time to time as well proves that such cross-class coalitions are not impossible.

5.10. Moralism

"Make idealism at the local level operative at the national level."

The late John Schumacher, a leading Filipino historian, stating at the same time "I'm beyond the stage of seeing solutions" (MT, 15.5.2014).

As already pointed out in the main body of this work, individual ethics are well pronounced in the Philippine public discourse just as in the self-understanding of the people. Kaelin speaks of an "emphasis on morality and the neglect of a discussion of an institutional social-ethics," resulting in a "good-citizens-make-a-good-state type of logic while avoiding a structural approach to problems that beset the state" (2012: 143).

Tolosa (2011: 119) observed for the Post-Marcos Era an "irritatingly sanctimonious assertion by some Filipino liberal and conservative elites that »values education« was the key to the post-authoritarian rehabilitation of the country as though all one had to do were to preach morality to the benighted and amoral masses and all would be well." More than 20 years later the former Chief Justice Reynato Puno (following PDI, 13.2.2009) stated that "the main problem of the country is moral decadence. … It's time for the moral forces of the country to manifest themselves. They should cease to be an invisible force." Manifold are also the statements from the ranks of the Catholic Church that poverty, ignorance and lack of education and lack of formation in virtues are the root causes of criminality, as the editorial of the Manila Times on January 14, 2014 states. And the head of new president of the Catholic Bishop Conference Socrates Villegas stated in early 2014 that the "social scandal" is not just to be "blamed on the government. … We need to understand our role in it, our personal responsibility for it in our individual lives and shared cultures, and return to Jesus" (following *Filipino bishops slam 'economy of exclusion'*, Rappler.com, 27.1.2014).

Cito Beltran, while not blinding out structural issues, nevertheless, stresses individual rectification: "It is high time for Filipinos to learn that it is not enough to take out corruption in government. It is also necessary to remove the corruption in the hearts and minds of Filipinos" (PS, 15.3.2013). Seldom it is that public personalities stress the institutional side (structural ethics) as the late Jesse Robredo (quoted in PDI, 21.8.2012) did, when insisting that, "it's not enough for a government official to be good. The system or the institution has to force him to be good."

As outlined above, this work does not want to follow a dichotomic either-or. An approach focusing on *Sinnverstehen* can hardly discount the fact that "good governance" also has to be reflected in individual behavior, individual orientations and an everyday culture favorable for a pronounced sense of citizenship. The work though rather follows the perspective Jemy Gatdula pointed out in his column in Business World on 4.3.2010, stating that "we are not definitely a damaged culture. … If our electorate has not matured, it's precisely because the economic circumstances of our citizens did not allow such maturity to happen and the elite, by maintaining protectionist attitudes and patronage system in business and politics, ensures that such maturity did not happen."

One may agree with Olivia Villanueva and other university professors of the leading universities, who insist on moral fundaments for a society by "wish(ing) for people to have enough morality to choose to do what's right and not only what's legal … guided by their own morality, or their own beliefs of what is right and wrong, in-

stead of just working within what the law permits. The core of a society is its people, and this is why they should be able to make the right choices" (in: *A New Year's Wish List for the Philippines*, Planet Philippines 30.12.13, by the way a quite good example for the communitarian approach of a virtue based citizenship). Following the paradigm drawn out in this work, such "frames" are also sociologically relevant. But at the same time it needs the right (*tama*) balance in relation to focusing on setting the institutions right.

Setting institutions right is not sufficient as stated in the introduction to this work. But it is nevertheless indispensable as institutional ethics show:

(1) Kindness, charity and solidarity have their place mainly on the small-scale as "community needs a space where people can see and know each other" (Reese-Schäfer 1996: 5). Summoning the small scale, the particular, the community cannot serve as model for highly differentiated, pluralistic mass societies. Unlike *Gemeinschaften* (communities) *Gesellschaften* cannot be based on "mechanical solidarity" (Durkheim), which draws on the similarity of people (tradition, values). *Gemeinschaften* might be integrated by such similarities, by kinship or other forms of eye contact between "concrete others" (Mead) which create emotional and reciprocal relations as well as direct concerns and obligations and so motivate to exercise benevolence, good conduct and solidarity. *Gesellschaften* in contrast are pluralist, with different stories of how living together can be successful. [543]

While communities may mainly draw on social integration to function, societies need laws and other conventions and market mechanisms as form of system integration. Although compassion needs not necessarily to be factored out from social relationships, it is however insufficient as foundation of society. Where the 'sight of the other' cannot get concrete, there is need for it to be reflected in social (abstract) institutions like norms, laws and procedures.

(2) Solving societal challenges is not (only) a question of morality, but (also) of rules and changing rules, as in highly differentiated mass societies "the morally relevant life situations as (unintended) overall results follow out of countless acts of individual actors who individually strive for very different goals "(Homann 1994: 20). There is therefore no (longer a) direct link between the individual will and the solution of collective problems. The system is interdependent and the individual cannot foresee the consequences of its actions, which is why rules need to channel the countless actions of individuals into a direction socially desirable. "This arrangement allows for the extension of the moral intentions from the face-to-face world to anonymous contexts in principle world society," as Homann (ibid.) believes.

(3) The readiness to act morally is an unreliable resource, exposed by overuse to erosion. Without restrictions, morality becomes a fair-weather event (*weather-weather na*

---

[543] Weber distinguishes in his main work *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* between *Vergemeinschaftung* (communitization) developing by traditions or affections and *Vergesellschaftung* (association) developing by instrumental or value rationality.

lang as it is expressed in the Philippines), with “morally based advances … dismissed when bad times come” (Homann 1994: 22). Ultimately social rules - like Kant's 'Perpetual Peace' - have to made for a people of devils. Even if perhaps the least members of society are devils (or in Hobbes' diction: wolves), they are overwhelmed by moral appeals as well. Karl Homann, who comes from the economically inspired rational choice theory and considers the societal framework as the systematic place of morality (1994: 16), assumes that morally motivated advances and supererogation by single people are impossible as they are exploited by competitors and thus too »expensive». Action is therefore only possible within a specific framework. Institutions such as laws, but also a socially normed scope of action, then act as rules of the game, coordinating individual actions and so supporting moral behavior. . Such rules then must be guaranteed, monitored and enforced also because as Hobbes said, “covenants, without the sword are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all.”

To make society work, it takes more than social integration (by values and concrete relationships), and forms of societal coordination such as markets, standards and laws cannot be waived.[544] It is not enough to rely on (the revival of) communities and social emotions (such as *awa*), partly also because then “solidarity among friends” would dominate (at the expense of the *ibang tao*). The ethical quality of a complex modern economy and society is thus determined not by individual decision-makers, but by social framework regulations. “For what and for whom concretely the outcome of market procedures is 'efficient,' gets decided by the normative framework of the market system,” as Ulrich (1997: 122) says and the answers a society mainly based on community (or on a market left to itself) are most likely not in the interest of all (which in Kant's sense alone can be considered 'moral'), but are dominated by those with the necessary connections or with enough purchasing power serving as substitute for societal discourse and voting.

(4) Finally, it is also questionable in how far the Philippines is (still) a bunch of “*Gemeinschaften,*” resilient enough to fulfill the role the public discourse and Catholic traditionalists are assigning to it. The high number of single mothers is but one sign for its precarity.

Even if one follows such actor-oriented approaches (many developed within the context of rational choice theory) and thus neglects the caveats raised by the sociological method, the habitus concept or other approaches which rather highlight human *behavior* (cf. chapter 3.6. on *Political mobilization – ridden with prerequisites*), actors must not only want to act morally, the system must also allow them to do so. Institutions are therefore to be designed in ways that enable individual morality. To bring changes

---

[544] See Kaelin 2012 (p. 77) for a whole outline of the incompatibility of the logic of “family” (operating through “particular altruism”) and “civil society” (operating through “universal egoism”), as Kaelin calls the spheres in the style of Hegel and what problems it causes when “imaging either society at large or the state as an extended family fails to acknowledge the different logic in place” (p. 154), as often done in the Philippines. Kaelin follows Hegel also in introducing the state as mediator, operating through “universal altruism” (ibid.), though Kaelin believes that this role in the Philippines is rather taken by the civil society.

on the way, a two-tier approach is needed; structural reforms need to be accompanied by behavioral change. (Cf. Reese 2004 for a possible setup of such a "real liberal" world in which "all worlds find space and none is excluded," as the Zapatistas formulated it.)

Therefore, one has to agree with Randy David when stating that "reduc(ing) Philippine politics today into a fight between good and evil I view … as a residual habit from traditional society … simplify(ing) the search for political solutions into a quest for heroes." David wrote this comment in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on September 9, 2009, in the context of an upcoming presidential campaign by then candidate Benigno Aquino III who was focusing exactly on such dichotomy (*tuwid* vs. *baluktot* or right vs. crooked). This campaign even later portrayed him as the "*haring araw*" (king of the sun/the day).

For Greven (2009: 67), such moralism is an expression that such society is "not yet fully a political one" (as it considers social conditions either not caused by human activity and/or not controllable by human activity). He compares such moralism to Europe's medieval society where epidemics, wars and other »misfortunes« (*malas*) were still primarily considered as caused by moral transgressions (sin), creating the need of meeting them with true virtue and penance, in the same manner Filipino bishops and traditional Catholics attributed typhoons in the late 2012 to an alleged divine displeasure with the Reproductive Health Bill.[545] Bankoff speaks of a "religious mysticism (that) can trace its origins to a long historical tradition of visionary and messianic figures. Governments may not be credited with the ability to do much to mitigate the devastation wrought by the forces of nature so there is a need to call on heavenly assistance" (Bankoff 2003: 172). (See in more detail in the chapter 4.2.: *Citizenship - a western concept?*)

Owensby considers such "redemptive moralism" though less pre-modern, but rather to be a specific middle-class attitude, as compared to working-class militancy and to elite power: "Workers might gain more for themselves and elites might retain power, but the middle-class claim to moral superiority made it possible to believe that neither was a legitimate political outcome" (Owensby 2009: 239). "Political moralism expressed shared but not collectively articulated concerns" (ibid.).

Owensby reports of a conference in 1940 in which a commentator argued that morality rather than economics should bind the middle class together: »The problem is primarily moral. ... We must resuscitate and maintain family, moral, and spiritual and professional traditions in order to balance the middle groups between the continual ascension of the working class and the compression of the upper strata«"

---

[545] In August 2012, a conservative lawmaker attributed a heavy flood to a pro-RH decision made by the House. "Heaven must be crying, we have to undo what has been done" (PDI, 8.8.2012). No matter if she really believes in such connection or not, as a politician she probably has beforehand evaluated that the logic of a divine *Tun-Ergehens-Zusammenhang* (a theological term for the idea that one's condition is caused by one's deeds) is not alien to her constituents. According to Bankoff (2003), 47% of all respondents in a survey on the 1991 Ormoc flood survivors attributed the event to supernatural causes such as God's will, just punishment for sinners and/or a trial to test one's faith or the work of the Devil.

(Owensby 1999: 227). Owensby observed that "the idea that the middle class could be defined by its morality spread beyond the relatively small circle of middle-class spokesmen. In 1948, responding to a nationwide survey on middle-class attitudes, a lawyer stated that »morally, the middle class leads the most stable life. In high circles … there are all of the vices of the bourgeoisie. In the proletarian classes, there is a tendency to loosen family ties« (ibid.). We can thus see that individual ethics (moralism) can be also understood as a distinctive feature of middle-classness, resonating with the modern myths of do-ability, autonomy and progress.

In the case of Brazil, Owensby describes that such moralist approach also drew heavily on papal encyclicals and other Catholic documents, "emphasizing the importance of social peace and class harmony" (Owensby 1997: 227) and proving that such approaches resonate with Catholic moral doctrine. "They … argued that Brazil could be saved from the conflagration of class only by adhering to Catholic moral doctrine, downplaying individual competition and group conflict" (ibid.: 228).

Often 'society' (*Gesellschaft*) and 'community' (*Gemeinschaft*) are categorically separated and contrasted with each other. Here the life world - the self-evident, the unproblematic, the real, the world of our common experience (Alfred Schütz) – and over there, "the system," "colonizing" the life-world (Habermas). With a grain of salt, we can say that while liberalism does not believe that modern societies can still be *Gemeinschaften*, communitarism tries to re-invent the *Gemeinschaft* resp. by strengthening the remaining community resources; while republicanism is an attempt to merge both in an appropriate way. The differentiation between the two though is an ideal type (i.e. norms for example serving as connector between both forms of human living together) and there are many traits of '*Gemeinschaft*' in modern societies (nationalism, cosmopolitanism and selective community building being examples for this).

Concepts of citizenship developed in contemporary citizenship theory thus rather employ bricolage, they "attempt to find ways of uniting the liberal emphasis on individual rights, equality and due process of law, with the communitarian focus on belonging and the civic republican focus on processes of deliberation, collective action and responsibility," as Gaventa et al. (2002: 6) have observed. Communitarism, republicanism and liberalism are then not in any case opposites, but can also be understood in a dialectical relationship. There are situations people act as communitarians, as there are situations where they act as economical men, or they also simply 'behave' following traditions and social rules.

5.11. Do it yourself: The connivance of communitarism and neoliberalism

The criteria of a liberal society are formally largely met in the Philippines: The national bourgeoisie has plenty of room for maneuver, employers have de facto almost unlimited dispositional rights as economic citizens in their own company, the taxation of income and wealth is moderate, the social system is based largely on self-responsibility, the economic system is based on free property, freedom of trade,

competition and market regulation and education privileges children of the propertied and educated classes. The government also generally respects the freedom of contract and opinion. Despite its formal equality, the rule of law gives advantage to the educated and the rich. That even a murder case is prosecuted only if there is a plaintiff is also a sign for such a factual minimal state.

Nevertheless, the sense of citizenship among Filipin@s derived from the ISSP data and the qualitative research cannot be considered as "liberal," but rather as communitarian. Occasionally there are attempts to resolve the tension between society and community by turning society into a big community - in the tradition of organic social theory society conceptualized as "organised body, consisting of mutually connected and dependent parts constituted to share a common life" (Benn/Gaus 1983: 49) and no longer as an association of individuals. This led up to an organological understanding of the state as a tribe or a national community (*Volksgemeinschaft*), where either, as in romantism next to the individuals, the "people" are considered a second natural source of law (like in Herder's *Volksgeist*), so that people only develop their true personality within the nation state (Hölscher 1978: 426) - or as in (national) socialism, where "you" eventually are "nothing" and "the people" are everything (*Du bist nichts, das Volk ist alles*). Such body-metaphor was continued from feudal society in which social groups (estates) are understood as in reference and dependence to each other, but fitted with different rights (and duties). This though got modernized by horizontalizing and democratizing this concept, such as in Rousseau's idea of the *volonté generale*, based on a concept of identitary democracy in which representatives and the represented do want the same.

Within such a communal concept of society, collective rights and necessities are considered superior to individual rights. This holds true for nationalist revolutions [as which anti-colonial (= national-democratic/national-liberal) struggles were often framed] as well as for the socialist tradition in the wake of Jacobinism. As human existence takes place within community, the private/individual has no rights separate from community. The Jacobean approach to citizenship, carried on and intensified by Leninism, aimed at having the public entirely submerge the private through the continuous mobilization of civic virtue. Public life is absorbed in the practice of citizenship.[546] "Marxists," says Kaminski (1983: 275) "elevated the collective - giving it moral and historical primacy over the individual and arguing that it was only in and through the collective that any individual could realize his potentialities. A concern with private rights or individual satisfactions was condemned as a bourgeois hangover." In the case of nationalism, as well as of socialism, internal inequalities were veiled and some ended up more equal than others as George Orwell candidly observed in Animal Farm, a critique of real socialism.

---

[546] Viewing at the adaption of Jacobean ideas in real socialist countries, Weintraub (1997: 16) though comes to the conclusion that "to »politicize« everything in society has led, in the long or short run, to massive depoliticization and a retreat to the privacy of personal relations"(Likewise Claußen/Geißler 1996: 63ff.).

Community ethics and moral recovery also stands prominent in the Philippine public discourse. Although as pointed out above, the Filipin@s are not die-hard communitarians, leaving everything simply to families and other communities. We also saw that they expect more from the government than just to leave them alone (which is said of the colonial subjects in the Spanish colonial era), instead of putting the state into the "positive moral obligation to provide for the maintenance needs of their subjects in time of dearth," which Scott (1976: 33) considers to be the "maximal formulation" of the traditional social contract in subsistence economies. The way this "positive moral obligation" is spelled out though (in the words of one of our respondents "when one really, really needs the government"), provides only for a kind of proto-welfare state that offers not much more than a basic provision (with several 'holes' in it as the rudimentary health insurance shows), advocated for by the World Bank as well (cf. Gsänger 2001). Even the Conditional Cash Transfers, heavily favored by the World Bank, do create quite some aversion among Filipin@s as pointed out above.

This goes along with an expectation towards the people to step in where the state lags behind. Ina Silverio observed (in *Beyond charity: analyzing relief work in the context of social conflict*, Bulatlat.com, 24.8.2012) in reaction to the series of typhoons that have hit the Philippines in the past years several that such "appeals for relief and assistance … issued quickly through various social media, and it appeared that not even the government was needed because ordinary citizens and various people's organizations had immediately taken action. Private corporations and their so-called »corporate responsibility« departments as well as television networks also joined the fray and conducted their own relief missions to extensive fanfare. Such goes along with making government seldom accountable for disasters."[547]

Such procedures contribute to the persistence of a weak state-strong society dichotomy Joel Migdal (1988) speaks of, a weakness which is at the heart of many characterizations of the Filipino state. But it resonates well with the "lean state"-approach (neo)liberalism pushes for and the governementality of responsibilization it is based on. The desire for (selective) deregulation connects neo-liberalism with communitarianism, both "believe that the law should not interfere more than necessary into the lives of the people," as the law sociologist Susanne Baer (2011: 246) observed.

---

[547] In 2009, during "Ondoy," the strongest typhoon that hit Metro Manila in the past years, the urban administration was perceived as so slow and incompetent so that Randy David even spoke of a "nation without a government" (PDI, 17.10.2009). "As dazed public officials shuffled pathetically in their places, making feeble references to »climate change« and the extraordinary amount of rain that had fallen, ordinary Filipinos stepped up to the challenge and did what needed to be done. They opened their homes to their less fortunate neighbors. They improvised their own watercraft and launched their own rescue missions, went on the air and on the Internet to pass on valuable information and, within a few hours, collected millions of pesos and tons of food and clothes for distribution to affected communities. In the absence of government, they rediscovered the spirit of community."

Randy David (unlike Silverio) also has some words of appreciation for such: "Those who think that a strong centralized government is the key to disaster preparedness need to take a look at what is happening elsewhere. All over the world, it is strong and cohesive local communities that have shown a greater ability to prepare for disasters, respond to emergencies, and protect the communal resources on which their way of life depends. More than the interventionist state, it is these that we need to nurture before it is too late" (ibid.).

Neoliberalism and citizenship though are not outright contradictions. In the first place neoliberalism even seems to strengthen citizenship. The concept of governance here involves collaboration and empowerment rather than hierarchy and control unlike in the Fordist approach or absolutism before – and it puts emphasis to actors, and less to structures and processes. Responsibilization and empowerment address them as problem solvers and (co-)creators of public goods instead of mere beneficiaries and "target populations." Public leaders move on from providers of services and solutions to partners, educators and organizers of citizen action. We could thus say that while neoliberalism strengthens and relies on active citizenship, it weakens passive citizenship – with its effects on growing social inequality, well documented globally, leading to a situation where one's own network consists of similarly poor people who are easily overburdened in times of crisis.

The withdrawal/absence of the state may strengthen the sense of solidarity and the skills to 'do-it –yourself' among citizens to "fill the development gap left by government " (Lambi in Amna 2010: 73).[548] Likewise, Boris explains the surge of social movements in Latin America, among others, as resulting from the withdrawal of the state and tendencies of decentralization of political rule during the "long night of neoliberalism" (Rafael Correa) in the 1990s. "The withdrawal of the state and the decentralization of decisions have … also created new spaces for movements from below," as Boris (2004: 161) assumes,[549] although their development is considered to depend on local regional initiatives. In the same way, such public space left empty by a structurally adjusting government in the Post-Marcos Era has been a significant reason for the expansion of Philippine civil society after 1986 (cf. Niklas Reese and Rainer Werning: *Between Confrontation and Cooptation. The Civil Society*. In: Ibid [2013]: 353-363).

Responsibilization thus does not necessarily weaken citizenship. It also makes strong ties such as the family and even weak ties such as networks and self-help structures a more probable site for tapping the political potential than the workplace and might make them a "root of future political activities" (Harari and Garcia Bouza in Reese 2008b). Additionally, even if the neoliberal focus on »empowerment« is in the first line meant to strengthen the self-help capacities and "fabricate entrepreneurial actors" (Bröckling 2007: 185), it might also lead to the mobilization of political resistan-

---

[548] Julius Lambi reports of a city in Cameroon called Bamenda, "where people tend to identify more with each other. This neighbourliness, belonging and common identity promotes their participation. Moreover, historically, the central government has often allocated comparatively fewer resources for development to Bamenda, which is the seat of the country's main opposition party. Such political and economic marginalisation has consolidated a common identity and sense of solidarity among the Bamenda people, who organize and take development into their own hands. This disposition to participate and fill the development gap left by government is evident in the multitude of community development organisations teeming in the Region" (ibid.).

[549] Boris though considers the "effects of neoliberal economic and social policies on the opportunities of social movements to develop" as "ambivalent." While informalization of working conditions led to social fragmentation, "on the other hand the conditions of resistance and organization have improved at the political level as well"(ibid.: 159) .

ce. The revival of community and family are thus not a form of de-politicization, but a reevaluation of the spaces relevant for politics.

The development of citizenship was closely connected to the development of a modern Gesellschaft, which had its high time in the 20th century under Fordist-Keynesian-social democratic premises. Here, the *oikos* was significantly replaced by society as primary space of managing personal and social affairs. Neoliberal governementality is here partly a return to the oikos in the form of responsibilization and management by community (cf. chapter 3.8.: *Neoliberal governementality: The paradigm of responsibilization*), an oikos based on nuclear families and thus much more intimate as the oikos in pre-modern times.

Here, neoliberal governementality easily gets reconciled with a communitarian social system within a developmental state built on a family and networks. Dagnino (2005: 17) speaks of a "perverse confluence between on one hand, the participatory project constructed around the extension of citizenship and the deepening of democracy and, on the other hand, the project of a minimal state, which requires the shrinking of its social responsibilities and the gradual abandonment of its role as guarantor of rights." Neoliberal and communitarian-inspired notions of citizen engagement in self-provisioning and localized action here go hand in hand. Munsch (2003: 19) considers such civil action as "oiling the motor (*Öl im Getriebe*) ... for a smoother flow and to save energy" (in more detail: ibid.: 18ff.). Cornwall et al. (2011: 16, drawing on Kabeer /Haq Kabir 2009) see civil society here as part of those oiling the motor (or as they would say in the Philippines: *consentedor*) with empowerment activities of civil society contributing to the "production of a powerful narrative which frames their subjects as »responsibilised citizens«" (ibid.), especially when NGOs consider it as main goal of empowerment for the poor to pay their loans to NGOs on time, instead of demanding accountability from the state.

Another striking example on how neoliberalism employs communitarian ideas is (re)assigning care labor to women due to the cutback or the halted expansion of the developmental state. This fits well to the observation by Philippe Aries that against its claim liberalism is not built on the individual, but the (bourgeois, nuclear) family. "It is not individualism which has triumphed, but the family" (Aries following Weintraub 1997: 21). This has also been reflected in the double social treaty "free" men imposed on their dependents (wife and children among them), mentioned in the chapter 4.3.: *Spaces of the political*). The interrelatedness of productive and reproductive work, for instance in the form of "one-and-a-half jobs" (*Anderthalb-Personen-Jobs*) requiring someone to back up those employed, are another example for the connivance of liberalism and communitarism.

In the Philippines, in case of need, people turn to first to their (extended) family. Transfers and support payments of this kind are the backbone of social security and risk mitigation. Instead of calling for concerted state action, people and families re-

spond to poverty and crises on an individual *and* collective level simultaneously. We could observe this among the research respondents for whom the family is the major site of activity, next and interrelated to work. The family's health, education and future, including their own, are a constant source of concern and worry for them. As the qualitative research on which this work is based has shown, these kinds of family bonds are still largely intact, regardless of all social, demographic and economic developments that point in other directions. "To the individual, the significance of family is virtually an article of faith" (Maruja Asis in Reese 2013g). Such high sense of responsibility (which is also reflected in the ISSP data drawn up), relieves pressure from the state to come up with reliable welfare state structures.

Same as Bourdieu (cf. chapter 3.8.: *Neoliberal governementality: The paradigm of responsibilization*), Alexander Schubert considers informalization as politically driven. "Informalization is an expression of instrumentalizing the state for particular society interests in a specific way," as Schubert (in *Ungeregelt und unterbezahlt. Der informelle Sektor in der Weltwirtschaft*, Wien, 1997, p. 180) says. "Informality can not be understood independently from the structures of power and domination of present in the respective states" (ibid.). We can also observe that the current administration in the Philippines combines neoliberal and communitarian elements in governing the country: While President Aquino has undertaken several symbolical acts to distance himself from patronage politics and feudal attitudes like refusing to be prioritized in traffic by abstaining from *wang-wang* (police sirens), lining up during the national elections in front of the voting precincts, prohibiting "name-dropping" on billboards for public projects (EPAL) or – partly forced to do so – positioning himself against the Pork Barrel Funds (but not giving up his own discretionary fund). On the other hand, he applies several elements of neoliberal responsibilization as outlined in part II in connection with the Yolanda rehabilitation projects (cf. conclusion to the chapter 4.15.: *Are the respondents representative for the Philippines?*).

The set up of the Conditional Cash Transfers also very well resonates with the responsibilization approach: Stay healthy and get educated – so you can care for yourself. Such programs are embedded in a focus on market instruments such as making Public-Private Partnerships the heart of his economic policies (in more detail cf. Reese 2013c) or by stating that "everything has its price" when asked about his strategy to counter the rotating brownouts in Mindanao (Source: PDI, 16.4.2012).[550] Pundits label his neoliberal approach pundits as »reformism«, as it is closely attached to the liberal-modernist good governance paradigm, unlike the competing approach of

[550] Only private sector investment can guarantee a sustainable power supply for Mindanao, Aquino said in the same context. "You have to pay a real price for a real service. There are only two choices: Pay a little more for energy or live with rotating brownouts," believing that in case of privatization "electricity generation would be more assured because sound economic and business policies will dictate decisions, instead of political expediency." "Instead of developing Mindanao's renewable energy resources and investing in the rehabilitation of existing of power plants," comments Radzini Oledan (Sun Star Davao, 15.4.2012), the proposal is simply to increase the power rates and pursue privatization."

»populism« his contender in the 2010 presidential elections, Joseph Estrada represents (cf. Manuel L. Quezon III: *A more balanced Philippines*, PDI, 7.6.2010[551]).

At the same time though, he also resorts to "organism" (a typical element of communitarism), for instance when appealing to the Filipino workforce and employers "to set aside negativism and blame-throwing and celebrate Labor Day to recognize the industry and dedication of the worker" (Source: Sun Star, 30.4.2013). "Isn't it more appropriate that instead of treating the Labor Day as the day of picket and shouting, let us treat it as a celebration - a day of joyful celebration of the workers and the businessmen because of the successful and productive year; a day wherein we recognize the hard work of every employee and what a big blessing to have a decent job that gives life to your family?," Aquino said.[552]

5.12. Outlook

Several further studies may be undertaken in connection to this study to be able to sum up findings and insights, which have only been scantily touched in this work. Among these may be:

- A theory of citizenship differentiated for the different subgroups among the middle stratum: the upper middle class/bourgeoisie (in connection to citizenship attitudes among the modern aristocracy), the lower middle class/petite bourgeoisie, the educated middle class and the economic middle class. This work should also have a considerable historical part (substantially touching European history as this is the context in which the concept of citizenship developed), and retrace the development of these senses of citizenship in a class-sensitive manner.

- A theory and baseline of citizenship in the Philippines, drawing especially on sociocultural concepts nowadays prevalent in Philippine society and everyday life *and* on the history of the Philippines, from the pre-colonial barangay, touching the colonial setup in Spanish times and retracing the concepts of citizenship (political action) among the ilustrados, as well as the influence of US-American "benevolent assimila-

---

[551] This dichotomy is again narrated in the historical-philosophical paradigm of traditionalism vs. modernism as Quezon does (picking up ideas of Marc Thompson) when writing: "In the Philippine context, it [reformism] originated with Rizal and the ilustrados; was continued by »Great Dissenters« such as Juan Sumulong (Aquino's maternal great-grandfather) [sic!], Claro M. Recto and Jovito Salonga; and involves the dynamics of questioning the ruling party, as exemplified by Ramon Magsaysay, Cory Aquino and the anti-Marcos movement, and the Defensor-Santiago and Roco campaigns from 1992-2004" (ibid.).

Quezon at the same time follows the equation of modernism and neoliberalism when claiming that "the great dividing line, then, is efficiency versus equality, where reformists and their focus on developmental efficiency must contend with the populist demand for economic redistribution to the poor: and where over-emphasis on development, which increases inequality, must be balanced with an over-emphasis on equality-eroding efficiency." He does not question how exactly "efficiency" is defined, but follows the neoliberal assumption that more equality can lead to less "efficiency;" even if efficiency is just defined narrowly as the increase of the GDP, an assumption Keynesianism puts into question.

[552] Randy David even considers Aquino to revert to »moralism« as outlined in the conclusion to part II: "Perhaps .. the basic flaw of P-Noy's daang matuwid campaign (is that) it relies too much on finding incorruptible officials and less on building modern systems that can compel us all to be truthful and honest."

tion." This though should be done as much as possible by "interpreting them based on their own historical and sense-giving contexts," instead of "presenting local structures as time-delayed copies of their counterparts in Western Europe and North America," as Manuela Boatca asks for (following Julia Reuter and Paula-Irene Villa [Ed., 2010]. *Postkoloniale Soziologie*, Bielefeld: transcript, p. 12).

- Both studies could culminate in a description of sense of citizenship among the Philippine middle classes "in between" the socio-economic dimension the first study focuses on (and the concepts of a global middle class influencing them) and the historical-cultural dimension the second study focuses on.

6. References

Literature

All translations from German and Spanish to English by the author.

For facilitating the look-up of the quoted literature I have refrained from splitting up the literature into monographies, journal articles and web-sourced material.

- Abad, Ricardo (1997). Attitudes Towards Welfare and Inequality. *Philippine Studies 45, No 4*, 447-476.
- Abinales, Patricio (2008). Notes on the Disappearing 'Middle' in Post-Authoritarian Philippine Politics. In Shiraishi Takashi & Pasuk Phongpaichit (Eds). *The Rise of Middle Classes in Southeast Asia*, Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 176-193.
- Africa, Tomas (2011*). Family Income Distribution in the Philippines, 1985-2009: Essentially the Same*. Quezon City: Social Weather Stations, retrieved 17.3.2014 <www.sws.org.ph/pr20110321%20-%20Family%20Income%20Distribution%20by%20Mr%20Tomas%20Africa_FINAL.pdf >
- Aganon, Marie, Melisa Serrano & Ramon A. Certeza (2008). *Revitalizing Philippine Unions – Potentials and Constraints to Social Movement Unionism*. Quezon City: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung & U.P. School of Labor and Industrial Relations.
- Agarwala, Rina (2008). From Work to Welfare – a new class movement in India. In Rina Agarwala & Ronald Hering (Eds.). *Whatever Happened to Class? Reflections from South Asia*, Lanham: Lexington Books, 91-108.
- Agarwala, Rina & Ronald Hering (Eds.) (2008). *Whatever Happened to Class? Reflections from South Asia*, Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Aguilar, Filomeno (2007). Political Transnationalism and the State's Reincorporation of Overseas Filipinos. In Virginia Miralao & Lorna Maki (Eds.). *Exploring Transnational Communities in the Philippines*, Quezon City: Philippine Social Science Council, 157-163.
- Aguilar, Filomeno: (1999). The triumph of instrumental citizenship? Migrations, identities, and the nation-state in Southeast Asia, *Asian Studies Review 23 (3),* 307-336.
- Almeida, Paul (2007). Defensive Mobilization: Popular Movements against Economic Adjustment Policies in Latin America. *Latin American Perspectives 34(3)*, 123- 139.
- Ammann, Ludwig (2006). Private and Public in Muslim Civilization. In Nilüfer Göle & Ludwig Ammann (Eds.). *Islam in Public*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 77-125.
- Amna, Erik (2010). Active, Passive, or Stand-by Citizens? - Latent and Manifest Political Participation. In Idem (Ed.). *New Forms of Citizen Participation*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 191-204.
- Amna, Erik & Joakim Ekman (2009). Political Participation and Civic Engagement: Towards a New Typology. *YeS Working Paper no. 2*, retrieved 1.12.2012 <www.oru.se/research/yes>.
- Anderson, Benedict (1998). *Spectre of Comparisons*, New York: Verso.
- Anderson, Benedict (1983). *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, New York: Verso.

•Ansary, Tamim (2010*). Die unbekannte Mitte der Welt - Globalgeschichte aus islamischer Sicht*, Frankfurt a.M.: Campus.

•Antweiler, Christoph (2009). Universalien im Kontext kultureller Vielfalt. *Erwägen, Wissen, Ethik 20(3)*, 341-351.

•Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism (2013). Jenaer Machtressourcenansatz 2.0. In Klaus Dörre & Stefan Schmalz (Eds.). *Comeback der Gewerkschaften? Machtressourcen, innovative Praktiken, internationale Perspektiven*, Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 345-375.

•Ataç, Ilker, Albert Kraler & Aram Ziai (Eds.) (2011). *Politik und Peripherie - Eine politikwissenschaftliche Einführung*, Wien: Mandelbaum.

•Baer, Susanne (2011). *Rechtssoziologie - Eine Einführung in die interdisziplinäre Rechtsforschung*, Baden-Baden: Nomos.

•Bain, Peter & Phil Taylor (2008). No passage to India? Initial responses of UK trade unions to call centre offshoring. *Industrial Relations Journal 39 (1)*, 5–23.

•Bankoff, Greg (2003). Cultures of Coping: Adaptation to Hazard and Living with Disaster in the Philippines. *Philippine Sociological Review 51*, 1-16.

•Bautista, Carlos (2001). Composition and Origins of the Philippine Middle Classes. In Hua Hsaio (Ed.). *Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia*, Taipei: Academica Sinica, 91-150.

•Bayat, Asef (2013, June). Jede Handlung erweitert den Spielraum – Asef Bayat über die Rolle des Alltagshandelns in den arabischen Revolutionen. Interview with Juliane Schumacher. *analyse &kritik 584*, 25.

•Bayat, Asef (2012). *Leben als Politik. Wie ganz normale Leute den Nahen Osten verändern*, Berlin: Assoziation A.

•Bayat, Asef (2000). From 'Dangerous Classes' to 'Quiet Rebels': Politics of the Urban Subaltern in the Global South. *International Sociology 15*, 533-557.

•Bayat, Asef (1997). Un-civil society: the politics of the ‚informal people'. *Third World Quarterly, 18 (1)*, 53-72.

•Bayly, Christopher (2004). *The Birth of the Modern World: Global Connections and Comparisons, 1780–1914*, Malden, MA : Blackwell Pub.

•Bechhofer, Frank & Brian Elliot (1981). Petty Property: the Survival of a Moral Economy. In Idem. (Eds.). *The petite bourgeoisie - Comparative Studies of the Uneasy Stratum,* London: The Macmillan Press, 182-200.

•Beck, Ulrich (1999). *Schöne neue Arbeitswelt*, Frankfurt a. M.: Campus.

•Beck, Ulrich (1995). *Eigenes Leben*, München: C.H.Beck.

•Beck, Ulrich (1986). *Risikogesellschaft*, Frankfurt a. M.: suhrkamp.

•Beck, Ulrich (1983). Jenseits von Klasse und Stand? In Reinhard Kreckel (Ed.). *Soziale Ungleichheiten (Sonderband 2 Soziale Welt)*, Göttingen: Schwartz, 35-74.

•Beck, Ulrich & Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (2010). Chinesische Bastelbiographie? Variationen der Individualisierung in kosmopolitischer Prespektive. In Anne Heuer Michael Meuser & Michaela Pfadenhauer (Eds.). *Fragile Sozialität*, Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

•Beck, Ulrich & Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (1994). *Riskante Freiheiten. Individualisierung in modernen Gesellschaften*, Frankfurt a. M.: suhrkamp.

•Becker, Bert, Jürgen Rüland & Nikolaus Werz (Eds.) (1999). *Mythos Mittelschichten?,* Bonn: Bouvier.

•Beer, Bettina (1996). *Deutsch-philippinische Ehen. Interethnische Heiraten und Migration von Frauen*, Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag.

•Benda-Beckmann von, Keebet (2001). Legal pluralism. *Tai Culture, VI (1)*, 18-40.

•Berger, Peter & Stefan Hradil (Eds.) (1990). *Lebenslagen, Lebensverläufe, Lebensstile (Soziale Welt, Sonderband 7)*, Göttingen: Schwartz.

•Benn, Stanley & Gerald Gaus (1983). The Public and the Private: Concepts and Action. In: Idem. (Eds.). *Public and Private in Social Life*, Manuka: Croom Helm Ltd.

•Bernardo, Allan (2013): Social Dominance Orientation and Attitudes towards the Poor: Contrasting Lower and Higher Socioeconomic Groups in the Philippines. *Philippine Journal of Psychology*, 46/1, 39-69.

•Berner, Erhard & Benedict Philipps (2004). Selbsthilfe oder unterlassene Hilfeleistung? - Die Flucht des Entwicklungsstaats aus der Fürsorgepflicht. *PERIPHERIE 9*, 500-514.

•Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics (BLES) [2012]: *Beyond the Unemployment Figures*, Labstat UpdateVol. 16 No. 31, Retrieved 1. 4. 2014. <www.bles.dole.gov.ph/ARCHIVES/LABSTAT%20UPDATES/issues/vol16_31.pdf>.

•Böhnisch, Lothar, Karl Lenz & Wolfgang Schröer (Eds.) (2009). *Sozialisation und Bewältigung - Eine Einführung in die Sozialisationstheorie der zweiten Moderne*, Weinheim und München: Juventa Verlag.

•Böhnisch, Tomke & Helga Cremer-Schäfer (2003). Coping with Social Exclusion: from acceptance to indignation. In Heinz Steinert & Arno Pilgram (Eds.). *Welfare policy from below. Struggles against social exclusion in Europe*, Oxon: Ashgate, 77–90.

•Böhnke, Petra & Dietmar Dathe (2010). Rückzug der Armen. Der Umfang freiwilligen Engagements hängt von der materiellen Lage ab – und von Bildung. *WZB Mitteilungen 128, June*, 14-17.

•Boer, Evert de (1996, Ed.). *We did not learn human rights from the books. The Philippines and human rights in the period 1986 to 1996*, Quezon City: Claretian Publications.

•Bonß, Wolfgang & Helmut Dubiel (1987). Zwischen Feudalismus und Post-Industrialismus - Metamorphosen der Leistungsgesellschaft. *Freibeuter 32*, 45-56.

•Borchgrevink, Axel (2014). *Clean and green. Knowledge and morality in a Philippine farming community*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

•Boris, Dieter (2004). Macht und Ohnmacht sozialer Bewegungen in Lateinamerika. In Olaf Kaltmeier, Jens Kastner & Elisabeth Truider (Eds.). *Neoliberalismus, Autonomie, Widerstand. Soziale Bewegungen in Lateinamerika*, Münster, Westfälisches Dampfboot, 145-161.

•Borras, Saturnino (1999). *The Bibingka Strategy in Land Reform Implementation: Autonomous Peasant Movements and State Reformists in the Philippines*, Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy.

•Bourdieu, Pierre (1998). Prekarität ist überall. In: Idem. *Gegenfeuer. Wortmeldungen im Dienste des Widerstands gegen die neoliberale Invasion*, Konstanz: UVK, 96-102.

•Bourdieu, Pierre (1997/ 1993). *Das Elend der Welt. Zeugnisse und Diagnosen alltäglichen Leidens an der Gesellschaft*, Konstanz: UVK.

•Bourdieu, Pierre (1996). *Reflexive Anthropologie*, Frankfurt a. M.: suhrkamp (Invitation to a Reflexive Sociology, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

•Bourdieu, Pierre (1991). Physischer, sozialer und angeeigneter physischer Raum. In Martin Wentz (Ed.). *Stadt-Räume*. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 25-34.

•Bourdieu, Pierre (1982). *Die feinen Unterschiede*, Frankfurt a. M.: suhrkamp. (Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, London: Routledge, 1984.)

•Breit, Gotthard & Peter Massing (Eds.) (2002). *Die Rückkehr des Bürgers in die politische Bildung*. Schwalbach/Ts.: Wochenschau Verlag.

•Bröckling, Ulrich (2007). *Das unternehmerische Selbst. Soziologie einer Subjektivierungsform*. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.

•Bröckling, Ulrich, Susanne Krasmann & Thomas Lemke (Eds.) (2004). *Glossar der Gegenwart*, Frankfurt a. M.: suhrkamp.

•Bröckling, Ulrich, Susanne Krasmann & Thomas Lemke (Eds.) (2000). *Gouvernementalität der Gegenwart - Studien zur Ökonomisierung des Sozialen*, Frankfurt a.M.: suhrkamp.

•Brömme, Norbert & Hermann Strasser (2001). Gespaltene Bürgergesellschaft? – Die ungleichen Folgen des Strukturwandels von Engagement und Partizipation. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 25-26*: 6-14.

•Bude, Heinz & Andreas Willisch (Eds.) (2008). *Exklusion. Die Debatte über die Überflüssigen*, Frankfurt a. M.: suhrkamp.

•Busch, Michael, Jan Jeskow & Rüdiger Stutz (Eds.) (2010). *Zwischen Prekarisierung und Protest. Die Lebenslagen und Generationsbilder von Jugendlichen in Ost und West*, Bielefeld: transcript.

•Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman & Sidney Verba (2001). *The Private Roots of Public action. Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

•Candeias, Mario (2006). Handlungsfähigkeit durch Widerspruchsorientierung – Kritik der Analysen von und Politiken gegen Prekarisierung. *Z. Zeitschrift Marxistische Erneuerung 68, December*. Retrieved 1.4.2008 <www.zeitschrift-marxistische-erneuerung.de/article/721.handlungsfaehigkeit-durch-widerspruchsorientierung.html>.

•Canieso-Doronila, Maria Luisa (1997). An Overview of Filipino Perspectives on Democracy and Citizenship. In: Maria Serena Diokno (Ed.). *Democracy and Citizenship in Filipino Political Culture*, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 69-112.

•Cannell, Fenella (1999). *Power and Intimacy in the Christian Philippines*, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

•Canuday, Jose Jowel (2009). *Bakwit. The Power of the Displaced*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

•Castel, Robert (2005). *Die Wiedergewinnung des Sozialen*. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition.

•Castel, Robert (2000). *Metamorphosen der sozialen Frage*, Konstanz: UVK. [Robert Castel (2003). From Manual Workers to Wage Laborers. Transformation of the Social Question, Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick.]

•Castel, Robert & Klaus Dörre (Eds.) (2008). *Prekarität, Abstieg, Ausgrenzung. Die soziale Frage am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts*, Frankfurt a.M.: Campus.

•Castles, Stephen & Alastair Davidson (2000). *Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

•Chavez, Gladys (1998). Nuestro siguiente programa: ¿Hacia una clase media mundial? Paradojas y mitos de la globalidad. In Gonzalo Portocarrero (Ed.). *Las clases medias: Entre la pretensión y la incertidumbre*, Lima: Tempo, 159-190.

•Cohen, Laurie & Amala El-Sawad (2007). Accounting for 'Us' and 'Them' - Indian and UK Customer Service Workers' Reflections on Offshoring. *Economic and Political Weekly, 42 (21)*, 1951-1957.

•Choi, Hae-Lin (2004). Organisierung der Unorganisierbaren. *Das Argument 256*, 428-439.

•Christ, Simone (2008). *Migrantinnen im "Übermorgenland". Soziale Kompetenzgewinnung und Alltagswissen von Filipinas in Dubai, Vereinigte Arabische Emirate*. Unpublished thesis (Magister Artium). Trier: Universität Trier.

•Clarke, Gerard (2013). *Civil Society in the Philippines – Theoretical, methodological and policy debates*, Oxon: Routledge.

•Claußen, Bernhard (1996). Die Politisierung des Menschen und die Instanzen der politischen Sozialisation. In Idem. & Rainer Geißler (Eds.). *Die Politisierung des Menschen - Instanzen der politischen Sozialisation*, Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 15-48.

•Claußen, Bernhard (1986). Politisches Lernen und die Sozialisation von Erwachsenen. In Rolf Arnold & Jochen Kaltschmitt (Eds.). *Erwachsenensozialisation und Erwachsenenbildung. Aspekte einer Sozialisationstheoretischen Begründung von Erwachsenenbildung*, Frankfurt a. M.: Diesterweg, 143-157.

•Claußen, Bernhard & Rainer Geißler (Eds.) (1996). *Die Politisierung des Menschen - Instanzen der politischen Sozialisation*, Opladen: Leske+Budrich.

•Claußen, Bernhard & Klaus Wasmund (Eds.) (1982). *Handbuch der politischen Sozialisation*, Braunschweig: Pedersen.

•Clemente, Jose Antonio, Delia Beleza, Angela Yu, Effie Catibog, Goyena Solis and Jason Laguerta (2008): Revisiting the Kapwa Theory: Applying Alternative Methodologies and Gaining New Insights. *Philippine Journal of Psychology 41/2*, 1-32.

•Coelho, Vera & Bettina von Lieres (Eds.) (2010). *Mobilizing for democracy: citizen engagement and the politics of public participation*, London: Zed Books.

•Comaroff, Jean & John L. Comaroff (2012). *Der Süden als Vorreiter der Globalisierung. Neue postkoloniale Perspektiven*, Frankfurt a. M.: Campus.

•Communications Workers of America [CWA] and Centre for Education and Communication (2005). *Bi-national Perspective on Offshore Outsorcing – A Collaboration Between Indian and US Labour*. Retrieved 1.6.2012 < www.jwj.org/campaigns/global/tools/outsourcing/us_india_report_2006.pdf.>.

•Connell, Raewyn (2007). *Southern Theory. The global dynamics of knowledge in social science*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

•Cornwall, Andrea, Steven Robins & Bettina von Lieres (2011*). States of Citizenship: Contexts and Cultures of Public Engagement and Citizen Action*, IDS Working Paper 363, Brigthon: Institute of Development Studies

•Cortes, Rosario, Celestina Boncan & Ricardo Jose (2000). *The Filipino Saga – History as Social Change*. Quezon City: New Day.

•Dagnino, Evelina (2005). 'We all have rights, but...' Contesting concepts of citizenship in Brazil. In Naila Kabeer (Ed.) (2005*). Inclusive citizenship*, London: Zed Books.

•Daines, Victoria & David Seddon (1994). Fighting for Survival: Women's responses to Austerity. In: John Walton & David Seddon (Eds.). *Free Markets and Food Riots*, Oxford: Blackwell, 57-96.

•Denzin, Norman & Yvonna Lincoln (Eds.) (2005). *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative research*, 3rd edition, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

•Department of Political Science (2010). *Philippine politics: democratic ideals and realities*, Quezon City, Ateneo de Manila University Press.

•Department of Science and Technology (DOST) (2012). *2012-2016 Philippine Information Technology and Business Process Management Road Map*, Retrieved 19.2.2014 <icto.dost.gov.ph/index.php/2012-2016-it-bpm-road-map>.

•Diokno, Maria Serena (1997). Becoming a Filipino Citizen. In: Idem. (Ed.). *Democracy and citizenship in Filipino Political Culture*, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 17-38.

•Dörre, Klaus (2013). *Generation Prekär - Der Fahrstuhl nach oben funktioniert nicht*. Deutschlandfunk, December 3.

•Dörre, Klaus (2007). Prekäre Klassengesellschaft? - Zur Strukturierung und Verarbeitung sozialer Ungleichheit im Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus. In Christina Kaindl (Ed.). *Subjekte im Neoliberalismus*, Marburg: BdWi-Verlag, 19-47.

•Dörre, Klaus & Stefan Schmalz (2013). Comeback der Gewerkschaften. Eine machtsoziologische Forschungsperspektive. In Idem. (Ed.). *Comeback der Gewerkschaften? Machtressourcen, innovative Praktiken, internationale Perspektiven*, Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 13-38.

•Dörre, Klaus & Tatjana Fuchs (2005). Prekarität und soziale (Des-)Integration. *Z. Zeitschrift Marxistische Erneuerung 63*, Retrieved 10.9.2010 <archiv.zme-net.de/archiv/xxinfo/h063s020.html>.

•DRC [Development Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation and Accountability] (2011). *Blurring the Boundaries. Citizen Action Across States and Societies*, retrieved 1.12.2012 <www.drc-citizenship.org>.

•Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research [EILER](2008). *Research on Transport-Related Call Centres in the Philippines*, unpublished PDF.

•Ehrenreich, Barbara & John Ehrenreich (2013). Das böse Erwachen: Aufstieg und Fall der Mittelschicht. *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik no. 3*, 109-120.

•Ehrenreich, Barbara (1989). *Fear of falling – The inner life of the middle class*. New York: Pantheon Books.

•Engels, Friedrich (1891/1975). Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats (4th edition). In: Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels (1975). *Werke*, Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

•English, Leo James (1986). *Tagalog-English Dictionary*, Mandaluyong City: National Book Store.

•Enriquez, Virgilio (1992*). From colonial to liberation psychology: the Philippine experience*, Quezon City: The University of the Philippines Press.

•Ermitanio, Noli (2012). *College students find work in call centers*, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 30.6.

•Fabros, Aya (2007). *Social production of outsourced selves: A view of call center regimes and experiences in the Philippines*. Master Thesis (unpublished), Quezon City: University of the Philippines.

•Fabros, Aya & Clarence Pascual (2007). *How Decent Is Call Center Work?,* unpublished manuscript.

•Fay, Brian (1996). *Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science*, Oxford: Blackwell.

•Fallows, James (1987). A damaged culture. A new Philippines? *The Atlantic Monthly*, November, 49-58.

•Fehrmann, Eberhard & Ulrike Metzner (1984). *Angestellte und Gewerkschaften*, Köln: Bund Verlag.

•Franco, Jennifer (2011). *Bound by law: Filipino rural poor and the search for justice in a plural-legal landscape*, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

•Fuchs-Heinritz, Werner & Alexandra König (2005). *Pierre Bourdieu*, Konstanz: UVK.

•Garcelon, Marc (1997). The Shadow of the Leviathan: Public and Private in Communist and Post-Communist Society. In: Jeff Weintraub & Krishan Kumar (Ed.). *Public and Private in Thought and Practice - Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 303-332.

•Garrido, Marco (2008). Civil and Uncivil Society. Symbolic Boundaries and Civic Exclusion in Metro Manila. *Philippine Studies 56/4*, 443-65.

•Gaspar, Karl (2010). *The Masses are Messiah – Contemplating the Filipino Soul*, Quezon City: Institute of Spirituality in Asia.

•Gaventa, John (2010). '*Seeing like a Citizen*'*: Re-claiming Citizenship in a Neoliberal World*. In Alan Fowler and Chiku Malunga (Eds). NGO Management: The Earthscan Companion, London: Earthscan.

•Gaventa, John & Gregory Barrett (2010). *So What Difference Does it Make? Mapping the Outcomes of Citizen Engagement*. IDS Working Paper 347, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

•Gaventa, John & Rosemarie McGee (Eds.) (2010). *Citizen Action and National Policy Reform: Making Change Happen*, London: Zed Books.

•Gaventa, John & Rajesh Tandon (2010). Citizen engagements in a globalizing world. In Idem. (Eds.). *Globalizing citizens: new dynamics of inclusion and exclusion*, London: Zed Books, 3-32.

•Gerke, Solvay (2000). Global Lifestyles under Local Conditions: the New Indonesian Middle Class. In Beng-Huat Chua (Ed.) (2000). *Consumption in Asia: Lifestyles and Identities*, London: Routledge, 135-158.

•Gessner, Volkmar (2002). Rechtspluralismus und globale soziale Bewegungen. *Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 23/2*, 277- 305.

•Giddens, Anthony (1998). Die Theorie der Strukturierung - Ein Interview mit Anthony Giddens. *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, no. 4, 286-295.

•Girndt, Cornelia (1997). The Citybetriebsrat never sleeps. In Idem. *Anwälte, Problemlöser, Modernisierer - Betriebsratsreportagen von Cornelia Girndt*, Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh, 91 – 100, Retrieved 2.3.2012 <www.tekomedia.de/files/0/111/published/the%20citibetriebsrat%20never%20sleeps.pdf>.

•Girtler, Roland (2001). *Methoden der Feldforschung*, Stuttgart: UTB.

•Glassman, Ronald (1995). *The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective*, Leiden: Brill.

•Go, Julian (2008). *American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite Political Cultures in the Philippines and Puerto Rico during U.S. Colonialism*, Durham: Duke University Press.

•Goldthorpe, John (1992). *Revised class schema*, London: Social and Community Planning Research.

•Greven, Michael (2009). *Die politische Gesellschaft. Kontingenz und Dezision als Probleme des Regierens und der Demokratie*, Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

•Groves, Julian McAllister & Kimberly A. Chang (2002). Romancing Resistance and Resisting Romance: Ethnography and the Construction of Power in the Filipina Domestic Worker Community in Hong Kong. In Filimeno Aguilar (Ed.). *Filipinos in Global Migrations*, Quezon City: PSSC, 316-343.

•Gsänger, Hans (2001). Wie fördert man die soziale Sicherung im Süden? *Der Überblick 1/2001*, 11-17.

•Gugutzer, Robert (2004). *Soziologie des Körpers*, Bielefeld: transcript.

•Habermas, Jürgen (1974). The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article. *New German Critique, No.3 (Autumn)*, 49-55. [First published (in German) 1964 in Fischer Lexikon, Staat und Politik, Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer.]

•Habermas, Jürgen (1962). *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*, Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag. (English: The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society.)

•Brühl, Tanja, Tobias Debiel, Brigitte Hamm, Hartwig Hummel & Jens Martens (Eds.) (2001). *Die Privatisierung der Weltpolitik. Entstaatlichung und Kommerzialisierung im Globalisierungsprozess*, Bonn. Dietz.

•Harriss, John (2006). Middle-class activism and the politics of the informal working class. A Perspective on Class Relations and Civil Society in Indian Cities. *Critical Asian Studies 38 (4)*, 445-465.

•Hartmann, Yvonne (2005). In Bed with Enemy - Some Ideas on the Connection between Neoliberalism and the Welfare State. *Current Sociology, January*, 57-73.

•Harvey, Paul & Jeremy Lind (2005). *Dependency and Aid*, HPG Report 19, London: Overseas Development Institute.

•Hayes, Peter (1992). *The people and the mob: the ideology of civil conflict in modern Europe*, Westport: Praeger Publishers.

•Hellmann, Kai-Uwe (1997). Marginalisierung und Mobilisierung. Konzeptionelle Überlegungen zur Emergenz und Mobilisierung von Marginalisierten. *Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen 10(2)*, 23-37.

•Higonnet, Patrice (1998). *Goodness beyond Virtue - Jacobins during the French Revolution*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

•Hilhorst, Dorothea (2003). *The Real World of NGOs*, London: Zed Books.

•Hilpert, Dagmar (2013). *Wohlfahrtsstaat der Mittelschichten? Sozialpolitik und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.

•Himmelmann, Gerhard (2002). Der Bürger in Politikwissenschaft und Praxis. In Gotthard Breit & Peter Massing (Eds.). *Die Rückkehr des Bürgers in die politische Bildung*, Schwalbach/Ts.: Wochenschau Verlag, 28-55.

•Hinz, Michael (2002). *Der Zivilisationsprozess: Mythos oder Realität? Wissenschaftssoziologische Untersuchungen zur Elias-Duerr-Kontroverse*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

•Höfert, Almut (2010). Alteritätsdiskurse: Analyseparameter historischer Antagonismusnarrative und ihre historiographischen Folgen. In Gabriele Haug-Moritz and Ludolf Pelizaeus (Ed.). *Repräsentationen der islamischen Welt im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit*, Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 21-40.

•Hölscher, Lucian (1978). Öffentlichkeit. In *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 413-467.

•Hofstede, Geert (2001). *Lokales Denken, globales Handeln: interkulturelle Zusammenarbeit und globales Management*, München: dtv (English original: *Culture's Consequences: comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations*, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2001.)

•Homann, Karl (1994). Die moralische Qualität der Marktwirtschaft. *LIST Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik 20*, 15-27.

•Hopf, Christel & Wulf Hopf (1997). *Familie, Persönlichkeit, Politik - Eine Einführung in die politische Sozialisation*. München: Juventa Verlag.

•Howe, Brian and Katherine Covell (2010). Miseducating children about their rights. *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice 5(2)*, 91-102.

•Hradil, Stefan (1987). *Sozialstrukturanalyse in einer fortgeschrittenen Gesellschaft: Von Klassen und Schichten zu Lagen und Milieus*, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

•Hurrelmann, Klaus and Dieter Ulich (Ed., 2008). *Handbuch Sozialisationsforschung*, Weinheim: Beltz, 7th revised edition.

•ISSP Research Group (2013). International Social Survey Programme: ***Health and Health Care - ISSP 2011***. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5800 Data file Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11759.

•ISSP Research Group (2013). International Social Survey Programme: ***Work Orientation III - ISSP 2005***. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4350 Data file Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11648.

•ISSP Research Group (2012). International Social Survey Programme: ***Social Inequality IV - ISSP 2009***. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5400 Data file Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11506 .

•ISSP Research Group (2012). International Social Survey Programme: ***Citizenship - ISSP 2004***. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3950 Data file Version 1.3.0, doi:10.4232/1.11372.

•ISSP Research Group (2012). International Social Survey Programme: ***National Identity II - ISSP 2003***. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3910 Data file Version 2.1.0, doi:10.4232/1.11449.

•ISSP Research Group (2008). International Social Survey Programme: ***Role of Government IV - ISSP 2006***. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4700 Data file Version 1.0.

•ISSP Research Group (2003). International Social Survey Programme**: *Social Relations and Support Systems / Social Networks II - ISSP 2001***. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3680 Data file Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.3680.

•Ileto, Reynaldo (1979). *Pasyon and Revolution. Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910,* Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Univesity Press.

•James, Stephen (2007). *Universal Human Rights. Origins and Development*, New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC.

•Jessop, Bob (1983). The capitalist state and the rule of capital: problems in the analysis of business associations. *West European Politics 6(2),* 139-62.

•Jones, Emma & John Gaventa (2002). *Concepts of Citizenship: A Review*, IDS Development Bibliography 19, Brighton: IDS.

•Joas, Hans (2013). *Die Sakralität der Person. Eine neue Genealogie der Menschenrechte*. Frankfurt a. M.: suhrkamp.

•Jung, Dirk (1982). *Vom Kleinbürgertum zur deutschen Mittelschicht: Analyse einer Sozialmentalität*, Saarbrücken: Die Mitte.

•Kabeer, Naila (Ed.)(2005). *Inclusive citizenship*, London: Zed Books.

•Kabeer, Naila & Ariful Haq Kabir (2009). *Citizenship Narratives in the Absence of Good Governance: Voices of the Working Poor in Bangladesh*, Sussex: IDS.

•Kaelin, Lucas (2012). *Strong Family, Weak State. Hegel's Political Philosoühy and the Filipino Family*, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

•Kahmann, Marcus (2003). *Trade Unions and the Growth of the Information Economy*, Brussels: European Trade Union Institute.

•Kamenka, Eugene (1983). Public/Private in Marxist Theory and Marxist Practice. In Stanley Benn & Gerald Gaus (Eds.). *Public and Private in Social Life*, Manuka: Croom Helm Ltd., 267-279.

•Karaos, Anna Marie (2006). Populist Mobilization and Manila's Urban Poor. In Institute for Popular Democracy (Ed.). *Social Movements*, Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 46 – 102.

•Karaos, Anna Marie (1997). Perceptions and Practices of Democracy Among Middle Class Families. In Maria Serena Diokno (Ed.). *Democracy and citizenship in Filipino Political Culture*, Quezon City: University of the Philippine Press, 113-132.

•Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver (2003). Sicherheit. Das Leitbild beherrschbarer Komplexität. In Stefan Lessenich (Ed.). *Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Grundbegriffe. Historische und aktuelle Diskurse*, Frankfurt: Campus, 73–104.

•Kaufmann, Jean-Claude (1999). *Das verstehende Interview*, Konstanz: UVK.

•Keller, Monika (2007). Moralentwicklung und moralische Sozialisation. In Detlef Horster (Ed.). *Moralentwicklung von Kindern und Jugendlichen*, Wiesbaden, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 17-49.

•Kerkvliet, Benedict (1991). *Everyday Politics in the Philippines. Class and Status Relations in a Central Luzon Village*, Quezon City: New Day Press.

•Kerkvliet, Benedict (1977). *The Huk Rebellion – A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines*, London: University of California Press.

•Kimura, Masataka (2003). The Emergence of the Middle Class and Political Change in the Philippines. *The Developing Economies, XLI-2 (June),* 264–84.

•Kinder, Donald & Walter Mebane (1983). Politics and Economics in Everyday Life.In Kristen Monroe (Ed.). *The Political Process and Economic Change*, NY: Agathon Press, 141-180.

•Klatt, Johanna & Franz Walter (2011). *Entbehrliche der Bürgergesellschaft? Sozial Benachteiligte und Engagement*, Bielefeld: transcript.

•Kocka, Jürgen (2008). Bürger und Bürgerlichkeit im Wandel. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, no. 9-10*, 3-9.

•Kocka, Jürgen (2002). Das Bürgertum als Träger von Zivilgesellschaft - Traditionslinien, Entwicklungen, Perspektiven. In Enquete-Kommission „Zukunft des bürgerschaftlichen Engagements" Deutscher Bundestag (Ed.). *Bürgerschaftliches Engagement und Zivilgesellschaft*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 15–22.

•Köcher, Renate (2009). *Der Statusfatalismus der Unterschicht*, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 16.

•Kohlberg, Lawrence (1996). *Die Psychologie der Moralentwicklung*, Frankfurt a. M. , suhrkamp.

•Kraemer, Klaus (2008a). Ist Prekarität überall?. In Claudio Altenhain, Anja Danilina, Erik Hildebrandt, Stefan Kausch, Annekathrin Müller & Tobias Roscher (Eds.). *Von "Neuer Unter-*

schicht" und Prekariat. Gesellschaftliche Verhältnisse und Kategorien im Umbruch, Bielefeld: transcript, 138-152.

•Kraemer, Klaus (2008b). Prekarisierung - jenseits von Stand und Klasse? In Robert Castel & Klaus Dörre (Eds.). *Prekarität, Abstieg, Ausgrenzung - Die soziale Frage am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts*, Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 241-252.

•Kramer, Dieter (1987). *Theorien zur historischen Arbeiterkultur*, Marburg: Verlag Arbeiterbewegung und Gesellschaftswissenschaft.

•Kraushaar, Wolfgang (2012). *Der Aufruhr der Ausgebildeten. Vom Arabischen Frühling zur Occupy-Bewegung*, Hamburg: Hamburger Edition.

•Kreckel, Reinhard (1992). *Politische Soziologie der sozialen Ungleichheit*, Frankfurt a. M.: Campus.

•Krumwiede, Heinrich (2002). Soziale Ungleichheit und Klassenstruktur in Lateinamerika. In Petra Bendel & Michael Krennerich (Eds.). *Soziale Ungerechtigkeit. Analysen zu Lateinamerika*, Frankfurt a.M., 57-80.

•Kühn, Thomas (2006). Alltägliche Lebensführung und soziale Ungleichheit – eine explorative Studie in Salvador (Bahia). In Idem & Jessé Souza (Eds.). *Das moderne Brasilien - Gesellschaft, Politik und Kultur in der Peripherie des Westens*, Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 129-143.

•Kumar, Krishan (1997). Home: The Promise and Predicament of Private Life at the End of the Twentieth Century. In Jeff Weintraub & Idem (Eds.). *Public and Private in Thought and Practice - Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 204-236.

•Lakha, Salim (1999). The state, the globalisation and Indian middle-class identity. In Michael Pinches (Ed.). *Culture And Privilege In Capitalist Asia*, London: Routledge, 251-274.

•Lantermann, Ernst, Elke Döring-Seipel, Frank Eierdanz & Lars Gerhold (2009). *Selbstsorge in unsicheren Zeiten. Resignieren oder Gestalten*, Beltz Verlag, Weinheim.

•Lanzona, Vina (2010). *Amazons of the Huk Rebellion – Gender, Sex and Revolution in the Philippines*, Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

•Lauser, Andrea (2004). *„Ein guter Mann ist harte Arbeit"*, Bielefeld: transcript

•Löther, Andrea (1998). Städtische Prozessionen zwischen repräsentativer Öffentlichkeit, Teilhabe und Publikum, In Gert Melville & Peter von Moos (Eds.). *Das Öffentliche und das Private in der Vormoderne*, Köln: Böhlau, 435-459.

•Lomnitz, Larissa (1975). *Como sobreviven los marginados*, Mexico D.F.: Siglo XXI.

•Lomnitz, Larissa (1971). Reciprocity of Favors in the Urban Middle Class of Chile. In George Dalton (Ed.). *Studies in Economic Anthropology,* Washington, DC: American Anthropological Association, 93-106.

•Maase, Kaspar (1997). *Grenzenloses Vergnügen. Der Aufstieg der Massenkultur 1850-1970*, Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer.

•Macapagal, Ma. Elisabeth, Mira Ofreneo, Cristina Montiel & Jocelyn Nolasco (2013). *Social Psychology in the Philippine Context*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

•Macdonald, Charles (2013): The Filipino as Libertarian. Contemporary Implications of Anarchism. *Philippine Studies 61/4*, 413-30.

•Mackert, Jürgen (2006). *Staatsbürgerschaft - Eine Einführung*, Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

•Madry, Nick & Mark Kirby (1996). *Investigating Work, Unemployment and Leisure*, London: Collins Educational.

•Mahmud, Simeen & Celestine Nyamu Musembi (2011). *Gender and Citizenship at the Grassroots: Assessing the Effect of NGO Initiatives in Social Mobilization and Political Empowerment in Kenya and Bangladesh*, Retrieved 1.8.2010 < www.drc-citizenship.org/system/assets/1052734718/original/1052734718-mahmud_etal.2011-gender.pdf?1299745681 >.

•Mariel, Francisco & Fe Maria Arriola (1987). *History of the Burgis*, Manila: GCF Books.

•Marshall, Thomas (1950). *Citizenship and Social Class*, Cambridge: CUP.

•Marx, Karl (1869/1972). Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Napoleon. In. *Karl Marx –Friedrich Engels – Werke, Band 8, Dietz Verlag: Berlin/DDR*, 115 -207 (first published in 1869).

•Matuschek, Ingo , Uwe Krähnke, Frank Kleemann & Frank Ernst (2011). *Links sein - Politische Praxen und Orientierungen in linksaffinen Alltagsmilieus*, Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

•McKay, Steven (2006). *Satanic Mills or Silicon Islands –The Politics of High-Tech Production in the Philippines*, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

•Medina, Belen (2001). *The Filipino Family* (2nd rev. ed.), Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.

•Mendoza, Rizalyn & Shuichi Nakayama (2003). Makabayan Curriculum for Secondary Schools in the Philippines: The Development of Citizenship. *Educational Research for Policy and Practice 2*: 13–26.

•Merklen, Dennis (2005). *Pobres ciudadanos. Las clases populares en la era democrática, Argentina, 1983-2003*, Buneos Aires: Gorla.

•Messenger, Jon & Naj Ghosheh (Eds.) (2010). *Offshoring and working conditions in remote work*, Geneva: International Labour Organisation.

•Meyer, Thomas (2009). *Was ist Demokratie? Eine diskursive Einführung*, Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

•Michel, Dirk (2009). *Politisierung und Biographie. Politische Einstellungen deutscher Zionisten und Holocaustüberlebender*, Opladen: Verlag Babara Budrich.

•Miraflor, James Matthew & Emmanuel Hizon (2008). *Class Struggle and the Radicalizing "Middle Class." Working class in a changing landscape*. Retrieved 14.3.2014 <politicsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2008/03/class-struggle-and-radicalizing-middle.html>.

•Mollat, Michel (1984). *Die Armen im Mittelalter*, München: Beck.

•Moore, Barrington (1982). *Ungerechtigkeit - die sozialen Ursachen von Unterordnung und Widerstand*, Frankfurt a. M.: suhrkamp.

•Moos, Peter von (1998). Das Öffentliche und das Private im Mittelalter. Für einen kontrollierten Anachronismus" In Gert Melville 6 Peter von Moos (Eds.). *Das Öffentliche und das Private in der Vormoderne*, Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 3-83.

•Mulder, Niels (2011). The Crux Is the Skin: Reflections on Southeast Asian Personhood. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 30 (1), 95-116.

•Mulder, Niels (2004). *Inside Philippine Society*, Quezon City: New Day Publishers.

•Mulder, Niels (1997). Filipino Images of the Nation. *Philippine Studies no. 1*, 50-74.

•Münch, Richard (1994). Von der Moderne zur Postmoderne? In: *Forschungsjournal Neue soziale Bewegungen* 7(7), 27-39.

•Munsch, Chantal (Ed.) (2003). *Sozial Benachteiligte engagieren sich doch. Über lokales Engagement und soziale Ausgrenzung und die Schwierigkeiten der Gemeinwesenarbeit*, Weinheim: Beltz.

•Nadeau, Kathleen (2004). *Liberation theology in the Philippines: faith in a revolution*, Manila: De La Salle University Press.

•Nyamu-Musembi, Celestine (2002). *Towards an actor-oriented perspective on human rights*, Working Paper No. 169, Sussex: Institute of Development Studies (IDS).

•Neckel, Sieghard (2008). Die gefühlte Unterschicht. Vom Wandel der sozialen Selbsteinschätzung. In Rolf Lindner & Lutz Musner (Ed.). *Unterschicht. Kulturwissenschaftliche Erkundungen der „Armen" in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Rombach Verlag: Freiburg i.B, 19-40.

•Newman, Katherine (1996). *Falling from Grace: The Experience of Downward Mobility in the American Middle Class*, New York: Vintage Books.

•Nolte, Paul (2007). Motive und Ziele - Zum Geleit. In Herbert Quandt-Stiftung (Ed.). *Zwischen Erosion und Erneuerung. Die gesellschaftliche Mitte in Deutschland. Ein Lagebericht*, Frankfurt: Societäts Verlag.

•Noronha, Ernesto & Premilla D' Cruz (2009). *Employee Identity in Indian Call Centres. The Notion of Professionalism*, New Delhi: SAGE Books.

•Opitz, Sven (2004). *Gouvernementalität im Postfordismus*, Hamburg: Argument Verlag.

•Osler, Audrey & Juanjuan Zhu (2011). Narratives in teaching and research for justice and human rights. *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice 6*, 223-235.

•Osterhammel, Jürgen (2010). *Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19.Jahrhunderts*, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.

•Owensby, Brian (1999). *Intimate Ironies. Modernity and the making of Middle-class Lives in Brazil*, Stanford: Stanford University Press

•Paguntalan, Aileen May (2002). *Nimble Fingers, Clenched Fists. Dynamics of Structure, Agency and Women's Spaces in a Manufacturing Company*. Quezon City: UP-Center for Women's Studies.

•Pannikkar, Raimundo (1982). Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept? *Diogenes 120 (Winter*). 75-102.

•Parreñas, Rhacel (2001). *Servants of globalization: Women, migration and domestic work*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

•Pateman, Carole (1983). Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy. In Stanley Benn & Gerald Gaus (Ed.). *Public and Private in Social Life*, Manuka: Croom Helm Ltd., 281-303.

•Perthes, Volker (2011). *Der Aufstand. Die arabische Revolution und ihre Folgen*, München: Pantheon.

•Pinches, Michael (2010). The making of middle class civil society in the Philippines. In Yuko Kasuya & Nathan Gilbert Quimpo (Eds.). *The Politics of Change in the Philippines*, Pasig City: Anvil Publishers, 284 – 312

•Pinches, Michael (Ed.) (1999a). *Culture And Privilege In Capitalist Asia*, London: Routledge.

•Pinches, Michael (1999b). Entrepreneurship, consumption, ethnicity and national identity in the making of the Philippines' new rich. In Idem (Ed). *Culture And Privilege In Capitalist Asia*, London: Routledge, 277-303.

•Pinches, Michael (1991). The Working Class Experience of Shame, Inequality and People Power in Tatalon, Manila. In Benedict Kerkvliet & Resil Mojares (Eds.). *From Marcos to Aquino:*

Local Perspectives on Political Transition in the Philippines, Quezon City, Ateneo de Manila University Press, 166-186.

•Piven, Frances Fox & Richard Cloward (1977/1986). *Poor People's Movements - Why They Succeed, How They Fail*, New York: Vintage Books (quoted after the German ediction: *Aufstand der Armen*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1986).

•Portocarrero, Gonzalo (Ed.) (1997). *Las clases medias: Entre la pretensión y la incertidumbre*, Lima: Tempo.

•Precarias a la Deriva (2004). Adrift through the circuits of feminized precarious work. *Feminist Review 77*, 157–161.

•Prein, Gerald, Udo Kelle & Susann Kluge (1993). *Strategien zur Integration quantitativer und qualitativer Auswertungsverfahren*, Sonderforschungsbereich 186 an der Universität Bremen, Retrieved 1.5. 2012 <www.sfb186.uni-bremen.de/download/paper19.pdfs>.

•Pries, Ludger (2008). *Die Transnationalisierung der sozialen Welt*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.

•Rademacher, Claudia & Philipp Ramos Lobato (2008). „Teufelskreis oder Glücksspirale?" Ungleiche Bewältigung unsicherer Beschäftigung. In: Rolf Eickenbach, Claudia Rademacher & Philipp Ramos Lobato (Eds.). *Metamorphosen des Kapitalismus - und seiner Kritik*, Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 118-147.

•Rafael, Vincente (2000). *White love*, Durham: Duke University Press.

•Raiser, Thomas (2013). *Grundlagen der Rechtssoziologie*, 6. edition, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

•Raiser, Thomas (2011). Rechtsgefühl, Rechtsbewusstsein, Rechtskenntnis, Rechtsakzeptanz. Einige begriffliche und methodische Bemerkungen zu den Grundlagen der Akzeptanzforschung. In Idem. *Beiträge zur Rechtssoziologie*, Nomos: Baden-Baden, 55-66.

•Raschke, Joachim (1988). *Soziale Bewegungen. Ein historisch-systematischer Grundriß*, Frankfurt a. M.: Campus.

•Reckordt, Michael (2008). *Die Shopping Mall – ein Surrogat des öffentlichen Raumes? – Eine kritische Analyse am Beispiel von Shopping Malls in Metro Manila, Philippinen*. Masteral thesis at the Institute For Geography of the Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster, unpublished.

•Reese, Niklas (2013a; with Joefel Soco-Carreon). No call for action? - Why there is no union (yet) in Philippine call centers. *Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies 6(1)*, 140-159.

•Reese, Niklas (2013b). Hopeless? - Poor People and Politics. In Niklas Reese & Rainer Werning (Eds.). *Handbook Philippines*, Davao: philippinenbuero, 371-380.

•Reese, Niklas (2013c). Poverty in Paradise - Social Inequality and the State-sponsored Fight against Poverty. In Niklas Reese & Rainer Werning (Eds.). *Handbook Philippines*, Davao: philippinenbuero, 61-79.

•Reese, Niklas (2013d). Hard Work, Hard Times. Employment, Trade Unions, and the Informal Sector. In Niklas Reese & Rainer Werning (Eds.). *Handbook Philippines*, Davao: philippinenbuero, 99-112.

•Reese, Niklas (2013e). Social Security And The Family - Social Security Systems and Private Insurance In Niklas Reese & Rainer Werning (Eds.). *Handbook Philippines*, Davao: philippinenbuero, 80-90.

•Reese, Niklas (2013f). Betwixt and Between. The Middle Class(es) – In Niklas Reese & Rainer Werning (Eds.). *Handbook Philippines*, Davao: philippinenbuero, 364-370.

•Reese, Niklas (2013g). Milking A Dry Cow - Privatization of Public Infrastructure, – In Niklas Reese & Rainer Werning (Eds.). *Handbook Philippines*, Davao: philippinenbuero, 133-144.

•Reese, Niklas (2013h). Power Wielders And Their Unruly Subjects. The Political System in Theory and Practice – In Niklas Reese & Rainer Werning (Eds.). *Handbook Philippines*, Davao: philippinenbuero, 313-330.

•Reese, Niklas (2013i). Still Working On It - Gender and Gender Relations – In Niklas Reese & Rainer Werning (Eds.). *Handbook Philippines*, Davao: philippinenbuero, 169-180.

•Reese, Niklas (2010a). Gelbfieber - Eine erste Analyse der Wahlen und was eine Präsidentschaft Aquino verspricht. *südostasien no. 2*, 83-86.

•Reese, Niklas (2010b). "Still Working on It": An Overview on the Current State of Public Activism of Women in the Philippines. *Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies 3(2)*, 136-150.

• Reese, Niklas (2008a). Stehaufmenschen – Umgang mit sozialer Unsicherheit in den Philippinen. In Karl Husa, Rolf Jordan & Helmut Wohlschlägl (Eds.). *Ost und Südostasien zwischen Wohlfahrtsstaat und Eigeninitiative. Aktuelle Entwicklungstendenzen von Armut und sozialer Unsicherheit*, Wien: Institut für Geographie und Regionalforschung der Universität Wien, 217-232. (**English version:** *Jack in the Box: Social precarity in the Philippines and How it is Coped with*, retrievable under www.scribd.com/niklas_reese/d/91160999-Precarity-in-the-Philippines.)

•Reese, Niklas (2008b). Zu dumm sich zu wehren? Die „gemeinen Menschen," die Politik und der Widerstand. In Claudio Altenhain, Anja Danilina, Erik Hildebrandt, Stefan Kausch, Annekathrin Müller & Tobias Roscher (Eds.). *Von "Neuer Unterschicht" und Prekariat. Gesellschaftliche Verhältnisse und Kategorien im Umbruch*, Bielefeld: transcript, 195-216. (**English version:** *Too Stupid to Defend themselves? Commoners, Politics and Resistance*, retrievable under: <www.scribd.com/niklas_reese/d/91160110-Commoners-Politics-Resistance>.)

•Reese, Niklas (2008c). "We are living in a different time zone." Transnational Working Spaces and the Glocalized Intermediary Class. *Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies 1(2)*, 34-58.

•Reese, Niklas (2006a). *„Ich kann sie doch nicht erschießen" - Unsicherheitsregime im Neoliberalismus*, unpublished manuscript, retrievable under <de.scribd.com/doc/55520886/Unsicherheitsregime-in-Neoliberalismus >.

•Reese, Niklas (2006b). Die neue Weltunordnung. Vom „Entwicklungsstaat" zum Management „globaler Herausforderungen". *Fantomas*, April, 37-43.

•Reese, Niklas (2005). *Human Security, Livelihood und Responsibilisierung*, Essen: Asienhaus.

•Reese, Niklas (2004a). *Alternativlos? Was Neoliberalismus ist und was wir ihm entgegensetzen können*, unpublished manuscript, retrievable under: <www.scribd.com/doc/55520900/Alternativlos-Herausforderung-Neoliberalismus>.

•Reese, Niklas (2004b). *Subjektivitäten ins Zentrum stellen - Die Subjektivierung unter neoliberaler Gouvernementalität*, unpublished manuscript. retrievable under: <www.scribd.com/doc/55520570/Subjektivitaten-ins-Zentrum-stellen>

•Reese, Niklas & Rainer Werning (Eds.) (2013). *Handbook Philippines*, Davao: philippinenbuero.

•Reese, Niklas & Werning, Rainer (2013). Off Track? The (Radical) Left. In Ibid (Eds.). *Handbook Philippines*, Davao: philippinenbuero, 364-370

•Reese-Schäfer, Walter (1996). Die politische Rezeption des kommunitarischen Denkens in Deutschland. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 36*, 3-11.

•Riedel, Manfred (1975). Gesellschaft, bürgerliche. In *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Volume 2*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 719-800.

•Rieger, Elmar (2003). Bürger. In Stephan Lessenich (Ed.), *Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Grundbegriffe. Historische und aktuelle Diskurse*, Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 215-242.

•Rivera, Temario (2001). The Middle Classes and Democratization in the Philippines: From the Asian Crisis to the Ouster of Estrada. In Abdul Rahman Embong. (Ed.). *Southeast Asian Middle Classes: Prospects for Social Change and Democratisation*, Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Bangi, 230-260.

•Robinson, Richard & David Goodman (Eds.) (1996). *The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonalds and Middle Class Revolution*. London: Routiedge.

•Robson, Colin (1993). *Real World Research*, Oxford: Blackwell.

•Rocamora, Joel (1998). Corruption in the Philippines. In Sheila Coronel (Ed.). *Pork and other Perks*, Quezon City: PCIJ, 8-31.

•Roche, Maurice (1995). Rethinking Citizenship and Social Movements. Themes in Contemporary Sociology and Neoconservative Ideology. In Louis Maheu (Ed.). *Social Movements and Social Classes*, London: SAGE/ ASSA, 187-219.

•Rodriguez, Agustin (2009). *Governing the Other – Exploring the Discourse of Democracy*, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

•Roose, Jochen (2011). Nordafrika 2011: Revolutions- und Bewegungstheorien und die (Un-)Vorhersehbarkeit von Protest. *Forschungsjournal soziale Bewegungen 24(1)*, 7-18.

•Roth, Roland (1997). Die Rückkehr des Sozialen. Neue soziale Bewegungen, poor people's movements und der Kampf um soziale Bürgerrechte. *Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen 10(2)*, 38-50.

•Rucht, Dieter (2013). Demokratie ohne Protest? Zur Wirkungsgeschichte sozialer Bewegungen. *Forschungsjournal soziale Bewegungen, 26(3)*, 65-70.

•Rudra, Nita (2008). *Globalization and the Race to the Bottom*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

•Rüb, Friedbert (2003). Risiko. In Stefan Lessenich (Ed.). *Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Grundbegriffe. Historische und aktuelle Diskurse*, Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 203-330.

•Rüland, Jürgen (1998). *Politische Systeme in Südostasien. Eine Einführung*, Landsberg/Lech: Günter Olzog Verlag.

•Rutten, Rosanne (2006). Shame and Worker Activism: Emotional Dynamics in Face-to-Face Encounters. *Qualitative Sociology 29*, 353-72.

•Rutten, Rosanne (2003). Changing "We-Feelings" in a Period of Revolutionary Mobilization, *Philippine Studies 51(3),* 406-34.

•Rutten, Rosanne (2000). High-Cost Activism and the Worker Household: Interests, Commitment, and the Cost of Revolutionary Activism in a Philippine Plantation Region. *Theory and Society* 29 (2), 215-52.

•Sachs, Wolfgang (1997). Sustainable Development - Zur politischen Anatomie eines internationalen Leitbildes. *epd- Entwicklungspolitik 1*, d1-d9.

•Sale, Jonathan & Lin Bool (2005). *Context and Possibilities of Trade Union Organizing in the Philippine Call Center and Business Outsourcing Industry: A Survey Report*, Retrieved 1.4. 2012

<www.scribd.com/doc/36503664/3-UNI-Apro-Survey-on-CBPOP-Professionals-Philippines-2005>.

•Sandhu, Amandeep (2006). Why Unions Fail in Organising India's BPO-ITES Industry. *Economic and Political Weekly, 41(41)*, 4319-322.

•Santos, Bonaventura De Sousa (1997). Toward a Multicultural Conception of Human Rights. *Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 1*, 1-15.

•Sarkar, Santanu (2008). Trade unionism in Indian BPO-ITeS industry - insights from literature. *Indian Journal of Industrial Relations* (44, July) Retrieved 29.9.2012 <www.freepatentsonline.com/article/Indian-Journal-Industrial-Relations/185430721.html >.

•Saunders, Peter (2006). Staatsbürgerschaft in einer liberalen Gesellschaft. In Hans-Peter Mueller & Jürgen Mackert (Eds.). *Citizenship. Institutionen und Dynamiken moderner Staatsbürgerschaft*, Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

•Savage, Michael, James Barlow, Peter Dickens & Tom Fielding (Eds.) (1992). *Property, Bureaucracy and Culture. Middle-Class Formation in Contemporary Britain*, London: Routledge.

•Schäfer, Michael (2009). *Geschichte des Bürgertums*, Köln: Böhlau.

•Schaffer, Charles (2009). *The Hidden Costs of Clean Elections*, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

•Schild, Veronica (2004). Die Freiheit der Frauen und gesellschaftlicher Fortschritt. Feministinnen, der Staat und die Armen bei der Schaffung neoliberaler Gouvernementalität. In Olaf Kaltmeier, Jens Kastner & Elisabeth Truider (Eds.). *Neoliberalismus, Autonomie, Widerstand. Soziale Bewegungen in Lateinamerika*, Münster, Westfälisches Dampfboot, 82-100.

•Schmidt, Volker (2006). Multiple Modernities or Varieties of Modernity? *Current Sociology 54(1)*, 77–97.

•Schmitt, Lars (2007). Soziale Ungleichheit und Protest. Waschen und Rasieren im Spiegel von Symbolischer Gewalt. *Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen 20 (1)*, 34-45.

•Schmitt, Lars (2006). Wie ausgeschlossen muss man sein, um zu protestieren? Sozialer Protest und seine Voraussetzungen. In *Die Proteste in Frankreich 2005. Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven der Konfliktforschung, CCS Working papers No. 1*, 17-21.

•Scholz, Fred (2001). Nachholende Entwicklung: Kein Entwicklungsparadigma mehr im Zeitalter der Globalisierung. *Entwicklungspolitik No. 11*, 35-37.

•Schüren, Peter (2013). *Wie illegale Arbeitsbedingungen die Unternehmenskultur in Deutschland verändern*, Deutschlandfunk, 1.7.

•Schultheis, Franz &Kristina Schulz (Ed.) (2005). *Gesellschaft mit begrenzter Haftung. Zumutungen und Leiden im deutschen Alltag*, Konstanz: UVK.

•Schulze, Gerhard (1976). *Politisches Lernen in der Alltagserfahrung. Eine empirische Analyse*, München: Juventa Verlag.

•Scott, James (2009). *The art of not being governed*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

•Scott, James (1990). *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

•Scott, James (1985) *Weapons of the Weak*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

•Scott, James (1976). *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

•Scott, William Henry (1997). *Barangay. Sixteenth-Century Philippine Culture and Society*, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

•Sebastian, Maria Angela Teresa (2014). *Are the Filipino youth apathetic?* Philippine Daily Inquirer, 13.6.

•Serrano, Melissa (2005). *Addressing union decline in the ASEAN in the era of globalization: some strategies and initiatives*, Retrieved 1.4.2012 <www.freewebs.com/upsolair/ADDRESSING%20UNION%20DECLINE%20IN%20THE%20ASEAN%20IN%20THE%20ERA%20OF%20GLOBALIZATION.pdf >.

•Shinozaki, Kyoko (2005). Contradictory Class Mobility" in Filipina/Filipino Domestic Workers in Germany. In Thomas Geisen (Ed.). *Arbeitsmigration. WanderarbeiterInnen auf dem Weltmarkt für Arbeitskraft*, Frankfurt a. M.: IKO-Verlag für Interkulturelle Kommunikation.

•Shiraishi, Takashi (2008). Introduction: The Rise of Middle Classes in Southeast Asia. In Idem & Pasuk Phongpaichit (Eds). *The Rise of Middle Classes in Southeast Asia*, Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 1-23.

•Sidel, John (1995). The Languages of Legitimation. In Muthiah Alagappa (Ed.). *Political legitimacy in Southeast Asia: the quest for moral authority*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

•Silver, Beverly (2005). *Forces of Labor*; Berlin: Assoziation A.

•Social Weather Stations [SWS] (2011). *The 2011 Survey on Good Governance, Quezon City: Social Weather Stations* – Retrieved 1.12.2013 < www.asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/The2011SurveyonGoodLocalGovernance.pdf >.

•Soco, Andrea (2008). Changing the Discourse on Return Migrants: Cosmopolitanism and the Reintegration of Return Filipino Migrant Domestic Workers. *Philippine Sociological Review 56*, 1-19.

•Sommer, Bernd (2010). *Prekarisierung und Ressentiments. Soziale Unsicherheit und rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland*. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

•Spehr, Christoph (2002). *Gegenöffentlichkeit - Entwicklung und Bedeutung des Begriffs "Gegenöffentlichkeit"*. LinksNet.de, July 20.

•Srinivasan, Nirmala (1989). Growth of Professional Managerial Unionism The Indian Experience. *Economic and Political Weekly, 24(47)*, M169-M174.

•Steinrücke, Margarete (1997). Vorwort. In Pierre Bourdieu. *Der Tote packt die Lebenden*, Hamburg: VSA Verlag.

•Stevens, Andrew & Vincent Mosco (2010). Prospects for trade unions and labour organisations in India's IT and ITES industries. *Work organisation, labour & globalisation Volume 4, Number 2*, 39-59.

•Tadem, Teresa (2010). The middle class and political reform - Examining the Philippine technocracy. In Yuko Kasuya and Nathan Gilbert Quimpo (Ed.). *The Politics of Change in the Philippines*, Pasig City: Anvil Publishers, 216-38.

•Tadiar, Nefarti (2004). *Fantasy-Production. Sexual Economies and other Philippine Consequences for the New World Order*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

•Taylor, Phil, Premilla D'Cruz, Ernesto Noronha & Dora Scholarios (2009). Indian Call Centres and Business Process Outsourcing: a Study in Union Formation. *New Technology, Work and Employment 24(1)*, 19-42.

•Taylor, Phil, Premilla D'Cruz, Ernesto Noronha & Dora Scholarios (2007). *Union Formation in Indian Call Centres/BPO –The Attitudes and Experiences of UNITES Members*, Retrieved 1.4.2012

< www.studymode.com/essays/Union-Formation-In-Indian-Call-Centres-Bpo-1430646.html >.

•Tedlock, Barbara (2005). Ethnography and Ethnographic Representation, Retrieved 1.4. 2011 <*www.corwin.com/upm-data/21156_Chapter_5.pdf*>.

•Thompson, Edward (1963/1987). *The making of the English working class*, Harmondsworth: Penguin (quoted and translated from the German edition. Idem. *Die Entstehung der englischen Arbeiterklasse*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1987).

•Tigno, Jorge (2007). *Necessary But Not Sufficient: Overseas Absentee Voting in the Philippines*. Paper presented at the Seminar on Transnational Approach to International Migration: The Case of the Philippines, Afrasia Centre for Peace and Development Studies, Ryukoku University, February 15.

•Tolosa, Benjamin (Ed.) (2011). *Socdem: Filipino Social Democracy in a Time of Turmoil and Transition, 1965-1995*, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

•Truman, Carole, Donna Mertens & Beth Humphries (Ed.) (2000). *Research and Inequality*, London: UCL Press.

•Turner, Mark (1995). Imagining the Middle Class in the Philippines. *Pilipinas 25*, 89-101.

•Überlebenswelten (2005). *Protokoll der AG´s beim Preka-Seminar in Esteli/Nicaragua*, December 17 (unpublished minutes).

•Ulrich, Peter (1997). *Integrative Wirtschaftsethik - Grundlagen einer lebensdienlichen Ökonomie*, Bern: Haupt.

•Umali, Jose (2006). *Strategies and techniques for organizing and recruiting workers in customer service centers in the Philippines*, unpublished manuscript.

•Velasco, Djorina (2006). Life on the Fast Track: Mobilizing the Urban Poor for Change - In Institute for Popular Democracy (Ed.). *Social Movements*, Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 103-128.

•Vester, Michael (2002). Das relationale Paradigma und die politische Soziologie sozialer Klassen. In Uwe Bittlingmayer, Rolf Eickelpasch, Jens Kastner & Claudia Rademacher (Eds.). *Theorie als Kampf? Zur politischen Soziologie Pierre Bourdieus*, Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 61–121.

•Virola, Romulo, Jessamyn Encarnacion, Bernadette Balamban, Mildred Addawe, & Mechelle Viernes (2013). *Will the recent robust growth create a burgeoning middle class in the Philippines?* Presentation at the 12th National Convention on Statistics (NCS), October 1. Retrieved June 30, 2014 <www.nscb.gov.ph/ncs/12thNCS/papers/INVITED/IPS-24%20Poverty%20and%20Inequality%20I/IPS-24_1%20Will%20the%20Recent%20Robust%20Economic%20Growth%20Create%20a%20Burgeoning%20Middle%20Income%20Class%20in%20the%20Philippines.pdf>

•Virola, Romulo, Redencion Ignacio, Mildred Addawe & Ma. Ivy Querubin (2007). *Trends and Characteristics of the Middle -Income Class in the Philippines: Is it Expanding or Shrinking?*, retrieved 1.8.2008 <www.nscb.gov.ph/ncs/10thNCS/abstracts/Contributed/57_Poverty/ContriPovertymiddleincome-abstract2007ncs-final.pdf>

•Vogel, Berthold (2006). Soziale Verwundbarkeit und prekärer Wohlstand. Für ein verändertes Vokabular sozialer Ungleichheit. In Heinz Bude & Andreas Willisch (Ed.). *Das Problem der Exklusion. Ausgegrenzte, Entbehrliche, Überflüssige*, Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 342-355.

•Voß, Günter & Hans Pongratz (1998). Der Arbeitskraftunternehmer. Eine neue Grundform der Ware Arbeitskraft? *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie no. 1*, 131-158.

•Wahl, Klaus (1989). *Die Modernisierungsfalle*, Frankfurt a. M.: suhrkamp.

•Walton, John & David Seddon (Ed.) (1994). *Free Markets and Food Riots*, Oxford: Blackwell.

•Wasmund, Klaus (1982). Ist der politische Einfluß der Familie ein Mythos oder eine Realität? In Bernhard Claußen & Klaus Wasmund (Eds.). *Handbuch der politischen Sozialisation*, Braunschweig: Pedersen, 23-63.

•Weidner, Anselm (2007). Diktatorensturz und Demokratieexport. *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik no. 9*, 1088-1098.

•Weintraub, Jeff (1997). The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction. In Jeff Weintraub & Krishan Kumar (Eds.). *Public and Private in Thought and Practice - Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1-42.

•Weiß, Anja (2008). Raumrelationen als zentraler Aspekt weltweiter Ungleichheiten. In Heinz Bude & Andreas Willisch (Eds.). *Exklusion. Die Debatte über die "Überflüssigen,"* Frankfurt a. M.: suhrkamp. 225-45.

•Welker, Michael (2002). Ist die autonome Person eine Erfindung der europäischen Moderne? In Klaus-Peter Köpping, Michael Welker & Reiner Wieh (Eds.). *Die autonome Person – eine europäische Erfindung?*, Fink: München, 9-11.

•Wendt, Reinhard (1997). *Fiesta Filipina. Koloniale Kultur zwischen Imperialismus und neuer Identität*, Freiburg i.B.: Rombach-Verlag.

•Werz, Nikolaus (1999). Das Konzept der „clase media" und die Mittelschichten in Lateinamerika. In Bert Becker, Jürgen Rüland & Nikolaus Werz (Eds.). *Mythos Mittelschichten?* Bonn: Bouvier, 96-119.

•Wheeler, Joana (2005). Rights without citizenship? - Participation, family and community in Rio de Janeiro. In Naila Kabeer (Ed.). *Inclusive citizenship*, London: Zed Books, 99-113.

•Willems, Ulrich & Thomas von Winter (Eds.) (2000). *Politische Repräsentation schwacher Interessen*, Opladen, Leske+Budrich.

•Wood, Geoff (2004). Informal Security Regimes: the strength of relationships. In Idem (Ed.). *Insecurity and Welfare Regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 49-87.

•Wright, Eric (1985). *Classes*, London: Verso.

•Yuval –Davis, Nira (1997). Women, Citizenship and Difference. *Feminist Review 57, Autumn*, 4–27.

•Zialcita, Fernando (1997). Barriers and bridges to a democratic culture. In Maria Serena Diokno (Ed.). *Democracy and citizenship in Filipino Political Culture*, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 39-68

Expert interviews and Focus group discussions (Validation)

•Binghay (2012). *Interview with Virgel Binghay*, Associate Professor and Graduate Studies Program Coordinator, School of Labor and Industrial Relations (SOLAIR), University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, October 25.

•Claudio (2014). *Interview with Sylvia E. Claudio*, professor at the College of Social Work and Community Development, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, August 6.

•David (2014). *Interview with Randy David*, professor at the Department of Sociology, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, August 13.

•FGD Davao (2012a). *First Focus Group Discussion with Davao respondents*, November 4, Davao City.

- FGD Davao (2012b). *Second Focus Group Discussion with Davao respondents*, November 11, Davao City.
- FGD Manila (2012). *Focus Group Discussion with Metro Manila respondents*, December 1, Quezon City.
- EILER (2012). *Interview with Anna Leah Escresa*, Executive Director of EILER, October 25, Quezon City.
- Hernandez (2014). *Interview with Amie Hernandez*, executive director of Kaya Natin!, August 8, Quezon City.
- Ilagan (2012). *Interview with Luz Ilagan*, congresswomen, representing the GABRIELA party list, Oct 28, Quezon City.
- Quimpo (2014). *Interview with Nathan Quimpo*, professor at the University of Tsukuba, Japan, July 28, Quezon City.
- Sale (2014). *Interview with Jonathan Sale*, Dean of the School for Labor and Industrial Relations, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, August 13.
- Sale (2012). *Interview with Jonathan Sale*, Dean of the School for Labor and Industrial Relations, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, October 27.
- Sobritchea (2014): *Interview with Carolyn Sobritchea*, professor at the Asian Center of the University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, August 1.
- TUCP (2012). *Interview with Anna Lee Fos* (TUCP Research Department) *and other TUCP staff*, October 27, Quezon City.
- Yacat (2014). *Interview with Jay Yacat*, professor at the Department of Psychology, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, August 13.
-

Abbrevations of Philippine dailies

- MT- The Manila Times
- PDI – Philippine Daily Inquirer
- PS – The Philippine Star