An Army with a Country

How the Pakistan military imposes hegemony via the infrastructure and welfare sectors

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Abstract

In addition to defending their countries, modern day militaries assist the state in labour intensive non-defence related activities. This ranges from disaster relief to providing administrative assistance. In countries where the military already exercises hegemonic control, possession of such auxiliary capabilities can potentially provide an avenue to extend the military's jurisdiction / further strengthen its hegemony.

This research uses Pakistan military as a case study. It operationalises military presence in two development sectors – Fauji Foundation representing welfare foundations, and Frontier Works Organisation (FWO) representing infrastructure building – to explore the underlying practices and methods through which militaries can use their additional or supplementary competencies to their own advantage.

An analysis of the primary data collected from the field for this thesis shows that while the [Pakistan] military is present and thriving in the 'development' sector, it reflects on, or calls this presence its nation building role. Closer scrutiny reveals that although the terms 'development' or nation building are used interchangeably, the military's understanding thereof, and the extent it holds itself responsible for it, are two separate questions. Moreover there is no clear answer thereto. The question is what is in the military's habitus that compels its behaviour? What is the guiding rationale?

The objective of this thesis is twofold: a) to investigate how the Pakistan military operationalises its presence in non-military domains to establish its hegemony albeit through non coercive means; and to understand b) what are the practices that allow for its continuous presence in the civil sphere (using the two case studies) without divesting its military status. The specific question that this thesis asks is what are the underlying practices and perceptions that allow the Pakistan military to establish its hegemony?

The research design of this thesis deviates from other studies pertaining to civil military interactions in that instead of rationalising the relationship of the two domains (*inter se*) within historical trajectories, it approaches the actions / practices of the military as a product of social conditions and contexts. Using habitus as a prism of analysis, it directs attention to the processes and procedures through which behaviours, codes of conduct and most importantly the perceptions and thoughts inform generated actions.

This study shows that Pakistan military's presence in the non-defence sectors is not circumscribed by the duration of the coup. Even when the military is not directly in control of the political and administrative structures, we see it present and thriving in almost all traditionally civil domains – especially those archetypically linked with public service delivery.

Primary data collected for this research reveals that after three takeovers, the military is not actively considering another coup. However, by extending its presence in the civil arenas it has discovered new avenues of concretising its hegemony. Just because a takeover is not a viable option any more does not mean the military is willing to compromise its omnipresence. It navigates the military yet not-military nature of entities like FWO and Fauji Foundation to consolidate its hegemony. These commercial concerns do not feature as symbols of hegemony or off-budget money making schemes within its

habitus, but as attempts to fix the country. The military considers itself not only responsible but ideally suited for delivering on nation building / 'development'.

I argue that this new kind of hegemony does not operate in lieu of hegemony as we understand but as an extension thereof. Using the usual tools of a hegemon – coercion and consent – would mean violating civil-military boundaries. By investing in the 'developmental' realms yet simultaneously calling it nation building, the military can be in control of the country and popular amongst the population.

Based upon the findings of the case studies this thesis illustrates that the military ensures an absence of a money trail linking it to such organisations. This way the civil military boundaries stay intact. Moreover, the trusteeship of 'development' remains with the civil state. The military does not need to acquire political control outright anymore as it is extending its hegemony via socio-cultural means. And such the military's preponderance endures because neither the hegemon nor the public perceive it as a forceful imposition.

Kurzfassung

Das moderne Militär übernimmt vermehrt Aufgaben im zivilen Sektor, die über die klassischen Aufgaben der Landesverteidigung hinausgehen. Gerade in arbeitsintensiven Bereichen wie Katastrophenschutz und Verwaltung ist dieser Trend zu beobachten. Dies kann in Ländern, in welchen das Militär bereits eine hegemoniale Rolle ein- und solche Hilfsfunktionen übernimmt, zu einer neuerlichen Erweiterung militärischer Zuständigkeiten führen.

Die vorliegende Forschungsarbeit untersucht diese Entwicklung mit Blick auf das pakistanische Militär. Dabei stehen zwei Organisationen, in denen die Streitkräfte im Entwicklungssektor tätig geworden sind, im Fokus: die Fauji Foundation, eine Wohlfahrtsorganisation, und die Frontier Works Organisation (FWO), ein mit Infrastrukturausbau betrautes öffentliches Unternehmen. Von besonderem Interesse ist hierbei die Analyse der Vorgehensweise des Militärs, insbesondere die zugrundeliegenden Mechanismen mit welchen es sich seine zusätzlich gewonnenen Kompetenzen zum eigenen Vorteil nutzbar machen kann.

Basierend auf den erhobenen Primärdaten kann festgestellt werden, dass das pakistanische Militär sehr präsent und erfolgreich im Entwicklungssektor Pakistans tätig ist. Es definiert seine Rolle dabei als die eines Nation-Builders. Die Begriffe Entwicklung und Nation-Building werden hierbei synonym verwendet. Was das Militär darunter versteht und ob es seiner neugewählten Rolle als Nation-Builder im Entwicklungssektor gerecht wird sind kritische Fragen. Es ist in diesem Zusammenhang entscheidend zu ergründen was das Militär grundsätzlich antreibt diese neue Rolle anzustreben und die Erreichung welcher Ziele es sich davon verspricht.

Die vorliegende Forschungsarbeit untersucht den Prozess der Etablierung des Militärs im zivilen Entwicklungssektor in zwei Schritten. Es wird analysiert a) wie das Militär die Etablierung seiner neuen Rolle operationalisiert, und wie es seine Hegemonie durch die Anwesenheit und Aktivität im Entwicklungssektor indirekt mehrt.. Es wir weiter versucht zu ergründen b)
welche Methoden eine ständige Präsenz im zivilen Bereich (anhand der beiden Fallstudien) weiterhin erlauben, ohne den militärischen Status zu verlieren. Die spezifische Frage, die sich in dieser Arbeit stellt, ist, welche grundlegenden Praktiken und Sichtweisen es dem pakistanischen Militär ermöglichen, seine Hegemonie langfristig zu verankern.

Das Forschungsdesign dieser Arbeit unterscheidet sich von anderen Studien, die sich auf zivil-militärische Interaktionen beziehen, indem die Verbindung der beiden Bereich (inter se) innerhalb historischer Entwicklungen nicht rationalisiert werden, sondern die Handlungen / Praktiken des Militärs als Produkt sozialer Bedingungen und Kontexte betrachtet werden. Die Analyse des Habitus lenkt die Aufmerksamkeit auf die Prozesse und Verfahren, durch die Verhaltensweisen, Verhaltensregeln und vor allem auf die Wahrnehmungen und Gedanken, die erzeugte Handlungen beeinflussen.

Die Einnahme einer starken Rolle des Militärs im zivilen Sektor ist nicht wie anzunehmen auf die Zeit eines militärischen Umsturzes begrenzt. Selbst wenn das Militär politische und administrative Strukturen nicht unter direkter Kontrolle hat, ist es in fast allen traditionellen zivilen Bereichen gegenwärtig und gedeiht – besonders in jenen, die mit der Erfüllung öffentlicher Dienstleistungen zusammenhängen.

Die Auswertung der Primärdaten ergab, dass das Militär derzeit nicht an einer aktiven Machtübernahme interessiert ist. Es ist jedoch auch nicht Willens seine omnipräsente Stellung im Staat aufzugeben. Der Wunsch diesen Hegemonialanspruch aufrechtzuerhalten ist die treibende Kraft hinter den Aktivitäten des Militärs, die derzeit in fast allen zivilen Sektoren zu beobachten ist, einschließlich des hier untersuchten Entwicklungssektors. Die Aktivitäten der Fauji Foundation und der FWO sind Teil des vom Militär betrieben Konsolidierungsprozesses seiner Macht. Das Militär will diese Aktivitäten jedoch nicht als offensichtliches Symbol seiner Hegemonie zur Schau stellen oder als außerbudgetäre Option zur Generierung von Geldern; es sieht sich, und projiziert ein Bild von sich, als kompetenter Partner im Entwicklungssektor und erfolgreicher Nation-Builder.

Diese Arbeit argumentiert, dass das Militär Indirekte Hegemonie als Erweiterung klassischer hegemonialer Ansprüche etabliert hat. Es versucht dabei jedoch den Anschein einer Verletzung der Grenze zwischen der militärischen und zivilen Sphäre zu vermeiden. Die Aktivität im Entwicklungssektor als Nation-Builder wird hier als sozioökonomisches Mittel diese Grenze zu wahren, verstanden, jedoch gleichzeitig dient sie dazu den eigenen Einfluss zu mehren und die Popularität in der Bevölkerung zu steigern.

Diese Arbeit zeigt, basierend auf den Ergebnissen der Fallstudien, dass das Militär dafür sorgt, dass keine Geldkanäle mit solchen Organisationen verbunden werden können / or: (Die Vermeidung direkter Finanzströme aus dem Militär in die Fauji Fundation und die FWO) und die nominell aufrechterhaltene Kontrolle der zivilen Regierung über diese Organisationen dient diesem Ziel. Somit bleibt die Verantwortung für ‚Entwicklung' beim zivilen Staat und das Militär muss sich nicht unmittelbare politische Kontrolle aneignen. Die Indirekte-Hegemonie wird daher von der Bevölkerung nicht als gewaltsame Übernahme und allumfassende Dominanz des Militärs im Staat wahrgenommen. Dies macht den relativen Erfolg der Strategie aus.

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Chapter I:

Introduction

All Pakistanis of my generation have been told the story that when General Ayub Khan imposed martial law in 1958[1] there was an immediate and perceptible drop in the crime rate. So much so, that people who has been kidnapped for ransom were voluntarily released by their respective kidnappers to return home without payment of the said ransom. There was a general feeling in the country that with the military in charge, the law and order situation would improve and those found wanting would have to face strict consequences. This story might not necessarily be true. It has however been repeated to successive generations enough times that it is certainly believed to be true. Irrespective of its factual veracity, it represents the public's perception of the military in Pakistan. Moreover it is not limited to a particular time or set of circumstances either.

When Musharraf took over in 1999 I witnessed a repetition thereof first hand. An elected government had been unconstitutionally ousted by the military and the public sentiment was that of relief. While there was a reluctant acknowledgement that the act in itself was illegal, it was immediately backed up with the proviso that there was no other option either. Now that the military was in charge, the economy would do well again, and

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[1] In his capacity as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, General Ayub Khan had been openly questioning the civilian government's performance. On October 1958 President Iskander Mirza appointed General Ayub Khan the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Twenty days later Ayub Khan disposed Iskander Mirza and formalised the military takeover of the political system in the country. This was the first military coup in Pakistan's history. On 25 March 1969 Ayub Khan handed over power to General Yahya Khan. This was the first and the only time in the country's history that political power was handed from one military general to another. Following the widespread civil disorder in the wake of secession of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), General Zia ul Haque overthrew the elected government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and imposed martial law on 05 July 1977. The third time that the military took over was on 12 October 1999 when General Pervez Musharraf overthrew the government of Mian M. Nawaz Sharif in a bloodless coup. For a time line of major political events in Pakistan's history see Annexure 3.

administrative and judicial offices will function at their optimal best (see Figures 1-3, Chapter V below).[2]

The military is and has been well aware of the public sentiment. In a recent interview with BBC Urdu, General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf defined his coup as "*a need of the hour. …The coup was staged because it was a demand of the country's people. … Military rule has always brought the country back on track whereas civilian governments have always derailed it. …The people came running to the army to be saved; people came to me to be saved. …It makes no difference to the population of Pakistan whether the country is being governed by an elected government or by an autocrat as long as there is progress and prosperity. …What is the point of holding elections and giving liberties [to the population], if the country does not see progress? …Dictators set the country right, whereas civilian governments brought it to ruins – military rule always brought progress to Pakistan*" (Dawn, 2017 quoting Soomro, 2017).

A key element of the military's habitus therefore is a self-designated compulsion to fix things, save the country as it were. Admittedly it would not be entirely off the mark to rationalise military coups within this context either. However, as shall be demonstrated from the analysis of the primary data collected for thesis, the military believes its hand to be forced when it comes to takeovers. The coup and all subsequent measures are rationalised only as the first step towards getting the house in order and that too from an administrative perspective.

That said, as things currently stand in Pakistan, military presence in the civil arena is neither limited to the duration of the coup nor circumscribed by political aspirations / administrative considerations. As shall be demonstrated in Chapters V to VII below, even when not in government, we see the military present and thriving in almost all traditionally civil domains – especially those archetypically linked with public service delivery (and hence considered the dominion of the civil state).

An analysis of the primary data collected from the field for this thesis shows that while the military is present and thriving in the 'development' sector, it reflects on, or calls this presence its nation building role. Closer scrutiny reveals that although the terms 'development' or nation building are used interchangeably, the military's understanding

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[2] Pages 128 – 130.

thereof and the extent it holds itself responsible for it are two separate questions. Moreover there is no clear answer thereto.

1.1　Objective and research question

The objective of this thesis is to investigate to what extent the Pakistan military operationalises its presence in non-military domains to establish its hegemony. The specific question it addresses is what are the underlying practices and perceptions that allow the Pakistan military to establish its hegemony?

This study operationalises the habitus of the military in search for an answer thereto. In order to appreciate hegemony operates and procedures of its enforcement, the military mind set and *modus operandi* need due consideration. To that end this study uses Frontier Works Organisation (FWO) and Fauji Foundation as case studies.

FWO is a construction company engaged in infrastructure building; Fauji Foundation is profitable organisation engaged in production of commercial goods and services. One vests the military with the ownership of physical development and construction of the country in the public's mind. The other provides welfare services like medical and education facilities. While FWO can be at least accused of cashing the securitisation argument to its benefit, no such blame can be levelled against the Fauji Foundation.

Both these organisations have their similarities as well as dissimilarities. As shown in chapters VI and VII they are both conspicuously military owned and military run organisations. Moreover both follow similar strategies / practices in enabling the military to establish its hegemony.

The self-perception and understanding informing the military habitus with respect to both bears stark resemblances in that it relies on the language of nation building and military's role in 'development' of the country in both the cases. In short the language used to refer to the two and even justify their operation / existence is the same. Their net effect is alike – in that they allow the military to step beyond the defence function and into the civil sphere not via the political or public institutions but directly affect the [civilian / public] lives.

Yet as discussed in sections 6.3 and 7.3 below, they both have taken historically dissimilar routes to reach their current stage and assume their present form. Moreover, they do not occupy the same space. They both outwardly perform wholly dissimilar functions, the benefits whereof reach the civilian population through different trajectories.

An analysis of the two organisations therefore provides a keen insight into how the military is capitalising on its hegemony via its presence in the development sector. It generates an explanation of how the military is able to replace the state by providing public services and to ingratiate itself to the public.

1.2   A hegemonic military

Pakistan has been under direct martial rule[3] for a total of thirty three years (1958 – 1971, 1977 – 1988, 1999 – 2008) – almost half the time since its independence in 1947. For the remainder, even though not directly in power, the military has been and continues to be an active player in the administration of the country albeit with varying degrees and levels of intrusion (Fair, 2011:571). Key issues like national security and foreign security *inter alia* have become strictly military domains even in times when a civil government resides in Islamabad (Fair, 2011:572).

Pakistan, its military, its political system and especially the challenges that confront its polity have been meticulously scrutinised in the past from various angles, albeit with the military's intervention in politics as the central theme. Some of the prominent research motifs thus far (all discussed in detail in Chapters IV) have been post-colonial institutional structure (Alavi, 1972:63-65) (Jalal, 1995); bureaucratic overreach; defence spending (Jalal, 1991); lack of political parties (Shafqat, 1997); military businesses (Siddiqa, 2007) etc. Although these studies have their merits, there is a common tendency to a) rely on a historical chronology of events to explain the civil military imbalance in the country; and

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[3] Throughout this book the terms martial rule, military takeovers and military coups have been used interchangeably. They collectively stand to represent a time in Pakistan's political history when an elected civil government was ousted by the military acting upon the orders of the then Commander in Chief / Chief of Army Staff (COAS). This includes the periods of time when a government was installed in the National Assembly through electioneering but the head of the state was military – be it President or Chief Executive and be it in uniform or otherwise.
Similarly, 'military' in this book refers to the collective armed forces of Pakistan. The three branches act in consort and collectively make up the 'military' component of the civil-military equation in the country. While it is true that successive takeovers were instigated by the army, that is merely because it is larger in size – the strategic requirements of the country are such that more ground forces are necessarily required.

b) operationalise this timeline to rationalise the state. The *status quo* is therefore invariably understood in terms of factors like military authoritarianism, over-developed state, military professionalism, bureaucratic authoritarianism, military mind set, and corporate interests of the military. Scholarly accounts (Talbot, 1998) of civil military imbalance in Pakistan ultimately converge at placing the blame at the military's door. These allegations are not necessarily entirely untrue. However, while conventional wisdom is not wrong, it does not present the complete picture either.

Pakistan military undoubtedly exercises hegemonic control. Its hegemony is accepted as common wisdom by academics writ large. For example:

> "*The army has gradually acquired a corporate structure and identity that appears to trump broader national interests. It tends to act autonomously in foreign dealings, particularly with the Middle East and the United States. It has penetrated the civilian sector and now controls large segments of civil administration. And, it has a wide economic footprint that goes well beyond the welfare needs of its ex-servicemen and women. Increasingly, the central decision making on political issues involves the corps commanders and the army chief. The newly instituted National Security Council gives the army and the other armed services a formal role in national policy-making*" (Nawaz, 2008:xlii).

Literature however does not theorise Pakistan military's hegemony[4] as such. It by and large employs the term to loosely refer to the military's authoritarian role (Haqqani, 2005:199-260). The emphasis of previous studies therefore has been to establish the fact of this preponderance. To that end we see an overreliance on chronological trajectories. To avoid replication, this study takes the military's hegemony as a given – where need be, it defers to the facts and timelines provided in the existing body of work. However this study adds thereto by establishing a working definition of military hegemony. Moreover it uses rich empirical evidence gathered from primary data sources, juxtaposes it against examples from literature on the subject and therefore provides the much needed theoretical context to the military's hegemonic status. And this is its distinctive quality –

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[4] The exception being Saeed Shafqat's book *Civil military relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto* (Shafqat, 1997). In fact as shall be shown in chapter II this study uses his definition as the baseline to establish a definition of military hegemony.

it tries to ascertain how, if at all, claims made in established literature factor in the military's own perception of these events.

Studies of Pakistan military also more often than not culminate in attempts to define the state – Paul for instance defines it as garrison state (Paul, 2014); Fair as revisionist state (Fair, 2014:04) to name a few. Defining the state is undoubtedly a necessary and important exercise. However, even if we accept this as an effective way of understanding the civil military imbalance in the country, none of the definitions have been able to provide a definitive description thus far. The fact that every few years a different author take up the same exercise anew is evidence in itself that there are inherent limitations to this approach.

Pakistan military occupies a position of power in the country. Explanations as to the how it acquired the said control would be an exercise in replication. Instead this thesis concentrates on explaining how the military's hegemony is maintained and reproduced; what forms does the military's preponderance take, and, how – if at all – it has altered over the years.

Pakistan is not the only country in the world where its military exercises hegemonic control – Egypt, Turkey, Bangladesh have similar civil military imbalance. Pakistan military's hegemony is however special in two respects. As shown in chapters V to VII it is distinctive in that it does not rely on the usual tools of coercion and consent for enforcement. Rather it is a more of an informal imposition of hegemonic control. It is concretised through innovative exercise of its auxiliary capabilities and ubiquitous presence in 'developmental' realms thereby opening new dimensions of how military hegemony is produced and preserved in the long run. In short there is a new dimension to the existing hegemony that needs to be investigated (for definition see Chapter II).

The military is and has been extremely popular amongst the people of the country. Though no longer directly in control (of the government), its approval ratings amongst the masses are currently at their highest ever. One of the commonalities amongst all coups in Pakistan thus far has been that at the time of the military takeover there has always been little to no opposition by the civil society. Interestingly, literature on civil military relations from the country alludes to such ceremonial resistance in passing, or a footnote, at best.

Granted, at the tail end of their direct rules, the military falls out of public favour. This is chiefly because once in power, the military has consistently failed to deliver upon its promises. This disapproval or dissatisfaction of the public however does not last and the military regains the public approval.

As things stand, polls show excellent military's approval ratings (see Figures 1 and 3 in chapter V).[5] Primary data collected from the field for this study also reveals that the military does not reflect favourably on the previous coups (see chapter V). The military holds "*internally weak political parties, tied to individual personalities or brought together by temporary and short-sighted common interests*" responsible for compelling its involvement in politics, "*only to later lament its active role and taking over the reins of power*" (Nawaz, 2008:xli). However to what extent that translates into / can be interpreted as a willingness to compromise the omnipresence it has meticulously cultivated over the years through promulgation of laws and policies remains to be ascertained.

Data also suggests that now that it is no longer directly in power, in the sense that a civil government resides in Islamabad and not the military, the military habitus has found a unique way of accommodating its ubiquity.

The military defines its responsibilities as defence of the country. Logic being that is what it is trained to do, that is what it understands best and that is what it is capable of. Yet while 'development' is consigned to the civil / political realm, the understanding of defence is a seamless web; 'defence' is perceived to include all socio-economic aspects pertaining to the running of the country - not precluding much from the umbrella term. This is reflected not only in the interviews but also the data where the military is discussing

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[5] The Pakistan army has always been a volunteer force. As per Shuja Nawaz "*The Pakistan Army today reflects Pakistani society more than at any time in its history*" (Nawaz, 2008:xli). The pool of recruits is increasingly shifting from the traditional Potohar Plateau to bigger towns and cities. The officer corps especially is progressively based on urban centers (Nawaz, 2008:xli). "*Based on GHQ data for soldiers and officers, Punjab shows an overall decline in recruitment of soldiers from 63.86 percent in 1991 to 43.33 in 2005, with Central Punjab outpacing Northern Punjab, the traditional recruitment ground by 7,500 to 5,000 recruits in 2005. Southern Punjab had 1,800 recruits. Recruitment from the NWFP and FATA increased from 20.91 to 22.43 percent, Sindh rose from 8.85 to 23.02 percent – with rural Sindh accounting for the majority of the recruits (5,095 to 2.500 in 2005) – in Baluchistan, it rose from 0.49 to 1.52 percent in 2005 with 200 urban to 300 rural recruits in 2005, and in Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas, recruitment rose from 5.86 to 9.70 percent*" (Nawaz, 2008:571).

its own role, especially with respect to what it calls 'nation building' - or what is commonly understood 'development'.

One thing that is clear from an analysis of the data collected for this research is that despite presence in the 'development' sector, the military's *modus operandi* is not informed by a concrete, institutionally prescribed, vision thereof. The military does not have an identifiable master plan against which it measures the civil government's performance – which in turn either forces a coup or justifies its presence in non-military sectors. As shall be demonstrated in this thesis, both written evidence and the interviews show a broad sentiment 'to see the country being run according to the dictates of law and constitution and to see Pakistan as a leading nation of the 21st century.' However, this is no more than a general representation of the hopes and aspirations of just about any Pakistani.

Using Pakistan military as a case study and operationalising its presence in two sectors in particular – Fauji Foundation representing welfare foundations, and Frontier Works Organisation representing infrastructure building – this study explores the underlying practices and methods through which militaries can use their additional or supplementary competencies to their own advantage. The end goal is to ascertain how the military manipulates the civil-military binaries under the rubric of 'development'.

1.3   Point of departure

This study departs from the current academic discourse in two respects. It puts military front and centre of analysis. This is not to be confused with providing the military an avenue to defend or propagate itself. The intention is to understand how the military reflects upon its presence in the 'development' sector. The military's own perspective is also important because the selection process of the 'developmental' sectors it chooses to be active in come to the fore. Moreover, considerations that prompt it to extend itself beyond proscribed fields of responsibility can be ascertained – that is, what is the military's understanding of 'development' and whether or not its actions are representative thereof.

It also aims at filling the gap by providing a theoretical context to the military's hegemonic status. This naturally includes the literature on civil military relations in general and

Pakistan in particular. With respect to the question of Pakistan military as a hegemon, this study takes the military's hegemony as a given. Examples of military's preponderance provided in the literature on the subject are juxtaposed against the military's own version and interpretation of events and actions.

Here it must be pointed out that it is not uncommon for militaries to undertake non-defence responsibilities. Military presence in civilian domain is however typically limited to disaster relief activities or when the civil government calls upon it for assistance in maintaining law and order. These are exigent circumstances at best though and are proscribed by legal and constitutional limitations. It is also not unusual to observe military participation in service delivery activities like education, health etc. They are traditionally undertaken for the benefit of ex-servicemen and their families. Legitimate (legal) exceptions include extending public services to remote parts of the country in question where civil state's access is difficult. Also such activity is undertaken for and on behalf of the civil state in order to assist with its outreach.

In Pakistan for instance, some of the border regions are not only geographically far removed from the rest of the country but are so sparsely populated that it is not economically feasible for the government to extend certain amenities. Military on the other hand is already present in these regions for security reasons. It makes sense for the civil state in such cases to delegate provision of 'development' related public services to the military. It would not be uncommon to see military operating hospitals and schools or even providing electricity and water to certain regions in the country.[6] In effect there is a circumspect logic informing military presence in 'development' arenas.

This is usually understood to involve activities like earthquake and flood relief and assisting the state maintain law and order, should the need arise etc. Pakistan too, like all modern militaries has a constitutional[7] obligation to assist the state in labour intensive, non-defence related activities.

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[6] Here it must be noted that this is different from the Winning Hearts and Mind project operated by the military which is discussed in detail in chapter V.
[7] Article 245 of the Constitution of Pakistan. 1973 defines military's as:

Functions of Armed forces _ Articles 245 (1) – Armed Forces shall, under the direction of the Federal Government defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war, and, subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so.

Pakistan the military's involvement in public sector however – as aforementioned – has systematically exceeded the constitutional limitations. Over the years its ubiquity in the 'development' sector has not only become to be accepted writ large as 'business as usual', but bestows a veneer of legitimacy to its extension of legal powers. This study looks beyond the traditional civil military theory for an explanation thereof.

1.4 Thesis Overview

While civil military relation theory is instrumental in understanding the institutional lay of the land, it has inherent short comings. It overlooks dynamic interactions between political, military and social sectors of the society (Schiff, 1995:8). It is also does not weigh in public sentiment; it is so preoccupied with preventing coups that it discounts situations where the military is so popular that a takeover is no longer necessary or even a viable option.

Civil military relations theory in its current form (following the Huntingtonian route) makes a strong case for "Objective Control" i.e. necessary separation of civil and military realms (Huntington, 1957)[8] and thereby fails to accommodate political settings which might naturally – because of cultural and historical reasons – have higher levels of integration between the military and other parts of the society. By doing so it denies the possible existence of several alternative types of civil military relations. Stringent civil military separation in the Huntingtonian sense becomes inadequate on such occasion and room is created for the possibility that under certain cultural and political conditions, civil institutions, or at the very least the idea of 'civil' might not be applicable (Schiff, 1995:7).

Civil military relations theory is historically and culturally bound to the American case and displays a tendency to superimpose the intuitional boundaries and even the lessons learnt therefrom upon nations where they might not be entirely relevant. "*Because the*

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[8] In order to keep the civil and the military realms separate, civil authorities needed to find a way of exercising control over the military without stepping onto its toes. The civil authority would decide the objective of any given military action and it would be up to the latter to execute it in a manner it deemed fit based on its own expertise. However the problem of deciding what exactly is the right amount of control –which would neither compromise its ability to defend the country it is supposed to, nor create circumstances conducive to a coup (for example the failure of the government) – persists. Huntington's solution (to this control dilemma) was "objective civilian control" as opposed to "subjective control" which as the name suggests is more precise, detail oriented and intrusive. Objective control on the other hand is where the civilians define the objective of the military and the military is free to pursue this within the prescribed bounds.

American standard of military professionalism subsequently became the *model, it was, as a consequence, exported to nations that had standards, histories, and cultures of professionalism quite different from the western norm*" (Schiff, 1995:10).

The second criticism is the centrality of 'institutional separation' in the current theory. Existing literature pertaining to civil military relations leans heavily on the separation of the two realms and turns a blind eye to the cultural aspects and the influence of the civil society on the institutional makeup of the country in question and consequently the civil military relations.

Citizens are of particular relevance for the purposes of this thesis. The current body of work pertaining to the civil military relations displays an overwhelming tendency of not considering the citizenry as a factor / group in itself. It instead works with the assumption that the people are represented by the political intuitions. In fact, as things stand the 'civil' component of 'civil military relations' is entirely represented by the said political institutions. It is not to say that this is false. However in a political set-up where an elected government is in power, but it is the military which is more popular, a distinction between the citizenry and the political institutions (albeit representative ones) becomes necessary.

The question then is how the military sets about the business of concretising its hegemony without resorting to an all-out takeover as it were. We need to understand how the hegemon reflects on its own *modus operandi*, how it organises its actions and the limits and constraints on the said actions within a given field. Making a case for opening spaces for discussing dynamic elements dynamic within the current theory, this thesis makes a case for putting the habitus of the hegemon (the military in this case) centre stage.

Chapter II of this study argues in favour of using the concept of 'hegemony' for examining civil military relations. Over the course of the research, a case is made that when hegemony is culturally and symbolically reinforced, it endures longer. As hegemony emphasises values, attitudes and symbols of the hegemon, this thesis uses Bourdieu's habitus to operationalise the issue at hand.

Habitus, as shall also be demonstrated in the chapter II below, creates theoretical space for a discussion on the perception of the decision makers – or the hegemon in this case. And we know perceptions are important because they impact the decision making process

(Buzan, 1983:226-31). However, using habitus to operationalise the research has both its merits as well as limitations.

A key point in favour of using habitus is that it allows for a juxtaposition of perceptions and practices. It awards centrality to the internalisation of actions performed by the actors. Instead of retrospectively interpreting practices from the outside by looking at historical trajectories, habitus creates space for construing the actions of the military / hegemon as a product of social conditions and contexts.

As per Bourdieu (see section 2.1 below) however, these action are so deeply entrenched in the agents' conscious that they themselves are unaware of their own acts and deeds. In addition to the perceptions and practices therefore, everyday individual code of conduct is required in order to ascertain the habitus.

Herein lies the limitation of using habitus to operationalise this research. Whereas perceptions and practices of the military can be accessed through a combination of research tools, there are inherent limitations to the extent that the everyday code of conduct or procedures can be observed by an outsider. The military is by its very nature a secretive organisation; a hegemonic military, even more so. First of all, gaining admission to the daily functioning of the military is almost impossible. Secondly, even in instances that such information was available / observed during the course of data collection process for this research, a large proportion of it had to be excluded from the final thesis because it was off the record.

For the purposes of this thesis therefore, practices are assessed using the Strategic Group Theory and the perceptions are evaluated using the Shared Mental Models theory. Moreover, as shown in chapter III below, both these theories are useful in that they also generates a justification for the two case studies.

Chapter III provides an insight into the methodology used in this study. This study is original in two respects: It puts military front and centre of analysis and allows it to tell its story in its own words. To that end it uses primary data sources in the form of interviews with senior military personnel. This is particularly significant because it provides a first-hand account of why and how it extends itself beyond proscribed fields of responsibility and the expected outcomes.

Secondly – and as aforementioned – it fills the gap in existing literature by providing a theoretical context to the military's hegemonic status. It uses literature on civil military relations in general and Pakistan in particular. This 'insider's account of Pakistan military's hegemonic practices makes a value addition to theory of hegemony in general.

As shall be shown in Chapter IV Pakistan military's hegemony is neither defined by nor limited to the duration of coup. This study illustrates that it has discovered new avenues of concretising its hegemony without having to transgress accepted boundaries of civil military relations. However we need to understand how hegemony has been used in the Pakistani context so far. Chapter IV therefore focuses on understanding the exercise of hegemony; the practices of Pakistan military that literature treats as evidence of its preponderance in the country. It adds to the existing literature by showing how the Pakistan military has internalised its non-defence role and how it systematically manoeuvres this to its own advantage.

A historical contextualisation of successive takeovers is not enough. In order to avoid taking the same route as its predecessors, that is discussing the military from an outsider's perspective, chapter V of this study shows how the military reflects upon its past forays in power – the lessons learnt and the way forward. It is narrated from the military's own perspective. Using direct quotes from senior military personnel the first step is to understand considerations that prompted previous coups. Here we see that within the military self-perception, previous bids for political power are now (over time perhaps) understood as attempts to safeguard 'developmental' needs of the people of Pakistan. Military frustrations with the civilian counterparts also come to the fore in the process.

In the years immediately following Pakistan's independence, we saw the military's *modus operandi* following a circumspect logic. Service delivery activities – like health and education – were limited for the benefit of ex-servicemen; exception being when acting on behalf of the civil state in the remote and inaccessible regions of the country (for further discussion see chapter VI and VII). Other than that, the military was seen outside the barracks, only when called upon by the state to assist with disaster relief and the maintenance of law and order. Over the years however, Pakistan military's involvement in projects archetypically linked to 'development' took a more mainstream turn in that they were available for the mutual benefit of civilians, ex-servicemen, and serving soldiers

and officers alike. Moreover, these services were openly undertaken under the banner of the military and its nation building / 'developmental' role. We not only saw the military extending its presence beyond its prescribed charter, but to an extent that it is arguably replacing the civil government. Furthermore, instead of attracting criticism for intruding upon state sovereignty, the military's new role was not only accepted as legitimate, but public sympathy also favoured the military more than the state itself. It is this role as an instrument of 'development' that chapter IV discusses.

The question then is how the military operationalises this presence in the 'development' sector to consolidate its hegemony. In chapter V we see a) how the military defines / understands its developmental role; b) what considerations compel the military to play an active role in the 'development' sector; and c) how it simultaneously protects its own self-interests and ingratiates itself to the people of Pakistan.

One of the quintessentially 'developmental' sectors that the military is ubiquitous in is that of large infrastructure building. Chapter VI of this research therefore uses FWO as a case study to discuss military omnipresence in 'developmental' arenas. This case study was selected because it is poised at the intersection of the 'development' and defence aspects of the military. The aim is to unpack how the military uses the military yet non-military status of entities like FWO to claim ownership of 'development' on the one hand and on the other restricts space for the state to deliver on its public sector responsibilities. The purpose is to ascertain how the military perceives its own role as a 'development' actor in the country and thus justifies its presence in non-military sectors. The undercutting theme is the habitus of the military and how it has evolved with time to reach its current state. FWO's dualistic financial status is used to distinguish between its civil and military roles. This chapter mainly relies on primary data gathered from the FWO Head Quarters which includes both expert interviews with FWO officials and written materials. Additionally it uses interviews with senior military officials, bureaucrats and other personnel involved with infrastructure projects in the country.

Chapter VII uses Fauji Foundation as an example to build upon the findings of Chapter VI. The aim is to demonstrate elements within the military's habitus that allow it to negotiate the civil sphere while retaining its military status. It also shows how the military habitus has evolved with the passage of time to accept commercial enterprises like the Fauji Foundation as its nation building / 'developmental' efforts. It illustrates how the military's

habitus is shaped by its ability to financially distance itself – at least on paper – from these entities, yet simultaneously justify its connection thereto on grounds that they meet welfare needs of ex-servicemen and civilians which the state fails to. While a case can be made that these business activities signify the organisation's hegemonic status, within its own understanding they have long ceased to be so.

This brings us back to the question of how, given that the core business of the Pakistan military is defence of the Country, are its auxiliary capabilities providing it legitimacy / sustained mass popularity? The intention of this research is to analyse the developmental activities conducted by the military and the self-perception and understanding that form the guiding behaviour. The ultimate aim is to understand where does the popularity high originate and how hegemony is established and reproduced via non coercive methods.

Chapter II:

Conceptual Framework: Habitus of a Hegemon

2.1 Introduction

The basic tenet of civil military relations theory is that the civil and military spheres should remain physically and ideologically separate [*inter se*]. As militaries by their very nature are "*a country's primary organized institution trained in the management of violence…*" they possess the latent capacity to not only exert coercion over the populace in general but "*…the armed forces have natural edge over players to dominate the state and society, especially in a non-democratic environment*" (Siddiqa, 2007:33). Moreover, as militaries are typically responsible for the national security, it is not necessarily unusual for the policy makers or the political society to defer to the military or at the very least confer a special status on it (Kohn, 1997)[9]. While according to Siddiqa this is inevitable, it also marks the beginning of a slippery slope; "*If unchecked the military can dominate all other stakeholders through their sheer organizational strength and power. In fact, the military can become the state itself…*" (Siddiqa, 2007:33).

In order to prevent such an eventuality Kohn argues that the penultimate aim of civilian control is ensure that the "*larger purposes of a nation*" are not over shadowed by matters of security. "*The purpose of the military is to defend society, not to define it*" (Kohn, 1997).

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[9] "*For a variety of reasons, military establishments have gained significant power and achieved considerable autonomy even in those democracies that have long practiced civilian control. In some countries, the military practice kept control over much of military life; in others, governments have never managed to develop the tools or the procedures, or the influence with elites or the prestige with the public, to establish supremacy over their armed forces. For the most part, however, a degree of military autonomy has grown out of the need to professionalise the management of war. In the last two centuries, war has become too complex – the preparations too elaborate, the weapons too sophisticated, command too arduous, operations too intricate – to leave the waging of combat to amateurs or part-time practitioners. As a result, the professional military's influence has grown, either from circumstance or from necessity*" (Kohn, 1997).

A principle preoccupation of a large bulk of literature of political sciences – has been dedicated to the conditions and circumstances that inform a domestic military's decision to intervene (Burk, 2002). As a result there exists a respectable trajectory of work documenting and theorising the causes of military intervention, all in many ways hypothesising that domestic military interventions are a result of weak civilian institutions that are unable to control their armed forces (Perlmutter, 1969:399).[10] The argument is that such an eventuality could easily be avoided if the civilian institutions (and maintain) dominion over its "professional military" (Huntington, 1957) or "professional soldiers" (Janowitz, 1960). This has been held to be especially true in the context of the countries of the global south where despite democratic and civil leanings, the military has held on to its position as a potent political actor.[11]

Civil military relations theory's treatment of the relationship between the two realms is not sufficient to explain the dynamic interactions between the political, military and social sectors of society (Schiff, 1995:8). The theory overlooks localised exigencies and complexities that make up nations. Moreover, in its preoccupation with scenarios that prevent domestic military intervention, the theory does not account for situations where domestic intervention is no longer necessary or even a viable option (for the military). It also does not weigh in public sentiment either. Civil military relations theory is instrumental in understanding the institutional structure and the circumstances under which militaries might appear as a likely symbol of nation building. This research thinks through the causes of *en masse* popularity the militaries might enjoy amongst a polity committed (for all intents and purposes) to the democratic / civil ideal.

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[10] For traditional classics which laid the foundations of civil military relations theory see: S.E. Finer, *The man on Horseback*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1962; Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968; Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1977); Henry Bienen (ed.),*The Military Intervenes, Case Studies in Political Development* (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1968).

[11] Military presence in development arenas is not new. The discourse on the subject though has assumed different stances over the years. The cold war period literature on the subject was very much inclined in favour of appointing militaries as engines of modernisation. Argument being that authoritarian regimes are better poised to promote economic growth as opposed to their liberal / democratic counterparts. In the post-cold war era however, when priorities shifted in favour of setting up participatory democratic infrastructure and self-sustaining political institutions, academia altered its standpoint accordingly. Now the argument ran in favour of eliminating the militaries' role as instruments of 'development' altogether. For classical studies on the developmental / modernization role of the military see: Henry Bienen, "*Armed Forces and National Modernization – Continuing the Debate*," Comparative Politics, vol. 16, No. 1, October 1983. Pp – 1-16; John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964; and John J. Johnson (ed.), *The Role of the Military in Under-developed Countries*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962).

This chapter directs attention towards the socio-cultural aspects of military hegemony. As shall be demonstrated below in section 2.4, military hegemony refers to a political system where the military establishes and exercises *de facto* control over economic resources and political structures (Rizvi, 2000). This includes both institutions as well as political processes. The military is therefore able to "inaugurate, prescribe, proscribe or stop any or all political action" (see section 2.4). As a consequence, conditions are created where the military can disseminate its own values or norms, thereby producing space [for itself] to orient social behaviour.

There are, needless to say, social and cultural ramifications of such political appropriation. For instance, the public trust and confidence may shift from political parties and institutions to the military instead (Shafqat, 1997:07). The military as a result is able to create grounds for legitimacy.

As shall be seen in sections 2.3 and 2.4 below, the discussions on military hegemony award a certain centrality to 'institutional separation'. Existing literature pertaining to civil military relations leans heavily on the separation of the two realms and turns a blind eye to the cultural aspects and the influence of the civil society on the institutional makeup of the respective country and consequently the civil military relations. This thesis focuses precisely on these socio-cultural elements of military hegemony. Cultural aspects here are held to include "*the values, attitudes, an symbols informing not only the nation's view of the military's role, but also the military's own view of that role*" (Schiff, 1995a:11)(Schiff, 1996).

Conceptualising the military as a hegemon allows us to look beyond the political and administrative processes as well as functions thereof – as has been discussed in the past within the Pakistani context – and to encapsulate within the analysis those values, attitudes and symbols which inform and shape the military, as well as the public perception regarding its role for governance. In short we can bring those activities of the military under the fold of hegemony which have been excluded thus far. We can refer to the military establishing or extending its hegemonic control (as defined in section 2.4 below) through practices that do not necessarily qualify as political action but can have political ramifications.

Through field data (Chapter V to VII below), this thesis demonstrates that although rooted in the more traditional or classic form of military hegemony, all visible links and connections thereto wane over time. I argue that when hegemony is culturally and symbolically reinforced, it endures for longer.

While the core business of militaries still remains defence, modern day militaries possess a wide range of auxiliary capabilities (Feaver, 1996:156). They are expected to assist the state in labour intensive, non-defence related activities such as flood and earthquake relief. Moreover, as Ayesha Siddiqa points out (footnote 1 above), even in polities under civilian control, military establishments have over the years gained significant power and autonomy. Whether or not these auxiliary capabilities can be used to garner mass popularity by the military in a way that does not challenge the accepted boundaries of civil military relations theory remains to be seen.

As hegemony concentrates on the socio-cultural aspects of the civil military relations and awards centrality to values, attitude and symbols informing the military as well as civil mind set, this thesis uses Bourdieu's concept of habitus to operationalise the issue at hand.

2.2   Habitus

No other organisation possesses the means, procedures or for that matter, even the interest in resocialising its members like the modern military. According to Elizabeth Kier, "*[f]ew organizations devote as many resources to the assimilation of their members. The emphasis on ceremony and tradition, and the development of a common language and esprit de corps, testify to the strength of the military's organizational culture*" (Kier, 1995:69).

Such re-orientation or uniformisation of thought processes and perceptions is achieved via the systemised reaffirmation of an institutional belief system. "*Politically relevant attitudes are purposefully learned, implicitly instilled, and latently internalized*" (Nordlinger, 1977:61). In an organisation with clear rules, stringent penalties and vertical hierarchies of enforcement, it is relatively easier to enforce and achieve conformity to an established institutional agenda. "*Modern, hierarchically led militaries restrict deviance*"

not just by threat or use of punishment and sanction but also by producing voluntary compliance through identity or role-based obligation and expectations" (Shah, 2014:08).

This thesis explores the underlying practices that perpetuate / allow hegemony to operate. In order to do so the perspective and self-perceptions of the military and the belief systems that mould them need to be ascertained. It is these self-perceptions and thought processes that form the edifice of practice after all.

To this end, Bourdieu's habitus is a handy tool because on the one hand it couches the military actions as a function of the aforementioned institutional practices and the accompanying belief system; on the other it allows us to explore the mind-set that informs this ethos or ideology, as it were. Using habitus to operationalise the data means that we can explain the impetuses underscoring the military's actions (agents as per Bourdieu) which it might be completely unaware of itself.

Bourdieu's oft-quoted definition of habitus describes it as a set of:

> "*…durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operation*" (Bourdieu, 1990:53).

In short it accounts for practices as a function of past activities. It understands present actions as dependent "*on the reiteration of patterns over time, that is, the multiple occurrences of a set of circumstances where people acted in the same way*" (Croce, 2015:328).

Admittedly Bourdieu disapproved of interpretive approaches whereby "*logic*" was retroactively superimposed on observed practices (Bourdieu, 1990:35).[12] Yet, he emphasised internalisation of actions on part of the actors. Habitus, according to Bourdieu, effectively circumscribes the thinking process of the agents and appears to deny them awareness of their own acts or deeds. It is hence that one of the main criticisms of

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[12] He called this a "generative formula" – that is a "*set of independent and coherent axioms the observer constructs on practices*" (Croce, 2015:331).

Bourdieu's is that "*his notion of habitus seems to imply an unbridgeable gap between the causal mechanisms that the theorists see at work and the reasons that agents would put forward if asked to verbalize what led them to do what they did*" (Croce, 2015:331).

That said, habitus remains an important interpretative tool. It allows for the accommodation of the factor of unawareness on the part of the actors – in that their perceptions and understandings are so deeply entrenched that they themselves are not aware of their actions. For the purposes of this thesis, this is of particular relevance as it creates an avenue to understand the actions of an organisation such as the military, where the decision process is both highly institutionalised, but more importantly inscrutable from the outside.

Bourdieu believed that the deeper engrained the causal mechanisms within the actors' consciousness, the better. In fact, he was of the view that the efficacy and endurance of schemes is dependent upon the incorporation of "*pre-reflective, quasi-instinctual* (Bourdieu, 1990a:115)" into the consciousness – so much so that it becomes second "*nature*" or "*natural*" to the actor (Bourdieu, 1990a:115).

The invisibility / imperceptibility of the habitus therefore becomes a condition precedent of its efficacy in the long run. In which case the "*reflective attitudes and conscious intuitions*" of the actors are rendered almost irrelevant. "*Consequently, in a properly functioning field, the habitus and its effects are concealed and work over people's heads to such an extent that only the theorist is equipped to discover the mechanisms that govern interaction and to provide a reliable account of the field where the habitus is at play*" (Croce, 2015:331).

A common tendency of literature pertaining to civil military interactions is to rationalise their relationship [*inter se*] within historical trajectories. Bourdieu, however, "*points out that historical analyses run a high risk of misinterpretation, because they are interpretations of the interpretations of other authors*" (Jensen, 2014:05). In order to overcome the aforementioned shortcomings of the civil military relations theory it is important therefore to construe the actions of the military as a product of social conditions and contexts. To that end Bourdieu's theory of habitus offers the best prism of analysis. It focuses attention towards the processes and procedures through which

behaviours, codes of conduct and most importantly the perceptions and thoughts informing the generated actions are created.

As per Bourdieu habitus is "*practical knowledge*" (Bourdieu, 2001:148) which is derived from the past experiences of the agent / actor in question. Specific acts or code of conducts cannot be categorised as either "*purely impulsive or purely rationalized*" (Jensen, 2014:06). They are in effect individual consciousness inexorably combined with structure.

> "*Habitus is a structure which is structured by the experiences in the social life of the person it belongs to, and furthermore habitus structures the field in which the person moves. In other words, habitus is the dialectic relation between structure and agent. According to Bourdieu the dialectic between habitus and the probabilities of a social space forms the basis for acts and thoughts*" (Jensen, 2014:05).

> "*… One should not say that a historical event determined a behavior but that it had this determining effect because a habitus capable of being affected by that event conferred that power upon it*" (Bourdieu, 2000:149).

Such practices become a part of society's structure when the original purpose thereof can no longer be recalled. It operates beneath the level of rational ideology and represents the aspects of practices that are anchored in the daily practices of a group of people.

Habitus has a clearly defined structure. "*It is systematically ordered by ones past and present circumstances as opposed to randomly arranged on unpredictable patterns. It is structured by conditions of past experiences on the one hand, and it generates future practices, beliefs and perceptions in line with its own structure on the other*" (Bourdieu, 2008:51). Therefore it is constantly evolving. Practices in short are not merely the consequence of one's habitus, but represent the relationship between one's habitus and one's current circumstances (Bourdieu, 2008:52).

That said, understanding habitus as a link between the past and the present and indeed the future would be an oversimplification. It is more of a thread that binds the social with the individual, structure with agency and objective with subjective (Bourdieu, 2008:44).

Therefore it is essentially the linchpin that helps describe how external social facts become internalised by individuals. Or alternatively put, it provides our personal dispositions and private actions an avenue to influence and affect social structures. What may be invisible to the untrained eye, as per Bourdieu, is critical to understanding the social world.

While it is true that we rely on our habitus to successfully navigate social environments, it must be recognised that habitus is culturally cultivated rather than inherited. Therefore while as per Bourdieu it would be wrong to assume that some people are born to appreciate finer things in life, it would be equally wrong to presuppose that behaviour patterns of the hegemon are not organically created to suit its needs and serve its purposes.

This study argues that hegemonies which are symbolically enforced, endure longer. Bourdieu's operationalisation of the term "*symbolic power*" or "*symbolic violence*" (Bourdieu, 2001:1-2 & 8) is of particular relevance in this respect. It is a form of power which goes unnoticed by the people subjected to it because it becomes *doxa*. "*Doxa is the state when the socially constructed is perceived as the natural order and therefore accepted; it is when categories are perceived as being 'in the order of things'*" (Jensen, 2014:07).

It is in the interest of the hegemon, especially a military hegemon, to look beyond the traditional tools of coercion and consent in order to establish its preponderance. The authority lies with the sovereign – sovereignty being the ability to "*employ laws by force and violence if necessary. The goal of the sovereign is to make people obey*" (Jensen, 2014:07). A hegemon who is not the state, is unable to do so. In order to fulfil its aspirations of control and power it must therefore make the population instruments to its own cause without their full awareness – this corresponds to Bourdieu's notion of 'symbolic power' above.

Why a military hegemon would choose to establish and concretise its hegemony through its presence in the 'development' sector can also be explained through habitus. As per Bourdieu "*if a person over a long period of time experiences to be powerless, the luciones, chances to acquire power, are likely to vanish from the person's habitus. This causes that*

the person is unlikely to find illusio, reason to invest, in the game of power over own life " (Jensen, 2014:08 quoting Bourdieu, 2000:221-224).

The point being, even if the military retreats from power *per se* it can ensure longevity of its hegemony through creating discourses with respect to its 'symbolic power' and controlling the interpretation of the discourse (Bourdieu, 2000:236). Bourdieu dubbed this '*margin of freedom*' (Bourdieu, 2000:234-235, Bourdieu, 2001:13-14). It created the possibility of transforming these symbols into tools available to the dominated to use for their own benefit (Jensen, 2014:08).

As per Jensen potential threats to deprive an actor can trigger habitus – that is, invoke its embodied structural dispositions. A person / agent's desire to acquire power, or *luciones*, is also triggered if there is sufficient money to follow through (Jensen, 2014:12). Simply put, the power and the monetary means to act increase the likelihood to act.

A hegemon – military in our case – develops a habitus based on past experiences and strategy that allows it to retain maximum power on the one hand and to co-opt as many subservient groups as possible on the other. By virtue of being a *hegemon* it is already in control of the avenues of power. By virtue of being a *military hegemon* it is potentially a uniting and nation building force within the country. Therefore once we understand the habitus of the hegemon, the fact that the people will identify with its habitus is not difficult to rationalise. And that in turn creates a hegemony that is not imposed through coercion or even consent for that matter but one where the habitus of the hegemon circumscribes the potential existence of a counter view.

2.2.1   Defining Practices and Perceptions

As established above, the key point in favour of using habitus is that it allows for a unique juxtaposition of perceptions and practices. It awards centrality to the internalisation of actions performed by the actors. Instead of retrospectively interpreting practices from the outside by looking at historical trajectories, habitus creates space for construing the actions of the military / hegemon as a product of social conditions and contexts.

As per Bourdieu, however, these action are so deeply entrenched in the actors' conscious that they themselves are unaware of their own acts and deeds. In addition to the

perceptions and practices therefore, everyday individual code of conduct is required in order to ascertain the habitus.

Herein lies the limitation of using habitus to operationalise this research. Whereas perceptions and practices of the military can be accessed through a combination of research tools (see the Chapter III below), there are inherent limitations to the extent that the everyday code of conduct or procedures can be observed by an outsider. The military is by its very nature a secretive organisation; a hegemonic military, even more so. First of all, gaining admission to observe the daily functioning of the military is almost impossible. Secondly, even in instances that observations were available during the course of data collection process, a large proportion of it had to be excluded from the analysis because it was off the record.[13]

Therefore, in this thesis, practices are assessed using the Strategic Group Theory (SGT) and the perceptions and code of conduct of the military are defined using the Shared Mental Models (SMM) theory. Even though military's hegemony is explained through an operationalisation of habitus, the practices element thereof is understood within the context of the explanation offered by the SGT and the perceptions as within the definition extended by the SMM.

2.2.2   The Strategic Group Theory

Strategic Group Theory states that human actions are governed by an interest in maximising material and immaterial gains and profits. This is not limited to the individual experience but can be observed on an organisational level as well. Every society therefore comprises of groups that aim at maximising their share of the resources. However, as these resources are limited, these groups compete amongst themselves to gain access to the available resources.

What are strategic groups then? Simply put, they are quasi groups that cut across socio-economic hierarchies and are driven by a common goal - that is to gain access to available resources. Some of the typical strategic groups identified by Evers and Gerke are [though not limited to] government / bureaucracy; military; intellectuals; professionals; big Businesses (Evers & Gerke, 2017:07) etc. As there are necessarily a limited number of

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[13] These instances can be discussed during the defence, but due to ethical considerations cannot be included in the text.

resources available, these strategic groups are locked in a competition *inter se* for the "*appropriation*" and "*distribution*" thereof (Evers & Gerke, 2017:03).

Seibold argues that military is as much a social group as any other. Therefore, for any given size of a society, a military, too, competes with other institutions – or strategic groups – for "*its survival and the broad ability to shape itself and carry out its purposes*" (Seibold, 2001:150). And hence it must justify the resources allocated to it (this would include people, money, laws, equipment etc.) not in purely economic terms, but in political / sociological terms as well.

According to Evers and Gerke in this attempt to establish a pattern of legitimacy, it is in the interest of each strategic group to "*create a political and economic system that provides for optimal chances for appropriation of surplus*" (Evers & Gerke, 2017:08). It does so by actively engaging in practices that would ultimately increase the strategic group's share of the GNP or the available resources. It relies on a wide range of measures to increase its chances, which includes and is not limited to enactment of "*economic laws and stringencies …also power, possibly coercion*".

Strategic groups are therefore actively engaged in using practices that would allow them to appropriate resources. As these resources are finite they not only compete with other groups for access, but create new resources. They do so by "*creating social, political and economic structures and institutions that enhance the chances to appropriate resources*" (Evers & Gerke, 2017:03).

Strategic group theory portends that there are typical ways in which different strategic groups go about the business of appropriating resources. And this depends on where the group is getting its resources from to begin with. Evers divided this into three broad categories of appropriation: personal mode, corporate and collective.

As this study is about the military, it is the third group which is the most applicable to us. A military's chief source of income is the public revenue after all.

> "*Strategic groups receiving revenue through a public or 'collective mode of appropriation' i.e. the government bureaucracy or the military, would tend to enlarge these organizations as a power-base*"(Evers & Gerke, 2017:08).

This group being the major representative of state power is already in the position to shape the political system in a way that suits its own needs. It therefore is more inclined to promote an expansion of the representative organisation itself in terms of "*members and extension of control*". One of the ways that the strategic group achieves this is through the creation of subservient organisations, mini-institutions, and even commercial concerns that would help it expand its base.

In its capacity as a strategic group, SGT would argue that a military is also driven by a need to maximise material and immaterial profits and gains. We therefore begin to see it in terms of a group engaged in using in practices that allow the military to extend beyond its mandate / jurisdiction albeit in an attempt to ensure that its chances of appropriation are enhanced. And therein lies an explanation of the Pakistani military's active presence in the civil arena.

There is an inherent contradiction though. Even if the enhanced appropriation is achieved through generating economic growth "*without necessarily reducing the absolute income of other strategic groups, it is at the end of the day appropriation of surplus and therefore exploitation*" (Evers & Gerke, 2017:07). A military appropriating resources beyond its given budgetary share would be immediately deemed exploitative.

Hegemony, as we will establish below, is not limited to exercise of coercive power only. It has socio-cultural elements. Military's selection of the 'developmental' arena in order to increase its resources can perhaps then be understood as an attempt to extend its hegemony without provoking "*reactions, movements, uprisings and possibly revolutions*" (Evers & Gerke, 2017:09). And it is this element that my analysis concentrates on. In the process we will see how it is able to able to extend its mandate and yet avoid conflict.

2.2.3   Shared Mental Models

Strategies employed by a hegemon, be it military or otherwise, to expand its power base cannot be isolated acts carried out without an incumbent rationale. They have to be ordered around and informed by a cogent thought process. These perceptions and thought processes are inimical to the resulting decision making (Buzan, 1983:226-31). This thesis makes a case that the hegemon, need not necessarily be consciously aware of how it came to adopt such practises and the considerations informing them in the first place.

With the passage of time they become a part of the hegemon's habitus in that they are so deeply ensconced in its consciousness that all subsequent action is subconsciously structured around it.

By virtue of being military we cannot follow it around and therefore cannot use everyday practices and conducts as reflections of its *mens rea*. We are dealing with an organisation that is closed off to the public. However, instead of observing the environment it operates in, we can discern its habitus through how it interprets its own environment and then juxtapose it with the resultant practices to present a clear picture. To that end this thesis uses the theory of Shared Mental Models (Denzau & North, 1994) in order to explain how the hegemon reflects on and interprets its environment and subsequently adopts relevant practices to extend its hegemony.

Denzau and North make a case for decision making as a function of ideas that individuals or, groups of individuals develop based on how they interpret their surrounding environment.[14] As opposed to an *a priori* self-awareness and rationalised understanding of their interests which dictate choices, Denzau and North focus on the role of cognition and reasoning. They argue that individuals with common cultural backgrounds and experiences form similar explanations and thought processes about their surrounding world. They therefore construct reasonably convergent mental models, ideologies and institutions (Denzau & North, 1994:03).

> "*In order to understand decision making ... we must understand the relationships of the mental models that individuals construct to make sense out of the world around them, the ideologies that evolve from such constructions, and the institutions that develop in a society to order interpersonal relationships*" (Denzau & North, 1994:04).

Ideologies here refer to those shared frameworks of mental models possessed by groups of individuals that they use to both interpret their surrounding environment as well prescribe how that given environment should be structured (Denzau & North, 1994:04). "*Institutions are the rules of the game of a society and consist of formal and informal constraints constructed to order interpersonal relationships*" (Denzau & North, 1994:04)

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[14] As opposed to rational choice framework which assumes that individuals know their self-interests and make conscious decisions accordingly.

(North, 1998)). Mental models are internal representations of environmental interpretations that the individual cognition creates. The institutions that the individuals create based on these mental models are an external representation or physical manifestations of how the given environment should be ordered / structured (Denzau & North, 1994:05).

> "*The mental models that the mind creates and the institutions that individuals create are both essential to the way human beings structure their environment in their interactions with it*" (Denzau & North, 1994:05).

Individuals hailing from dissimilar environments and cultural backgrounds naturally have different learning experiences (both cultural and environmental). As information feedback differs, so do reactions and responses to similar events. Therefore, when confronted with the same situation, it does not necessarily imply that varying groups of individuals may interpret it in the same manner. Nor is it a given that these groups will respond to it in a similar way. Reason being, they have through past experience developed diverse understandings and constructed mental models accordingly. Moreover, once established, these mental models do not change easily either. Therefore, even when varying groups get feedback with respect to their choices from their counterparts, it does not mean that they would alter their position or adjust their interpretation or the subsequent decision (Denzau & North, 1994:04).

With regard to Pakistan, it is hence not surprising that when confronted with similar situations of uncertainty or crises, the civil and military components interpret and subsequently respond quite differently thereto. They each have developed their own mental models based on their respective cultural backgrounds and environments and therefore employ dissimilar interpretations in problem solving or conflict resolution.

This is particularly problematic in instances where the civil military balance is tipped in the latter's favour to the extent that it enjoys a hegemonic status. In such polities, where the military is already engaged in strategic practices that allow it to appropriate resources and therefore extend beyond its given mandate, the manner in which it communicates or implements its ideas would only help it to further concretise its hegemony.

These strategies of expansion are, as it is, informed by ideas and interpretations of their environment. With time the interpretations of the environment and the strategies employed in response become an integral part of the military's thinking. The mental models about its own role as well as its civilian counterpart's become second nature and an essential part of the military habitus. Therefore it brings the military understanding or way of doing things to the civil arena. As mentioned above, when confronted with opposing information, groups of individuals do not change their perspectives. Same goes for the military, and a hegemonic one at that. Once a mental model of its role has been formed, it is unlikely to alter even when confronted with the counter perspective of the civilians. The ideas thus formed, and the subsequent strategies, together form its habitus.

Learning and sharing mental models

In order to understand how the mind confronts complex scenarios we need to first explore how the learning occurs to begin with. Learning, according to Denzau and North "*entails developing a structure by which to make sense out of varied signals received by the senses. The initial architecture of the structure is genetic but its subsequent development is the result of the experiences of the individual*" (Denzau & North, 1994:13). The experiences can then be classified into those gained from a) the physical environment, and b) the socio-cultural linguistic environment (Denzau & North, 1994:13). Perceptions are organised by keeping a track of the memories and results of these two categories. Using these perceptions as a bedrock, we form mental models in order to explain and interpret the environment (Denzau & North, 1994:13). "*The capacity to generalize, to reason from the particular to the general and to use analogy are all a part of this process*" (Denzau & North, 1994:14).

In short mental models are structured on or derived from experience – these experiences in turn are specific to the "*local physical environment*" as well as the "*socio-cultural linguistic environment*" (Denzau & North, 1994:14). As humans experience a diverse range of environments, there exists a wide spectrum of "*patterns of behaviour and thought*" (Denzau & North, 1994:15). It is therefore no wonder that the military mental models or the perception on which they are constructed diverge from those of the civilians. And with the former, as discussed earlier in this chapter, perception and thought processes are re-oriented via a systemised reaffirmation of an institutional belief system which is implemented through institutional hierarchies and stringently enforced through penalties. These learnings are with time internalised and become an essential part of the

belief structure. They create categories and concepts around which shared experiences are organised and communicated. This not only provides "*a means of internal communication*" but also "*shared explanations for phenomena outside of the immediate experience of the members of the society in the form of religions, myths and dogmas*" (Denzau & North, 1994:15).

Such belief structures also of inimical value as they help account for or rationalise those aspects of a given environment for which we do not already "*possess or acquire the information to arrive at something like a scientific consensus*" (Denzau & North, 1994:12). When confronted with ambiguity or uncertainty, a natural human reaction is to develop explanations so that subsequent actions can be ordered on it. In modern societies the mental models thus formed, become the basis of establishing institutions which in turn provides the necessary tools to perceive the environment and to communicate even better. "*These benefits can then improve the ability of those involved in the institution to extract the potential gains from exchange or cooperation*" (Denzau & North, 1994:12).

Denzau and North extended their explanation of how mental models are constructed in modern and pre-modern societies to present day's technologies and corporate social behaviour. Corporations or institutions tend to focus on those "*actions and valued outcomes*" which they define as being essential to "*fostering the vision embodied in the ideology*" (Denzau & North, 1994:15). It is therefore that we see large corporations operating extensive corporate social responsibility programmes. They further argue that the "*best way to be socially responsible, which we assume to be an argument in the chooser's utility, is to maximise profits*" (Denzau & North, 1994:15).

This aspect of their analysis is particularly relevant to the issue being discussed in this thesis. It generates an explanation for a military not only thriving in the civil sector, but extending its power base \ further concretising its hegemony through profit making commercial organisations. While the said hegemon might legitimately be able to justify its existence beyond its mandated jurisdiction – a military fulfilling the developmental needs as is the case in Pakistan. But simultaneously the profits thus made, also allow it to feed into the strategy of expanding its base and thereby concretising its hegemony.

In fact mental models are shared through communication which in turn allows for a co-evolution of ideologies and institutions. Hence the language or terminology used to

convey the mental model or discuss the ideas amongst themselves, either orally or in written form play a dual role in further developing the mental model as well as concretising it. The institutions subsequently constructed as a result of these are simply structural embodiments of the mental models. However, "*a market economy is based on the existence of a set of shared values such that trust can exist. The morality of a business person is a crucial intangible asset of a market economy, and its nonexistence substantially raises transaction costs*" (Denzau & North, 1994:20). The point being, extending hegemony via a narrative of development is not only good business but also represents positive shared values of the hegemon. Moreover, it is only natural for the 'development' narrative to manifest via organisations like Fauji Foundation and the Frontier Works Organisation.

Evolution of language of mental models

Once formed, mental models are not set or fixed. They in fact evolve with time. A crucial element of this evolution is that it brings in "*new meanings from related mental models, by analogy or metaphor*" (Denzau & North, 1994:25). Denzau and North call this a natural way of how our brains generalise and utilise concepts.

New meanings from one field of application are gradually transferred to another set of mental models. If repeated enough, they become an integral component of the mental model and actors change the use in the common parlance. With time actors not only alter the meanings we associate with terminology and but also how they use it.

These "*new concepts that have become important parts of the climate of opinion, both to the intellectuals and to the population en masse, can also get brought into the set of ideas in an ideology*…" (Denzau & North, 1994:25). Gradual evolutionary change and the incorporation of new elements does not always progress in a smooth and orderly fashion. It has the potential of generating a crisis of its own:

> "*The basis for this crisis would be the discovery of a lack of logical consistency in the ideology, or the discovery of a new set of implications which are viewed as disturbing by adherents of the ideology. The communication of this sort of problem could then be used by an entrepreneur to make a punctuated change in the ideology or religion to further the entrepreneur's own goals*" (Denzau & North, 1994:25).

Plus there are natural limits to the abundance of cognitive resources. Therefore there can be no certainty that as the mental models develop or even alter their language they would retain their coherence or their ideological logic.

This again become extremely relevant for the purposes of this thesis. As the language used to refer to the strategies employed by a hegemon to extend its power base alter with time so does the self-perception surrounding it. It still remains a strategy to expand, but with time it develops a more positive mental model to accommodate it.

2.3 The military in development / nation building

2.3.1 Defining 'development'

Even though Following Alan Thomas' line of reasoning, there are three different ways of looking at 'development' – a) as a vision[15]; b) as a historical transformation of societies (process)[16]; and, c) as a set of deliberate efforts of improvements aimed at agents of change which include, but are not limited to, governments, state and non-state organisations and social movements and practices (A. Thomas, 2000).

This study understands 'development' in the sense of the third category above – that is as change within a society. Modernisation theorists in the 1950's and 1960's explained this as a closing of the gap between the rich and the poor in underdeveloped economies. Gunnar Myrdal extended the definition to mean an increase in economic growth and a material betterment of the human condition (Myrdal, 1971). He took it to "*imply a deepening of the human potential, increasing access to many goods and services, and bringing about higher literacy rates, better health care systems, and freedom from poverty, famine, and social injustice*" (Weiss & Khattak, 2013:2).

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[15] Development as a Vision is a description of the state as a society in its most desirable form. Visions naturally might differ based on ideological inclinations; vision of a modern industrial society, a vision of human centred development with emphasis on empowerment of the people and the vision of seeing developing as a tool for reduction of poverty, improving health, mitigating environmental degradation etc.
[16] This school of thought sees the process of development as a struggle between pro-market and protectionist movement and argues that processes of production of development in certain parts of the world off set underdevelopment in others.

As shall be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, Pakistan military does not have an institutional agenda or definition of 'development' as such (see section 6.4). The data does however show that there is a clear and somewhat unanimous understanding of the term, albeit an informal one, amongst the officers. It would be safe to state that their understanding of 'development' aligns with Myrdal's definition thereof – an improvement of socio-economic condition through provision of goods and services. For the purposes of this study, the term 'development' therefore adheres to the following definition:

> It is an "*attempt to improve conditions of life, through material and social means. In this development implies change, affecting most, if not all, areas of life. The idea of development is a multi-dimensional and, by definition, interdisciplinary field in which economic, political, technological, social and cultural factors interact.*" Development in this is sense is "*synonymous with 'modernization'*" and therefore includes "*the ideas of industrialization, economic and organizational efficiency, delineated formal political institutions and functions, the pursuit of rational decision making and the fundamental alteration of social and cultural patterns*" (Damien Kingsbury, Joe Remenyi, 2004:12).

In short this is a localised form of change which is voluntarily instigated by external institutions or actors who do not necessarily belong to the "*milieu*" they aim at transforming. Innovative methods are used to initiate such 'development' (Olivier Sardan, 2005:25). It includes "*any grafting of technique, knowledge or hitherto unused mode of organization (usually in the form of adaption, borrowing or importation onto previously existing techniques, knowledge and modes of organization*" (Oliver de Sardan, 2005:90).

2.3.2   Development or Nation building

Two aspects of the military which are by and large shared by all societies are a) the role of military as an organised force; and b) its ability to absorb and mobilise resources. The military's capacity to use force – be it explicitly in the event of war or indirectly through political intervention – relies to a large extent on its organisational skills. Once in possession of coercive powers, the military has the potential to "*determine the balance of power, the complexion of government and the prevailing social and economic conditions*" (Kaldor, 1976:459). The second, allocation of resources, underscores the military's ability to mobilise resources through a "*concentration of skills infrastructure*

etc." (Kaldor, 1976:459). These resources include, but are not limited to, equipment, people and money.

Attempts to analysis these two aspects of the armed forces from multiple angles, invariably lead to discussions regarding the military's role in 'development'. The rationale is quite simple – the concept [of 'development' that is] tends to be ahistorical. The term 'development' is "*often treated as movement from one static situation to another*" (Kaldor, 1976:460). Institutions moreover can be approached independently from their social setting and entertained as "*free-floating entities*". The key advantage thereof being that room is created for an analysis of the military's 'developmental' role as a function of the internal characteristics of the institution.

As we shall see in Chapter V below, the Pakistan military uses the terms 'development' and nation building interchangeably. The reasons thereof are discussed extensively in the said chapter. It does however does make sense to unpack the two terms at this stage of the proceedings.

Nation building is more of a reconstructive exercise. It involves a broader effort on the part of the armed forces to initiate political and economic reforms "*with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one of peace with itself and its neighbours*" (Dobbins, Jones, Crane, & DeGrasse, 2007:xvii).

Key actors in nation building are national and international forces acting together (Fukuyama, 2004). Moreover, a nation building project is usually preceded by a conflict. It is therefore that Dobbins et al. argue that "*international military intervention*" (Dobbins et al., 2007:xxii) is the most reliable means of ensuring that societies emerging from war do not revert back to a state of conflict.

The prime objective of any nation building exercise is therefore "*to make violent societies peaceful, not to make poor ones prosperous, or authoritarian ones more democratic*" (Dobbins et al., 2007:xxiii). In short, while economic and political reforms are essential tools for effecting such transformations, they are not a condition precedent.

It is not difficult to understand why the data set for this thesis shows the military reverting to the terminology of nation building to refer to its 'developmental' experiments. Nation

building is by definition a military responsibility. The problem is that despite repeated usage of nation building, 'development' would have offered a far more precise and apt description.

The question then is why not call a spade a spade? Just because nation building is a natural fit for the military does not necessarily mean that it is entirely unaware or averse to the concept of 'development' as such. Moreover, it could be argued that it is even in favour of the military to openly embrace it. 'Development' after all is a good thing; it means progress; it evokes a positive emotion.

'Development' however is a highly politically charged term. The military is not the state but merely an organ thereof – a non-political, undemocratic, unelected organ of the state. Academic meanwhile considers inclusive political institutions the bedrock of economic 'development' (Sen, 2001) (North, 1998). Acemoglu and Robinson argue in their book *Why Nations Fail* (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012) that pluralistic systems that protect individual rights need to be established so as to ensure higher incomes and human welfare in the long term. Only then can inclusive economic institutions be created which not only secure private property but encourage entrepreneurship also (Sachs, 2012:142).

Cowen and Shenton not only entrusted the state with the trusteeship of 'development' but "*embedded it in the predicate of social and political order*" (Cowen & Shenton, 1996:8). The state therefore, acting through its institutions and legal regime, becomes the appropriate tool for instigating change.

The very notion of 'development' therefore becomes fundamentally interwoven with that of the state's sovereignty.[17] So much so that Kay argued that national sovereignty is rendered meaningless unless enjoined with the idea of 'development' as progress towards a "*social and economic equality. National sovereignty and development defined in this way adhere to each other as closely as the principle of equal rights adheres to that of the freedom of the individual*" (Kay, 1975:1-2). It is then in the interest of a military seeking to concretise its hegemony via the 'development' sector to avoid the term despite its professed potential to capture the public imagination.

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[17] Since the promulgation of the notion of intentional 'development' the civil state / government has claimed both the right as well as the might to 'develop'; it meets the criteria of legitimacy, has access to ample resources and possesses the requisite institutional history as well as the know-how.

Moreover post-development theorists draw a direct link from 'development' and 'development' strategies to the establishment of hegemonies. For Escobar, Sachs etc. 'development' as we understand it today was created by the United States in the 1950s as a tool to help it establish its hegemony on the global stage. Our understanding of the term is merely an extension of the earlier colonial discourse in that the world is divided in the 'advanced' North and the 'backward' South. Whereas the North is progressive, the South is degenerative and primitive. "*It has created extremely efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third World. …It has successfully deployed a regime of government over the Third World, a "space for 'subject peoples'" that ensures certain control over it*" (Escobar, 1952:09)

Literature on hydro-hegemony offers a more concrete discussion on installation of hegemony with the help of development strategies. The World Bank in the 1980-90s defined water scarcity as the main problem for the world's poor. Public sector failure to deliver in this regard was identified as the main culprit in preventing development and modernisation of the economy. The argument was a simple one. If the state cannot fulfil a basic need like clean drinking water and sanitation facilities, it is indicative of arrested development – often due to ineptitude, corruption and politicisation of the government at hand (World Bank, 2003). "*Water scarcity therefore became [sic] simultaneously indicative of a problem of poverty, of modernization, and of governance*" (Goldman, 2007:797).

The solution was a concerted and dedicated privatisation scheme. However, as post development theory argues, rarely does sale or lease of a public good go unpunished. It brings in its wake neoliberal capitalist forces that superimpose state-citizen relations and North-South dynamics under the garb of 'development' (Bayliss & Hall, 2002) (Grusky, 2002) (Barlow & Clarke, 2002).

> "*It has marked the entrance of new transnational codes of conduct and procedures of arbitration, accounting, banking, and billing; a new ethics of compensation; new expectations of the role of the public sphere; and the normalization of transnational corporations as the local provider of public services and goods*" (Goldman, 2007:797).

It is therefore that Wolfgang Sachs contends that "*development is much more than just a socio-economic endeavour; it is a perception which models reality, a myth which comforts societies, and a fantasy which unleashes passions*" (Sachs, 1992:01). It evokes a promise of delivery and therefore invites automatic approval. Referring to the 'development' as a buzzword, Andrea Cornwall argues that there is a vagueness to the exact meaning of the term. Policies are dependent on endorsement from diverse potential actors and audiences. Buzzwords like 'development' aid this process by casting a thin veneer of linguistic ambiguity which can be filled by the recipients depending on how they relate to it. "*In the struggles for interpretive power that characterise the negotiation of the language of policy, buzzwords shelter multiple agendas, providing room for manoeuvre and space for contestation*" (Andrea Cornwall, 2007:474).

It hence makes all the more sense to employ habitus as a tool to operationalise the research at hand. This thesis makes a case that hegemony is enforced via the socio-economic spheres through a capture of symbols of 'development'. On the one hand we have the post-development theorist's line of reasoning that 'development' is arguably no more than a myth or perception that moulds the reality. On the other we have an actor [hegemon in this case] convinced of its good faith as well as its indispensability in meeting 'development' needs of a people. Instead of measuring the 'developmental' act in isolation habitus allows for a discussion on the perception of the decision makers [or the hegemon, as the case may be].

The rationale being, if 'development' is no more than a play on perceptions, it is all the more important to understand the perception of the 'development' actor in question. Habitus creates the theoretical space conducive for a discussion on the perception of the decision maker in question. It allows actions to be accounted for as a function of past activities. Perceptions therefore can be seen as holding an impact value in the decision making process (Buzan, 1983:226-31).

On a local setting, Pakistan military's reluctance to steer well clear of employing the language of 'development' – and finding a substitute in nation building – becomes clearer. On a broader academic scale, the uneasy relationship of military and development has a checkered past.

2.3.3   Military and development: A historically uneasy partnership

Even though the above definitions recognise non-state civil actors as potential 'development' actors, academia's stance on military driven 'development' has historically taken its cues from the international political stage. The cold war period literature on the subject was inclined in favour of nominating militaries as engines of modernisation (Chang, 1969). The argument being that authoritarian regimes are better poised to promote economic growth as opposed to their liberal / democratic counterparts (Daadler, 1962) (Janowitz, 1964). As per Huntington, order is the key objective of developing countries. As long as it ultimately promotes economic 'development' the type of order should not be a consideration; authoritarian regimes may well be the author of such 'development' (Huntington, 1968:6-9&198) (Huntington and Nelson, 1976).

Pye, for instance, argued in favour of recognising militaries as a "*critical group in shaping the course of nation building*" and "*effectively mobilising resources*" in order to achieve objectives of political and economic 'development' (Pye, 1962:69-73) (Pye, 1961). This is because militaries of the newly independent countries or the transitional democracies had been highly invested in and allocated scarce resources during the colonial times. So much so that despite post transition efforts to cultivate civil administration or the political parties, militaries still emerged as the comparatively "*modern social structure*" (Pye, 1962:74). "*Military establishment comes as close as any human organization can to the ideal type for an industrialized secularized enterprise*". Even though the emphasis on "*professionalism and the extremely explicit standards for individual behaviour make the military appear to be a more sacred than secular institution ... in most newly emergent countries armies have tended to emphasize a rational outlook and to champion responsible change and national development*" (Pye, 1962:75-76).

Military presence in the 'development' sector can be explained as being unavoidable in developing economies. As per Shils transitioning countries view economic 'development' as the principal task of the government. Therefore vast sums of money and resources are invested in the civil administrative and bureaucratic structures. As institutional traditions and structures are still in their formative stage, "*the charges of corruption and certainly the number of accusations*" (Shils, 1962:25) increases. Militaries are naturally sensitive to such charges. When utilising "*economic aid from the more advanced states*" the proclivity of wastefulness and corruption increases in some of the newer states. "*In countries where aid is intended for both military and economic purposes, the military becomes involved*

willy-nilly and so becomes even more sensitive to corruption and more critical of the politicians and civil servants whom it holds responsible" (Shils, 1962:25-26).

By the 1990's "*democracy won the great ideological struggle of the cold war*" (Diamond, 1992:25). In the post-cold war era, as priorities shifted in favour of setting up participatory democratic infrastructure and self-sustaining political institutions, academia altered its standpoint accordingly. Now the argument ran in favour of eliminating the militaries' role as instruments of 'development' altogether.

The state's reliance on military – in combatting crime and maintenance of peace – was identified as the real reason for military transgression "*The more it is called upon to perform these sensitive internal-security functions, the greater the risks of its becoming embroiled in domestic political conflicts, and of its wielding democratically unaccountable power in civic life*" (Diamond & Plattner, 1996:xxxi). Military involvement in socio-economic 'development' arenas is informed by the same logic and yields similar outcomes – that is, even if it is to 'develop' marginalised areas and / or alleviate poverty at the behest of the state:

> "*If such involvement is generalized and ongoing* (as opposed to limited and intermittent, to address humanitarian emergencies or very specific logistical and engineering needs)*, it erodes the boundaries of the military's distinct professional role as a combat force, and immerses the armed forces in a myriad of domestic political issues and conflicts. This threatens the corporate unity of the military as a professional force. Worse still is the symbolic implication. Non-combatant domestic roles convey to the armed forces that their involvement in broad economic, political and social problems is legitimate. Thus these domestic roles must be sharply restricted or terminated. This goes as well for military ownership and control of industries and major mass-media outlets*" (Diamond & Plattner, 1996:xxxi).

This argument however did not last long. Militaries were anointed agents of economic change on grounds that the proponents thereof failed to extend sufficient supporting evidence. Furthermore whether or not militaries play a positive role in socio-economic change in a country has nothing to do with acquisition of power. "*Except under certain conditions, soldiers …are not agents of modernization*" (Nordlinger, 1970:1134). Even in

circumstances where the political/civil elements fail to live up to their potential of agents of change, the motivations and underlying values impelling the two are entirely different. Officers involved in such economic modernisation or 'development' espouse very different priorities from their political counterparts. These are officers determined to protect and preserve political stability that serves their own "*interests and identities*". Therefore actions which can be interpreted as efforts to instigate change are in reality them pursuing their own "*corporate interests in combination with their deeply inculcated military values*" (Nordlinger, 1970:1134).

Whilst instigating a coup, all militaries claim to be propelled by the need to reform. "*However, when the militaries are a more or less autonomous state within a state, without a constituency to which they are responsible or an executive to which they are subordinate, they are unlikely to be motivated by the goals of poplar responsiveness, social and economic reforms, or economic development. The officers' corporate interests and military values go a long way in accounting for their disinclination to match their original pronouncements with governmental decisions*" (Nordlinger, 1970:1134).

However, a takeover is a measure of the last resort. It is a manifestation of the military's efforts at preserving its corporate self-interest and privileges; military aggressively guards its position as the ultimate arbiter in all matters pertaining to the armed forces. These, as per Finer include "…*foreign policy, and invariably include domestic economic policy and may well include all the factors making for morale, i.e., education and the mass media of communicatio*n …" (Finer, 1962:47). The instinct to safeguard its corporate interests therefore, combined with the seizure of political power meant that there was no room left for the hypothesising militaries as drivers of 'development'.

It is only reasonable to deduce that such conservationist tendencies are exacerbated in societies where the military already exercises hegemonic control. The instinct of self-preservation and amassing power and resources is more likely to hinder economic and social change as opposed to promote it. The military's role as an instrument of 'development' therefore stands impugned if not eliminated altogether. It is therefore that this thesis makes a case for a hegemony which is symbolically enforced.

2.4   Hegemony

The concept of hegemony in its current form is accredited to Antonio Gramsci. With the failure of Western-European working class to overthrow the existing structures of power on the one hand (as Marx had predicted) and rise of fascism instead in late 1920's / early 1930's on the other, Gramsci was searching for an explanation for the failure of the Marxist predictions. According to him the answer lay in his theory of hegemony which emphasised the role of human agency as opposed to solely relying upon economic structures and the crises that were bound to ensue. He put culture and ideas – or "ideology" as he called it – front and centre of this theory. This ideology represents the willingness and ability to exercise power which resulted from the said material dominance and secondly, "*the success in acquiring ideological support from the subordinates for this role*" (Beyer, 2012:33). Therefore supremacy of the bourgeoisie is not reserved to economic control only, but factors like intellectual and moral leadership play an equally important role (Gramsci, 1971:193).

> "*It can be argued that Gramsci's theory suggests that subordinated groups accept the ideas, values and leadership of the dominant group not because they are physically or mentally induced to do so, nor because they are ideologically indoctrinated, but because they have reasons of their own*" (Strinati, 1995:166).

Political leadership in short is dependent upon the consent of the led, which in turn is secured by diffusing and popularising the understanding and world view of the dominant class (Bates, 1975:353).

Here it would be pertinent to highlight the fact that for the purposes of this thesis and in order to develop a conceptual framework for analysing the question at hand, hegemony – as Gramsci propounded – is relevant for developing a basic understanding of the concept itself. As indicated above Gramsci propounded his theory with a completely different agenda at hand; he was searching for a reason why, despite the rise of capitalism, the subordinate classes did not overthrow the structures of power. The purpose of this study on the other hand, is to understand how hegemony is established – by a military in this case – and what are the underlying practices that help perpetuate it. In order to make a case for the preponderance of one group (military) over others, it is important to develop a basic working understanding of 'hegemony' as a concept in its

original form first. Only then can it effectively be imported to civil military relations theory in order to search for an answer to the question posed by this thesis.

2.4.1 Framework of Hegemony

So, what exactly does hegemony mean? It essentially refers to the ability of a group or state to unite a deeply divided, heterogeneous social body. "*This process happens not only through material bases, but especially through ideational ones, developing a collective will towards an economic, social and political project that reproduces a given social order*" (Zahran & Ramos, 2010). Hegemony is an outcome of power configurations, based on the distribution of economic, political and military resources, aligning in favour of the said dominant states or social groups (Agnew, 2005). Gramsci described the resultant rules of interaction and structures of belief systems as a relationship not of domination by way of brute force, but of consent garnered through political and ideological leadership (Gramsci, 1971).

The dominant group (or the bourgeoisie, for Gramsci was elaborating Marxist theory after all) cannot just maintain control through advancing its own economic interests, nor can it dominate through force alone. Hence it orients expected behaviours through dissemination of a dominant ideology. A 'hegemonic culture' is developed which propagates its own values and norms that can be broadly understood and acquire acceptance as 'common sense values' (Gramsci, 1971:135&625 and Bates, 1975:357).

Moreover the group trying to establish its hegemony is invariably the one which controls economic structures. That said, Gramsci avoids the Marxist trap of reductionism and "*articulates society in its totality of political, ideational and economic sphere*" (Zahran & Ramos, 2010). In this way, instead of being dependent upon the economic structures only, ideological and political organisations are awarded an equal opportunity to exert influence. The hegemon therefore is able to exert both moral and intellectual leadership over a variety of social forces. Gramsci coined this alliance between classes and fractions of classes over a set of hegemonic ideas 'historic bloc'. It is in essence a cornerstone of a certain social order which produces and reproduces hegemony through a nexus of institutions, social relations and ideas. Once established, the people identify their own good with that of the dominant group, which in turn helps maintain *status quo* as opposed to lay foundation for a revolution.

> "*It* [historic bloc] *must supress the particular interests of some of its classes in favour of a universal ideology, and must also coordinate concrete interests of other underprivileged groups in a manner that at least some of them are fulfilled. And once the hegemony is established, the historic bloc keeps its social cohesion and unity through the diffusion of a common culture*" (Zahran & Ramos, 2010).

Hegemony, however, is not the exclusive domain of the dominant group. The subservient group has immanent potential of developing its own hegemony; a strategy of controlling the state as it were. In order to achieve this though, a network of alliances amongst varying minority groups needs to be formed. The dominant group, being cognisant of the interest of various social forces involved, pre-empts attempts to have its control wrested from it by actively aligning its own interests with theirs. Consequently hegemony is in a state of constant re-negotiation. It adjusts it character according to the need of the hour with the balance of power always tilted in the hegemons favour. And it is thus that consensual control arises; that is, individuals voluntarily accede to the perspective of the hegemon.

The question then is how a hegemonic regime can be overthrown. Intellectuals play a fundamental role in the creation of the historic bloc. In order to successfully assume the hegemonic role, the group in question must also create its own intellectuals to develop a new ideology or historic bloc of its own. As the theory was originally propounded with particular goal in mind, that is understand how the working class can take control for itself, Gramsci suggested that intellectuals must originate from within the subservient group itself as opposed to being superimposed from the outside. Alternatively put, the institution or social group that wants to assume hegemonic control must organically produce ideas, develop ideologies and create intellectuals.[18]

As aforementioned, dominant groups do not rule through brute force only but employ ideas to further their agendas. It is also clear that the responsibility of generation of said ideology rests with the intellectuals of the group in question. This is not to say that ideas are "… *powerful enough to eliminate class struggle, but they [are] obviously capable of*

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[18]The point being, a military is able to exercise hegemony not because it is has access to weapons and methods of coercion alone. Hegemonic control comes from its ability to generate ideologies / historic bloc which appeal to the masses and aligning its own interests with other [subservient] groups in addition to controlling the economic and political structures.

muting it sufficiently to allow class societies to function" (Bates, 1975:351). Should the intellectuals[19] fail to establish their hegemony, the ruling class always has the option of resorting to coercive apparatus that exists primarily as a fall back option *"… in anticipation of moments of crisis when spontaneous consensus declines"* (Bates, 1975:353).

Symbolism in short plays a vital role in the imposition of hegemony. The hegemon does not dominate through the appropriation of "*means of physical production, but the means of symbolic production as well*" (Scott, 1985:315). The ideas generated through its control of material forces of production are replicated in its control over the ideological sectors of society – culture, religion, education, and the media – "*in a manner that allows it to disseminate those values that reinforce its position*" (Scott, 1985:315).

Hegemony is not a one way road either. For the symbolism to be generated, but more importantly in order to ensure compliance from the dominated group, the hegemon is expected to deliver on its promises. It imposes restrains on the exercise of power by the dominant group. "*Hegemony is not just a symbolic bone tossed to subordinate groups; it requires some actual sacrifices or restraint by the dominant groups*" (Scott, 1985:337).

Only then can the dominated fully accept the ideology generated by the hegemon. When the hegemon is seen to be making compromises as well, as opposed to simply appropriating resources, the system of domination is made to appear inevitable to those living under it (Scott, 1985:330).

That leads to the question of the means through which ideology can effectively be circulated. The theory makes a case for mass media as means for dissemination of the dominant ideology of the hegemon:

> "*Pop culture and the mass media are subject to the production, reproduction and transformation of hegemony through the institution of civil society which cover the areas of cultural production and consumption. Hegemony operates culturally and ideologically through the institutions of civil society which*

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[19] What then is the definition of the said intellectuals; who as per Gramsci are capable of authoring this new ideology?: "*They are not only thinkers, writers and artists but also organisers such as civil servants and political leaders, and they not only function in civil society and the state, but also in the productive apparatus…* (rogersimon - find book)."

characterises mature liberal-democratic, capitalist societies. These institutions include education, the family, the church, the mass media, popular culture, etc." (Strinati, 1995:168-169).

Though disseminated through mass media, it is the electoral process where effective control of cultural organisations manifests. If the hegemon controls the parliament, it literally has the consent of the majority on its side. And as the hegemon already possess superior organisation, information and communication, this is no difficult feat either. "*Public opinion is strictly linked to political hegemony. It is the point between civil society and political society, between consensus and force. The state, when it wants to initiate an unpopular action, preventively creates the adequate public opinion; that is it organises and concentrates certain elements of civil society*" (Bates, 1975:363).

In essence for Gramsci, hegemony referred to the ability of the ruling class to "*exercise leadership and control*" (Ekers, Loftus, & Mann, 2009:289) over the subservient group through a marriage of economic and political aims on one hand and "*intellectual, moral unity*" (Gramsci, 1971:182) on the other. Hegemony in short includes both an attempt – by the dominant social group in question – to legitimise its position of power as well as "*diffusion and adoption of a set of ideologies and social relationships power*" (Ekers et al., 2009:289). Gramsci's formulation therefore allows for a discussion on state, civil-society, ideology, philosophy and popular culture on a unified platform whereby a wide range of social phenomenon can be simultaneously applied.

That said, hegemony is not an abstract concept. It entails "concrete lived practices" through which it is enacted. Secondly, despite its attempt to achieve some type of universalism, it is not a singular project (Ekers et al., 2009:289). A wide range of economic, culture, philosophical and even popular elements are hence deployed simultaneously to achieve hegemony. Over the years it is this juxtaposition of the political with the socio-cultural elements that has generated debate with Joseph Nye's formulation of the concept soft power (section 2.4.3 below) being of particular relevance to us.

2.4.2 From Gramsci to hegemony today

Gramsci propounded hegemony within the context of a nation state. Analysts of International Relation (IR) have since appropriated the term and applied it to the United States of America (the USA) within the empire context. Briefly, in IR hegemony has been

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defined as "*a state ... able to impose its sets of rules on the interstate system, and thereby create temporarily a new political order. The hegemon also offers certain extra advantages for enterprises located within it or protected by it, advantages not accorded by the 'market' but obtained through political pressure"* ((Ferguson, 2003) quoting (Wallerstein, 2003))

Even though beyond the scope of the issue at hand, this neo-Gramscian approach has produced certain concepts and terminologies which can be beneficial for our purposes. For instance, although he was writing about the US as a hegemon, as per Cox "*[i]t is important, in appraising a hegemonic order, to know both (a) that it functions mainly by consent in accordance with universalist principles, and (b) that it rests upon a certain structure of power and serves to maintain that structure"* (Cox, 1983:55).

Expounding the Gramscian hypothesis of consensus as justification for domination, Gilpin proposed that empires and dominant states commandeer public support by aligning their values and interests. One way to achieve this is by supplying public goods. Another is "*...a religion or ideology that justifies the domination over other states in the system"* (Gilpin, 1981:30).

Another interesting observation made by Gilpin is that for a hegemon (approaching the concept from the empire vantage) perception and prestige is the linchpin:

> "[T]*he hierarchy of prestige in the international system rests on economic and military power. Prestige is the reputation for power, and military power in particular. Whereas power refers to economic, military, and related capabilities of the state, prestige refers primarily to the perceptions of other states with respect to a state's capacities and its ability and willingness to exercise is power"* (Gilpin, 1981:31).

In 2000 Hobson reverted back to Gramsci to list criteria for measuring hegemony. A hegemon, according to him, must: "*a) Be economically and militarily dominant over other states, have preponderant power; b) Be a state committed to liberal principles, 'because only liberal states have the will to pursue hegemony: authoritarian states prefer imperialism, moreover, liberal states are concerned to create an open and liberal world order'; c) have rudimentary consensus among those states which it dominates; and d)*

Pursue a long-term perspective or strategy on setting up regimes, and thereby creating a sort of world order" (Beyer, 2012:35).

2.4.3   From hegemony to soft power

The most exciting contribution of IR yet is the concept of Soft Power by Joseph Nye (Nye Jr., 1990:166) which was first coined as such by him in the 1990's. Over the years the concept has been subject to both scrutiny and revision as demonstrated below. If power is accepted as the ability to influence outcomes to suits one's own desires then according to Nye, this can be achieved in three ways: coercion, payment, and attraction. While hard power includes the first two, that is coercion and payment, soft power refers to the third element (Nye Jr., 2009:160). It is this capacity to get what one wants through the power of attraction as opposed through coercive influence that is what he calls soft power. "*It differs from hard power, the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make other follow your will. Both hard and soft power are important… but attraction is much cheaper than coercion, and an asset that needs to be nourished*" (Nye Jr., 2003).

A key trait that the hegemon must possess is the understanding of and the ability to develop an "*integrated strategy that combines hard military power with soft attractive power.*" Even though at the time Nye was approaching the topic within the terrorism context, the essence of the message remains the same. The fundamental elements of a dominant group or country's soft power are its "*culture*[20] *(when its pleasing to others), its values (when they are attractive and consistently practiced), and its policies (when they are seen as inclusive and legitimate)*" (Nye Jr., 2009:161).

Moreover, a hegemon's success depends on its ability to win the hearts and minds of the dominated groups and that entails gaining control of the instruments of soft power that is "*public diplomacy, broadcasting, exchange programs, development assistance, disaster relief, military to military contacts*… etc." (Nye Jr., 2010b). After all in this increasingly globalised age, success is not merely a measure of whose army wins by also of whose story endures.

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[20] Here I am accepting the definition of culture extend by Rebecca Schiff discussed in section 2.4 below.

He later described this ability to successfully combine the strategies of hard (coercive) power and soft (attractive) power, as 'smart power' (Nye Jr., 2009;160, Nye Jr., 2010b and Nye Jr., 2010a). Exercising soft power is not an easy task. Combining the two to a desirable end even more so; especially when the aim is to produce effective foreign policy. Reason being, ownership of sources of soft resources usually lies beyond the purview of the group that owns the avenues of hard power.

Like Gramsci before him, Nye propounded his theory with a specific goal in mind; he was concerned with the United States foreign policy and the United States led 'war on terrorism'. Hence the point he was trying to make with respect to difficulties posed by effort of combining hard and soft powers specifically referred to the fact that many of United States' soft power resources lie with the private sector and civil society as opposed to with the government which controls sources of hard power. For instance, even though security is increasingly privatised, the main responsibility to provide security on a transnational level – at least at a level where hegemonies can be established – still – constitutionally rests with the military. Similarly, even though militaries in the 21st century possess a spectrum of auxiliary capabilities which comes in rather handy in presenting a 'softer' image to the public at large, there exist policy, strategic, and most importantly budgetary constraints that circumscribe the scope of soft power of the military.

Soft power also depends on credibility. Such credibility can come from an institution which *prima facie* is the source of hard power. As shown above, hegemonies are established upon consent as opposed to coercion. Same is the case for soft power: as opposed to manipulating, it incentivises; instead of coercing, it co-opts. In short it provides a free choice to the people as opposed to indoctrination. "*Sometimes people are attracted by myths of invincibility*" (Nye Jr., 2010a). It is not entirely inconceivable then to cast military in the role of a hegemon [in the Gramscian sense]. The point being, simply by virtue of being a source of hard power – an element of force and intimidation as it were – it is not excluded from the exercise of soft power.

2.5   Military Hegemony

What is military hegemony then and how does it come about? A key asset of the military is its ability to exercise coercion (Siddiqa, 2007:33). As stated above, hegemonies are established when economic, political and military resources are distributed in a way that

favours a particular dominant group, institution or state. Military hegemony then – by necessary extension – refers to a political system where [economic] resources and structures of [political] power are in control of the military (Rizvi, 2000). This allows the military to propagate its own values or norms and therefore orient societal behaviour. Shafqat defines military hegemony as system where:

> "[T]he military has a monopoly of control over strategic policy issues and decision making institutions in the country. It can manipulate and steer behaviour of political leaders and interest groups in a chosen direction. In the social and cultural sense the public also shows greater trust and confidence in the military as compared to political parties. This lends legitimacy to the military" (Shafqat, 1997:7).

Using the above definition as a basis, in this study the term military hegemony shall mean the military's monopolistic control of political institutions and processes as well as strategic policy issues which vests it with the authority to inaugurate, prescribe, proscribe or stop any or all political action.

A combination of internal and external factors come together to induct militaries into a hegemonic role. The external factors include security concerns both in the form of [real or perceived] threat on its own borders as well as international strategic alliances entered into with other countries[21]. Internal factors would be a high degree of "communal particularism" (Daadler, 1962) or heterogeneous societies where due to its organisational skills as well as coercive capacity the military is naturally a potential hegemon (Shafqat, 1997:8)(Moore, 1967). "*It gives a semblance of cohesion and emerges as a symbol of nation building. It appears to be the only force capable of creating political order and of promoting economic development* (Shafqat, 1997:8 and Shafqat, 1991)."

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[21]Giving Pakistan's example as to how its military assumed hegemonic control Saeed Shafqat states "*external factors, such as the international strategic environment (the strategic alliance with the United States in the 1950s and later economic and military assistance in 1980s helped the military to consolidate its position in the country's politics) and security threats e.g. the fear of India, Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979, and Khomeni's revolution in Iran, contributed to the military's hegemony in Pakistan. … Internally, in heterogeneous societies like Pakistan or Nigeria, the military gives semblance of cohesion and emerges as a symbol of nation building. It appears to be the only force capable of creating political order and promoting economic development. In such societies the military is a potential hegemon. It skillfully uses its organizational superiority and coercive capacity to restrict, suppress and abort the growth and development of autonomous groups and political parties (in Pakistan various martial law regulations have been used to achieve this goal*.)" (Shafqat, 1997:08)

It must be noted here that military hegemony might *prima facie* offers a semblance of stability, paradoxically the stability is dependent on the extent of military's hegemonic control of the political system to begin with.

This stability or cohesion is achieved through what Keohane calls 'cooperation'. He argues that it is in the interest of the hegemon to "*create a pattern of order*" (Keohane, 1984:49). In fact the key trait of a successful hegemon is creating and maintaining "*some kind of asymmetrical cooperation*" (Keohane, 1984:49) which although valuable, is extremely difficult to organise. Here it must be pointed out that Keohane extended an explanation of cooperation and hegemonic control against the backdrop of international regimes.

In order to explain this so called "cooperation", he juxtaposed it against and distinguished it from the concept of "harmony". Harmony refers to a situation where the actors' designed and pursued polices with their own self-interest in mind and to the exclusion of all others. However, "*the pursuit of self-interest by each contributes to the interest of all*" (Keohane, 1984:51). Cooperation on the other hand occurs "*when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination*" (Keohane, 1984:51).

> "*To summarize more formally, intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination*" (Keohane, 1984:51-52).

While harmony is apolitical, cooperation is highly politically charged in that patterns of behaviour have to be forcibly altered. "*Cooperation therefore does not imply an absence of conflict*" (Keohane, 1984:53-54). On the contrary, it represents an effort to overcome an existing or potential clash. Such conflict can be real or imagined. So for instance, concerned actors do not cooperate only when their policies are actually in discord. The mere perception that their policies could be the basis for future clash or conflict is sufficient to initiate cooperation. Cooperation in short is "*a reaction to conflict or potential conflict. Without the specter of conflict, there is no need to cooperate*" (Keohane, 1984:54).

As aforementioned, Keohane formulated his argument against the backdrop of international regimes; be it while competing for resources or brokering international peace. He was after all looking for an explanation as to "*how do patterns of rule-guided policy coordination emerge, maintain themselves, and decay in world politics*?" That however does not mean that his line of reasoning is not applicable to the subject at hand – military hegemony.

Shafqat reifies Keohane's claim by arguing that a military hegemonic system operates through forming strategic alliances and manipulating the existing legal system. This allows the hegemon to co-opt those groups and political leaders that could potentially pose a challenge.[22] Therefore, "[i]*t is not the 'absence of effective political institutions 'alone, but the military-bureaucratic elites' perceptions and beliefs that the political process and political parties are chaotic and non-legitimate that prompt hegemony. Under the military hegemonic conditions, political parties and interest groups do not develop; they stagnate and fragment. These conditions produce anti-system movements*" (Shafqat, 1997:8).

Although Shafqat's formulation of military hegemony provided the basis for formulating a definition of my own, it must be pointed out that he presented his analysis of military hegemony in a slightly different context than that at hand. He was examining the changing configurations of the civil military relations against the backdrop of a breakdown of military control 1990 in Pakistan and the rise of the People's Party Pakistan (a left wing political party). This research on the other hand is exploring the mechanisms employed by a military that allow it to enjoy popularity amongst a polity that *prima facie* wants a civilian state as opposed to a military one.

The term 'military hegemony' is not ubiquitous in the literature pertaining to civil and military relationships. The civil military relations theory's chief concern is to understand how civil control can be maintained over the military. Although 'military' and 'hegemony' have been used in tandem in the inquiry, 'military hegemony' has not been theorised exhaustively as a concept as such within the realm of civil-military relations.

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[22]As per Saeed Shafqat, the chief aim of the military hegemonic system is to obfuscate opposition. This is achieved through pursing inclusionary and exclusionary policy making simultaneously. While on the one hand allowances are made for financially viable / beneficial industrial groups and the rural feudal classes, the political participation of "aspiring urban middle classes and politicized labor" is actively restricted through policy making (Shafqat, 1997:8).

The closest the civil military relations theory comes to discussing military hegemony without necessarily committing to the exact terminology is when Huntington describes a 'Praetorian State'[23] (Huntington, 1957, Huntington, 1968 and Huntington, 1965).

> "*A modern praetorian state is one in which the military tends to intervene and potentially could dominate the political system. The political processes of this state favor the development of the military as the core group and the growth of its expectations as a ruling class; its political leadership (as distinguished from bureaucratic, administrative, and managerial leadership) is chiefly recruited from the military, or from groups sympathetic, or at least not antagonistic, to the military. Constitutional changes are effected and sustained by the military, and the army frequently intervenes in the government. In a praetorian state, therefore, the military plays a dominant role in political structures and institutions*" (Perlmutter, 1969:383).

That said praetorianism has its limitations in utility. It is useful to the extent of explaining how the military appears to be the sole force capable of creating a political order and promoting development in what Huntington calls 'modernising countries' (Huntington, 1968) – Huntington was writing during the cold war after all. While this is key in imagining militaries' as symbols of nation building and the factors that compel militaries' to intervene in domestic politics, it stops short of providing an explanation for the popularity a military might enjoy amongst a civil society devoted to retaining a civil government [through popular electioneering]. Praetorianism works on the assumption that the military is directly in charge of the state institutions and [in an ideal world] shall cede control to the rightful bearers once institutional balance is established. Methods employed by a military to rule the hearts and minds of the people from the General Head Quarters with a politically elected government in charge are the province of hegemony and for that we need to fall back on Gramsci's explanation thereof as opposed to any explanation offered by the civil military theory.

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[23]It emerges in states that are stages of political mobilisation and economic development. As the civilian groups fail to establish themselves as legitimate actors, the army is propelled into political action. In such circumstance, military presence in traditionally political arenas is indicative of corruption and institutional decay with no foreseeable respite. "*Moreover, modern institutions are … difficult to organize because of the traditional orientation of the people. In the ensuing disorganization, both economy and ideology suffer setbacks* (Perlmutter, 1969)." In such circumstances only the military appears as the force capable of offering any remedy (Shafqat, 1997).

This thesis, as aforementioned, is concerned with the seemingly apolitical practices through which military extends its hegemonic control. The significance of Nye's work is that he created a platform where the notion of socio-cultural power propounded by Gramsci can be discussed in tandem with military might. This in turn allows us to explain the more dynamic in reactions between the political, military and social sectors of the society. Dynamic interactions between the civil and military realms which have not thus far been accounted for by the civil military relations theory can be explicated under the rubric of hegemony.

2.6   Conclusion

The key advantage of using hegemony as a concept − especially with respect to the Pakistan military – is twofold. First, while the Pakistan military has certainly been called a hegemon, its hegemony has yet to be theorised as such. Secondly, it allows for an extension of the scope of how civil military relations have approached the Pakistan military's hegemony. It rectifies the current constraints of the concept as well as the theory within which it is situated. Instead of focusing on political and administrative elements confines it extends the scope of discussion to institutional and policy considerations. In short it creates room for the inclusion of socio-cultural elements which have been previously excluded from discussions on the topic. These include but are not limited to the 'developmental' activities of the military.

'Developmental' activities in this case are not to be confused with nation building. For the time being at least, there seems to be consensus on the issue that reconstruction of post conflict nations is the province of national and international militaries acting in tandem. Civil military relations theory as well as post development discourse on the other hand had constricted space for military presence in the 'development' sector. Hegemony as seen above, allows for an acknowledgement of the *de facto* presence of military in the sector.

Such activities do not include those services within the civil arena that the military is constitutionally and legally prescribe to render. This also does not refer to those acts and services that the military performs because from a defence perspective the military is the only organ of state which has the means and the know how to perform. Hegemony includes within its folds those socio-cultural and socio-economic elements which on the

one hand fulfil 'developmental' or public sector need of the citizenry but simultaneously allow the military to secure its hegemony. Even though no longer directly in control of the government, the military replaces the state in arenas which have implications for its sovereignty.

Whereas the very presence of military in a non-defence arena would tantamount to a violation of accepted terms of engagement between the civil and the military, a visible monetary delinking vests a veneer of legitimacy. It endures because neither the hegemon nor the public perceive it as a forceful imposition. Especially with the absence of a money trail, it can claim not having challenged the accepted boundaries of civil military relations. Moreover, the trusteeship of 'development' remains with the civil state. But in effect the military is meeting the people's 'development' needs through an extension of its non-defence resources. It does not need to acquire political control outright anymore as it is extending its hegemony via socio-cultural means.

Chapter III

Research Design

As discussed in chapter I the objective of this thesis is to explore how the Pakistan military operationalises its presence in non-military domains to establish its hegemony. The subject matter of this thesis is the military. This thesis uses Frontier Works Organisation (FWO) and the Fauji Foundation as an entry point into military conduct. To that end I use Bourdieu's habitus to operationalise the data collected with respect to the two case studies mentioned above.

The research design of this thesis deviates from other studies pertaining to civil military interactions in that instead of rationalising the relationship of the two domains (*inter se*) within historical trajectories, it approaches the actions / practices of the military as a product of social conditions and contexts. Using habitus as a prism of analysis, it directs attention to the processes and procedures through which behaviours, codes of conduct and most importantly the perceptions and thoughts inform generated actions.

Research Question:
What are the underlying practices and perceptions that allow the Pakistan military to establish its hegemony?

Sub-questions:
- What are the elements in military perception that compel it to play an active role in (what it defines as) nation building?
- What are the practices that allow for its presence in the civil sphere (using the two case-studies), without divesting its military status?

- How hegemony is culturally and symbolically enforced through the activities of Frontiers Works Organisation and the Fauji Foundation?

3.1   Selection of the two case studies

As established in chapter II above there is no institution more invested in re-socialising its members (Kier, 1995:69) and dedicated to nurturing a uniformity of thought (Shah, 2014:08)(Nordlinger, 1977:61) as the military. Habitus stresses on internalisation of actions. It not only allows us to focus on the practise or act itself, but to also understand it as a function of the [military's] belief system. Using habitus to operationalise the data means that we can trace discernible behavioural and thought patterns back to institutional practices and belief systems. Moreover, it provides access to those aspects of military's motivations and incentives which it might be entirely unaware of itself.

Habitus allows for a juxtaposition of practices with perceptions of the actor in question – in this case the military. As shown above, for this thesis practices are being understood in the context of the definition provided by strategic growth theory and perceptions within the meaning extended by the shared mental models. The decision to operationalise two organisations of the military as case studies, as representative of the military as a whole, is derived from these two theories.

In order to understand the self-perception element of the military habitus, it makes sense to use a case study approach. As discussed above mental models, institutions and ideologies together contribute to the processes through which we interpret and organise our environment. While mental models might differ on an individual basis, the ideologies that are created as a result of these mental models express a uniformity of thought. They represent a consensus ad idem which in turn physically manifests in the form of institutions specifically created for the implementation of these ideologies (Denzau & North, 1994:21).

Institutions thus created serve a second purpose too. Larger groups like the military, and hegemonic groups at that, are spoilt for choice when it comes to selecting specific areas

/ avenues in which to implement their policies.[24] Moreover, as discussed earlier, mental models operate at a subconscious level and the group or individual in question need not be entirely aware thereof. However, according to Denzau and North, the areas that a group elects to act or set up institutions in should not be treated as isolated entities. The institutions or organisation thus set up should instead be understood as a function of its mental models - perceptions and thought processes (Denzau & North, 1994:21).

Therefore, organisations selected (or the case studies being discussed in this thesis) offer a glimpse into how the group in question interprets the environment, and its self-perception about the role it can play with respect thereto. In short the sectors / areas they choose, represent priorities, a thought process, and an interpretation of the environment. They show how the group feels best to act / strategies in the said circumstance.

Strategic groups as we know are actively engaged in practices that allow it to appropriate resources. They create an economic and political power base that ensures the group's access to the surplus. Military as a strategic group is already in a position to mould the political system. The section on hegemony in general and military hegemony in particular in fact establishes that it is this ability of the military to mould and influence political action and outcomes that makes it a hegemon. See definition of military hegemony in chapter 2.4.

Therefore, military as a strategic group can be observed seeking and enhancing economic opportunities to further its base. One way it achieves this is through the creation of economic / commercial organisations which in turn help it appropriate resources. That said, it must quell criticism from other groups and manage public reactions also (Evers & Gerke, 2017:11).

The two case studies selected are very much military run and operated commercial organisations. However they operate under the rubric of development / nation building. They have been selected to see how the military, maximises its profits in a non-defence

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[24] *"A basic problem with this standard substantive rationality result is that the menu of choices is not really known a priori by the chooser. This menu is itself to be learned, and this learning can often involve exploring unknown territory"* (Denzau & North, 1994:21).

sector, expands its hegemony, while simultaneously ensuring a favourable public opinion by couching it n developmental terms.

3.1.1 Frontier Works Organisation

I selected FWO as a case study during the proposal writing stage. Reason being massive infrastructurs are historically used to convey the state's power to its citizens (Chalfin, 2001)(Chalfin, 2008)(Chalfin, 2010). However infrastructures have political ramifications that extend far beyond the physical representation. They embody the "*dreams of individuals and societies and are the vehicles whereby those fantasies are transmitted and made emotionally real*" (Larkin, 2013:333).

Therefore they do not merely represent the technical and physical manifestation of roads and railways etc. but are a "*mixture of political rationality, administrative techniques, and material systems*" (Larkin, 2013:331). Infrastructures in short are a window into 'practices of government' (Collier, 2011). It is for this reason that Mbembe argues that even the act of award of contracts should not be understood as a procedural technicality but perceived as an act of "*gaining access to government contracts*" and "*rewarding patron-client networks*" (Larkin, 2013:334 quoting Mbembe, 2001).

FWO was also selected because I felt it might be able to offer an explanation of how the 'development' and defence aspects of the [Pakistan] military interact with each other. Though initially constituted for a single project, that is, the construction of the Karakoram Highway, the organisation has over the years transformed into a profit making commercial entity, while retaining its military status.

Secondly it can potentially lend perspective to the infrastructure construction scenario in the country in general. A road of such a nature – the Karakoram Highway that is – had been contemplated by the government[s] of the day for 'developing' the remote northern regions of the country. As shall be demonstrated in chapter VI, the impetus behind the extension and completion of the project however was very much informed by a militaristic intent of purpose.

Most importantly the nature of the organisation is such that it concurrently occupies both the civil and military domains all the while – self professedly – performing a 'developmental' / nation building function as well. Selection of FWO as a case study allows

an opportunity to unpack how entities like the FWO feature in the military habitus and how their military yet non-military status is used to implement its hegemony.

3.1.2   Fauji Foundation

Fauji Foundation on the contrary was not a case study I had contemplated at the proposal writing stage. It was selected while in the field based on the data I gathered. This research puts the habitus of the military front and centre of the analysis. During discussions with respect to military's 'developmental' role, the military respondents voluntarily offered the Fauji Foundation as an example.

Fauji Foundation turned out to feature more prominently in the military habitus than initially anticipated. While citing military's contributions to the 'developmental' landscape of the country, it was instinctively offered as an example by the military after the FWO. Therefore, instead of selecting a potential case study beforehand and then pursuing data, in this case the military itself highlighted Fauji Foundation as an area of study.

This research looks at the mechanisms through which hegemony is established in a way that it does not challenge the accepted boundaries of civil military relations. It endures longer precisely because it is perceived neither by the hegemon – and consequently – nor the public as a forceful imposition.

Although Fauji Foundation was created for military consumption, it now extends benefits to the civilian population via a spill-over effect. It too offers a glimpse into the military habitus. On the one hand we can unpack how its activities are perceived by the military [as an extension of its nation building activities]. On the other, it shows how in practice it transcended from being a multi-million rupee, military owed, commercial concern to, [the military's] contribution to the 'developmental' landscape of the country.

Both these organisations have their similarities as well as dissimilarities. As shown in chapter VI and VII they are both conspicuously military owned and military run organisations. Moreover both provide the military an opportunity to capitalise on its hegemony. In short, both are allowing the military to replace the state by providing public services and to ingratiate itself to the public.

3.2   Methodology

This chapter provides an overview of the research approach and methodology that I used in the data collection process of this thesis. The field work was conducted entirely in Pakistan – starting from 20 May 2015 to 20 March 2016. The principle idea was to collect sufficient data – both primary and secondary – to be able to operationalise the findings within the context of the research.

The selection of using qualitative data collection method was therefore dictated by the research topic (as described in chapter II). It allows to look beyond the simple formulation of "*cause and effect*" of practices, and to analyse the underlying apparatuses and instruments (Sayer, 2010:104f).

This research follows an inductive approach. A mixture of data analysis methods were used in this thesis. Qualitative data collection methods were used to address the questions identified above. These included a) semi structured interviews with military personnel, civil bureaucrats and other relevant technocrats important to the research; b) document review which included military and governmental publications – this was in addition to literature on the subject and other grey literature; and c) personal observations which have been mentioned throughout the study wherever relevant.

A major proportion of primary data set are semi-structured interviews with military personnel, civil servants and other relevant technocrats. As this research is about the habitus of the military, interviews with military respondents are awarded centrality. As these were semi-structured interviews they did not allow for an adherence as strict pattern as would be the case with questionnaires. But the discussions still by and large followed a structure. As mentioned below, most of the respondents were serving as junior officers during General Zia's regime and were at senior positions during General Musharraf's. They were therefore ideally situated to explain elements within the military habitus.

In order to understand how the military rationalises its presence in civil arena and how it perceives its own role in civil-military domains, the respondents' were questioned about how they perceived successive military takeovers. In the discussion that followed I was able to discern the factors compel it [the military] to play an active role in the development domains – takeovers being the ultimate manifestation thereof.

As this research is about 'development', the interviews also focused on how they approached military presence in the 'development' sector. In the process naturally questions about the existence of an institutionalised vision, if any, that they are working towards arose. Within this context it was the military that introduced the term nation building. Hence a differentiation between the two terms was created by the respondents themselves.

These positions were then triangulated with the interviews with the bureaucrats. Data triangulation was the appropriate method of bringing together multiple sources of data and that too from distinct sources (Mays and Pope, 2000; Barbour, 2001; Mason, 2002). The military works alongside, if not through the civil administrative structures during coup periods. Literature also focuses on the military and bureaucracy relationship. This however could not be developed to the extent that I wanted because of the limitations described in section 3.4 below.

Using the two case studies as a bedrock, a clearer picture was developed that helped identify the practices that allow for military presence in the civil sphere without divesting its military status. The practices and procedures of the two cases, especially how they handle their budget, showed how hegemony is established. Here military self-perception was compared in greater detail – at least to the extent that access to date was allowed – with that of the bureaucrats working in corresponding areas.

Even though military habitus is the central focus of this research, and interviews were the best source for that, I did conduct an extensive document review listed in section 3.6 below. These have been juxtaposed with the interview where the need arises. I however have not relied upon them much during the thesis. These were used mostly for informing myself of the terms used in the military.

Reason being these are mostly military publications. They follow a particular line of reasoning and agenda pushing. They have certainly been used in the past by various authors, but mostly to present a particular image of the military. Using this data would have not done justice to the respondents who were frank, self-critical and self-aware. It would have certainly helped present a face pf military that audiences like to read about,

but the purpose of this research is not military bashing but to understand an academic concept.

One of the biggest constraints of the research was the topic itself. This research does not pertain to issues that could potentially have security implications. Moreover, the Pakistan military has been written about extensively over the years. Even then, my position as someone of non-military background meant that access to data pertaining to the military was not going to be easy. It is the military after all. The organisation is inscrutable by its very nature and inaccessible to the public.

Although the topic had broadly been decided at the proposal writing stage the accessibility of the data and the nature of the material that would be available were unclear up until I arrived in the field.

This meant that the first few months of the field research were a learning process not only in the literal sense [in terms of the data collected] but gathering impressions about the military as an institution, its respondents and to my own surprise, how the non-military respondents received me / responded to me as a researcher working on the topic at hand (see below).

This was the first time I was interacting with the military or gathering data with respect to it. Plus I could not arrange interviews with both military and non-military respondents for the first three months into the field work. I therefore was not too sure about what would constitute data for the final thesis. Thinking that I might have to chiefly rely on secondary data for the final thesis, I collected any and all documents that I believed at the time might come in handy at a later stage. Admittedly most of these did not get used in the final thesis, but I have enough material to write papers related to the thesis topic. Secondly, even though the focus of the research remained manifestly the same, I had to reorganise subthemes and reformulate the sub questions according to the material gathered.

I began categorising the interviews in general themes as early as the transcription stage – which I did while still in the field. This allowed me to identify areas which needed further clarification while still in the data collection stage. Once the data collection was completed, these themes then formed the basis for codification of the transcribed data.

These [codes] were then re-grouped and organised on a need be basis in order to answer the main research question as well as formulate the sub questions (Ritchie, Lewis, Nicholls, & Ormston, 2003; J. Thomas & Harden, 2008; Joffe, 2012).

I interpreted the data using thematic methods "…*the method that involves discovering, interpreting and reporting patterns and clusters of meaning within the data*" (Ritchie et al., 2003). The nature of the research and the research question is such that I had to rely to extensive quotes from the interviews to answer the question. These quotes I analysed using the content analysis approach - it allowed me to make replicable[25] and valid inferences from multiple sources and provide context to their use (Krippendorff, 2013).

"*There is nothing inherent in a text; the meanings of text are always brought to it by someone*" (Krippendorff, 2013:28-29). Content analysis was an important tool for this research because it allowed the researcher, who is familiar with the data set, text, design and analysis, to code the data and interpret the results in a way that is not only replicable and hence measurable, but also understandable for others. As this research is about mental models, content analyses allowed me to look outside the "physicality of the text" and interpret the evidence within a certain context and then to narrate the meaning in a comprehensible form.

I did not use any of the data analysis software usually used. It would certainly have been easier to do so, but my primary data was mostly based on semi-structured interviews and I did not want to skip or overlook any detail.

3.3   Location of the field work

I was principally based in Lahore during the field work and travelled to Rawalpindi / Islamabad where the military (both personnel as well as offices like the Frontier Works Organisation head Quarters, National Defence University etc.) and federal offices (like the Ministry of defence, Finance Division etc.) are based respectively.

I had two principal informants (Dr Saeed Shafqat and Brig. Retd. Asad Ali Khan) both of whom were based in Lahore. However, as I used snowball technique for data collection,

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[25] Replicability not only lends a systematicity to diverse data sets but is an important tool because it makes the context measurable

the location of the field work was by and large dictated by the respondents themselves and not by me or my chief informants. Given that the topic pertains to the military and has political elements, an important exercise was separating facts from the respondent's personal opinions and perceptions. I therefore constantly reverted back to my two key informants so as to corroborate and verify facts and issues I had my doubts about. Even then it must be stressed that the location of the field was an outcome of the snowball effect used for data collection.

I used Center for Public Policy and Governance, (CPPG) (Forman Christian College, Lahore) as a collaborative institute for this research. They provided office space and access to the library. Having a collaborative institute came in particularly handy because it made approaching the interviewees easy – this included both military and non-military personnel.

Before leaving for the field, Center for Development Research (ZEF) had issued a certificate clarifying that I was indeed a PhD candidate at the University of Bonn and conducting data collection for my doctoral studies. However, some authors writing about the military in the past have been accused of pushing a foreign agenda through foreign funding. Therefore, in order to allay any possible doubts or complications created by either the military personnel or civil bureaucrats I deemed it wise to prioritise my association with a reputable local university – should the need arise. As I approached all the respondents through my principal informants, I did not need to capitalise on my collaboration as such. That said, at the beginning of every single interview, be it with military or non-military personnel I would be asked extensive questions about who was funding the PhD, what is DAAD, and what role if any was the German government playing in it.

3.4   Interviewees / Respondents

As aforementioned the interviewees were mainly from the military and the civil bureaucracy – twelve generals and thirteen other senior ranked military officers.[26] The third group was that of technocrats / civil society. I triangulated the findings of the three

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[26] List is given as Annexure 1.

broader groups to not only verify the data set but also to understand the true nature of facts and events free of personal biases of the respondent.

 The military respondents were mainly retired officers. As the bureaucrats wished to remain anonymous, only ten of the interviews conducted were on the record and hence are the only ones who have been quoted in this study. These were mostly serving and two retired ex bureaucrats.

3.4.1   Respondents from the military

This research pertains to the military's habitus and how it reflects upon it. Therefore even though they were no longer in active service, the retired military officers are familiar with the institution; its inner workings and thought processes. Moreover, a bulk of military interviewees had retired from service as generals. Military being a strictly hierarchical institution, this means that they were involved in the decision making processes and were in the best possible position to explain the military's actions and behavioural patterns. Due to their retired status they were in a position to critically reflect upon the military's role and activities. With the exception of one respondent, all the military interviewees spoke to me on the record. Respondents from the military belonged to the Engineers Corps (for the infrastructure chapter), Education Corps, Corps Commanders during Musharraf's time, one general who headed the National Accountability Bureau when it was first set up, and some randomly selected officers (both serving and retired) to have a balance of opinion.

Here it must be pointed out that some of the quotes provided by the military have been anonymised. They were obtained from interviews given on the record. However, wherever I have felt that there is potential of misinterpretation or causing problems for the respondent in question, I have anonymised at my own discretion and take full responsibility. Otherwise all the military respondents gave the interviews on the record. If during the proceedings I felt something said could be potentially controversial, I would ask there and then if they agreed to be quoted on it. It was extremely rare that the interviewee changed their mind. Even then the general response was you can include it, just don't quote me on it.

One military respondent at the Ministry of Defence gave the interview on the record as long his name is not mentioned anywhere. Respecting his wishes I did not even write his name in my notes, so that nothing can be traced back to him.

As most of the military respondents were retired officers, I visited them at their homes in order to conduct interviews. One interview typically lasted an hour / an hour and a half and most of them invited me to come back if I had remaining questions – an opportunity I invariably capitalised. An interesting observation here is that all [retired military] respondents without exception had a private library / study at their houses where these interviews were conducted.

I also visited some military installations in order to meet military respondents. I visited the Inter Services Public Relations (the public relations wing of the military) offices in Lahore as well as within the Military General Headquarters, Rawalpindi. I was able to conduct some interviews in Lahore but not in the Rawalpindi offices despites promises. The point was to gather information about what is the image that the military wants to project to the public. Another purpose of visiting the Rawalpindi offices was to gain access to the Army Central Library for copies of ISPR publications. They told me to wait as they had to conduct some kind of Military Intelligence before they allowed access. Later they stopped taking my calls.

National Defence University (NDU) and National University of Science and Technology (NUST) – both military owned and military run universities were also a port of call. The visit to NDU was extremely fruitful. I interviewed the Vice Chancellor of the University. He explained how NDU worked, the training of senior military officers and the kind of course work they have to do for promotions. As the study is about the habitus of the military this helped me to develop an understanding of the kind and level of information the senior military officers are exposed to in order to nurture their defence as well as non-defence role in the country.

I also interviewed the Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA) is a think tank associated with the National Defence University, Islamabad [formerly known as the National Defence College. He also provided me access to their library for 2 weeks. The documents I gathered there are listed in section 3.6 below.

NUST on the other hand was not helpful at all. Here I interviewed a senior professor who also headed the Planning Commission during General Musharraf's takeover. The intention was to understand the planning processes on the whole, but especially during Musharraf's time. While he was helpful with respect to development procedures he was extremely reluctant about broaching any details.

For both the case studies different methods were used to gather data from the military respondents. This was not deliberately planned to be so. FWO had been identified as a case study at the proposal writing stage. As this research uses the military's habitus as a prism of analysis it made sense to visit the FWO Headquarters in Rawalpindi and to understand the organisation, its mores and its *modus operandi* by physical being present there and getting a feel of things as it were. I spent a week there establishing contacts, conducting interviews, learning processes, understanding it's standing vis the Army etc. and developed a keen insight into the behavioural patterns of the respondents for this particular case study.

Fauji Foundation on the contrary was selected while in the field based on the data I gathered. This research puts the habitus of the military front and centre of the analysis. During discussions with respect to military's 'developmental' role the military respondents voluntarily offered the Fauji Foundation as an example. Even though I did not physically visit the Fauji Foundation offices, this do not compromise the quality of the data in any way. Most of the military personnel quoted within this category headed the organisation at some point after retiring from active service.

3.4.2   Respondents from the bureaucracy

The second large proportion of interviewees was the civil bureaucrats. Even when in charge, the Pakistan military acts through the administrative / bureaucratic structures. All the bureaucrats currently in service have served under the Musharraf regime. Some of the more senior ones had even served under Zia. Hence the reason behind approaching the bureaucrats was to understand how the military operates during a takeover; its *modus operandi* and the extent to which it succeeds or fails on delivering on its promises. Plus I wanted to understand the procedures of statecraft which are violated due to the civil military imbalance in the country.

The bureaucrats as shown in Annexure 1 below were selected from the Ministry of Defence, the Finance Commission, Transport Department, Department of Planning and Development – in short areas which were germane to the case studies.

I discovered during the field research, that simply because the topic pertained to the military, the respondents from the civil side were neither willing to share any data in document form, nor were willing to talk. Quite a few agreed to explain the institutional lay of the land as it were and procedures involved in civil military interaction on the express condition that I do not even mention that I met them. Some agreed to be quoted if they were kept anonymous. Then there were some who indicated during the interview the content they wanted to be kept either of the record or not attributed to them.

Even though admittedly it was comparatively difficult to access the bureaucrats, even then there was a rationale in the selection of the respondents. I visited the Transport Department not only to verify the claims made by the military respondents at the FWO, but to also understand the procedures entailed in the grant of projects etc. The next step was to visit the National Highway Authority offices in Lahore for the same reason – to understand FWO's standing *vis* the government's transport authorities and their relationship *inter se*. However, unlike the Transport Department they refused to help at all and I did not return because it was clear they were not going to share any form of data. I also visited NESPAK – which a quasi-government engineering consultancy firm. They design a majority of large infrastructure projects on behalf of the federal as well as provincial governments. This was particularly helpful in that it provided a neutral outsider's perspective to the military, government and private contractor relationship.

I visited respondents at the Ministry of Defence in order to understand the exact role that the Ministry plays vis the military. The second purpose was to understand how the defence budget is made and distributed. However, I could not gather much details beyond the obvious procedural aspects. I tried my best to find out at the very least the heads under the budget, but either they did not know themselves or were not willing to share. Two officers I met here were off the record to the extent that they did not want me to even mention the fact that I met them.

The intention behind visiting the Finance Commission was to explore further the making of the defence budget, the considerations informing and the procedures involved. As

usual, beyond explaining the procedural aspects, the bureaucrats were reluctant to divulge any information. However, while I did get some idea of how defence budget procedures work, the exact contents thereof, even the heads under which it is disbursed was something even they claimed to not know.

The purpose behind visiting the Department of Planning and Development was that when I arrived in the field, I was not clear as to the extent that military would be forthcoming. However, as the military is bound to consult the government (federal or provincial as the case maybe) in such matters I decided this would be a good starting point. I gathered a lot of information about the general 'developmental' landscape of the country, but nothing that was of particular relevance to the research.

3.4.3   Technocrats / civil society

The third group of respondents included the activists, academics, development practitioners, lawyers and other technocrats like engineers. These were around twenty in number but some of them overlap with the military and the bureaucracy personnel. Even though the study is about the military and how it reflects on certain issues, this group provides a critical counter balance to the military perspective. In December 2016 I went back to the field. By this time I had had an opportunity to go through all the data, codify and thematically sort it out. In short it had a composite form. The idea was to verify my initial findings with an expert group. At this stage the idea was to interview academics and journalists who have written extensively about the military over the years. These had been deliberately left to be conducted at a later stage. However, as the meetings had been arranged while still in Bonn and there were only four weeks' time available, I could not succeed in conducting as many interviews as I had initially wanted. That said it would be safe to say that I by and large achieved my intended purpose.

3.5   Interviews – Language and set-up

The interviews were conducted in a mixture of Urdu and English, mainly the latter. In the beginning, subject to the respondents' consent, I recorded the interviews and transcribed them later on. However, I very soon realised that despite having agreed to a recording earlier, the respondents would visibly relax and start sharing more candid views as soon as the recorder was switched off. Therefore for all subsequent interviews I took hand notes. These semi structured notes are all in English. Even though I am a native Urdu

speaker it was only during this research I realised that I cannot write Urdu anymore and automatically translate what is being said in English in my own head. Up until this research I had not noticed that I have difficulty writing Urdu. The quotations included in this study are direct quotes except that in some cases they have been translated from Urdu to English.

These were one to three hour long semi-structured interviews. Interviews military personnel formed a large bulk of the (primary) qualitative data collected from the field. I decided that in order to develop a workable understanding of the perceptions and though processes of principal actor of the thesis the military itself would be best suited to "*contribute to their own knowledge, techniques and experiences...*" (Fals-Borda, 1987:332).

At the beginning of each interview I handed out my ZEF business cards, introduced myself, my academic background, and the research topic. I shared ethical considerations and concerns of such a research right at the outset. Whether the interview was on or off the record was entirely the interviewee's decision. In case the respondent agreed to share information with me on the record, which was the case in majority, I gave them the option to go off the record with respect to any anecdote or names etc. during the conversation.

There were many instances where while the interview was on the record, the respondent would indicate that what they were about to say next was not to be quoted. For those sections of the conversation that the interviewee indicated as off the record, I would stop taking notes altogether and put the pen down in plain sight so as to ensure that their wishes were being respected. As they had my business card I made sure they knew they could call me back and with draw any statement they had made at the time but retrospectively felt that it should be put off the record. Nobody availed the option though.

During the interview process I positioned myself as the listener and the learner who stood to benefit from the wisdom and internal / practical know how of the respondent. My ice breaking strategy was to begin by asking how and why they joined the military and carry the conversation forward from there.

I feigned ignorance and allowed the respondent to speak and provide their own point of view. Even if I knew something to be factually wrong, I did not correct them but simply

posited a follow up question in a manner which would provide the respondent an opportunity to either retract their statement or clarify their stance. The interview process was not a journalistic exercise after all and the point was not to catch someone out as it were. Moreover I was very aware of the fact that only were the respondents taking time out to help me achieve my research.

I realised very early on that as I was trying to familiarise myself with the interviewers, their language and mannerisms, the respondents were also sizing me up, as it were. One question that I was asked by all respondents with the exception of maybe one or two was if I had read Ayesha Siddiqa's book Military Inc. Initially I used to say yes, because I had read sections of it if not the entire book and also I naturally assumed that as it is popular book and they are trying to assess the extent I am aware of the literature and the military through it. However the follow up question inevitably was what did I think of it and whether I agreed with the findings or not. I realised soon (through some informal discussions) that they were trying to assess my positionality; what was my opinion of the military and how did I perceive its activities. As I did not want to compromise the quality of the data set, I tailored my response to out-rightly say I have read it but it has nothing do with my work. Or simply admit to reading sections of it and move on.

3.6   Document research

The secondary data used is mostly military's own publications. They are mainly used to corroborate what the respondents' claims. As it is the military we are talking about here, it is not possible to get internal policy documents; that is, it is absolutely impossible to find a document that states upfront the military's institutional stance on selected issues. Therefore understanding the military habitus is more of a deductive exercise. Fortunately a fairly clear picture can be drawn of the lines on which the institution thinks based on the journals published by the military itself which contain essays and articles written by its own officers. It must be pointed out that the contents thereof are not to be taken to represent the official policy of the military as an institution. These are personal views of the respective officers published by the military of course. They are useful for this thesis because they allow a glimpse into the thought process. It lets us understand how they reflect upon and understand issues like nation building and development etc.

These journals and essays were mostly obtained from the library of the National Defence University but some of the essays were provided by some of the senior military officers also. Here it must be pointed out that all of them have not been quoted in the study. A majority were used to familiarise myself with the military only. These include:

- The Green books [1999 – 2015] – Pakistan Army General Head Quarters, Rawalpindi
- Hilal Magazine – Inter Services Public Relations (Online publication)
- Margalla Papers [2006 – 2016] – National Defence College, Islamabad
- National Defence College Journal [1988 -2016] – National Defence College, Islamabad (which later became National University Journal and was published by the National Defence University, Islamabad)
- ISSRA[27] papers [20101- 2015] –
- Monographs [2011 – 2013] – National Defence University, Islamabad -
- Essays written by serving officers as a part of their course works

An interesting addition to the secondary data set would have been the syllabuses taught at the military universities to the military officers that is, as part of their promotion programme. However, despite best of efforts that was not possible.

For the chapter on infrastructure I visited the Frontier Works Organisation's headquarters in Rawalpindi and conducted interviews for around four days. Their Public Relations department provided:

- Newsletters
- Company Profiles
- Pamphlets
- Essays / Newspaper Articles etc.

In addition to military documents, this thesis also relies on:

- The website of FWO
- The website of Fauji Foundation
- The website of ISPR

In order to understand the 'development' sector – the procedures and priorities involved I established contact with the Planning and Development Department, Lahore (P&D). They gave me an office space for a month and half and granted me full access to their library and photocopying facilities. Form here I obtained:

- Five year Development Plans
- Annual Development Plans

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[27] Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA) is a think tank associated with the National Defence university, Islamabad [formerly known as the National Defence College)

- Economic Surveys

An essential component of this research is the popularity of the Pakistan military amongst the people of the country; a people for all intents and purposes at least committed to the democratic ideal. For this I rely upon polls conducted by US Aid, Gallop Pakistan and various credible newspapers lie the Dawn, and Herald, Pakistan. Additionally, reports by various NGO's, Aid Organisations and Governmental Organisations were collected to draw a picture of the development sector in the country but the need to quote therefrom did not arise.

Every time the military takes over, the constitutional and legal veracity thereof are adjudicate upon by the highest legal forums in the country. Perusal of the legal judgements showed that that the military's presence in the 'development' sector has been used as the basis for legitimising successive military coups. Legal judgements were therefore used as a form of secondary data also.

3.7   Challenges in the field

Conducting research on the organisation was however not easy. I was informed by an interviewee at the Inter Services Public Relations department of the military that there have been instances in the past where prospective authors did not disclose their true objectives upfront. They had stated that they were working on a particular topic. Once granted access to data and military personnel however, they set about researching an entirely different issue altogether. This, as per the respondent, was not only embarrassing for the organisation in general but created internal administrative problems as well.

This turned out to be a much bigger consideration for the respondents than I had initially given it credit for. Not long into the field work I realised that military respondents I had met through my gatekeepers were more candid, forthcoming and self-critical and those who I met through other contacts. While introducing myself to the latter group, a question invariably asked was whether I had a relative within the military. In some of the initial interviews I had naturally denied. Once I got to understand the military mind set better I started mentioning my military gatekeeper – who is friend of the family's. I could visibly see the respondents relax a little and found them more sharing. My deduction that having

a military connection portrayed me a legitimate researcher and they felt secure that they would not be misquoted.

Bureaucrats were not forthcoming

The first step once in the field was to contact the informants – one from the military and one from the bureaucracy. My military gatekeeper too was not clear about the kind of data that would be available and the extent to which the military personnel he offered to put me in touch with would be forthcoming. He therefore suggested contacting the bureaucracy / the government offices first. Even when in charge, the Pakistan military acts through the administrative / bureaucratic structures.

The civil servants however, as aforementioned were not as helpful as I had expected. Most did not want to be mentioned. The ones who did, shared most of the information which could have been useful for this research off the record. I had for instance wanted to understand how defence budget procedures work. The Finance Commission which responsible for drafting the budget claimed outright that they had no information on the issue. The Ministry of Defence explained it to a certain extent but they could not explain the exact contents thereof or even the heads under which it is disbursed.

After having tried my [civil] contacts and failing to get anything constructive, I had no option but to contact the military directly for primary data. For that I went to the Inter Services Public Relations Head Quarters in Lahore – without any reference or prior contact. As the topic pertains directly to the military, I was told that they would have to conduct a military intelligence first (into my background and affiliations etc.). I was not allowed to approach any military personnel until this was complete. When I did not hear from them for three months I decided to go ahead with my collection anyway. No body raised any objections at any point.

Here I must point out that the military respondents on the other hand were extremely helpful, forthcoming and honest about a lot of issues. They were self-critical and explained a lot of internal practices and procedures which are not discernible from the outside. I must also state that one of the chief reasons for doing so was that both of my principal informants would personally call the military respondents to introduce me and my work. This seemed to carry a lot of weight with respect to the candour of the interview.

3.8   Limitations of the research

- While at the Frontier Works Organisation the head of the Public Relations team was present in every interview that I conducted while at the FWO Head Quarters. He was taking notes because he wanted to write an article on the subject in the newsletter. It would though be reasonable to assume that the respondents I met there might have exercised some sort of self-censorship while talking to me.

- I could not establish a contact within the National Logistic Cell and therefore could not visit their offices. I interviewed a general who had headed the organisation previously. He however was not too comfortable arranging a visit. This however did not hamper the research a great deal. FWO was the case study. I wanted to visit the NLC in order to compare the two and see what differences and similarities I could find. Not being able to do so did not affect the outcomes of this research

- While the National Defence University was an excellent source for the secondary data and it was extremely convenient to find most of the data set in one place, they did not have all the copies of the journals. The Green Book for example found to be extremely reliable source of military's self-perception and habitus and would have preferred to have access to more copies.

- I also could not get copies of the Hilal magazine which is published by the ISPR and represents the public face of the military. I went to the ISPR Head Quarters to ask for access to the Army Central Library in Rawalpindi. They never issued the letter and then stopped taking my calls.

- I realised that I had only three female respondents out of fifty. That too because I had gathered some data regarding the military's presence in the education sector at the time which was not needed in the final product. While the gender component is an essential element of development research, it is not inimical to this study. This study is largely about the habitus of the military and that is a male dominated institution.

Chapter IV:

Pakistan military: Evolution of a hegemon

4.1   Introduction

Chapter II argued that once hegemonic conditions have been established, the stronghold of the dominant group or the hegemon strengthens with time. The weak or the subservient groups conversely "…*become weaker and perhaps more fragmented*" (Shafqat, 1997:12). The same has been the case for Pakistan. Since its independence in 1947 there have been three coups – 1958, 1977 and 1999. As shall be discussed in section 4.4 below, carefully crafted policies and laws were promulgated by these military regimes, which ensured that even when not directly in control, the balance of power would be tipped in the military's favour. As a result thereof, Pakistan military's hegemony is neither defined by nor limited to the duration that it was directly in office. Therefore, even when it withdrew from power, it retained its supervisory role and its hegemonic control lingered.

Literature's default position is to explain the military's authoritative control in Pakistan, the causes thereof and how it is maintained and justified against a chronology of facts and events. While the term hegemon is often used to refer to the military, its hegemony has yet to be conceptualised within a theoretical framework.

Here it has to be mentioned that Saeed Shafqat in his book *Civil-Military relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto* (Shafqat, 1997) expounds on the military's authoritative role, its bids for power in the form of takeovers and successive civilian regimes within the framework of hegemony. His explanation of the hegemonic control will be used herein as the foundation to understand policies and practices that allow for the military to assume the role of a hegemon. However, Shafqat illustrated the rise of the Pakistan Peoples' Party and changing relations between the civilian and military leadership. This study on the other hand pertains to how the military's non-defence capacities can be used to enforce hegemonies.

This study argues that just because the Pakistan military is no longer directly in control of the government it does not mean that it has either relinquished or intends to give up its authoritative role. Its hegemony lingers.

It has simply discovered new avenues of concretising its hegemony without having to overstep or challenge the accepted boundaries of civil military relations. Its hegemony is not enforced through the conventional tools of coercion and consent but rather through cultural and symbolic measures. It is concretised through innovative exercise of its auxiliary capabilities and ubiquitous presence in 'developmental' realms thereby opening new dimensions of how military hegemony is produced and maintained in the long run.

In order to make a case of how the Pakistan military extends its hegemony beyond its constitutionally mandated role, we need to understand how hegemony has been understood so far – set the scene, as it were. This chapter identifies and discusses the factors that the literature treats as sources of military's authoritative status – the aim being to understand why the military is a hegemon; what key events propelled it to assume the said role. Instead of replicating a time line, the factors will be discussed under the headings / categories that the previous authors have discussed them under.

This chapter focuses on understanding the exercise of hegemony i.e. practices that the literature treats as evidence of the military's overarching presence in the country. Even when not directly in power the military retains control over key administrative fields which are ideally speaking civil domains. This chapter will discuss some of the methods it employed to intrude upon quintessentially civil spheres. It must be clarified here though that this is a collection of how military authoritarianism, preponderance or hegemony has been discussed in the past. It is an assembly of what are the methods employed the military to entrench its hegemony identified by other authors.

4.2   The Colonial inheritance

Pakistan military's hegemony has long been understood in the context of a post-colonial state. The general argument being that the military traces its roots back to the colonial times. During the Raj it was an instrument in the hands of the colonial masters used for controlling the local population. By the time of independence in 1947, institutional

foundations had already been established and roles already defined. The very act of decolonisation and the creation of a new nation state was not as much of a clean break from the past as might be expected. Post – independence the military simply continued performing the previously assigned role. This study uses the work of Hamza Alavi and Ayesha Jalal to deconstruct the civil military imbalance as a part of the colonial inheritance.

Alavi saw the civil military imbalance as a product of what he called an 'over-developed state'. A fundamental difference between a post-colonial state and western societies is that in the latter, the nation state is created by the indigenous bourgeoisies who "*provide a framework of law and various institutions which are essential for the development of capitalist relations of production"* (Alavi, 1972:61).

Colonial rule on the other hand is implemented through the bureaucracy and the military – which he called the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Due to their association with the colonial structure, the military-bureaucratic structures are more developed and hence more organised than the "*economic and social forces*" (Mitra, 1998:9). Yet, after the revolution it is the same metropolitan bourgeoisie who are vested with the task of creating the new nation state. Post revolution it is their responsibility to a) "*replicate the superstructure of the state which it had established in the metropolitan country itself;*" and b) *"create state apparatus through which it can exercise dominion over all the indigenous social classes in the colony"* (Alavi, 1972:61)*.

The bureaucratic and military apparatus that had previously been used to subordinate the native social classes simply transfers to the new [post-colonial] state without undergoing major changes. "*The colonial state is therefore equipped with a powerful bureaucratic military apparatus and mechanisms of government which enable it through routine operations to subordinate the native social classes"* (Alavi, 1972:61)*.

The political parties are unable to provide an effective counter balance because in the post-colonial state, the political parties and politicians serve the function of "*…manipulating public relations on behalf of those who make public policy"* (Mitra, 1998:9). The bureaucratic military structure on the other hand is by and large mutually accommodative and supportive as long as neither attempts to tip the balance in its own favour.

Specifically with respect to Pakistan and India, Alavi argued that the terms of interaction between the political leadership and the bureaucratic – military alliance were a product of their mutual institutional history. The two neither had an opportunity nor the cause to establish common ground. During the colonial rule, and by necessary extension the freedom struggle, both had been pitted against each other on opposing sides.

The bureaucracy and military were "*instruments of colonial power*" in that it was their responsibility to "*subordinate the various native classes and to repress the nationalist's movement on behalf of the colonial master*" (Alavi, 1972:63). Post-independence they found themselves answerable to the very same political leadership. Moreover, "the *experience of partial transfer of power by stages during the twenties and thirties had, however, already institutionalized procedures by which the bureaucracy could by-pass the political leaders who had been inducted into office, on sufferance under the umbrella of British imperial rule*" (Alavi, 1972:63). Therefore the relationship of mutual accommodation which should have been established at the time of independence never got a chance to set roots.

Once the colonial rule ended, members of the public already had extensive and direct access to the state through the militaristic and bureaucratic structure without having to "*admit to mediation by political parties. Politicians are reduced to playing the role of brokers for official favors.*" Pakistan, inherited "… *powerfully organized bureaucratic and military structures*" (Alavi, 1972:63-65). While it is true that at the time of independence the military was not as organised and structured as it is today, the political parties were "*still weaker*" (Alavi, 1972:63-65). As can be seen from an expert interview below, foundations of the hegemon were laid even before the country came into existence:

> "*The most stable constituency of the military [in terms of popularity that is] is the middle class. By default and due to the exigencies of Partition the middle class always had a near monopoly of education. Plus they already had a social base which meant they never voted. Why not? Because things got done by the bureaucracy or the military. The entire point of politicians is that you go to them when you need help / want to get things done.*

Politics is rooted in the society. In Pakistan, the hub of state authority and state power lies with the bureaucracy and the military. Hence the middle class is where the military power resides; a middle class which is socially progressive and politically conservative. And they have distrusted and disliked the political leadership from as early as 1947. But then the middle class has not been pro-democracy either because the system is designed as such that there is no mechanism for them coming into power either.

They became politicised in urban centres around 2007 when we see the emergence of Imran Khan. But then Imran Khan was created by the military. The military has figured out that the people need it now more than ever. Hence we see them influence peddling. The military knows that power is more important than representation. Its decided to let the politicians handle the day to day running of the country but retain control and use threat of intervention whenever necessary" (Interview dated 19 November 2015 with Dr. Mohammad Waseem, professor of political science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences).

Alavi illustrated his case by showing that since the inception of Pakistan, the bureaucratic-military oligarchy has been in search for greater legitimation and has challenged the state power in the process. In order to achieve this, it acted through:

"*(a)   A facade of representative government, which, from time to time, it was unable to control as it like;*

(b)   The charisma of the military itself, as the final and morally superior (to the corrupt politician) guarantor of the state and the wellbeing of the people of Pakistan; and

(c)   The attempt, particularly under Zia, to institute Islam as the basis of legitimacy of the state" (Mitra, 1998:9).

While Ayesha Jalal accepts the position that the institutional structure of a post-colonial state is certainly conducive to the emergence of a hegemon, she argues that military superiority over either the inefficient civil service or the disorganised political parties is not a given:

"[F]or some four years after the establishment of the state, no single institution was either stable or solid enough to command a clear monopoly of power – not the military, not even the well-oiled civil bureaucracy and certainly not the main political party" (Jalal, 1991:123-124).

In the early years after independence there was certainly some evidence of power being shifted away from the political/representative leadership through an alliance between members of the civil and military establishment. The 'Rawalpindi Conspiracy'[28] is the perfect example of the fact that in the early years the military was neither as united nor in control as assumed. The lines of power were drawn in the military's favour only once it joined the Seato and Cento [29] through *"skilful manipulation of international connections"* (Jalal, 1991:124). Jalal calls these *"artless attempts to secure international support to support bureaucratic controls over the domestic economy while at the same time confirming dominance of the armed forces in the still fluid positioning of forces within the state apparatus"* (Jalal, 1991:124).

That said the unique structure of the post-colonial state definitely provides an edifice for the military's authoritarianism. In Pakistan's case in particular, "the *colonial legacy – institutional, strategic, economic as well as ideological – informed the dialect between state construction and political processes in critical ways"* (Jalal, 1995:4). *"The highly centralised, bureaucratic and administrative structures remained intact even after independence which in turn made it difficult to establish the writ of the representative offices over the executive"* (Jalal, 1995:18).

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[28] There were elements within the military which were not too happy with the then Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's handling of the government in general, but the Kashmir issue in particular. Lead by Major General Akbar Khan, a group within the army attempted the coup against the government. The coup was not only detected and foiled in early stages but the Army Commander in Chief Ayyub Khan and the Defence Secretary Major General Iskander Mirza remained loyal to the government. The fact the coup failed shows that the military was not one strong unit as it is now.

[29] Pakistan entered the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954. Other members were United States, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand. The purpose of the treaty was to neutralise the rapid acceleration of communism in the region. Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) also known as the Baghdad Pact Organization Mutual Security Organization dating from 1955 to 1979. The main purpose of this treaty was to thwart Soviet involvement in the Middle Eastern countries. Pakistan's involvement in both the treaties is largely attributed to its growing ties with the United Kingdom and the United States. "Pakistan's interest in these pacts stemmed from its desire to develop its military and defensive capabilities, which were substantially weaker than those of India. Both the United States and the United Kingdom supplied arms to Pakistan in those years" (Office of the Historian, n.d.).

Since early days after independence, rule of law was used as a tool by the dominant class – in this case the administrative bureaucracy – to enforce their will over the society. As a result instead of "substantive democracy" – taking hold – which derives from the empowerment of the people, "formal democracy" set roots. Formal democracy is distinct from substantive [democracy] in that while it certainly ensures freedom of expression and the right to vote, it does not encapsulate all the characteristics of its normative ideal (Jalal, 1995:3). Authoritarianism on the other hand is defined as "*organized power embedded in the institutional structure of the state. It is seen as distinguishable, though not insulated, from the myriad structures of dominance lining the larger body politic. So while an element of covert authoritarianism inheres in any state structure, the degree of its overt manifestation is contingent upon the existence or the absence of formal, much less substantive, democracy*" (Jalal, 1995:3).

Substantive democracy could never take hold in Pakistan. This is because in the over developed [post-colonial] state like Pakistan, the political parties could not provide an effective counter balance to the powerful military and bureaucratic structures which used rule of law as a tool for self-preservation.

Colonial inheritance is not condition precedent of military's hegemonic control. That applies to Pakistan as well. Tracing the sources of the military's authoritarianism back to the country's colonial past does not imply that the country's fate was preordained – as some scholars argue. It was important however because any discussion on the subject would be incomplete without acknowledging this particular aspect of the country's past. Moreover, till date the colonial legacy looms large within the military habitus. During interviews / discussions on the military, the military interviewees would often refer to it as shown below:

> "*Post partition we [Pakistan] got our share of military, bureaucracy and law but we were the breakaway state. India was the larger whole state. Therefore we had to build everything anew. Instead of recreating the state however, a struggle between the migrants (the UP elite who had come on an adventure and had no stake in the country – could easily go back) and the natives as it were. In short, there was rampant disorganisation.*

Even the military did not have such rules in place that a disciplined force could be built upon. Plus duties of helping civil administration like helping the refugees etc. came the military's way very early on, which is how they got involved in the running / organisation of affairs very early on. The India fear factor was there any way. With all these factors, the managers of statecraft concentrated on development of military more.

With naturally in a better position institutionally speaking (because of the above listed factors) a lot of burden was shifted to the military. National Guards was given training by the military. Policing was given to the military. Road construction fell into the military domain because it had engineers. Ok they did wartime military work, but they were able to help"[30]

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"The military is taught to serve in whatever way we can. We help out with flood, earthquakes, tree planting in cities. We perform these tasks for the better future of the country. Maintenance is a part of the Fauji culture. We inherited it from the British"[31]

Pakistan military's hegemony therefore can be attributed to a number of factors. One of these has been the country's colonial roots. Even though this chapter pertains to an analysis of the literature on the subject we see that the military too, to a certain extend attributes it habitus to its colonial past. That however is not to be interpreted to mean that this particular theorisation holds more merit than the others. The aim is to just point out that this particular line of reasoning holds merit within the military consciousness.

4.3   Labelling the Pakistani state

Literature pertaining to interaction between civil and military domains in Pakistan ranges from professional and organisational attributes that facilitate assumption of power to issues of transfer of power and the crisis of legitimacy. The most common approach to

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[30] Interview dated 22 February 2016 with Lt. Gul at his house.
[31] Col. Syed Shahid Abbas, Deputy Director Inter Service Public Relations at his office in Lahore on 17 September 2015.

understanding the civil military imbalance in the country is to categorise or explain the nature of the state. The military's role in politics, economy and society in general are operationalised to that end. However, as argued in the previous chapter, it is extremely difficult to simplify real life facts so that they sit squarely on a theoretical hypothesis or typology; in Pakistan's case, even more so. Below are some of the more commonly used labels used to describe the Pakistani state *vis* the civil military imbalance in the country and why they do not apply to Pakistan's case entirely:

4.3.1   The Praetorian State

A good starting point is defining Pakistan as a praetorian state. "*On the one hand the military is a differentiated body, with distinct group interests of its own, as well as those held in common with civilian groups. On the other hand it acts like any other political elite in pursuit of its own interests*" (Luckham, 1971:31). Yet Pakistan does not qualify as an ideal praetorian type. Even though the military's political power is enhanced by its ability to regulate internal law and order (at the behest of civil partners) it has not lost its original purpose of protection against external threat. The military remains very much an organisation united from within against an outside enemy. In fact if anything it uses its role as a protector as the basis for establishing its position of power.

4.3.2   The Garrison State

Nor can we call Pakistan a garrison state – where the military power exceeds that of the civil institutions. In a garrison state military does not necessarily seize political power directly but maintains veto powers in respect of important policy decisions (Lasswell, 1941). T.V. Paul sees Pakistan as a garrison state "*as it describes a state with a deeper penetration by the military as the most dominant actor in society, where military values and culture dominate the societal ethos profoundly*" (Paul, 2014:72). However, while civilian institutions have undoubtedly shown an inability to establish objective control over the military chiefly due to what Paul correctly calls "a democratic deficit" the military has never been able to enforce "a military model of society" or for that matter legitimise its control in the public's mind.

Granted successive military takeovers were welcomed by the public at large, but all military ousters were brought about by large scale anti-military and pro-democracy

protests.[32] The military being popular with the polity is not the same as the public subscribing to the military model that the garrison state typology suggests. True in Pakistan's case a 'civil government' is a more appropriate description than a 'democratic' one (Zaidi, 2005) but the polity's commitment to the democratic ideal at least is indisputable also. The point being that being popular as a military is distinct from being a military the people want directly in power. While the military's popularity ratings amongst the public are quite high, the latter does not want a military takeover.

4.3.3   The Guardian State

Even the guardian state model, that is arguably the closest to describing the Pakistan military's role, cannot be called a perfect fit. A guardian type of military is "…*disposed to regarding itself as the platonic custodian of a vaguely defined national interest. On those occasions that it does put coercion to political use, this occurs because of dispute with other elites as to the definition or methods of pursuit of the national will, rather than because it acts as the agent of particular interests or power groups*" (Luckham, 1971:27). Guardian type militaries are relatively independent from the civil institutions. While their political role is to assist the state's internal matters as well as protect it from external threats, they are able to exercise their own agenda setting.

While the first part of this is applicable to Pakistan's case, despite the balance of power tipped in its favour, the military is not independent from the civil bureaucracy at all. The takeovers and other transgressions into civil arena are certainly justified to the public as attempts to safeguard the national interest. The reality is far more nuanced. From the outset the militaries' latitude to act at will is constitutionally circumscribed (Shah, 2014c). The military is very conscious of the legality of its actions. Moreover once in power the military has to depend on the bureaucratic and administrative structures for enforcement which further limits its exercise of power or agenda setting as it were.

4.3.4   Military as a hegemon

Emphasis on categorising the state and retelling facts and timelines distracts from the military itself and its self-understanding. This study puts the military front and centre of the analysis. It therefore makes sense to accept that there is a civil military imbalance in

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[32] Students and Peasants Movement (1968-69) against Field Marshal Ayub Khan; movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) (1981-84) against the regime of General Zia-ul-Haq; and the Lawyers' Movement (2007-09) against General Pervaiz Musharaf.

the country and that balance is tipped in the military's favour. This has been subject of a number of excellent scholarly works and the military's preponderance has been studied from various perspectives: bureaucratic overreach (Husain, 2015); lack of political parties (Shafqat, 1997); military businesses (Siddiqa, 2007); post-colonial institutional structure (Alavi, 1972:63-65) (Jalal, 1995); defence spending (Jalal, 1991); the military structure and its workings (Nawaz, 2008) (Shah, 2014c). Regurgitating historical events and choronologising the facts would be an unnecessary replication.

For reasons that shall become self-evident in the proceeding chapter[33], this study accepts the military as a hegemon. Military hegemony was described in the previous chapter broadly as "military's monopolistic control of political institutions and processes as well as strategic policy issues – it is therefore vested with the authority to initiate, prescribe, proscribe or halt any or all political action" (see chapter II). The purpose of this definition is not to confine analysis within its parameters but use it as a base to identify hegemonic behaviour. Only then can a case be built for hegemonic control through alternative means.

4.4   Establishing hegemony

As per Saeed Shafqat "*Military hegemony has emerged as the most dominant and durable characteristic of Pakistan's political system*" (Shafqat, 1997:34). Even when not directly in power, the military retains control over key administrative fields which are ideally speaking civil domains. He argued that the military achieved this hegemony through the following four processes:

> "*(1)   Promotion of the corporate interests of the military;*
>
> *(2)   Exclusion of political leaders, political parties and the urban middle classes;*
>
> *(3)   Political control, i.e. control of the press and labor; and*
>
> *(4)   Political inclusion, i.e. co-optation and consolidation of bureaucratic elites, financial industrial groups and the feudal classes*" (Shafqat, 1997:34).

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[33] Chapter IV below lays down the measures adopted by the military over the years to establish its hegemony. These range from legal/ constitutional changes, to neutralizing political opposition / leadership etc.

Shafqat's breakdown will be used as the baseline for further discussion because as aforementioned his is one of the few attempts to conceptualise the [Pakistan] military with a theoretical perspective. More importantly he operationalised military's authoritarianism as evidence of hegemony which is the focus of this study also. For historical facts this chapter also draws from Charles Kennedy's paper *A User's Guide to Guided Democracy* (Kennedy, 2005). These are undisputed historical facts but need to be assembled in a coherent form and to that end Kennedy's paper is an excellent source.

Before examining a breakdown of hegemony it is important to note here that all three military takeovers in Pakistan followed almost identical trajectories. As shall be demonstrated in chapter V, the takeovers are not an institutional decision. This means they are not a result of a grand strategy formulated at the General Head Quarters (GHQ) but a personal decision made by the then Chief of Army Staff based on circumstance peculiar to that time (see section 5.2 below). It is 'personal' because the military interferes in national politics and policy making even when not in power. It is a hegemon after all. However the decision to instigate an all-out coup pivots on personalities. The nature of the military as an organisation is such that decision making is a hierarchical process and institutional consultation or consent is not a consideration. Reason dictates that in absence of a grand strategy at an institutional level, the successive takeovers should not display any parallels. Yet they are similar to a point of being identical. Therefore it makes sense to trace evidence of hegemony through the processes and practices that demonstrate concretising of hegemonic role as opposed to treating all three takeovers as distinct events or chronologising events.

4.4.1 Neutralising political parties and leadership

A military coup necessarily means that an elected parliament was dissolved and the constitution overturned in order to assume power. Therefore, despite military's overall popularity and the initial public approval of the coup, there is political opposition to the military takeover. If not neutralised in the initial phase, when the military is still riding popularity high and therefore legitimacy is not that big a problem, the political elements can very quickly become an effective threat as soon as the military's performance begins to waiver.

After the very first military coup imposed by General Ayub Khan (1958 – 1969), the military was dubbed as a "Vehicle of Social Change" (Moore, 1967:58 quoting the

country's Second Five Year Plan 1960-65) and was expected to play a vital 'developmental' role in the country. That was the reason extended for the takeover and it was widely accepted by the citizenry as such (Moore 1967 and Vorys 1965). Since then, irrespective of the real reasons, subsequent takeovers have extended similar *raison d'etre*, at least in the public domain and have been accepted at face value by the public – a public which *prima facie* at least, espouses a democratic ideal.

That said there is an inherent contradiction at play here. On the one hand a military coup is sold to and bought by the public as an attempt to fix the country. On the other a takeover in itself is an obviously unconstitutional act purporting to displace political leadership. This is not easy because electoral process in itself is sufficient to vest the political leadership with both popularity and legitimacy. It is therefore imperative that the coup maker – military in this case – presents a strong justification for its actions. Discrediting the incumbent political leadership is an obvious first step.

Even before that however, it is inimical to eliminate the deposed Prime Minister (or President in Ayub Khan's case). Ayub Khan arrested Iskander Mirza (see Annexure 3) and had him exiled to the United Kingdom. It must be noted that Mirza was not an elected representative and hence removing him was not difficult.

Zia published white papers[34] presenting evidence against Bhutto's performance as the Prime Minister.[35] Moreover murder charges were brought against him – for the murder of Nawab Muhammad Ahmed[36] – in which Bhutto was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death. He was hanged to death on 04 April 1979 in Rawalpindi Central Jail.

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[34] These White Papers were published by the Government of Pakistan. There were as follows:
a) *White Paper on The Performance of the Bhutto Regime* had three volumes: Vol. – I: Mr. ZA Bhutto, Family and Associates (January 1979); Vol. – II: Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions (January 1979); and Vol. – III: Misuse of the Instruments of State Power (January 1979). b) *White Paper on the misuse of the Media* (August 1978). c) *White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977* (July 1978).

[35] "*Zia-ul-Haq took over on the morning of 5th July 1977. Bhutto was arrested and Martial proclaimed throughout Pakistan on that very day. …It was evident that the decision of General Zia-ul-Haq was not sudden but a premeditated one. Prime Minister Bhutto along with some ministers and civilian officers had been taken into custody.*
Zia-ul-Haq, in one of his press interviews, promised the nation to hold elections after three months on which he went back fearing, as some of his close associates felt, a return of Bhutto to power would be a direct threat to him. When Bhutto was let off from jail, he was given a tumultuous welcome wherever he went with roaring crowds to greet him. Bhutto was re-arrested and charged for murder. He was Zia's benefactor but in power Zia was a different soul and was shrewd enough not to risk the vengeance of a free Bhutto. He heeded his supporters, who said: 'There is only one grave destined either for Zia or Bhutto.' Zia made it certain that Bhutto would never come out of prison again as a free man" (Syed Munir Husain, 2015:219).

[36] Nawab Muhammad Ahmed was father of Ahmad Raza Kasuri, political rival of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

In 1999 Musharraf introduced amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Ordinance so that Nawaz Sharif could be charged with and tried for conspiracy to highjack a plane in special terrorism courts instead of the court of original jurisdiction – where the chances of charges surviving were slim. Moreover, if convicted under the newly amended terrorism laws, he would be sentenced for life. "*The thread of evidence linking Nawaz Sharif to the 'high jacking' was weak, at best. Certainly, a trial conducted through regular courts would have taken far longer to complete. In any event, Nawaz Sharif appealed the decision to the Appellate Tribunal of the Sindh High Court*" (Kennedy, 2005:129). This appeal was never heard because while the case was still pending, the government brokered a deal with Nawaz Sharif and his family. In December 2000 they were allowed to leave the country for Saudi Arabia.

Coming back to neutralising political leadership and parties - "*The legacy of the military rule [is] a disruption of the existing patterns of political relationships among different elites, groups and classes*" (Shafqat, 1997:79). This was primarily achieved through reviving some of the old laws and ordinances which had previously been used to the same effect during the colonial times. Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code for instance, during the British Colonial Rule vested the District Magistrate with the authority to prohibit large gatherings and carrying of arms during times of civil disobedience. It had been used to supress tenant revolt against the landlords back then. Under Ayub's military regime it was the principle weapon of political control and obfuscating political opposition. In addition to a bevy of martial law orders, ordinances and decrees, "*The Security of Pakistan Act, 1952, and the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1965 were frequently used for purely political purposes*" (Shafqat, 1997:39). The *pièce de résistance* however were Public Offices (Dis-qualification) Order, 1959 (PODO) and Electoral Bodies (Disqualification) Order 1959, (EBDO).[37] While PODO was used to silence political leadership, EBDO served the purpose of removing any opposition from the political activists.[38] Politically aware classes in both East and West Pakistan were neutralised and

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[37] Contents of PODO were almost identical to those of Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act, 1949 commonly known as Paroda. Under this law, the government had the power to exclude anyone from holding a public office for up to ten years if the person in question was "*found guilty of misconduct in any public office or representative capacity*" (Shah, 2014b:60). Quoting Feldman, Shafqat argues that Paroda had been a promulgated to be wielded as a tool of political subjugation. In early years Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan had invoked the law many times to either discipline or even remove Muslim League leaders from public office (Shafqat, 1997:39).
[38] "*With this Order more than 6,000 persons who held public offices or positions were debarred from participatory politics. The order had a forgiveness clause; if the person against whom the inquiry was being*

rendered incapable of mounting any kind of resistance to the military leadership through these laws.

Zia consolidated his power through the promulgation of Provisional Constitutional Order, 1981 (PCO) whereby members of the Higher Judiciary – which includes judges of the Supreme, High and Federal Shariah Courts – were required to take an oath to uphold the PCO. "*A few judges of the Supreme and High Courts resigned but by and large they complied with the order. These measures marginalized the effectiveness of judiciary and helped the regime to include new sets of individuals and groups in the ruling coalition, thereby, consolidating military hegemony. … The PCO, not only altered the relationship between judiciary and military, but also redefined the basis of who were 'politically relevant' and 'politically powerful' "* (Shafqat, 1997:194). Zia's most effective weapon however in counteracting political opposition were the local governments as explained below.

Musharraf (who had chosen to call himself Chief Executive as opposed to Martial Law Administrator as his predecessors) promulgated Provisional Constitutional Order, 1999 immediately upon assumption of power. It stated that all government and administrative offices shall continue as before and that "*…the Supreme Court or High Courts and any other court shall not have the powers to make any order against the Chief Executive or any other person exercising powers or jurisdiction under this authority.*"[39]

Musharraf also obfuscated political opposition through the Political Parties Ordinance, 2002. Through this law Musharraf was able to redefine electoral process in a way that the political careers of incumbent leadership – which could have mounted effective opposition to him and his allies – would be ejected from politics altogether.

For instance those who had either been implicated or were under investigation under the accountability laws – irrespective of the outcome – could no longer contest in elections. It also "*…required political parties to develop a party manifesto (a time consuming and divisive exercise) before being deemed eligibility to contest the elections*" (Kennedy, 2005:142). Another eligibility criteria introduced via this law was that candidates who did

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conducted chose to retire from public life voluntarily, the inquiry would not proceed against him" (Shafqat, 1997:39).

[39] Provisional Constitution Order, 1999 PLD 1999 Central Statutes 446.

not possess a Bachelor's degree or its equivalent could not contest the election from either house of the parliament. "*Ostensibly, the target …was the numerous standing politicians, particularly from the* [ousted] *PML-N who did not possess the requisite qualifications*" (Kennedy, 2005:142).

The intended goal of the above legislative measures was to ensure that any one of political parties which could launch an effective opposition to Musharraf did not gain majority in the parliament. And that is precisely what happened in the end. Elected parliament was deeply divided and reaching consensus was extremely difficult. In the end a consensus was reached between the opposing sides but Musharraf was the ultimate winner because he was confirmed as the President (as opposed to the Chief Executive) for the next five years and Articles 58(2)(b) and 119(2)(b) were reintroduced in the Constitution. These constitutional provisions vested the President and the Governors respectively with the power to dissolve the National and the Provincial Assembly at will.

Musharraf was not the only one who arranged to become the President through an orchestrated election. Ayub Khan had arranged for the Basic Democrats (see the section on Local Governments below) to elect him as a President through simple majority. He was empowered to make draft a new Constitution and to hold the office of the President under the said constitution. Zia too held a referendum to the same effect which he ultimately won. He though used the Islamic agenda as a prop. The idea was that if elected he, as President, would ensure that the laws in Pakistan conformed to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Quran and Sunnah.

Making constitutional amendments

Making constitutional amendments in order to establish control – thereby neutralising political opposition – had been a tool deployed by Musharraf's predecessors also. Ayub Khan's coup had abrogated the Constitution of 1956. Once in power he was not only in control of the constitution making process but had the penultimate authority to accept or reject the new constitution. One of the most significant measures taken under the aegis of the 1962 Constitution – which was drafted under Ayub's supervision – was the alteration of the election process so as to restrict / limit adult franchise. Instead of direct elections, the Electoral College now consisted of Basic Democrats – who, as aforementioned legitimised the military takeover by voting Ayub in power as President by an overwhelming majority.

Zia too rewrote the Constitution. His however was a more complicated task – than his predecessor's – as his takeover had not been affected through abrogating the existing constitution. Therefore his alterations were an intermittent and patchy affair. Through a series of Presidential Orders between 1979 and 1984 Federal Shariat Court and Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court were created. He restored the Presidential form of government introduced by Ayub. The President had the power to dissolve the national Assembly. Moreover, he "…*would be empowered to appoint the prime minister, the chiefs of the armed services, the chief election commissioner, and the provincial governors*" (Kennedy, 2005:139).

> "[I]*n the mid-1980s, under external and internal pressure, the military regime was forced to restore some degree of democracy, Zia devised a system that behind a civilian façade allowed the military to control the decision-making process: in 1985 he amended the constitution to empower the president, a position he then held, to dismiss parliament and the prime minister. Zia used this clause when three years later he dismissed Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, who had tried to have a say on military promotions and attempted to reduce defence expenditures*" (Giunchi, 2014:6).

Musharraf too did not abrogate the constitution as such but held it in abeyance. Therefore his coup had to operate within the legal parameters of the 1973 Constitution. That did not stop him from making necessary constitutional changes which would effectively enhance his power. In addition to re-introducing Articles 58(2)(b) and 119(2)(b) as aforementioned, Musharraf introduced a new Local Government Plan [see section below]. His magnum opus was the Legal Framework Order, 2002 (LFO) – which was subsequently incorporated in the constitution through the 17th Amendment. Some of its changes are as follows:

a) He [Musharraf] became the President for the next five years;

b) Reserve seats for the minorities and women were introduced in both the houses of the Parliament;

c) The number of electable seats overall (in both the Upper and Lower Houses) were increased;

d)   Alterations were made to election laws so that further restrictions could be placed on who qualified to compete in the upcoming elections;

e)   All laws made by the government with Musharraf as the Chief Executive (as opposed to Musharraf as the president which he became as a result of this LFO) would be validated and deemed legal retrospectively.

Reviving the local government system

An interesting aspect of Pakistani political system is that the local government system never got a chance to set roots and thrive. Even more so, successive military governments have championed the introduction of the local governments. A common attribute of all military takeovers in Pakistan is that sooner or later the coup-makers oversee the construction of local governments. Ayub Khan introduced the Basic Democracies in 1959, Zia reintroduced the Local Bodies in 1979 and Musharraf, the Local Government system in 2001.

The simple act of installing the system and conducting the elections under it does not represent *per se* the intention to deliver improved service delivery via participation or self-management on the part of the military government. If anything, successive military regimes have utilised the inauguration and reconstruction of local governments as a tool for regime survival.

A military regime dedicated to the creation of representative and democratic institutions is by any stretch of imagination an oxymoron. In Pakistan's case however, despite a narrative to the contrary, we repeatedly see the local governments [created under military tutelage] failing to govern as well as deliver services at the local level. Instead, they serve the military leaders' interests by providing them "source of patronage"; they create a channel "*for demonstrating the process of 'democratization' and / or for holding 'elections'* "; and most importantly they allow the military leaders to nurture "*new and loyal political leaders*" loyal to the military and willing to challenge the incumbent politicians (Kennedy, 2005:13).

Ayub's Basic Democracies programme established local councils which operated at the union, *tehsil* (district) and *thana* (sub-district) levels. Even though some councils were

partially constituted through direct elections, a majority of the councils' membership was appointed – especially that above union level. These – appointed – Basic Democrats later served as an electoral college (as mentioned above) for electing the president as well as the national and provincial assemblies.

Zia too instituted the local government through a series of provincial ordinances. He called them Local Bodies however. Even though these had a similar structure as Ayub before him, they did not serve as an electoral college. Rather elections were held on the basis of adult suffrage. However presence of local bodies meant that the elections could be held on a non-party basis. This meant that the local bodies became an avenue for creating and nurturing new political elites. As a result, a majority of the National Assembly appointed by Zia in 1985 (known as *Majlis-i-Shura* then) had gained experience by serving at these local bodies. The most prominent beneficiary was IJI (*Islami Jamhuri Ittehad* – literally, the Islamic Democratic Alliance) which chiefly comprised of those who had operated at the local body level. These new Zia loyal political elites did not form a majority in the National Assembly. Their numbers were sufficiently large enough however to act as a neutralising force to political opposition.

It was only natural for Musharraf to follow suit then. Musharraf championed the Local Governments Act of 2001. While the said law retained the three tiered system introduced by its predecessors, it differed in that it vested the councils with comparatively more powers and introduced the office of a directly elected mayor. The said mayor was to replace the colonial office of the Deputy Commissioner which was traditionally a non-elected post held by a senior career civil servant. There was major upheaval and an overall revision of the local governmental departments under this law. All said and done, it was a law passed during a military regime; it could not be allowed to become an avenue for launching opposition to the regime in power. Therefore the law decreed that the elections to the councils were to be held on a non-party basis.

Within the military habitus the installation of local government represents an effort on the military's part to fix the system. Musharraf's particular brand of devolution received mixed reviews. On the one hand it represented a sincere effort to bring about political change by empowering local representatives and creating a coherent administrative structure with minimal room for abuse of power. On the other, history judges actions count and not intentions. The reason why his system failed was that in the end political

aspirations outweighed the desire for political reform.[40] It was in effect "*no different from Ayub's or Zia's. As the military controlled the state, it could not only selectively distribute resources but now possessed the additional authority to invest in the creation of "dependable non-party local elites*", who "*could be used to create a support base for sustaining military rule*" (Shah, 2014b:195).

Soon after the promulgation, more of the radical elements of the law were neutralised and the law was back on familiar territory where it was a tool to neutralise opposition as opposed to a means of developing effective democratic institutions.

> "*(1)   Mayors were stripped of their prospective power to unilaterally transfer dismiss recalcitrant Deputy Commissioners;*
>
> *(2)   The election of mayors (nazims) and vice-mayors (naib-nazims) was made indirect (such officials were to be elected by the members of the union councils); and*
>
> *(3)   The reservation of posts for women in the union councils was reduced from 50 to 30 per cent*" (Kennedy, 2005:134).

As shall be discussed in detail in chapter V, general understanding within the military is that political immaturity of the politicians creates circumstances which leave the military with no choice but to takeover – "*Situations for takeover are created, not sought.*"[41]

One evidence of lack of political maturity on the politicians' part is their inability and unwillingness to constitute local governments. Policy making therefore is done without accounting for the public needs. There exists "*a gap between development and policy.*" which in turn explains the "poor development performance of the country".[42]

The military conversely, whenever in power, installs local governments. Instead of seeing this as a measure to neutralise the politicians, the military perceives this as a "*reason why the country went leaps and bound during various military rules is that they invested in the*

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[40] One of the many criticism of the law was that it made structural changes only and did not introduce accountability and "effective economic diffusion of economic power" at the grassroots level which is the main function of power devolution (Khan, Khan, & Akhtar, 2007:21)

[41] Interview dated 21 October 2015 with Major Gen. (Retd.) Khokhar.

[42] Ibid

local governments."[43] The bottom line being that the military is more in tune with the needs of the people.

The question then is why military governments are not the success stories they are perceived to be. Let's take the example of Musharraf. He did away with the Commissionaire system. As a result whereof the all power Deputy Commissioner – a remnant of the colonial system of control – now reported to a Nazim [the mayor that is]. "*All in all the DC was now reduced from the all-powerful king to taking orders from the Nazim*".[44] And yet Musharraf's local body system did not fare any better than his predecessors. The reason being, military rulers inevitably have to rely on the same politicians and political systems that they sought to fix to begin with. "*The military is not designed to, taught to or can understand running the country and that too for the benefit of the country. It is not an easy thing to do. Hence they give away to political aspects.*"[45]

A converse argument is that military performance is not dependent upon the creation of local governments. The military is simply better at running the country than the politicians. While differentiating between the pre and post-election eras of Musharraf regime one military interviewee who was a Corps Commander at the time and hence very much involved in the process stated that:

> "*In a political dispensation, tehsil (district) is where the common man is. It is the unit where the people are represented. During military regimes, with the politician out of the picture, you need local governments. When Musharraf was a dictator there were no local governments. People saw an overall improvement in the country. Culture of bribery was going away. Over all there was a general impression amongst the people that things were running fine. During this time the system remained the same. There were no military people in the government offices. Ok the Governors were retired generals, but that is it. This was his technocratic era – he was constantly being given feedback from the Corps Commanders. During his political / democratic phase local governments did the part. The corps commanders were still*

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[43] Interview dated 16 February 2016 with Lt. General (Retd.) Abbasi at his house.
[44] Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Gul. See footnote 30.
[45] Ibid.

indirectly keeping tabs even if Musharraf was no longer doing so. This though gradually petered out".[46]

Here it must be pointed out that Amy Monitoring Cells had been set up in all governmental administrative offices which were overseeing the everyday functioning of the bureaucracy. This has been discussed in detail in chapter V. The point the interviewee was trying to make though was that the military is not dependent on the local governments. It is just that the military does better homework and knows how to connect to the people and local governments are a merely tool wielded to that end. The decision to inaugurate the local government system therefore becomes a purely logical one. Once the military government has decided to legitimise itself through orchestrated electioneering, local governments become a need.

As shown in quotations below, the fact that local governments are ultimately instruments of perpetuating military hegemony is not lost on some military officers.

"Military's narrative of development is infrastructure development. During their own governments they do spend on elite bureaucracy and the local governments and sell this to the public as developmental effort. But it is for self-interest only. Local governments are a means to neutralise politicians".[47]

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"I was asked by my superior officers to comment on the local government system during Musharraf's time. I did not agree with the law at all and gave him my opinion. He [my superior officer] said "this decision has been taken by the President of Pakistan who is also the Chief of Army staff. Either you are a part of this team or you are against the institution and country. Tell us how it is to be implemented. Suggest improvements but don't reject it. The captain has decided" (Senior military respondent who wished to remain anonymous on this point).

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[46] Interviews dated 18 December 2016 and 16 February 2016 with Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Khan at his house.
[47] Interview dated 29 December 2015 with Col. (Retd.) Mazhar at Gymkhana, Lahore.

4.4.2   Co-opting bureaucratic elites

With the politicians successfully neutralised and too weak to mount opposition to the coup makers – with the "*leaders exiled or worse; political parties banned; assemblies dissolved etc.* (Kennedy, 2005:134)" – the next step is to take the civilian bureaucrats and the judiciary on board. Shafqat argues that even co-opting the bureaucracy was a part of the scheme to "*exclude political leaders and parties from the political arena*" (Shafqat, 1997:38). Moreover, with the politicians out of the picture, the bureaucracy can be coerced to run the state as per the military's bidding.

That said military takeovers in Pakistan have certain distinctive qualities. The takeover in itself is an illegal and unconstitutional act. Therefore the very act of imposing a martial law or instigating coup means that the constitutional and the legal regime have to be suspended or set aside. But as aforementioned coups in Pakistan are not institutional affairs but are personal decisions of the highest military officer. The institution stands behind the decision because that is the very nature of military. Therefore, even though the military is in charge, in that for all intents and purposes it has taken over, the military on the whole has never assumed direct command in the country. While the politicians were dispensed by successive military regimes as quickly and effectively as possible, the bureaucratic and judicial circles are not only retained but are relied upon throughout the duration of the coup.

The main point of contact between the civil state and the army during the coup is the Chief of Army Staff. The institution on the whole is never involved in the direct running of the country. While military officers are appointed to various civil administration offices and ministries, "unlike other *militarized authoritarian regimes the military institution did not hierarchically take over direct command of the state. There were no military councils of ministers and no reserved seats for members of the military in the parliament like Suharto's Indonesia or Pinochet's Chile*" (Shah, 2014a:1008). The state therefore continues to function unaffected by the political or economic performance of the coup makers. Moreover "*while the anti-regime mobilization attached the legitimacy of the military government, the military institutions qua institution generally managed to remain above political fray*" (Shah, 2014a:1008).

Co-opting bureaucratic elites helps the military establish hegemonic control in two ways. Instead of replacing civil bureaucrats with military officers, the workings of the state can

be controlled by using the carrot and stick strategy against the existing bureaucracy – on the hand they are allowed to retain their respective posts with the fear of elimination on the other, measures are taken which would sufficiently intimidate them. For instance changes are made to laws for constant supervision. In addition to the administrative control, the political hold can be strengthened by making a military controlled bureaucracy more powerful than the political leadership. As a result, even when not in control, the military would have successfully tilted the balance of power away from the political offices.

As per Shafqat co-opting bureaucratic elites in a bid to establish hegemonic control started with Ayub.[48] "*The military established its hegemony by appointing more than 272 military officers to oversee and administer civilian departments and agencies*" (Shafqat, 1997:35). In doing so, the military redefined its relationship with the bureaucracy from that of mutually supportive one to that of a bureaucracy controlled by the military. Screening committees were set up which between January and April 1959 scrutinised and dismissed, demoted and retired as many as 1,662 civil servants (from both central as well as provincial services) (Shafqat, 1997:37).

Zia established the practice of recruiting military officers into the civil bureaucracy. 10 percent of seats from both the entry level officer ranks (BPS grades 17 and 18) and senior bureaucratic ranks (BPS grades 19 and above) were reserved for military personnel who upon entry became regular members of the bureaucracy.[49] "*Since Zia's initiative retired or released military officers have become a regular part of the civilian bureaucracy; thereby directly challenging the autonomy and the career prospects of its officers. Members of the civil bureaucracy have greatly resented this intrusion into their domain*" (Kennedy, 2005:136).

Musharraf shadowed the actions of his predecessors in this respect too. The institution of the office of the mayor through the local government was in itself a show of power. The said measure was certainly justified as being part of the accountability campaign that had become the poster child of Musharraf's coup "*but their immediate effect was to*

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[48] "*The removal of the top officers certainly was a despotic act on the part of the President and smelt of some lingering vendetta he had against them. The other clear message of that deliberate act was to warn the senior bureaucracy to fall in line with the martial law regime and refrain from becoming a stumbling block against it*" (Syed Munir Husain, 2015:66).
[49] Via an amendment to Establishment Code Vol. 1, Chapter 2, Part V, S. 214.

demonstrate who was boss; to intimidate the officers of the civil bureaucracy" (Kennedy, 2005:136). The numbers of military officers being recruited in the civil services through reserve quotas were also increased.

As per Shafqat, systematically strengthening the bureaucracy at the behest of weakening of party politics only reinforced praetorian conditions. The political leaders were rendered incapable of organising party politics. "*The dominance of bureaucratic elites was well established and the regimes in Pakistan were from then on clearly military supported"* (Shafqat, 1997:31). "*A small number of bureaucratic-military elites made some of the most important decisions that were to influence the future course of political development in Pakistan"* (Shafqat, 1997:28-29).

Here a distinction must be made between those military officers who joined the bureaucracy on deputations and those who are lateral entrants. The lateral entrants – that is the 10 percent reserved seats mentioned above – still exist. Upon entry into the bureaucracy they are stripped off their military status and become a part of the civil services. They are called inductees – they undergo the same training as the civil servants prior to their posting except they did not have to sit for the rigorous examination like their civilian counterparts but were inducted in to the system.

For the officers on deputation on the other hand, as per the military at least:

> "T*here is a mandate for their deputation. Something is wrong and needs to be fixed. These guys are called in to make it work. As they are military they are expected to be honest and fulfil their mandate"*.[50]

Career civil servants interviewed during the data collection for this thesis don't share this opinion entirely though:

> "*If they come to fix the civilian set up they have not incorporated any system or idea. No effort was made for improvement. They take extra salary (their regular salary as an army officer and that which they are paid as a deputation fee) yet things continue as before. Even if we accept they bring experience,*

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[50] Interviews dated 17 November 2015 & 17 January 2016 with Brigadier (Retd.) Khan at his house.

they do nothing to inculcate it" (Junior civil servant who wanted to remain anonymous).

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"*Reasons for deputation are twofold: a) the military life is very difficult; and b) they come to the civilian set up and observe it from within. Then they report back.*" (Junior civil servant who wanted to remain anonymous).

As per the interviews from the civil servants who wished to remain unnamed on this issue, a general feeling amongst the career bureaucrats was that the officers on deputation were really there to keep an eye on things as it were and were somehow reporting their observations back to the military headquarters. In short the deputations were a way the military controls or at least keeps a check on the bureaucracy. It must be pointed out here that immediately after the end of Musharraf's coup, the officers on deputations were recalled *en masse* by the then Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani.[51] Musharraf's regime had been ousted through popular protests and the military's popularity in general amongst the public was at an all-time low. This was seen as an attempt at face keeping on the military's part. At the time data for this research was collected the status of how things stood was not clear to either the military or civil respondents. However, irrespective of their current status, there is no doubting the fact that the entire concept of deputations was created as part of the process to establish military hegemony. So much so that even the military respondents agreed with this hypothesis as shown in the two interview excerpts below:

"*The entire concept of deputations was started during military regimes but has been removed by Kiyani. The purpose was to create jobs for ex-army people and to correct civilian institution by having their own people there*".[52]

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[51] "*In 2008, when Gen. Ashfaq Kayani became the army chief, he ordered that army officers would be withdrawn from 23 civil departments including the Ministry of Education, the Water and Power Development Authority, the National Accountability Bureau, and the National Highway Authority. This order did not affect retired officers who were so ensconced*" (Fair, 2014:35).
[52] Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 46.

"We find military officers serving in the bureaucracy on deputations because the concerned ministry requests them for technical expertise.[53] It is not because they are there to fix the running of the concerned department or to eradicate corruption or anything. There are plenty of honest civil servants because of whom this country is running. If removing corruption was the agenda then there would have been no corruption during Musharraf's time. Having military officers in the bureaucratic circles during the Martial Law is an entirely different story. Then there are vested interests and the reason is to control the power centre. The top man wants his people on the top and hence the heads of Investigation Bureau, Federal investigation Agency, and National Accountability Bureau etc. are ex or serving military people".[54]*

In short, the civil servants believe that they are no more inefficient or corrupt than their military counterparts. Evidence being that that none of the military regimes fared any better than the democratic ones in the long run. The military officers serving on deputation in the civil administrative offices represent the military's distrust of non-military elements of the state. These officers in question have therefore been installed there specifically for the purpose of spying and thereby ultimately retaining power.

This brings us to the third category whereby retired military officers are given top jobs in government owned and quasi-government organisations for example government owned agencies and industries etc.[55] The argument goes that these officer do not represent the military and are acting in their individual capacity. The reason being that "*once retired, the views held by the person are not of the Pakistan Army's but his personal views. They might be influenced by the Army but they do not represent it*".[56] The government advertises jobs and they secure those posts in open merit. However, by virtue of being ex-military they have acquired certain organisational and administrative skills which are still lacking in the civil administrative system thereby leaving them with no choice but to lean on the military.

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[53] The bureaucrats did not confirm this nor could I find any corroborative evidence.
[54] Col. (Retd.) Mazhar. See footnote 47.
[55] "*When military officers retire, they are frequently granted senior leadership posts within private-sector enterprises but also government ministries*" (Fair, 2014:35).
[56] Brigadier (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 50.

If we accept the 'fixing the system from within' argument, the next natural question is have they been successful in achieving the purpose. If that were the case, the military's constant claims as to the inefficiency and corruptibility of the system which necessitate intervention would be laid to rest. The military certainly has had ample of opportunity to do so. Successive takeovers were affected on the grounds that they were going to set the system back on track. With political opposition neutralised and civil administrative offices directly in control it is only pertinent to ask why not fix the bureaucracy when in power? Some of the military's responses were as follows:

> "*In order to fix the bureaucracy you need to rid the institutions of corruption. But that is possible only if the military remains a dictator. When you have political aspirations you cannot fix the bureaucracy or for that matter any of the institutions. You co-opt or create new politicians and then you do what your politician friend wants you to do. And they [politicians] are what is wrong with the country – that is why you [military] took over in the first place*".[57]

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> "*Musharraf wanted a liberal Pakistan as he himself was of a secular bent of mind. Zia on the other hand was narrow minded with a religious bent of mind and used religion for personal gain. But at the end of the day they both took a lot of decisions for their survival and establish control. They shared many similarities in this regard. Zia granted support to religious parties. Musharraf nurtured MMA*[58] *and that did a lot of damage. Both made compromises. Both remained away from things that needed to be done. Reforming the bureaucracy was one of them*".[59]

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[57] Interview dated 17 February 2016 General (Retd.) Amjad at his house.
[58] Muttahida Majil-i-Amal (MMA) – a six party alliance of religious parties which not only secured the third largest number of seats in the National Assembly but acquired enough votes in Khyber Pukhtun-Khawa (then NWFP) to form a government in the province (Kennedy, 2005:142).
[59] Interview dated 11 March 20116 with Lt. General (Retd.) Karamat.

The point being that installing military officer in civil administrative structures – whatever the context may be – is a method of establishing hegemonic control and once entrenched, an avenue for exercising the said hegemony. The fixing the bureaucracy from within rhetoric is merely a pretext. The net result is that a network of military and ex-military personnel has been placed in the civil echelons of power whose sympathises if not loyalties lie with the military.

On a micro level a strong military network is created within the country. Military's hegemony is concretised by controlling all non-military avenues through its personnel (both retired and serving):

> "*Say for example a retired military officer wants to set up a travel agency. It would be much easier for him than a non-military person. That is because all the top jobs related to aviation are being occupied by retired Air Force or military personnel. It is not that the person in question is doing anything wrong. It is just easier to get the required licencing and permits*" (Gen. Retd. Afzal).

On a macro level it can influence policy outcomes. The best example of how co-opting civil bureaucracy allows for military hegemony – the military's monopolistic control of institutions and processes as well as strategic policy outcomes – is the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Technically and constitutionally, defence is a political issue. However, an analysis of the data collected from the field shows that in Pakistan that the MoD is always headed by a retired general. There is no formal rule stating that this must be the case. But there is no example when this has not been so. As per the respondents, the MoD was placed under the command of a retired general probably during one of the initial military regimes so that the GHQ could have direct access to it. That tradition became a norm and has continued even during civilian government.

> "*Ministry of Defence is supposed to be a conduit between the military and the civil state. However as things stand it is not because military plays an overbearing role in the country. I cannot foresee a Chief of the Army staff being directed by the Ministry of Defence. That is at least until the time that democracy well and truly takes hold in the country.*"[60] He went on to explain

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[60] Lt. General (Retd.) Abbasi. See footnote 43.

that "*The reason for this overbearing role is because of the inefficiency and corruption of the civil leadership as well as geo political conditions*".[61]

4.4.3   Promotion of corporate interests

Shafqat argues that once military dominance over the bureaucratic and political elites was established and political parties and leadership sufficiently weakened, "*the façade of 'parliamentary politics' persisted but in reality the focus of power had shuttled to the bureaucratic and military institutions*" (Shafqat, 1997:26). While directly in power, the military was able to promote its own corporate interests. When not [in power], it could mobilise its control of the non-political elements of the state to accrue financial and corporate benefits.

> "*It seeks to maximise as many of its own corporate interests as possible, even if it must do so at the expense of the state's interest. Because the army requires the state to enable its own existence, it must make appropriate adjustments along the way to ensure that's its policies and preferences do not, in fact, destroy the state*" (Fair, 2014:6)

There is a historical context to the military's economic expansion. During the British rule in the sub-continent retired officers received "*a wide range of benefits including licences and large plots of land*" (Giunchi, 2014:8) – a tradition that survives till date. Owning large estate holdings, couple key posts in the public sector (as aforementioned) and being top positions in state-run corporations the military plays an important economic role in Pakistan.

As per Siddiqa the greater the military's economic role – "Milbus" (Military business) as she calls it – the more restricted will the political role of the elected leadership get. Moreover it creates a relationship of unequal dependency. Once the military has established economic, dominance the political elites, even during civilian rule, provide it [the military] "*with even greater economic opportunities in order to appease it while trying to reduce its political role*" (Giunchi, 2014:8). It allows for the military's hegemony to concretise even further:

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[61] Lt. General (Retd.) Abbasi. See footnote 43.

"… *Milbus is both a source and beneficiary of crony capitalism. Such redistributive processes encourage both authoritarianism and clientship. The internal economy in fact consolidates the military's hegemonic control over the society through direct and indirect means. While direct means of imposing hegemony involve the military dominating key administrative and political positions in the state and society, indirect methods relate to encouraging the perception that the armed forces have the panacea for all ills of the nation. The indirect control is exercised through strategic partnership with other players"* (Siddiqa, 2007:14-15).

While military's presence in financial sectors has been received and documented as evidence of its hegemony, what remains missing from the literature is how this is operationalised by it its own benefit. One would assume that a hegemon in control of avenues of power as well as financial interests would not be as popular as the Pakistan military is. However that is demonstrably not the case. Military's control of economic and monetary avenues adds to its *de facto* dominance but it somehow also augments its image as a source of social mobility. This is because its involvement in the financial sector, no matter how direct, does not mean that the military as an organisation accrues any direct monetary benefit from any of these concerns. It is able to spread across the financial sector and yet on paper maintain a distance. Therefore, it has not only "*become a ladder of respectable jobs in the society*" (Shafqat, 1997:37) but it is openly employing a rhetoric of dominance which only adds to its popularity.

"*Then, we have Army Welfare Trust, we have Fauji Foundation. Yes, they are involved in banking … we've got fertilizers … we are involved in pharmaceuticals. We are involved in cement plants … So, what is the problem if these organizations are contributing and are being run properly? We have the best banks. Our cement plants are exceptionally well. Our fertilizer plants are doing exceptionally well. So, why is anyone jealous? Why is anyone jealous if the retired military officials or civilians with them are doing a good job contributing to the economy of Pakistan and doing well?*" (Siddiqa, 2007:15)[62]

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[62] Ayesha Siddiqa quoting General Musharraf from a speech given in 2004 at the inauguration of the DHA desalination plant in Karachi.

An Inter Services Public Relations officer reified the above in an interview in the following terms:

> "*There is a feeling in the military that the civilians are jealous of it. There is also a very strong feeling within the military to eradicate this. Hence we decided to share [these facilities] with the public. Through these projects not only is connectivity formed with the people of Pakistan, but a sense of the defence budget being shared is conveyed*".[63]

4.5   Conclusion

This chapter focused on those measures taken by the military in the past that existing literature accepts as evidence of military hegemony in Pakistan. In order to understand how this hegemony is established and reproduced it was essential to identify historical events that perpetuated its control. Moreover methods of reproduction when in power and especially when not [in power] are of particular importance because it helped understand why and how Pakistan military's hegemony endures even when the military is not directly in control.

The electoral process has finally taken hold in that in the 2013 elections, for the first time since 1947, one elected government handed over power to another. The military also does not show any signs of another out and out takeover. The question that follows is if it needs to do so. Measures identified above ensure that the military retains its hegemony even when not directly in power. In fact over the years this supervisory role has become so entrenched in the system that the military does not need to take over any more.

Since the promulgation of the notion of intentional 'development' the civil state / government has claimed both the right as well as the might to 'develop'; it meets the criteria of legitimacy, has access to ample resources and possesses the requisite institutional history as well as the know-how. It has been demonstrated above though that despite a *de facto* collapse of military the methods of dominance remain intact. It is supreme force in the country. Moreover over the years literature has conceded, albeit extremely reluctantly, that the civil government is no longer the sole source of 'development' (Sen 2001, Haq 1996, Evans 1995 and Banuri 1990). Given the extent of

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[63] Col. Syed Shahid Abbas, ISPR. See footnote 31.

Pakistan military's control, its 'developmental' face needs to be explored. The question being whether it is yet another form of hegemony in that after successfully established its preponderance.

Chapter V

Military habitus – How the military perceives its 'development'/ nation building role

5.1 Introduction

We have seen that military presence in civil domain under the broader rubric of 'development' is not an anomaly. It is accepted by the civil military relations as business as usual. Specifically with respect to Pakistan we saw that its military is particularly active in the 'developmental' field.

How Pakistan military operationalises this presence in the 'development' sector to [further] consolidate its hegemonic control needs scrutiny. The first step to that end is to deduce the considerations and the surrounding thought processes that compel the military to play an active role in 'development' – or what it defines as nation building. To understand military habitus it must be ascertained how it reflects thereupon and, how it defines self-interest and the methods and avenues it deems appropriate for pursuing them. In short to see what considerations inform the military's decision to extend its jurisdiction to include 'developmental' activities.

To that end a good starting point is how the military rationalises its own presence in the civil arena. In Pakistan's case this is not limited to takeovers only. The military's hegemony means that it actively participates in civil matters even when not directly in power. However, as a takeover is the more tangible form of interference, a logical starting point for discussion about the military's habitus and regarding its nation building role would be to understand how it perceives a takeover. It is also a good starting point because as chapter IV showed, military hegemony, though traceable to the Raj, actually set its roots during successive military regimes.

Chapter IV historically contextualised successive takeovers. This chapter establishes how the military reflects upon them; the lessons learnt and the way forward. Empirical evidence shall be used to establish contours of military habitus. Primary data used in this chapter includes interviews with military personnel mostly senior generals who were at the helm of affairs during Musharraf's coup and hence are an ideal source of military thought process. Most of them were already serving in the military during Zia's time also; although junior officers at the time, they were very much a part of the machinery and hence an excellent source of military thought process. Wherever needed literature on the subject is relied upon for broader discussions on the subject. Secondary data relied upon herein includes military's own writings in the form of self-published articles and journals.

5.2   Military Takeovers

This research is not about military takeovers in Pakistan. The object is not to contextualise the Pakistan military's political ambitions or to list the factors and circumstances that compel a *coup d'état*. The focus instead is how the military extends its hegemonic control through its presence in the 'development' sector. To that end the natural starting point was to ask the military interviewees how *they* perceived military presence in the 'development' sector; to ascertain what considerations in their opinion propelled the military's nation building activities.

During the interview process it soon became clear that within the military mind-set discussions pertaining to military presence in the civil arena – whether of 'developmental' nature or not – began with their own understanding and explanation of military takeovers instead.

Analysis of the data collected in the form of primary interviews with military personnel shows that takeovers in Pakistan are not a joint military effort. The coup itself is the initiative of one person – the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) – who takes a handful of senior generals and officers in his confidence at the time of execution. For instance one of the interviewees said that he was a brigadier in the army in 1999 at the time of Musharraf ousted the then Nawaz government "*and [he] found out about the coup like the rest of the country when they announced it on television*".[64]

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[64] Lt. General (Retd.) Abbasi. See footnote 43.

Of course it would be reasonable to assume that he might have heard of the coup sometime after the wheels had already been set into motion, but certainly before the public broadcast was made to the country at large. The point he was trying to make here was that it – the coup that is – was not an institutional decision. Despite being a senior officer at the time, he was neither involved in, nor aware of what was about to happen. Had it been a joint effort on the part of the military as a whole, an officer of his level would certainly have picked up some warning signs and not caught unawares.

The commonly held opinion was that the COAS' hand is forced by a particular set of circumstances. "*Military intervenes only when the political situation has reached an impasse. The situation that makes a takeover necessary is created, not sought*".[65] The takeovers therefore might arise out of a long run of the incompetence of the politicians, but within their own understanding at least, senior military officials believe it to be a solitary act, which has an identifiable triggering event that is peculiar to the time and the place, and is conducted in good faith.

> "*Both Zia and Musharraf took over with the best of intentions for the country;
> to do good for the country. Takeovers are forced down the military's throats.
> But there is definitely an honesty of purpose. There is never an intention at
> the outset to takeover. Zia was very docile compared to the shenanigans that
> Bhutto pulled (nationalisation etc.). Musharraf had no intention of takeover;
> his people did it on his behalf. He had no political aspirations* of his own".[66]

On the one hand the takeover is a product of peculiar circumstances which has a trajectory of political corruption and inadequacy leading up to the coup itself. On the other it is a personal initiative [facilitated by close confidants] and not an institutional bid for power. Therefore, as per the military:

a) Personal political aspirations are not the *raison d'etre* of the takeover itself but a minor factor attributable to the few directly involved with the coup;

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[65] Major Gen. (Retd.) Khokhar. See footnote 41.
[66] Brigadier (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 50.

b) The takeover is an attempt to "*fix the system or save the country*". That is the narrative that legitimises legislative and administrative actions taken by the coup makers which would otherwise be unconstitutional;

c) The military has public support. There is little to no resistance by the public to the takeover due to the state of affairs; and

d) The image of military as a saviour forever becomes a part of public memory which not only does the ground work for the next coup, should the need arise, but allows for the 'protection of the country' story-line to develop.

Decision making as has been argued in chapter II, is a function of ideas that individuals or groups of individuals develop based on how they interpret their surrounding environment. The military is certainly aware of the illegality of the coup. What compels a takeover then?

Within its thought process and subsequently the habitus, the motivation to fix the system as it were, outbalances the constitutionality of the decision to takeover. The military therefore [as summarised by one military interviewee] believes its hand to be forced. It is obliged to perform a role it does not want to but has no choice in this respect either.

> "*It is not the job of the military to fix the country. However, when you see the country going downhill and fast, coupled with the fact that the military is very popular with the masses and has their support at the time [of the coup], it is left with no other choice. The military takes over in order to avoid the chaos which would ensue if it didn't. Ayyub Khan took over because Iskandar Mirza had told him that the politicians will not be able to sort out the mess. Musharraf took over because the economy of the country was in a very bad state. The nuclear explosion had resulted in sanctions which had adversely affected the economy. Nawaz Sharif had come into power with a heavy mandate but now wanted total and absolute control of the country (even the army). Therefore people were happy when military took over. And military really did not have a choice in the matter. Yes the military has had good luck, but it has made good use of that luck*".[67]

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[67] Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 46.

As the [military] interview partners were all serving on high posts at the time of the 1999 coup lead by General Pervez Musharraf and subsequently served in key position during and while the military rule lasted, the examples they extended were naturally from and of the said period. Here it must be noted that even though the 1999 coup is a singular act, it is not an isolated event. It has been demonstrated in chapter IV that coups in Pakistan might be prompted by differing considerations but, they by and large follow similar *modus operandi*. Therefore, even though the respondents below give the example of Nawaz Sharif's ouster to illustrate their point, they were referring to how they perceived the coup as insiders and by extension, how the military understands takeovers.

In 1998 Nawaz Sharif had been indicating that he wanted to control the Pakistan Army Promotions Board. There was buzz in the political circles that the government would have no qualms replacing Musharraf were they not allowed to do so. This had reached the military through informal channels:[68]

> *"Military guards its procedures jealously because that is what makes it a proper institution. So naturally there was resentment against interference in the routine running of the military. Plus we must not forget [Musharraf's] personality was an important element also. Therefore – for considerations of self-preservation – a decision was taken that come what may, we will not allow them to remove Musharraf. This was just a few people, five to six in number, who had been entrusted with the task.[69] The people responsible did not have a plan in place before hand. The idea was that should the government make any attempt to remove Musharraf, the military would not let that happen. And that is about it. Had the airplane incident not occurred[70],*

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[68] As per Nordlinger there exists a correlation between civil interference with military matters and military takeovers. In Egypt in 1952 King Farouk was deposed by the military for meddling with their internal affairs. In 1964 the Brazilian president Goulart was overthrown by its military for similar reasons (Nordlinger, 1977). Shafqat extends that argument to the Pakistani case. "*In March 1973. A group of army officers led by the retired Brigadier F. B. Ali and Colonel Alim Afridi, attempted a coup against the Bhutto regime. The leaders aimed at not only overthrowing Bhutto, but also unseating senior commanders who were collaborating with Bhutto. The attempted coup failed because the conspiring officers had a very narrow base and their organization was weak*" (Shafqat, 1997: 175-176).

[69] A book review of 'Yeh Khamoshi Kahan Tak' by Lt. General Shahid Aziz (published on 28 October 2013 in Times of India) identifies these as the then CGS Lt. General Aziz Khan, then Corps Commander Pindi Lt. General Mehmood, then DG MI Major General Ahsanul Haq (who later became DG ISI), the DG ISPR Brigadier Rashid Qureshi, then Personal Staff officer to COAS Brigadier Nadeem Taj and major General Aziz himself

[70] "*Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had made the decision to remove General Musharraf from his position as Chief of Army Staff; but delayed the execution of that decision until Musharraf was out of Pakistan. Therefore, when Musharraf went to Sri Lanka in order to attend a conference, Nawaz Sharif struck. Allegedly, Sharif was hopeful*

there would have been no coup. Corps Commanders Conference is like a jalsa

– it is too many people to be involved in a decision like this. We knew that a

decision had been taken, but that's about it.[71] *We were neither involved in it*

nor responsible for the execution thereof"[72]

Whether or not it is appropriate to say the coup results from considerations of the greater good of the people and country remains disputed in the minds of some. "*Military's omnipresence in the country is due to its large size. The takeover or coming in power is because of circumstances*".[73]

"*It would be wrong to say that the takeover, any takeover is guided by considerations of prosperity [of the country that is]. There is always a specific – political – incident that triggers the takeover. With Musharraf it was the airplane incident. If he had been thinking about taking over, it would not have taken him five days to address the nation and lay out an agenda of what he was planning on doing next. In those five days he had interacted with all military personnel trying to figure out what to do next*" (Interview with senior military general which I have anonymised myself).

The question then is how and to what extent security concerns, more specifically India, feature in the imposition of the coup. "*India factor is still omnipresent. The armed forces need strength and equipment. This though has to be supported by the economy of the country. Hence when the military feels that that it would not be possible for the civil side to manage, it takes the economy in its own hands in the form of takeovers*".[74] Here it must be pointed out that – contrary to expectations – any mention of India, including this

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that by the time Musharraf had returned the unpleasantness associated with the dismissal of the COAS would have subsided. However, Nawaz Sharif's plans were foiled when key personnel within the military remained loyal to Musharraf, and refused to accept the orders of the Prime Minister. When Nawaz learned that his orders were not being followed, and in light of Musharraf's imminent return to Karachi (the latter had boarded a commercial PIA flight destined for Karachi), Sharif struck. He ordered that the flight not be allowed to land in Pakistan. Various officials of PIA and the airport authority cooperated with the prime Minister's directive, while others refused, but in any case, the airplane, carrying not only General Musharraf, but also more than one hundred other passengers was diverted from its original flightpath. The diversion, in turn, 'threatened lives' of the passengers as the aircraft was running low on fuel and as a result could not comply with the directive to land outside Pakistan. Eventually, the relevant airport authorities relented, perhaps owing to the involvement of military personnel who had in the meantime occupied Karachi Airport. The plane landed, its passengers, inconvenienced, but safe. No one was hurt, let alone killed, owing to the events" (Kennedy, 2005:128-129).
[71] The interviewee was a corps Commander at the time of the Musharraf coup. Corps Commander is the highest post in the military. Based on his seniority, one of the Corps Commanders then becomes the COAS.
[72] Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Gul. See footnote 30.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 46.

particular instance, was made in the passing as an additional consideration and not as the principal point of focus throughout the data collection process.

That said, a categorical position taken by all of the interviewees of military background – and this includes one or two serving officers as well – was that the military should not take over.[75] The rationale being that their job is defence of the country. That is what they are trained to do, that is what they understand best and that is what they are capable of. *"The military is fully aware of its weaknesses at the time of the takeover."*[76] *"Military is not designed to, taught to or can understand running of the country. It is not an easy thing to do"*.[77]

As the public face or premise of the coup is that there is a need to fix the country or put it back on the rails as it were, the military sets about the business of making changes [or reforms depending how one approaches the issue] to the legal, administrative and political systems immediately upon coming into power. Most of these tie in neatly with the justification extended for the takeover.[78] As a result different military governments over the years have promulgated laws ranging from sanitation to anti-corruption laws; from police reforms to curriculum amendments. As discussed earlier, these laws are no more than an avenue for establishing hegemonic control. *Prima Facie* they might represent an attempt to fix the system as it were. They are certainly sold to the public and accepted by it, as such. But essentially they are physical manifestations of the military's self -perception. The contents thereof, as explained earlier, speak to a hegemonic intent of purpose.

When it came to delivering on the promises so that it would actually fix the system, all the three coups fell short. Primarily because the militaristic organisational strategies that are

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[75] The structure and nature of the organisation is an important factor here also. Whether or not they agreed with the takeover is entirely irrelevant in face of the fact that once the superiors have initiated a coup, disagreeing with it is akin to disobeying an order and that is simply not in the habitus of the military. "*Military coups in Pakistan have succeeded only when they have been led from the top. The soldiers have respected the military chain of command even when they have repeatedly violated the constitutional one*" (Shah, 2014:25).
[76] Major Gen. (Retd.) Khokhar. See footnote 41.
[77] Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 46.
[78] The 1958 coup was more of a collaborative effort between President Iskandar Mirza and Ayyub Khan. Owing to the growing governance deficit in practically all of the provinces, the President had asked the latter to takeover. Rigging of the 1977 election by the People's Party had become a sore point for the Pakistan National Alliance. Zia's coup which incidentally was called 'Operation Fair Paly' was justified on the grounds that rising tensions could only be diffused by the military. Nawaz Sharif's corruption and the foreign debt were presented to the public as the public as the main reasons for the coup.

pertinent in the barracks seldom deliver when applied to the civil side of affairs.[79] And the military is not only aware of this but sees it as a reason not to take over. The most often cited example of how the military does not understand how the civil side is run was that of the Army Monitoring Cells set up by Musharraf.[80]

> *"The system that Musharraf installed – especially that of the Monitoring cells – upon taking over was a bastard child. I say let the civil administration do their work. We will monitor only without interfering. What happened as a result of the system was that there was a lot of misunderstanding generated and a fractious relationship developed. I was heading the Peshawar Corps at the time and refused to have any monitoring cells. We let the civil administration work as usual and continued sending our monthly reports as we always did. In Peshawar … [we] did not interfere in anything or stop them from doing anything. Because by interfering you are only stopping the institution from working and really not helping 'fix the system'. The monitoring cells system was faulty to begin with. And the bureaucracy made use of it and had a field day".[81]*

This sentiment was reiterated by the bureaucracy itself. I interviewed a mid-level civil servant who worked in the transport department at the time the army monitoring units were set up. These teams had been established at the district level. An army officer of the ranking of a Colonel would be assigned to a civil office and their job was to ensure smooth running and zero corruption in their designated area.

> *"Because he was a military officer and hence an outsider the Colonel neither knew not understood the technicalities of the civil system. However, given that there was a military coup, they were all powerful. Plus there was just this general understanding that the bureaucracy and the civil system are corrupt and lazy. So one day the Colonel who had been assigned to my office said that any file I go through should be passed to him for his perusal also. I said sir why don't you go through the file first. I knew he had no idea what was going*

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[79] Brigadier (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 50.
[80] A peculiarity of successive military takeovers in Pakistan has been that despite being labelled as martial law with the Chief of Army in charge, the civil bureaucratic machinery and structures have not only remained intact but continued to function as before.
[81] Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Gul. See footnote 30.

on. He knew he had no idea what was going on. There was no way he could understand the system. This went on for maximum of three weeks. Then he gave up also".[82]

"In the end the monitoring cells were only doing administrative work like ensuring that the officers were punctual or were not taking unnecessary holidays or for that matter there was no overt bribery taking place" (Lt. General Afzal). They are an ideal representation of the military habitus in that they show that even the managerial efforts of the monitoring cells were circumscribed by a militaristic frame of reference and hence were of no real value. *"The military by its very nature is organised. Take them to a forest and the very first thing they will do is they will set a perimeter, clear the area out and clean it. That is because they have to set up tents. These are useful militaristic skills. It does not mean these are valuable or even relevant in the outside world".*[83]

The monitoring cells are a classic example of how military does not understand running civil institutions. *"The monitoring cells were not successful because they aimed at a quick fix and not development of the concerned institutions".*[84]

"The changes made by the monitoring cells established by Musharraf were cosmetic only. They simply did not understand the nitty gritty of how civil institutions work. Plus they bring their military way of doing things. Instead of trying to change the perspective of the [school] teachers, providing them trainings etc. their solution was to discipline them. We have reports of teachers being made to do push ups because they had been absent for a few days. How does that fix the education system?"[85]

Why takeover at all then? It would certainly seem from the above that the overall military is not in favour or for that matter approves of either a coup or any attempt to interfere with the civil administrative systems.[86] Yet the reason given for a takeover is that there

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[82] Interview dated 27 January 2016 with Additional Secretary Transport Department at his office.
[83] Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Gul. See footnote 30.
[84] Lt. General (Retd.) Abbasi. See footnote 43.
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[86] *"Taught identical curricula at each stage of their careers, officers tend to hold fairly predictable views about the army's proper institutional role in domestic politics, national security, and nation building"*(Shah, 2014b:20). While views might vary according to the officer's *"…ethnic origins, social ties, political affiliations, or even personal ambition…"* historically the officers have taken a uniform position with respect to the issues above. According to Shah by presenting a unanimous front the *"…officers show that the sense of institutional unity, loyalty, and purpose instilled by professional indoctrination, especially against the threat from India, and the*

was no other option and that the military is here to fix the system as it were. There is an obvious cognitive dissonance at the very heart of this argument. Where does the root of this thought process lie then?

5.3   Military habitus and self-perception

> *"A word for the disruptionists, political opportunists, smugglers, black marketers, and other such social vermin, sharks and leeches. The soldier and the people are sick of the sight of you. So it will be good for yourself to turn a new leaf and begin to behave, otherwise retribution will be swift and sure*."

<div align="right">

From General Ayub Khan's Broadcast to the Nation
8 October 1958

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It would seem then that the only way the military can play a decision making role is by directly seizing power. *"The army can interfere – tangibly that is – only when it is directly in power. When it is not in power there is no legal mechanism for getting in touch with civilian institutions. Unless the military has been handed over a certain area of responsibility directly, for example the Rangers[87] in Karachi or when the Punjab Government asked them to look for ghost schools[88] etc. there is absolutely no avenue for consultation between the military and the civil government"*.[89]

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guardian role in which it casts its army can often be a more powerful indicator of officers' political preferences and behavior than other factors" (Shah, 2014b:20).

[87] "Pakistan Rangers is responsible for the protection of Pakistan's Eastern Borders, however, at times it also assists the Government for Internal Security Duty. The Rangers are also very active in securing important monuments and guarding national assets in various cities of Pakistan. The Rangers have notably contributed towards maintaining law and order in the country" Pakistan Rangers website http://pakistanrangerspunjab.com/intro.html (accessed on 29 August 2017). "Rangers are formally supervised by the Special Security unit, National Crisis Management Cell, in the federal Ministry of Interior, but are commanded by officers on secondment from the Pakistan Army. As a part of the Civil Armed Forces the Rangers can come under the operational control of army headquarters not just in war time, but whenever Article 245 of the Pakistan constitution is invoked to provide 'military aid to civil power', for example in Karachi since 2015 and in Punjab since February 2017"(Pakistan Rangers facebook page https://www.facebook.com/pg/rangerspaki/about/?ref=page_internal accessed on 12 February 2018). "*The Director General, an army officer with the rank of major general, leads both forces* [Sindh and Punjab Rangers]. *Commanders of these forces closely coordinate with local military commanders in Karachi and Lahore. Deputy Director Generals are appointed by provincial governments. The Rangers' strength in Punjab is 19,475, and in Sindh, 24,630*" (H. Abbas, 2011:16). The organisation / force is governed by Rangers Ordinance, 1959.

[88] Ghost schools are those schools which exist on paper but not on the ground. As a part of an education reform scheme in the late 1990s, the Punjab government decided to find and shut these ghost schools down. The Pakistan Rangers were called upon to assist the provincial government in tracing these ghost schools and closing them.

[89] Lt. General (Retd.) Abbasi. See footnote 43.

However, even when in control, "*during the military government the Corps Commanders do not participate in the decision making process at the country level. For example during Musharraf's time, he would convey to them what was happening and that was it. There was no direct interaction between the military and the politicians*".[90] Plus the military demonstrably is not in favour of tipping the balance of the civil and military relations. If then not driven by self-serving interests what is in the mind-set of the military that compels a takeover. Answer to that question lies in understanding how it perceives and interacts with variables of the civil political system.

5.3.1 Military believes that "politicians are corrupt"[91]

As aforementioned individuals or groups of individuals hailing from different backgrounds have different mental models. This is so because mental models are structured around experiences which are gained from a) the physical environment, and b) the socio-cultural linguistic environment. Needless to say, the military as a group has developed its own mental models based on its own cultural and physical environment. Moreover, by virtue of being military, these mental models form the basis of a broader institutional assimilation process. It is no wonder then that the military has very set perceptions not only about itself and its role, but also its civilian counterparts. These perceptions have been formed not only on its own environment and the interpretation thereof, but also how it interprets the background and environment of the civilians. This in turn forms the bedrock of subsequent action.

Corruption and nepotism are an undeniable reality of the Pakistani political and administrative system – the civil servants enjoy "*perks and privileges*" that would essentially tantamount to corruption. Politicians have "*insecure tenures*" are in and out of power. Therefore they avail all opportunity to line their pockets it were (Haqqani, 2005:220).

> "*It must be said however that as part of its justification for its own intervention in politics, Pakistan military has made a concerted effort since the 1950s to paint politicians and political activists as corrupt. In the period of partial civil rule beginning in 1988, corruption charges were frequently*

bandied about, making it easier to get rid of politicians who did not otherwise see eye to eye with the security establishment" (Haqqani, 2005:220). See also Annexure 3.

With the passage of time, the military has abandoned memory of its own role. Instead, the corruption of politicians has become an important element of the military thought process. A common view held by the military interviewees was that politicians, albeit with a handful of exceptions, were corrupt and driven by self-serving interests.[92] There is merit to the argument too. "*The military is convinced that the political leadership in Pakistan is not mature as such. It considers most politicians corrupt. Hence it takes upon itself that if the country is to be run properly then the military has to keep an eye on it*".[93]

Mental models are formed on the basis of past experience as well as interpretations of the crisis in question and interaction with other groups. As discussed earlier, there are no legal avenues for civil and military interaction. The military's views about the politicians' corruption are therefore substantiated when:[94]

a) The military is called upon in aid of civil powers. These are not instances when military is required to assist with natural calamities. These are situations where when confronted by a crisis of governance the civil government requests the military's help for instance the Rangers for handling law and order in Karachi[95],

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[92] Interestingly this view was reiterated by the bureaucrats as well as the technocrats that I interviewed. In fact the bureaucrats were far more candid about their views regarding the politicians than they were about the military. So much so that with the exception of four to five interviews, all of them were entirely off the record. Even those which were on the record were obviously careful of being critical of the military. Anything even vaguely critical was shared off the record. That said the bureaucrats' frustration was that the original system had over the years, through repeated amendments, been brought to appoint where all administrative decision making pivots on the will of the local politician or else their – the bureaucrats' – careers hang in balance. The military personnel on the other hand were steadfast in the view that all politicians with the exception of a handful were corrupt and this was the root of lack of 'development' in the country.

[93] Lt. General (Retd.) Abbasi. See footnote 43.

[94] There is an element of institutional history at play here as well. Literature on the subject proposes that the military has an inherent and inherited distrust of the politicians. The military evolved at a much faster pace than its civil counter parts. "… military's success in overcoming acute organizational problems sharpened the difference between its self-image as a cohesive professional institution and its pessimistic view of the politics as divisive and parochial (Shah, 2014:5)."

[95] "*The Rangers were created under Pakistan Rangers Ordinance, 1959 for the "protection of and maintenance of order in the border areas". They were requisitioned in Sindh for the first time under Article 147 of the Constitution in 1989 by none other than the present chief minister, Qaim Ali Shah, under Benazir Bhutto's first government. Again, it was his present government which vested the Rangers with police powers for the first time in 2009. The Anti-Terrorism Act [ATA], 1997 was amended in 2014 allowing, inter alia, the Rangers employed under Section 4 of the said Act to detain a suspect for 90 days. An all-embracing Protection of Pakistan Act was passed that also gave additional powers to the Rangers and other law enforcers to use force*

search for ghost schools in Punjab[96], electricity meter reading in Khyber Pakhtun-Khawa etc.[97];

b) Through the various projects that the military undertakes in the civil realm – larger infrastructure projects for example; and

c) When the military is directly in power during a takeover and has access to the financial / budgetary and administrative details.

One of the military interviewees elaborated the last point above as follows: "*Let us take the example of the Coastal Highway. The military was at the helm of affairs when the project started in 2002. The provincial and the national budgets were the same as the civil government earlier. However it is a perfect case of how the military concludes that the civil government is corrupt. The project was completed within time and within the estimated budget. There was no evidence of any corruption or kickbacks. And the highway itself is physical evidence that some progress has been made; something has been done for the development and betterment of the country*".[98]

There is a fine distinction at play here. The fact that the military is called in aid of civil powers is accepted as its constitutional duty.[99] In fact the military interviewees even considered this to be its peacetime role. "*The policy makers are aware that they have able bodied, disciplined, healthy, full of energy young men at their disposal who are able to undertake tough tasks and have nothing else to do during peacetime. Why not put them to work. It is efficient use of resources*".[100] Moreover they are paid for it. "*The military is involved in tasks such as meter reading purely because it is a matter of trust. The Chief Minister will ask the Corps Commander if he can lend some men. Soldiers will be deputed.*

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against a suspect on a "reasonable ground of suspicion". Meanwhile, the 21st Constitutional Amendment was passed creating military courts, which apparently are beyond even the pale of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction" (Usto, 2015).

[96] The Supreme Court of Pakistan defined a ghost school as a "building or infrastructure built for education but no longer used for that purpose". In 2013 the Supreme Court took *suo moto* notice of these notice of these schools and tasked the provinces to use all available resources to locate these ghost schools and take appropriate action. Punjab deployed the help of Rangers and it was discovered that out of 58,000 schools on the record, "*more than 266 were occupied for purposes other than education*"(A. Khan, 2013).

[97] Pakistan Rangers Ordinance, 1959 _ Article 7(b): The Force shall re-inforce the Police for the maintenance of Law and Order whenever it is necessary.

Article 10: Government may, by a general or special order confer or impose upon any member of the Force, any of the powers or duties conferred or imposed on a Police officer of any class or grade by any enactment for the time being in Force.

[98] Lt. General (Retd.) Abbasi. See footnote 43.

[99] For the text of Article 245 of the Constitution of Pakistan defining the Functions of the Armed Forces see page 12 Footnote 4

[100] Col. (Retd.) Mazhar. See footnote 47.

Wapda[101] *will provide them the concerned training and pay them. They are not paid like contractors. A daily allowance is fixed on the basis of the rank. The bill goes to the government, the concerned Deputy Commissioner counter signs it and it is paid into the army accounts*".[102]

Conversely, bureaucrats (who wished to remain anonymous) had a curious take on events. They claimed that keeping the military involved in such activities "*keeps them busy and we remain in their good books*" (Senior retired civil servant who wanted to remain anonymous). A counter point made by a few military interviewees was that the government employs them because they are politically neutral. Additionally people trust them. It is therefore naturally easier for the military to conduct a lot of sensitive tasks like meter reading. In fact allegedly people help them out of free will and point out discrepancies in their area. Here it must be pointed out that this was not the view held by all military respondents. Some maintained that the military gets paid for carrying out these labour intensive tasks. The military in such instances is no more than a contractor. Therefore the point of discussion should not be the reason why the government hired it for the task at hand but why the need to do so arose in the first place. They argue that the focus should be the fact that the government is obliged to call upon the military from time to time because it is not governing properly – and that in their opinion is entirely attributable to the politicians' corruption and lack of competence.

So it is not the mere fact of being asked to help the government out that shapes their habitus then. As mentioned in Chapter IV, over the years the military's hegemony has been discussed from various angles and attributed – by varying degrees – to a number of factors. Some of the more prominent candidates for military's preponderance have been weak political institutions (Jalal, 1985:01); colonial legacy (Talbot, 1998:125); military elitism (Hashmi, 1972:03); conflict with India (Ganguly, 2001:01); US-Pakistan relations (Kux, 2001:18); path dependency (Aziz, 2008:09); Punjabisation (Talbot, 1998:03)[103]– to

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[101] Water and Power Development Authority of Pakistan
[102] Brigadier (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 50.
[103] "*The emphasis on the 'Punjabisation' of the Pakistan military (referring to the presence of personnel from the majority province of the Punjab) is reductionist in essence in that it glosses over the approach of the military as an institution that defends and extends its institutional interests. The removal of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in October 1999 is a significant piece of evidence that the 'Punjabisation' of the army is not a useful analogy. In this instance, a prime minister from the majority province of the Punjab (Sharif), with a comfortable majority in the National Assembly, was overthrown after a military coup led by an army chief (General Pervez Musharraf) belonging to the Urdu-speaking (Muhajir) ethnic minority group*" (Aziz, 2008:09). Also see footnote 4 above for changes in recruitment patterns.

name a few. This research tries to represent the military's own perspective with respect to factors that influence its habitus and an analysis of the data collected from the field shows that it [the military that is] attributes its conduct / habitus to the "*The Army's training; discipline and accountability helps the civil governments achieve their purpose*"[104] Their perception of the politicians' inability to run the country is informed by the corruption and the money pilferage that they witness on the civil side.

> "*Today … the word politician itself has become synonymous with graft, loan default, nepotism, misuse of authority and all other abuses, which so far have eaten the vitals of the country. … The army [conversely] has a first class infrastructure, higher leadership, which is not interested in politics and a chain of command, which is schooled in the best traditions of the Army and therefore immune to the corrosion of graft and corruption*" (Tahir, 2000:11-12).

In short the military has not only developed an explanation of the civilian behaviour, but also ordered its own responses based on these interpretations.

5.3.2   Whereas, there is "No corruption within the military"[105]

Every single military interviewee described the politicians as corrupt. They conversely saw the military as a well-oiled machine, the one true institution in the country. Its success is the result of a strict adherence to a complex set of self-governing rules and regulations. "*The military is an institution steeped in tradition and accountability which are national assets*".[106]

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[104] Interview dated 28 February 2016 with Major General (Retd.) Saleemullah at his house.

[105] In an article published in the Green Book one senior military officer expressing an opinion about how the then newly installed Musharraf martial law regime could contribute to nation building wrote: "*Amongst a host of social problems, rampant corruption stands out to be one of the major challenges that the country faces at present. Pakistan, a few years ago, was adjudged as the land of second most corrupt nation in the world. Corruption is one thread which runs through the entire structure and spectrum of our economic and political power. … it has permeated all sections of our social life notably government departments which are afflicted to the core. To avert total collapse, all forms of corruption need to be eliminated without any favours or exemptions. In other words, it requires a major surgery in which casualties of innocent people should be accepted in a bid to bring the guilty to the dock. In this process, armed forces need to be involved in a big way to cleanse the society of this evil. This should constitute one of the major commitments of armed forces insofar as nation building is concerned as just and clean society remains one of the lofty ideals of any nation building exercise*"(Muhammad, 2000:44).

[106] Major General (Retd.) Saleemullah. See footnote 104.

When confronted with feedback from their counterparts, individuals or groups of individuals do not alter their mental models. This in part has to do with the fact that they have not shared the socio-physical background or cultural environment. It is not surprising that the military constantly compares itself and its way of operating with the civil elements. Even though the comparison is unfair given the scale and size on which the two operate, the most oft-quoted frustration is that if it can do [something], so can the rest of the country. And the ground that this claim was repeatedly verified on was that there was no corruption within the military:

> "*Despite using the same of kitty resources available to its political antecedents, the volume of developmental activity increases during military regimes*" (Junior serving military officer who wished to remain anonymous).

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> "*Civil institutions suffer from endemic and institutional inadequacies which the military does not have. There is macro level corruption happening. Politicians take the money out of the country. This is extremely frustrating for the military because it sticks to its targets. Eventually these things add to reasons for taking over. …It is because of this complete transparency and zero corruption that military has the complete trust of the people. Whenever it has been entrusted with a task, it has done a proper job. Far flung areas of the country which were unreachable earlier now have cities [because of the military]*".[107]

It would be pertinent to point out that there is no possible avenue whereby the claims of military honesty and lack of corruption can be verified. Inscrutability is inherent to militaries in general the world over. They deal with matters of national security after all and hence it makes sense that the aspects of the institution would be beyond public scrutiny. In the case of Pakistan military however, it is not just the administrative functions / aspects of organisation that are beyond public domain. Even the military budget is not available to inspection. That is, elements thereof which do not pertain to national security are also beyond reproach. The military budget is not open to discussion even in the parliament (Mason, 2016:07). The point being, with complete lack of transparency with

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[107] Major Gen. (Retd.) Khokhar. See footnote 41.

respect of military handling of funds, charges of corruption against the political leadership and the civil bureaucracy lose some strength. That said, this section is about the perceptions and the mental models formed thereupon after all; and as has been established, is a highly interpretive exercise.

> "*The reason why the military has an inbuilt system of accountability is that you should be able to follow your officer in war. A soldier has to be an example of honesty, discipline and patriotism. That is why we call them gentlemen cadets. When the political government meets difficulties, they ask the military for help. But it is only so that they can meet their own ends and not because they are trying to use the military as an example to build their own institutions*"[108]

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> "*Politicians do not have the kind of day to day accountability that the military has. The institutions that are supposed to hold them to task are weak – National Accountability Bureau is weak; the judiciary is weak*".[109]

There is no doubt that on an individual level there is exponentially less corruption in the military than its civil counter parts. However, the reality is more nuanced than it seems at a glance and the military interpretation thereof seems to have excluded a lot of vital factors. For instance, operational makeup of the organisation has a very important role to play in internal corruption levels. Command structure within the military incorporates judicial powers as well. "*Anyone can be fired on the spot and sent packing if the senior orders*" (Interview dated 09 January 2016 with Major General (Retd.) Naeem Ahmed at his house. He was Director General, National Logistic Cell during Musharraf's regime). Additionally, "*the promotion system is such that it factors in academic performance as well as personal reputation of an officer. There is an internal intelligence and they will observe any excesses. Everything is documented and goes on your file*".[110] Plus the sheer difference in size of the military and the civil political/bureaucratic elements makes any comparison of this sort redundant.

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[108] Major General (Retd.) Saleemullah. See footnote 104.
[109] Major Gen. (Retd.) Khokhar. See footnote 41.
[110] Interview with Major General (Retd.) Iqbal at CPPG on 24 August 2015.

Another extremely important factor is that the military self professedly 'takes care of its own'. *"You start as a Major at 17/18 years of age and retire at 43/44. Conversely a bureaucrat retires at 60. Military therefore has to cater for all these people it has invested in. Especially given that [at the time of retirement] half their life is still ahead of them and the responsibilities are just starting. This is when the military run organisations like FWO and the Fauji Foundation etc. come in handy"*.[111]

The military ensures that the individual incentives of corruption do not exist from the get go. In addition to the pension, upon retirement officers get a residential plot for constructing a house – which it must be pointed out they have paid through their salary during service – the children get admission in the military run schools and universities automatically at minimal fee etc. The officer as aforementioned will be accommodated in one of the military run business should he wish to. The Combined Military Hospitals provide free, state of the art medical and health facilities. The point being, the military takes care to eliminate the obvious inducements of corruption.

During an informal discussion with a senior retired bureaucrat, he explained that when he retired, all he had was his pension. It took him ten years before he could build a house of his own and that too after getting a loan from a bank. Conversely his brother who retired from the military around the same time was well taken care of by the military. It is not that at the end of the day one was more honest than the other. Both of them had performed their jobs equally honestly. The point being that 'lack of corruption' is certainly a crucial element of the military's habitus. However, while the claim might undoubtedly be by and large true also, it has a context within which it is to be understood.

5.3.3   "The public [therefore] supports the military"

The military is confident of the fact that it does not only enjoy the public support but it represents the ideals that the society aspires for (as shown in see Figure 1 below). Yet again we see traces of its self-perception, but via its interpretation of the public sentiment.

> *"Apart from the few cynics, Pakistan Army is, generally, considered an efficient organization, capable of delivering the goods. In the prevailing*

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[111] Brigadier (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 50.

chaotic conditions, even the intelligentsia and people with vision in the society concede that Army is the 'Anchor of Stability' and the 'island of excellence' provided that it does not meddle into political affairs half-heartedly as Pretorian Guards. Army portrays an image and model of national integration as conceived by the founding fathers" (Akhtar, 2000).

Figure 1 - Military the most trustworthy institution in the country

Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (Pildat) survey [19 October 2015] shows the Pakistan military as the most trustworthy institution in the country

Pakistan military is certainly unique in the public support it enjoys. A commonality amongst all the takeovers thus far has been that at the time, there was little to no opposition by the civil society. In fact it would not be entirely wrong to say that the public even supported the coup. Polls show (see Figure 2) that immediately after the ouster of the Nawaz government in 1999, which by the way had been elected with a heavy mandate, people supported the army misadventure (Synnott, 2009:51) (Bennett-Jones, 2002:230-231). "*When public compares the military and civil set up, military comes out on the top.*"[112] This then becomes the basis of the military belief that it is the true guardian of the public sentiment and hence a vanguard for nation building or 'development'. This can be corroborated by Figure 3.

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[112] Interview dated 17 September 2015 with Col. Shahid Kirmani at ISPR HQ Lahore.

Figure 2 – Aftermath of 1999 coup - People believe that the military should be the governing party

THE DAILY PAKISTAN
ISLAMABAD
OCTOBER 15, 1999

The News International, Friday, October 15, 1999

75pc favour non-political govt

ISLAMABAD: A Gallup poll in the major urban centres of the country shows that approximately 75 per cent favour a government comprising non-political reputable experts, while less than 10 per cent support returning government to Pakistan Muslim League leaders including Nawaz Sharif.

A snap poll conducted by Gallup Pakistan in different parts of the country on the evening of October 13, the day after the removal of the Nawaz Sharif government shows the support for forming a national government of respectable politicians of political parties is around 15 per cent. In the initial

5pc favour

response within hours of the military action, when asked would they favour an election in less than ninety days or after two to three years, around 60 per cent favoured election after two to three years.

Approximately 75 per cent approved the action taken by the military. But only one-thirds favoured direct military rule while the remaining two-thirds supported civilian alternatives.

Concerning expectations from the post-Nawaz set-up, a majority was not very hopeful of a turnaround in the economic situation: only 25 per cent are hopeful of a respite in inflation or unemployment but around 80 per cent are hopeful that the law and order situation will improve. —NNI

As per a Gallup Poll conducted on 15 October 1999, 75% of Pakistani's were of the opinion that the military should be the governing party. www.gallup.com.pk/فوج-کو-خود-حکومت-کرنا-چاہیے-،-قیادت-سیاس

Figure 3 – People are proud of the military

Nearly 2/3rd of Pakistanis cite Army as an institution that has made Pakistan proud

It is indeed true that the military is popular at the time of the takeover. Military popularity however does not translate into omnipotence. Military power is circumscribed by its own performance once in power. One commonality amongst all military regimes thus far is that they have ended as a result of protest and popular uprising. This is mostly due to an inability to deliver upon the promises. There are multiple reasons for below par performance, the chief amongst many being that as shown in chapter IV despite the rhetoric of development of fixing things, measures taken while in power are informed with a self-serving purpose.

Moreover the military way of doing things cannot be sustained in the civil sphere. As shown above, the military does not understand civil administrative functions of a country. Additionally, the unconstitutionality of a coup probably also weighs in with the military because despite its authoritarian status, we do not see it exerting the level of blanket authority expected from a coup maker.

A military respondent explained it as follows: "*When the military comes into power, it has lofty ideas like we will make the system corruption free and we will empower people etc. etc. The problems start immediately after the takeover. Once in power they have to find ways to legitimise themselves. Therefore the lofty objectives get mired and in the quest for survival they lose focus*".[113]

Other military respondents reified this stance in the following terms: "*Post a military takeover the government is always run by the bureaucracy. But taking over is always different from running the country*".[114] "*The military cannot do everything itself. It is not equipped to govern. We have technical specialities only. We are not trained in economic or foreign policy etc. also the military is not in a comprehensive position to govern either. Therefore when it comes into power, it has to co-opt the same corrupt politicians. Blame them [for the military's failure to govern] not the military*".[115]

Such behaviour is not limited to any one military takeover in particular. Comparing Zia and Musharraf, a military respondent explained the issue as follows: "*Zia was crafty and used religion as tool to further his personal rule. He brought clergy to his side for ensuring longevity of his reign. There was certainly no love on his part for the people of the country. A very short sighted person I must say. Musharraf on the other hand was well meaning. He was a straight man who had a definite vision. Only problem was that he did not have a clear understanding of what to do. True he gave us a seven point agenda, but that was not enough. When he was trying to become a democrat, the Corps Commanders advised him not to make that mistake. We said you have usurped power, make good use of it - stick to the seven point agenda and leave. But in the end it is the same narrative for them all. Musharraf did exactly what his predecessors did. Made a political party, held a referendum, joined the assembly etc.*"[116]

In short once in power the military consistently fails to deliver on its promises. The triggering point of its ouster however is invariably an act in particular, the constitutionality or legality whereof becomes difficult to justify. In Musharraf's case for instance, dissatisfaction with the regime had been building for years. However, when he dismissed the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court over charges of alleged misuse of office, it

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[113] Lt. General (Retd.) Abbasi. See footnote 43
[114] Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 46.
[115] Major Gen. (Retd.) Khokhar. See footnote 41.
[116] Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Gul. See footnote30.

unravelled the military tenure. This lead to mass protests against Musharraf and his military regime across the country and he was forced to leave office.

That said, once the military retreats back to the barracks it does not take very long to recover sympathy. One of the reasons, as listed earlier, is that the coup is not operated from the General Head Quarters and hence the military is able to distance itself from the regime in power as soon as public dissatisfaction begins to play. The second and the most important is that by maintaining a strong rhetoric of nation building and development, it is able to ensure a public friendly omnipresence the country. As with the takeover, the retreat too is not an exhaustive affair.

When confronted with an ambiguous situation or uncertain environment, a natural human reaction as per the shared mental models theory is to develop explanations so that subsequent actions can be ordered on it. These mental models in turn become the basis for establishing institutions. These in turn equips the group or individuals in question with the necessary tools to perceive the environment and to open further channels of communication.

Therefore, even though during a takeover the military's insurance policy lies in maintaining a *prima facie* distance from the regime; in the immediate aftermath of the toppling of regime its saving grace are its non-military activities which it operationalises as its nation building or developmental contributions to the country.

5.4   Development or nation building?

Irrespective of personal opinion,[117] the general understanding amongst the interviewees – and this includes both the military as well as non-military respondents – was that "*the Pakistan military has a mind-set that it has a role to play in nation building. It is convinced of that. And you have to accept that as a given. That cannot be changed now*".[118] Additionally they did not make a distinction between 'development' and nation building.

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[117] Personal opinion did not always support the military's nation building / development activities, the broader sentiment being that anything that is not strictly security oriented distracts from the main purpose. Also, increased interaction with the civil side is considered a corrupting influence.
[118] Major General (Retd.) Iqbal. See footnote 110.

The two terms are often used in tandem and invariably, interchangeably.[119] They not only instinctively referred to the duties performed in aid of civil powers as examples of military's nation building or developmental role but any military activity in the civil field which involved interaction with the civilian population fell under the rubric.

5.4.1   Nation building

The military considers itself not only responsible but ideally suited for nation building. That said there isn't an identifiable institutional agenda that can be labelled as such. "*The military does not have an organised nation building plan or even thought process. There is no discussion on the institutional level that says for example that the education system of the country is in a bad way, lets fix it*."[120] Nation building therefore is an all-encompassing term which includes under its rubric "*political, economic as well as social*" elements. Military feels better disposed to undertake these tasks because nation building requires money and the politicians and other civil elements due to their ineptitude and inherent corruptness fail to deliver

> "*One of the biggest frustrations of the military is that it feels that the national and provincial budget is not spent properly. Additionally the military is also convinced that it can do something about this by either directly accessing the person in charge or by doing the required task themselves through FWO, NLC etc. Hence bulk of the work on CPEC has been given to the FWO*" (For further details see chapter VI below).[121]

Yet the nation building role is a key element of the organisation's habitus. Therefore even though there is not a set definition, a rough picture of what counts as nation building emerges. The net result is that military's self-appointed role of nation building, as opposed to political aspirations, is seen as a bed rock of takeovers. As one military respondent explained:

> "*The military is really not interested in the political affairs of the country and yet there are interventions. These interventions really start as an effort at*

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[119] Here it must be pointed out that the term 'development' was not used in the sense it is understood in development discourse. 'Development' here refers to any activities that result in economic growth and over all progress.

[120] Brigadier (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 50.

[121] Lt. General (Retd.) Abbasi. See footnote 43.

nation building which the civilians can benefit from if they want to. Benazir Bhutto could have utilised the experience of the military leadership at the time (see Annexure 3) which could have led to political accommodation and nation building but she chose not to".[122]

At various stages of their careers the officers are given papers to write, presentations and projects on a number of issues. These are a part of their academic as well as professional training and deal with a vast number of issues pertinent to the military. Subjects like nation building, developmental needs of the country, etc. can be a part thereof. "*Within the military there is a systematic procedure of achieving consensus on all major issues. Nuances of military thinking might change with time. However, there are a number of avenues and forums where the thought process is nurtured and developed*"[123] These 'thinking forums' would be the Seminars at the army field level,[124] study periods, all the schools of instruction (including for example the War course at the National Defence University for example), Army Formation Command Conference, etc.

These studies are good tools for ascertaining the mood of the troops and soldiers. Very rarely decision making within the military, on strictly military matters can be loosely guided by the suggestions made therein.[125] At best they add to the institutional history.[126] They are not to be confused with an official institutional goals or agenda. For our purposes though they are an excellent window into the habitus of the organisation. As these documents are a part of the institutional history and thinking process there were limitations to accessing them. However, I did manage to get hold of some of the essays

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[122] Major General (Retd.) Saleemullah. See footnote 104.

[123] Lt. General (Retd.) Karamat. See footnote 59.

[124] With respect to the civil domain there is no legally prescribed avenue / domain to contact the civil government. Nor does the Military feel any sense of responsibility with respect to the matter either – juxtaposed with the assertion that defence includes socio-economic factors as well. If however an issue pertaining to the civil domain does crop up, which the Chief feels that it absolutely must be brought to the attention to the 'government', he might bring it up in the regular meeting with the PM. For example the monthly reports of a brigade stationed in Kashmir might conceivably include some issue that Chief feels must be brought to the attention of the civil government if it hasn't so far. But this is just theoretical conjecturing and has never happened to any ones knowledge. The bottom line though is that there is absolutely no way to contact the civil government for conceiving or initiating any development project.

[125] Decision making within the organization, as is the case with militaries in general, is extremely hierarchical. One some rare occasions, the governing body while contemplating a particular decision, might want to ascertain in advance how it will be received or what is the common opinion regarding an issue. In those cases there is a possibility that the GHQ would recommend a topic for discussion or a written essay. This does not alter the decision making process in any way whatsoever though.

[126] Institutional history is a source of pride and an important element of the habitus. It is yet another example of governance capabilities of the military which the civil institutions lack entirely because of the latter's ineptitude.

written as part of their academic careers and official military publications like the Green Book and the ISPR monthly magazine *Hilal.* As mentioned in chapter III discussions of nation building in such documents are not to be taken as a policy stance of the military. Following a few examples of how the military rationalises its nation building role. Using these a picture of military's habitus emerges.

A general sentiment that comes to the fore from published material is that the military feels it can help in sharing the nation's economic burdens by increasing the levels of involvement in nation building projects.[127] As expected there isn't a set definition of nation building. However it is quite easy to discern how the term is understood / what is the habitus regarding the concept. "*There is no set vision of development of nation building formally. But broadly speaking there is a desire for economic and social prosperity. And this includes everything*".[128]

Broadly speaking "*nation building … means establishing a common citizenry, common political and social structures, a common [S]tate, and an additional sense of identity, or belonging together*"[129] That said, it is not to be understood as an intangible concept; one where there are deliverable socio-economic results. "*It is a direct involvement of armed forces in national development to undertake dedicated activities in certain exclusive fields that are essentially economic and social in nature* (Baz, 2000:04)."[130] These 'fields' or the main problem areas identified are as wide ranging as diverse. They include, but are not limited to, low literacy rate, inadequate basic health facilities, high rate of population growth, low production in agriculture sector, scarcity of forests and environmental

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[127] As explained in Chapter III the military publications are not to be confused with official military policy. These are essays and articles have been included in here as secondary data – to corroborate the claims of military respondents. They however are a good source into the mind-set as they are written by officers in service and published by the GHQ and other military institutions alike the National Defence University and ISSRA. They are not official military policy but they certainly allow a glimpse into the military thought process. And that is important because in absence of official policy documents – which are impossible to obtain because it is the military after all – such secondary sources, which are published and circulated under the aegis of the military show us how the military understands issues like nation building and development etc.

[128] General (Retd.) Amjad. See footnote 57.

[129] Visualised Role of the Armed Forces in Nation Building, Individual research paper obtained from the National Defence College Library. "*As such Armed Forces of Pakistan owe it to the country to make maximum possible contribution in nation building as well as socio-economic fields without compromising on their combat readiness, military ethos/ culture traditional values and morale.*"

[130] General Musharraf took over in October 1999. In 2000 a special edition of the Pakistan Army green book was published titled Role of Pakistan Army in Nation Building in which there were around 40 articles on the subject, broadly divided in three categories: Nation Building – A Conceptual Framework; Pakistan Army's Contribution to National Development; and Areas in which Pakistan Army can Contribute. This publication could be a way to ascertain the mood of the military and see ow they understand the coup, or get the organisation in describing a way forward retrospectively.

degradation, lack of communication infrastructure, inadequate human resource development, lack of information technology, breakdown of social order, lack of political stability and geo-economic and geo-strategic deficiencies.

On the one hand in its mind it is a vanguard of national development[131] on the other absence of a set definition evidently does not sit very well with the officers. There are a number of instances where it is recommended to find constitutional or legal cover for the 'developmental activities' undertaken by the military. "*To lend legal validity and to avoid criticism, the constitutional role of the Army may have to be redefined to undertake nation building projects. At the least, appropriate legal cover through legislation should be obtained* (Baz, 2000:08)."

5.4.2   Development

The question then is whether or not the military holds itself responsible for 'development' of or in Pakistan. Almost all the military respondents were of the opinion that the military does not hold itself responsible for development of or in Pakistan. Developmental activity in this instance means any measures conducted in the civil arena for the benefit of non-military personnel.

> "*There is no institutional agenda of development. The military certainly contributes to nation building in many small ways. Any arena dominated by the armed forces has the potential of having strategic implications. So the decision to undertake small projects which can very likely improve the life of locals can be labelled as nation building. However, it is not a responsibility of the military as an institution. Additionally, on a practical front there is no budgetary provision for a large scale nation building undertaking. If the military were responsible for nation building, where is the money? How is it going to do it?* ".[132]

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[131] "Although primary orientation of the army remains towards safeguarding national integrity against external aggression; nowadays, threat to national integrity from within is becoming more pronounced. … apart from maintenance of law and order which is absolutely essential for political stability and economic growth, Army, by virtue of its inherent organizational ability to operate efficiently in the times of crises, has the capacity to expand its conventional role to contributing towards overall improvement in the country, by remarkable managerial skills and technical expertise which are time tested and cost effective" (Akhtar, 2000:01).

[132] Brigadier (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 50. He gave the example that a military run school in Lahore Cantonment needed a water tank. Ordnance Depot which is next door offered to help out with the white washing for free. However, for the water tank they asked for help in personal capacity.

Development therefore is believed to be a civilian responsibility for a number of reasons. For starters there is no budgetary provision for developmental activity. Second, development is a civilian function because military does not possess the requisite expertise. The most common cited example was that even when in power, all the three military regimes relied on the bureaucracy for the procedural and administrative purposes. Reason being the bureaucracy understands what measures need to be taken and how. Third, development is not the military's job because it "*does not need votes*" and hence does not stand to benefit in any way.

Does that mean that 'development' as per the military is a politically charged term? When juxtaposed with the claim that takeovers are guided by a need to fix things, it would seem that either political aspirations of the military play a far greater role in coup-making, or they are so deeply buried in the habitus that they themselves cannot identify it. Moreover, it is an all-encompassing term which does not exclude much from its rubric. For further quotations from military respondents:

> "*In my opinion development is very much a part of nation building. However I would distinguish between positive and negative nation building. The military is not interested in the political affairs of the country. Yet there are interventions. ..These interventions really do start as an effort at nation building. However, this is where I would distinguish between negative and positive nation building. And a takeover is a negative form of nation building. In my opinion positive nation building is when the civilian government takes the initiative and ownership of improving its institutions and uses the help of the military within legal bounds. Civilian governments have real handicaps in the form of security and spatial difficulties that the military can help overcome. Anything beyond that is a waste of military and in the long term a negative use of the military and its nation building capabilities*".[133]

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> "*As I understand that when it comes to nation building, development is very much a part of it. Not only economic but supporting the right kind of political*

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[133] Major General (Retd.) Saleemullah. See footnote 104.

structure. For example the primary task of the National Security Council is nation building".[134]

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"When it comes to development the military is definitely invested. Whether it is capable of it or not is a completely different matter. But it is the biggest institution in the country and consequently has a lot of influence. There is no set vision for development or nation building formally. But broadly speaking there is a desire for the economic and social prosperity. And this includes everything. Which sphere can you possibly exclude from 'Social Prosperity'?"[135]

A common perception was that there is more 'development' during military regimes. The most cited example being that of the local governments that various military regimes has attempted to install. The argument was that the politicians want to retain power and hence do not let the local governments thrive. Military on the other hand tries to fix the governance infrastructure to the lowest level and hence tries to install the local governments.

Another commonly held view was that the military is filling in for the state as it were.

"Due to the inefficiency and corruption of the civil government space for military intervention is created in the development sector. As a result military is delivering services that the state is not providing. However, this is being done on a very small scale and it cannot be said that the military is hampering institutional building in any way".[136]

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[134] Ibid.
[135] General (Retd.) Amjad. See footnote 57.
[136] Lt. General (Retd.) Abbasi. See footnote 43.

> *"For example people prefer going to the CMH as opposed to the government hospitals. It is not that there are not any doctors and state of the equipment on the civil side. Things are just badly done".*[137]

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> *"Until the country is economically, politically and strategically stable the military needs to remain involved [in the developmental activities]. But it needs to make sure that the development it undertakes is financially viable; it stays within the parameters of the legal system; and that it is civilian development for the country and not for the benefit of the military only".*[138]

While nation building is a part of the military consciousness or habitus, 'development' is not. *"'Development' priorities of the country are described by the civilian government. Military can only give opinions. The government may choose to act on some of these recommendations at the end of the day but that does not mean that the military can or does force it [the civil government]. But when in power, social sector services are naturally the military's responsibility".*[139]

5.4.3   A matter of cognitive dissonance

It has already been discussed in section 2.2.3 above that mental models are in a constant state of flux. Not only do the ideologies on which mental models are based evolve, so does the language informing them. Moreover, there are natural limits to the abundance of cognitive resources as well as the vocabulary through which they are expressed. Therefore new meanings are [gradually] transferred from one field of application to another to fill in the cognitive as well as linguistic gaps. If repeated enough, they become an integral component of the mental model and we change the use in the common parlance. With time we not only alter the meanings we associate with terminology and but also how we use it.

There seems to be, for lack of a better term, a cognitive dissonance around the military's nation building or 'developmental' role. On the one hand it is only responsible for the

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[137] Lt. General (Retd.) Karamat. See footnote 59.
[138] Major General (Retd.) Iqbal. See footnote 110.
[139] General (Retd.) Amjad. See footnote 57.

security of the country. As aforementioned that is what they are capable of. Yet when pressed about military presence in certain civil developmental areas the response was by and large that security is not limited to strictly military matters and has socio-economic dimensions as well. Therefore, if the military undertakes any 'developmental' or nation building activity, it is acting on its charter to secure the country.

Pakistan is a big country. Strategically relevant border areas are sparsely populated and cut off from the federal as well as provincial centres. As a result it is not only physically complicated for the civil governments to reach them and provide certain basic social sector services like electricity and gas but economically not viable either. *"One must realise that the civilian governments have real handicaps in the form of security and spatial difficulties that the military can help overcome"*.[140]

Military for strategic reasons is already present in these areas. That means that there would be an electric and gas system also which they can easily share with the local. Electric and telephone lines would be laid out. There would be a hospital providing basic health care. Schools for the children of both the officers as well as troops would be set up. The civil government in such localities relies on the military to provide the basic amenities. Medical care in a vast majority of areas in Kashmir is provided by the military. The civil government pays them for it. Same goes for a sizeable number of schools in the Northern Areas. Point being there is interdependence between defence and 'development' in certain parts of the country which makes it difficult to treat the two separately and as distinct concepts. As a result there is what the interviewees called a "spill-over of defence into development" which the civil population is an unwitting beneficiary of. Whether such activity qualifies as military's 'developmental' and nation building strategy is unclear. However, it is certainly a part of its habitus. Despite the fact that the military does not hold itself responsible for 'development' as such, examples of such spill-over activities are definitely cited as its achievements. Here it must be clarified that the term 'spill-over' was suggested by the interviewees themselves. The concept has been discussed in detail in the next chapter

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[140] Major General (Retd.) Saleemullah. See footnote 104.

5.4.4   Winning hearts and minds (Wham)

This thesis is about the 'developmental' activities of the military that it undertakes in the civil arena. During the data collection process, while reflecting on its nation building activities or even referring to activities beyond the strictly defence or strategic domains, the military respondents often used the term Winning Hearts and Minds (Wham). Even though Wham is not necessarily germane to the study, the mere fact that it was [voluntarily] employed by the respondents while discussing the subject of the research makes it necessary to briefly explain the term in general and to see in what sense the respondents used it.

The concept of 'winning hearts and minds'[141] was coined to be used in war / insurgency situations and referred to emotional and intellectual appeals [as opposed to militaristic methods] made by one side to gain support from the non-combatant elements of the other. It does not hold a strategic significance any longer. However it is still used by the militaries to refer to their activities in civil arenas. As this denotes non-military functions of the organisations, and lies at the cusp of civil-military boundaries, it is important to see how it interplays with the Pakistan military's nation building activities.

The military perspective on WHAM is: "*Military is not concerned with the hearts and minds of anyone. Mainly because it is not within its rules. It does not have to run for elections. Hence there is neither a need or for that matter applicability of winning hearts and minds. Plus the most important thing is that there is no budget for any such activity. Point being Wham is not a systemised organised thing. If anyone wants to do something they do it on their own. Sometimes they will take money out of the fund for something that needs immediate attention. But mostly this is a personal initiative. Plus these are very small scale activities which do not cost much to begin with. For example let us suppose a school needs*

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[141] The phrase 'winning hearts and minds' "…*is almost universally misattributed to Sir Gerald Templer, the British high commissioner in Malaya between 1952 and 1954. Templer is thought to have coined it to describe his counterinsurgency campaign against the Malayan Communist Party, then waging a bloody war along the length of the peninsula. Many strategic thinkers and military personnel, including the authors of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual (2006), believe the rules laid down by Templer to be a golden formula for waging and winning an asymmetric conflict. Yet Templer borrowed the phrase from a colonial administrator of a previous generation. Writing to a friend in 1891, Sir Robert Groves Sandeman, agent of the governor-general in Baluchistan, argues that to be successful on this frontier a man has to deal with the hearts and mind of the people and not only their fears. What came to be known as the 'Sandeman system' was based on the recruitment of local tribesmen into the office of imperial governance.*" (Hopkins, 2010:25). The idea was for "*one side to seek to prevail not by the use superior force, but making emotional or intellectual appeals to sway supporters of the other side*" (Hunt, 2015:23). Within this context, as indicated above it Is not being used as a combative tool.

to be whitewashed. The material will cost Rs. 1500 maximum. Manpower is abundant and free as it is. Or maybe teach a class. But that is because the concerned person has free time and offers to do so as a personal initiative. It is not part of an institutional agenda. Nobody is trying to fix the system through such small activities".[142]

One thing is evident that there are no provisions made in a Corps' budget to look after civilians.[143] An officer can make a request to the civilian government in his personal capacity regarding something that has been brought to his attention.[144] Like for example if the ceiling of a school has caved or there is no water or electricity in a particular area. However this will be done in his personal capacity without any institutional involvement. Moreover, as aforementioned, there are no legal avenues for interaction between the military and civil sides. The only way the government can be contacted is through the monthly report that they have to prepare anyway. "*Even then this report is sent to the GHQ. It might contain something that can be forwarded to the Ministry of Defence. Otherwise the military is not concerned with winning hearts and minds. There is no need to win the loyalty of the people. Fixing schools and etc. are not institutional matters*".[145]

An unexpected outcome of the exercise however is that it provides an unexpected insight into the military habitus with respect to its non-defence activities. A number of initiatives and activities which are identified as Wham or nation building in common parlance are in reality conducted by the military either because they fall on the cusp of development and

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[142] Brigadier (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 50.

[143] "*Even though the ministry of Defence, headed by a civilian minister, is formally responsible for the administration of the armed forces, oversight over the military is primarily restricted to formal audits of its expenditures. In any case, military officers dominate senior positions (additional secretary and secretary level) in the Ministry of Defence, which mostly acts as a clearinghouse for military proposals and demands.*
In terms of budgetary allocations, the military has made nominal concessions, since 2008, by allowing the disclosure of an itemized annual budget before parliament. Yet, it has evaded any real accountability on the grounds that the disclosure of 'sensitive' budgetary matters will undermine national security by exposing critical information to enemy agents. It has also advised the government to 'streamline' wasteful civilian expenditures rather than questioning the military budget" (Shah, 2014a:1021).

As per one interviewee at the Ministry of Defence, Military Finance "*There is a complete and full audit of the defence budget but strategic defence activities (which would also include internal budgetary matters) cannot be disclosed of course. There is a DG Defence Audit under the Auditor General. But I won't be surprised if the AG office does not have all the data. There is a tendency you know. Maximum information you can obtain is how much is spent in lump sum on the four heads that we do know of. These are Employees, Civil and works, Purchases and Physical Assets.*" (Interview dated 26 November 2015 with, Additional Secretary Ministry of Defence, Military Finance at the Ministry of Defence. Rawalpindi).

[144] Whether it approaches the provincial or federal government depends on the issue at hand and which arm of the civil government exercises jurisdiction over it.

[145] Brigadier (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 50.

defence or because the civil government has real limitations accessing these areas. "*For example there might be social sector presence in Kashmir like the hospitals etc. but not in Punjab or Sindh*" (General Afzal).

Another reason is that some border areas are so far from the rest of the country or so remote that it is not economically feasible for the government to provide certain amenities. Military is already present in these areas as a matter of necessity. Hence it makes more sense to entrust the military with the provision thereof. There is a strategic element involved in wham also. For instance if the people can see that their village has electricity and the Indian village across the border does not, it makes the security narrative easy to sell to the public also. "*The bottom line though is that the military does not get any brownie points for any such activity. You do good because you can*".[146]

5.5   Conclusion

After three takeovers the Pakistan military seems to have developed some distinct mental models on which it organises its activities and institutions. These stints into power have come to be accommodated within the military thought process as outcomes of peculiar circumstances enforced upon it. Evidence shows that as things stand, within the military perception, takeovers are not considered bids for power informed by political aspirations but [necessary] measures of the last resort to save the country. With the passage of time, especially given that ten years have passed since the last takeover ended, the military habitus has evolved to accommodate / accept these takeovers as a necessity of the hour. The most prominent advantage of this particular line of reasoning being that is allows for the military as a saviour narrative to develop.

Admittedly, the geo-political realities of the country are such that the civil government relies more on the military than it should. Moreover, its own inability to deliver public sector services due to what can only be described as incompetence only supports the saviour narrative. The net result is that the military is popular amongst the citizenry and has an indelible belief in its own indispensability.

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[146] Brigadier (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 50.

Mental models formed by a group through an interpretation of its environment especially in situations of crisis or uncertainty ideologies. These ideologies prescribe how the given environment should be structured (Denzau & North, 1994:04). Moreover, the language used in the process is not limited to a particular field of application. Words and concepts can be borrowed without necessarily importing the full wealth of knowledge informing these concepts.

As things stand with the Pakistan military, boundaries between defence and 'development' have become precariously intertwined. While 'development' is accepted as a civilian domain, the military holds itself responsible for nation building. As seen above there is no tangible difference between the two terms and are often used interchangeably. In fact at times, they are even conflated with those activities that it performs in aid of civil powers.

While mental models are internal representations of the environmental representations that the individual cognition creates, the institutions that the individuals create based on these mental models are a physical manifestations of how the given environment should be ordered / structured (Denzau & North, 1994:05). Secure in its hegemonic status, the Pakistan military has found ways to simultaneously navigate both the civil and the military spheres while remaining within legally and theoretically prescribed boundaries.

This conflation of 'development' and defence provides the military an avenue to perceive its hegemony not through overt displays of power, but through provision of social sector amenities. This in turn physically manifests in the form of organisations it has created in the development and commercial sector. The next two chapter use military presence in the field of large infrastructure building and its welfare activities to show this.

Chapter VI:

Defence or 'development':

Frontier Works Organisation – thriving at the crossroads of civil military binaries

6.1   Introduction

This research aims to ascertain whether hegemonies that are culturally and symbolically reinforced endure longer. This chapter looks at military habitus, the avenues selected for implementation thereof and elements within the military's self-perception that allow for its presence in the civil sphere without divesting its military status. To that end, Frontier Works Organisation (FWO) will be used as a case study. Reasons of selecting FWO have been stated in chapter III.

FWO is poised at the intersection of the 'development' and defence aspects of the military interact with each other. Though initially constituted for a single project, that is the construction of the Karakoram Highway, the organisation has over the years transformed into a profit making commercial entity, while retaining its military status.

Moreover, it lends perspective to the infrastructure construction scenario in the country in general. A road of such a nature – the Karakoram Highway that is – had been contemplated by the government[s] of the day for 'developing' the remote northern regions of the country. As shall be demonstrated below, the impetus behind the extension and completion of the project however was very much informed by a militaristic intent of purpose.

Most importantly the nature of the organisation is such that it concurrently occupies both the civil and military domains all the while – self professedly – performing a 'developmental' / nation building function as well. The aim of this chapter is to unpack how entities like the FWO feature in the military habitus and how their military yet non-military status is used to negotiate civil military binaries.

This chapter begins with the overall structure of the organisation, followed by the historical background of FWO; its inception and evolution to its current form. The undercutting theme is the habitus of the military and how it has evolved with time to reach its current state. The purpose is to ascertain how the military perceives its own role as a 'development' actor and thus justifies its presence in non-military sectors. FWO's dualistic financial status shall be used to distinguish between its civil and military roles. This chapter mainly relies on primary data gathered from the FWO Head Quarters which includes both expert interviews with FWO officials and written materials. Additionally it uses interviews with senior military officials, bureaucrats and other personnel involved with infrastructure projects in the country.

6.2   Structure of FWO

The FWO is one of the three major, military controlled, public sector, infrastructure making entities that are directly involved in profit-making activities by and on behalf of the military – the other two being the National Logistic Cell (NLC) and the Special Communication Organisation (SCO). As shown in figures 5 and 6 below, it is staffed with serving officers form the Army corps of Engineers, as well as retired military personnel and some civilian staff.

An analysis of the data as well as literature on the subject shows that there is no doubt about FWO not being a military run and commercially operated entity. While it is true that the organisational chart given in Figure 4 below, places the Ministry of Defence at the top, according to Siddiqa:

> "*Placing the MoD at the top of the organizational chart does not, however, mean that the economic initiatives are centrally planned. It simply indicates the administrative position of the MoD in the overall system of defence administration in the country. Each of the three services plans independently.*

In fact, the MoD is used as a forum to negotiate economic opportunities and the monopolization of resources. For instance, it is used to obtain ownership of provincial and federal government land and sanction its distribution between the three services, which then allocate it to their personnel. The various government departments such as the MoD or the MLC are an administrative mechanism for economic exploitation" (Siddiqa, 2007:113).

Figure 4 – FWO is a military Organisation

This research does not pertain to the political and financial ambitions of the military. However, during a discussion on the civil military imbalance in the country one military interviewee described the functions of the ministry of defence as:

"The ministry of defence takes care of the budget of the military. It coordinates the joint staff of the HQ which basically means coordination of the all the armed forces, it also organises peacekeeping operations and visits abroad. However, it [ministry of defence] has become nothing more than a

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post office. This is because nobody does or can say anything to the military.
We need an effective Ministry of Defence and Secretary of Defence".[147]

The process through which FWO acquires projects and negotiates civil military binaries is described in detail in section 6.4 below. However, describing the structural make up of FWO, one interviewee – a retired military officer who was employed at FWO at the time – unwittingly reified Siddiqa's claim above. The fact that the structural chart is headed by the Ministry of Defence does not divest FWO if it's military status.

> "*FWO is run like a military formation – like a division. It is commanded by a Major General. The employees remain military officers [when they join FWO] but they are contractually employed by the FWO. However, it is not only the officers who are employed by FWO. With the exception of projects undertaken by independent FWO subsidiaries, jawans [soldiers] do the construction work. The personnel employed here [FWO] fall under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952 and are accountable to the military. Duality of role certainly causes inherent confusion. So they switch roles whenever needed. As FWO is now self-sustaining and generates its own income and profit, it pays the salaries of these officers from its own budget.*
>
> *The governing body is Project Board* (see figure 6 below) *which oversees and enforces rules. It has financial and auditory powers and enforces a mixture of military and civil rules. The Project Board decides which projects to undertake. Barring security and strategic concerns, project selection is entirely FWO's decision. Plus we keep the profit. For national disaster relief work the Project Board usually decides not to take any payment. But for road building, even if it is in the cantonment area, it will take money for the work done.*
>
> *FWO now as has constituted its own 10 to 12 companies which are regulated under the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan. Take LAFCO for example (above figure 5). It is mostly run / operated by civilian employees but the board of directors is from the FWO. The positions of control are held by retired military officers. These companies have the capacity of operating*

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[147] Lt. General (Retd.) Karamat. See footnote 59.

independently – administrative matter and hiring and firing they can handle
on their own. The money matters however are owned by the FWO".[148]

Although a rather lengthy quote, it provides an insight – from the inside – as to how the organisation operates, its command structures and more importantly how it has expanded over the years. The respondent highlights the ambiguity created by the dual (military / non-military) role of the employees, but simultaneously is quite clear about the fact that the decision making powers reside with the military. The success therefore is attributable to the military component of the organisation. Whereas any questions raised regarding the presence of a strictly military organisation in a civil sector can be neutralised through the duality of the organisation and its members.

Figure 5 – A Project Board decides which projects to take

It is a public sector organisation owned by the military (FWO, 2015a).

Figure 6 – Organisational details of FWO

Organization

" FWO is Organized into a Head Office at Rawalpindi and six Group Headquarters besides private limited subsidiaries, covering the entire country, while the Foreign Project Cell in UAE looks after the projects in Gulf. "

The headquarters at Rawalpindi having Planning, Operations, Logistics, Finance, Human Resource and Audit Directorates provide overall management of the projects and the Group Headquarters control the construction activities in the field either directly or through the Sector Headquarters which are placed under their command where ever considered necessary.

A work force of over 29,000 personnel, divided into construction units and construction teams execute the projects. Depending upon the nature and quantum of the projects with different groups, the units and construction teams are articulated. In addition to the integral machinery with the units and construction teams the specialized machinery / equipment at the pool of the Head Office at Rawalpindi is utilized to augment the resources on requirement basis. As and when required, local sub-contractors, local labour and hired machinery and transport is also employed.

The quality of work is assured through the qualified staff at each Group Headquarters and over all monitoring is done by Head Office through Operations Directorate. FWO possesses over 150 qualified and experienced engineers (Including 2 PHDs and 50 MSc), senior managers and managers covering all disciplines of civil, electrical, mechanical, communication, tunnelling and geo-tech engineering. In addition, about 4,500 middle and lower level technicians and operators, specialised in their own fields, are available to complement the workforce in the field where required.

Here it must be noted that figures pertaining to the financial standing of the FWO are not available. At least not of the same kind as that for the Fauji Foundation. I have provided two charts of the financial layout as well monthly work done for those periods to give some idea of how much money the FWO makes per month through its projects. However, these have been copied from a printed document containing slides from an internal presentation which was given to me off the record. Financial records for Fauji Foundation are available only because the military chooses to make them available. With respect to FWO there is no such data available in the public domain.

Figure 7 - Financial Layout of the FWO


Figure 8 - Monthly Work done by the FWO

Figures provided by the FWO

6.3 Military and infrastructure – Historical background of Frontier Works Organisation

In order to understand how the military perceives the FWO and its role, a good place is to look at how it presents it (FWO) to the world. The 2015 Company Profile of the Frontier Works Organisation (FWO) begins with a message from the CEO – an excerpt of which reads as follows:

> "*With professionally qualified and competent staff, efficient work force, flexible organization and a broad pool of modern state of art construction equipment, FWO is capable of undertaking any construction assignment anywhere in Pakistan or abroad. FWO's motto 'Striving for Excellence' amply speaks of the spirit and continuing endeavours to deliver the best.*
>
> *FWO was raised in 1966 for the construction of Karakoram Highway. It has progressed phenomenally since then and is one of the largest firms in Pakistan specialized in multifarious fields of civil engineering. Beyond the national frontiers it has successfully undertaken projects in Kuwait, Afghanistan, Liberia and Dubai"* (FWO, 2015:2-3)

In short it is considered a success story over all with the military [self] perception spilling through terms like "professionally qualified", "competent", "efficient", and "state of the art". Moreover it hints at generating progress. The self-perception is also represented in the very logo of the organisation itself which is the Himalayan ibex as shown below (Figure 9). The Himalayan ibex is indigenous to the Himalaya and Karakoram region. It is noted for its ability to live at extremely high altitudes (up to 5000 m/above sea level) and to negotiate through dangerous terrain. The ibex was selected as a logo for FWO for those reasons. I was told it represents the FWO's skill to carry out the job at hand irrespective of environmental and topographical difficulties. As shown in the pictures of the KKH (next page) the road in question is not only extremely high but manoeuvres through some extremely dangerous and difficult landscapes.

Figure 9 – FWO: a versatile and skilled organisation

FWO Logo

China – Pakistan Border via KKH (Courtesy FWO)

In the late 1950's, Pakistan Army's Corps of Engineers[149] was entrusted with the construction of Indus Valley Road. It was to connect Gilgit (in the north) with Rawalpindi, via a road going through the Indus Valley.[150] The objective was to develop the northern states of Swat, Gilgit and Hunza by providing them access to the rest of the country (then, West Pakistan) and vice versa. The area is an especially strategically important part of the

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[149] There are multiple processes taking place within the military which are not necessarily purely combative in nature. These are classified as administrative staff corps (pronounced as core) and are responsible for the managing, training and other administrative tasks pertaining to the personnel. One such supporting arm is the Corps of Engineers. It specifically deals with the science and technology aspect of the military. During combat or war situation the Corps of Engineers' functions include providing technological assistance to the troops which assists with their advancement. This includes activities like (but is not limited to) building makeshift bridges, digging canals, ensuring passage through difficult terrains like deserts and mountainous regions etc. However, as a military is not always at war, the Corps of Engineers (or Engineers Corps) has peacetime functions also which have the additional advantage of adding to the skills of the personnel. These include building dams, canal, flood protection etc. The Engineers Corps can be called in aid of civil powers under Article 245 of the Constitution of Pakistan. Given that it has to be combat ready with state of the at all times, the peacetime role of the military is an efficacious use of its resources.

[150] Colonel (Retd.) Manzoor. See footnote 150. The interviewee is a retired military officer. At the time of the construction of the KKH he had been had been involved with the construction of the road itself (in the Sakardu area) and had sustained lifelong injuries as a result of the terrain being extremely difficult. As per him the valleys of the areas were already connected via pedestrian bridge and a jeep-able track between Swat and Challas already existed. But there was nothing along the Indus River that would connect the very remotest areas in the north with the rest of the country and most importantly the center.

country as it borders both Kashmir and India,[151] therefore was also a militaristic intent of purpose behind the project.

Strictly speaking the project was not a military initiative. It had been in the pipelines as it were since before Field Marshall Ayub Khan came into power (Kreutzmann, 1991:723). Ayub Khan though made it his number one priority.[152] Once completed, the road would become a symbol for nation building efforts of the military as shown in the picture below.

Here it must be noted that at the time (in late 1950's -60's) the Indus Valley Road and later the Karakoram Highway were seen by many authors of civil-military relations theory as a good example of the developmental role that militaries can play in newly emerging states. In fact authors like Pye and Moore specifically cite the example of the Pakistan military and the Indus Valley Road (which later became known as the Karakoram Highway) as an example of military role in nation building.

Figure 10 – FWO: From then to now

The Express Tribune 01 November 2016 on the Golden Jubilee Celebrations of FWO.

Courtesy FWO

The pictures above show that even though in terms of its expertise and capacity the organisation has come a long way since its inception, KKH remains the crowning glory of FWO.

Construction on the road continued till 1965 when the troops had to be withdrawn because of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war which played a vital role in the creation of FWO as

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[151] Major General (Retd.) Iqbal. See footnote 110. "*Ayub had wanted to open up Northern Areas which despite being a part of Pakistan had been cut off from the rest of the country.*"
[152] Colonel (Retd.) Manzoor. See footnote 150.

we see it today. A new chapter in Pakistan and China relations began[153] and it was decided that the two countries should be linked by road for strategic reasons. The idea was that in case of another war with India, China would be able to come to Pakistan's assistance much quicker. Delivering heavy machinery and equipment – like tanks and other weapons – by road would be faster and more cost effective than via sea.

In 1966 – as a result of this Pakistan – China cooperation – the Indus Valley Road was renamed as Karakoram Highway (KKH).[154] It now extends to Kashghar in the south of China (through the Khunjarab Pass). As the construction of an international standard highway going through one of the highest mountains of the world was beyond the capacity of just one Corps of the military, a special organisation by the name of Frontier Works Organization (FWO) was created on 31 October 1966 (B. H. Abbas, 2000). At the time, even though the internal workings and execution of the organisation were very much the responsibility of the military, FWO was financed by the Ministry of Communications.[155]

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[153] In 1963 Pakistan and China entered into Sino-Pak Agreement also known as the Sino-Pak Border Agreement of 1963 whereby Pakistan was allowed to maintain all areas adjoining the Chinese Xinjiang region. Moreover Pakistan was allowed control over 1,942 square kilometers of area which constitutes Shimshal area.

[154] Lt. Col. Hafeez in an article titled "Pakistan Army's contribution to National Development" provides the following statistics of the KKH (Lt. Col. Khawaja Sohail Hafeez, 2000): Length of Road – 806 Km; Rock blasting / earthwork - 27 million cubic yards; Explosive - 800 tons; Cement - 80,000 tons; Manpower - 15,000 persons; Vehicles - 1200 Nos.; Plant-dozers etc. - 100 Nos.; Deaths - 408 Pakistanis & 100 Chinese; Injured - 397 persons.

[155] Interview dated 05 October 2015 with Major (Retd.) Hussain Abdur Rehman (FWO Public Relations Officer) at FWO HQ.

Figure 11 – The Karakoram Highway

Google Images

Map Courtesy FWO

On the right is the map of Karakoram Highway showing how it connects the capital city Islamabad and Rawalpindi (the military city) with china via the Karakoram Range. The image on the left is a traditional keystone found along all major roads and highways in Pakistan. Even though the Karakoram Highway ends at Kashghar, this keystone shows the distance up to Beijing via road.

FWO became an organisation in its own right under the aegis of the civil government that followed the martial rule. Initially FWO was a small entity; up to two to four units strong. "*It was later because of Bhutto's*[156] *vision of infrastructure and capacity building [in the early 1970's] that FWO grew almost four times in size. By this time now up to ten units were being employed by the FWO*".[157] Bhutto also emphasised revitalising ties with the Chinese. Earlier the Chinese contribution had been limited to providing machinery. However "*… by the 1970's the work had not finished, and it had become sort of clear that it was beyond Pakistan's capacity [given the then expertise and resources at this point]*".[158]

> "*The main reason was that the troops were not acclimatised to the high altitudes of the Karakoram Range. Pakistan accepted the Chinese offer to build the last 100 miles of the KKH*".[159]

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[156] The then democratically elected Prime Minister.
[157] Major General (Retd.) Iqbal. See footnote 110.
[158] Colonel (Retd.) Manzoor. See footnote 150.
[159] Ibid.

Bhutto extended FWO's charter beyond the construction of the KKH, and used it for building a road network and water supply schemes in Baluchistan.[160] This is the point where FWO transitioned from being a task specific entity, to a military organisation ready to act in aid of the civil power whenever and wherever needed. It would reach its current status though only once it was commercialised.

An interesting observation was made in the passing by an interviewee who had previously headed the organisation.[161] While discussing the founding of FWO and the rationale behind it, he said that in the 1960s India had already set up a similar yet smaller organisation by the name of Border Roads Organisation. The point he was making was that the formation of such an organisation was inevitable. It highlights the nature of the borders in the region and the necessity that the new state of Pakistan must have felt at that time for creating an entity like the FWO.

With respect to the KKH, FWO achieved its objective. People who had worked on the project narrated that some of the areas the road went through were so remote, and cut off from the rest of the country to such an extent, that up until the 1960 – 70's residents did not have shoes and were tying cloth around their feet for protection. This is because they didn't have access to any markets. One interviewee recalled that while conducting reconnaissance for the project they stopped by one village where they had never seen jeeps before in their lives. So the women brought water and grass for the military jeeps thinking they were cows.[162]

In its formative years, the projects undertaken by FWO were by and large a military domain. In addition to highly strategic assignments undertaken in its capacity as a military branch, FWO's mandate included building roads in remote and difficult areas, *"… opening them up and connecting them with the rest of the country. Most of the work initially done in Kashmir and East Pakistan in the 1960's and 70's was carried out FWO"*[163] However sustaining it from a strictly monetary point of view became difficult therefore *"… different options were explored. One was government funding. But then it would have been a part of the federal government and not the military and that could potentially be a problem during war. So it was decided that it should become self-sustaining and for that it had to*

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[160] Colonel (Retd.) Manzoor. See footnote 150.
[161] Major General (Retd.) Iqbal. See footnote 110.
[162] Colonel (Retd.) Manzoor. See footnote 150.
[163] Major General (Retd.) Iqbal. See footnote 110.

be commercialised. Currently, while it is a part of the army it is expected to be self-sustaining which is why it takes up civil projects"[164] at CPPG (24.08.2015). This decision was primarily military lead. As so much time has passed none of the respondents could recall the exact chain of command though.

All larger infrastructure construction in the country gets input from the military. Here we are talking about projects like roads, railways, and canals etc. but primarily roads.

> *"Military gives input on all infrastructure projects in the country because we expect a land attack. There would probably be no such requirement in the United States of America, but that is because it does not contemplate a land attack. For example Ayub definitely would have given input on the layout of the Indus Water Treaty. This input giving is much easier during the military regime because the Corps Commanders have direct access to the boss. And as he [COAS] is military, he understands their point of view. There might not be a political agenda. However, if there isn't any security significance, the government can and does call all the shots. For example the government made the military vacate the cantonment at Dera Bugti because it was just adding to the unrest in the area"[165]*

An example of the nature of military input in infrastructure projects is as follows. A railway track was being built from Bahawalpur to Yazman. The military stopped its construction midway. It was running too close to the border and would have been considered strategically unviable. What would have probably happened is that the Corps Head Quarters would have conducted a war game on the map from the security point of view. They would have been able to ascertain how it would help the Indian forces in crossing the border. "*If they discovered a strategic vulnerability, the General Head Quarters would then talk to the government. It is quite sad that there is a fully operational railway station which could have provided transport to the area is just lying around. But then Pakistan expects a land attack*".[166]

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[164] Ibid.
[165] Brigadier (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 50.
[166] Ibid.

6.4   The defence and 'development' overlap

A recent example of 'development' overlapping with defence is the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In addition to further concretising economic links between Pakistan and China, the CPEC will also expand the Pakistani infrastructure. The CPEC comprises of energy projects and 3,000 kilometer long road, railway and pipelines network which will transport oil and gas between *Gawadar* Port and *Kashgar* in China's Xinjiang region. "*The purpose of the economic corridor is to promote trade and commercial ties through connectivity*" (Ahmar, 2015:38). Moreover it is "*expected to act as a bridge for the new maritime route that envisages linking three billion people in Asia, Africa and Europe. There are 12 energy projects under CPEC which are expected to add 5,000 megawatts of electricity to the national grid. Similarly, the transport infrastructure under the CPEC consists of rail based mass transit system, railways, new provincial projects and new Gawadar projects* " (Tribune, 2017). In short, the project is of immense significance for the "politico-economic future" of Pakistan. "*It creates a new framework of interaction on the basis of economic connectivity and regional cooperation which will have far reaching positive implications for the two countries as well as the adjoining regions*" (Rizvi, 2015:02).

Despite the project's imbrications on the country's future,[167] the CPEC encapsulates the 'development' and defence overlap. Here it must be noted that at the time of data collection [June 2014 to March 2015] the project was still in its nascent stages; the major proportion of the foundational paper work had materialised but had yet to be signed.[168] Furthermore, finer / implementable details thereof still had to be worked out. Even at such an early stage however, an insight can be gained into the thought process of the military with respect to infrastructure projects and the habitus with respect thereto which allows for its hegemonic control.

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[167] "*An economic corridor is described as a territorial or sea- based transportation grid which is used on a regular basis for movement of goods, services and people from one state to another. It connects economic activity along clearly identified geography and provides* 'a connection between economic hubs… in which a large amount of economic resources and multiple actors are concentrated.' *It links* 'the supply and demand side of markets.' *Therefore, an economic corridor does not represent* 'mere transport connections along which people and goods move.' It is 'integral to the economic fabric and the economic actors surrounding it' which 'have to be analysed as a part of integrated economic actors.'" (Rizvi, 2015:5-6).

[168] The "*US $ 46 billion worth of agreements between Pakistan and China were signed on 20-21 April 2015*" in Islamabad (Ahmar, 2015:38)

For instance all the interviewees – both military and non-military – were of the opinion that the project was neither conceived nor initiated by the military. Yet foundations of military involvement in the project on grounds of defence had already been laid despite it still being in early stages. As per one interviewee "*Military's role in the CPEC is entirely justified on the grounds of security. The military did not think of it nor initiate it. We will only provide security*" (Anonymous senior bureaucrat at the Ministry of Defence). At the time of data collection for this research – when as aforementioned even the paper work had not been completed as yet – one of the chief concerns or anticipated challenges was security threats that might arise the project commences. As per the military therefore FWO was the natural candidate to undertake this task – "*only FWO has the capability and capacity to do work of such nature. Not only from the security angle, but from the financial security angle too. Hence the government and the Chinese both prefer the FWO*" (Interview dated 06 October 2015 with Brig. Retd. Abeer at the FWO HQ Rawalpindi).

This ties in neatly with the [military's own stance] that it does not contemplate 'development' on an institutional level. While within its self-perception, it holds itself responsible for nation building, there is neither an established definition thereof nor an official obligation to do. In short: a) there is no clear distinction between the two terms within the military habitus or thinking; and b) self-professedly it holds itself responsible for it as well as delivering nation building. When juxtaposed with the fact that the military has a say in all large infrastructure projects, claims of military's role being limited to the defence elements lose some strength. A veteran journalist and an extremely respected human rights activist pointed out that lager infrastructure projects which have 'developmental' implications are only possible with China because Pakistan has military ties with it.[169]

The military's cognitive dissonance surrounding its 'developmental' role becomes more evident while discussing the role of FWO. It [the military] holds a number of conflicting views simultaneously. It does however, lend a keen insight into its self-perception. We saw from discussion on mental models that a) mental models are in flux, and b) in order to fill in the cognitive as well as linguistic gaps, individuals or groups of individuals rely on transfer of new meanings from one field to another. With repetition these terminologies become an integral component of the mental model. Over time we not only alter the

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[169] Interview dated 08 December 2015 with Mr. Hussain Naqi at the Human Rights Commission Pakistan Office

meanings we associate with terminology and but also how we use it. We can understand how the FWO features in military habitus through the language used to discuss it.

On the one hand it is not responsible for 'development'; its job being the defence and security of the country. It has neither the means nor the motive for any such undertaking.[170] On the other hand, roads built by FWO and other military concerns are cited as not only a source of pride and achievement, but intuitively cited as examples of how the military is contributing to the 'development' of the country or nation building. Livelihoods of entire communities are seen – by the military – to have improved all because of the military.

> *"My personal view is that FWO has proven to be an efficient organisation. It shares and represents the spirit of a developing country. Because the military travels to remoter parts of the country, travels more than the civil elements, they know the country very well and have more association with the people. As a result of social interaction with the people a) they earn the good will of the people [the local population]; and b) there is an element of quid pro quo. People lookout for them also".[171]*

Examples of social interaction would be that while a project is on-going, they might white-wash a mosque, install a water tank, set up medical camps etc. However, this is for the duration that the military is in the area only. It does not assume the responsibility of maintenance and up keep of any of these social projects. Long term 'development' projects are conceived and paid for by the relevant government.

That said, military presence in arenas beyond its constitutional jurisdiction is justified on the grounds that the civilian governmental and administrative structures are either too corrupt or too inept to meet the demands of the people and hence the military has to step up out of necessity. Though this is an inherent part of the military's mental models, it was apparent during the interviews that the inherent contradiction in the concurrently held views was something the interviewees had not thought through earlier. So in response to the question that if the military is not concerned with 'development' how

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[170] As mentioned in earlier chapters, the terms nation building and 'development' were used interchangeably. While discussing roads and infrastructure projects of FWO, data shows that the term 'development' was used more often.

[171] Major General (Retd.) Iqbal. See footnote 110.

does it understand the extensive road network spread across the country under the aegis of FWO, or how would they explain 'military improving the lives of millions through its infrastructure' rhetoric, there would be a perceptible pause for thought. It was here that the argument was made that nothing much can be excluded from the rubric of defence; the term therefore has socio-economic aspects as well:

> "*The only vision that the military has is to assist the nation. Defence is all encompassing. The economy is very much a part of the defence. Participating in economic aspects helps the military in assisting the nation. And roads provide the very network on which the economy can thrive*".[172]

> *****

> "*The cement and urea factories [owned by the military] are helping fulfil a state requirement. These military owned enterprises are the highest taxpayers in the country*" (Interview with Dr. Akram Sheikh at National University of Science and Technology on 14 January 2015. He used to head the Planning Commission of Pakistan during the Musharraf's regime).

The concept of spill-over of defence and development emerged in this context also and is discussed below. The projects that the FWO undertakes are referred to as 'developmental' projects or contributions of the military.

The spill-over effect of defence into 'development' is different from the symbiotic relationship between the civil and military sides discussed in the previous chapter.[173] The latter refers to a scenario where even though the military is guided by preserving or advancing its own interests, the measure or act in itself is mutually advantageous to both the parties. It is more of a joint exercise in the sense that each – that is civilians and military – is dependent on the other and hence benefit collectively. For example the cantonment constructed at Pannu Aaqil mentioned in the previous chapter is an ideal example of a symbiotic relationship. Spill-over occurs when the military acts purely for defence considerations and as the term suggests, the civilian population benefits as a result.

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[172] Major General (Retd.) Saleemullah. See footnote 104.
[173] This is my understanding / definition of the two ideas and not an institutionally defined concept.

One of the interviewees narrated an incident which is a perfect example thereof. Whilst commanding a brigade in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (south), banks of River Chakothi, which forms the border between India and Pakistan, broke and the river started moving westwards.

> "Not only were we losing territory to India, but small scale farmers who had land along the river were losing their land also. Military had no money to fix and repair the river works. As it was February the flood protection budget was still unspent and around Rs. 200 Billion was lying unused. No project was underway either. We asked the Ministry of Irrigation for the money. The offer was that we [the military] will design the project and the Irrigation Department can carry out the actual task of fixing the problem. In return, small-holdings will be protected, the border will stop moving and additionally, defence vulnerability of Head Minallah will be fixed for all time. Contacts in such scenarios are always personal. Official mechanisms do exist. Brigade office writes too the GHQ, the GHQ writes to the ministry of defence, and the ministry of defence writes to the concerned department. But that is merely procedure. True that is when the work really gets started. But the work will never get started if a personal contact is not used beforehand. This is how red tapeism of the bureaucracy can be bypassed or avoided. It is a parallel strategy if you will".[174]

A symbiotic relationship is very different from spill-over between defence and 'development'. The latter refers to purely defence oriented measure have intended and sometimes even unintended 'developmental' consequences.

> "We are a very poor country. Most people do not have any job opportunities. Once a cantonment is built, job opportunities are automatically generated. Take the Pannu Aaaqil Cantonment for example. The nationalists opposed it to the hilt and said they will not let it be created. The cantonment was built nonetheless because the military needed it. But even though it was built for entirely military reasons, it changed the entire area. Because the officers and

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[174] Major Gen. (Retd.) Khokhar. See footnote 41.

soldiers are living there with their respective families, employment opportunities are generated. A mini city forms. True, the military purely looks at its own interests but a school will be built. The civilians living in the area will now have a good school to go to. The military conversely needs bakeries and groceries etc. A relationship of interdependence develops. Once the cantonment was established, a railway station was built. Initially tracks had been laid down but there was no railway station as the area was too remote. Post the cantonment, not only was there a train station now, but it was a commercial success too. Again, it was made for war /defence interests, but in the long run it provided people access and made profits for the railway. Moreover electricity and gas were brought to the area. All this was done entirely on military budget" (Interview dated 09 January 2016 with Major General (Retd.) Ahmed at his house.).

6.5 FWO: Negotiating civil military binaries through a dualistic financial status

FWO is a profit maximising commercial entity of the military, undertaking projects with 'developmental' implications for and on behalf of the government. At the same time it assists the military in conducting strategic defence activities the spill-over of which benefits the public at large. The multiple aspects of the organisation are so intricately interwoven that classification by the nature of projects alone is impossible. One way is to follow the money trail concerning each category.

Infrastructure projects that have defence or security ramifications are the domain of FWO. This is when FWO is acting as an extension of the military. Such projects include bridges, emergency roads and landing strips etc. built either during war on an emergency basis or during peacetime with the understanding that they have defence implications. "*FWO does not fit in the Army in the conventional sense. Even though we are a part of the military we are not fighters. We are engineers*" (Interview dated 06 October 2015 with Colonel (Retd.) Tareen at the FWO, HQ). These projects are mostly funded by the military as a part of the defence budget of the country. With respect to a very small number of projects, if the military finds itself short of funds, the profits made by FWO in its commercial capacity might be utilised to fund them. Based on the data, this is a rare and exceptional occurrence and is a measure of the last resort.

On the other hand, FWO is a purely commercial entity undertaking projects with the view of making profits. In this case it acts like any other construction company. The money is used for paying salaries of those officers who are working for the FWO at the time [on deputations], invested back into the company for upkeep and purchase of new machinery. The profits earned do not revert to the military in any way whatsoever. Nor does the military invest monetarily in FWO.

"FWO is a profit making organisation, but the profit is for self-sustenance. It does not matter whether a project fails or is highly successful. The money for the salary of the staff is generated by the FWO" (Interview dated 05 October 2015 with Major Hussain Abdur Rehman, Public Relations Officer, FWO at the FWO, HQ). This financial independence from the military, works to the advantage of both the military (in general) and the FWO (in particular). The FWO is better off because in absence of the military tag it is able to openly compete with other contractors in the open market, is able to bid for and win contracts, which in turn means it can develop its portfolio. Most importantly it means more profits and financial stability.

> *"FWO are not contractors. The government approaches the FWO when it wants work done in inaccessible and insecure areas. Once the government asks for help we really do not have an option to refuse. In fact at times specific skills have to be acquired for a special job for example when asked for cleaning canals. These are not military jobs but have been thrust upon it. The civil institutions first port of call for solving any problem is the military.*
>
> *What is the military? An institution for the protection of the country. But the country has no money. When we ask the government for more money, it refuses. So basically Pakistan cannot afford protection. Yet the threat persists; hence the commercial concerns of the military like Frontier Works Organisation, Fauji Foundation, National Logistic Cell, etc.*
>
> *Rationale of military is its officers and soldiers retire very young. So we need these concerns to generate money for the welfare of the retired officers and soldiers, and for the maintenance of cantonments. All the money generated through these organisations is used within the military and for the welfare of*

its own people. It is not used for any kind of personal gain whatsoever"
(Interview dated 09 January 2016 with Major General (Retd.) Ahmed at his
house).

The military is at an advantage because should the need arise, it can rely on FWO's expertise – which by any estimation is considerably more than had it still been the Engineering Corps it started out as fifty years ago. FWO profits mean that in case of strategic defence related tasks the military can revert to FWO expertise and resources without having to pay for them. Furthermore, the credit of anything that FWO does, goes to the military which in turn makes it popular amongst the people. Even if the project in question has been bid for under the FWOs commercial capacity, the organisation is as military as it gets. The people who ultimately benefit from the road see military men in military uniform building a road for example and providing them all the advantages that come with such infrastructure 'development'. The financial bifurcation and the dual identity of the organisation is neither evident to the common man not does he / she care.

Projects under this category can be divided into roughly types based on their budgetary standing. First are the fairly straight forward projects, mostly based in or near large commercial centres. These include, for example, the Lahore-Sheikhupura-Faisalabad Road; refurbishment of the Lahore-Islamabad Motorway (M-2) and Karachi-Hyderabad Motorway (M-9); and, sections of the Metro Bus and Orange Line is Lahore etc. The second are large infrastructure ventures like the Coastal highway, the Torkham-Jalalabad Road, Attabad Lake, Gomal-zam Dam. These are more difficult of the two to execute – due to the complicated nature of the project and / or difficulty of terrain as well as the security implications.

A case therefore can be made that given the geo-political realities of the country, FWO is if not the only organisation capable of executing these projects, at least the most ideally suited. Its military status as well as training allows it to work in areas and in conditions that would be difficult for a private contractor or even the civilian state. There are pockets of insecurity within the country that do not allow for private or foreign contracts to freely move around. On the other hand military training prepares them – the FWO personnel – to infiltrate insecure areas and work there. Moreover with time the organisation has not only developed its portfolio in terms of expertise but has invested in and owns unparalleled state of the art machinery.

"Infrastructure development activities / apparatus still has not developed in Pakistan to the extent that allows them to undertake large projects especially those in difficult areas without the help of FWO and military. These areas are genuinely very difficult at times. The locals sometimes kill the outsider even if they are trying to help them. If a soldier gets killed, it's his job. But civilian and foreigners can't deal with that".[175]

FWO is not only aware of this advantage but capitalises on it also. Its website reads as follows:

"Frontier Works Organization (FWO), today's most versatile and vibrant construction firm, was established on 31 October 1966 to carve out the Karakoram Highway, across crags and crevices of the highest mountain ranges of the world. Over the last 49 years, <u>FWO has brought prosperity to utterly backward and deprived areas of the homeland</u>. It has worked in diversified fields [like] construction of roads, railway lines, airfields, dams, canals and barrages, power projects, tunnelling and mining, telecommunication, construction of residential and industrial infrastructure and proved its unmatched qualitative and quantitative capabilities. FWO has the distinction of being a pioneer in Build Operate and Transfer of the [Government] of Punjab and National Highway Authority (NHA) in the country ("Frontier Works Organisation," 2017)."[176]

Here again we catch a glimpse of the military habitus. It has over time developed an understanding / interpretation of both the geo-political scenario as well as the civil state's capacity of meeting the infrastructure needs of the country. In its mind it is own training as well as capacity that fills in the aforesaid gaps. In practice on the other hand, it capitalises on the fact that the credit of anything that FWO does, goes to the military which in turn makes it popular amongst the people.

These Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) projects are essentially a form of public private partnership (PPP). It involves "...*the investment of private capital to design, finance,*

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[175] Major General (Retd.) Iqbal. See footnote 110.
[176] http://www.fwo.com.pk/extensions/overview accessed 11 April 2017

construct, operate and maintain a project for public use for specific term during which a private investment consortium is able to collect revenue from the users of the facility. When the consortium's limited term of ownership expires, title of the project reverts to the NHA[177], by then, the consortium should have collected enough revenue to recover its investment and earn reasonable return on the project" (FWO, 2015b).

The arguments runs that such arrangements benefit of the National Highway Authority:

> *National Highway Authority intends to accelerate the highway, motorway, tunnel and bridge development through increased private sector participation for promoting economic growth and reducing poverty. Transport is an important sector of Pakistan's economy, making up 10% of GDP and over 17% of Gross Capital Formulation.*
>
> *To utilize the vital resources of private sector for national development, NHA encourages it to participate in a development of national highways, motorways, tunnels and bridges to facilitate public safety and convenience, and to support Pakistan's economic growth.*
>
> *NHA encourages PPP for building the road sector on Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) basis. Since the private sector is expected to be efficient and cost effective in managing the construction projects, the resources of government can be freed for a judicious use elsewhere"* (FWO, 2015b).
> *[quoted from FWO Brochure]*

Within the military habitus though, these are not seen as monetary and organisational infrastructure arrangements that are unique to the FWO and can only ever be utilised or benefit from it [FWO] and by extension the military only. Instead they are pegged as the outcome of FWO's efficiency and repute which is now benefiting the country. A message from the Director General of the FWO in one of the brochures reads as follows:

> "… *FWO has grown into a versatile organisation for bringing progress all across the country, particularly in the remote areas by building quality*

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[177] National Highway Authority

infrastructure. NHA and FWO form a winning combination for the development of national highway" (FWO, 2015b)

These BOT or PPP are multi-million Rupees[178] projects. They are categorised and advertised as FWO's and by extension military's 'developmental' contributions. The public image and rhetoric though overlooks the fact that self professedly the military does not have an institutional agenda of 'development' and these projects are both conceived and funded by the government or transnational aid agencies like the World Bank and USAID, but through the civil government. The National Highway Authority is designated the 'client' and the provincial or federal government – as the case may be – a 'partner' of the FWO.

There is a third category of the projects that fall under the FWO domain. This where the FWO acts in aid of civil powers. Such activities or tasks would include civilian evacuations, and construction of permanent and semi-permanent structures during floods or other natural disasters. As these are the constitutional responsibilities of the military and not an example of how the military is utilising its auxiliary capabilities in carrying out 'developmental' activities there are beyond the purview of this study. Additionally these too are government conceived, sanctioned and funded projects. That said it is important to mention this particular aspect of the military and by extension the FWO because during floods, earthquakes, landslides and other natural calamities they have always done an exemplary job and to overlook that would be a disservice to the organisation.

Box 1 – Some distinct projects of FWO

- *Torkham – Jalalabad Road*
  The road was initially being funded by the Government of Pakistan and built by Echowest. The work had been going on for six months when the government of Afghanistan complained about the quality and speed of work. The NHA chief then asked the FWO to take over. FWO reassessed the contract and revaluated the in terms of time and money, negotiated with the afghan government and started working on the 76km road. The project was completed within one year. It was such good quality work and done so punctually that the Afghan government asked for building the second carriageway. In 2008 the then Peoples Party government refused funding and FWO had to abandon the project.

- *Miranshah – Wana Road*

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[178] There are 150 Rupees to one US Dollar roughly, depending on the going exchange rate.

This road was strategically important because it was being built from the perspective that C-130 will be landing and taking off from it in time of need. This was a top priority project and an operational requirement of the army. Hence had to be / could be built by FWO only. FWO completed this projected within one month. It is currently being used as a part of the operations. End purpose though is a commercial airport in the area. So I would say that a strictly strategic project also has spill over effect into development.

- *Lahore – Sheikhupura – Faisalabad Road*
  It was 114km road which was to be constructed by LAFCO, a private subsidiary of the FWO. The joint venture was between FWO (60%) and the private shareholder (40%). The private shareholder went to the government of Punjab and shared its vision. Offered to build it on BOT (Build Operate and Transfer) basis. It was made with FWOs own money and will maintain it for a fixed time. We will transfer it to the Government of Punjab in good condition at the end of the fixed time. In the process the people benefit from the road, FWO makes profit and the government does not have to do anything. FWO took loan from Askari Bank for the project so no expense incurred to the government.

- *Gomalzam Dam (Waziristan Tank District, DI Khan)*
  The Chinese were building it in 1997-98. Two of their people were kidnapped. They stopped work and the project was abandoned in 2002-04. In 2009, the government redirected and FWO bid for it and got the project. FWO did not have dam building expertise then and hence suggested a Joint Venture with China. Sino Hydra Corp and FWO entered into a Joint Venture. FWO provided the protection, built the roads coming from and leading to the dam and learned the dam works (which has power component, irrigation component which includes building canals, barrages going to Tank district etc.) FWO did most of this work alone and developed its portfolio in the process. Road going from Wana to DI Khan was widened in the process.

Picture courtesy FWO

This road is a part of the Gomalzam Dam project. Though the main project was the construction of the dam As mentioned above, there were a number of smaller off-shoot construction works that emerged from the primary project. This road is one such example.

6.6   Bidding and assignment of FWO projects

When acting in its commercial capacity there are two ways FWO is awarded a project; through a) open bidding; and b) direct mode.

a)   Open Bidding

Open bidding is when it bids in open competition with other contractors and wins the project contract just like anyone else would have. "*The government gives an advertisement; we submit a tender like any other firm and are selected for the job on pure merit. This is when FWO is acting like any other contractor.*"[179]

b)   Direct Mode

In the Direct Mode FWO gets contacted directly by a [provincial or federal] government. In such a scenario the FWO will prepare a feasibility report, provide a time frame and work commences if all parties are agreed. "*Sometimes there is a political intent of purpose behind this. Like for example elections are approaching and the government in question might want us [FWO] to deliver when they want us to. But we don't care because we cannot compromise on the quality of work.*"[180] "*The federal or provincial government approaches us [FWO] through the NHA and FWO is the contractor. In certain cases, the Prime Minister can sanction the project directly.*"[181]

Another option under the direct mode category is FWO approaches the concerned government expressing its desire to build a road. This however, is a rare occurrence and is informed by strategic military reasons. Moreover it is almost never so in large cities. These are tasks of a strategic nature which are undertaken by the FWO in its capacity as a fighting arm of the military. As they have security implications the process through which the FWO is contacted, paid and the elements surrounding project details etc. are not available. Moreover, as this category falls strictly within the defence domain of military responsibilities and does not have any 'developmental' implications, it is beyond the purview of this study.

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[179] Major General (Retd.) Iqbal. See footnote 110+ Major (Retd.) Hussain Abdur Rehman (05.10.2015), Public Relations Officer, FWO

[180] Major (Retd.) Hussain Abdur Rehman (05.10.2015), Public Relations Officer, FWO + Major General (Retd.) qbal. See footnote 110

[181] Interview dated 06 October 2015 with Brigadier (Retd.) Abeer at FWO, HQ

How FWO is awarded a project and the considerations behind the decision are so intrinsically linked and interdependent that treating the two as mutually exclusive categories is impossible. A cohesive picture emerges only once both the military as well as bureaucratic understandings / explanations are juxtaposed together.

6.6.1 Military understanding / explanation of the awarding of FWO projects

Strategies employed by a hegemon in order to expand its power base cannot be treated as isolated acts carried out without a rationale informing them. They have to be ordered around and informed by a cogent thought process. These perceptions and thought process are inimical to the resulting decision making (Buzan, 1983:226-31). In chapters II and III this research made a case that a hegemon need not organise its actions around conscious thought. It adopts perceptions and forms mental models thereupon which with the passage of time they become a part of the hegemon's habitus. These in turn are so deeply ensconced in its consciousness that all subsequent action is subconsciously structured around it. We have already seen the methods through which it secures a project. This section contains some of the military's own perceptions on why FWO is awarded projects. That in turn helps develop an understanding of how the military perceives the surrounding environment and the considerations upon which it builds its mental models thereby developing its habitus.

Analysis of the data during field research shows that as per the military the reasons of FWO's success is attributed to a) it follows specifications (adheres to rules and regulations and provides a quality product); b) completes and delivers projects on time; and c) there is no monetary pilferage as it is corruption free. It is a military organisation and hence by nature well organised and transparent.[182] The fact that civil government relies on FWO to undertake projects ideally linked with public / social sector is taken as proof thereof.

Just because FWO takes on profit making civil engineering projects does not mean that it stands divested of its military roots. The question then is why the civilian government would actively seek out an overtly military run and owned entity to take on projects on its behalf.

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[182] Major General (Retd.) Iqbal. See footnote 110

One explanation given – by the military that is – was that the military lends neutrality to the proceedings. As it is not the government, it automatically stands exonerated of pursuing a political agenda. The public is more willing to accept the project in question on face value as a legitimate 'developmental' effort. This is particularly handy with respect to potentially controversial tasks as it becomes easier to garner public acceptance.

The second was that the civil governments are corrupt and inefficient. The institutions therefore have not developed. As a result there exists a space in the 'development' sector which the military fills. The military is simply delivering on services that the state fails to provide. "*The military feels that it has a role to play in 'development' / prosperity of the country. Civilians accept this because they are aware of their own incompetence and know that they are not handling the state the way they should. As a result, successive governments simply accept that it's the military's domain to keep an eye on things especially with respect to matters of 'development'* " (Interview with Anonymous government officer dated 25 November 2016, at the Ministry of Finance).

Siddiqa call this evidence of state surrender in favour of the military. As per Siddiqa in the 1980s-90s successive civilian governments purposely privileged military public sector organisations such as the FWO. While their own incompetence was a factor, it helped safeguard their tenures. The most important consequence was that they ended up securing the corporate interests of the military.

> "*According to Sharif's commerce minister, Ishaq Dar, projects were given to the military companies to make use of their idle capacity. …Interestingly, Sharif did not try to prop up the civilian institutions to make them perform the tsk better, but the civilian government did make extra efforts to strengthen the military companies. Shahbaz Sharif's attitude was to the NLC and FWO was reflective of a state surrender by the civilian governments, in viewing the military as an alternative institution better poised to carry out development programmes. This 'passing the buck' from civil to military bodies for development work was done in the belief that the military could perform better than the civilians*" (Siddiqa, 2007:153-154)

There is a security angle as well. The civil government's inability to deliver can potentially have adverse defence ramifications from defence perspective. "*The military plays a*

'developmental' role because the civil government creates a vacuum. If we don't do all this in peacetime, we will suffer during war time."[183] Moreover *"all road work in strategically sensitive areas like Kashmir for example is done by the FWO out of necessity. It has a captive market which it utilises to its advantage. Yet should the need arise in a war like situation for example, it [FWO] is in a sustainable state to help the military also"*.[184]

From a purely costs perspective, FWO's rate is higher. Even FWO conceded the point. However the explanation was that *"it works through trained troops and hence has to pay them more. It always completes and delivers the project in time no matter what the considerations and conditions. By virtue of its military affiliation it is held to the same standards of accountability as the military. If any project is not completed on time, the Director General of the organisation will either be changed or fired. In the civilian domain, the same work will stop for 'x' number of reason. In military it will not"*.[185]

Different sets of interviewees qualified the above in different ways. One view within the military was *"… this is being done on a very small scale and it cannot be said the military is hampering institution building in any way"*.[186] Another view was that the issue has historical roots. At the time of independence the state institutions were weak. Military conversely due to its colonial roots had not undergone the kind of bifurcation that the bureaucratic and political institutions had. The government of the day therefore had no choice but to ask for military help. *"Over time 'development' in environmentally and physically harsh areas of the country became accepted as a military domain. It was not only already present in the particular regions for defence reasons but possessed requisite capabilities. The civilian population became to rely on the military more than the government"*.

There was a school of thought within the military that the mandate for social sector services lays with the civil government. *"Naturally there are complicated procedures that need to be adhered to. With the military there is no red tape and it can take immediate action. The military might get asked by the civil government to act on its behalf. The military in turn will get paid"*.[187]

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[183] Major Gen. (Retd.) Khokhar. See footnote 41.
[184] Lt. General (Retd.) Karamat. See footnote 59.
[185] Major General (Retd.) Iqbal. See footnote 110.
[186] Lt. General (Retd.) Abbasi. See footnote 43.
[187] Brigadier (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 50.

6.6.2 Non-Military and bureaucratic understanding / explanation of the awarding of FWO projects

Societies of course are comprised of competing groups, with competing interpretations of the environment in which they operate. So far we have seen the military perspective. The bureaucracy, has its own explanations of military's omnipresence in the infrastructure sector in the country. As shown in Chapter II, when confronted with an alternate perspective, groups do not alter their own perceptions or ideologies. These perceptions are a product of their environment and background after all. But juxtaposing the military version of the state of affairs or the military perception against the account of the civilian counterparts will help us draw a clearer picture of things as they stand.

Ready availability of funds was the chief explanation. One bureaucrat in the Finance Division (who wished to remain unnamed) was of the view that "*a space definitely exists but the reason is lack of money. Main source of a country's income is the taxes and the Federal Board of Revenue is unable to meet its annual target. There is no money in the country.* The military therefore arguably fills in the space because it has the requisite resources.

FWO has a monetary advantage in the form of Askari Bank[188] that neither the government institutions nor private companies have. With large projects availability of funds is a major aspect both for the commencement of the project as well as the continuation thereof. FWO does not have this problem. "*It makes enough money from the contracts to pay the salary of its own people*".[189] Therefore, in case of delayed payments it can sustain itself. Moreover, where any other – private or public – contractor would be constrained to commence work due to delay in release of finance, FWO simply borrows money from the Askari Bank and starts work. By virtue of being a military affiliate they know they will get paid later. This is kind of financial liquidity that no one else.

An additional general view amongst the bureaucrats was that politicians prefer smaller projects which can be delivered relatively quickly. This in turn means that come election

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[188] Askari literally translates as Army. Askari Bank Ltd. (formerly known as Askari Commercial Bank) is a commercial and retail bank in Pakistan owned by the Army. A serving Adjutant General of the Pakistan Army is the head of the Board of Governors. It was founded in 1991 during the tenue of General Zia as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Originally Askari Bank was operated by the Army Welfare Trust however in 2012 it was wholly acquired by the Fauji Foundation.

[189] Lt. General (Retd.) Karamat. See footnote 59.

time, the project in question can be used to get votes. Capacities of relevant state authorities like the National Highway Authority are therefore built accordingly. Large infrastructure projects consequently naturally revert to FWO as only it has the requisite capacity.

> *"Developmental urgencies in this country are politically motivated. The entire procedure surrounding it therefore is being flouted. Any proposal without political will will definitely get shelved. As a result institutional strength is weakened. The decision making space is occupied by the politicians who's considerations are vote driven. As a result space in 'development' sector is created which is now being occupied by the military. Military is less accountable also, which especially given the nature of the space they occupy is extremely helpful. A civil institution is immediately taken to court for any decision taken and the whole thing then plays out in the public domain. Military on the other hand is entirely exempt from public scrutiny. Hence they can and do take decisions which can be implemented without hurdles."*[190]

The military is all too aware of the civil governments' motivations behind approaching the FWO. When it comes to civilian preference for FWO, they shared exactly the same opinion as their civilian counterparts:

> *"The reason why they – federal or provincial government as the case may be – approach FWO and not any other commercial organisation is that supposing the next elections are approaching, they would want the proposed work done within a certain timeframe – before the elections that is – and would want it to be of good quality also. The FWO prepares the feasibility and shares it with them and stars work"* (Interview with military officer who did not want to quoted on this point).

The bureaucrats at the Transport Department – Government of Punjab – by and large agreed with almost all the positions taken by the military above albeit with interesting insights regarding the procedural aspects. The unanimous opinion was that over the years FWO has developed such a diverse portfolio that none of the Pakistani firms can compete now even if they tried. FWO has state of the art machinery as well as the requisite know

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[190] Interview with Anonymous government officer date 25 November 2016, at the Ministry of Finance

how. "*From a purely technical perspective, FWO's portfolio emerges as the best from the lot. They have already executed a wide range of projects of a massive scale and have the necessary expertise as well as implementation capacity*".[191] Moreover by virtue of being military it can provide security that the international firms cannot. Therefore, when it comes to large infrastructure projects on paper FWO genuinely turns out to be the best possible option available.

This was corroborated by Nespak[192] as well. The general view was that ownership of a project is a pivotal factor. Reason being "…*that is where the money is made. Once the money has been pocketed, there are no stakes left in the project and it gets either delayed or abandoned altogether. With FWO the money goes directly to them and they will always see the project to its fruition and in a timely manner*" (Interview dated 16 March 2016 with Mr. Ahsan, Nespak).

The bureaucrats agreed that they [FWO] complete the project on time and as per specifications. However, in the bureaucratic circles the military does not stand exonerated of corruption charges to the extent it does in its own mind. As one bureaucrat put it "*10% of the project cost goes into 'service charges' [a euphemism for bribes] any way. With military we are sure it does not exceed 10% and it goes to one person only. We do not have to pay at every step of the way. Plus once the military gets involved other troublesome elements back off. Like I said, we have one hand to feed only*" (Interview with Anonymous government officer date 25 November 2016, at the Ministry of Finance). FWO's explanation thereof was that it contracts out the work to private contractors. A rate is set and the contractor is expected to follow it. Beyond that it does not micromanage the project. However, "*if the project in question is directly being overseen by the FWO, there is absolutely no chance or opportunity of any corruption at all*".[193]

Military's popularity amongst the masses lies at the very core of this study. Military has no doubts whatsoever about its positive reputation amongst the people. Admittedly when directly in power, its repute takes a turn for the worse; mainly because it fails to deliver up to the people's expectations. But that is attributed to the fact that it has to lean

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[191] See footnote 82.
[192] National Engineering Services Pakistan (Nespak) is a private engineering consultancy firm established by the government of Pakistan in 1973. They design and award a majority of the 'developmental' projects for the federal and provincial governments in the country.
[193] Major General (Retd.) Iqbal. See footnote 110.

on the existing administrative structures for the day to day running of the country which in turns hampers its performance. "*Maintenance is a part of fauji [military] culture. We inherited it from the British. But when the public compares military performance with that of the civilian set up, the military comes out on the top. Nation building or 'development' is a part of serving the country also. We serve the country by protecting it as well as performing tasks which are beneficial for the future of the country*" (Interview dated 17 September 2015 with Colonel Shahid Kirmani at the Inter Services Public Relations HQ, Lahore).

This again lends an insight into the military self-perception. They perform better because they military and hence inherently more organised and efficient. Whereas the bureaucrats see their activities as a part of expansion project, the military sees it as serving the nation.

Box 2 – Conflict transformation by the Pakistan Army through infrastructure projects

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**Conflict Transformation by Pakistan Army: The Central Trade Corridor (CTC)**
By Col. Ehsan Mehmood Khan[194]

"Pakistan Army has contributed a great deal towards nation building both in kinetic and non-kinetic realms. inter alia, the socio-economic spheres such as education, health, communication and telephony, national logistics, infrastructural development, and disaster management including rescue, relief and rehabilitation activities in the aftermath of natural calamities are but a few to note. In line with its counterinsurgency strategy, Pakistan Army has made noteworthy contributions towards the development of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), especially the North and South Waziristan Agencies, and the Malakand Division including Swat, after successful conduct of Operation Rah-e-Rast and Operation Rah-e-Nijat. The socio-economic development provides for the third stage in the strategy: Clear-Hold-Build-Transfer. Viewed through the intellectual prism of Johan Galtung, who is known as the Father of Peace Studies, it can be aptly called the course of conflict transformation being pursued by the army in FATA and Malakand Division. The "BUILD" stage of the counterinsurgency is reflective of the transformational approach of Pakistan Army.

The transformation has marked a host of milestones in recent years: ranging from rehabilitation of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Swat and South Waziristan Agency to building of road networks, rebuilding of the schools destroyed by

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[194] http://hilal.gov.pk/index.php/layouts/item/606-conflict-transformation-by-pakistan-army-the-central-trade-corridor-ctc accessed 10 April 2017

the terrorists to construction of new schools, and from agricultural development initiatives to trade enhancement projects. The construction of Central Trade Corridor (CTC) is another major step, which is nothing less than a miracle and no smaller a gift by the army to the people of a conflict-torn region. It is a socio-economic project that systematically nets together Pakistan and Afghanistan by acting as a meaningful link between the Indus Highway of Pakistan and the Afghan Ring Road. Built by the Pakistan Army and Frontier Works Organization (FWO) over the last few years, it is 714 kilometres long road network. For such projects, the Army has followed an institutional approach. General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the ex COAS had pushed this development work in FATA. General Raheel Sharif, COAS, has also vowed to pursue the development works vigorously. Recently, during his interaction with the officers and men at Miranshah and Wana, he expressed satisfaction over the achievements of the Army towards bringing stability in the conflict zone through development projects. He affirmed that these projects were likely to contribute in the national effort for durable peace in the conflict hit areas, and showed his resolve to go on with these initiatives at a very high pace (C. E. M. Khan, 2013)."

PAK-AFGHAN TRADE CORRIDORS

© 2013 Ehsan Mehmood Khan

Belief in its objectivity and impartiality is an essential element of the military's habitus. By virtue of being neither the government nor political, the military believes itself to occupy a neutral space in public consciousness. This in turn is often cited as a cause of its popularity. For example, while justifying successive coups we saw that the military relied on lack of organised resistance from civil society as evidence of its approval ratings. This particular aspect of its habitus resurfaced while contemplating its 'developmental'

activities. Claims of its popularity are iterated on grounds that civil governments prefer to engage FWO because it vests neutrality to a project.

While there is merit to the argument that the public trusts the military more, this faith does not *ipso facto* verify the claim that the government prefers awarding military infrastructure projects because the public is more willing to accept the 'developmental' value thereof. There are other considerations behind this too. As per the transport department, besides efficiency and timely delivery of the project, one major factor why civil governments seek out military is that its involvement minimises potential litigation.

"*As per PEPRA rules there are set procedures regarding all projects where government expenditure is involved. For example a project can only be awarded through bidding in open competition. However, if the relevant authority deems a particular project to fall under the category of 'difficult projects', it can legally be taken outside the purview of PEPRA rules*" (Anonymous senior civil servant who wished to remain unnamed). The project then can be directly awarded to the organisation that the government considers best for the job. By declaring potentially litigious projects 'difficult' the concerned government can bypass the bidding process and award the project to whomsoever it pleases. FWO is one such beneficiary of this legal *lacuna*. If the concerned government is apprehensive that a project will be either delayed or even cancelled because of public disapproval, the easiest way out is declaring it 'difficult' and awarding it to FWO.

In an informal discussion with a lawyer (Interview dated 14 October 2015 with a lawyer of the Higher and Supreme Court of Pakistan (who wished to remain anonymous) at his office in Lahore) this claim was reified. He narrated a few examples of cases where their clients refused to file a suit simply because making FWO a party thereto meant suing the military. They were willing to let go their perfectly legitimate claim instead of commencing legal proceedings against the military. For ethical reasons the exact details of the examples cannot be included / narrated here.

6.7   FWO: 'Development' actor or a making money hegemon?

Strategic Group Theory dictates that human actions – individual as well as institutional – are informed by an interest to maximise material and immaterial gains and profits. As

these resources are limited, different groups compete against each other in order to gain access to the available resources.

Gerke and Evers argue that even if such appropriation is either achieved through or generates overall economic growth in the country, it is at the end of the day appropriation of surplus. Hence strategic groups invest time and energy to ensure that their actions do not provoke adverse reactions from the public. A military in short, appropriating resources beyond its given budgetary share would be immediately deemed exploitative. Acting through a sub-organisation like the FWO and putting its military yet non-military status to the forefront helps manage public opinion.

Moreover, Denzau and North made a case that modern day corporations justify their actions to themselves as well as the public at large via their corporate social responsibility activities. Simultaneously, within their own perception of themselves or self-imagination, the best way to be socially responsible is "*is to maximise profits*" (Denzau & North, 1994:15). The question then is how does the military perceive and act upon its role in the 'development' sector in general and infrastructure building in particular through the FWO?

FWO's ubiquity in main cities is a fairly recent phenomenon. When asked in the 1990s by the then Punjab Government to help with roads within the city, FWO refused on grounds that it would only accept projects which were beyond the government's capacity to deliver for example those in extremely remote areas, with security implications or those which were technologically difficult to conduct.[195] There was a circumspect logic to this. Presence in cities was considered to undermine the military. However, in absence of a public or private enterprise which was up to the task it made sense – for the military – to assume responsibility of projects particularly difficult to execute.

An analysis of the data collected during field research shows that it was only during Musharraf's tenure that we begin to see the organisation now undertaking projects in larger cities; projects which cannot necessarily be categorised as being particularly difficult or tricky. This in turn became a stepping stone towards it current omnipresent status. To be fair, once the military had taken over under the pretext of fixing things as it

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[195] Major General (Retd.) Saleemullah. See footnote 104.

were, it only made sense at the time to entrust it with monitoring and coordination roles as well:

> "*Army's active participation in nation building activities has become the need of the hour. Our decaying civil institutions need support and monitoring to bring them up to an acceptable level of performance. Besides, it has been repeatedly confirmed that whenever, and wherever the Army was called in for 'Troubleshooting', it provided visible and substantial results. Therefore, rather than employ it on an ad hoc basis, the role of the Army in Nation building should be properly institutionalised* (Ataullah, 2000)."

The fact that the military's involvement in civil structures would equip it with technical know-how of the administrative and bureaucratic elements of the state machinery was taken by it – the military that is – as a given. The long term intention – at least within a select section within the military – was that "*this invaluable experience can, once the Army returns to barracks and the spirit and soul of democracy is restored, be profitably harnessed by the Government of the day for utilization in selected fields* (Ataullah, 2000)."

Even if the *raison d'etre* of the coup had not been setting the house in order but was informed by a political aspirations, from a purely administrative perspective it made sense at the time to utilise its own resources. However following this logic, once the civil government had been restored, the FWO should have retreated back to its original charter as well. Instead it went through an identity makeover and is now building roads in cities like Lahore and re-constructing motorways on build-operate and transfer models. Moreover, it has a fully functioning branch in United Arab Emirates. I was not provided satisfactory information as to the nature of the work it carries out there and the budgetary details etc. The FWO website has the United Arab Emirates flag in the corner with "FWO UAE" written in front but no further details pertaining thereto can be accessed.

The organisation's commercial status that is key to making sense of its current activities. Military is not sitting idle. It has its own systems: equipment maintenance etc. Same goes for FWO. It is officered by military, but that would be seven to eight battalions strong only. The rest are civilians. "*Plus it has now become a commercial entity which has a lot of state of the art equipment. Letting it sit idle would be a waste. So yes (FWO) requires work but*

it bids for this work in the open completion. No favours done for being military".[196] The processes through which the FWO is awarded projects and the considerations informing them has already been discussed above. But FWO's commercial status casts a shadow on the military's 'developmental' or nation building role; is military then a legitimate 'development' actor in the country or a hegemon making money on the side?

Language used to discuss the role of FWO is very much that of 'development' used interchangeably with nation building and at times even national development. Data shows that even if it is not an active actor in the planning stage of 'development' in the country, it not only holds itself responsible for delivering thereon but also is of the view that it is best situated to do so:

> "*The military does not do the thinking part of it [any developmental projects that is] but it is certainly involved in the doing part of it. The security implications of the placement of road network for example. Broad understanding within the military is not just of military matters but also socio-economic factors, foreign affairs etc. Military understands security as a mixture of all this. There has been an undeniable globalisation of information and the military has moved to enhance its own understanding of economic matters*".[197]

The 'Overview' section of the official FWO website reads as follows:

> "*For the last 50 years FWO has left its imprints, bringing prosperity to utterly backward and forgotten areas [emphasis added] from the sun burnt plateaus of Baluchistan to lush green dales of Swat and Chitral and from the deserts of Sindh to snow-capped Siachin. Over these years FWO has worked in diversified fields to include development of communication infrastructure like construction of roads, railway lines and airfields, irrigation like construction of dams, canals and barrages; power projects like thermal and hydal; tunnel and mining; telecommunication; construction of residential and industrial*

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[196] Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 46.
[197] Lt. General (Retd.) Karamat. See footnote 59.

infrastructure and proved its unmatched qualitative and quantitative capabilities."[198]

However the fact that is an active branch of the military cannot be avoided. First and foremost it has unparalleled monetary liquidity in the form of Askari Bank. By virtue of simultaneously being a commercial entity as well as a military affiliate it straddles the military and civilian domains to its own advantage. By virtue of being military it has captive clientele insofar as infrastructure construction in security sensitive areas like Kashmir, Baluchistan, FATA etc. is concerned. It has unlimited resources in form of manpower. The thinking and planning part of 'development' is not its responsibility but no infrastructure can be without its input. By virtue of being a commercial entity it can build its portfolio using the expertise gained from its military status and openly compete in the market.

6.8   Conclusion

To sum up, FWO was established to execute a specific project; the construction of KKH. It endured in order to help the military fulfil what it considers its peacetime role; utilising its idle resources for the 'development' or improving the quality of life of fellow Pakistanis to whatever extent it can. Today it performs a dual role. It is a profit making commercial organisation which bids for government projects in the open like any other construction company. Should the need arise it reverts to its military roots and undertakes strictly strategic assignments with security implications for and on behalf of the military.

The bottom line is that FWO is a military concern, albeit with a dual role to play. Even when acting in its commercial capacity, its military roots remain intact. There is no bar to it undertaking strategic defence projects for the military concurrently. Moreover, should the military find itself short of funds for a strategic defence projects, the reserve profits of the FWO earned from the commercial projects can be and are utilised.

While reflecting upon the reasons for its presence in infrastructure development, familiar patterns of military habitus emerge. Military is not only neutral but it seen to be so both by the civilian government as well as the population. It is neither responsible for 'development' nor has the requisite budget. But it is an active contributor nonetheless. It

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[198] http://www.fwo.com.pk/extensions/overview [Accessed on 15 March 2017]

did not actively seek this role, but has been entrusted with it. The corruption and ineptitude of the civil government has created a veritable vacuum which only the military's sense of discipline and efficiency can fill. True the military is responsible for defence, but it has an active peacetime role to play also. Military's failure to step up will leave the country economically weak which in turn will jeopardise the security of the country. Therefore, the definition of defence comprises socio-economic elements.

This study argues that hegemonies that are culturally and symbolically enforced endure longer. Pakistan military has perfected this distinctive brand of hegemony. By distancing itself financially it is able to perpetuate the rhetoric of 'development' and nation building. Whether the civilians benefit by design or through the spill-over effect, the bottom line is that public support for the military is ensured. Whether the state institutions fail due to their ineptitude or because the space is snatched away from them because of the military's hegemonic expansion is immaterial. As long as the population benefits doubts as to the military's stands exonerated of all *mala fides*.

The very presence of the military in a non-defence area, let alone in one which is a key 'development' sector is in itself a transgression of the boundaries separating civil and military realms. However in Pakistan, organisations like the FWO simply provide yet another avenue for the military to further concretise its hegemonic status. FWO's *modus operandi* and the habitus that allows for its operation, explain the public support for the hegemonic behaviour. It is an ideal means of extending its hegemony without ever having to assume direct control.

Chapter VII:

From cornflakes to cement:

Fauji Foundation – a business empire or military welfare?

7.1   Introduction

This chapter uses Fauji Foundation to demonstrate elements within the military's habitus that allow it to negotiate the civil sphere while retaining its military status. Comparisons will be drawn with the Askari (*soldier*) Bank and Army Welfare Trust a) as and when need arises for corroborative purposes; or b) if they were cited by the interviewees themselves in order to illustrate a point – this research is about the military habitus and how it reflects upon it after all. The primary focus however is the Fauji Foundation. Askari Bank and Army Welfare Trust have been included in the chapter for a comparative exercise only.

This chapter demonstrates how military self-perception and reflection of its practices has evolved to accept commercial enterprises like the Fauji Foundation as its nation building / 'developmental' efforts. It illustrates how the military's habitus is shaped by its ability to financially distance itself – at least on paper – from these entities, yet simultaneously justify its connection thereto on grounds that they meet welfare needs of ex-servicemen and civilians which the state fails to. While a case can be made that these business activities signify the organisation's hegemonic status, within its own understanding they have long ceased to be so.

This chapter briefly outlines how military owned commercial enterprises have been discussed in literature. The intention is not to conduct an elaborate literature review but to familiarise the reader with how the [Pakistan] military run business have been broadly discussed. After a brief introduction of the Fauji Foundation – its background and certain

factual details etc. – empirical evidence shall be used to demonstrate how it features within the military habitus.

7.2 A general discussion on [Pakistan] military businesses

Pakistan military and its economic activities have previously been subject to extensive examination. It would be correct to say that they have mostly been inferred as representative of the military's hegemonic status.[199] Following is a broad representation of how it has generally been discussed or understood:

> *"Through the decades the Pakistan military has acquired a prominent economic role which takes various forms; in addition to being given a wide range of benefits including licences and large plots of land, reflecting a British tradition in the subcontinent, retired and serving senior officers received key posts in the public sector and state run corporations. The military also penetrated the economy through the business ventures of its welfare foundations. Initially created mostly to look after retired and disabled soldiers, these foundations today operate a wide array of commercial activities, whereby economic and geostrategic interests often intersect, and are among the largest business conglomerates* (Giunchi, 2014:8)."

Ayesha Siddiqa used the concept of Milbus[200] to contextualise the business interests of the military. Tracing the roots back to colonial times, Siddiqa likened the military's *modus operandi* to predatory behaviour:

> *"The military in Pakistan is a formidable political player with greater influence than any other actor. The organization's political control … is also a*

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[199] "*The military… enriches itself at the expense of rest of the society, crowding out legitimate public and private sector enterprise that could serve as alternative constituencies and power bases. These entities have not only ensured that the army has a vested interest in maintaining the system, hey have also enhanced the army's ability to dominate it. True reform would threaten too many officers' profits to be very likely. True, the military being a more disciplined institution can offer services more efficiently especially in situations of national calamities*" (Paul, 2014:87).

[200] She defined Mil-bus as "*military capital used for the personal benefit of the military fraternity, especially the officer cadre, which is not recorded as part of the defence budget or does not follow the normal accountability procedures of the state, making it an independent genre of capital. It is either controlled by the military or under its implicit or explicit patronage*" (Siddiqa, 2007:5).

manifestation of its financial autonomy. Over the years the military has built

an economic empire that strengthens it institutionally (Siddiqa, 2007:112)."

She argued that the economic dividends from its commercial undertakings allowed for the military to establish and exert its influence in the state's political decision making processes.

"… [T]he accumulation of capital or assets is not just to gather wealth but to buy additional power. In the process of seeking benefits, those in power give carte blanche to other elite groups to behave predatorily. This nourishes the symbiotic relationship between the armed forces and political power (Siddiqa, 2007:4)."

As the financial interests of (the officer cadre) the military grew, so did the financial autonomy of the military fraternity thus providing it "…*the clout to become independent of all other players* (Siddiqa, 2007:26)."

Siddiqa's work has been specifically mentioned here for two reasons: a) it is an excellent source of facts for the case studies and therefore shall be relied upon from time to time; b) her work is the most prominent when it comes to understanding Pakistan military and its commercial activities. From a purely theoretical perspective though, it has limited application for this research. This study does not evaluate the military's might or the methods employed in pursuit thereof. It takes a step back as it were and using the military's habitus as a factor tries to understand the existing civil military binaries. The fact that the military is a hegemon is being taken as a given.

The most relevant work for this thesis is that of Saeed Shafqat who identified military hegemony as the "*most dominant and durable characteristic of Pakistan's political system* (Shafqat, 1997:34)." He argued that one of the ways the military achieved hegemony was by promoting its own corporate interests through the creation of commercial concerns like the Fauji Foundation (Shafqat, 1997:34). As shown in the figures 12 and 13 below, the sheer size of the organisations and their rate of growth is such that even twenty years later the above argument remains valid.

Figure 12 – Net profit of Fauji Foundation

Figure 13 – Total assets of Fauji Foundation

In this study the lens of scrutiny however is slightly different; military habitus with respect to its 'developmental' role is a critical element herein.

An analysis of the field data shows that Pakistan military's habitus has shaped over the years to tell a different story altogether. Within the military consciousness Fauji Foundation is not merely a business empire it owns and operates within the civil sphere. It represents the military's nation building / 'developmental' contributions to the country.

7.3   Fauji Foundation

Fauji Foundation was established in 1952. In 1945 a Post War Services Reconstruction Fund was established by the British government for the Indian War Veterans who had served the Crown during the Second World War. "*At the time of partition (1947) when Pakistan came into being the balance fund was transferred to Pakistan in the proportion of its post WW-II veterans* ("Fauji Foundation," 2015)." "*India [on paper] distributed this fund to the British Indian Army soldiers who by that time were long dead. Pakistan decided to create Fauji Foundation. The aim was to help the widows, retired officers and their children*".[201] The logo (below) shows that the rationale of the organisation continues. Its principle purpose remains 'welfare of Ex-servicemen and their families.' How the military thinks it through, the form it assumes and the manner in which it is fulfilled shall be demonstrated in due course below.

Figure 14 – Fauji Foundation a welfare organisation

Source: Fauji Foundation website http://www.fauji.org.pk/fauji/ (accessed 25 May 2017)

"*Fauji Foundation (also known as Fauji Group), is amongst the largest business conglomerate in Pakistan which "Earns To Serve" the interests of ex-servicemen* ("Fauji Foundation," 2015)*."*

Logic for establishing commercial entities like the Fauji Foundation is derived from the fact that ideally the economy should be performing at a level where it can accommodate the retirees. In the absence thereof, the military is left with no other option but to make arrangements of its own. On average an officer retires at the age of 44; troops even younger. Given that there is a steady supply of retirees per annum provision for life after

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[201] Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 46.

service is an institutional concern. This seems to be recognised as an institutional cause for concern by non-military observers also:

> *"Military personnel retire very early compared to all other careers and this is a concern for the military on an institutional level. Private sector cannot accommodate them all. There is a steady supply of retirees every year hence the military creates private businesses under the garb of welfare. The number of retirees dictates the need for business concerns. Over the years an empire has been created. Defence Housing Authority for example is a multi-billion rupee industry. Same goes for Fauji Foundation, Army Welfare Trust, Shaheen Foundation etc. There is definitely a welfare element to these. Civil government even if it wants to cannot look after that many soldiers because there is absolutely NO money in the country.*
>
> *The question is do we look at these activities as (*stricto senso*) military, a civil military cooperation or separate? If together, then the military is definitely contributing to the 'development' of the country and in my opinion can be counted as a legitimate 'development' actor. Together, FWO, Fauji Foundation, Askari, Shaheen, the Defence Housing Authorities etc. have a very good portfolio. They are everywhere; roads, stadiums businesses, hospitals, schools, universities, food items, cement – almost all private and public sector activities. However if we treat it as separate, then the military does 'development' for its own people and purpose only.*
>
> *The thing is, none of these are not meant for civil consumption because military is not concerned with governance. They do everything for themselves"* (Interviewee from the ministry of finance – wanted to remain unnamed)

Within the military perception, it is looking out for its own. In practice however, there is a strategy of expansion at play. With FWO above, we saw the military capitalising on the security considerations of the country in order to expand its base. In the case of Fauji Foundation we see it making most of the very real economic realities of the country. There is a financial constraint in the country which in turn limits the [civil] state's ability to deliver public services. The military however, capitalises the poor performance of the economy

to create a base for expanding into the civil arena on the one hand, and justifying this [presence] to the people – and to itself – on the other. The strategy of expansion thereby gets varnished with logic of necessity and creates room for the narrative of 'development'. However, one cannot turn away from the fact that no matter what the public speak, and whether or not the strategy of expansion results in welfare activities that are in fact being shared with the civil population, the military is acting in self-interest. To borrow previous chapter, the civilians benefit from the spill over only.

Paul interpreted this to mean that "… *if the interests of the retired military personnel are not taken care of, it would be extremely difficult to obtain new recruits* (Paul, 2014:87)."[202] Despite extensive discussions on the topic, this particular line of reasoning did not surface during the data collection for this research. The data does however shows a recurring theme of how the 'military takes care of its own'; Fauji Foundation being an avenue through which this is realised.

> "*You start as a major at 17 – 18 years of age and retire at 43 - 44. Conversely a bureaucrat retires at 60. Military therefore has to cater for all these people it has invested in. when they retire they still have half their lives and the responsibilities are just starting. This is when and why entities like the Fauji Foundation come in handy*" (Used to head the Development Commission Pakistan during Musharrafs reign).

Welfare of the ex-servicemen and their families is accepted as the principle purpose of the organisation. As shown in the diagram below, the Fauji Foundation's status as a military concern however, stands beyond doubt.

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[202] He was quoting Tariq Waseem Ghazi former director of Fauji Foundation.

Figure 15 – Fauji Foundation is a military organisation

Its militaristic roots are evident from the structure of the organisation given on its website. The two tiers of management are as follows:

"Policy level
  o   The Committee of Administration

Executive level
  o   Central Board of Directors"[203]

At the top is the Committee of Administration. This is where the policy making is done. The committee is responsible for defining the strategic direction of the organisation without its involvement in the day to day functioning. Its charter of responsibilities as per the website of Fauji Foundation is as follows:

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[203] http://www.fauji.org.pk/fauji/about-us/governance-structure (accessed 13 June 2017)

"The Committee of Administration (CoA) is the policy board of the organization. It is responsible for defining the strategic direction of the Foundation without its involvement in its day-to-day functioning. Major decisions in investments, disinvestments, financial and welfare operations are approved by it. As the highest statutory body, it is invested with the powers necessary to govern these affairs and meet the objectives of the Foundation as laid down in the Constitution ("Fauji Foundation" 2015)."*

Figure 16 – Committee of Administration of Fauji Foundation

Source: Fauji Foundation Website http://www.fauji.org.pk/fauji/about-us/governance-structure (accessed 08 May 2017)

One need not look beyond the above picture to ascertain the extent of military affiliation with Fauji Foundation. All nine members of the Committee of Administration are military, six of whom are uniformed serving military officers of the highest ranks. The remainder three are retired officers. In short the highest management body – which is responsible for policy making and for defining the objectives of the organisation and determining implementation strategies – is entirely military in nature.

At the second tier – the Executive Level that is – is the Central Board of Directors. They are responsible for the day to day management of organisation. This includes both administrative and fiscal control. The Central Board of Directors ensures implementation

of the policy objectives set by the CoA (above). Secretary, Ministry of Defence is the ex-officio Chairman of the organisation. The everyday procedures and workings are overseen by the Vice Chairman and Managing Director (with requisite direction of the functionaries). As per the website:

> "*The Central Board of Directors functions at the executive level for control, management, supervision, planning and direction of all industrial, commercial and welfare operations of the Foundation, within the laid down mandate and policies. The Managing Director Fauji Foundation directs and oversees the daily operations of the Foundation with the assistance of the Directors and the management* ("Fauji Foundation," 2015)."

Figure 17 – Board of Directors of Fauji Foundation

Source: Fauji Foundation Website http://www.fauji.org.pk/fauji/about-us/governance-structure (accessed 08 May 2017)

As can be clearly seen, even the Board of Directors which is directly responsible for the running of the organisation is openly and directly comprised of military officers.[204] The

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[204] Here it must be added that the Fauji Foundation website was last updated in 2014 / 15. When I interviewed General Abbasi in January 2016 he informed me that the Competition Commission Pakistan had expressed objections to a private company having an all military Board of Directors. Hence in compliance with the law, now five out of eight members of the Board of Directors were civilians. This does not alter the military status of the organisation by much, but it had to be stated in the interest of balance.

only difference is that these are retired officers. That does not mean however that links with military, tangible or otherwise are severed upon retirement. True, an argument extended (during field work) was that "...*once an officer retires he ceases to be a part of the military and for all intents and purposes is considered a civilian*".[205] But that is an administrative distinction only and irrelevant to this research. This research looks at the habitus of the military and the rhetoric and self-perception informing it. Retiring from the military does not alter their training or their *modus operandi*. Most importantly their networks remain intact. The frustrations with and perceptions of their civil counterparts therefore endure well after retirement. In short retirement from service neither alters the habitus nor severs ties with the military.

This is important because not only is the military habitus imported into non-military sector but retaining a visible link with the military means that to an outsider, Fauji Foundation's achievements are easily attributable to the military. In the public eye, Fauji Foundation is a financially successful entity which is offering welfare schemes to the civilians also. This can easily be translated into Fauji Foundation is making money due to its military roots and the military provides welfare where the state fails.

As demonstrated in section 7.2, traditionally Fauji Foundation has been taken as evidence of military's hegemony. It is not difficult to see why. *Prima facie* it is a military concern created by and for military consumption. Military benefit remains its primary function. Moreover, it is the military's own position that it is neither concerned with nor understands 'development'. In short Fauji Foundation is easily a simple case of military's hegemonic behaviour.

However, this research argues that the above is not a complete representation. It does not account for the military's habitus. True the military does not understand or hold itself responsible for 'development'. It does however hold itself accountable for nation building. And it has been established at great length and in detail how the two are demonstrably similar in the military habitus. More specifically, when thinking through its nation building role it instinctively cites Fauji Foundation as an example of how it is delivering on its responsibilities.

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[205] Brigadier (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 50.

> "*Within the military consciousness Fauji Foundation represents its contribution to economic development in the country*"[206]

As things stand, in military perception Fauji Foundation represents its contribution to the economic growth and 'development' of the country. The military is of the view that it is well within its bounds to own such commercial organisations. Military presence in the commercial sectors is not perceived as a transgression perpetuating its hegemony but seen as an attempt to kick start economic growth in the country as it were:

> "*Different militaries have different levels of commercial activities. In developing countries (historically speaking) militaries have played a very significant role in 'development'. Take Thailand, China, Indonesia, and Egypt for example. The military has been involved in commercial activity and as a result there has been grand scale national 'development'. Therefore such involvement of the military can be interpreted as a starter / stimulant for economic growth. Fauji Foundation plays that role in Pakistan*".[207]

Evidence gathered from the field suggests that whatever the methods and rationale fifty years ago, within the military self-perception Fauji Foundation now represents its nation building or 'development' role.

> *The Fauji Foundation is not making money from the state. It was established from the Post War Reconstruction fund. Yes it employs retired military officers but it is participating in and contributing to the economy of the country. It is building up and bonding the country together*".[208]

In the military mind set or mental models, although created for military benefit, it contributes to local production, revenue generation, civilian employment and therefore to the economic 'development' of the country. It is distinct from the other commercial concerns in that it was established for the welfare of ex-servicemen and their families. However, due to the spill over effect, it fills the 'developmental' void created by the civilian leadership.

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[206] Major General (Retd.) Iqbal. See footnote 110.
[207] General (Retd.) Amjad. See footnote 57.
[208] Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Gul. See footnote 30

In short, Fauji Foundation stands for the economic and social success that can be achieved if the civil government were to 'clean up their act' as it were. It represents the efficiency, organisational skills and transparency of the military which the civil side lacks:

> *"The strength of the military lies in its training. But this is training with a direction to it. We work for the country. We don't just utilise the resources available but are taught how to best utilise the resources. A military officer or soldier is not just taught how to fire a gun but also how to take care of it. Every penny counts. If you lose a gun it's a burden on the defence budget, which is a burden on the country. Value for money is ingrained on an institutional level. Our motto in everything is profit for the country and loss for the enemy"* (Retired military officer at the ministry of defence. Wanted to remain unnamed).

Basically it is a success simply by virtue of being military.

Fauji Foundation is also a means of conveying the message that it is a peoples military – even though 'development' is not its responsibility, it has to step up on behalf of the people and into arenas beyond its charter in order to deliver them their due (see Box 23 below).

> "*What is military? An institution of the nation for the protection of the country. But the country has no money. When we ask the government for more money, it refuses. So basically Pakistan cannot afford protection. Yet the threat persists. Hence the commercial concerns of the military like the Fauji foundation, FWO, Army Welfare Trust etc were formed. The rationale is that military officers and soldier retire very young. So we need concerns to generate money for the welfare of the retired officers and soldiers and for the maintenance of cantonments. All the money generated through these organisations is used within the military and for the welfare of its own people. It is not used for any kind pf personal gain whatsoever*" (Interview dated 09 January 2016 with Major General (Retd.) Ahmed at his house).

It should be pointed out that Fauji Foundation is not the only military owned commercial enterprise. It is however, after the housing schemes like the Defence Housing Authorities, the most ubiquitous. In 2016 the Defence Minister presented to the Senate details of commercial entities being run by various wings of the armed forces in Pakistan. "*There were nearly 50 projects, units and housing colonies functioning in the country under the administrative control of Fauji Foundation, Shaheen Foundation[209], Bahria Foundation, Army Welfare Trust and Defence Housing Authorities (Wasim, 2016)*." List of those commercial enterprises that are either wholly owned or affiliated with / associated to Fauji Foundation is given below. The table pertains to Fauji Foundation only. The point is to get an over view of the range and diversity of its activities. For a list of military owned commercial ventures see Annexure 2.[210]

Table 1 – Projects owned by the Fauji Foundation[211]

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[209] As per their website "Shaheen Foundation was established in 1977 by the Pakistan Air Force under Charitable Endowment Act 1890 to promote welfare activities for the benefit of serving and retired PAF personnel including civilians and their dependents by generating finds through industrial and commercial enterprises." (http://www.shaheenfoundation.com/ accessed on 26 May 2017). Essentially Shaheen (which means hawk) performs the same function for Air Force that Fauji Foundation is to the Army. Similarly Bahria (literally navy) Foundation fulfills similar function for the navy personnel and ex-servicemen (http://bahriafoundation.com/bf/ accessed on 26 May 2017).

[210] For others see Annexure 2.

[211] This list has been compiled using the Fauji Foundation Website (http://www.fauji.org.pk/fauji/businesses/overview), the Fresh & Freeze Website

Fully Owned Projects	• Fauji Cereals
	• Foundation Gas
	• Overseas Employment Services
	• FF Seed multiplication Farm
Associated Companies	• Fauji Fresh & Freeze
	• Fauji Fertiliser Co. Ltd.
	• Fauji Fertiliser Bin Qasim Ltd.
	• Fauji Cement Co. Ltd.
	• Fauji Kabirwala Power Company Ltd.
	• Foundation Power Co (Dharki) Ltd.
	• Mari Petroleum Company Ltd.
	• Fauji Akbar Portia Marine Terminal Ltd.
	• Fauji Oil Terminal and Distribution Co. Ltd.
	• Foundation Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.
	• Askari Bank Co. Ltd.
	• Askari Cement Ltd.
	• Foundation Wind Energy (I and II) Ltd.
	• Fauji Meat Ltd.
	• Noon Pakistan Ltd. Lahore
Investment abroad	• Pakistan MarocPhosphore SA

As is evident from the list of the companies given above, Fauji Foundation's product diversity ranges from breakfast cereal to cement. Its activities are therefore not limited to a particular sector only, but have extended into every possible avenue. Juxtaposed with the figures pertaining to the net assets and annual profits given above, a rough picture can be drawn about the size of the organisation and the volume of its business.

Here it must be pointed out that the military's rationale for expanding into the commercial sector is that the economy is not doing well and that its hand is forced in order to better look after its people. However, it is not just doing that only. It is constantly expanding its base in an area where it is not supposed to be in the first place, and that too in an economy which is already doing poorly (by self-admittance). Hence we revert back to Gerke and Evers' argument that even if appropriation of surplus is achieved through or generates economic growth in the country, it is appropriation nonetheless.

Even though the Army Welfare Trust also falls under the Army, it was glossed over as a money making venture – of the military – which though established for the welfare of

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(http://www.freshnfreeze.com/ff.html), Military Inc. (Siddiqa, 2007:120) and Amir Wasim's article in Dawn Newspaper (https://www.dawn.com/news/1272211) – all accessed for this list on 26 May 2017.

former service men and their families – like the Fauji Foundation – was not necessarily a success story because it failed to imbue the quintessentially militaristic characteristics – these being organisational skills, transparency and above all nation building.[212] Fauji Foundation conversely, in addition to representing a commercial and welfare achievement, contributes to the economy of the country.

7.4   Financial independence of Fauji Foundation

As with the FWO, financial status of Fauji foundation viz. the military needs clarification. That is how we understand how the military extends its power base in practice. Financially the Fauji Foundation is entirely independent from the military. As explained by various military personnel who had run the organisation at one point or another:

> *Fauji Foundation continued to be in public sector till 1975 when Bhutto gifted the entire assets of the company to the committee. Within 10 years the assets were moved to private sector. Ever since nothing has been giving back to the military.*

> *Fauji Foundation never takes any money from the military. The money it makes is spent on establishment, servicing loans and the welfare activities – the hospitals, schools, colleges etc."*[213]

> *******

> "*When Pakistan created the Fauji Foundation (with the money from the Post War Services Reconstruction Fund) the aim was to help the widows, retired officers and their children. All the profit from the Fauji Foundation is used for welfare and investing in further industry. Initially some share was given from the military budget but now for very long time no money comes from the military. They [Fauji Foundation] are entirely self-sustaining. Fauji Foundation*

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[212] "*The Army Welfare Trust was created in the 1980s. It was created during Zia's regime to create a money source for pensioned officers and soldiers' parents. It was however not handled as well as the Fauji Foundation. It was being run by a huge number of retired officers who do not have any business acumen at all*." (Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 46).

[213] General (Retd.) Amjad. See footnote 57.

> *money is spent on schools, hospitals, colleges and vocation centres. Military budget is spent on defence of the country".[214]*

Therefore it can be said that there is absolutely no flow of money either to or from the military. Like the FWO, profits are invested back into the company. Profits from the Fauji Foundation are either used for welfare activities or are invested back into the industry. The welfare activities include schools, hospitals and colleges which though intended entirely for the benefit of ex-service men and their families has now opened doors for the civilian population as well (see section 7.5 below). "*Fauji Foundation does not fall under any defence budget head… Initially it might have been owned by the Federal Government but now it cannot take a single penny from the defence budget. These are strictly welfare organisations which generate their own funds now*"[215]

> *"Fauji Foundation does not contribute towards generating the wherewithal for the army. Retired people join these organisations and hence have no connection with the military. There is absolutely no money going back to the military. The aim was to help retired officers and their children. All profit from Fauji Foundation is used for welfare and investing in further industry".[216]*

> ***

> *"These are public listed companies. They have proper audits and affiliates. They cannot just take money and give it to the fauj [military]. But they are definitely contributing to the economy of the country as they are the biggest taxpayer in the country".[217]*

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[214] Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 46.
[215] Mr. Hamid Raza. See footnote 144.
[216] Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Khan. See footnote 46.
[217] Lt. General (Retd.) Abbasi. See footnote 43.

Figure 18 – Taxes paid by Fauji Foundation

Source: http://www.fauji.org.pk/fauji/investors/financial-highlights (Accessed 14 June 2017)

We do not know whether it is indeed the largest taxpayer in the country or not. However tax audits published on its website show that as its turnover and total assets increased (see Figure 18 above), so did its tax returns. Moreover these are published tax return which lends credibility to the no corruption / transparency rhetoric maintained by the military. It is also not difficult to see why the public perception would favour the military.

As established in Chapter V while the military holds itself responsible for and capable of the defence of the country, defence is by and large unanimously understood to include the economy. By distancing itself monetarily from an obviously money making concern, it retains defence as its chief responsibility; avoids the label of a money making hegemon; fulfils post-service welfare needs of its own people; and caters to the welfare of the civilians. The mental models thus created accommodate all of the above under the rubric of nation building or 'development'.

When asked whether the military has a vision for the country the [military's] answer was that the *"only vision that the military has is to assist the nation. Defence is all-encompassing. The economy is very much a part of the defence. Participating in the economic aspects helps the military in assisting the nation. The cement and the urea*

factories[218] *owned by the military are helping fulfil a state requirement. Plus these military owned enterprises are the highest taxpayers in the country*".[219]

In addition to the economic activity that these enterprises generate, another way the military believes it contributes to nation building or 'development' is that it is a source of employment for the ex-military and civilians alike.

That said these companies were set up to provide post retirement employment to ex-service men after all. Therefore, the structure of the enterprises is such that the top administrative jobs are inevitably reserved for retired military officers. The technical posts are occupied by experts in the field. Let us take Askari Bank for example. "*It is run by a civil head with vast banking experience because the military knows it cannot run a bank.*"[220] For the remainder, they are available to the civilians and retried soldiers alike though the latter are given obvious preference; it being a military concern after all.

Fauji Foundation is undoubtedly a military affiliate. Therefore even though it is currently financially independent of the military this does not necessarily imply that that has always been the case. Self-admittedly "*in the initial years some share was given from the military budget*" though that is no longer the case. Moreover this military connection has been instrumental in helping it achieve its present status.

One of the reasons why it is the most commonly cited example of the military's hegemony is that the organisation was amongst the more obvious beneficiaries of successive military regimes. As early as the 1970s it had transformed into a "*sizeable industrial establishment* (Shafqat, 1997:37)." Initially it had only three industrial ventures: textiles, cereals and sugar. It expanded "… *so that by 1970 it had total assets of 152 million rupees and by 1982 it had become 'the largest welfare industrial complex in Pakistan.' It had total assets of more than 2060 million rupees with twenty nine industrial projects operating* (Shafqat, 1997:37)."

The military interviewees were of the view that under successive military regimes the organisation would have accrued benefits which might not have been the case under

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[218] Fauji Foundation owns the largest cement and fertilizer factories in the country
[219] Major General (Retd.) Saleemullah. See footnote 104.
[220] Lt. General (Retd.) Karamat. See footnote 59.

civilian rule. Some went so far as to say that exponential growth of the organisation continued even when the military was no longer directly in power because it [the military] was in a powerful enough position to act in its own interests. "*I would say that the organisations like the Fauji Foundation and the Army Welfare Trust were sponsored by the military leadership. They were intended as a welfare system for serving and ex-servicemen but they reached the stage they did because of the military's help.*"[221]

As with the FWO, Fauji Foundation lies at the intersection of military and civil realms. This makes it poised for promotion of military's corporate interests or appropriation of surplus resources in order to expand its base. *Prima facie* Fauji Foundation is a "*purely commercial organisation. The only difference is that retired officers are running its administration. The strictly professional aspects are handed over to the concerned professionals. It is registered under the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and does not advantage from being a military affiliate. It has its own audits and no money comes from or goes to the military*."[222]

> "*Fauji Foundation is not making money from either the state or the military. It was created from the Post War Reconstruction Fund. Yes it employs military officers but it is contributing to the economy of the country.*"[223]

As demonstrated in the previous chapter FWO provides a service that is militaristic in nature. Identifying it as entirely military or non-military / commercial is a slightly more difficult task with the Fauji Foundation. On the other hand it is much easier to distinguish between the military and the Fauji Foundation. Benefit that accrues to the military is in form of welfare and that too to the retirees. However closer inspection reveals similar methodology at play – as with FWO. The commercial success today is because of the financial and other benefits it received in the past by virtue of being a military affiliate.

7.5   Welfare activities of Fauji Foundation

As aforementioned even if appropriation of resources is achieved through or generates overall economic growth in the country, it is nonetheless appropriation of surplus and smacks of a strategy to extend power. In order to avoid provoking adverse reactions from

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[221] Major General (Retd.) Iqbal. See footnote 110.
[222] Lt. General (Retd.) Abbasi. See footnote 43.
[223] Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Gul. See footnote 30.

the public, be it in the form of protests, public unrest, or even a simple downward trend in popularity, strategic groups therefore invest time and energy in order to ingratiate themselves to the citizenry. No doubt a military appropriating resources beyond its given budgetary shares and that too through presence in areas beyond its constitutional jurisdiction, would be deemed exploitative by the people. Therefore, as with FWO, acting through a sub-organisation like the Fauji Foundation and exploiting its military yet non-military status to its own advantage helps the military manage public opinion.

Denzau and North presented a solution as it were, by arguing that modern day corporations justify their actions to themselves as well as the public at large via their corporate social responsibility activities. Simultaneously, within their own perception of themselves or self-imagination, the best way to be socially responsible is "*is to maximise profits*" (Denzau & North, 1994:15). The question then is how does the military perceive and organise its role in the 'development' / welfare activities?

> "*The Army instead of disbursing the balance fund of about Rs. 18.2 million (USD 0.2 million) among the beneficiaries, invested it in establishing a Textile Mill. Later from the income of the textile mill, it established first 50 bedded TB hospital in Rawalpindi.*
>
> *Fauji Foundation … from Rs. 18.2 million in 1953, today runs more than 18 industries, the income from which is utilized to serve about 9 million beneficiaries (5% of country's population). Generally, more than 80 percent of the income goes towards the welfare activities every year* ("Fauji Foundation Overview," 2015)."

By virtue of being a welfare organisation a portion of the profits is spent on strictly welfare activities like Schools, colleges, hospitals, vocation centres etc. The remainder is reinvested for expansion of the organisation. As per the Fauji Foundation website the welfare activities of the organisation can be categorised under four broad heads: Healthcare, education, training and employment. These include:

- 116 Healthcare facilities – providing free medical treatment and hospitalisation;

- 110 educational institutions – providing subsidised education up to higher secondary level;
- 65 vocational training centres – providing free vocational training (along with stipend) to the wives and daughters of ex-servicemen;
- 9 technical training centres – providing free technical training along with stipend to ex-servicemen and their sons; and
- Moreover providing opportunities for employment of ex-servicemen compatible with their skills and jib requirement for the Foundation.

"*In addition to the above, Fauji Foundation also assists the Services Headquarters and other defence related entities in looking after the welfare of ex-servicemen in other areas. Whereas, all the above services are primarily for the Beneficiaries,*[224] *Fauji Foundation also extends normal healthcare, education and training services to the general public. Where required, employment opportunities are also offered to the local population* ("Fauji Foundation," 2015)."

Figure 19 – Fauji Foundation welfare expenses

Fauji Foundation Welfare Expenses

Welfare Expenses		
Year	PKR (Millions)	USD (Millions)
2011	5,164	59
2012	8,577	70
2013	8,074	77
2014	7,135	70
2015	9,329	90

Source: http://www.fauji.org.pk/fauji/investors/financial-highlights (Accessed 14 June 2017)

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[224] These being retired military personnel and their families.

In 1953 Fauji Foundation started with establishing "…*three industrial ventures: a textile mill, a cereals mill and a sugar mill* (Shafqat, 1997:37)." "*From the profits a 50 bed tuberculosis hospital was set up. At the time – in 1959 – Fauji foundation was still under the command of the GHQ and a serving Brigadier – F.R. Khan – was the first managing director.*"[225] "*Today, the Fauji Foundation medical system is the largest medical chain outside the Government sector, spread all over Pakistan.*"[226]

Just from the one fifty bed specialised hospital, the medical facilities provided by the Fauji Foundation have expanded considerably:

Hospitals[227]	11
Other Health Centres	
Medical Centres	25
Dispensaries	31
Mobile Dispensaries	47
Artificial Limb Centre	1
Nursing School	1

The expansion of hospitals has been given as an example only. This is just the hospitals. Other welfare activities have undergone similar systematic expansion which within military habitus represents the military's organisational skills and transparency and the lack thereof on part of the civil state:

> "*There is a lot of discussion about how the defence budget is so high. In reality it is not that high. Poor levels of 'development' in Pakistan are not due to the lack of money but due to the lack of implementation and utilisation of the money that is allocated for the intended purposes. The quality of education is not poor because enough money is not assigned for it. It is poor because the money that is allocated to education does not get spent on it*".[228]

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[225] General (Retd.) Amjad. See footnote 57.
[226] Fauji Foundation website http://www.fauji.org.pk/fauji/welfare/healthcare/healthcare-overview (accessed 19 June 2017)
[227] Fauji Foundation website http://www.fauji.org.pk/fauji/welfare/healthcare/healthcare-overview (accessed 19 June
[228] Retired military officer now working at the Ministry of defence who wished to remain anonymous

The success of Fauji Foundation conversely understood is evidence of the transparency, organisational skills and effectiveness that the military represents. Moreover, within the military habitus it is a welfare organisation catering to ex- servicemen and civilians alike. It successfully meets both their medical and educational needs which the state does not. This habitus is reified by the fact that on the books it is a purely commercial organisation which does not extend any monetary benefit to the military. The profits are invested back into the organisation for either further expansion of the business or welfare activities. This in turn adds a second dimension to the military's nation building role in that the commercial expansion is a source of employment as well as revenue for the state.

In absence of a direct monetary link between the military and Fauji Foundation this habitus persists unchallenged. However one critic impugned this position by asking why the military pensions are being payed from the establishment budget and not the defence budget "*as should be the case*".[229] The argument runs that if the military is aware that the state is unable to support the military retirees and the commercial activity is part of an attempt to rectify that, then why add additional burden on the financially weak state. Fauji Foundation alone generates sufficient revenue to be able to do so.

> "*It [Fauji Foundation] is a welfare organisation for retired military personnel making commercial profit but not paying the pensions of the very same retirees from the profits earned by the said 'welfare' organisation. It is stimulating economic growth in the country by not sharing or even easing the burden on the economy which technically it has created*".[230]

When this question was posed to the military the answer was simple: "*the military does not have any monetary ties with any of these organisations. They are financially independent.*" This argument is however, tenuous at best. Self admittedly, these organisations are the commercial success they are today because they have benefited from and thrived under successive military regimes. Even when noting power, the political landscape of the country is such that the military has always been able to exert *de facto* power. Additionally the organisation is obviously military run. True it is run by retired officers, but if it is a link we are looking for between the military and say Fauji Foundation

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[229] Senior journalist, Mr. Hussain Naqi. Interview at the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan dated 08 December 2015
[230] Interview dated § with Mr. I.A Rehman, a senior journalist and human rights activist in his office at the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan

we need not look beyond the picture / composition of the Board of Directors given above. Moreover just on the pension issue the *modus operandi* becomes clear.

In 2015 the Defence Minister was asked whether military pensions were "*reflected in the defence budget and, if not, the date since when it is not reflected and the reasons for the same*." In response the senate was informed that not only have the "*pensions to the retired personnel of the armed forces been paid from the civilian kitty*" but "… *the expenditure on account of said pension is not being reflected in the defence budget since July 2000. The decision to charge the defence services pension to the civil estimates was made for the purposes of (having) one budget demand both for civil and defence pensions,'* he replied without explaining why the decision was taken*." It must however be pointed out here that in 2000 General Pervez Musharraf was ruling the country as it were in the capacity of the Chief Executive subsequent to deposing the Nawaz government in 1999.

On the one hand the military is able to distance itself from the organisation on the grounds that its job is defence of the country and Fauji Foundation is a profit maximising commercial entity. This argument holds true for other affiliates listed in Annexure 2 too. On the other hand it is able to justify its connection with the very same commercial enterprises on the grounds that they were set up for the benefit of the retired servicemen and their families which the civil state fails to. As over the years it has been able to sever the traceable monetary ties, and as the sheer size and nature of the organisations in question is such that there is inevitable spill-over [of benefits] into the civil arena, the habitus of nation building and development is provided natural space to develop.

7.6   Conclusion

Discussions on the military's hegemonic status in Pakistan invariably point at military owned businesses as an example. Fauji Foundation in particular has been front and centre of this debate. It is after all, a multi-million rupee commercial industry being operated entirely by the armed forces of the country. One need not look beyond its administrative structure to establish that it is indeed a military concern. Moreover data shows that even the military admits to the Fauji Foundation having reached its current status with the help of successive military regimes. In short the very existence of a commercial entity like the Fauji Foundation is sufficient to establish that the Pakistan military displays all the traits

of a quintessential hegemon. The fact that the Fauji Foundation is only one of many such commercial concerns simply reifies the hegemony argument.

Even if we set aside the hegemonic status of the Pakistan military, the very fact of military presence in a non-defence arena is tantamount to a violation of the accepted terms of engagement between the civil and military realms.

This research therefore argues for a softer form of hegemony. It explains the popularity of the hegemon in question. More importantly, it endures because neither the hegemon and nor the public perceive it as a forceful imposition. This research argues that a true representation of facts is only possible once the hegemons habitus and how it reflects upon it has been accounted for.

And within the military self-perception or belief system Fauji Foundation represents its 'developmental' efforts – a) it provides welfare services to the masses; and b) it creates jobs. True these are primarily intended for the retired servicemen but civilians are equal beneficiaries. The military is not under a compulsion to share or cater to the public at large but it is filling a space created by the ineptitude of the political and administrative leadership.

Just like the FWO, in Fauji foundation the military has discovered an ideal means of extending its hegemony without ever having to assume direct control. Fauji Foundation is both military and yet not military in nature. One need not look beyond its administrative structure to establish its military affiliation. Yet there is no flow of money – albeit anymore – either to or from the military. This allows the military to not only denounce the hegemony label but with no visible financial gains, it habitus perceives this as its 'developmental' or nation building contributions.

The same holds true for the public. On the one hand it is benefitting from the military's spill-overs. The military is catering to the publics welfare needs, provides education, health facilities etc. for all intents and purposes, in the public. On the other any doubts as to military's intention stand ameliorated on grounds that it is not financially benefitting therefrom.

In short the military does not need to take over anymore. By championing 'development', it has effectively won over the hearts and minds of people. There is no room or danger for introspection because the habitus and the rhetoric surrounding it accommodates it as nation building. Fauji Foundation, an openly military concern produces everything from cornflakes to cement in the country. But it invests the profits into welfare of its own people. The civilians get to benefit from the spill-over. The trusteeship of development lies with the state. But confronted with the inability of the state to cater, even the spill-over means that a sizeable populations benefits.

Chapter VII:

Conclusion

This research operationalises the habitus of the Pakistan military to examine the practices that allow for the functioning of hegemony. Using two case studies, the objective is to explore the underlying practices and perceptions that allow the Pakistan military to establish its hegemony.

First of all, this study lays the foundations of the concept of hegemony via the habitus of the military. Secondly, two case studies – FWO and the Fauji Foundation, representing infrastructure and welfare sectors respectively – have been operationalised to understand the functioning of hegemony [in Pakistan]. It must be stressed here that the operation of hegemony, is neither limited to nor dependent on these two sectors only. It can be replicated in other countries through different sectors. Therefore a generalisation of the topic or attempts to couch it within higher abstractions would not only rob the study of its epistemological approach but establish a precondition of its operation via these two sectors only. It therefore makes sense to understand the practices that allow for extension of hegemony via cultural and symbolic means on a case by case basis using country specific examples as avenues thereof.

From an academic standpoint this study is different in several respects. It attempts to think through the symbolic and cultural elements of Pakistan military's hegemony and operationalises the military's habitus for the first time.

8.1   Military hegemony in Pakistan

This thesis provides a working definition of military hegemony in Pakistan [as]: "the military's monopolistic control of political institutions and processes as well as strategic

policy issues which vests it with the authority to inaugurate, prescribe, proscribe or stop any or all political action" (see section 2.4 of chapter II).

This is important because Pakistan military's authoritarian role is accepted as common wisdom by academics writ large (as already discussed in chapters II & III). However some of more prominent research themes thus far have been post-colonial institutional structure (Alavi, 1972:63-65) (Jalal, 1995); bureaucratic overreach (Husain, 2015); defence spending (Jalal, 1991); lack of political parties (Shafqat, 1997); military businesses (Siddiqa, 2007) etc. This means that although in discussions pertaining to the civil military imbalance in Pakistan there is evidence of the military being referred to as a hegemon (Nawaz, 2008), the military has never been theorised as such from this perspective. This could be because the principal point of investigation has been the whys and wherefores of the military's preponderance.

As shown in chapter II, this study uses Shafqat's definition of military hegemony (Shafqat, 1997) as the baseline to establish a definition of its own. However, it must be pointed Shafqat uses military hegemony to examine the shift in structures of the civil military relations against the backdrop of a breakdown of military control 1990 in Pakistan and the rise of the People's Party Pakistan (a left wing political party). This research on the other hand demonstrates that the Pakistan military's hegemony is neither defined by nor limited to the duration of the coup. It therefore makes a case for juxtaposing the military's self-perceptions with the practices employed by it that allow it to extend its hegemony.

The military is already secure in its hegemonic status. However, by taking its 'developmental' activities into perspective, we are able to bring into the fold of Pakistan military's hegemony those practices which cannot be designated as political action, but can have political repercussions nonetheless. This thesis focuses on the socio-cultural elements of hegemony. Hegemony need not manifest in overt displays of power, but through provision of social sector amenities. It allows the [military] hegemon to thrive, without a manifest subversion of the democratic process.

8.2 A methodological approach that allows for the perspective of the military

This study puts military front and centre of analysis and allows the military to tell its story in its own words. It departs from current literature on the subject (chapter IV) in that it does not provide an outsiders understanding of a) how the military operates; and b) the civil military imbalance in Pakistan via successive takeovers. Instead it presents the military's own perspective and how it interprets its own practices. This is not to be confused with providing the military an avenue to defend or propagate itself. The intention is to understand how the military perceives its own decisions and consequently the considerations that inform its conduct.

This creates room for the military's own perception. Perceptions (as shown in chapter II) are an important element of analysis as they are ultimately reflected in the decision output (Buzan, 1983:226-31). Decisions therefore are not to be understood in isolation, but instead as a product of their environment (Schramm, 1961:109), recorded memory (Deutsch, 1963:100), as well as past experiences (Kuhn, 1996:113). To this end it uses primary data sources in the form of interviews with senior military personnel and military documentation obtained from various military sources (see chapter II and Annexure 1).

The methodological approach adopted in this study allows for a discussion on military's previous takeovers and future plans from military point of view. In the process it fills the theoretical gap of how the military has created a space for itself in non-defence sectors and its rationale. This is particularly significant because it provides a first-hand account of why and how it extends itself beyond proscribed fields of responsibility and the expected outcomes.

8.3   The military's habitus

This research argues for hegemony on the basis that that the Pakistan military's hegemony is neither defined by nor limited to the duration of the coup.

> A "*visible manifestation of military domination of the civil sector lie[s] in the*
> *re-employment of the retired or even serving officers in civil institutions and*
> *in the host of military-owned enterprises that provide longer term of*

employment for army officers. Today, military officers dominate education and training institutions in the civil sector. All the major civil service training establishments, for example, are now headed by army officers. They also head universities and state-owned corporations" (Nawaz, 2008:577).

The study began with the question what are the underlying practices and perceptions that allow the Pakistan military to establish its hegemony? The first step to that end was to understand how the military rationalises its presence in civil arenas. How they perceived successive takeovers and rationalise military presence in civil domains was the starting point.

That the Pakistan military concretised its hegemony through a wide range of measures during its tenure in government has already been demonstrated in chapter IV above. These included [but were not limited to] neutralising political parties and obfuscating political opposition, reviving the local government system, constitutional amendments, legal and policy reforms, co-opting bureaucratic elites etc. Ousting yet another elected government and seizing direct control could be a blow to the popularity that it has painstakingly recaptured since the last coup (Shah, 2014b).

This study therefore explores that now that it has effectively secured its hegemony, it is extending its presence into the civil arena through sub organisations like the FWO and Fauji Foundation. Thereby it ensures that it retains its hegemony without suffering a loss of reputation.

8.3.1   'Development' under the rubric of nation building

As things stand we see the military presence in the 'development sector. The question that naturally needs to be asked in that case is what are the elements in military's habitus that compel it to play an active role in (what it defines as) nation building? How does it, if at all, differentiate between nation building and 'development'?

We saw that the [Pakistan] military legitimises its presence in traditionally non-defence sectors by cashing in on the saviour narrative it has developed over the years. Admittedly due to governance issues civil governments have fallen short of delivering public services (for a wide range of reasons beyond the scope this research).

"While military rule or military dominated rule has something to do with this, the role of civilian rulers cannot be downplayed, for they have allowed the military free ingress into their domain over the years and indeed have elevated the military presence to the detriment of the civil sector" (Nawaz, 2008:277).

Successive governments have therefore had to rely on the military's Article 245 powers (see footnote 6 above) more than they should. The military's 'stepping in' as it were, at the behest of the civil government, only reifies its indelible belief in its own indispensability. Furthermore the citizens look up to the military instead of the civil government for meeting their 'developmental' needs. The military in turn sees this as adding to its own popularity.

The military is well aware of the legal / constitutional boundaries on its presence in the non-defence sectors. Persistent presence in the sector though has with time generated its own legitimising logic. Defence and 'development' have been loosely conjoined within the military consciousness – a link which can then be exploited on a need be basis. For instance it allows for the military to remain active in the 'development' sector without having to out rightly replace the civil government or to assume responsibility thereof. Civil and military domains thus remain detached, at least *prima facie*, and 'development' is categorised within the military habitus as belonging to the civilian purview.

The military conversely does hold itself responsible for nation building. One of the main findings of this study is that in practical usage the two terms are both understood and employed interchangeably (chapter V). So much so, that sometimes even duties performed in the aid of civil powers are pigeon holed in this category. Although this is a matter of cognitive dissonance, it has been embedded so far in the military's habitus that it too is unaware of its own perceptions and resultant actions. This conflation of 'development' and nation building in the military habitus allows for an extension of its hegemony.

8.3.2   Demarking hegemony via FWO and Fauji Foundation

The question is how the military's hegemony does it manifest? More importantly is the Pakistan military's hegemony a seamless web or does it have any outer bounds, even if self-imposed ones? This study used two case studies – FWO and Fauji Foundation.

Though initially created for a specific project, FWO was never dissolved once it had performed its initial responsibilities. Instead it continued to fulfil the military's peacetime role with respect to infrastructure construction. Today it is a profit maximising commercial entity which bids for projects which have no bearing on defence of the country in open competition. It operates like any other private construction entity. Yet one need not look beyond its administrative structure to establish that FWO is very much a military owned and military run organisation. It reverts to its military roots and undertakes strategic projects with defence / security implications [only] as and when the need arises.

Familiar patterns of military habitus emerged in discussion regarding the *raison d'etre* of FWO. While acknowledging its contributions to the infrastructure sector of the country, the military did not hold itself responsible for 'development' – 'development' being a strictly civilian domain. It was however duty bound to contribute to nation building. The military did not seek this role but had been entrusted with the responsibility. Its failure to step up would render the country economically weak and strategically insecure. Defence therefore became intrinsically tied with socio-economic elements.

We saw the Pakistan military's attempts at securing the socio-economic of its hegemony through the workings of FWO. The distinguishing feature was no perceptible monetary link between the military and the organisation in question. This study shows that it is imperative that there is no money exchanged between the military and whatever entity it is establishing its hegemony through – FWO in this instance. This is because money is tangible and money is traceable. Moreover Pakistan military has been repeatedly blamed in the past for thwarting progress and tipping the civil military balance in its favour by creating a defence based economy (Jalal, 1991).

The commercial nature of FWO means that it is a financially independent entity. It is certainly run and owned by the military, but there is no financial relationship between two. Absence of a monetary link allows for a veil of separation between the civil and the military domains. This means that the military stands exonerated of usurping resources and thereby extending hidden political agendas. As things stand, this takes it out of the theoretical domain of hegemony. However, no matter what the current status, links with the military's hegemonic status cannot be severed.

FWO reached its current status because of the concessions provided – both directly as well as conducive legal regimes – during military coups. Now it certainly operates independently of the military, at least on the face of it. However as it operates under the military banner, for all intents and purposes to the outsider it is the military meeting the infrastructure needs of the country which are the responsibility of the civilian government. With no money exchanging hands, it means that the population benefits from the output and exonerates the military of *mala fides*. The military conversely is able to both cash in and extend its hegemony without having to assume direct political control.

We see a very similar *modus operandi* with respect to Fuji Foundation. It too (as shown in chapter VI) was created for a specific purpose – welfare of widows' retired officers and their children. Today it is a multi-million rupee worth, financially successful commercial entity which is simultaneously the largest taxpayer in the country and provides a wide range of welfare services from the profits it makes.

Within the military's self-perception, it represents the organisation's 'development' / nation building efforts as it provides welfare services to the masses which the state fails to; and it creates jobs. Within the military mind set civilians are after all equal beneficiaries of the services. The military is simply forced to fill in the space that has been created by the political and administrative leadership.

Just like FWO, Fauji Foundation too enjoys a military, yet non-military status. One need not look beyond the organisational and administrative structure of Fauji Foundation to establish that is a military run and military owned entity. It has self-admittedly achieved its current status through conducive policies made during military regimes. Yet, there is no flow of money either to or from the military. In the absence of visible monetary flows, the military is able to denounce the hegemony label.

In reality its hegemony remains intact. With Fauji Foundation operating at the scale that it currently is, the space for the state to cater to the welfare needs of the people is ceded in military's favour. The public on the other hand continues to benefit from the military spill overs. The military through Fauji Foundation is catering to the public welfare needs, provides education, health facilities etc. It stands ameliorates of all *mala fides* because there is no financial benefit accruing to the military directly.

Whereas the very presence of military in a non-defence arena would tantamount to a violation of accepted terms of engagement between the civil and the military, a visible monetary delinking vests a veneer of legitimacy. It endures because neither the hegemon nor the public perceive it as a forceful imposition. Especially with the absence of a money trail, it can claim not having challenged the accepted boundaries of civil military relations. Moreover, the trusteeship of 'development' remains with the civil state. But in effect the military is meeting the people's 'development' needs through an extension of its non-defence resources. It does not need to acquire political control outright anymore as it is extending its hegemony via socio-cultural means.

8.4 How to take the research further

That the Pakistan military is popular amongst the people of the country is quite clear. Given the time frame, it was not possible to get the people's perspective. This study therefore relies on literature on the subject and data collected by various polling agencies as evidence thereof. It would be interesting to explore how the people perceive military and rationalise its presence in development sector. Juxtaposed with the military's own perceptions and its belief in favourable public opinion would be an instructive exercise.

In retrospect, given the opportunity, one group I would like to research are the contractors and private companies working the infrastructure sector. As we saw in chapter VI, a case is made by relevant authorities that the military is active in the infrastructure building sector because private companies are unable to provide requisite security and know how. What I want to investigate further is how the public sector reflects on this assertion. How is the competitive market being affected by military presence?

During the fieldwork for my doctoral research I collected a lot of data that I still have not used. Some of the data can be used for publications as it is. The remainder can be the basis for designing further research projects so as to take this research forward.

For instance one such research possibility is to focus on the aggressive media campaign currently being conducted by the military and its consequences. The relationship of governments, militaries and media has been discussed. There exists literature on the growing ubiquity of media and that how affects terms of interaction between the public, the government and the armed forces. This becomes more complicated in a day and age

where information sharing is not limited to news distribution. New mediums such as multiple social media fora and websites are available where dissemination of non-news products such as songs, plays, documentaries, films, gifs, memes, etc. can achieve a far effective brand management and development than the conventional news outlets. Non-government actors get direct access to the citizenship; the state is both simultaneously present as well as absent. My research plan – which is still in its initial stages – is to focus on how the political can be constituted by capturing the collective fantasy of the society through these modern tools. First step is to ascertain what constitutes a symbol of power. Second is to see how these seemingly arbitrary and neutral symbolic acts capture the poetics of governance and create a politics of 'what if'. I am interested in researching the consequences of such unfettered access of a hegemon to communication tools and how it can be mobilised as a tool for legitimacy? How its plays with the perception of the citizenship and the implications thereof on the broader civil military relations?

For this I already have the initial data set. I already have already interviews from the Inter Services Public Relations department of the Pakistan military on this issue in particular. I also have military publications using which I can identify the time and circumstance under which the military began contemplating disseminating multi-media content themselves as opposed to the conventional news channels, to what end how they achieved their purpose. Using the data that I already have as a base I can conduct further field research which would involve collecting primary as well as secondary data both from the military as well as independent and state media outlets

During the research the Kerry Luger Bill was mentioned from time to time. Moreover, it transpired that large swathes of projects being conducted by the military are being funded by various aid agencies but through the federal of the relevant provincial government as the case may be. Military aid is however an entire topic in itself. It would be instructive however to see how aid agencies operationalise civil m military imbalances for agenda pushing.

I already have data that shows that a sizeable proportion of both large scale as well as smaller development projects undertaken by the military are funded through international development aid. Literature on the subject conversely shows that as per the international development community, development is the responsibility of the civil state which in turn represents the will of the people. As the international community

increasingly rules out traditional interventions as a viable option with respect to states with fragile security conditions, issues like mitigating state insatiability and insecurity for sustained development are being prioritised. Development actors have never been more aware that ensuring a level of security is an essential component of promoting economic progress. This includes countries acting in their independent capacities and through transnational aid agencies. That said international community – as well as literature on the subject – considers states trustees of development and does not accept militaries as legitimate development actors. I therefore intend to conduct a research on the terms on which civil military relations playout in the development arena on the domestic front in many developing economies.

One option is to embed this research within the case studies of my doctoral research that is welfare and large infrastructure projects funded by aid agencies like the USAID funded roads between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The second is to conduct a larger interdisciplinary and collaborative research. The first step therefore will be to visit aid agencies working in Pakistan to understand the processes through which development aid is dispensed and how it ends up in military hands. This can also be a starting point for a comparative exercise with other countries with similar political and economic realities.

Annexure 1– List of Interviewees (can be provided upon request)

Military

NESPAK

Bureaucracy

Education

Technocrats / Civil Society

Total: 50

Annexure 2 - List of Commercial Entities owned by the Armed Forces

In a newspaper article titled '50 commercial entities being run by the armed forces' Amir Wasim reported that the Defence Minister, Khawaja Asif informed the Senate that "there were nearly 50 'projects, units and housing colonies' functioning in the country under the administrative control of Fauji Foundation, Shaheen Foundation, Bahria Foundation, Army Welfare Trust (AWT) and defence Housing authorities (DHAs) (Wasim, 2016)."

Fauji Foundation:

- Fauji Cereals
- Foundation Gas
- Fauji Fertiliser Co. Ltd.
- Fauji Cement Co. Ltd.
- Fauji Oil Terminal and Distillery Co. Ltd.
- Fauji Kabirwala Power Company Ltd.
- Foundation Power Co (Dharki) Ltd.
- Askari Cement Ltd.
- Askari Bank Ltd.
- Foundation Wind Energy (I and II) Ltd.
- Noon Pakistan Ltd. Lahore
- Fauji Meat Ltd.
- Fauji Fertiliser Bin Qasim Ltd.
- Fauji Akbar Partia Marine Terminal Ltd. – Head office in Karachi
- In 2008 Pakistan MarocPhosphore SA was set up in Morocco by the Fauji Foundation (Wasim, 2016)

Army welfare trust:

- Two stud farms in Pakpattan and Okara
- Army Welfare Sugar Mills
- Askari Project (Shoe and Wollen)
- ArmyWelfare Mess and Blue Lagoon Restaurant, Rawalpindi
- Real easts comprising three small housing schemes in Lahore, Badaber and Sangjani
- Askari General insurance Co. Ltd.
- Askari Aviation Services
- MAL Pakistan Ltd. Karachi
- Askari Guards (Pvt.) Ltd. – Head office in Rawalpindi
- Askari Fuels (CNG) – Head office in Rawalpindi
- Askari Seeds
- Askari Enterprises
- Fauji Security Services (acquired from Fauji Foundation)
- Askari Apparel
- Askari Lagoon

Shaheen Foundation – which is a trust of the Pakistan Air Force:

- Shaheen Airport Services
- Shaheen Aero-traders
- Shaheen Complex Karachi
- Shaheen Complex Lahore
- Shaheen Medical Services
- Hawk Advertising
- Fazaia Welfare Education School System
- SAPS Aviation college
- Air Eagle Aviation Academy
- Shaheen Welfare Housing scheme

Annexure 3 – Pakistan Timeline

1947   End of British rule. Pakistan comes into existence as an independent state.

1948
- Muhammad Ali Jinnah – the founding father of Pakistan Dies.
- Khawaja Nazin ud Din takes over as Governor General.
- First war over the disputed territory of Kashmir fought with India.

1951
- General Muhammad Ayub Khan appointed the first – post independence – Commander in Chief of the armed forces in Pakistan.
- Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan reveals the Rawalpindi Conspiracy case – the conspiracy by Major General Akbar Khan to overthrow government.
- Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime minister of Pakistan and the first successor of Jinnah, is assassinated.

1952
- Khawaja Nazin ud Din takes over as Prime Minister.
- Ghulam Mohammad takes over a Governor General.

1953
- Mohammad Ali Bogra takes over as Prime Minister.
- Ahmaddiya riots erupt at the instigation of religious parties which results in many Ahmaddiyya deaths

.

1954
- Ayub Khan appointed Defence Minister.
- Pakistan joins South East Treaty Organisation (SEATO).
- One Unit Programme is introduced dividing the country into two provinces only and centralises the economy towards West Pakistan.
- First legislative elections held. Iskander Mirza becomes the President and Huseyn Suharwardy the Prime Minister.

1955   Pakistan joins Central treaty organisation CETO – known as the Baghdad Pactat the time.

1956   First constitution of Pakistan is promulgated.

1957
- Amongst growing tensions between East and West Pakistan, Suharwardy resigns and I. I. Chundrigarh becomes the Prime Minister.
- Two months later he too is dismissed and Feroz Khan Noon becomes Prime Minister.

1958
- Iskander Mirza declares a state of emergency and orders mobilisation of the Armed Forces.
- Two months later General Ayub disposes of Iskander Mirza and declares martial law and the military takes over for the first time in Pakistan.

1959
- Elected Bodies Disqualification Order promulgated.

1960
- General Ayub Khan changes his title from Field Martial to President after a national referendum.
- Basic Democracies system introduced.
- Pakistan signs Indus Water Treaty with India.

1962	• Second Constitution of Pakistan promulgated under the tutelage of Ayub Khan.
	• Military ties with china strengthened post Sino-Indian war. Ties with United States subsequently weaken.

1965	• Ayub Khan almost loses election to Fatima Jinnah – but is victorious.
	• Second war with India with Kashmir after Pakistan armed Forces carry out guerrilla action in Kashmir called Operation Gibraltar.
	• War ends in ceasefire after USSR intervention leads to the signing of the Tashkent Agreement.
	• At the UN General Assembly Summit Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto announces Pakistan's intention to build nuclear arsenal in response to India.

1966	• Z.A. Bhutto sacked as Foreign Minister on a personal directive by Ayub Khan.
	• Resentment in East Pakistan grows towards West Pakistan due to economic policies. Bengali nationalism gains ground.
	• Awami Leaugue led by Shaikh Mujib ur Rehman asks for provincial autonomy at the Round Table Conference.

1967	Pakistan People's Party (PPP) formed with Z.A. Bhutto as its chairman.

1969	General Ayub Khan resigns and hands over power to General Yahya Khan.

1970	• General Yahya Khan issues Legal Framework Order 1970 – One Unit dissolved and provinces restored.
	• Major administrative and political changes made further tightening the grip of Martial Law.
	• General elections held in the country. Awami League wins the election by a landslide but not asked to form government by the President. Tensions between East and West Pakistan rise.

1971	• Civil disobedience movement starts in East Pakistan.
	• Talks between Bhutto and Rehman collapse.
	• Yayha Khan order crackdown on East Pakistan politicians, student activists and civil servants called Operation Searchlight.
	• Rehman sets up parallel government with the help of Indian insurgents.
	• Civil war breaks out as East Pakistan tries to secede from West Pakistan.
	• With the help of Indian intervention, East Pakistan breaks away to become Bangladesh.
	• Yahya Khan resigns and Z.A. replaces him as Chief Martial Law Administrator.

1972	A new frontline in Kashmir established through Simla Peace Agreement with Kashmir.

1973	• Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto becomes Prime Minister of Pakistan.
	• Rallies scientists for construction of Nuclear Bomb for national survival.
	• 1973 Constitution pf Pakistan promulgated.
	• Shariat Court and Council of Islamic Ideology created under the Constitution.
	• Ahmaddiyas declared non-muslim under pressure.

1974	• Bhutto reorganises the Military and creates the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.
	• Major land reforms, industrialisation and expansion of higher education system.

1977	• Bhutto's People's Party Pakistan (PPP) accused of rigging the 1977 elections. Riots erupt all over the country. • General Zia ul-Haq imposes martial law in the country.
1978	General Zia becomes President and installs Islamic legal system through various legal and policy measures. Hudood Ordinances promulgated as apart of grand Islamisation of the country. State sponsored Islamisation creates divides between various sects of Islam (Deobandis and Barelvis; and between Sia and Sunnis) White papers against Z.A Bhutto issued.
1979	Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto hanged for murder charges.
1980	• Military ties with the United States strengthen. • As a result of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan the United States pledges military assistance to Pakistan. • Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province became a base for the anti-Soviet Afghan fighters.
1984	Referendum held asking for support of his religious programme. Zia wins by overwhelming majority due to support from religious parties.
1985	• Non-partisan general elections held under pressure from Ronal Reagan. • Mohammad Khan Junejo handpicked to be Prime Minister. • Junejo extends Zia's terms as Chief of Army. • Ban on political parties lifted.
1986	Benazir Bhutto (daughter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto) returns to Pakistan from a self-imposed exile to lead the election campaign.
1987	Tensions with India escalate over Siachen border.
1988	• General Zia dies in a plane crash. • Benazir lead PPP wins the general election. • Benazir government oversees Soviet evacuation of Afghanistan.
1990	Benazir Bhutto dismissed as prime minister by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on charges of incompetence and corruption.
1991	The newly elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif begins economic liberalisation programme.
1992	Government launches campaign to end violence by Mohajir Quami Movement in Karachi.
1993	• President Ghulam Ishaq Khan tries to sack Nawaz Sharif on similar grounds as Benazir. • Sharif is restored through a judgement of the Supreme Court. • Weeks later Nawaz Sharif resigns as prime minister under pressure from the military. • Benazir Bhutto comes back into power by winning the general elections.

1994	• Benazir hand picks Farooq Leghari as President.
	• Oversees the appointment of all four-star (Army, Navy, Air Force and Joint chief) Chiefs of Staff of the Military thereby earning the nickname Iron Lady.
	• Pakistan's primary intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) becomes involved in arming / supporting Muslims around the world (Bosnia, Xinjiang, Phillipines etc.)
	• Pakistan government recognises the Taliban government with Mullah Omar as its head.
1996	Benazir government dismissed by President Farooq Leghari amid corruption charges and allegations of causing her own brother's death.
1997	Muslim League wins elections and Nawaz Sharif returns as Prime Minister.
1998	• Nawaz forces General Jehangir Karamat to resign as Chief of Army Staff over disagreement over issues of national security.
	• Pakistan conducts nuclear tests amid international opposition.
1999	Pakistani and Indian forces clash at Kargil (in Indian held Kashmir). Both sides suffer heavy casualties.
	General Pervez Musharraf seizes power in a bloodless coup.
2000	Nawaz Sharif sentenced to life imprisonment on terrorism charges over the high jacking incident [when he was trying to prevent the 1999 coup].
	Sharif goes into exile to Saudi Arabia after being pardoned by the military.
2001	• Musharraf remains the head of the military but names himself the President of Pakistan.
	• Musharraf extends military support to the United States in the 'fight against terrorism'. In return United States lifts some of the sanctions imposed on Pakistan in the aftermath of the nuclear tests.
	• Troops deployed along the Pakistan-India border. Full scale war anticipated amid growing tensions in Kashmir following suicide attack on Indian parliament.
2002	• President Musharraf wins five years in office via referendum [which heavily criticised for being unconstitutional].
	• Within a few months Musharraf grants himself sweeping new powers, including the right to dismiss an elected parliament.
2003	Pakistan and India declare ceasefire in Kashmir. Air links resumed between the two countries.
2004	• Pakistan mounts first military offensive against suspected AL-Qaeda militants and their supporters in tribal areas along the Afghan border. United States simultaneously begins drone strikes in Pakistan.
	• Military led National Security Council formed [institutionalising the role of armed forces in civilian affairs] after parliamentary approval.
2005	• Pakistan tests its first nuclear-capable cruise missile.
	• Earthquake in Pakistan administered Kashmir kills tens of thousands of people.

2006   Government signs peace accord with pro-Al-Qaeda militants in Waziristan (tribal areas along Afghan border).

2007
- Musharraf suspends the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftikhat Muhammad Chaudhry. A wave of anti-Musharraf protests is triggered through the country.
- Militants occupy the Red Mosque in Islamabad which results in a full-fledged security action.
- Supreme Courts reinstates Chief Justice Chaudhry.
- Benazir Bhutto returns from self-imposed exile.
- Army launches offensive against militants in North-Waziristan.
- Musharraf wins Presidential election which is then challenged by the Supreme Court.
- Musharraf declares emergency rule, dismisses the chief justices again and appoints a new Supreme Court which confirms his re-election.
- Nawaz Sharif returns from exile.
- The state of emergency is lifted.
- Benazir Bhutto is assassinated in Rawalpindi during an election campaign rally.

2008
- Following general elections Yousaf Raza Gillani led PPP and Nawaz Sharif led PML-N form a coalition. The coalition later breaks.
- President Musharraf resigns after the two main governing parties agree to launch impeachment proceedings against him.
- India blames Pakistan for the Mumbai attacks. Pakistan denies any involvement.

2009
- In an attempt to install permanent ceasefire with Islamist militants, the government agrees to implement Shariah law in north-western Swat valley. These talks break down after Taliban-linked militants seek to extend their control. Offensive to wrest control of Swat from militants launched.
- The judges dismissed by Musharraf are reinstated.

2010
- 18th constitutional amendment passed. Parliament approves wide-ranging conditional reforms which include transferring key powers from the office of president to prime minister.
- Worst floods in 80 years kill approximately 1,600 people; 20 million displaced.

2011
- Osama bin laden killed by American Special Forces in Abottabad.
- NATO attack on Pakistan military outposts in Salalah kills 25 Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan shut down the NATO supply routes and boycotted the Bonn conference on Afghanistan.
- Leaked memo alleges senior officials sought US aid against a military coup after the killing of Osama bin Laden earlier in the year. This becomes known as the Memogate scandal

2012
- Amid growing tensions overs the Memogtae scandal, the Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani criticised top military brass and sacked some top defence officials.
- Army Chief General Pervez Kayani warns of unpredictable consequences".
- Government refuses to reopen corruption cases against President Asif Ali Zardari and other political figures. Supreme Court threatens to prosecute Prime Minister Gilani for contempt of court.
- A US Senate panel cuts $33m in aid to Pakistan.

- Supreme Court disqualifies Prime Minister Gilani over the President Zardari corruption row.
- Raja Pervez Ashraf becomes the new Prime Minister.
- US apologies for killing Pakistani soldiers in the NATO attack. Pakistan agrees to reopen the NATO supply routes.

2013
- Supreme Court orders arrest of Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf over corruption charges.
- Populist cleric Tahirul Qadri leads a nationwide march towards Islamabad.
- Government agrees to dissolve parliament early.

2014
- Government and Taliban representatives meet in North Waziristan for peace talks, with a cease-fire top of the agenda.
- Peace talks collapse after attack on Karachi airport. Uzbek militants and Pakistani Taliban claim responsibility.
- Taliban attack Army Public School in Peshawar killing 150 children.

2015 Pakistan and China sign agreements worth billions of dollars to boost infrastructure, end energy crisis, create economic parks in Pakistan
.
2016 Supreme Court lifts three-year travel ban on General Pervez Musharraf. He leaves country.

2017
- Supreme Court disqualifies Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif corruption charges.
- Shahid Khaqan Abbasi becomes new Prime Minister.

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