

11 “We can kill striking workers without being prosecuted”: armed bands of strikebreakers in late Imperial Germany*

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During a debate in the Reichstag in 1927, the communist member of parliament Paul Bertz looked back at the rise of professional strikebreaking before the First World War. He explicitly mentioned the “bands of strikebreakers” (*Streikbrecherbanden*) led by Karl Katzmarek and Friedrich Hintze, two notorious strikebreaking agents who organised the replacement of striking workers as well as violent intimidation and repression of the labour movement.¹ Bertz argued polemically that irregular bands of strikebreakers in Wilhelmine Germany and the paramilitary Technical Emergency Corps (*Technische Nothilfe*) in the early Weimar years served similar purposes. Indeed, the corps emerged after the November Revolution with the aim of replacing striking workers in industrial sectors considered to be of national importance.² Left-wing politicians accused it of being “Gustav Noske’s strikebreakers’ guard”, alluding to the Weimar defence minister, a resolutely anti-Bolshevik member of the Social Democratic Party who deployed paramilitary *Freikorps* along with government soldiers against the revolutionary uprisings in early 1919.³

The unlikely analogy between the Technical Emergency Corps and armed bands of strikebreakers highlights the fact that different political systems, such as Wilhelmine Germany and the Weimar Republic, were confronted with similar challenges stemming from the process of democratisation and the rise of social movements. One of the crucial challenges facing states during the early decades of the twentieth century was how to deal with militarised citizens and privately organised coercion. In an effort to tackle “strike terrorism”, both the Wilhelmine and Weimar authorities supported the creation of formally regulated organisations of civilian volunteers, such as the Colliery Auxiliary Police Corps (*Zechenwehren*) in the pre-war years and the Technical Emergency Corps after the November Revolution.⁴ In addition, violent gangs of strikebreakers led by charismatic figures such as Hintze and Katzmarek were already a familiar presence in labour disputes before 1914. Paul Bertz was therefore not completely wrong in claiming that mercenary bands of strikebreakers had emerged with aims similar to those of the auxiliary corps. In the case of armed strikebreakers, counter-strike strategies consisted in extra-legal, non-regulated action.

The aim of this chapter is to shed new light on the structure of internal violence and its media representation in late Imperial Germany. In doing so, I will argue

that repressive functions carried out by militarised citizens were more widespread and more readily tolerated when social conflicts and political antagonism were perceived as a major threat to the established order and when state-led repression triggered divisive discussions concerning the legitimate use of violence. Although the erosion of trust in the state and political violence reached unprecedented levels after 1918, violent confrontations between strikers and strikebreakers had already been an integral part of the social reality and public discourses before the outbreak of the war. However, while debates about legitimate repression and “class justice” were led by the Social Democratic milieu in the pre-war period, it was the radical left that redirected them against the moderate SPD after the brutal repression of the Spartacist uprising.

This chapter focuses on the violence perpetrated by armed bands of professional strikebreakers before 1914, i.e. in a period in German history of massive but largely non-violent protest and relatively few episodes of brutal repression.⁵ The first section examines the structure of violence in late Imperial Germany, with particular focus on the fact that it was not only ideological antagonism but also the glamorisation and sensationalisation of violence in the modern media that played a crucial role in intensifying political polarisation, hence setting the pre-conditions for political violence. Section two presents the context in which violent strikebreaking tactics emerged and became part of the social reality and the media reconstruction of it. Sections three to five analyse several episodes of violence, namely eight murders carried out by armed strikebreakers in the decade before the outbreak of the First World War. The sixth section explores the repertoire of action by professional bands of armed strikebreakers, including those led by Katzmarek and Hintze. This is followed by some concluding remarks.

Violence in late Wilhelmine Germany

According to Alf Lütke in his studies of the history of everyday life, low-level violence against outsiders and potential revolutionaries is a widespread and routine practice in modern societies.⁶ Throughout the nineteenth century European states were increasingly successful in establishing a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force, although violence perpetrated by private citizens was far from marginalised. Private violence survived as a form of counter-violence against the state, or, in contrast, as a form of private law enforcement and support for the established order. After the emergence of a modern private security industry around 1900,⁷ privately organised coercion was more frequently driven by economic than political reasons. The rise of armed strikebreaking was politically motivated in that it was a counter-strike strategy supported by the so-called loyal classes, but it was also, and probably more importantly, economically motivated by the steady growth in demand for replacement workers and for the “protection” of non-strikers in the decades before 1914.

As mentioned in the introduction, collective violence and brutal repression were relatively infrequent in Wilhelmine Germany, and it is common knowledge that the SPD and the Free Trade Unions discouraged violence as counterproductive.

The picture changes, at least in part, if we take a micro-historical approach and examine the low-level aggression and violent confrontations that became a widespread phenomenon during mass demonstrations and strikes, especially where strikebreakers and pickets were involved.⁸ The armed strikebreakers' repertoire of strategies included repressive practices and mafia-like activities, such as provocation, harassment, intimidation and even murder. What makes the episodes of "strike terrorism" and the activities of armed strikebreakers remarkable is that violent confrontations during labour disputes were some of the most frequently discussed and polarising topics in German newspapers. Widespread "threat communication" made conflicts and violence more visible.⁹ As noted by Ian Kershaw, the processes of enlargement of the public sphere and massification of society often led to the "glamorisation of violence".¹⁰ Sensational media reports of "strike terrorism" had an impact not only on the political debate, but also on the popular culture and everyday life. In 1910, for example, the semi-official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* reported that instead of playing "cops & robbers" or "cowboys & indians", children in Berlin were playing "strikebreakers & unionised workers".¹¹

The heightened media attention on violent strikebreaking reflected a social reality that emerged during the decade before the First World War, when transnationally active bands of strikebreakers spread throughout the highly industrialised regions of Central Europe. The innovative aspect of their activity was that they not only replaced striking workers, they also organised multiple services, such as transportation and supplying and housing "blacklegs". Strikebreaker agents also organised "self-defence" against "strike terrorism", and intimidation of unionised workers was an integral part of their business. They were almost always armed, mostly with revolvers, sticks and daggers. Cheap handguns could be obtained with no legal restrictions, and the wide circulation of firearms became a destabilising factor in an age of class conflict, fear of social disintegration and radical nationalism.¹² Bands of strikebreakers were therefore involved not only in the broader class struggles and political antagonism of late Imperial Germany, but also in the dynamics of violent masculinity and firearm obsession that characterised the "Browning generation", i.e. those born in the late nineteenth century with no greater desire than to buy (and use) a revolver.¹³

Strikebreaking in context

In North America, the business of providing strikebreakers and armed guards during labour conflicts had already become widespread in the late nineteenth century. Several detective agencies and private police forces were widely employed to protect "blacklegs" and intimidate striking workers.¹⁴ At the same time, famous strikebreaking agents, such as Jack Whitehead and James Farley, the latter portrayed in Jack London's novel *Iron Heel* (1907), assembled permanent groups of replacement workers to be deployed throughout the country.¹⁵ In Great Britain, "free labour" organisations such as the National Free Labour Association (1893) led by William Collison, self-proclaimed "king of the blacklegs", also emerged

around 1900.¹⁶ Only a few years later, however, strikebreaking became increasingly professionalised, more widespread and violent in Imperial Germany as well. The intensification of strikes and social conflicts created a new sense of urgency among employers, who were interested not only in the rapid recruitment of replacement workers, but also in private security services.

In the years leading up to World War I, the Social Democratic press in Germany complained on an almost daily basis about legal discrimination against unionised workers and the intensification of violence and intimidation perpetrated by armed bands of strikebreakers, which went largely unpunished. The SPD party newspaper, *Vorwärts*, was openly critical of the fact that violent repression against the labour movement was de facto considered a legitimate course of action, while the impunity of strikebreakers represented a major threat to the rule of law in Wilhelmine society.¹⁷ The Social Democratic propaganda pointed out that class-based justice was the result of the general incompatibility of interests and values of the working class and the capitalist elites.¹⁸ This emotionally charged narrative of left-wing newspapers tended to exaggerate – or even invent – episodes of anti-labour repression, while, by contrast, conservative newspapers placed greater emphasis on the violence against and intimidation of strikebreakers. With the discourse radicalised on both sides, unionised workers and strikebreakers alike were accused of “terrorism”.¹⁹ However, aside from these politically motivated overstatements, violent clashes between strikebreakers and unionised workers undoubtedly intensified around 1910. What is also remarkable is that the SPD party press and its agitational journalism were able to use sensationalised and tendentious reports as an effective political and moral weapon in the context of emerging mass communication.²⁰ In doing so, Social Democratic opinion making managed to create a political culture of opposition in an era in which the SPD and the “free” trade unions were unassimilated forces in Wilhelmine society.²¹

At the opposite end of the political spectrum, the threat to national interests by “strike terrorism” and growing fears of revolution were enough in the eyes of the “parties of order” to justify violent intimidation and repression of the labour movement. The right wing saw counter-strike actions by “yellow” unions and professional strikebreakers as necessary and urgent. Rudolf Lebius, a former Social Democratic journalist who founded the Federation of Yellow Unions (*Gelber Arbeiterbund*) in 1907, described the emerging yellow movement as a “fighting force” (*Kampforganisation*) against “strike terrorism”.²² This narrative was rooted in anti-socialist discourses that spread more rapidly after the Social Democratic victories in 1903 and were supported by nationalist pressure groups such as the Imperial League against Social Democracy.²³

As a result of partly spontaneous but partly orchestrated fears of revolution and “strike terrorism”, the formation of professional groups of armed strikebreakers was seen as both economically and politically necessary. The idea of rallying anti-socialist forces together, which was typical of the so-called Bülow Bloc, resulted in strikebreakers being considered part of the loyal classes and deserving of special protection, or a sort of extended right of self-defence against supposed terrorism. Hence, when two strikebreakers killed a worker during a pub brawl

in north-eastern Bavaria in 1907, *Vorwärts* polemically argued that since state authorities protected strikebreakers as “useful members of the community”, the murder was therefore a state crime (*Staatsverbrechen*).²⁴ Karl Otto Uhlig, a Social Democratic member of the Saxon Landtag, accused bands of strikebreakers of persistent immorality and criminal acts that threatened not only the unionised workers but also the entire community, and he considered it unacceptable that the police protected them.²⁵ What is remarkable is that non-state armed groups, such as pirates, mercenaries and bandits, were primarily characterised by their recourse to violence without state authority or in opposition to it.²⁶ However, these armed groups – and professional strikebreakers clearly were – could also serve as a source of extra-legal repression and law enforcement.

“We can kill striking workers without being prosecuted”

According to *Vorwärts* and other left-wing newspapers, strikebreakers had good reason to claim that they could “kill striking workers without being prosecuted”.²⁷ This catchphrase was attributed to a strikebreaker flaunting his impunity, and it became a widespread slogan against counter-strike action and “class justice”. After being mentioned for the first time in 1906, the phrase was used and reused by many left-wing newspapers in Germany, Austria and the Swiss Confederation before 1914.²⁸ In the summer of 1906 when there had already been widespread debates about the impunity of violent strikebreakers, a brutal fight between unionised workers and strikebreakers took place outside the “Union” motor vehicle factory near Nuremberg in Bavaria. On the morning of 17 August, during the ongoing labour dispute, the management of the company incited the strikebreakers to intimidate the leaders of the local trade unions standing outside the factory. On the evening of the same day, a group of strikebreakers assaulted striking workers with revolvers, sticks and knives. Maurer, the director of the factory, led the attack; he drove his car into the fighting crowd and used an air pump as a weapon. *Vorwärts* and the Austrian *Arbeiter-Zeitung* reported that the police were present but did not intervene to stop the attacks.²⁹

During the fight, 22-year-old strikebreaker Ernst Thiel fired three times at Melchior Fleischmann, one of the local trade union leaders, who died two days later. Claiming self-defence, Thiel went unpunished. In court, the company and the strikebreakers successfully accused the striking workers of being responsible for the escalation of violence outside the factory.³⁰ Thiel was not the only strikebreaker armed with a revolver; another, by the name of Fackelmeier, carried weapons and threatened unionised workers with his revolver.³¹ The fact that the police ignored calls to take the weapons away from the strikebreakers provoked quite frequent violent outbursts by the crowd against strikebreakers and police forces.³²

The court case on the 1906 riot in Nuremberg resulted in five striking workers being sentenced to prison for upwards of three months. By contrast, the armed strikebreakers Fackelmeier and Thiel (who had murdered Fleischmann) went unpunished because their actions were deemed legitimate self-defence against

the provocations and attacks of unionised workers.³³ Liberal newspapers such as the *Allgemeine Zeitung* defended the plea of self-defence and blamed the unionised workers who had attacked the strikebreakers.³⁴ The paper confirmed that Fleischmann had been killed by Thiel, although it presented the murder in a completely different way to *Vorwärts*. The *Allgemeine Zeitung* denounced the striking workers outside the “Union” factory as violent alcoholics and published detailed reports on the trial endorsing the claim of legitimised self-defence against “strike terrorism”.³⁵

Murders carried out by armed strikebreakers before 1914

Although the Nuremberg riot of 1906 and the murder of Fleischmann had a huge echo in the Social Democratic press, it was only after popular protests erupted in 1910 in Moabit, an industrial suburb of Berlin, that the debate about “strike terrorism”, “excessive strikes” and claims for better protection of “willing workers” spread more rapidly.³⁶ It reached its peak in the last years before the First World War when, after the first murder case in Nuremberg, several more workers were killed by strikebreakers, strikebreaking agents and armed employers (see Table 11.1).

It is not surprising that liberal and conservative newspapers tended to overlook episodes of anti-labour violence while left-wing newspapers overstated them. Even though the narrative of “class justice” emphasised by Social Democrats needs critical reassessment, it seems clear that the *Kaiserreich*’s judicial system took a very permissive attitude towards strikebreakers’ armed self-defence.³⁷ The quasi-impunity of armed strikebreakers was clearly demonstrated by the Nuremberg case and many similar episodes in the following years. The most sensational of these episodes involved Paul Keiling, a well-known strikebreaking agent who had 17 prior convictions for theft, violence, robbery and other crimes.³⁸ In February 1914, despite being well known to the police, he was able to leave German territory and offer his strikebreaking services in Austria-Hungary, where he killed the bookbinder Johann Solinger during a strike in Silesia. Keiling was sentenced to only eight months in prison in what was one of most extensively discussed murder cases in German, Swiss and Austrian newspapers until the outbreak of war.³⁹

Prior to the Keiling case, the most prominent and most important transnationally, another murder had been carried out by an armed strikebreaker in Duisburg in September 1911 during the Rhineland transport company strike. Strikebreaker and former police officer Brackhage fired his revolver and killed the dockworker Meierling.⁴⁰ Brackhage’s crime was also deemed to be self-defence and this unpunished murder had a huge impact on the working class. Postcards were printed to commemorate the victim and to denounce the *Kaiserreich*’s class-based justice system.⁴¹ A few months before Meierling’s murder, another episode of violence in Lübeck outraged the left-wing newspapers. In the old city port, a group of 40 strikebreakers armed with revolvers and sticks were responsible for a night of terror as pubs and stores were plundered and many citizens injured.⁴²

In September 1912, a striking worker was killed by Joseph Ruppert, a prominent strikebreaking agent, near Magdeburg. Here, too, the murderer was acquitted

Table 11.1 Workers killed by German strikebreakers, strikebreaking agents and armed employers between 1906 and 1914

<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Incident</i>	<i>Court decision</i>
17 August 1906	Nuremberg	Strikebreaker Ernst Thiel fired at one of the local trade union leaders, Melchior Fleischmann, who died two days later	Acquitted (acting in self-defence)
1907	Wunsiedel (Bavaria)	Two strikebreakers employed by the local porcelain factory, fatally stabbed the worker Schödel	Unknown
27 September 1911	Duisburg	Strikebreaker and former police officer Brackhage killed dockworker Meierling	Acquitted (acting in self-defence)
14 September 1912	Burg (Magdeburg)	Joseph Ruppert, a professional strikebreaker, killed striking worker Karl Fritsche	Acquitted (acting in self-defence)
21 April 1912	Zurich	German strikebreaker Otto Kaiser killed Swiss worker Karl Wydler	Acquitted (acting in self-defence)
6 May 1912	Aachen	Employer Von der Hecken, armed with a revolver, killed Dutch worker Hieronymus Stroet	Sentenced to three months in prison, later reprieved
4 June 1913	Frauendorf/Golecino (Stettin)	Strikebreaker Brandenburg stabbed striking worker Kühl with a bread knife	Acquitted (acting in self-defence)
4 October 1913	Magdeburg	Strikebreaking agent Karl Katzmarek caused a traffic collision killing a pedestrian, retired tailor Kühne	Sentenced to one month in prison
8 February 1914	Tetschen/Děčín (Bohemia)	Strikebreaking agent Paul Keiling killed foreman Johann Solinger during a bookbinders' strike	Sentenced to eight months in prison (in Austria-Hungary)

by a German court because he was deemed to have been exercising his right of legitimate self-defence.⁴³ A few months before Magdeburg, there was another case of a strikebreaker shooting and killing a striking worker in Zurich. The perpetrator was the German strikebreaker Otto Kaiser and the victim the unionised worker Karl Wydler, who was shot with a revolver and died a few days later.⁴⁴ Kaiser was acquitted, this time by a Swiss tribunal, because he was deemed to be acting in self-defence. This new case of “class justice” and “terrorism” once again sparked off emotionally charged discussions in the German, Swiss and Austrian press.⁴⁵ One year after Wydler’s murder, on the evening of 4 June 1913 in the port city of Stettin, a strikebreaker named Brandenburg stabbed a striking worker with a bread knife. The victim, named Kühl, died almost instantly.⁴⁶

Alongside these cases of striking workers killed by strikebreakers, there is a very long list of workers seriously injured by armed strikebreakers. In 1913, for example, three blacklegs who were working in Kassel fired their revolvers at the striking worker Ostertag, who miraculously escaped death.⁴⁷ Although the multiple episodes of violence mentioned here involved German-speaking strikebreakers and striking workers, the conflicts between unionised workers and strikebreakers, and hence the ideological antagonism between left-wing and bourgeois newspapers, became radicalised when foreign “blacklegs” were employed. In June 1906, *Vorwärts* reported from Cologne that armed strikebreakers from “semi-civilised regions”, such as the Balkans and Italy, not only threatened striking workers but terrorised the entire city with their violence and criminal activities.⁴⁸ If bands of strikebreakers used a broad repertoire of violence against labour, it is also true that exploited and vulnerable migrant workers were frequently discriminated against, insulted and attacked by striking workers. Socialist and trade union newspapers used an extremely harsh tone in speaking of strikebreakers, who were not only morally stigmatised but also physically threatened. The home addresses of notorious strikebreakers were often published in left-wing newspapers, and posters with explicit death threats were frequently printed during strikes.⁴⁹ In Basel, for example, posters with explicit death threats against strikebreakers were frequently translated into Italian.⁵⁰ Xenophobic discourses against strikebreakers also clearly emerged during transport workers’ strikes in Berlin, when for instance Russian replacement workers were stigmatised as “*Pollacken*” (a disrespectful term for “Polish”) or “*Müllkosaken*” (rubbish Cossacks).⁵¹

More than isolated cases of violence?

As early as 1904, two years before the first murder case in Nuremberg, *Vorwärts* had extensively reported on the violent clashes between armed strikebreakers and unionised workers in Berlin. The SPD party newspaper argued that at least two companies in the industrial area of Berlin (Krey and Zürn & Glienicke) systematically distributed weapons to strikebreakers. Armed with sticks, they formed an “assault column” (*Sturmkolonne*) against strike pickets.⁵² The newspaper of the Federation of Yellow Unions echoed these rumours and boastfully reported on the increasing number of armed strikebreakers in, for example, Wittenau near Berlin, where they were all armed with revolvers.⁵³ Sometimes employers did not limit themselves to arming strikebreakers but were themselves armed and actively participated in “self-defence”. This was the case with the iron industry employer, Von der Hecken, from Aachen, who not only distributed revolvers to his strikebreakers, but also armed himself and killed the Dutch worker Hieronymus Stroet during a strike in 1912.⁵⁴

What is remarkable is that it was not only the professional and hierarchically organised groups of strikebreakers, such as those led by Hintze and Katzmarek, that were armed: the more ad hoc groups also obtained weapons. However, while armed intimidation was a fundamental aspect of the business of professional strikebreakers, who were already equipped with revolvers, unorganised strikebreakers were mostly provided with weapons by the employers. Eventually, the

problem of armed strikebreakers was discussed in the Reichstag. During a debate in 1907, the Social Democratic member of parliament Paul Singer showed the assembly a photograph of armed strikebreakers in Cologne symbolically carrying their weapons to “defend” the company of the industrial magnate Kohl.⁵⁵ Another SPD parliamentarian, Theodor Bömelburg, created a huge sensation when he showed the Reichstag assembly one of the steel-reinforced sticks that had been distributed to strikebreakers in the Ruhr area.⁵⁶

The first reports of “blackleg gunfighters” (*arbeitswillige Revolverhelden*) and employers’ attempts to militarise strikebreakers had appeared already around 1900 but intensified in the decade before the war.⁵⁷ Liberal newspapers also frequently reported on armed strikebreakers. Between September 1906 and March 1907, for example, the *Allgemeine Zeitung* published three articles about strikebreakers armed with revolvers in Munich, Nuremberg and Cologne.⁵⁸ These armed strikebreakers were labelled “gunfighters” by the left-wing newspapers, a term that was broadly used to demonise gun violence and criminal gangs and hence created a semantic connection between the criminal underworld and professional strikebreakers.⁵⁹ Highly evocative notions, such as “gunfighters”, or “worker’s murder” (*Arbeitermord*), suggested that bands of strikebreakers serving to secure capitalist interests were similar to street gangs and that violence was an integral part of their service. Although left-wing newspapers dramatically emphasised the strikebreakers’ (illegal) use of violence, the polemic against “blackleg gunfighters” did partly reflect the social reality after the turn of the century when strikebreakers began systematically to use weapons, partly in self-defence and partly with the aim of intimidating workers and offering private security services to employers. It is therefore not surprising that *Vorwärts* also explicitly compared strikebreaking agents like Friedrich Hintze with Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency.⁶⁰

Bands of strikebreakers: “Yellow Katzmarek” and “Hintze’s soldiers”

In the decade up to 1914, the groups led by Friedrich Hintze in Hamburg and Karl Katzmarek in Berlin emerged as the most important strikebreaking agencies in Imperial Germany. Both bands of strikebreakers were highly professionalised and active in almost the whole of German-speaking Central Europe. They were well known for their brutality and for their use of weapons as a major part of their everyday business. Katzmarek’s and Hintze’s activities resulted in these leaders becoming synonymous with violent, professional strikebreaking activities. In describing the broader phenomenon of strikebreaking, left-wing newspapers used their names as negative terms for violent strikebreaking (*Katzmareks*, *Hintzegardisten* and *Hintzebrüder*).⁶¹ Katzmarek, in particular, had a great interest in his self-representation. Nicknamed “Yellow Katzmarek”, he was a member of the board of the Federation of Yellow Unions and had a personal link with Rudolf Lebius, leader of the Federation.⁶² “Yellow Katzmarek” was always armed with revolvers and daggers and he owned a car, which was not at all common at the time. On the

night of 4 October 1913, on his way back to Magdeburg in his car, he caused a traffic collision killing a pedestrian. Socialist newspapers reported that during the trial Katzmarek tried to defend himself with the argument that he was a prominent strikebreaking agent and therefore a useful member of the community deserving of special protection. Although he had previous convictions for violence, insults and robbery, he was sentenced to only one month in prison.⁶³

In 1912, during a strike in Berlin, Katzmarek joined forces with Hintze to mobilise an armed band of strikebreakers that terrorised unionised workers.⁶⁴ According to sensationalised reports in the SPD party press, violent intimidation of both striking workers and the Social Democratic milieu was the trademark activity of Katzmarek's and Hintze's bands. In 1911, during a strike in the small city of Güstrow in Mecklenburg, Katzmarek's band arrived from Berlin and took de facto control of the town and established a "rule of violence" (*Gewaltherrschaft*).⁶⁵ The same strategy had been adopted by Hintze a year earlier during a mineworkers' strike in Finkenheerd, another small town in northern Germany. When the 15 members of "Hintze's guard" arrived in Finkenheerd, they immediately set about organising a shooting range for weapons training, sending a clear message to the striking workers.⁶⁶

After the Moabit riot in 1910, Hintze became the most notorious German strikebreaker, ironically nicknamed "the hero of Moabit" by *Vorwärts* because of his having led the so-called patriotic forces that helped to restore order after two weeks of rioting.⁶⁷ The Moabit riot was actually a labour dispute that escalated into widespread popular protests, especially after violent clashes between striking workers and strikebreakers.⁶⁸ According to the semi-official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, fighting escalated on the evening of 28 September with more than 90 injured.⁶⁹ "Hintze's soldiers" undertook two tasks during the riot: they supplied substitutes for striking workers, helping to deliver coal during the day, and at night they cooperated with the police to combat "strike terrorism". Hintze and his strikebreakers had access to a temporary prison camp for arrested striking workers, where, in collusion with the police authorities, they savagely beat the prisoners. It was not only *Vorwärts* but also the liberal *Vossische Zeitung* that reported on the quasi-paramilitary organisation of Hintze's band during the Moabit uprising.⁷⁰

In October 1910, Hintze gave a long interview to the popular newspaper *Berliner Morgenpost*, in which he described his career as a professional strikebreaker and provided insights on how he organised his business.⁷¹ Initially, Hintze worked for the well-known strikebreaker agent August Müller in Hamburg, but shortly after Müller's death, the 21-year-old Hintze established his own organisation. He claimed to have more than 6,000 strikebreakers whom he could mobilise in only eight days. Despite this obviously exaggerated statement, Hintze was able to organise quite large groups of armed strikebreakers with long-range mobility. In 1911 *Vorwärts* reported that hundreds of "Hintze's soldiers" had travelled from Hamburg to the East Prussian city of Königsberg, which was almost 1,000 kilometres away.⁷² Berlin and Hamburg were the most important logistic centres for the distribution of strikebreakers to distant cities such as Königsberg or Basel, but

they more frequently operated in the regional areas of cities such as Bremen and Kassel as well as many small towns in Mecklenburg and Brandenburg.⁷³

Hintze's name became a synonym for professional strikebreaking with brutal methods. According to the SPD parliamentarian Cohn, Hintze recruited violent teenagers from the poorest districts of Berlin.⁷⁴ In his interview to the *Morgenpost*, Hintze mentioned that his agency was doing very well and that he was paid ten marks for each strikebreaker he delivered. He explicitly stated that he offered not only labour replacement but also supply services, logistics (he had three cars) and, of course, organisation of the strikebreakers' "self-defence". He was aware that the interview with the *Morgenpost* was a great opportunity for free publicity and mentioned that his strikebreakers would do any kind of job that the company would pay for, but, more importantly, they could effectively intimidate unionised workers. The agent proudly proclaimed that "with thirty men I can terrify five hundred strikers".⁷⁵ Hintze's agency was not only active during strikes, it also offered its services to private companies in the aftermath of unrest to prevent the expansion of labour unions.⁷⁶ Hintze also mentioned that he was already involved in 15 different strikes and that the most important aspect of his business was to create a military-like organisation and establish military discipline among the strikebreakers.

Bands of strikebreakers combined violence, a quasi-paramilitary organisation and street gang behaviour with a highly professionalised business. It was not only Hintze who made an effort to publicise his semi-legal strikebreaking agency: Katzmarek distributed marketing brochures informing potential employers that they were to pay his strikebreakers five marks per day and that they should also pay for transportation, food supplies and housing. Katzmarek's brochure also stated that he was able to recruit service staff and cooks and to provide cooking utensils for the strikebreakers as well as "resolute foremen" and armed guards.⁷⁷ His band of strikebreakers was hierarchically organised and well known not only in Germany but also in Austria and the Swiss Confederation. Katzmarek had a right-hand man, Gründke, and a group of foremen who oversaw the other strikebreakers.⁷⁸ After his election to the central committee of Lebius's Federation of Yellow Workers in January 1908, Katzmarek was described by Lebius as someone with a charismatic but dangerously self-overestimated personality and "gipsy blood" (*Zigeunerblut*).⁷⁹ Although Katzmarek cooperated with other notorious strikebreakers, such as Hintze, he also tried to protect his lucrative business using illegal methods against his competitors. In 1913, for example, he sent falsified letters purporting to be from private companies to other strikebreaking agents resulting in these delivering "blacklegs" to the wrong place and therefore receiving no pay.⁸⁰

Joseph Ruppert was another professional strikebreaker who killed a worker near Magdeburg in 1912 and who, during his trial, tried to justify always carrying his revolver with the argument that "weapons are the tools of our trade".⁸¹ He was accused by *Vorwärts* of being one of the most dangerous members of Katzmarek's band.⁸² More often, Ruppert worked independently with his partner Anton Meinel, another notorious strikebreaker who was also accused of being a procurer.⁸³

They were involved in several episodes of violence and intimidation not only in Magdeburg but also in Berlin, Thuringia (Zeulenroda) and Nesseldorf in the Moravian-Silesian region. The Social Democratic *Arbeiter-Zeitung* reported that Meinel threatened unionised workers during a strike in Berlin claiming: "I can do what I want, I am allowed in certain circumstances to shoot, I can even kill a man".⁸⁴ Like the other "blackleg gunfighters" mentioned in this chapter, the focus of Ruppert's and Meinel's activities was less on replacing striking workers and more on intimidating them.⁸⁵

Conclusion

Greater protection for strikebreakers had already begun to be sought by conservative politicians and employers at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1897, the Kaiser announced a programme of "protection for the national labour of the productive classes, . . . ruthless repression of all revolutionary subversion and the heaviest penalty for anyone who dares to hinder his neighbour, who wants to work, in his freedom to work".⁸⁶ This political manifesto against organised labour formed part of the so-called *Zuchthausvorlage*, the penitentiary bill designed to penalise picketing that was presented to the Reichstag in 1899 but defeated by the parliamentary opposition.⁸⁷ However, the spirit of the *Zuchthausvorlage* remained embedded in the Prussian courts, at least from a Social Democratic standpoint, even after its defeat in the Reichstag.

The de facto impunity of armed groups of strikebreakers can be explained as an extra-legal response aimed at protecting the "productive classes" after leading conservatives recognised that the intensification of repressive authoritarian practices against the labour movement was rather unpopular and could not be legally imposed. The advent of mass politics, especially the introduction of universal male suffrage and the rise of mass-produced newspapers, set new limits on state repression and authoritarian control. At the same time, "threat communication" and the radicalisation of the debates on "strike terrorism" gave greater visibility and urgency to social conflicts. As a result, strikebreaking became more professionalised and militarised after the turn of the century. This shows that the transition to democracy and mass politics opened up new horizons for privately organised coercion and motivated the redistribution of coercive tasks to non-state actors.

The debate about "strike terrorism" reached a new peak in 1907 when some of the most influential members of the conservative party stressed the urgency for greater protection for those "patriotic and loyal workers" who opposed the "red terror".⁸⁸ During a debate in the Reichstag in 1907, Arthur von Posadowsky-Wehner, the Prussian secretary of state of the interior and vice chancellor, openly encouraged presumed victims of the "red terror" to organise themselves against the intimidation and violence inflicted on them by the labour movement. Posadowsky openly supported the formation of yellow unions and armed groups of strikebreakers and assured them that Prussian courts and police authorities would tolerate counter-strike actions.⁸⁹ This proposition was well received and was taken up by

the leader of the Federation of Yellow Workers, Rudolf Lebius, as stated in his pamphlet *Gelbe Gedanken* (Yellow Thoughts), published in 1908.⁹⁰ In his articles for the federation's newspaper and for several other publications, Lebius stressed the fact that the yellow unions were born out of the right to self-defence of patriotic workers who organised themselves against terrorism: "Red terrorism is the initiator of the yellow movement".⁹¹ The Federation of Patriotic Workers (*Bund Vaterländischer Arbeitervereine*), another anti-labour organisation, created in 1907, used the same argumentative strategy as Lebius. *Deutsche Treue*, the newspaper of the "patriotic workers", claimed that "true German men" should not wait for state protection, but had to mobilise against labour militancy and socialist propaganda.⁹²

In 1910, German industrialists launched a fresh campaign for better protection of "willing workers", calling for the army's intervention and the demonstrative use of machine guns against striking mineworkers in the Ruhr area.⁹³ State-led repression and repressive practices on the part of extra-legal groups, such as the armed bands of strikebreakers, had something in common: they all involved "collective violence". In Charles Tilly's definition, collective violence includes a vast range of social interactions and excludes "purely individual action".⁹⁴ It is therefore grounded in complex interactions and is also closely related to the perceived urgency to defend the established order against emerging social movements and their claims. Therefore, violence carried out by armed strikebreakers was, again following Tilly's definition, not simply "individual aggression writ large" but was significantly affected by "social ties, structures and process" as well as by the political discourses and media representations in Wilhelmine Germany.⁹⁵

Defining repressive practices carried out by armed strikebreakers as collective violence raises further, more general questions: why did strikes and mass demonstrations in the first decades of the twentieth century increasingly shift into collective violence (both in late Imperial Germany and much more dramatically in the early Weimar years)? What impact did different political regimes (semi-authoritarian before 1918, democratic after 1918) have on the levels and forms of collective violence? What impact did the glamorisation and sensationalisation of collective violence in the modern media have in different political contexts? Although further studies are needed to provide exhaustive answers, the rise of armed groups of professional strikebreakers examined in this chapter is an important yet less well-studied issue within the broader framework of authoritarian responses to social conflicts. The impunity of Katzmarek, Hintze and other notorious strikebreakers gives new insights into the privatisation of repressive strategies and the mobilisation of non-state actors in defence of the bourgeois order. In the decade up to 1914, strikebreaking agents were almost always armed and frequently used mafia-like methods to intimidate unionised workers. Along with providing labour replacement, the main aim of these "gunfighters" was to effect non-bureaucratic repression of the labour movement. The violence carried out by bands of strikebreakers demonstrates that the *Kaiserreich's* authorities were inclined to tolerate, to a certain extent, privately organised coercion, especially where social movements, democratic institutions and the modern media were effective in thwarting legal, state-led authoritarian responses.

Notes

* This chapter is part of a broader research project on social conflicts and political violence in late Imperial Germany. A monograph on these topics will be published in spring 2021 under the title *"Blut und Eisen auch im Innern"*. *Soziale Konflikte, Massenpolitik und Gewalt in Deutschland vor 1914* (Frankfurt: Campus).

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- 1 *Reichstagprotokolle*, Vol. 392, March 21, 1927, 9760. The term "bands of strikebreakers" has been also used by historian Stephen H. Norwood. He has examined the spread of large mercenary bands for strikebreaking purposes in early twentieth-century America. Stephen H. Norwood, *Strikebreaking & Intimidation: Mercenaries and Masculinity in Twentieth-century America* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 10.
- 2 See Michael H. Kater, "Die Technische Nothilfe im Spannungsfeld von Arbeiterunruhen, Unternehmerinteressen und Parteipolitik," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 27, no. 1 (1979): 30–78.
- 3 Mark Jones, *Founding Weimar. Violence and the German Revolution of 1918–1919* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 252–59.
- 4 See Amerigo Caruso, "Joining Forces against 'Strike Terrorism': The Public-Private Interplay in Policing Strikes in Imperial Germany, 1890–1914," *European History Quarterly* 49, no. 4 (2019): 597–624. On "wild strikes", counter-strike reactions and armed clashes after 1919 see Dirk Schumann, *Political Violence in the Weimar Republic, 1918–1933: Fight for the Streets and Fear of Civil War* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009).
- 5 See, for example, Anja Johansen, *Soldiers as Police: The French and Prussian Armies and the Policing of Popular Protest, 1889–1914* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).
- 6 Thomas Lindenberger and Alf Lüdtke, "Einleitung. Physische Gewalt – eine Kontinuität der Moderne," in *Physische Gewalt. Studien zur Geschichte der Neuzeit*, ed. Thomas Lindenberger and Alf Lüdtke (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1995), 7–38.
- 7 See, for example, Pieter Leloup, "The Private Security Industry in Antwerp (1907–1934). A Historical-criminological Analysis of its Modus Operandi and Growth," *Crime, History & Societies* 19, no. 2 (2015): 119–47.
- 8 Johansen, *Soldiers as Police*, 134.
- 9 Fabian Fechner, Tanja Granzow, Jacek Klimek, Roman Krawielicki, Beatrice von Lüpke, and Rebekka Nöcker, "'We are Gambling with Our Survival.' Bedrohungskommunikation als Indikator für bedrohte Ordnungen," in *Aufbruch – Katastrophe – Konkurrenz – Zerfall. Bedrohte Ordnungen als Thema der Kulturwissenschaften*, ed. Ewald Frie and Mischa Meier (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 141–73.
- 10 Ian Kershaw, "War and Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe," *Contemporary European History* 14, no. 1 (2005): 107–23, here 111.
- 11 *Norddeutsche Zeitung*, September 29, 1910, 2.
- 12 The possession of guns was not restricted but there were limitations to the right of carrying arms in public.
- 13 Dagmar Ellerbrock, "Gun Violence and Control in Germany 1880–1911: Scandalizing Gun Violence and Changing Perceptions as Preconditions for Firearm Control," in *Control of Violence. Historical and International Perspectives on Violence in Modern Societies*, ed. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (New York: Springer, 2011), 185–212.
- 14 Robert P. Weiss, "Private Detective Agencies and Labour Discipline in the United States, 1855–1946," *The Historical Journal* 29, no. 1 (1986): 87–107.
- 15 Stephen H. Norwood, "Strikebreaking," in *Encyclopedia of U.S. Labor and Working-class History*, Vol. 1, ed. Eric Arnesen (New York: Routledge, 2007), 1338–43.

- 16 Arthur McIvor, *Organised Capital: Employers' Associations and Industrial Relations in Northern England 1880–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 93.
- 17 *Vorwärts*, February 14, 1914, 1–2.
- 18 Benjamin Carter Hett, *Death in the Tiergarten. Murder and Criminal Justice in the Kaiser's Berlin* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 1.
- 19 See, for example, *Arbeiterwille*, April 14, 1914, 1.
- 20 Alex Hall, *Scandal, Sensation and Social Democracy. The SPD Press and Wilhelmine Germany 1890–1914* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 11. See also Frank Bösch, *Öffentliche Geheimnisse: Skandale, Politik und Medien in Deutschland und Großbritannien 1880–1914* (München: Oldenbourg, 2009).
- 21 Thomas Welskopp, “Im Bann des 19. Jahrhunderts. Die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung und ihre Zukunftsvorstellungen zu Gesellschaftspolitik und sozialer Frage,” in *Das neue Jahrhundert. Europäische Zeitdiagnosen und Zukunftsentwürfe um 1900*, ed. Ute Frevert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht), 15–46.
- 22 Rudolf Lebius, *Die gelbe Arbeiterbewegung* (Berlin: Reformverlag Der Bund, 1908), 1. See also Lebius's article against “red terrorism” in *Der Bund*, July 1909, 1. On Lebius see also Martin Kohlrausch, “Zwischen Star-Schriftsteller und Hochstapler: Der ‘Fall-May’ als wilhelminischer Skandal,” in *Karl May: Brückenbauer zwischen den Kulturen*, ed. Wolfram Pyta (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2010), 197–214. On transnational connections of the “yellow” movement in France, Germany and the Swiss Confederation see Romain Bonnet and Amerigo Caruso, “Europe industrielle et contre-internationalisme: le mouvement Jaune dans l'espace franco-allemand avant 1914,” *Histoire@Politique* 39 (2019).
- 23 The increase of Social Democratic votes after the abolition of the antisocialist-laws century was accompanied by the unprecedented intensity of labour conflicts, which reached a provisional peak in the period between 1904 and 1907.
- 24 *Vorwärts*, November 12, 1907, 6.
- 25 *Mitteilungen über die Verhandlungen des Ordentlichen Landtags im Königreiche Sachsen*, 17 Mai 1912, 3389. Uhlig referred to violent activities carried out by armed strikebreakers in Reichenau.
- 26 Vgl. Alejandro Colás and Bryan Mabee, “Introduction,” in *Pirates, Mercenaries, Bandits and Empires. Private Violence in Historical Perspective*, ed. Alejandro Colás and Bryan Mabee (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 1–32.
- 27 *Vorwärts*, February 14, 1914, 1 (“*Wir Arbeitswillige dürfen jemand totschiessen und es passiert uns nichts*”).
- 28 *Vorwärts*, August 21, 1906, 3. See also *Vorwärts*, November 27, 1913, 1; *Vorwärts*, June 7, 1913, 1; *Grütliener*, February 12, 1914, 1; *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, April 14, 1914, 3.
- 29 *Vorwärts*, August 21, 1906, 3; *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, August 26, 1906, 7.
- 30 *Vorwärts*, August 22, 1906, 4. In the following weeks *Vorwärts* reported extensively on the trial, see *Vorwärts*, September 22, 1906, 4; October 10, 1906, October 3 and 12, 1906, 13.
- 31 *Vorwärts*, October 13, 1906, 9.
- 32 See Thomas Lindenberger, *Straßenpolitik. Zur Sozialgeschichte der öffentlichen Ordnung in Berlin 1900 bis 1914* (Bonn: Dietz, 1995), 200.
- 33 *Vorwärts*, October 17, 1906, 2.
- 34 *Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 24, 1906, 7.
- 35 *Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 14, 1906, 6–7 and October 15, 1906, 6.
- 36 On Moabit, see Lindenberger, *Straßenpolitik*.
- 37 For a comprehensive analysis of the Kaiserreich's judicial system and the political debate on “class justice”, see Uwe Wilhelm, *Das Deutsche Kaiserreich und seine Justiz: Justizkritik, politische Strafrechtsprechung, Justizpolitik* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010), 504–10. As noted by Richard F. Wetzell criminal justice in Imperial Germany was the product of a “hybrid legal culture that combined authoritarian elements with the liberal legal principles of the rule of law”. Richard F. Wetzell, “Crime and Criminal

- Justice in Modern Germany,” in *Crime and Criminal Justice in Modern Germany*, ed. Richard F. Wetzell (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014), 1–28.
- 38 *Vorwärts* journalists uncovered 17 convictions between 1895 and 1912. *Vorwärts*, January 15, 1914, 13.
- 39 See Amerigo Caruso and Claire Morelon, “The Threat from Within across Empires: Strikes, Labor Migration, and Violence in Central Europe, 1900–1914” (forthcoming article).
- 40 *Vorwärts*, February 21, 1913, 10.
- 41 *Vorwärts*, October 6, 1911, 4.
- 42 *Vorwärts*, Mai 6, 1911, 9.
- 43 *Vorwärts*, November 31, 1912, 3.
- 44 *Gewerkschaftliche Rundschau für die Schweiz*, January 5, 1912, 62.
- 45 Along with *Vorwärts*, a total of six Austrian and 13 Swiss newspapers reported about the murder of Wydler. For example *La lutte syndicale*, June 22, 1912, 4; *La Liberté*, Mai 7, 1912, 1; *Grütliauer*, Mai 25, 1912, 2; *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, Mai 13, 1912, 5 and *Böhmerwald Volksbote*, Mai 18, 1912, 6.
- 46 *Vorwärts*, June 7, 1913, 1. See also *Vorwärts*, June 29, 1913, 2.
- 47 *Vorwärts*, April 1, 1913, 4.
- 48 *Vorwärts*, June 11, 1912, 4.
- 49 *Grütliauer*, May 31, 1906, 1. See also *Grütliauer*, June 26, 1906, 4.
- 50 *Grütliauer*, June 27, 1907, 6.
- 51 Lindenberger, *Straßenpolitik*, 216–18.
- 52 *Vorwärts*, November 8, 1904, 6.
- 53 *Vorwärts*, February 2, 1908, 4.
- 54 *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, July 26, 1912, 8; *Vorwärts*, July 21, 1912, 6. See also Michael Klöcker, *Die Sozialdemokratie im Regierungsbezirk Aachen vor dem 1. Weltkrieg* (Hamburg: Einhorn-Pressen Verlag, 1977), 153.
- 55 *Reichstagsprotokolle*, Vol. 227, March 1, 1907, 159–60.
- 56 *Reichstagsprotokolle*, Vol. 201, January 23, 1905, 3990.
- 57 One of the first report on “blackleg gunfighters” appeared in 1902. See *Vorwärts*, June 17, 1902, 4.
- 58 *Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 8, 1906, 18–20; March 2, 1907, 14 and December 20, 1907, 21.
- 59 On dramatisation of crime in Imperial Germany see Philipp Müller, *Auf der Suche nach dem Täter. Die öffentliche Dramatisierung von Verbrechen im Berlin des Kaiserreichs* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2005).
- 60 *Vorwärts*, October 22, 1910, 6.
- 61 For this reason it is sometimes unclear whether Hintze was directly involved, or his name was used to describe other armed groups of strikebreakers.
- 62 *Vorwärts*, April 25, 1911, 4. Lebius was accused of offering the same services of strike-breaking agencies; see *Vorwärts*, September 15, 1908, and March 4, 11, 1910, 4.
- 63 *Vorwärts*, February 6, 1914, 7. The sentence was lenient also because legislation on road accidents was still in the preparation phase and the maximum penalty, for example for *Fahrerflucht* (failing to stop after being involved in an accident) was six months in prison. See Uwe Fraunholz, *Motorphobia: anti-automobiler Protest in Kaiserreich und Weimarer Republik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002), 213.
- 64 *Vorwärts*, September 11, 1912, 4.
- 65 *Vorwärts*, July 14, 1911, 4.
- 66 *Vorwärts*, February 28, 1911, 4.
- 67 *Vorwärts*, October 5, 1910, 1–3.
- 68 *Norddeutsche Zeitung*, September 25, 1910, 7.
- 69 *Norddeutsche Zeitung*, September 29, 1910, 2. *Vorwärts* reported about 75 seriously injured persons, see *Vorwärts*, September 30, 1910, 1–3.
- 70 Lindenberger, *Straßenpolitik*, 283–85.

- 71 *Berliner Morgenpost*, October 4, 1910, 1. Founded in 1898 with a modern and accessible format, the *Morgenpost* reported a daily circulation of 250,000 copies already in 1900. Corey Ross, *Media and the Making of Modern Germany: Mass Communication, Society, and Politics from the Empire to the Third Reich* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 27.
- 72 *Vorwärts*, July 4, 1911, 4.
- 73 *Vorwärts*, November 28, 1911, 9.
- 74 *Reichstagprotokolle*, Vol. 287, February 8, 1913, 3585.
- 75 *Berliner Morgenpost*, October 4, 1910, 1.
- 76 *Ibid.*, 2.
- 77 *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, June 9, 1914, 10.
- 78 *Salzburger Wacht*, April 8, 1913, 6. See also *Vorwärts*, April 5, 1913, 4.
- 79 *Der gelbe Sumpf: ein Blick hinter die Kulissen der gelben Arbeiter-Vereine durch Einsichtnahme in einige Lebius-Briefe* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1908), 15.
- 80 *Vorwärts*, March 20, 1913, 4.
- 81 *Vorwärts*, February 13, 1914, 15.
- 82 *Vorwärts*, September 27, 1913, 9.
- 83 *Vorwärts*, February 16, 1914, 7.
- 84 *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, February 15, 1914, 10.
- 85 *Vorwärts*, April 10, 1913, 4. Following the *Vorwärts*, the police provided Ruppert and Meinel with a special firearms licence, which allowed them to bear weapons during public demonstrations, see *Vorwärts*, February 14, 1914, 1.
- 86 Edgar Feuchtwanger, *Imperial Germany 1850–1918* (London: Routledge, 2001), 129.
- 87 See Geoff Eley, “The Social Construction of Democracy in Germany, 1871–1933,” in *The Social Construction of Democracy, 1870–1990*, ed. George Andrews and Herrick Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 90–117.
- 88 *Reichstagprotokolle*, Vol. 227, April 15, 1907, 770.
- 89 *Ibid.*, 772.
- 90 Rudolf Lebius, *Gelbe Gedanken* (Berlin: Reformverlag Der Bund, 1908), 28.
- 91 “Der rote Terror ist der Vater der gelben Arbeiterbewegung,” *Der Bund*, July 18, 1909, 1. See also Lebius, *Die gelbe Arbeiterbewegung*, 1; Lebius, *Gelbe Gedanken*, 28; *Der Bund*, December 4, 1906, 2.
- 92 *Deutsche Treue*, January 19, 1908, 42 (“Selbsthilfe und die Tätigkeit der deutschen Männer”).
- 93 See Klaus Saul, “Repression or Integration? The State, Trade Unions and Industrial Disputes in Imperial Germany,” in *The Development of Trade Unionism in Great Britain and Germany, 1880–1914*, ed. Wolfgang Mommsen and Hans-Gerhard Husung (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), 338–56.
- 94 Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 4.
- 95 *Ibid.*