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**European Foreign and
Security Policy since the
Lisbon Treaty – From
Common to Single?**

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European Foreign and Security Policy since the Lisbon Treaty – From Common to Single?

I.

The Lisbon Treaty, concluded by 27 member states of the European Union on the 13th of December 2007, effective since 2009, set a renewed and extended agenda for the European Foreign and Security Policy. Since then, the member states of the union have advanced along a common path towards joint “external action”¹, within agreed still narrow limits. Taking hesitant steps through the international crises of the past six and a half years with progress through trial and error.

This progress has occurred mostly in the fields of European diplomacy and civilian crisis management by stabilization efforts. European diplomacy and foreign policy have been severely tested in the Southern Caucasus by the Georgian summer war of 2008 with Russia over two secessionist border provinces. France took the initiative to mediate and acted more in the name of the EU than with its support, let alone with a participation of its partners. The next challenge came with the tumultuous events of “the Arab awakening” (Al Jazeera, Doha) in 2011, called erroneously in Europe through an error of judgment “Arab Spring”. Especially the Syrian civil war and the continuing turmoil in Egypt under a military regime with a civilian front and an Islamic underground after the first relatively free

1 See text of treaty; i.e. Article 9C on external action. The formula refers to all missions and operations, civilian and military.

election of a president, the Muslim Brother Mursi, who was later ousted from office by a military coup with vast popular support, called into question the Egyptian policy of both the EU and the USA.

The limited participation in the presidential election of May 2014 at about 45% showed the effect of the Islamist protest, the latent opposition and the extent of exhaustion of the population after years of excitement, hope and disappointments. Egypt's future remains shrouded, the economy weak, the prospects of Western policy unclear, and there appears to be no way out of the crisis in sight. In fact, the Egyptian state is broken into disparate parts with police and justice on their own as the armed forces that must try to put it together again. The EU and some of its member states tried to contain and end the internal conflict, but failed. American policy in Egypt was likewise paralyzed in spite of insistent American political pressure and continuing massive financial aid to Egypt of over 1,2 billion Dollar p.a., mostly to the benefit of the military, despite warning and threats to cut it off as a political sanction to punish the authoritarian government and abuse of power. The problem of Egypt has remained without a practical solution. For Europe it presents an open political-strategic flank both in the Mediterranean and towards the Middle East, in particular concerning the precarious peace with Israel.

The Libyan Revolution of 2011 with its chaotic aftermath after Muammar al-Gaddafi and the booty of warring rival armed groups, is in danger of falling into the abyss of a further civil war and a failing state, threatening the positive result of the Western military intervention and the prospect of a somewhat more liberal democracy in North Africa rich energy resources and a promise of a better life for its people.

The murderous Syrian civil war, which in 2014 is in its fourth year, has delivered the cruel dementi of an "Arab Spring" in a European sense after the example of Central Europe in 1988/91 and has frustrated both Western "crisis management" through mediation and sanctions as well as the threat of armed intervention. It is typical of the error of judgment by European public opinion and political authorities, that now European discourse favors "Arab winter" to characterize the situation. In fact, the development

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of the general upheaval in the Arab world and in particular of the Syrian civil war has by no means reached its end. A military intervention might have ended the war during the first year – but nobody was ready for it. The EU is in obvious need of a consistent long-term strategy for its Oriental policies with realistic aims, ways and means. The time-honored method of “sticks and carrots” has not worked so far in Syria or with sufficient success in Egypt or Libya. Tunisia remains in limbo.

However, in Egypt the peace with Israel and the Suez Canal/Red Sea maritime route have so far been preserved from populist nationalism and the collective outcry for a cancellation of the peace and a return to a state of war. Military rule has prevailed and so far saved the security of the region and the limited cooperation with Israel. Anti-terrorist policy has been continued vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip and the Sinai with mixed success. But all three positive facts are permanently endangered by revolt and anarchy, the latent threats to the surface stability of Egypt under authoritarian military government, which is in danger of becoming a repressive dictatorship under pressure from violent opposition and mass expectations of a better life through economic growth which cannot be produced under the present conditions. Militant Islamism runs through the Egyptian rural population and the underprivileged quarters of the poor urban areas. The EU has no means to significantly influence the situation. It has not been able or willing to effectively help Egypt or Libya. Even calmer Tunisia and firmly controlled Morocco remain in precarious political and social conditions as does Algeria, the most important Maghreb country, culturally and politically the closest to Europe via France.

The increasingly dangerous dynamics of failing states in Africa have completed the large scale political and social-economic destabilization of Europe’s immediate neighborhood on the opposite coasts of the Mediterranean. The negative results of the upheaval are massive losses of economic substance, growing unemployment and mass flight of people en route to Europe; compounding the refugee and border control problems of the illegal crossing of frontiers into the EU as well as public health and welfare. The necessary selective immigration and integration policies are

at risk. Italy, Spain and Greece bear the heaviest burden of this rapidly evolving crisis, Turkey does little to relieve this plight on its border with Greece or on the Aegean Sea. Ankara shows little interest in cooperation with Europe in spite of its ambition to become a full member of the EU. For this long-standing goal Ankara has spent so far little political capital, in particular since the world financial and economic crisis in 2008, rather looking beyond Europe and EU membership towards the East and South as well as West across the Atlantic to America.

The opening of Eastern Europe and Central Asia has returned Turkey to its former key geopolitical position as a regional power between Europe, the Middle East, and Russia across the Black Sea and in the Caucasus, and North Africa in the South. Turkish national interests since 1992 are wider and more differentiated than during the Cold War where the Soviet Union was the main threat and mighty neighbor. There is a “neo-Osman” sensibility in Turkish mental attitudes vis-à-vis the Oriental environment but also vis-à-vis Europe, although it is difficult to place it on particular political issues.

The USA and NATO still form the back-bone of Turkish security, but Turkey has the longest coastline on the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits are safe from immediate military threat. They have become a gateway from Asia to the Mediterranean. The EU, as a political goal has receded into the background of the Turkish horizon. Under these new conditions it has to be asked if Turkey is still the “corner-stone” and alliance “pillar” on the Southeastern flank of Western Europe or the “bridge into the Orient” for Europe. There is no answer yet. The Southeastern flank of Europe is less and less protected as the strategic periphery is adrift and no longer either a natural barrier against transnational penetration by migration, nor a Western controlled strategic glacis against military and terrorist threats.

EU countries are more and more exposed to and defenseless against the new phenomena of exported slavery, piracy and terrorism. International criminal gangs are operating in the new refugee business and piracy is endangering international shipping and maritime trade around the coasts of Arabia and Somalia deep into the Arab Sea and the Indian Ocean – one of

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Europe's lifelines to the world economy – with increasing insecurity east of Suez, and in the meantime also around Africa in the Western direction towards the Gulf of Guinea. With 60% to 80% of EU external foreign trade ocean-going, maritime security has again become a vital concern for the EU countries. Naval power will be needed on a large scale with operational readiness and flexibility. The EU member states have recognized the risks of piracy to European trade as well as the risks, failing states in Africa and in the Middle East pose to European security and welfare, as was proclaimed during the December 2013 EC summit conference on security and defense, the first such EC meeting since 2008. It has tasked the European Commission and the other executive authorities to propose concrete solutions to these challenges by 2015.²

These problems have given the security and defense issues of Europe a vast dimension of gravity and relevance to European political and social stability. This new emerging dimension has internal aspects as well as international ones. External and internal security, foreign and domestic policy is inseparable and has been so since at least the early 1990s. They must be dealt with through a comprehensive strategic approach on a European scale, with participation and the use of power and based on clear-cut European interests. This is particularly true for Africa and the Near East, as was stated in the confidential conclusions of the Franco-German high official's seminar in 2013. These conclusions led to the German government's initiative to activate the German Africa policy with a comprehensive approach and agenda. This is to be determined by national interest and the selective use of economic aid and political support as well as technical, including military, assistance³ in cooperation with international, in particular EU and NATO partners. The European media and hence public opinion consider the problems as mainly being humanitarian, requiring more help for refugees and a more humane treatment of the boat-loads of people. But while this is noble and laudable, it does not and will not solve the main problems, as exposed above. It

2 See text of the conclusions of the EC presidency of December 2008 and December 2013.

3 Information of the author as a participant.

cannot enhance European security and EU control of the borders and immigration. However, the political will to think, to plan and to act together for a consistent and realistic policy, to share the costs and the burden of making decisions, carrying these out, with force if need be, and to protect EU laws and interests in a peaceful and viable geographic environment of Europe, is still lacking in the population and the media, in particular in Germany.

During the Libyan war this was different, when German public opinion came out strongly in favor of actively helping the rebellion; however it is again the case with regard to North and West Africa as well as with the ongoing Syrian civil war and its border-crossing extension into Lebanon and Iraq. The mass flight from Syria into Jordan has endangered the internal stability and welfare of the Hashemite kingdom. As far as the Egyptian situation is concerned, the EU authorities and governments try to influence the developments without being able, so far, to create an impact for positive change and progress towards liberal democracy. Anyway, they cannot match American or Saudi influence. In sum, the options for CFSP political operations and prospects for success are few and for military intervention nil. Economic sanctions against governments such as in Cairo or Damascus have little chance of success without the overwhelming risk of ruining both the economy of the country and European interests, while also damaging the life of the population. Europe is essentially a bystander, not an actor, let alone a “global player” in this sphere of influence.

The unchanged Israeli-Palestinian conflict with its frozen stand-off and the unsuccessful mediation efforts of the USA and the EU has put the entire Western strategy and all European policies for the Near East and the Arab-Muslim world into question. It can be said that the EU has neither an Oriental nor an African or even a Turkish policy of a realistic nature and effective approach to the developing situations.

The shadow of the Iranian nuclear program with a military option, more precisely a nuclear weapons capability on the “threshold” to nuclear arms production, enhanced by the medium-to-long range missile developments, which continuing even under the impact of international trade and transfer

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sanctions, adds to the growing insecurity of the Oriental neighborhood across the Mediterranean. European diplomacy of mediation and of assistance to the US efforts has not, so far, yielded the expected progress in the management of this latent but growing risk. Again, the US is going it alone with forward based strategic missile defense and theatre missile defense for its bases and forces, using selected partners, able and willing, such as Israel and, more limited, Turkey. The EU is actively engaged in meditative diplomacy as the only manifestation of its CSDP vis-à-vis Iran as in the “Near East Quartet” between Israel and Palestine, however so far without much success or prospects of progress.

The entire Middle East has been taken hostage by Iranian policy seemingly engaged in a quest for a military nuclear option and predominance in the Gulf region, threatening the security and internal cohesion of Arab Gulf states such as Bahrain and Iraq. The latter has teetered towards the brink of civil war again with sectarian violence between Sunnites and Shiites. The Iraqi situation with the characteristics of a failing state is linked in mutual influence to the Syrian war and the related unrest with Shiite-Christian confrontation in neighboring Lebanon. This dangerous situation from the Gulf to the Levant around the south-eastern periphery of NATO in Turkey has remained the tallest order for European security, a strategic problem compounded by the North African instability from Egypt westwards closer to Europe. As the events since 2008 have shown, the “arc of crisis” from Southwest Asia via the Caucasus, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf to the Near East and further to the Maghreb near the European coast around Sicily and at Gibraltar, covers the entire Southern periphery of Europe. An Islamic axis of aggression from East to West has emerged under this arc in sub-Saharan Africa. It runs through Northern Mali and Nigeria, connected to Libya from whence arms and Islamic guerilla fighters penetrate southwards, as French president François Hollande publicly declared in Paris in mid-May 2014 after a conference with African heads of state. On this occasion the French president underlined the fact that France, while not intervening with armed force, was lending its technical assistance to the embattled states (including threatened Cameroon, Chad, Niger) in the fields of reconnaissance, intelligence, communications, air transport and

“coordination” in cooperation with Britain and the US, thus exercising a special “responsibility”, based on “historical legitimacy”.⁴ Such reminders of former days of French colonial rule and post-colonial influence do not make it easier to round up European support for French initiatives and EU action. Hollande did not mention the EU or its policies or other EU states: The external assistance was tripartite, not European or Euro-Atlantic. Again, as in 2011 in Libya and since 2011 in Syria, there was no crisis response by the EU or its members, acting jointly in the implementation of the European foreign and security policy.

What was imagined in the 50s and 60s of the past century in France as “Eurafrique”, a geopolitical-economic intercontinental unit with common security interests and a common strategy under European, preferably French, control, seems to become *peu à peu*, but more and more rapidly, a zone “Afrique-Europe” of increasing insecurity and coexistence of problems with profound social and ethnic-cultural repercussions in Europe, due to mass migration across the Mediterranean. The Oriental influence on Western Europe has become obvious and is growing without any positive solution to the existing problems in sight. The common foreign and security policy of the EU has hardly addressed this major problem as it has not yet acted in response to the urgent security problems in Africa and in the Orient, close to Europe. The geopolitical-strategic challenge to European security and economy is critical to the EU, as to all member states. The question is how Europe can and will respond. The response would have to come from the EU and its definition of “security” and “stability”, two of the three master terms of European political discourse, the third being “growth”. The latter more and more doubtful since the world financial crisis of 2008, especially in Southern Europe and in France, the most affected part of the EU by Oriental and African immigration (including literally “gate crashing” around the Spanish enclaves on the Moroccan coast).

The year 2014 has added another major crisis to Europe’s concerns in the East with the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the threat to Eastern

4 Public statement on French TV 24, 17 May 2014.

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Ukraine, a confrontation too large to be met by the countervailing force or diplomacy either of NATO or of European countries in unison, while the strategic interest of the US has shifted to the Far East and West Pacific, at least in the allocation and deployment of military resources if not in political and economic priorities. However, even these priorities are in question, considering US policies in 2014. The Ukrainian problem, which has existed, even if overlaid by superficial notions of EU “widening and deepening”, since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, is the only glaringly open historical frontier of Russia with its borderlands to the West outside the Russian Federation and the far more severe problems of Russia’s coexistence with EU- and NATO-Europe on one continent and the Eurasian nature of Russia with its geostrategic dimension as a Great Power, measured in territorial terms; complete with its geopolitical ambition to restore a wider Russian sphere of interest and “responsibility” over what was called “the near abroad” in president Jelzin’s time during the 1990s. The “protection of Russian populations” beyond the Russian borders is no invention by Putin, it was already put forward in Jelzin’s “National Security Strategy” of 1993 and afterwards in other official documents. Russian governments under prime ministers Ponomarev and Tshernomyrdin drew various “red lines” across the map of Europe against Western advances towards Russia since the end of the USSR, one west of Finland, the Baltic countries, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Slovakia and Yugoslavia down to the Black Sea west of Bulgaria and Romania. These lines marked the extent of Moscow’s concept of a strategic glacis of neutral countries in a zone of Russian influence east of EU and NATO.⁵

5 See Lothar Rühl, “Kollektive Sicherheit und Allianzen“, in: Karl Kaiser/Hans-Peter Schwarz (eds.), *Die neue Weltpolitik*, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Band 334, Bonn, 1995: 426ff; esp. 431-433; also in: Karl Kaiser/Hans-Peter Schwarz (eds.), *Weltpolitik im neuen Jahrhundert*, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Band 364, Bonn: 2000: 523-528.

See Lothar Rühl, “The historical background of Russian security concepts and requirements, in Vladimir Baranovsky (eds.), *Russia and Europe. The Emerging Security Agenda*, SIPRI, New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997: 32-36. See also Alexei Arbatov, op. cit., “Russian foreign policy thinking in transition”, 144-151.

The political coupling of the EU with NATO in December 1994 by the foreign ministers conferences of both organizations, notably by the EU foreign ministers council in Essen with the programmatic formula of “parallelism” in the extension of EU and NATO, created what was called “the Euro Atlantic alliance and security system” (German defense minister Volker Rühle)⁶ and confronted Moscow with a geopolitical power combination ever closer to the new Western borders of Russia as EU and NATO kept “opening” towards the East. While this Western policy was not motivated by hostility towards Russia and was even accompanied by proposals for political and economic cooperation, common security and mutual arms control, it was problematic, as it presented an element of strategic containment and geopolitical exclusion of Russia from the rest of Europe. This reality was clearly shown in the formula “16 to 1” in the NATO-Russia Council created in the NATO Head Quarters at Brussels by the agreement of 1996 with follow-on for Ukraine in 1997. To put the “Russian Federation” on par with Ukraine, on the level of cooperation with NATO was a reassurance for Ukraine, fearing for its independence and security, but it also suggested that Russia would not really be treated as a Great Power in the Russia-NATO context, but rather on the same level as Ukraine. This was underlined by the three refusals, expressed since 1994 by NATO in dealing with Russian demands:

- No privileged treatment for Russia.
- No acknowledged spheres of interest in Europe, therefore no Russian sphere of special responsibility including other countries.
- No Russian veto against or droit de regard on accession of any country to NATO.⁷

While this negative canon was by no means an intrusion on Russian sovereignty, security or independence, it was clearly a signal: No Russian Great Power exceptionalism in Europe. On the other hand, the formula for

6 See Alastair Buchan, Memorial Lecture, London: March 23, 1993; see Ulrich Weisser, “From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to the Admission of New Members to Nato”, in: Wolfgang Ischinger (eds.), *Towards Mutual Security*, Göttingen: Stiftung MSC, 2014: 153 ff.

7 See footnote 5.

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consultations in the NATO-Russia Council “16 to 1” (at the time) meant that the NATO members would present a common position to Russia, which was and is normal for an alliance, but sets Russia apart from all the other participants, creating at least a diplomatic difference if not latent confrontation. The coupling of EU and NATO “expansion” to the East (the term was used in the NAC in December 1993 by US secretary of State Warren Christopher) set EU policy in the context of NATO extension towards Russia, which had lost its strategic glacis in Eastern Europe and a considerable industrial base for its armaments in Ukraine together with Crimea. This is particular to the Dnepropetrovsk province with its armaments, i.e. missile and rocket fabrication district, on which Russia is dependent.

It has to be considered that with the break-up of the Soviet Union the Western borders of Russia had fallen back on average about 1000 km at the end of 1991: between approximately 600 km in the Northwest and 1300 in the Southwest. The new frontiers were approximately those of Muscovy at the end of the 16th century after Ivan the Terrible had lost the First Nordic War against Poland-Lithuania and Sweden and a war with the Tatar-Khanate on Crimea. All the conquests of Czar Alexei Mikhailovich in the 17th, Peter the Great and Catherine the Great in the 18th century were gone. In 1991 Russia had lost the former dominance of both, the Baltic and the Black Seas. It could no longer be a maritime, let alone a leading naval power in the European seas. Its strategic situation had completely changed as had that of Europe as a whole.

The loss of Belarus and Ukraine with Crimea was not just a “loss of empire” as was that of Eastern Central Europe with the Baltic states, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia or Romania, Bulgaria and Moldova; it was the loss of a valuable part of the historical heartland of Russia with a deep impact on the feeling and thinking of Russia’s elites in the political-bureaucratic and academic hierarchies of the Russian state. Therefore, the Western discussion about “post-imperial” or “neo-imperial” Russian concepts has been largely beside the point. As far as Russia within the borders of the Czars’ empire and of the Soviet Union is concerned, Ukraine, Crimea, Belarus and the Baltic region were part of “Greater

Russia” – and to the large majority of the Russians this was both national Russian territory and the Russian empire. Hence the discussion of Russian “imperialism” after 1991 under Jelzin and Putin would seem rather artificial and academic when confronted with political and economic reality, geography and history. This is what Gorbachev suggested when he said in 1993 that the separation of Ukraine and Belarus from Russia went “against geography and Russian history”, and would “not last”.⁸ Russian foreign policy has been consistently imperial and expansive for the last four centuries.⁹

The key question was how Moscow would react to the new situation with its geopolitical and strategic changes once it would have recovered from the immediate loss of force and resources. This question was asked, but was not really answered by either EU policies or NATO strategy. The diplomatic and economic approaches by Brussels were certainly rational and well-meaning but superficial and inadequate as a method for dealing with wounded and defiant Russian national pride and Russian power quest to be equal – not to “Europe”, but as a “world power by vocation” to America and China.¹⁰ The answer by Russian exceptionalism to the Europe of EU and NATO would come in due time, as the opportunity would present itself. It is in this context that the question has to be answered whether a further extension or “opening” of the EU can politically stabilize Eastern Europe and calm the stormy relationship with Russia. Opinions differ. An extreme example has been offered by the EU Commissioner Füle at the end of May 2014 with the public statement that Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia should become full members of the EU,

8 Conversation with the author at SIPRI in Stockholm; Various similar statements in the same time span 1992-1995.

9 See Lothar Rühl, “Die Anfänge der imperialen Politik: Russland als eurasische Macht“, in: Lothar Rühl, *Aufstieg und Niedergang des Russischen Reiches*, Stuttgart: DVA, 1992: 98ff.; “Das Imperium Peters des Großen und der europäische Machtanspruch Russlands“, *op. cit.* 156; “Der Russische Nationalismus und die imperiale Politik Russlands im 19. Jahrhundert“, *op. cit.* 279ff.

10 See Lothar Rühl, “The Discussion in the Critical Period of the East-West Conflict from the Mid-Sixties to the Early Nineties”, in: Wolfgang Ischinger (eds.), *Towards Mutual Security*, Göttingen: Stiftung MSC, 2014: 100; Lothar Rühl, footnote 5, i.e. on statement by Russian foreign minister Kosyrev.

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“since widening (of the EU) is the mightiest instrument of the transformation of Eastern Europe”.¹¹ However, this maximalist policy of EU expansion could well lead to a permanent and deep-set geopolitical confrontation with Russia, which is certainly not the aim or interest of German policy, as explained by chancellor Merkel.¹²

II. The innovations of the Lisbon Treaty for the European Foreign and Security Policy, now Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

There are four important innovations:

1. The reference to “strategic guidelines” by the European Council for the implementation of the CFSP, defining EU “strategic interests and objectives”.¹³
2. The addition of a European Common Security and Defense Policy as an “integral part” of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)¹⁴ with a program for operational civil and military missions including “combat” in specific cases and an organizational structure as well as procedures for decisions; finally mentioning a “European defense” as a possible future result.
3. The general formulation of a comprehensive “neighborhood” policy¹⁵ for the development of a “special relationship with neighboring countries” by “special agreements”; possibly “including reciprocal rights and obligations”.

11 Die Welt, “Ukraine, Moldau und Georgien sollen in die EU“, 30 May, 2014.

12 FAZ, *interview with chancellor Angela Merkel*: “Russland wendet sich wieder altem Denken zu“ ...“Trotzdem bin ich davon überzeugt, dass mittel- und langfristig die enge Partnerschaft mit Russland fortgesetzt werden sollte“., *which means that she is convinced of the necessity of a “close partnership with Russia in the mid-to long term“.*

13 See treaty text.

14 See treaty text.

15 See treaty text.

4. The upgraded office of a “High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”, presiding over the Foreign Affairs Council and occupying a chair in the European Commission as one of its Vice Presidents with the privilege of proposing “external action” to the European Council of the Heads of State and Government; such an office has existed since 1999 with a slightly different name and occupied by former NATO secretary general Javier Solana of Spain for ten years until November 2009.

When the Lisbon Treaty came into effect in 2009, Europe had experienced two major external crises of international scope: in 2003 the Iraq war, which divided EU and European NATO states in their attitude to the US, and in 2008 the Georgian conflict, which reactivated the Russian challenge to European security and cooperation as well as exposed the differences of political choices in crisis between EU and NATO member states. A third challenge to EU cohesion emerged in April 2008 with the North Atlantic Council’s decision to promise Georgia and Ukraine future membership in NATO against stiff Russian opposition. France and Germany had prevented the formal opening of preparations for the admission of these two countries, as demanded by US president George Bush junior. Bush had told NATO secretary general de Hoop Scheffer in 2006 that he wanted to see Georgia and Ukraine “within NATO” before he would have to leave office in January 2009.¹⁶ While the case of Georgia was by all practical means closed for the foreseeable future with the silent acceptance of the ‘fait accompli’ by Russia, the Ukraine crisis was in the making.

16 Information given by De Hoop Scheffer to the author.

III. The Eastern neighborhood and association policies of the EU after 2007

It has remained unclear what the proclaimed “strategic interests” of the EU and the role of the CFSP in serving such interests are supposed to be, let alone how they could be defined and concretely identified in actual international situations. In all test cases since 2008 the EU states have failed to answer the strategic questions, let alone rise to a challenge to European security.

The agreed purpose of the EU neighborhood policy is to be peaceful and comprehensive, formulated in general terms by the Lisbon Treaty:

“...develop a special relationship with neighboring countries to establish an area of prosperity and good neighborliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterized by close and peaceful relations and based on cooperation...”¹⁷

These good intentions had and still have a political-strategic “heavy metal” side underneath: the increasing cooperation between EU and NATO and the latter’s military substance, constantly spelled out over the years in the coordination of crisis-related action and allocation of military resources between the two organizations – if only on paper. This political coupling was proclaimed by the EU foreign ministers in their Council communiqué at Essen with the formula of “parallelism” for the enlarging of EU and NATO; a formula directly linked to the policies of association and enlarging of membership by admission of new member states.

On this occasion, at the latest, the emerging relationship between the EU and NATO – for a long time resisted both by the European Commission and most of the governments – had become evident under the friendly pressure of the US and the new EU members in Eastern Europe. The admission of ten countries to the EU in 2004 contributed forcefully to the change towards a security and defense union, envisaged since the Cologne EC in June 1999 at the height of the Kosovo War.

17 See treaty text.

This development remained still incomplete ten years later, but hesitant progress has been visible in 25 external missions, most of them, however, non-military in essence.¹⁸ It is essential to understand that the Eastern countries Poland, Hungary, the then still existing Czechoslovakia (in 1999 only Czech Republic was admitted) and the three Baltic states, the later admitted Romania and Bulgaria all sought membership in NATO for their security under the cover of American power and membership in the EU for economic reasons with the aim of assured national welfare and wealth by free trade, foreign capital investment and assistance, but not especially for security and defense. They sought the protection and security guarantee of Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty by common defense in NATO – to be directly allied to the US.

Ukraine, outside NATO, could not invoke the alliance Articles, but Poland and the three Baltic States as well as Romania, could rely on the alliance clauses, when faced with a threat of aggression on their outer borders. Internal “destabilization” even by force is not a ‘casus foederis’ in terms of the alliance treaty. Turkey, which invoked the alliance solidarity of NATO in the 1980s against the Kurdish rebellion with border guerilla and internal terrorism, was told that this was not a threat to the territorial integrity of an ally or the security of the treaty area and hence not an alliance case.¹⁹ NATO policy has not changed since, as was made clear officially by NATO during the Ukrainian crisis of 2014.

Turkey, not being a member of the EU, cannot ask for solidarity of EU states against aggression, even as an associated partner. Turkey was never admitted to the WEU with its far-reaching military alliance clause. The Turkish example is a case in point for EU-associated countries – in the context of the crisis of 2014 for Ukraine.

There is a fundamental strategic difference between association and membership in the EU treaty. Association does not extend security to an outside country, even as a privileged partner of cooperation. In this sense,

18 Most of the military missions were so far passive observation.

19 Information of the author, who delivered such a statement in behalf of the German government to the Turkish minister of defense and Turkish deputy chief of the general staff.

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the treaty of association between the EU and Ukraine, ready for conclusion in 2013, could not have been by itself a security challenge to Russia or a change in the geopolitical-strategic correlation of forces in Europe. On balance, the European security situation would have remained the same as before 2013. The situation would have been entirely different if Ukraine (and Georgia) had been admitted to NATO as envisaged in the spring of 2008 at Bucharest by the North Atlantic Council. It would also have been different if Ukraine had been admitted to the EU under the terms of the Lisbon Treaty; this would change if this were to happen in the future.

The Lisbon Treaty creates an obligation of all EU members for “aid and assistance by all means in their power, in accordance with Art. 51 of the UN Charter” to a member state “victim of armed aggression on its territory”, as spelled out in Art. 28A7. This is a new version of the former Brussels Treaty of 1955 on the creation of the WEU, then as an organized military-political security pact between seven West European countries.²⁰

Concerning Ukraine in 2014, it is possible to claim that in Crimea there was no predominantly “internal” conflict but intrusion of armed force from abroad, in this case from Russia and from the Russian fleet base at Sevastopol. Even the ambiguous situation created and exploited by Russia on this occasion could not hide nor mask the presence of Russian soldiers during the secession of Crimea from Ukraine: The armed aggression by Russia was materialized by this presence and the control, these forces had established over Crimea. Russian president Putin later admitted publicly that Russian military had been deployed in Crimea at that time – the ambiguity lies in the Russian naval base of Sevastopol with its garrisons, from which the unmarked soldiers could have swarmed out. But even in this case it would have been a foreign intervention by military force – quite apart from the reinforcements added with heavy equipment fresh out of Russia.²¹ Therefore, membership in the EU, not association, could have protected Ukraine and Crimea in 2014 from aggression, if the EU countries

20 The WEU was made subject to NATO from the beginning but used as a coordinator for European defense efforts within NATO; it was „vitalized“ in the 1980ies but definitely deactivated when the CSDP was organized after 2003.

21 Russia so far has not admitted to such transfer of arms onto Crimea.

had acted in time and with the appropriate means. However, this hypothetical eventuality must be considered as unlikely, given the EU's record and the situation on the ground with the balance of military forces and the immediate vicinity of Russia.

Moscow had put on alert and on an offensive posture a force of about 200.000 soldiers with heavy armor, artillery and combat aircraft: 40.000-50.000 at one time for a massive exercise close to the East Ukrainian border and 150.000 in a wider semicircle farther back around the Baltic region in the north, Belarus and the Ukraine in the center, to Romania and Moldavia in the south to the Black Sea coast.²² This force could have swept across Ukraine to the Eastern border of the NATO area and the EU. The security issue for and around Ukraine was therefore rather a NATO case. Even according to the 1992/99 doctrine of “the light end for the EU” in international crisis as opposed to “the heavy end for NATO” on the balance of risks and challenges to common security,²³ the Crimea/Ukraine crisis had to be considered a NATO case if this situation was seen as an actual threat to Western security by a developing offensive posture ready for war in Western Russia. The Baltic allies, Poland and Romania could then have invoked Art. 4 of the Washington Treaty for crisis consultations in NATO. Forward deployments of allied forces, i.e. air force units and naval units into the Black Sea and the Eastern Baltic Sea regions could have been the immediate response. While all this is only hypothetical and far removed from the reality of the European situation both for the EU and NATO, it can be useful in considering the military options within the treaty limits. Even within these political and practical limits the five NATO Border States named did ask for forward deployments of allied forces, i.e. Poland. As a consequence NATO infrastructure for such deployments may well be reinforced. For the EU no such demand has been made and there were no plans in 2014 so far.

22 Author's information with NATO Brussels and German government circles in Berlin.

23 All the official documents and statements by EU governments and CSDP authorities confirm this doctrine of the military priority of NATO action in serious crisis situations.

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The security and defense character of the EU is programmed in the Lisbon Treaty in Art. 10C:

“The Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and security shall cover all areas and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy that might lead to a common defense.”

This clearly means that a policy, which would gradually step by step or in one movement change “neighborhood” relations or “association” with the EU into membership of the union or would offer this prospect, would create, at least tentatively, a new situation in Europe, in particular in the East vis-à-vis Russia. This is why the EU integration policy of “widening and deepening” with its progressive program of “expansive integration”²⁴ has been an ambiguous aspect in the relationship with Russia. Moscow could have interpreted this policy as NATO’s extension policy since 1993 one way or the other – but neither was entirely harmless to Russia’s situation in Europe nor indifferent to the emerging EU-NATO cooperation. It was in the vital security interests of all the Eastern countries (including the non-aligned on the external flank of NATO in Northern Europe, Sweden and Finland) that the outer borders of the EU coincide with those of NATO or at least were as close as possible to the outer borders of the NATO area.²⁵ The main reason was and has remained Russia.

As Russian pressure in the period since 1992 has been directed at NATO and the US military presence in Europe, the EU was considered generally a safe haven outside the field of direct political and possibly military confrontation in case of crisis and conflict, albeit somehow under the

24 See footnote 5.

25 Information of the author from talks to high representatives of these countries, i.p. of Sweden, Finland, Estonia and Latvia. An example of a sophisticated concept of the relationship between EU and NATO in a security partnership was offered by Sweden’s Prime Minister Carl Bildt in 1994 in an interview with “Die Welt”, 11 April, 1994: “*Russland hat kein Recht auf Mitsprache im Baltikum*”. In this interview the Swedish Prime Minister said that NATO is... “*the counterweight to Russia as the great power in the East of Europe and on the Eurasian continent. NATO remains important as anchorage of the USA in Europe and for the defense of Western Europe. In this was NATO contributes essentially to the Pan European security*” ...

NATO umbrella in Sweden, Finland, Malta or Cyprus. This is how the situation was and still is understood by the mainstream of politics and public opinion in neutral Austria, where an initiative for NATO membership by the then head of government failed against the opposition of a large popular and political majority.²⁶ Hence, non-allied EU member states profit from NATO and the NATO membership of the large majority of EU countries without being obliged to contribute to allied forces and defense expenditure. This does not exclude participation in NATO-led military missions of crisis management and even conflict termination, as is shown first of all by the Swedish example in Libya 2011. Art. 10A of the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 states that the Union's action

“...shall preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security in accordance with the purpose and the principles of the UN Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders.”

These references are not only entirely compatible with the North Atlantic Treaty, but directly relevant to the political defense of the European peace order as embodied in the CSCE Helsinki agreement of 1975 and the 1991 Paris Charter as well as with the 1994 OSCE Budapest act. They apply fully to the case of Georgia in 2008 and to the case of Crimea and Ukraine in 2014: “relating to external borders” is not restricted to those of EU countries but extends to all international borders in the OSCE area and wider under the aegis of the UN Charter; that is, in principle, globally. Whether the EU could and will become a “global player” in the full sense of the term in the field of international security is another matter.

26 An example of the difficult choice Austria had to make after the end of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact for its new foreign policy beyond neutrality is offered by the then Austrian foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel in an interview with “Die Welt”, 2 March, 1988. In this interview he dealt with Austria's options and showed a preference for Austria's membership in NATO: ... *“as member of NATO one has quite a different position and access to information” ...and... “as a non-member one is largely excluded from the planning and management of international operations (such as in Bosnia)” ...*

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EU foreign and security policy as well as EU security and defense policy are therefore linked to the OSCE and to the UN, by Art. 51 of the UN Charter on “collective defense” against armed aggression indirectly to NATO external action in crisis and conflict as in defensive war.

Art. 28A7 of the Lisbon Treaty states:

“If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power in accordance with Art. 51 of the UN Charter. It shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States.”
...Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the NATO treaty, which for those states which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defense and the forum for its implementation.”

This somewhat convoluted wording simply means that the “non-aligned and neutral” EU members may act as such outside NATO bounds and pursue their various international policies in crisis and conflict according to their preferences, while the EU countries with NATO membership would act as allies in support of their threatened NATO ally. For the non-NATO EU members this does not cancel out the “obligation of aid and assistance with all the means in their power” for the support of another EU member. They would only have to aid and assist with their neutral hat on their head. 2011 Sweden demonstrated an example of participating in the NATO air campaign over Libya while no NATO or EU state had been the victim of aggression or exposed to a military threat to their territory. The six EU members, to whom the chosen treaty formula applies, Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Malta and Cyprus, are in different geopolitical surroundings and situations with different armed forces and other “means” for applying power or influence in crisis or conflict. Ireland, Sweden, Finland and Austria have participated in UN missions with military contingents or observers on various occasions, i.e. in the Near East and on Cyprus, in the Balkans and in Africa. In some cases they have cooperated with NATO members and even joined their committed military contingents with them.

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There is enough political margin of movement for pragmatic behavior inside the EU and its foreign, security and defense policy as well as outside in UN, OSCE and NATO contexts. Art. 28B of the Lisbon Treaty names

“...tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization” and states that “all these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.”

Even coalitions of the able and willing amongst EU member states for joint action are envisaged by the treaty in Art. 28C:

”The Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capabilities for such a task.”

However, experience has shown that major EU countries have a tendency to act outside the framework of the CFSP and not to refer to the EU Council for a European mandate. The recent case in point is Libya in 2011, as mentioned above. The reasons for such unilateral or bilateral actions with military force, as in 2011 by France and Britain, joined by Italy and supported by Greece, and later actively by Sweden, may be practical, political or both. In 2011 France had to act swiftly and decisively in order to protect Bengasi from Gadhafi’s troops and a possible massacre. There was no time for lengthy diplomatic maneuvers and EU or NATO consultations. The shadow of Srebrenica lay over Bengasi and Europe. The situation in Northern Mali in 2013/14 was not quite as dramatic but was critical both for the population in the North and for the state of Mali. France had to again act swiftly and alone, and it did so to protect French interests. However the French government had asked the German ally and partner to participate with a combat force but was refused. The EU could not come in with crisis response forces of the CFSP.

IV. The EU summit of 2013 on security and defense

By 2013, four years after the Lisbon Treaty had come into effect; all the pieces for implementation of the CFSP were in place. The pattern of military as well as political and diplomatic joint action was complete, as far as the member states had agreed on the matter. 26 civilian and military operations have been counted since 2003, even if most of those were small scale and low level as far as risks and burdens were concerned. They were mostly “light end” on the balance of engagement as had been agreed in 1999. But the “Eurocorps”, existing since 1992 as a multilateral force composed of French, German, Spanish, Belgian and Luxembourg units with a multinational headquarters, has been held ready for EU and NATO missions. Since 1995 EU countries hold up to 65.000 soldiers available for operational missions with one infantry brigade of 6.000 as a rapid intervention force. Since 2002 the EU has made available a “Rapid Reaction Corps” for crisis action also by NATO as part of the NRF (NATO Response Force) complete with a “Rapidly Deployable Corps Head Quarters”. Since 2003 the EU may and can use NATO assets and command and control organization for its own operations under the responsibility of the European Deputy SACEUR. In 2004 the “Eurocorps” supported the ISAF Head Quarters in Kabul with military personnel and continued to do so for several years until 2013. It is planned that the larger nations each make one division available for operational missions. Two ready combat forces of brigade strength are to be made available at all times for seven different types of missions from monitoring situations and border assistance to military operations for stabilization, training, enabling and support of security forces in crisis areas. The situation in Mali and beyond in Northwest Africa could have been an occasion for EU action instead of French national intervention and German indirect support. In addition to the “Eurocorps”, the EU has organized various military structures and forces such as “Eurofor”, a land force with contingents from France, Spain, Italy and Portugal, “Euromarforce” a naval flotilla with units from France, Spain, Italy and Portugal and the “European Air Group” with air force assets from Britain, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Netherlands and Belgium. Other partners could also join.

CFSP operations and forces are considered as “complement” to NATO or other international actors such as UN forces or OSCE missions, not as “alternative”. Such missions would not be identical with the “common defense policy”, as added in 2007 by the Lisbon Treaty. A “common defense” would have to be organized within NATO as a “European pillar” as had been the intention of the “revitalization” of the now extinct WEU in 1984/85. The “European Defense Agency”, created by the Lisbon Treaty has to identify common objectives for military capabilities, define programs for these, harmonize the operational requirements, direct research in the defense sector and reinforce the industrial and technological base in the EU for standardized armaments and equipment. So far everything seems to be well ordered and established, however until now mostly on paper. The important exceptions are to be found in the Balkans and in Kabul, Afghanistan. The new agenda is ambitious. It was prepared by a Franco-German initiative with a series of proposals.

The 19/20th December 2013 Conclusions of the first summit deliberations of the EC on security and defense since 2008,²⁷ clearly spell out the political ambition and set forth a number of tasks for “priority actions for stronger cooperation with NATO”, thus strengthening the ties of the military alliance between Europe and North America under US leadership. This cooperation is to extend beyond Europe in order to contribute “to peace and stability in our neighborhood and in the broader world”²⁸. The reason given in the text is that “Europe’s strategic and geopolitical environment is evolving rapidly”²⁹, a development already addressed in December 2003 by the European security strategy under Solana’s authority, and closely following president George Bush’s US National Security Strategy.

27 See EU Council conclusions on Common Security and Defense Policy, 19/20 December, 2013. Online under: www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140214.pdf.

28 Ibid., I.1.

29 Ibid., I.1.

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Ten years later, in December 2013 the EC Conclusions proclaim:

„The EU and its Member States must exercise greater responsibilities in response to these challenges if they want to contribute to maintaining peace and security through CSDP together with key partners such as UN and NATO. The CSDP will continue to develop in full complementarity with NATO in the agreed framework of the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO”...this “in compliance with the decision-making autonomy and procedures of each of the two organizations.”

The political key terms here are “complementarity with NATO”, “strategic partnership between EU and NATO” and “autonomy of decision-making”. It is undeniable that in this way a NATO/EU ensemble has been created for joint policies and actions based on mutual autonomy but for the purpose of common goals. The EU can no longer be looked at as completely independent from NATO and hence as a European or international player on its own. It is firmly linked by the CSDP to NATO and via NATO to the USA. This is the perception in Moscow since the mid-1990s after the decision in 1994 of the EU foreign ministers council in Essen on “parallelism” of opening and widening of the EU and NATO (as explained above). It has been reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 and again by the Conclusions of the 2013 EC on security and defense.

On this occasion, the EC has “identified a number of priority actions built around three axes: increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of the CSDP; enhancing the development of capabilities and strengthening Europe’s defense industry”³⁰. In the same logic, a “unique ability” to combine policies and tools “ranging from diplomacy, security and defense to finance, trade, development and justice” was claimed for the EU’s CSDP as a “EU Comprehensive Approach, including as it applies to EU crisis management” as a “priority”, the EU being “committed to close collaboration with its global, transatlantic and regional partners”³¹. This led to the conclusion to acknowledge the “importance of supporting partner countries and regional organizations, through providing training, advice, equipment and resources when appropriate, so they can

30 Ibid., I. 3./4.

31 Ibid., I. 5./6.

increasingly prevent or manage crises by themselves”³². With these guidelines the CSDP may and could go into action anywhere in the world, as far as its means of transport would carry its missions and as long as its logistics could supply and support their operations. It had been originally planned to hold a force of about 60.000 soldiers ready for combat contingents in brigade-strength to be selected for several missions at the same time or in succession. The beginnings, however, were small, as the EC Conclusions of 12/13 noted: “EU deploys more than 7.000 staff in 12 civilian and 4 military operations”³³. Therefore it was and remains imperative for effective operations, “to be able to plan and deploy the right civilian and military assets rapidly and effectively” and “to improve the EU rapid response capabilities, including through more flexible and deployable EU Battle Groups, as Member States may decide”³⁴.

The summit conclusions then turn on “new challenges” which “continue to emerge” and which make “Europe’s internal and external security are increasingly interlinked”³⁵, a development, that has been already under way already since the end of the East-West conflict.

On this assumption the EC called for:

- An EC Cyber Defense Policy Framework in 2014;
- An EU Maritime Security Strategy by June 2014;
- Increased synergies between CSDP and Freedom/Security/Justice actors to tackle horizontal issues such as illegal migration, organized crime and terrorism;
- Progress in developing CSDP support for third states and regions, to help improve border management;
- Further strengthening cooperation to tackle energy security challenges;
- Report to the EC in 2015 “on challenges and opportunities arising for the Union”.

32 Ibid., I. 7.

33 Ibid., I. 5.

34 Ibid., I. 8.

35 Ibid., II. 9.

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Finally “cooperation on military capability development” through pooling demand, consolidating requirements and realizing economies of scale to enhance the efficient use of resources and ensure inter-operability, including with key partner organizations such as NATO, was ordered. Cooperative approaches whereby willing members or groups of Member States develop capabilities based on common standards or decide on common usage, maintenance or training arrangements “for enhanced military effectiveness” were demanded. All these demands and objectives had been those of NATO’s since the beginning of the 1980s for the European allies to adopt, but were never considered by the European Community, which, on the contrary, tended to keep as much and as far apart from NATO as possible³⁶.

In 2013, the EC “committed to delivering key capabilities and addressing critical shortfalls through concrete projects”³⁷:

- The development of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) in the 2020-2025 timeframe;
- Multi-Role-Tanker Transport of Air-to-Air refueling capacity;
- Satellite Communications;
- A “roadmap” for EU “Cyber Security Strategy” as well as protection of assets in EU missions and operations.

The European Air Transport Command³⁸, created in the 1990s on the initiative of the WEU secretary general and against high political and financial obstacles erected by the EC, was now, belatedly, heralded as “a model” to be “replicated in other areas”. The learning process of the EC authorities, especially the European Commission, has been long, even after

36 An example was given by the chairman of the Military Committee of NATO General Klaus Naumann to the author about the refusal of the European Commission to receive him for a proposed courtesy visit in Brussels. The difficult relationship eased only after the Kosovo war of 1999 and turned around full circle in 2008. On the actual state of cooperations between EU and NATO see Klaus Olshausen, „Perspektiven zu den Beziehungen zwischen EU und NATO-Strategisch in der Sackgasse, pragmatisch auf Stabsebene“, in: Jahrbuch 2013 der Clausewitz-Gesellschaft, Hamburg, 2014: 293 ff.

37 EU Council conclusions, op. cit., I.b)11.

38 Ibid., I.b)13.

the Kosovo war of 1999. In the fifteen years since a certain balance has been established between the civilian and the military mission philosophy of the EU. The desired “Code of Conduct of Pooling and Sharing” for cooperation through the European Defense Agency for “pooled procurement projects” with a progress report to the EC by the end of 2014 is paired with a “Civilian Capability Deployment Plan” for “frequent recourse to missions which are civilian in nature” and with an “enhanced development by CCDP”³⁹.

The main conclusion of the 2013 examinations of the EC seems to be essentially the same as in 1999, when the common European security and defense policy was launched: “enhance Europe’s strategic autonomy and its ability to act with partners through a more “integrated, sustainable, innovative and competitive defense technological and industrial base (EDTIB) to develop and sustain defense capabilities to ensure operational effectiveness and security of supply, while remaining globally competitive”⁴⁰. For this repeatedly stated purpose it is said to be “essential to retain defense Research and Technology (R&T) expertise, especially in critical defense technologies, increase investment in cooperative research programs, in particular collaborative investment in cooperative research programs and to maximize synergies between national and EU research. Civilian and defense research reinforce each other including key enabling technologies”⁴¹. The Horizon 2020 has been considered by the Council, who will assess “concrete progress on all issues in June 2015 and provide further guidance”⁴².

Again, this would seem to be a tall political order for the EC and the partner governments, since parliaments and public opinion in various countries are still far behind, in particular in Germany. Germany presents a threefold political problem: The shyness with regard to arms production and sharing of technologies for exports outside the union, even in NATO (the case of Turkey); the particularly sensitive attitude of the German

39 Ibid., I.b)15.

40 Ibid., I.c)16.

41 Ibid., I.c)18.

42 Ibid., I.d)22.

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Bundestag to executive decisions on military and double-use technologies, arms procurement and joint export schemes with partners, finally the adverse influence of the academic community, that has politically organized itself as a sort of anti-military research front, contradicting the entire reason for the national and European armaments technology and industry, forbidding participation in their R&T programs by university and science organization researchers.

As long as the German political authorities have not brought this emotional and doctrinal, in part sectarian opposition into line, EU defense technology and research will lag behind in Germany – if it participates in EU programs at all. German active pacifism and neutralism are again running strong throughout society, while a narrow understanding of German sovereignty in favor of national decisions and parliamentary privilege over executive powers is gaining ground. The political reliability of the German partner in this field, divided between civilian and military, political and academic authorities would seem to be again in question. The media are not really impartial but leaning to pacifist, neutralist and unilateralist disarmament attitudes, as do, of course, the religious authorities and most of the left wing of the political spectrum. This problem of authority, persuasion and reassurance must first be solved in Germany as too, the problem of asserting the authority of international treaties such as the Treaty of Lisbon and of the law.

V. Outlook

The years since the Treaty of Lisbon has come into effect have aggravated the security problems for Europe and the credibility problem of the EU.

There are five major fields of political fire around Europe and political contest within.

1. The unresolved and unregulated relationship with the USA. America will not lose interest in Europe, its only congenial partner beyond the seas. But it has begun to reassess the utility and the possibilities of the transatlantic relationship including the North Atlantic alliance and the

geopolitical-strategic priorities for the US. It is obvious and should no longer be disregarded in Europe, that the sphere of active American strategic involvement across the Atlantic Ocean to Europe is two-pronged: In the North Atlantic from North America via Greenland and Iceland to Britain and Northern Europe – a maritime glacis directed at the Polar region and Russia, with Northern Asia to the Far East with Japan for the advanced protection of North America itself. The second in the South Atlantic, from the Caribbean Sea through West-Africa towards the Horn of Africa and the Middle East with the Eastern Mediterranean as the Western border along Italy including the Suez Canal and Persian Gulf regions, Turkey and the Turkish Straits with the access to Western Central Asia leading to the Indian Subcontinent and South West Asia into the Pacific Ocean with Australia.

The relatively small space in between, the Western Mediterranean with Western Europe has receded on the scale of priorities and must be consolidated, developed and defended by Europe, i.e. the EU economically and politically with NATO as the military organization, to which the EU must be subject to and on which it must remain dependent with a growing investment in usable military force for crisis response and conflict management. The US will guard the control of NATO and Western Europe with less ready operational force and investment in military capabilities. Burden sharing will acquire a new importance and meaning. Anti-missile defense will be forward deployed to protect US stationed forces, bases and expeditionary troops if need be. This will be deployed in the Mediterranean, around European coasts in mobile rotational presence and partly in Eastern Central Europe. NATO is asked to cooperate and pay for its own missile shield.

2. The further extension of the EU and NATO towards the East and closer to Russia will make both more dependent on the US protection and expose them ever more to Russian countervailing power and strategic interest. It will most probably tend to make Europe less safe, its security more costly and its stability more precarious. This is the real issue about the Ukraine, Crimea, Belarus and the Southern Caucasus. It has been since 1991 the real issue of the Baltic States. “Détente” with Russia will be possible with an

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adroit European policy, however not with partners such as those, which urge confrontation with Russia and insist that their national security and independence be guaranteed by association with or even membership in the EU and NATO – this will remain so for the next years to come. EU and NATO policies even with “Eastern Neighborhood” relations will need to be conducted with caution and sensitivity towards Russia and not in a permanent crisis mode. The probability that Moscow will try to destabilize and weaken Ukraine, keep Crimea and consolidate its Southern border in the Caucasus at the expense of Georgia will have to be accepted as a basic reality for the implementation of Western crisis response, conflict prevention and stabilization of borders, i.e. for the useful application of the CSDP by the EU. But it will also be a part of the normalization of the relationship with Russia. This does not mean that such territorial changes by force will have to be de jure recognized, but they will have to be de facto accepted for a long time, as the existence of the GDR and the Warsaw Pact had to be accepted for half a century. It may not last that long this time, since Russia is not the Soviet Union and it is weaker than ever, with an even more deficient economy, a growing burden internally due to the cost of its aggressive policies in 2014. The EU can rely on its soft power, economic and technological capacities, advantageous trade and a new energy policy, making it less dependent on Russian gas and oil supplies in the medium-to-long term. Energy and trade policies including selective capital investment in Russia will have to be coordinated with the application of the CSDP.

A simple policy of economic sanctions and “isolation of Russia” will not work over time without negative results for Europe and an unproductive political stand-off with Russia, with Ukraine becoming the useless and costly exercise without stability gain in the East of Europe. Association of Ukraine with the EU is neither necessary for stability nor for security as long as tenable understandings can be reached and kept with Russia. EU membership of Ukraine would be a security risk and a heavy economic load on the EU. The Polish-Lithuanian cauchemar of “Zwischeneuropa”, a power void between the EU and Russia, politically loaded with Russo-German cooperation and power-sharing should not be overrated, since it is

an obsession of the past and a historical argument against constructive policies in the future. The Ukrainian case has shown that the EU can also rely on the CSCE and that CSCE missions of crisis observation and supervision of elections can be more useful than activities of the CSDP, since Russia is a member and in principle bound to the Helsinki rules. In the Ukrainian case it was an advantage that Russia and Ukraine are OSCE members, albeit with contrary interests and policies in the acute crisis. But such situations must be managed by diplomacy and stabilization measures, for which the civilian part of the CSDP has been made and is held ready.

3. The third major problem for European security and international influence is the unsatisfactory and critical relationship with allied Turkey. European policy has been the hostage of Greek historical idiosyncrasy and selfishness vis-à-vis the European partners and allies. Greece has blocked every attempt at remedying the crisis situation and consolidating the Southeastern flank of both NATO and Europe. It has overplayed the Cyprus crisis and the Aegean territorial sea crisis to the hilt. It has lost valuable time, chances to regain valuable real-estate and political independence with international influence, but it has wrecked great political havoc on Europe. The EC policies towards Greece have been wrong from the beginning and have jeopardized relations with Turkey, which were and remain far more important than Greek membership in the EU. It would have been possible, but for firm Greek opposition, to associate Turkey with the security policy and the execution of the “Petersberg Tasks” for the then still existing WEU. This would have been to the practical advantage of EC/EU crisis response actions and the later CSDP, since 130 of the 135 or so objective data for military and other security missions lie within the geographical sphere of Turkey. Since then Turkey has become an indispensable ally in the Middle East, the Black Sea, the Levant and for access to Central Asia unto Afghanistan. It is clear since Putin’s presentation in 2011, that Russia seeks to organize the “Eurasian space” around itself as the central power as one large sphere of geopolitical-strategic interest and that Kazakhstan is ready to participate to shield itself from China and South Asia, as made clear by Kazakh president Nasarbajev in 1994.

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It is no longer an absolute requirement to accept Turkey as a full partner of the EU; it is not even certain that Turkey would seriously accept all the necessary conditions for admission to the union. But the relationship with Turkey must be turned around to become as positive and reliable as possible and to be consolidated in NATO. For this purpose a close association with the CSDP of the EU would be helpful, as it ever would have been in the past. The Syrian civil war makes this plain as does the situation in and around Lebanon and Israel with Palestine as well as all containment and sanction policy towards Iran and the relations with Iraq. The EU has its own interest in treating Turkey as an independent but allied regional power between Europe, Russia, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. Moscow's Ambition to create a "Eurasian Union" with Kazakhstan and European Armenia, possibly Azerbaijan and other Central Asian ex-Soviet states, i.e. Turkmenistan and Kirgizstan, will tend to enhance and upgrade Turkey's geopolitical-strategic and economic importance in the wider region and as a transit-land for Europe.

Turkey's usefulness for the US has been proven negatively in the Iraq war of 2003 and positively in the relative stabilization of Kurdish Northern Iraq since, but also in dealing with Iraq and Iran. Whatever "great game" may be played in the Wider Middle East in the coming years, Turkey will somehow be part of it and possibly a player of regional consequence. Without Turkey Europe has no such role in sight and little hold in the region. US policy will try to hold on to Turkey as an ally and a valuable strategic partner and Turkey to the US as its security insurance. The same will be the case for the Arab Gulf states confronted by Iranian ambition for predominance.

4. The Israel problem cannot be resolved to European satisfaction as long as there is no territorial and "historical compromise" between the Jewish state and the Arab neighbors, whether Israel's security is part of the "raison d'état" of Germany or any other European country. Therefore, EU relations with the Arab-Muslim world will remain subject to the unresolved coexistence problem and entirely dependent on US policies. This limits European CSDP not only "in action" but also as a concept. It will have to satisfy itself with the time-honored diplomatic mediation,

relief action in need and above all in patience. CSDP is but a holdover operation in the expectation of better times and new opportunities. European (and German) rhetoric should best be adapted to this reality. Whether EU policies can succeed in being “even-handed” between the adversaries and what influence can be exercised for moderation on all sides, will be important but uncertain and always a matter of fortune and speculation. For the CSDP the Near East is certainly no promising playground, whatever the diplomatic efforts. Cooperation with Israel will be necessary, also to strengthen Israel’s defense and border security, but cooperation with Arab states is also necessary for political reasons of moderating influence and stability of the relationship; this is i.e. true for Jordan, Saudi-Arabia and Egypt.

5. What remains is the wider demi-circle under the Southern “arc of crisis” along the Mediterranean periphery of Europe between the Levant and the Straits of Gibraltar with the width of North Africa and West Africa. It is here, that the EU must bring into play its CSDP as its economic and development policies, its diplomacy and the soft power of good will. A strong flexible operationally capable naval power presence of EU countries would help improve coast guards and a reasonably realistic border/immigration policy of the union. Investment in Africa is paramount and should not be seen independently from security, defense, development and settlement of populations in more stable environments than so far. CSDP options are available, the basic pattern can be laid, what is now finally decisive is what Lady Ashton has asked for “the political will”.

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