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Essays on Mechanism Design without Transfers

dc.contributor.advisorMoldovanu, Benny
dc.contributor.authorNiemeyer, Axel
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-29T14:18:18Z
dc.date.available2023-06-29T14:18:18Z
dc.date.issued29.06.2023
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/10917
dc.description.abstractThis thesis comprises four self-contained essays on mechanism design without transfers. Chapters 1 and 2 characterize ex post and posterior implementation in collective decision problems with interdependent values. Chapters 3 and 4 study allocation problems with correlated types.en
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsIn Copyright
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectmechanism design
dc.subjectinterdependent values
dc.subjectex post implementation
dc.subjectposterior implementation
dc.subjectcollective decision-making
dc.subjectsequential voting
dc.subjectcorrelated types
dc.subjectnon-transferable utility
dc.subjectallocation
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleEssays on Mechanism Design without Transfers
dc.typeDissertation oder Habilitation
dc.publisher.nameUniversitäts- und Landesbibliothek Bonn
dc.publisher.locationBonn
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccess
dc.identifier.urnhttps://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-71288
dc.relation.doihttps://doi.org/10.3982/TE4915
ulbbn.pubtypeErstveröffentlichung
ulbbnediss.affiliation.nameRheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
ulbbnediss.affiliation.locationBonn
ulbbnediss.thesis.levelDissertation
ulbbnediss.dissID7128
ulbbnediss.date.accepted27.06.2023
ulbbnediss.instituteRechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
ulbbnediss.fakultaetRechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.contributor.coRefereeKrähmer, Daniel
ulbbnediss.contributor.gnd1241053472


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