Bytes the Dust: Normative Notions in Decommissioning Digital Doppelgängers

Abstract

In recent debates on digital twins, much attention has been paid to understanding the interaction between individuals and their digital representations (Braun, 2021). Iglesias et al. (2025) shed new light on this debate, extending the reflection on digital doppelgängers—digital twins that try to replicate the psychological dimension of an individual. They argue that such copies may serve as valuable means to achieve legacy and relational aims left unaddressed due to the person's death. Against this background, we discuss how far we may better understand the implied normative aspects by considering them in terms of the represented person's death. Specifically, we ask how we can and should, in normative terms, deal with a digital twin as a representation of a person after their death.<br /> Here, we consider the decommissioning of such technology. We define decommissioning as the withdrawal, dismantling, or rendering the doppelgänger incapable of serving its original aims. We hypothesize that the way in which these digital doppelgängers ought to be decommissioned may depend upon whether they are viewed either as a proxy or as an extension of personhood. By proxy, we mean a stand-in for an individual by replicating their decisions and style without embodying their personal identity or subjective experience; something that makes decisions on your behalf but is not you (Braun and Krutzinna 2022). What is left behind is akin to an artifact owned by you. Whereas an extension of personhood can mean extending aspects of an individual's identity and relational presence beyond death by reflecting their values, projects, and relationships; something that is/was a part of yourself. What is left behind is akin to an "informational corpse" (Öhman and Floridi 2018).<br /> Answering this decommissioning question is necessary not only to respect the intended aims of those for whom the digital doppelgängers were created, but also to potentially respect certain social norms surrounding obsequies. Viewing digital doppelgängers either as proxies or extensions of personhood implies respective normative notions. For instance, the pursuit of any decommissioning strategy will require necesary and sufficient standards of informed consent, which may be difficult to parse given that not all individuals will view their digital doppelgänger in the same manner. The decommissioning of digital doppelgängers is thus enriched by moral nuances influenced by the perceptions we may have of this technology.