Essays on Organization and Incentives in R&D and on Compatibility in Two-Sided Markets
dc.contributor.advisor | Shaked, Avner | |
dc.contributor.author | Goldfayn, Ekaterina | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-04-11T18:43:15Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-04-11T18:43:15Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/3315 | |
dc.description.abstract | This dissertation covers two distinct topics. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 investigate a model with a principal and two agents, where the hidden action of agents is a source of moral hazard problem. It is shown that competition between agents can be used to improve their incentives even if their production technologies are independent. The first chapter shows that the principal is often better off financing innovation race between competing agents, rather than only one (even the most advanced) of them. The second chapter investigates advantages of competition as compared to team production, which is technologically more efficient. Chapter 3 deals with different topic: it studies two-sided markets and develop a theory of compatibility between subsequent generations of technology. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.rights | In Copyright | |
dc.rights.uri | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ | |
dc.subject | two-sided market | |
dc.subject | network externalities | |
dc.subject | compatibility of platforms | |
dc.subject | moral hazard | |
dc.subject | team incentives | |
dc.subject | competition | |
dc.subject | venture capital | |
dc.subject | optimal contract | |
dc.subject | innovation races | |
dc.subject | organisation of R & D | |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 Wirtschaft | |
dc.title | Essays on Organization and Incentives in R&D and on Compatibility in Two-Sided Markets | |
dc.type | Dissertation oder Habilitation | |
dc.publisher.name | Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Bonn | |
dc.publisher.location | Bonn | |
dc.rights.accessRights | openAccess | |
dc.identifier.urn | https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-14138 | |
ulbbn.pubtype | Erstveröffentlichung | |
ulbbnediss.affiliation.name | Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn | |
ulbbnediss.affiliation.location | Bonn | |
ulbbnediss.thesis.level | Dissertation | |
ulbbnediss.dissID | 1413 | |
ulbbnediss.date.accepted | 11.04.2008 | |
ulbbnediss.fakultaet | Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät | |
dc.contributor.coReferee | Heidhues, Paul |
Files in this item
This item appears in the following Collection(s)
-
E-Dissertationen (272)