Economic Behavior in Real Effort Experiments

Abstract

<p>Laboratory experiments have gained more and more importance in economics in the last twenty years. Their superior control possibilities are not called in doubt. However, it is often complained that laboratory experiments lack some realism. One way of adding more realism to a laboratory experiment is to conduct so-called “real effort” experiments. The experiments presented in this dissertation all include real effort tasks that subjects have to work on and are paid for. With this methodical approach different research questions are investigated: Chapter 2 deals with the so-called in-group/out-group bias that leads to a favoring of own team members as candidates in promotion relative to other teams and their members. Chapter 3 examines managers’ self-predictions of their subsequent performance and, based on their self-predictions, their choice of a collaborator. Chapter 4 investigates whether the self-assessments of subjects improve when they receive feedback about their performance. Chapter 5 examines how performance differences affect donating behavior in an experimental solidarity game. <br /></p>