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Informational externalities and strategic interaction

dc.contributor.advisorRady, Sven
dc.contributor.authorSalish, Mirjam
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-22T18:11:48Z
dc.date.available2020-04-22T18:11:48Z
dc.date.issued13.12.2016
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/6832
dc.description.abstractThis thesis studies the role of uncertainty and informational externalities in strategic interaction. In the presence of informational externalities, the incentives of strategic agents to invest in innovative and risky activities are affected by different monitoring structures and monitoring imperfections. A fast and perfect information transmission is not necessarily optimal due to the strong incentives of firms to free-ride on the experimentation efforts of others. Incomplete interaction structures or monitoring imperfections such as uncertainties in the patent system can encourage firms to invest in R&D and thereby increase welfare.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsIn Copyright
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleInformational externalities and strategic interaction
dc.typeDissertation oder Habilitation
dc.publisher.nameUniversitäts- und Landesbibliothek Bonn
dc.publisher.locationBonn
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccess
dc.identifier.urnhttps://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-45750
ulbbn.pubtypeErstveröffentlichung
ulbbnediss.affiliation.nameRheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
ulbbnediss.affiliation.locationBonn
ulbbnediss.thesis.levelDissertation
ulbbnediss.dissID4575
ulbbnediss.date.accepted18.11.2016
ulbbnediss.fakultaetRechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.contributor.coRefereeGärtner, Dennis


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