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An optimal split of school classes

dc.contributor.authorStark, Oded
dc.date.accessioned2024-09-02T15:02:14Z
dc.date.available2024-09-02T15:02:14Z
dc.date.issued02.2021
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/12035
dc.description.abstractIn many countries, schools have responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by splitting up classes. While the purpose of dividing classes is clearly health-related, the process of doing so poses an interesting question: what is the best way to divide a class so as to maximize the incentive for students to perform better? Using a constructive example, we demonstrate how social-psychological unhappiness can be the basis for an incentive structure that optimally nudges students to improve their performance. The example is based on evidence that students aspire to improve their performance when it lags behind that of other students with whom they naturally compare themselves. For a given set of m students, we quantify unhappiness by the index of relative deprivation, which measures the extent to which a student lags behind other students in the set who are doing better than him. We examine how to divide the set into an exogenously predetermined number of subsets in order to maximize aggregate relative deprivation, so that the incentive for the students to study harder because of unfavorable comparison with other students is at its strongest. We show that the solution to this problem depends only on the students’ ordinally-measured levels of performance, independent of the performance of comparators. In addition, we find that when m is an even number, there are multiple optimal divisions, whereas when m is an odd number, there is only one optimal division.de
dc.format.extent22
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesZEF-Discussion Papers on Development Policy ; 306
dc.rightsIn Copyright
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectSocial-psychological preferences
dc.subjectDistaste for trailing behind others
dc.subjectUnhappiness as measured by relative deprivation
dc.subjectPressure to perform better
dc.subjectSuperior performance of comparators
dc.subjectAssignment of students to subclasses
dc.subjectOptimum incentive to improve performance
dc.subject.ddc300 Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie, Anthropologie
dc.subject.ddc320 Politik
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleAn optimal split of school classes
dc.typeArbeitspapier
dc.publisher.nameCenter for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn
dc.publisher.locationBonn
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccess
dc.relation.eissn1436-9931
dc.relation.urlhttps://www.zef.de/fileadmin/webfiles/downloads/zef_dp/ZEF_DP_306.pdf
ulbbn.pubtypeZweitveröffentlichung
dc.versionpublishedVersion


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