Cooperation and wealth

dc.contributor.author	Stark, Oded
dc.date.accessioned	2024-09-25T13:47:06Z
dc.date.available	2024-09-25T13:47:06Z
dc.date.issued	01.2003
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/12331
dc.description.abstract	We calculate the equilibrium fraction of cooperators in a population in which payoffs accrue from playing a single-shot prisoner’s dilemma game. Individuals who are hardwired as cooperators or defectors are randomly matched into pairs, and cooperators are able to perfectly find out the type of a partner to a game by incurring a recognition cost. We show that the equilibrium fraction of cooperators relates negatively to the population’s level of wealth.	de
dc.format.extent	23
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	ZEF-Discussion Papers on Development Policy ; 59
dc.rights	In Copyright
dc.rights.uri	http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subject.ddc	300 Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie, Anthropologie
dc.subject.ddc	320 Politik
dc.subject.ddc	330 Wirtschaft
dc.title	Cooperation and wealth
dc.type	Arbeitspapier
dc.publisher.name	Center for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn
dc.publisher.location	Bonn
dc.rights.accessRights	openAccess
dc.relation.eissn	1436-9931
dc.relation.url	https://www.zef.de/fileadmin/user_upload/zef_dp59.pdf
ulbbn.pubtype	Zweitveröffentlichung
dc.version	publishedVersion

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