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Essays in Contract Theory

dc.contributor.advisorKrähmer, Daniel
dc.contributor.authorTerstiege, Stefan
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-18T06:07:03Z
dc.date.available2020-04-18T06:07:03Z
dc.date.issued25.09.2013
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/5439
dc.description.abstractThe dissertation consists of three chapters. The fist two chapters use principal-agent models to analyze optimal contract design under the assumption that the contract can induce the agent to acquire relevant private information. Specifically, Chapter 1 demonstrates the use of stochastic contracts, and Chapter 2 demonstrates the use of sequential screening mechanisms. Chapter 3, on the other hand, offers an explanation as to why incentive pay sometimes depends on subjective performance evaluations even though comprehensive objective appraisal systems seem feasible.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsIn Copyright
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectVertragstheorie
dc.subjectWirtschaftstheorie
dc.subjectPrinzipal-Agenten-Theorie
dc.subjectInformationsökonomik
dc.subjectAnreizsystem
dc.subjectVergütungssystem
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleEssays in Contract Theory
dc.typeDissertation oder Habilitation
dc.publisher.nameUniversitäts- und Landesbibliothek Bonn
dc.publisher.locationBonn
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccess
dc.identifier.urnhttps://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-33442
ulbbn.pubtypeErstveröffentlichung
ulbbnediss.affiliation.nameRheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
ulbbnediss.affiliation.locationBonn
ulbbnediss.thesis.levelDissertation
ulbbnediss.dissID3344
ulbbnediss.date.accepted2013-09-12
ulbbnediss.fakultaetRechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.contributor.coRefereeSzalay, Dezsö


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