Kulms, Marius: Essays in Applied Microeconomic Theory. - Bonn, 2020. - Dissertation, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn.
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urn: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-58618,
author = {{Marius Kulms}},
title = {Essays in Applied Microeconomic Theory},
school = {Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn},
year = 2020,
month = may,

note = {This thesis consists of three self-contained chapters in applied microeconomic theory. A common feature of all three projects is communication about private information in different strategic environments. In Chapter 1, I analyze the problem of allocating a resource to a privately informed agent in a stochastically changing world from a contract design perspective. Chapter 2 deals with the optimal allocation of control rights on the market for corporate control. Finally, Chapter 3 analyzes how a decision-maker can optimally assign costly tasks to agents based on non-verifiable, simultaneous communication. Commitment and the ways in which players can communicate are very different across the three chapters. In Chapter 1, the principal has commitment power in terms of her ability to specify transfers and allocations. The information provided by the agent is costly. On the other hand, in Chapter 3, no player has the power to commit to a predefined allocation or communication rule and information provision is costless and non-binding. Finally, Chapter 2 combines costly signaling via price offers by one player with responding cheap talk communication by another player in one sequential model without commitment.},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/8379}

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