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Essays in Economic Theory

dc.contributor.advisorLauermann, Stephan
dc.contributor.authorSpeit, Andre
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-08T14:13:47Z
dc.date.available2021-01-08T14:13:47Z
dc.date.issued08.01.2021
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/8875
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation is composed of four chapters with two overarching themes. In the first two chapters, we analyze common-value auctions in which bidders are either uninformed about the number of their competitors or their competitors’ additional private values for the good. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the effects of decoupling and vote trading on corporate governance.en
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsIn Copyright
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectcommon-value auctions
dc.subjectrandom player games
dc.subjectnumbers uncertainty
dc.subjectPoisson games
dc.subjectendogenous tie-breaking
dc.subjectnon-existence
dc.subjectmultidimensional signals
dc.subjectfirst-price auction
dc.subjectsecond-price auction
dc.subjectequilibrium existence
dc.subjectmultidimensional auctions
dc.subjectblockholder
dc.subjectdecoupling techniques
dc.subjectempty voting
dc.subjecthostile activism
dc.subjectshareholder activism
dc.subjectvote trading
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleEssays in Economic Theory
dc.typeDissertation oder Habilitation
dc.publisher.nameUniversitäts- und Landesbibliothek Bonn
dc.publisher.locationBonn
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccess
dc.identifier.urnhttps://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-60625
ulbbn.pubtypeErstveröffentlichung
ulbbnediss.affiliation.nameRheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
ulbbnediss.affiliation.locationBonn
ulbbnediss.thesis.levelDissertation
ulbbnediss.dissID6062
ulbbnediss.date.accepted06.09.2020
ulbbnediss.instituteRechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Institut für Mikroökonomik
ulbbnediss.fakultaetRechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.contributor.coRefereeKrähmer, Daniel


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