Structures, possibilities and limits of European crisis reaction forces for conflict prevention and resolution

Abstract

The following paper is based on the author’s “Conditions and options for an autonomous ‘Common European Policy on Security and Defence’ in and by the European Union in the post-Amsterdam perspective opened at Cologne in June 1999“, written after the decisions by the European Council in June 1999 and published by the Center for European Integration Studies in Bonn.1 In addition, it is supplemented by a new analysis of the problems raised by the later agreements in the context of the EU summit decisions at Helsinki and Nice on European security and defence policy, the European crisis reaction forces and the “Headline Goal” for their strength and composition. <br /> The question is asked, whether these decisions and guidelines as well as the Headline Goal for the forces meet the conditions posed by the European security situation, the requirements of the European military contribution to Nato as well as those for an independent European military crisis response. This paper discusses the main aspects of the planned security, defence and crisis response policies in the limited European context against the background of crisis and conflict realities on the European periphery and beyond. It deals in particular with six central issues and problems of a general nature: <br /> - the issue of political-military structures and intergovernmental decisionmaking in the EU, <br /> - the problem of force structuring between participants for military operations outside Nato, <br /> - the issue of standardisation, interoperability and readiness of crisis response forces, <br /> - the problem of “European options“ for independent use of EU forces in crisis and conflict, <br /> - the issue of “European Armed Forces“ and European military integration in the EU - the problem of harmony in the Atlantic alliance for an enlarged “European role”. <br /> These six subjects are interrelated and must be seen in the general context. They are being dealt with in this discussion paper in three parts: <br /> I. The necessary political-military structures and political decision-making in the EU on security and defence policy for crisis response, including the requirements for flexibility in exercise of international missions and mandates under changing conditions. <br /> II. The requirements for force structuring, including interoperability and standardisation, readiness of forces and sustainability of deployments in crisis contingencies as conditions for “European“ options of crisis response. <br /> III. The problems of harmony within the alliance, compatibility with US forces and of the creation of “European Armed Forces“ for a “European defence“ within the alliance as the hidden agenda behind the EC programme of 1999/2000.